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
Sir Richard Bithell

Lincoln Inn.

OW.U.K.

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R E P O R T S

O F

C A S E S

ARGUED AND DETERMINED

In the High Court of Chancery,

IN THE TIME OF

Lord Chancellor **HARDWICKE.**

BY

JOHN TRACY ATKYNS,

Of LINCOLN'S INN, Esq.

CURSITOR BARON OF THE EXCHEQUER.

The **THIRD EDITION**, revised and corrected ;
With **NOTES**, and **REFERENCES** to **FORMER** and **MODERN**
DETERMINATIONS, and to the **REGISTER'S BOOKS**,

By **FRANCIS WILLIAMS SANDERS,**

Of LINCOLN'S INN, Esq.

Author of **AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF USES AND TRUSTS.**

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

L O N D O N :

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1794.



T H E

P R E F A C E.

IN the books of Reports which have lately been published, the Cases by being placed in the order they were determined, without the least connection in respect to the matter, are if I may be allowed the expression, a Journal of Cases only, and, upon that account, more likely to confound the reader, by stepping so abruptly from one head of equity to another, than if he was to take in, at one view, the whole that relates to each separate branch: This was the reason which induced me to range the Cases under their particular heads of equity, in an alphabetical series; and though my methodizing them in this manner, has occasioned me infinite trouble, yet I shall think myself sufficiently recompensed, if it answers the end I design by it, which is, instead of a book of reports, to make it, in some measure, a digest, or system of equity.

I am aware only of one objection, that in the same case there may arise different points of equity, which do not correspond with the principal one; this I hope is obviated, by a reference under the proper heads, to the respective pages, where these several points may be found.

Robert J. Whitwell.

KENDAL.

Sir Richard Bethell
Lincoln Inn.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

TO THE

THIRD EDITION.

HAVING completed a Third Edition of Mr. *Atkyns's Reports*, the Editor thinks it necessary to acquaint the Profession with the general plan, which he has pursued upon this occasion. To examine the cases with the Register's Books, and to correct them, when found necessary, has been his principal object. Where a correction has been thought in any wise material to the decision of a Case, it has been distinguished by a separate note. In some very few instances a slight alteration in the original text has been adopted, with a view of making it correspond with the Register: but this has been done in such cases only, where the alteration has been deemed too inconsiderable to require a distinct note. In other respects the original text has been fully preserved. When it has been thought unnecessary to make extracts (the case being considered sufficiently correct without them), a mere reference to the folio, letter, and year of the Register's Book has been added. The Editor must take this opportunity however of observing, that he has frequently experienced his researches in the Register's Books anticipated by the previous

labours of Mr. *Atkyns*. That gentleman, before the publication of his Reports, had certainly compared many of them with the records; and this is evident, not only from his own declaration in the preface to his second volume, but more especially as many of his statements of cases and decrees thereupon are taken almost *verbatim* from the Register's Books.

To the present Edition a variety of references have been made to cases determined, as well before, as subsequent, to the original publication of these Reports. Some MSS. Cases have likewise been added; and to each volume is prefixed a Table of the Names of the Cases referred to by the notes contained in such volume. Upon points which have been considered material, notes have been subjoined, in which the principles of the several cases relative thereto, have been carefully extracted and explained.

The Editor has now to express his hopes, that the additions, which he has made to this Edition, may render this work still more useful and acceptable to the Profession.

Lincoln's-Inn New Square, No. 7.
October 10th 1794.

A

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Alphabetically disposed, in such a double Order, as that the Cases may be found by the Names either of the Plaintiffs or Defendants.

N. B. Where *versus* follows the first Name, it is that of the Plaintiff; where *and*, it is the Name of the Defendant.

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C A P. CXXVI.

Words. *ibid.*

C A P. CXXVII.

Writ.

- (A) Of the *de homine replegiando*, and its effects. 633

A LIST of the Masters of the Rolls during the time LORD HARDWICKE was Chancellor; and also of Attornies and Solicitors General, and King's Counsel, who were conversant in the Court of Chancery during that period.

Masters of the Rolls.

SIR JOSEPH JEKYLL appointed Master of the Rolls July 13, 1717, and continued in this office till the latter end of the year 1738.

The Honourable JOHN VERNEY succeeded him October 9, 1738.

WILLIAM FORTESCUE, Esq; appointed November 5, 1741.

Sir John Strange, January 11, 1749—50.

Sir Thomas Clarke, May 29, 1754.

Solicitors General.

Sir Dudley Ryder appointed November 30, 1733.

Sir John Strange, January 28, 1736.

The Honourable William Murray, November 27, 1742.

Sir Richard Lloyd, April 10, 1754.

The Honourable Charles York, November 3, 1756.

Attorneys General.

Sir Dudley Ryder appointed January 28, 1736.

The Honourable William Murray, April 9th 1754.

Sir Robert Henley, November 3, 1756.

King's Counsel.

Francis Chute, Esquire, appointed February 14, 1735.

John Browne, Esquire, February 14, 1735.

William Noel, Esquire, February 6, 1737—8.

Thomas Sewell, Esquire, April 4, 1754.

Memorandum, That on *Monday* the 21st of *February* 1736, Lord HARDWICKE was appointed Lord High Chancellor of *Great Britain*, and on the *Thursday* following, sat in *Lincoln's Inn Hall*, to hold the first General Seal after *Hilary* term.

C A P. I.

Abatement and Reversal.

Vide title *Bill*, under the *Division*, *Supplemental Bill*.

C A P. II.

Account.

(A) *What shall be a good Bar to a Demand of a general one.*

Dawson v. Dawson.

Lord Chancellor. **W**HERE a bill is brought for a general account, and the defendant sets forth a stated one, the plaintiff must amend his bill (1): For the stated account is, *prima facie*, a bar, till particular errors are assigned to the stated account (2).

To support a stated account it is not sufficient to say, that there has been a dividend, which implies an account stated, for a dividend may be made upon a supposition that the estate will amount to so much; but still subject to an account that may be taken afterwards.

Michaelmas
term, 1737.
Case 1.

Where a defendant sets forth a stated account, it is a bar to a general one till particular errors are assigned.

It is not sufficient, to maintain a stated account, to alledge there has been a dividend made between the parties.

(1) See *Sumner v. Thorpe*, *post* 2 vol. 1. *Willis v. Fernegan*, *ibid.* 251. *Burk v. Brown*, *ibid.* 399. *Hankey v. Simpson*, *post* 3 vol. 303.

(2) In a bill to open a settled account, particular or specific errors must be

shewn. *Taylor v. Haylin*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 310. *Johnson v. Curtis*, 3 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 266. As to the length of time permitted by the Courts to bar the opening of accounts, see *post* 2 vol. 113. and note.

C A P. III.

Ademption.

Vide title *Legacies*.

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C A P. IV.

Admission.

Vide title Bill, under the Division, Bills of Discovery, &c.

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Admission.

Vide title Trust and Trustees, under the Division, Resulting Trusts, and Trusts by Implication.

Meap v. Jorrell
q. Harb. 90.

C A P. VI.

Northam

Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

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(A) Agreements and Covenants which ought to be performed in specie.

Goodale

(B) Parol Agreements, or such as are within the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries.

Southam

(C) Voluntary Agreements, in what Cases to be performed.

1 Ann. 460

(D) Concerning the Manner of performing Agreements.

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(A) Agreements and Covenants which ought to be performed in specie.

See d. Daniel

Woodroffe
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3739.
1608

Henry Stapilton an Infant, by Ann his Mother — Plaintiff.

Philip Stapilton and others — Defendants.

See d. Case 2.

Philip
tenant of the
premises in
question for 99
years, if he so
long lived.

BY a deed dated on the 21st of August, 1661, Philip Stapilton was tenant of the premises in question for 99 years, if he so long live, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, remainder to his right heirs.

long lived, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, remainder to his right heirs, having two sons, Henry and Philip, they by lease and release of the 9th and 10th Sept. 1724, in order to settle and perpetuate the manors, &c. in the name and blood of the Stapiltons, and for making provision for his sons, and for preventing disputes that might possibly arise between them or any other person claiming an interest in the estates, and for barring all estates tail, release and confirm to two trustees all those manors, &c. to hold to them and their heirs, (as to part) to the use of Philip the father, his heirs and assigns for ever, and (as to another part) to the use of the father for life, to Henry the son for life, remainder to trustees for preserving, &c. remainder to his first and every other son in tail male, remainder to Philip the son for life, with like remainders to the daughters of Henry in tail, remainder to the daughters of Philip the son in tail, remainder to the right heirs of Philip the father. And as to the other part, to the use of Philip the father for life, remainder to Philip the son for life, &c.

Houghton v. Houghton.

Philip

16 *40.*

Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

3

Philip having two sons, *Henry* and *Philip*, they by deeds of lease and release the 9th and 10th of *Sept.* 1724, reciting, that for settling and perpetuating all manors, &c. in the name and blood of the *Stapiltons*, and for making provision for his two sons, &c. for preventing disputes and controversies that might possibly arise between the said two sons, or any other person claiming an interest in all or any of the estates therein after mentioned, and for barring all estates tail, and for answering all and every the purpose and purposes of the parties thereto, and for and in consideration of the sum of 5*s.* release and confirm to *Thompson* and *Fairfax* all those manors, &c. To have and to hold to them, their heirs and assigns, to the use (as to part) of *Philip* the father, his heirs and assigns for ever, and as to another part, to the use of *Philip* the father for life, remainder to *Henry* the son for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and every other son in tail male, remainder to *Philip* the son for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, remainder to the daughters of *Philip* the son in tail, remainder to the right heirs of *Philip* the father. And as to the remaining part, to the use of *Philip* the father for life, with like limitations in the first place to *Philip* the son and his issue, and then to *Henry* and his issue, remainder in fee to the father.

There were covenants to suffer a recovery within 12 months, and likewise for farther assurances.—*N. B.* To this deed, the heir of the surviving trustee in the deed in 1661 was not a party.

But by deeds of lease and release dated the 28th and 29th of *Sept.* 1724, to which the heir of the surviving trustee of the deed of 1661 was a party, the father and two sons make *Thompson* and *Fairfax* tenants to the præcipe, in order to suffer a recovery for the purposes mentioned in the former deeds of the 9th and 10th of *Sept.*

Before any recovery suffered *Henry* died, leaving issue the plaintiff.

former deed : Before any recovery suffered *Henry* died, leaving issue the plaintiff,

Afterwards, by lease and release the 12th and 13th of *Apr.* 1725, to which the heir of the surviving trustee of the deed of 1661 was a party, *Philip* the father and *Philip* the son covenant to suffer a recovery, in which *Thompson* and *Fairfax* were to be tenants to the præcipe, to the use, as to part, of *Philip* the father, his heirs and assigns; and as to the other part, to the use of *Philip* the father for life, remainder to *Philip* the son in fee.

to be tenants to the præcipe, to the use, as to part, of *Philip* the father and his heirs; and as to the other part, to the use of *Philip* the father for life, remainder to *Philip* the son in fee.

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Harvey & Co.
he Russell.

Collyer

Mulgan

2. Keen

Frank

Mainwain

2. Brown

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Carry & Co.

1. Vasey

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Thos. H.

1. Vasey &

30

Stewart

Stewart

6. Clark

9.

By lease and release 28th and 29th of *Sept.* 1724, the father and two sons make *Thompson* and *Fairfax* tenants to the præcipe, in order to suffer a recovery for the purposes mentioned in the

former deed.

Ma

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4. P.

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C A P. IV.

Admission.

Vide title Bill, under the Division, Bills of Discovery, &c.

[2]

C A P. V.

Admission.

Vide title Trust and Trustees, under the Division, Resulting Trusts, and Trusts by Implication.

C A P. VI.

Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

Meys v. Jorje
9. *Harb. 90.*

Northam

Pemberton
1 *De Gay & Son v. al.*
644

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319

(A) Agreements and Covenants which ought to be performed in specie.

(B) Parol Agreements, or such as are within the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries.

(C) Voluntary Agreements, in what Cases to be performed.

(D) Concerning the Manner of performing Agreements.

(A) Agreements and Covenants which ought to be performed in specie.

Doc d. Daniell
Woodroffe
10 *Woodroffe the 2d*
1739.
11. 608

Henry Stapilton an Infant, by *Ann* his Mother — Plaintiff.

Philip Stapilton and others — Defendants.

Doc d. Case 2.
Phillips

Philip
Stapilton
tenant of the
premises in
question for 99
years, if he so
long lived.
112.

BY a deed dated on the 21st of *August*, 1661, *Philip Stapilton* was tenant of the premises in question for 99 years, if he so long live, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, remainder to his right heirs.

long lived, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, remainder to his right heirs, having two sons, *Henry* and *Philip*, they by lease and release of the 9th and 10th *Sept. 1724*, in order to settle and perpetuate the manors, &c. in the name and blood of the *Stapiltons*, and for making provision for his sons, and for preventing disputes that might possibly arise between them or any other person claiming an interest in the estates, and for barring all estates tail, release and confirm to two trustees all those manors, &c. to hold to them and their heirs, (as to part) to the use of *Philip* the father, his heirs and assigns for ever, and (as to another part) to the use of the father for life, to *Henry* the son for life, remainder to trustees for preserving, &c. remainder to his first and every other son in tail male, remainder to *Philip* the son for life, with like remainders to the daughters of *Henry* in tail, remainder to the daughters of *Philip* the son in tail, remainder to the right heirs of *Philip* the father. And as to the other part, to the use of *Philip* the father for life, remainder to *Philip* the son for life, &c.

Houghton v. Houghton.

15 *Beav. 270.*

Philip

Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

5

If tenant in tail confesses a judgment, or mortgages the lands, and afterwards suffers a recovery to a collateral purpose, that recovery shall enure to make good all his precedent acts and incumbrances. 1 *Ch. Caf.* 119. (Lord Chancellor mentioned a case in lord King's time, where father tenant in tail, remainder to himself in fee, contracting debts on specialty, his son after his death levying a fine let in his father's creditors) (1). And if a recovery suffered for another purpose will substantiate any prior act of the tenant in tail, much more, in this case, this recovery will substantiate the first deed, where there are all the parties who covenanted by that deed.

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STAPILTON.
*Doe, d.
Daniel
Woodroff
2 H. of Lord
Pill*

As to the second point; this cannot be considered as a voluntary agreement, for *Henry's* legitimacy was then doubtful, and if he had proved legitimate, *Philip* would have come into this court to have the agreement executed, and *Henry* would have been bound by it. This court has decreed the performance of agreements like this founded upon mistakes; as in the cases of *Frank v. Frank*, 1 *Ch. Caf.* 84. and *Cann v. Cann*, 1 *Will.* 723.

For the defendant it was argued, as to the first point, that *Henry* being dead before the recovery was suffered, the intent of the parties, in the first deed, could not be pursued; for the plaintiff (supposing him legitimate) claims paramount his father, and the deed of 1661, therefore as the recovery could not substantiate the first deed; supposing him legitimate, it shall not substantiate it, now he is found illegitimate.

The plaintiff upon the death of his father had not any use vested in him, for the intent of the parties was, that the uses should arise out of the recovery; the ends recited could not be come at without a recovery, and where the intent of the parties is, that the uses should pass, by fine or recovery, nothing will pass by the deed, that is intended, only to declare the uses; the fine and recovery all make but one conveyance. *Cro. Jac.* 643. 2 *Ro. Rcp.* 68. 2 *Lev.* 306. 1 *Vent.* 279. 2 *Lev.* 54. *Cromwell's case.* 2 *Co.* 69. b. *Cro. Jac.* 320.

As to the second point; take it as an agreement, this court will not decree a performance of it, for supposing *Henry* had been found legitimate, this court would not have decreed a performance of it against the plaintiff; so that, in regard to the defendant, it must be considered as a voluntary agreement, into which he was drawn without any valuable consideration, and the covenant for further assurance will be void as the deed itself to which it is annexed is void; and so it was determined in the case of *Furzaker v. Robinson*, *Prec. in Chan.* 475.

(1) See the case of *Symonds v. Cud-* *Shelburne v. Bidduph*, 4 *Bio. Par. Ca.* more, 1 *Salk.* 338. 1 *Show.* 370. 4 594.
Mad. 1. *Cartburn* 257. and *Earl of*

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STAPILTON.

Where agree-
ments are entred
into to save the
honour of a fam-
ily, and are
reasonable ones,
a court of equity
will, if possible,
decree a per-
formance.

[*6]

Lord Chancellor. The plaintiff in this case is intituled to have a decree; there was a sufficient foundation for *Philip* the father, and *Henry* and *Philip* his two sons, to execute the lease and release of the 9th and 10th of *Sept.* 1724. It was to save the honour of the father and his family, and was a reasonable agreement, and therefore if it is possible for a court of equity to decree a performance of it, it ought to be done.

*It would be very hard for the defendant on his side, to endeavour to set aside this agreement, and the effect of this deed. Consider the state and situation of the family at the time of making the agreement: *Philip* had these children grown up, had a very considerable real estate, both his sons then owned as legitimate, their father and mother had lived together as husband and wife for many years, and at the time of this agreement were so; there was a foresight in the father and mother, that such a dispute between their two sons might hereafter arise, to their dishonour and likewise that of the family.

The foundation of this agreement, the illegitimacy of the eldest son *Henry*, has now been determined by trial, and it is found that *Henry* was a bastard, yet both the sons are of the same blood of the father equally, though not so in the notion of the law.

If the elder son should be found illegitimate (as he now is), the father knew he would be left without any provision if no such agreement was made; and on the other hand, if his legitimacy should be established, then *Philip* the younger son would have nothing: to prevent these disputes, and ill consequences, the father brings both his sons into an agreement to make a division of his real estate. It is very plain the parties did not know who was the heir of the surviving trustee, in the settlement of 1661, at the time of the lease and release the 9th and 10th of *Sept.* 1724; because they covenant a writ of entry should be sued out within 12 months, which is a very unusual time to limit to suffer a recovery, and done in order to give time to find out the heir of the surviving trustee, if they could find him out; but he was afterwards found and made a party to the deeds of the 28th and 29th of *Sept.* 1724.

The bill is brought by the eldest son and heir of *Henry*, to have the benefit and possession of the whole estate, and to have an account of the rents and profits, and to be quieted in the possession, and for general relief. Upon the first hearing an issue was directed to try whether *Henry* the father was legitimate, and found he was not, and now the plaintiff insists upon having the benefit of this agreement, whereby he is only intituled to a part: this being the bill of an infant, he may have a decree upon any matter arising upon the state of his case, though he has not particularly mentioned and insisted upon it, and

An infant may
have a decree up-
on any matter
arising on the
state of his case,
though not par-
ticularly prayed
by his bill.

and prayed it by his bill; but it might be otherwise in the case STAPILTON v. STAPILTON. of an adult person (1).

Upon this case there arise two general questions.

First, Whether the plaintiff has any estate in law by virtue of any of the conveyances, or by the recovery?

Secondly, If he has no estate at law, or only a defeasible one, whether he is intitled to have the benefit of this agreement, and to have it carried into execution here?

The first question consists of two branches.

First, Whether the lease and release of the 9th and 10th of [7]
Sept. 1724, will amount to a good declaration of the uses of the recovery, notwithstanding the subsequent deed of *April* 1725?

Secondly, If not, whether the recovery of *Trinity* term 1725, having barred the estate tail, will make good any estate which passed by the lease and release of the 9th and 10th of *September* 1724?

As to the first; whether *the lease and release* is a good declaration of the uses of the recovery, I am strongly inclined to think it will amount to a good declaration: this question depends on the construction of law, and the authority of cases upon the declaration of uses. It is true, where there is an agreement to suffer a recovery, and uses are declared, if the recovery is after suffered, though it varies in point of time from the recovery covenanted to be suffered, yet if there is no subsequent declaration of uses, the recovery will enure to the uses so declared (2).

Where there is an agreement to suffer a recovery, and uses are declared, tho' it is suffered at a different time from

the recovery covenanted to be suffered, yet if no subsequent declaration of uses, it will enure to the uses so declared.

And before the statute of frauds, if the deeds declaring the uses had not been pursued, a parol declaration of uses would have been let in; but if there is a deed declaring the uses, and the common recovery is suffered accordingly, that would, before the statute, exclude a parol declaration of new uses (3).

But even now there may be a subsequent declaration of uses, Where there is a deed to lead the uses of a recovery, it is not in the power of tenant in tail to but that declaration must be in writing, and such a new declaration of uses depends upon the agreement of the parties; therefore, though it is said at the bar, that the declaration of uses is

to declare new uses, but such subsequent declaration must be by all the parties concerned in interest.

The expression in the countess of *Rutland's* case. 5 Co. that whilst it is directory only, new uses may be declared, means that as the uses must arise out of the agreement of the parties, they by mutual consent may change the uses.

(1) See *post* 2 vol. 141. *Grimes v. French*.

(2) See *Havergil and Hare*, 2 Roll. Abr. 799.

(3) Countess of *Rutland's* case, 5 Co. 25. a. b. *Downman's* case, 9 Co. 10. b.

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in the power of the tenant in tail, and that he may declare new uses; I take that not to be law, for such subsequent declaration must be by all the parties, concerned in interest; and in the case of the countess of Rutland, 5 Co. 25. it is not laid down there, that the tenant in tail might declare new uses, but said, *unless it is directory only*, new uses may be declared, and the meaning of that is, that as the uses must arise out of the agreement of the parties, the parties may change the uses (1), but that must be done by the mutual consent of all the parties concerned in interest, and in that case it was a mutual agreement of all parties (2).

And in the case of *Jones v. Morley*, 2 Salk. 677. There was a variance as to the time of suffering the recovery, from the deed declaring the uses, and there held that a declaration of uses was equally good, whether by deed or not, if in writing.

But in the present case, the second agreement not being between all the parties concerned in interest, ought not to control the first declaration, and especially as this recovery was suffered within the time prescribed by the first deed, and between the same demandant and tenant.

[8]

The consideration for suffering the recovery was good both in law and equity, and there is no case to warrant me to say, the first agreement is not good and binding, or that the tenant in tail could by his own agreement afterwards change the uses.

But if it was doubtful whether the recovery suffered in 1725 should enure to the uses declared by the deed of 1724, I am of opinion the recovery will operate to make good those estates which passed by the deed of 1724.

But to this two objections have been made.

First, That the uses must be governed by, and operate according to the intention of the parties, therefore the subsequent recovery being suffered to other uses, those uses will take place.

Secondly, If any uses did pass by the deed in 1724, yet this recovery will not make those uses good, because the subsequent recovery was suffered to particular uses declared by the deed of 1725.

Where a court of law or equity find that the general and substantial intent of the parties was, that the estate should pass, they will construe deeds in support of that intention, different from the formal nature of those deeds themselves.

As to the first objection. I am of opinion that a use did pass by the deed of 1724, and according to the intention of the parties. It is certainly true, that, according to the statute of uses, the general doctrine is, that the uses shall be executed according to the intention of the parties, but both the courts of law and equity consider what was the general and final intent of the parties. In this case, their intention was, that the estate should

(1) See second resolution in *Jones v. Morley*, 2 Salk. 677. S. C. Comb. 429.

(2) See *Durnford v. Lane*, 1 Bro. Chan. Ca. 106.

pass,

pass, and wherever a court of law or equity find that the general and substantial intent of the parties, was that the estate should pass, they will construe deeds in support of that intention, different from the formal nature of those deeds themselves; as a feoffment, to serve the intention of the parties, shall operate as a covenant to stand seised (1). The intent here was, that the estate in point of law should pass by the deed of 1724, and that the uses declared by that deed should vest in the mean time till the recovery suffered.

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This is an answer to the objection arising from the statute of uses; but there is another question, what estate passed by the deed of 1724?

It was a defeasible estate to serve the uses of that deed, and so is the resolution in *Macbell v. Clark in Farr.* 18. Salk. 619. (2). That tenant in tail may convey a base fee and estate defeasible by the entry of the issue.

The next question is, Whether the recovery suffered in 1725 did enure to make good, and render indefeasible those base estates created by the deed of 1724?

And I am of opinion they are made good.

The objection to this is, That the recovery was suffered in pursuance of the deed in 1725, wherein there were new uses limited, but the only uses which make any difference in that deed are to *Philip* the son and his heirs, so there is nobody concerned in the question but *Philip* and his heirs.

It has been argued by defendant's counsel, that, if the first declaration of uses is in general to prevail, purchasers of estates, though they have a recovery for strengthening their title, with a declaration of the uses of the recovery to themselves and their heirs, cannot be safe, for the *vendor* may defeat such declaration by a precedent one to different uses; but in such cases I think a recovery would not enure to make good such former declaration of uses, but only the uses of the purchase.

[9]

Where there is a recovery for strengthening the title of a purchaser, with a declaration of the uses to him and his heirs, notwithstanding

a precedent one to different uses, it will not enure to make good such former declaration, but the uses of the purchase only.

It is admitted, that if tenant in tail confesses a judgment, or a statute, or enters into a bond, and afterwards suffers a recovery to bar the estate tail, it lets in the precedent judgment, &c. And it is as clear, if a tenant in tail makes a lease not warranted by the statute of the 32 *Hen.* 8. if he suffers a recovery, that lets in the lease and makes it good (3). There are so many cases of this kind, that it is not necessary for me to mention them.

If tenant in tail makes a lease not warranted by the statute, and suffers a recovery, it lets in the lease and makes it good; the same as to a judgment, statute or bond.

This case is different from those that turn only upon the point of the effect of a mere declaration of uses; for a mere declaration of uses subsists only upon the agreement of the parties,

(1) See *Croffing v. Scudamore*, 1 Vent. 137.

(2) *Com.* 119. S. C.

(3) See *Capel's case*, 1 Co. 62. a. *Chomley's case*, 2 Co. 52. b. *Beck on dem. Hawkins v. Wilb.* 1 Wilk. 277.

and

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and in such cases, where the agreement has been changed by mutual assent of all parties, there a recovery shall enure to make good such last agreement or declaration.

The issue of tenant in tail by virtue of the statute *de donis* may avoid a prior lease, charge or estate made by such tenant, but not he himself; but when by the recovery he has gained a fee, the issue being barred, all the reasoning for their avoiding estates, &c. made by him ceases.

But if the estate was vested, notwithstanding such declaration of uses, yet the recovery has always been held to make good such defeasible estate (1); for the prior lease, charge or estate made by tenant in tail is only defeasible by the issue, by virtue of the statute *de donis*, which was made to protect the issue against the alienation of the tenant in tail; therefore the issue would avoid such lease, &c. but not the tenant in tail himself; but when by the recovery he has gained to himself a fee, all the reasoning for avoiding an estate made by tenant in tail is gone, for the issue is barred by the recovery. The reason why the issue may avoid a charge made by tenant in tail, is upon account of the protection of the issue and his estate under the statute *de donis*, and of the privity of the estate tail; but when the privity is gone, the reason ceases, and to this purpose is the case of *Croker v. Kelsey*, Sir W. Jones 60.

Where a tenant in tail suffers a recovery, he by construction of law is in of the old use, and the estate is discharged of the statute *de donis*.

In the case of Lord *Derwentwater*, *Mod. Cases in Law and Equity*, 172. 2d part, the question was, Whether a papist, tenant in tail, suffering a recovery and declaring the uses to himself in fee, gained a new estate within the 11th and 12th of *Will. 3.* or was in of the old use? And it was held the 5th of *Geo. 1.* by four judges out of five, appointed delegates to determine appeals from the commissioners of forfeited estates, that he was in of the old use; and I take it for law, that a tenant in tail suffering a recovery is in of the old use, and that the estate is discharged of the statute *de donis* (2), and therefore I am of opinion that the recovery has made good this defeasible estate created by the deed of 1724.

[10]

It has been objected, that if the plaintiff has any title, his remedy is at law, but I think it is more properly here; he is an infant, and has come recently into this court, nor do I think this case depends intirely upon the point of law; for I am of opinion that the plaintiff is intitled to have an execution of the agreement, as a good and binding agreement in this court.

Where a valuable consideration for an agreement on all sides, there is a sufficient ground to come into a court of equity, but a mere volunteer not entitled to come here for an execution of an agreement.

The question is, Whether there was any valuable consideration on all sides for entering into this agreement? If so, then there is a sufficient ground for coming here; but a mere volunteer is not intitled to come here for an execution of an agree-

(1) See *Goodright v. Mead*, 3 Burr. 1703. *Cherry v. Hall*, Amb. 526. *Moody v. Moody*, Amb. 649.

(2) *Vide Martin ex dem. Tregonwell, v. Strachan*, 2 Stra. 1179. 1 Wilson 66. S. C. 4 Bro. Par. Ca. 486. 5 Term Rep.

107. S. C. *Roe dem. Crowe, v. Balldere*, 5 Term Rep. 104. And see (as in some measure connected with this point), the case of *Hill v. Droughton*, 3 Bro. Cha. Ca. 180.

ment; but here is a proper consideration as appears in the recital of the deed of 1724; neither is it the common case of a bastard, for the law of *England* does allow of some privileges to a bastard *eigne*, and their parents are not punishable by the canon law for antenuptial fornication.

In the case of *Cann v. Cann* (1), it was laid down by lord *Macclesfield*, that an agreement entered into upon a supposition of a right, or of a doubtful right, though it after comes out that the right was on the other side, shall be binding, and the right shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties, for the right must always be on one side or the other; and therefore the compromise of a doubtful right, is a sufficient foundation of an agreement (2).

STAPILTON v. STAPILTON.
An agreement upon a supposition of a right, though it may afterwards come out on the other side, is binding, and shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties.

Another objection has been made to this agreement, that the benefit on *Henry* and *Philip*'s side was not mutual and equal.

During both their lives, the benefit and obligation was mutual, and *Henry* would have been equally compellable to suffer a recovery with *Philip*.

But it is said, that an alteration as to their mutual benefit has happened by the death of *Henry*, and it is said, that if *Henry* had been legitimate the plaintiff would not have been compellable to suffer a recovery, because the issue in tail is not compellable to perform the covenants of his ancestor the tenant in tail (3).

But here the chance was at first equal, and it is hard to say, that the act of God should hinder the agreement from being carried into execution; the chance was equal, who died first, *Henry* or *Philip*: if *Henry* had been legitimate, and *Philip* had died in *Henry*'s life, leaving children, I am of opinion *Philip*'s son would have been intitled to have come against *Henry* for an execution of the agreement; and therefore the chance was at first equal on both sides, and we are not to consider how the event has happened.

Another objection has been taken, that the father made use of his coercive power over *Philip* to force him into this agreement, and it is said equity does not favour agreements made by compulsion.

But this court always considers the reasonableness of the agreement (4): besides here is no proof of compulsion by the father; if there was any compulsion, it seems rather to have been made use of against *Henry*, who was then esteemed his eldest son, and considering the consequence of setting aside this agreement, a

[11]

(1) 1 P. W. 727. S. C.

(2) See *Chesserfield v. Jansen*, post 354. *Pullen v. Ready*, post 2 vol. 592. *Corry v. Corry*, 1 Vesf. 19. *Cole v. Gibson*, ibid. 506. *Ballard v. Crowe*, 3 Bro. Cba. Rep. 117.

(3) See Mr. *Savill*'s case cited 1 Vesf. 224. 2 Vesf. 634. 662. *Hayward v. Stillingfleet*, post 422.

(4) See *Llandel v. Barker*, 1 P. W. 639. *Corry v. Corry*, 1 Vesf. 19. *Kinchant v. Kinchant*, 1 Bro. Cba. Ca. 309. court

STAPILTON V. STAPILTON. court of equity will be glad to lay hold of any just ground to carry it into execution, and to establish the peace of a family.

His lordship therefore declared, that the plaintiff is intitled to the lands and premisses limited in remainder, to the first son of *Henry Stapilton*, his father, by the deeds of the 9th and 10th of *September 1724*, according to the uses therein, and to the benefit of the covenants in those deeds, and decreed the defendant *Philip* to come to an account for the rents of the said premisses, and declared that *Philip* was intitled to hold the lands limited by the deeds of the 9th and 10th of *September 1724*, to *Philip* the elder for life, with a remainder to the defendant for life, against the plaintiff and his heirs, and that the defendant should make further assurance to the plaintiff of his part, and the plaintiff the like assurance to the defendant of his part, and no costs on either side (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. B. 1738. fol. 446.*

June the 2d.
1749

Collet v. Collet.

Case 3.

BY a settlement made previous to the marriage of the plaintiff's mother, several securities for money belonging to her were assigned to a trustee, in trust within one year after the date of the settlement, or as soon as conveniently might be after the marriage, to be laid out in the purchase of a freehold estate in lands or houses, to be settled to the use of the husband for life; to the wife for life, and to the first son of the marriage, and the heirs male of the body of such first son, with like remainders to the second and other sons of the said marriage, remainder to the heirs female of the marriage in tail.

By a settlement before marriage, securities for money belonging to the wife were assigned to a trustee, to be laid out in the purchase of freehold lands, and settled among other uses, to the first son in tail male, with like remainders to the second and other sons, remainder to the heirs female in tail. The father and mother die, leaving the plaintiff, two other sons and four daughters. The eldest son now prays by his bill, that the securities may be assigned to him, being tenant in tail, and not laid out in land.

The father and mother died, leaving the plaintiff, two other sons and four daughters. The money in the said securities were never invested in any freehold land of inheritance, nor were any of the securities changed, except only 1000*l.* which was invested in a purchase of a moiety of two houses by the consent of the plaintiff's mother, and settled to the uses mentioned in the settlement; and now the eldest son being tenant in tail prayed by his bill that the remainder of the said securities might be assigned to him, and not laid out, because, if lands were purchased and settled, he could, as tenant in tail, bar all the remainders over.

Lord

Lord Chancellor : The court is to execute the trust, and the way to carry it into execution is to order the money to be laid out in land, and since the case of *Colwell v. Shadwell* before Lord *Cowper*, it has been the constant rule of the court to give the remainder-man his chance (1). But, on the brothers and sisters of the plaintiff, who were in remainder, appearing in court and consenting, his Lordship ordered that the securities, not already invested in land, be assigned to the plaintiff, and that the representative of the trustee do transfer them to the plaintiff to his own use, and pay him also the interest of such securities.

COLLET v.
COLLET.

The constant rule of the court is to order the money to be laid out in land, to give the remainder-man his chance. But the brothers and sisters in this

case appearing in court and consenting, the representative of the trustee directed to transfer the securities to the plaintiff's own use, and pay him the interest likewise.

(1) *So Short v. Wood*, 1 P. W. 470. *Chaplin v. Horner*, *ibid.* 483. and the case of ——— v. *Marsh* in note, *ibid.* 485. *Cunningham v. Moody*, 1 Ves. 176. *Calthorpe v. Gough*, 4 Durn. & East 707. *Sed fecus* where the reversion in fee is in the tenant in tail himself, and see *Benson v. Benson*, 1 P. W. 131. *Edwards v. Countess of Warwick*, 2 P. W. 173. *Trafford v. Boehm*, *post.* 3 vol. 447. *Cunningham v. Moody*, 1 Ves. 176. *Ex parte King*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 160. *Contra Eyre's case*, 3 P. W. 13.

Hil. term 1737,
Jan. 31.

Gibson v. Patterfon and Others.

Case 's.

Though the vendor of an estate does not produce his deeds, or tender a conveyance within the time limited by the articles, the court does not regard this neglect, but will decree a sale notwithstanding.

A Bill brought for a specific performance of articles of agreement for sale of an estate, and decreed in favour of the plaintiff, the vendor, without any regard had to the plaintiff's negligence in not producing his title deeds (1), &c. and not tending a conveyance *within the time* (2) limited for that

purpose

(1) In 4 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 332. it is said by the Lord Chancellor "*that the vendor could not bring an action against the vendee without having tendered him a conveyance.*"

(2) In *Lloyd v. Collett*, cited *infra*, Lord Loughborough observed, it appeared from Lord Hardwicke's notes of the above case of *Gibson v. Patterfon*, that upon an application being made in that case *within the time* by the plaintiff to the defendant to perform his agreement, the latter said he would not; but would go into Scotland to avoid being compelled so to do. It also appears from the bill as stated in the Register's book, that the defendant had agreed to let part of the lands to the plaintiff. The defendant in his answer says, that he had made frequent applications within the time limited for the completion of his purchase to the plaintiff, in order to have the title deeds or copies thereof produced, but that the plaintiff had neglected so to do. It is also observable, that the lands were *in mortgage*; and therefore the title deeds were probably in the mortgagee's possession: but the mortgagee in his answer said, that he then was, and always had been ready to join in the sale. *Reg. Lib. A.* 1737. fol. 322. In *Pincke v. Curtis*, 4 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 329. a specific performance was decreed, though the abstract was not delivered till near three weeks after the expiration of the time appointed for the completion of the purchase. But in *Keen v. Stuckley*, *Gilb. Rep.* 155. a specific performance was refused after the time limited by the articles. The case of *Lloyd and Young v. Collett*, 25th November, 1793, was thus;

The plaintiff *Young* on the 2d May, 1792, caused printed particulars and conditions of sale of the ground rents in question to be delivered, and on that day the premises were put up to be sold by public auction: but they were not then sold. The defendant on the 10th of August 1792 agreed, by writing indorsed on one of the printed particulars to purchase the premises for 2609*l.* 17*s.* and the purchase was to be completed on or before the 25th of March, 1793; and *Collett* paid the plaintiff *Young*, the auctioneer, 100*l.* as a deposit. On the 6th of November, 1793, the plaintiffs filed their bill against the defendant for a specific performance of the agreement, and for an injunction to restrain *Collett* from proceeding at law in the action, which he had brought for the deposit. On the 16th of November, 1793, the defendant put in his answer, stating the following facts, which as far as they related to the conduct of the vendor and purchaser could not be controverted. He admitted the agreement; but said, that he had frequently between the 10th of August, 1792, and the 25th of March, 1793, applied to *Young*, to his clerk, and to Mr. *Woodcock*, the plaintiff's solicitor for an abstract of the title: but he could obtain no abstract relating thereto. That shortly after the 25th of March, 1793, he applied to *Young* for his deposit with interest from 10th of August, 1792. That *Young* having desired him to write a letter to him, which he might shew to *Woodcock*, the defendant 4th April, 1793, wrote a letter to *Young*, insinuating upon his deposit: that he repeatedly applied for his deposit

purpose by the articles; Lord Chancellor saying, most of the cases which were brought in this court relating to the execution of articles for sale of an estate were of the same kind, and liable to this objection, but thought there was nothing in the objection.

GIBSON V.
PATTERSON.

His Lordship decreed the articles to be performed and referred to a Master to see if a good title could be made by the plaintiff of the premises in question, and in case a good title could be made, then the defendant to pay plaintiff's costs to be taxed.

deposit between 4th of *April* and 10th of *June* 1793, when he brought his action: that no abstract was delivered or left with him till the 16th of *September*, 1793, at which time he was out of town. On the 25th of *October*, the defendant upon his return to town wrote a letter to *Woodcock*, insisting, that he would not complete his purchase. He stated by his answer the value of the ground rents, and the value of the government long annuities at the time he entered into the agreement, and on the 16th of *September*, 1793; and from thence he inferred, that the value of the ground rents was diminished 560/. and upwards. That if he had been furnished with the abstract in due time, he believed he could have re-fold the ground rents to advantage.

A motion was now made for an injunction to restrain the defendant from

proceeding at law, and that such injunction might extend to stay trial. In support of the motion it was urged, that lapse of time was not regarded in a court of equity. That it was an established principle, that such an agreement ought to be performed; and that the delay in this case was not equal to that which had occurred in many other cases, in which agreements had been decreed to be performed; although it was morally certain that much greater delay must happen, than had happened or could happen in the present case. The counsel cited the case of *Pincke v. Curtis*, *supra*, and the cases there cited.

The Lord Chancellor considered the conduct of the vendor as evidence of an abandonment of his contract, and refused the motion.

(B) *Parol Agreements, or such as are within the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries.*

Mill. term 1737,
Feb. 8.

Clerk v. Wright.

Case 5.

A. agrees for the purchase of an estate, but the agreement not reduced into writing; though *A.* in confidence thereof gave orders for conveyances to be drawn, and went several times to view the estate, this court will not carry such agreement into execution, and the statute of frauds may be pleaded to a bill brought for that purpose.

THE plaintiff had agreed for the purchase of an estate of the defendant, but the agreement was not reduced into writing; however, in confidence of the agreement, plaintiff had given orders for conveyances to be drawn and engrossed, and went several times to view the estate: some time after the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff, informing him, that at the *time he contracted for the sale of the estate, the value of the timber was not known to him, and that the plaintiff should not have the estate unless he would give him a larger price.

[*13] The bill was brought to carry the agreement into execution, to which the statute of frauds afterwards was pleaded.

A letter is not a sufficient evidence of the agreement, unless the terms of the agreement are mentioned therein, but where a man takes possession in pursuance of an agreement, the court will decree an execution of it.

Lord Chancellor allowed the plea, and observed the letter could not be sufficient evidence of the agreement, the terms of the agreement not being therein mentioned (1). As to the objection that this agreement was in part performed, he allowed, that when a man takes possession in pursuance of an agreement (2), or does any act of the like nature, the court will decree an execution of it, but the circumstances only of giving directions for conveyances and going to take a view of the estate, he thought not sufficient (3).

(1) So *Seagood v. Neale*, 1 *Str.* 426. *Cha. Prec.* 560. 2 *Eq. Ab.* 49. pl. 20. *Viscountess Montacute v. Maxwell*, 1 *P. W.* 618. 620. 1 *Str.* 236. *S. C. Prec. Cha.* 526. *S. C.* But if the letter contains the terms of an agreement, or acknowledges or refers to a former written one, then it takes it out of the statute of frauds. See *Moore v. Hart*, 1 *Vern.* 110. 201. 2 *Cha. Rep.*

284. *Wankford v. Pottiberry*, 2 *Vern.* 322. *Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea*, 1 *P. W.* 277. *Welford v. Beasley*, post. 3 vol. 503. 1 *Vesf.* 8. *Allan v. Bower*, 3 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 149. *Tawney v. Crowther*, *ibid.* 161. 318.

(2) *Lacon v. Mertins*, post. 3 vol. 4.

(3) See *Barodes v. Amberst*, *Prec. Cha.* 402. *Hawkins v. Holmes*, 1 *P. W.* 770. & *Stokes v. Moore*, in note, *ibid.* 771.

(C) *Voluntary Agreements, in what Cases to be performed.*

Edward Ruffel, William Hayward, and others, Plaintiffs. November the
Elizabeth Hammond, and others, — Defendants. 27th 1738.

THE bill was brought by the creditors of *William and German Hammond* deceased, for a discovery of their freehold, copyhold, and personal estates, and to be relieved against the several settlements of several parts of their freehold and leasehold estates, which were made after the marriage of *William Hammond* with the defendant *Elizabeth*, without consideration, and fraudulent with respect to the plaintiffs as creditors, and to have the freehold and leasehold sold, and to go in aid of the other estates of *William and German Hammond*, towards satisfaction of the plaintiff's demands.

The defendant *Elizabeth Hammond* insisted that about 1720 she intermarried with *William Hammond*, but such marriage being without the consent of *Thomas Stedman* her father, he then refused to give her any portion; but afterwards *William and German Hammond* his father, offering to make a settlement on her, *Thomas Stedman* agreed to pay 300*l.* as her fortune, and by indentures of lease and release of the 16th and 17th of April 1722, in consideration of 200*l.* a freehold estate was settled on *William* for life, with remainder to *Elizabeth* for life, with remainder to the first and other sons of the marriage, with remainders over, and by two other indentures dated respectively the said 17th of April 1722, in consideration of 100*l.* then paid or secured, several leasehold estates of *William Hammond* were settled in like manner. Since which *William Hammond* was dead intestate, leaving defendant and four children: that the 200*l.* was paid by her father on the execution of the settlements, and the remaining 100*l.* was paid soon afterwards.

Upon the 25th of February 1734, this cause was heard before the Master of the Rolls, who decreed an account of the personal estate of *William Hammond*, and that the same should be applied in payment of what the Master should certify to be due to the plaintiffs, and all other the bond creditors of *William Hammond* in a course of administration. The same direction with regard to the personal estate of *German Hammond*. And if the personal estates were not sufficient to pay the plaintiffs and other bond creditors, then his Honor declared, that the settlement so made of the leasehold estates was fraudulent with respect to the creditors, and ought to be set aside; and that such part of the leasehold as was the proper estate of *German Hammond*, at the time of making the said settlements, should be applied in satisfaction of such of his bond creditors, as his personal estate should fall short of satisfying. The same directions

A settlement after marriage in consideration of a portion paid by the wife's father good against creditors and not within the statute 13 Eliz.

Surgeon
Michael
2. Beane
340
Shap & Seal
1 Dec. 1738.
364.

RUSSEL V.
HAMMOND.

rections with regard to *William Hammond's* leasehold estates, as were his proper estate at the time of the settlements, and *Elizabeth Hammond* was to come to an account for the rents of the leasehold estates, and if there should not be sufficient to pay the bond creditors, then that a competent part of the leasehold estates of *German* and *William* be sold, and the money applied to pay the bond creditors, and ordered that the matter of the bill that sought to impeach the settlement of the freehold estate, and to make the same liable to the plaintiff's demands, should be dismissed without costs.

From which decree *Elizabeth Hammond* appealed, and insisted the decree ought to be rectified as to the account directed against her of the rents and profits of the leasehold estates; for that it appeared by the proofs in the cause, that the 200*l.* was paid down in specie at the execution of the articles by the defendant's father, and that the 100*l.* was afterwards paid by him to *William* and *German Hammond*, and therefore the settlement of the leasehold estates was not fraudulent, nor ought defendant to account for the rents and profits thereof, and for that by the said decree, the plaintiff's bill, so far as it sought relief against the settlement of the freehold, was dismissed without costs, notwithstanding the consideration was proved to have been paid, and for that she had possessed no part of the personal estate of *German* or *William*, and her answer was in no sort falsified; for which reasons the bill as against her ought in general to have been dismissed with costs, and therefore prayed the decree might be rectified in all such particulars.

Lord Chancellor: There is no evidence whatsoever in the cause to impeach the settlements of actual fraud.

But what the plaintiffs insist on, is, That *German Hammond* was largely indebted at the time of making the settlements on *William* the son, and that therefore these settlements were fraudulent upon the statute of the 13th of *Eliz. c. 5.* which regards creditors only.

[15]

I must consider this act of parliament as it would have been considered at law, for I will not lay down any other rule of construction, in equity, than is followed at law upon this statute.

What is prayed by the creditors, is the application of these leasehold terms as assets for the satisfaction of their debts. The present is a case of general creditors, and not of mortgagees, judgment creditors or purchasers; and therefore not so strong, as where a man has paid his money for the same estate; which would have brought it within the statute of the 27 *Eliz. cap. 4.* which makes every conveyance made for the intent to defraud purchasers, for a good consideration, to be utterly void (1).

(1) See *Walker v. Burrows*, post 94.

There

There are three settlements in question, the first of a freehold estate, the second of a leasehold estate called *Ford*, and the third of another leasehold estate.

RUSSELL V.
HAMMOND.

William Hammond the son married the daughter of one *Stedman* without the consent of the fathers of either side, no articles nor settlement were made before the marriage; Mr. *Stedman* afterwards proposed to *German Hammond* to give 300*l.* as a portion with his daughter, if he would make an adequate settlement; afterwards a kind of survey was taken of the premises proposed to be settled, and therefore the settlement was not merely colourable.

The consideration for settling the freehold is 200*l.* paid; there is no pretence to impeach this, it is a fair transaction as can be (1).

The second is a settlement of the leasehold estate called *Ford*, made in consideration of the marriage already had, and for the consideration of 100*l.* paid, or secured to be paid.

The question is, Whether this shall prevail against the creditors of *German* as a good settlement?

A great deal has been said upon this head, but it depends upon circumstances, and every case varies in that respect.

There are many opinions that every voluntary settlement is not fraudulent; what the judges mean is, that a settlement being voluntary is not for that reason fraudulent, but an evidence of fraud only. *Bovey's case* in 1 *Vent.* 193. 1 *M.d.* 119. *Ld. Tenham v. Mullins.* Though I have hardly known one case, where the person conveying was indebted at the time of the conveyance, that has not been deemed fraudulent; there are, to be sure, cases of voluntary settlements that are not fraudulent, and those are, where the person making, is not indebted at the time; in which case, subsequent debts will not shake such settlement (2).

A settlement being voluntary, is not for that reason fraudulent, but an evidence of fraud only, though hardly a case, where the person conveying was indebted at the time that it has not been deemed fraudulent.

A voluntary settlement is not fraudulent, where the person making it is not indebted at the time, nor will subsequent debts shake such settlement.

But I will not enter into a nice disquisition, Whether every voluntary settlement is, or is not, fraudulent? Because I think, as to the *Ford* estate, there was a valuable consideration, upon the face of the settlement, for the father was tenant for life, and the son intitled to the reversion in tail (3).

[16]

And where father and son join in a marriage settlement, it is a bargain for a good and valuable consideration, and has been so held in several cases; but then the question is, Whether it has been extended to creditors.

(1) *Styleman v. Ashdown*, post 2 vol. 479.

(2) So *Shaw v. Lady Stundisb*, 2 *Vern.* 327. *Walker v. Burrows*, post 93. *Mid-
dleton v. Marlow*, post 2 vol. 520. *Lord Townsend v. Wyndham*, 2 *Vesf.* 10, 11. *Stephens v. Olive*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 90. Secus if indebted at the time.

Brannant v. Thorpe, 1 *Vesf.* 27. Or if there appear any badges of fraud to de-

settlement with a view to his being indebted at a future time. *Styleman v. Ashdown*, post 2 vol. 481. *Fitzer v. Fitzer*, *ibid.* 511: *Taylor v. Jones*, *ibid.* 600.

(3) This does not appear in the *Register's Book*. Indeed Lord *Hardwicke's* reasons respecting the *Ford* estate seem rather to apply to freehold than to leasehold property.

RUSSEL v.
HAMMOND.

Where the father tenant for life, and son tenant in fee, join in a settlement, it is good against creditors, for the son might have disposed of the residuary interest

In the present case, the son could not have settled the residuary interest, without the father's help, because he was tenant in tail in reversion, and not in possession; but if the father had been tenant for life, and the son tenant in fee, and had joined in such settlement, it would have made a material difference, for then I should have thought this good against creditors; for there was no occasion for the son's joining, as the son might have disposed of the residuary interest without him.

without the father's joining.

I am of opinion besides, here is a fair pecuniary consideration, as there was a sum of money paid, amounting to 100*l.* by *Stedman* to *German Hammond*, and, when paid, expressed to be on account of the third 100*l.* agreed to be given by *Stedman* as a portion, and no other account appears to have passed between *Stedman* and *Hammond* but this.

As to the assignment of the other leasehold estate, it is of a very different nature; for it is expressed to be in consideration of the marriage, and divers other good considerations.

All the deeds bear date the same day, and it is insisted it is inartificial, to split them into three.

But I cannot think it is so here; for they have made the consideration of the freehold 200*l.* and of the *Ford* estate 100*l.* and I cannot take in the consideration of those deeds, which have a *quid pro quo*, and a consideration of their own, to support a third deed.

Where a father takes back an annuity to the value of the estate comprised in the settlement, it is tantamount to a continuance in

But in the last settlement is a plain badge of fraud, for *German Hammond* took back an annuity to himself and his wife for life of 27*l.* which probably was the full value of the estate comprized in this deed, and therefore gave the son nothing (1); which is almost tantamount to a continuance in possession, and has always been deemed a strong circumstance of fraud (2).

possession; and creditors will be relieved against such settlement.

Therefore I am of opinion the creditors ought to be relieved against this settlement.

The decree was made in *Feb.* 1734, very near four years ago, and if I should enter into the consideration of costs, I doubt I must give the plaintiffs costs before the Master, and though the bill, as to two of the matters, has no foundation for relief, yet as to a third part, *viz.* the last settlement, it is as clearly for the plaintiff; therefore, for all parties, it will be better to drop the costs.

His Lordship therefore ordered the said decree to be affirmed, save as to that part thereof which relates to the settlement of the leasehold estate called *Ford*; and as to the plaintiff's bill, so far as it seeks to impeach the settlement of that leasehold

(1) This last settlement does not appear in *Reg. Lib. B.* 1738. fol. 209. where the above case is stated; but very shortly.

(2) *Twyn's case*, 3 Co. 80. b. *Taylor v. Jones*, post 2 vol. 6co.

estate, and to make the same liable to the plaintiff's demands; his Lordship dismissed the same without costs.

RUSSEL V.
HAMMOND.

And as to the costs of the rest of this suit, that the said decree whereby the same are reserved till after the said report, be varied as follows: that to the time of hearing this cause at the Rolls, no costs be paid on either side, but that the consideration of costs of such other parts of this cause from such hearing, be reserved till the Master shall have made his report; the ten pounds deposit to be paid back to the defendant (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. B. 1738. fol. 209.*

(D) *Concerning the Manner of performing Agreements.*

Arthur O'Keeffe Esq; and Isabella his Wife, — Plaintiffs,
James Calthorpe Esq; — — — Defendant.

November 27th,
1739.

THE plaintiff *Isabella* being possessed of Old and New South Sea annuities and Bank stock, and a marriage being intended between the plaintiffs, previous thereto, the plaintiff *Isabella*, for securing the stocks and dividends for her separate use and disposal, notwithstanding her coverture, did by indenture, with the privity of the plaintiff *Arthur*, transfer the stocks to the defendant, his executors and administrators, in trust that he, his executors and administrators should pay, or suffer plaintiff *Isabella* to receive the dividends and profits thereof for her separate use during her life; provided, that if *Isabella* survived *Arthur*, then the defendant, his executors or administrators should transfer the same to the plaintiff *Isabella*, her executors or administrators, or to such person as she should, apart from her husband, by deed or will appoint, and for want of appointment, to the issue of her body, and for want of such issue, then as to one moiety of such of the stock as should be remaining at the death of *Isabella*, in trust for the plaintiff *Arthur*, his executors and administrators; and as to the other moiety in trust for the defendant, and one *John Burrell* the brother of the half blood of *Isabella*, their executors and administrators.

Case 7.
Where children under a marriage settlement have obtained a contingent advantage, the court will not vary it to the prejudice of the issue after marriage.

The marriage took effect, and plaintiff *Isabella* by *Arthur*'s consent applied to the defendant to sell part of the annuities, and to pay the money to her, and to assign the trust to some other trustees; declaring to him it was not her intention that the same should be unalterable, but only to preserve the same in her own disposal; but the defendant insisting he could not safely sell the same or assign his trust without the directions of the court of chancery, the plaintiffs therefore by their bill pray that the defendant might assign his trust, and that the stock and annuities might be transferred, subject to such uses as *Isabella* alone should from time to time direct, and for want thereof, subject to the trusts in the settlement.

Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

**O'KEEFE v.
CALTHORPE.**

Lord Chancellor : Where under a marriage settlement, the children have obtained a contingent advantage, I will not vary it to the prejudice of the issue after the marriage; if I should, I might sit here only to alter marriage agreements upon the particular whim of a feme covert. Therefore let the plaintiff *Isabella* make the appointment, and let the appointee take such interest as the law will give him; for I shall not lend him the assistance of this court to make such appointment more effectual than it will be at law.

The court will not change a mere trustee for a wife under a marriage settlement, without sending it first to the master, to see if the

A person might as well bring a bill in this court to change trustees to preserve contingent remainders; if the defendant had been merely a trustee for the lady, there might be some grounds for this application; though if I was inclinable to change the trustee, I would not do it unless it went first before the Master to examine, Whether the person proposed is a proper person.

per son proposed is a proper person.

A new trustee being by the consent of all parties added to the old one, his Lordship decreed the defendant to transfer the annuities in question in such manner, as to vest the same in himself and the new trustee, subject to the same trusts as are in the said deed of agreement; and decreed that the plaintiff's bill should be as to other matters dismissed (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. B. 1739. fol. 46.*

C A P. VII.

Administrators.

Vide title Executors.

[19]

C A P. VIII.

Allen.

Anon.

*December the
21st, 1737.*

Case 8.

The persons of foreigners, subject to the authority of this court, only while in England; but though their persons are out of the reach of this court, yet the property they have here in the funds, is under the controul of it.

A Foreigner in the king of *Prussia's* service applies to the court, to compel his wife, now residing at *Dantzick*, to deliver up his children; one of 15, and another of 13 years of age, to be educated by him as having a natural right to the care of them. A bill was brought some years ago by the wife, who had then been separated from her husband a considerable time, to have an allowance out of stocks here in *England*, belonging to her, for the maintenance of the children; which was decreed accordingly.

Lord

Lord Chancellor : I have no power over the persons of foreigners any longer than while they are in *England*, for then they owe a local obedience ; but as they are now in foreign countries, my authority will not reach them ; but though I cannot come at their persons, yet I might lay my hand upon any property they have here in stocks, &c. but as a sum of money has been already ordered out of a fund belonging to the petitioner's wife, for the maintenance of her children, I cannot make any alteration in that order, while the children continue under her custody, for it is given merely upon their account, and not the mother's.

Ramkiss, *seat of the Town of Calcutta, at Fort* } Plaintiffs,
William in Bengal and others, — — }
Hugh Barker an Infant, by his Guardian and } Defendants.
others, et e contra. } December the
4th, 1739.
S. C. post 51.

IT was moved on behalf of the plaintiff in the original cause, that he may be at liberty to sue out duplicates of the commission, to take his answer to the plaintiff's bill in the cross cause, and that the commissioners may by such commission be impowered to swear an interpreter, to interpret the oath to the defendant in the cross bill, and to translate his answer from the *Bengal* language into *English*, if it shall be found necessary, and that these words *corporal* and *upon the holy Evangelist* may be left out of the commission, and instead of the latter words, on a proper oath in the most solemn manner, or some other proper words, and agreeable to the circumstances of the defendants' case, may be inserted in their room.

Case 9.
The court directed a commission to the East Indies, to take the answer of the defendant to the cross bill, who was of the Gentoo religion ; and impowered two or three of the commissioners to administer such oath in the most solemn manner, as

is their discretions shall seem meet ; and if they administered any other oath than the Christian, to certify to the court what was done by them ; that, if there should be any doubt as to the validity, the opinion of the judges might be taken.

In support of the motion was cited 1 *Vern.* 263. *Anon.* Where a *Jew* was ordered to be sworn to his answer upon the Pentateuch. *Hale's 2d Part of the Pleas of the Crown.* 279.

Lord Chancellor : It depends upon what is admitted on the other side, that the defendant in the cross cause is of the *Gentoo* religion, and an idolator.

I have often wondered, as the dominions of *Great Britain* are so extensive, that there has never been any rule or method in cases of this sort.

The general rule is, that all persons who believe a God, are capable of an oath ; and what is universally understood by an oath is, *that the person who takes it, imprecates the vengeance of God upon him, if the oath he takes is false.*

Definition of an oath.

It was upon this principle that the judges were inclined to admit the *Jews* who believed a God, according to our notion of a God, to swear upon the Old Testament.

And *Lord Hale* very justly observes, it is a wise rule in the kingdom of *Spain* ; that a heathen and idolator should be sworn upon what he thinks is the most sacred part of his religion.

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If a *Jew* should be indicted for perjury, and it is laid in the indictment that he swore *tactis sacro-sanctis Dei evangelis*; yet according to *Hale* the word *evangelis* in the indictment may be answered by the Old Testament, which is the *evangelium* of the *Jews*.

In order to remove the difficulties in this case, I shall direct that these words, *upon the holy evangelists*, may be left out.

The next consideration is, What words must be inserted in their room? Now on the part of the plaintiff in the cross bill, it is desired, that I should appoint a solemn form for the oath: I think this very improper; because I may possibly direct a form that is contrary to the notions of religion entertained by the *Gentoo* people.

I will therefore make this rule, That two or three of the commissioners may administer such oath in the most solemn manner, as in their discretions shall seem meet; and if the person upon the usual oath being explained to him shall consent to take it, and the commissioners approve of administering it (for he may perhaps be a Christian convert) the difficulty is removed; or if they should think proper to administer another oath, that then they shall certify to the court, what was done by them, and that will be the proper time to controvert the validity of such an oath, and to take the opinion of the judges upon it, if the court should have any doubt.

The words corporal oath may stand, for lifting up an arm, or other bodily member. This will come up to the meaning of a corporal oath; but upon the *Attorney General's* suggesting that there might be no ceremonies in their form of taking oaths, these words were likewise left out, and the words *most solemnly* to be inserted in their room (1).

Sir Dudley Rider.

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There was likewise a cross motion for *Barker* the defendant in the original and plaintiff in the cross bill, that all further proceedings in the original cause may be stayed until the plaintiff in the original cause, and the defendant in the cross cause, shall have fully answered the cross bill.

The court will not stay proceedings in an original cause, 'till the answer comes in to the cross bill, but will only stay publication.

Lord Chancellor: The general rule in this court is not to stay proceedings in an original cause, till the answer comes in to the cross bill, but to stay publication only (2). Indeed it would have been of course to stay proceedings in the original cause, if the plaintiff in the cross cause had brought his bill, before he had put in an answer to the original bill (3).

In the cause of *Omychund v. Barker, & Franco v. Barker*, there were two more orders of the same day to the same purpose.

(1) The commissioners were empowered, "to swear an interpreter to interpret the oath, and interrogatories are to be exhibited to the plaintiff's witnesses at each of the said commissions, and also to interpret their depositions to the said interrogatories, and that these words (*corporal*) and (*upon the holy evangelist*) be left out of such

"commissions, and instead of the latter words, the word (*solemnly*) be inserted." *Reg. Lib. B. 1739. fol. 61.*

(2) Ordered, "that publication in the original cause be enlarged, until the plaintiffs in that cause shall have fully answered the said cross bill." *Reg. Lib. B. 1739. fol. 61.*

(3) *Post. 291. Creswick v. Creswick.*

Omychund v. Barker.

PURsuant to the order above of the 4th of *December* 1739, a commission went to the *East Indies*, and on the 12th of *February* 1742, the commissioners certified, that among other witnesses for the plaintiff, they had examined *Ramkissenfeat*, and *Ramchurnecooborage*, and several others, subjects of the *Great Mogul*, being persons who profess the *Gentoo* religion, and that they were solemnly sworn in the following manner, *viz.*

"The several persons being before us, with a bramin or priest of the *Gentoo* religion, the oath prescribed to be taken by the witnesses was interpreted to each witness respectively; after which they did severally with their hands touch the foot of the bramin or priest of the *Gentoo* religion, being also before us with another bramin or priest of the same religion, the oath prescribed to be taken by the witnesses was interpreted to him; after which *Neenderam Surmah*, being himself a priest, did touch the hand of the bramin, the same being the usual and most solemn form, in which oaths are most usually administered to witnesses who profess the *Gentoo* religion, and the same manner in which oaths are usually administered to such witnesses in the courts of justice, erected by letters patents of the late king at *Calcutta*."

The cause came on this term upon the merits, and the bill was brought to have a satisfaction for 67,955 rupees, amounting to about 7,600 *l.* *English* money, from the estate of the late *Mr. Barker*, the father of the defendant.

Mr. Barker in *July* 1729 being appointed, by the *East-India* Company, Chief of *Patna*, applied to the plaintiff, who was a considerable merchant, to be engaged in partnership with him in the sale of goods.

The plaintiff was to advance the money for buying the goods, and in consideration thereof *Mr. Barker* was to allow him interest upon a moiety at 12 *l.* *per cent.*

The goods were sold by *Mr. Barker* for a great profit, and the whole money received by him; but he refused to come to any account with the plaintiff, upon which he filed his bill in 1736, in the mayor's court at *Calcutta*, and when the cause was ready for hearing there, *Mr. Barker* left *Calcutta*, and took his passage in a *French East-India* ship for *Europe*, and upon his withdrawing himself, the court at *Calcutta* interpreted it to be a flight from justice, and decreed that he should pay plaintiff's demand in full, and all his costs.

Mr. Barker died in the voyage, but by his will made on the 21st of *December*, 1736 charges his real and personal estate with the payment of his debts.

The end of the bill was, that all books and papers relating to the dealings between *Mr. Barker* and the plaintiff might be produced, and that the sum before mentioned might be paid with subsequent interest, and the costs in the mayor's court at *Calcutta*.

Michaelmas term, 1744.
2 Eq. Caf. Abr. 397. pl. 15.
S. C. 1 Will. Rep. 84. Note 2.
Harg. Co. Lit. 6. b.

Case 10.

Lord Chancellor, assisted by Lord Chief Jus. Lee, Lord Chief Jus. Willes, and Lord Chief Baron Parker, of opinion that the deposition of witnesses of the *Gentoo* religion, sworn according to their ceremonies, ought upon the special circumstances of this case to be read as evidence in the cause.

Admitted
7 Feb. 475

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Mr. Attorney General for the plaintiff offered to read the deposition of *Ramkiffenfeat*, but the counsel for the defendant objecting to his being a proper witness, Lord Chancellor ordered the commission and the return to be read, and likewise the letters patent, bearing date the 12th of Sept the 13th of the late king.

Mr. Tracy Atkins argued in support of the objection,

1st, That as the law of *England* now stands, no oath can be administered to make a man a competent witness, but the oath upon the Evangelists.

2dly, That it would be contrary even to the rules of equity to admit any other.

The substance of this argument follows :

I will endeavour to shew, from the oldest authorities extant down to the present time, that the rule has been uniform and invariable as to the particular oath required.

Fleta, lib. 5. c. 22. p. 344. "*Juramentum est affirmatio vel negatio de aliquo attestatione sacre rei firmata*," so that as long ago as *Ed.* the First's time, which is at least 400 years, the general definition of an oath was the person's affirming or denying a thing, with a solemn appeal to the sacred writings for the truth of what he said.

Bracton, fol. 116. the oath that was administered by the justices itinerant, to the jury, summoned to inquire for the crown, agrees exactly with this definition : "*Hoc audite justitiarum, quod ego veritatem dicam de hoc quod a me interrogabitis ex parte domini regis, et fideliter faciam id quod mihi precipietis ex parte domini regis et pro aliquo non omittam, quin ita faciam pro posse meo ; sic me Deus adjuvet, et hæc sancta Dei evangelia.*"

Briton de Challenge de Jurors, c. 53. p. 135. describes the oath thus ; "*Que jeo verite diray, si Dieu moi aide & les seintz, & p'sout les evangelies beyes tous boors sicome notre foy & notre sauve-
tion.*"

In *Fortescue de Laud. Leg. Anglie*, c. 26. p. 38. octavo edition, intituled, How jurors ought to be informed by evidence and witnesses, he says, "*Et tunc adducere potest utraque pars coram eisdem justitiariis et juratis, omnes et singulos testes, quos pro parte sua producere velit, qui super sancta Dei evangelia, per justitiarum arios onerati, testificabuntur omnia quæ cognoscunt probantia veritatem facti, de quo partes contendunt.*"

So that your Lordship sees it is *omnes et singulos testes*, without any exception of persons whatsoever, *qui super sancta Dei evangelia onerati testificabuntur*.

Lord Coke in his 2d *Institute* 479, upon the statute of *Westminster* the 2d, says, "*A new oath cannot be imposed upon any subject without authority of parliament, but the giving of every oath must be warranted by act of parliament, or by the common law time out of mind.*" And in the 719th page of the same *Institute* in the margin, "*None can examine witnesses in a new manner, or give an oath in a new case, without an act of parliament.*"

And in his 3d *Institute*, c. 14. p. 165. intituled, Of Perjury, Subornation of Perjury, and incidentally of oaths, saith, that the word oath is derived from the Saxon word *Eoth*, and that it is expressed by three several names, 1st, *sacramentum a sacra & mente* because

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because it ought to be performed with a sacred and religious mind, *quia jurare est Deum in testem vocare, et est actus divini cultus*. 2dly, by *juramentum a jure*, which signifieth law and right, because both are required and meant, or because it must be done with a just and righteous mind. 3dly, *jus jurandum a jure et jurando*.

And in the very next section he saith, *An oath is an affirmation or denial, by any Christian, of any thing lawful and honest, before one or more that have authority to give the same for advancement of truth and right, calling Almighty God to witness, that his testimony is true. So as an oath is so sacred, and so deeply concerneth the consciences of Christian men, as the same cannot be ministered to any, unless the same be allowed by the common law, or by some act of parliament; neither can any oath allowed by the common law, or by act of parliament, be altered but by act of parliament; it is called a corporal oath, because he toucheth with his hand some part of the holy scriptures.*

In the 4th Institute, c. 64. p. 279. he says, *An oath ought to be accompanied with the fear of God and service of God, for advancement of truth, Dominus Deum tuum timebis, et illi soli ser-* Deut. chap. vi.
v. 13.
vies, et per nomen illius jurabis, taken out of the Mosaic law; and the words immediately following are, *Bracton* saith, *That an alien born cannot be a witness, which is to be understood of an alien infidel.*

I shall beg leave to mention a statute made in the 21st of Hen. 8. c. 16. touching artificers strangers, in the 4th section of which 'tis enacted, *that the same strangers should, upon lawful warning to them given, by the wardens of divers misteries, within the cities and towns, present themselves to the common hall of the said crafts, and there to receive and take their oath, and be sworn before the wardens upon the holy evangelists, to be true to the king, &c.*

So that notwithstanding aliens and strangers are the subjects of this act of parliament, yet without reservation of any form of ceremony in their own religion, relating to oaths, they are directed to take the oath upon the holy Evangelists: so that the legislature governed themselves by the law as it then stood, and saw no reason to alter it for the private convenience of particular persons.

I appeal to your Lordship's judgment, whether the people who are offered as witnesses, are capable of taking an oath, as the law of England conceives of it. The most authentic histories of this part of the world represent the natives as extremely ignorant, and particularly with regard to their notions of religion, absurd and ridiculous, and in their ideas of the Deity so gross, that it would be shocking even to mention. How then can they be said to perform such a ceremony with a sacred and religious mind, which the word *sacramentum* implies?

It appears by the certificates of the commissioners, and even by their own witnesses, who may be supposed to represent it in the most favourable light, that the ceremony is for the person who swears to fall down, and touch the foot of the priest with his right hand.

Can this be said *Deum in testem vocare*? Or is it *actus divini cultus*? so far from being accompanied with the fear [or worship of God, as an oath by our law ought to be] it is meanly prostrating themselves at the foot of a priest, and calling upon the

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the creature instead of the Creator, and cannot possibly raise any other emotions, but those of contempt and ridicule.

It is said too, that if such person shall swear any thing contrary to truth, *that he will be esteemed a vagabond.*

I do not know how far the people of *India* may be deterred by such an apprehension; but I am confident great numbers of persons here, would be so far from thinking this a punishment, that, if the only effect of forswearing themselves was being a vagabond, they would be more inclinable to break an oath, than to keep it.

I do not find that the priest tells us what are the general notions of the people, as to the belief of a God, but only *that he himself believes in a Supreme Being*; of whom his superior abilities and education may have given him some confused knowledge; and yet the bulk of the people who have not had these advantages may think quite otherwise.

I shall now beg leave to mention the later opinions.

Mr. Serjeant *Hawkins* in his Pleas of the Crown, the last folio edition, 434, under the head of Evidence; says, it seems agreed to be a good exception, *that a witness is an infidel.* "That is, says he, as I take it, that he believes neither the Old or New Testament to be the word of God, *on one of which* the laws require the oath should be administered."

I expect we shall be told by the Gentlemen of the other side, of Sir *Matthew Hale's* opinion in his Pleas of the Crown, 2 vol. 279; and therefore I will read the passage, and submit to your Lordship; it is rather in favour of what we contend for, than against us.

"It is laid down by *Ld. Coke*, (*says Ld. Hale*), *that an infidel is not to be admitted as a witness; the consequence whereof would be that a Jew who only owns the Old Testament, could not be a witness.*

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"But I take it that although the regular oath, as it is allowed by the laws of England, is *tactis sacro-sanctis Dei evangelis*; which supposeth a man to be a Christian: yet in cases of necessity, as in foreign contracts between merchant and merchant, which are many times transacted by Jewish brokers; the testimony of a Jew *tactio libro legis Mosaicæ*, is not to be rejected, and is used as I have been informed among all nations.

"Yea the oaths of idolatrous infidels have been admitted in the municipal laws of many kingdoms; especially, *si juraverit per Deum verum Creatorem*; and special laws are instituted in Spain, touching the form of the oaths of infidels.

"And it were a very hard case, if a murder committed here in England, in presence only of a Turk or a Jew, that owns not the Christian religion, should be dispensable; because such an oath should not be taken which the witness holds binding, and cannot swear otherwise, and possibly might think himself under no obligation, if sworn according to the usual stile of the courts of England. "But then it is agreed, that the credit of such a testimony must be left to a jury."

With deference to so great a man, I do not see the consequence drawn from Lord *Coke's* position, *that an infidel cannot be a witness,*

a witness, therefore a Jew cannot be one; for they believe a God, just in the same manner the Christians do; and the Old Testament is as much the *evangelium* to them, as the New is to us; and therefore widely different from the infidel, who has no notion of the true God.

And this was the very reason for admitting the evidence of Jews in the case of *Robley v. Langston*, 2 Roll. 314. "Nota; Wild, serjeant, on evidence to a jury at Guildhall, yesterday, (where because the witnesses produced were Jews, Keeling Chief Justice swore them upon the Old Testament) desired the opinion of the court, if this were any oath by the statute of 5 Eliz. that might be assigned for perjury; and *per curiam*, it is so, and within the general words of *sacro-sancta evangelia*; so of the common prayer book that hath the epistles and gospels; *contra* by Windham of a psalm-book only."

It was upon this I apprehend the court formed their opinion, and not upon a consideration of their being brokers in foreign contracts between merchant and merchant.

I submit it upon the whole passage: Sir Matthew Hale does not positively say, that, by the laws of England, a person who owns not the Christian religion, may be examined according to the form of his own religion, but is only commending the municipal laws of other kingdoms, and throws it out rather as a wish, that the rule were to prevail here, in cases of necessity, than as his opinion; therefore the utmost which can be collected from what he says is, that he thought it a defect in our law.

But though his genius and knowledge were equal perhaps to any one man of the profession; yet I hope I may be allowed to put in the other scale, the wisdom and experience of the great and eminent persons, who for so many ages before his time have adhered to the form of an oath as the constant and inviolable rule.

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Besides the present cannot be called a case of necessity, because there are persons in India, privy to all these transactions, who are under no objection, as to their capacity of taking an oath; but the plaintiff knew very well, that natives of the same country, engaged in the same interest, and the same business with themselves, were much more inclinable to swear for them.

I will mention but one thing more upon the first head, to shew your Lordship, that nothing but the legislature can dispense with the common and usual form of oaths; and that is the case of the Quakers, who had entertained a notion that all manner of oaths were unlawful; and there is scarce any error perhaps that hath a more plausible colour from scripture than this, which made the case of those who were seduced by it, the more pityable; and yet, upon their refusing to take the oath in a court of justice, to use the words of the preamble to the statute of the 7 & 8 Will. c. 34. s. 1. for the relief of Quakers, They were frequently imprisoned, and their estates sequestered, by process of contempt issuing out of such courts, to the ruin of themselves and families.

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If the law of *England*, with regard to the form of an oath was so strict, that the judges did not think themselves justified in admitting the most solemn affirmations and declarations the Quakers instead of the oath, though in favour of persons who agreed in the substantial and fundamental part of Christian religion with the church of *England*, and who are in all respects very useful and serviceable members of the commonwealth; I hope your Lordship will see no reason to do in this case, where the persons are proved by the plaintiff himself to be infidels and idolators; and whatever ceremony they may have in swearing, it cannot be called a solemn and religious one.

In the second place, I shall endeavour to shew, that it would be contrary to the rules of equity to admit this evidence.

And here I must submit to the court, that in the admitting this evidence, very great hardships and inconveniences necessarily arise to the defendant, and that he is brought to this court upon very unequal terms.

Should your Lordship admit the depositions of these witnesses to be read, the plaintiff would have one manifest advantage over the defendant; that notwithstanding his witnesses should swear the grossest falsehoods, and be guilty of the most notorious perjury, yet the defendants would be without remedy; for there is no indictment that could be framed against them, which could be supported; for I apprehend it to be a material ingredient in indictments of this kind, that *per se sacro evangelio voluntarie corruptè commisit perjurium*; and that omitting these words would be a fatal error, and quash the indictment.

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If this expression be necessary in the indictment, these witnesses, let them be ever so guilty, must go unpunished; for I am afraid it will not be sufficient, to maintain the indictment to say, that *touching the foot of the priest with his right hand voluntarie et corruptè commisit perjurium*.

Upon the commission, your Lordship was pleased to say that you wondered as the dominions of *Great Britain* are so large, and their commerce so extensive, and as things of this kind must have happened before, there should be no method yet established on such occasions.

Whatever prudential reasons there may be to introduce new rules in future cases, we hope that as courts of equity govern themselves by the same rule, with regard to admitting evidence, as the courts of law; that your Lordship will be of opinion, that you cannot, without overturning the law itself, allow these depositions to be read; and that nothing but an act of parliament can alter the present form of swearing.

Sir Dudley Rider.

Mr. Attorney General for the plaintiff, by way of answering the objection, stated a few particular facts.

1st, That the matters now in question, are matters of commerce arising in a foreign country, in a foreign jurisdiction between a Christian and an infidel.

2^{dly}, That in this country the *Gentoo* religion prevails and that *Calcutta* was only a factory within this country.

3^{dly},

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3dly, That the witnesses do believe in a Deity.

4thly, Not only that they believe in a Deity, but that in swearing they use an expression equivalent to ours. *So help me God.*

5thly, That solemn oaths to attest facts, is usual amongst them.

6thly, That they understand an oath in the same manner we do.

7thly, That by the letters patent establishing a court at Calcutta, there is all the reason in the world to admit their evidence.

8thly, In point of fact, *Gentoos* are admitted as witnesses in the court of Calcutta.

9thly, That the manner made use of in the present cause, is the most solemn and customary.

10thly, That these witnesses are all of the *Gentoos* religion.

He then submitted it, Whether a person of such a religion, and an infidel, may be admitted as a witness. He then made two propositions.

1st, That the witness is capable of taking an oath as an infidel, according to the opinion we have of oaths.

2dly, That there is nothing in our law that prevents him from being a witness.

An Infidel properly defined is a Deist, that does not believe the Christian religion.

All that in point of nature and reason is necessary to qualify a person for swearing, is the belief of a God, and an imprecation of the Divine Being upon him if he swears falsely.

This is the sense of all the civilized nations in the world, the foundation of all treaties; *nullum enim vinculum ad adstringendum fidem iurijurando majores arctius esse voluerint.* Lib. tert. M. T. C. de Offic. sec. 31.

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The best writers on Christian morality have gone so far as to admit the oath to false gods. It is the sense of *Grotius*; *sed et quis per falsos deos juraverit, obligabitur; quia quanquam sub falsis notis, generali tamen complexione, numen intuetur: Ideoque Deus verus, si pejeratum sit, in suam injuriam id factum interpretatur.* Lib. 2. c. 13. s. 12.

Nothing is proper to the oath here, but *so help me God*; when it comes to the corporal part, I own it is *supra sanctum evangelium*, which is a mere ceremony and not essential.

I can go to a higher authority, the authority of the *Jewish* religion, and of the old patriarchs; and it will appear they constantly considered the heathens capable of an oath. The instance of *Isaac* and *Abimelech* swearing to one another, *Genesis* 26. v. 31. and in the 31st of *Genesis*, v. 53. *Jacob* swears by the fear of his father *Isaac*, and accepted of *Laban's* oath without hesitation, though he swore by false gods.

Consider now the circumstances and situation of the *Gentoos* with respect to the oath they have taken.

1st, As to the form of the oath.

And then as to the corporal parts.

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As to the form of the words : it is the same we make use of here ; for the interrogatory, *Do you believe in the Supreme Being, &c.* is read over and interpreted to him, and he takes it in the same sense other people do ; which will put an end to the whole objection.

As to the corporal part : where is the objection to it, a least it shews great humility, and is in all respects applicable to the kissing of the book, and equally significant, for both are no more than signs, and not material to the oath.

The Gentlemen, by their manner of arguing would make one believe, there is only one form of an oath.

Grotius in the same chapter and book as before mentioned and 10th sect. says, *Forma jurisjurandi verbis differt, re convinit; hunc enim sensum habere debet, ut Deus invocetur, puta h modo, Deus testis sit, aut Deus sit vindex, quæ duo in idem recidunt.* *Vid. Voet, upon the Dig. lib. 12. tit. 2. sec. 2.*

A greater authority, our Saviour, says, in St. *Matthew's* gospel, *Who swears by the temple, swears by the God who inhabits it.*

So that all terminates in a solemn appeal to the Deity, for the truth of what he says.

There are several passages in *Livy*, *Polybius*, and *Grotius* which shew that oaths are totally arbitrary.

The consequence must be, that an infidel is capable of an oath.

2dly, Whether there is any thing in the law of *England* that impugns it ?

It is laid down by Lord *Coke*, that an infidel cannot be a witness, and said that his position is proved by all the cases cited out of the old authorities.

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It may indeed be laid down as a general rule, but therefore does it follow, that there shall be no exception ? Does not our law say, *exceptio probat regulam* ?

It is extremely proper there should be some general rules in relation to evidence ; but if exceptions were not allowed them, it would be better to demolish all the general rules.

There is no general rule without exception that we know but this, that the best evidence shall be admitted, which the nature of the case will afford.

I will shew that rules as general as this are broke in upon for the sake of allowing evidence.

There is no rule that seems more binding than that a man shall not be admitted an evidence in his own case, and yet the statute of Hue and Cry is an exception.

A man's books are allowed to be evidence, or, which is substance the same, his servant's books, because the nature of the case requires it, as in the case of a brewer's servants (1).

Another general rule, that a wife cannot be a witness against her husband, has been broke in upon in cases of treason.

(1) See *Glynn v. Bank of England*, 2 *Vesf.* 43. *Leitch v. Warden*, *ibid.* 54. *Peck v. Monk*, *ibid.* 193.

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Another exception to the general rule, that a man may be examined without oath: the last words of a dying man are given in evidence in the case of murder; a child may be examined without oath; *Lord Chief Justice Hale's Pleas of the Crown*, 1 vol. p. 634; but, if capable of considering the obligation of an oath, may be sworn.

This sufficiently shews how much our law allows exceptions against oaths.

Lord Chief Justice *Lee* interrupted the Attorney General, and said, it was determined at the *Old Bailey* upon mature consideration, that a child should not be admitted as an evidence without oath.

Lord Chief Baron *Parker* likewise said, it was so ruled at *King's Bench* before Lord *Raymond*, where upon an indictment for a rape he refused the evidence of a child without oath.

Mr. Attorney General then proceeded in his argument, and insisted that admitting a *Jew* to be sworn is an exception from the general rule: what is the definition of an infidel? Why, one who does not believe in the Christian religion. Then a *Jew* is an infidel, for the sense of *evangelium* has been perverted, and ought to be confined to the New Testament only; for it is used by our Saviour as good tidings, in opposition to the bondage the *Jews* then underwent, and was delivered to them first.

We are taught there are but four Evangelists, and the prophets are not so, and yet the Gentlemen of the other side would introduce many more. As to the passages in *Deuteronomy*, it happens unfortunately that the books of *Moses* are no part of our religion, nor does the law esteem them such.

Are all the *Jewish* dispensations confirmed by our law? No. This was as much a municipal law to the *Jews*, as the municipal laws here to *England*, or the laws of *Solon* to *Athens*, or of *Lycurgus* to *Lacedaemon*, and therefore quite foreign, and nothing to do with the present question.

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He mentioned then what had happened before a committee of privy council the 9th of *December* 1738, on a complaint against General *Sabine*. A *Turk* was brought there and offered as a witness, and to be sworn upon the alcoran, and was sworn accordingly.

So far this agrees exactly with the present case; but it may be said, this was not in a court of justice, but rather a matter of state. In that respect there is some difference, but it will not take away the usefulness of the precedent, to shew that a court or persons may alter the form of an oath.

This *Indian* witness has sworn by the very same words that we do, therefore your Lordship will not presume that he means any other God than we do.

It is of the greatest moment, that we should have commerce and correspondence with all mankind; trade requires it, policy requires it, and in dealings of this kind it is of infinite consequence, there should not be a failure of justice. It has been objected that we might have other evidence.

But

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But though we may have slighter evidence, why should we be tied down to this, and debarred of the present, which is much stronger? *Gentoo*s are the common brokers in this country, and the necessity of the case will work strongly for us.

There was a time when even *Jews* were not sworn, and no longer since than the 5th of *November* 1732, there was a commission out of the Exchequer in the cause of *Lopes* and *Nunes*, in which there was a distinction between the oath for *Jews* and Christians; for if *Jews*, they were directed to be sworn *supra Vetus Testamentum* only.

An *objection* was likewise made, that this *Indian* would not be liable to be punished for perjury; to which it is answered, That if the court should be of opinion this is an oath which may be taken, of consequence he is liable to be punished, if forsworn.

Another *objection* is, that Quakers could not be admitted as witnesses till an express act of parliament to empower them. The *plain answer* is, that they would not take the oath at all, therefore their solemn affirmation was not sufficient, because it had not the essence of an oath.

Upon the whole, as it is a case of necessity, and we have fully in proof from the return of the commissioners, that they believe in the Supreme Being, these witnesses ought to be admitted.

November the 10th 1744.

• Mr. Murray.

• Mr. Solicitor General, of the same side with the Attorney General.

It is expressly certified by the commissioners, that the oath prescribed to be taken by our law was read over to the plaintiff's witnesses.

The *objection* is, That they have not made the use of the corporal ceremony, the kissing of the Evangelists.

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But they have made use of another symbol, the taking the priest's foot with their right hand, because this is the form and ceremony most binding in their own religion, and notwithstanding this, an objection has been taken to the reading of their evidence.

First, Because they have not touched the Evangelists and are Pagans, and therefore cannot be admitted.

Secondly, Supposing they may be admitted as witnesses, yet under the sanction of the oath thus certified, they ought not to be admitted as witnesses.

In most of the reasons the Gentlemen have begged the question, and have insisted that the admitting their evidence is contrary to law, and they cannot be indicted for perjury.

But if the admission is not contrary to law, then of course the witnesses are liable to be indicted for perjury as well as a *Jew*, who may be indicted *tacito libro legis Mosaicæ*.

The statute of the 5th of *Elizabeth* leaves this matter intirely open.

Tis

id there is no one precedent or case of a heathen sworn to the ceremonies of his own religion, ever existed be-
ngland in courts of justice, proceeding according to the
law.

have been sworn in the court of admiralty, as Dr.
nd Dr. *Andrews* have informed me; but they had no
ie case, and had forgot the name of it.
nder that it has not existed before, because all our
is carried on by our going to them, instead of their
ere.

se of a *Jew* as a witness in a private cause never existed
the restoration; they went out of *England* the 18th of
he 1st, and did not return 'till *Oliver Cromwell's* time.
ily authority of consequence cited, is a saying of Lord
Co. Lit. 6. b. That an infidel cannot be a witness.

ying is not warranted by any authority, nor supported
eason, and lastly contradicted by common experience.
meant *Jews*, as emphatically *Infidels* by shutting their
ist the light. He hardly ever mentions them without
ation of *Infidel Jews*, 2 *Inst.* 506, 507; and thus this
(meaning *Edward the First*) banished for ever these in-
us *Jews*: therefore Lord Chief Justice *Hale* was not
when he understood Lord Chief Justice *Coke* meant
Infidels as well as others.

ll the law books when they mention an oath mean a
oath, is no argument at all; *Fleta's* definition, *magis*
rare per Creatorem quam creaturam: this shews the oath
ixed, but like the oath sworn in the *Roman* empire after
lishment of Christianity; and Lord *Coke's* saying an
affirmation or denial by a Christian, is no wonder at
ie laws of *England* could speak only of the Christian
ause they had no intercourse with Pagans.

guments of the other side therefore prove nothing; for
llow from hence that no witnesses can be examined in
t never specifically existed before, or that an action
brought in a case that never happened before?

, stated to be the first ground of all laws, by the author
ok called *Doctor and Student*, and general principles
rmine the case; therefore the only question is, whether
iples of reason, justice and convenience, this witness
e-admitted. Upon this occasion I shall lay down two
ns.

That by the practice of *England*, and of all the nations
orld that are Christians, persons, though not of the
persuasion, may be admitted as witnesses, and sworn
to their own form.

, That the case of a Pagan is within this reasoning,
rity.

f law depend upon occasions which give rise to them.
the commerce and intercourse is most frequently
Pagans, the instances to be sure will most frequently

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After the Roman emperors were converts, Christians, as we as those who continued Pagans, swore according to their fancy without any particular form. *Selden*, tom. 2. f. 1467. "*Mittimi hic, principibus Christianis, ut ex historiis satis obviis liquet, solenniter fuisse et peculiaria juramenta, ut per vultum sancti Lucae, per pedem Christi, per sanctum hunc vel illum, ejusmodi alia nimis crebra Inolevit vero tandem, ut quemadmodum Pagani sacris ac mysticis aliquo suis aut tactis aut presentibus jurari solebant, ita solenniter Christianorum juramenta fierent, aut tactis sacrosanctis evangelii aut inspectis, aut in eorum presentia manu ad pectus amota, seu lata aut protensa; atque is corporaliter seu personaliter juramentum prestari dictum est, ut ab juramentis per epistolam, aut scriptis solummodo praestitis distingueretur, inde in vulgi passim ore.*" Upon my corporal oath.

So that by this passage out of *Selden* it appears, the corporal part which prevails now all over Christendom, was taken from the Pagans, and by degrees under the Greek Roman emperors, came to be established, that this ceremony should be used.

The opinion of the Greek Roman emperors, as to the oaths of persons of other persuasions, is mentioned by *Selden*, tom. 2. p. 1468. to be as follows: "*Aliena autem persuasionis homines per id quod venerantur illi, et juxta modum quo venerantur, adjurati consueverunt.*" And in p. 1469. *Selden* gives a long account of a particular ceremony in swearing a Jew in courts of justice and before the 18th of Edward the First, the person administering an oath to a Jew, said, If you don't speak the truth, *veniant si per caput tuum omnia peccata tua, & parentum tuorum, et omnium maledictiones quae in lege Moisaica et prophetarum inscriptae sunt semper tecum maneant.*" To which he answered, Amen.

In Spain the Turks possessed the greatest part of the kingdom till the time of Ferdinand the Catholic; what did they then do when Christians and Turks had controversy together? Why, according to *Selden* tom. 2. 1470. the form of the oath was in Spanish to swear as he hoped to be saved by the contents of the alcoran and says he, "*Pœna autem Mauro perjuris infligenda est, non minus quam Christiano, licet pro locorum et seculorum discrimine dispar.*"

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Thus it stands upon the authorities of Christian countries where such questions have arisen; but, as I said before, the question did not arise here till after the restoration. Was then determined that a person not a Christian should not be sworn? No! the first time it existed, the court determined that he should be sworn according to his own principles.

No case of a Turk sworn upon the alcoran in England but that before the council, who were of opinion, greatly assisted and greatly attended, that he might be sworn upon the alcoran.

Here is a material circumstance in this case, a court erected in Calcutta, by the authority of the crown of England, where Indians are sworn according to the most solemn part of their own religion.

All occasions do not arise at once; now a particular species of Indians appears; hereafter another species of Indians may arise a statute very seldom can take in all cases, therefore the cor

mon law, *that works itself pure* by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this reason superior to an act of parliament.

The oldest books of all countries mention the solemnity of an oath, as a security for a person's speaking the truth; they can do no more than lay him under the most sacred and binding obligations; they all call it appealing to God for the truth, and deprecating his vengeance as they speak truth.

There is not a book upon the general law of nature and nations, but admits that Christians may allow persons to swear *per Dominum et per falsos deos*. It is so laid down in the Decretals, in *Grotius*, and *Puffendorf*, who in his 4th book, 4th sect. and 122d page, saith, "That part of the form in oaths under which God is invoked as a witness, or as an avenger, is to be accommodated to the religious persuasion which the swearer entertains of God; it being vain and insignificant to compel a man to swear by a God whom he doth not believe, and therefore doth not reverence; and no one thinks himself bound to the Divine Majesty in any other words, or under any other titles, than what are agreeable to the doctrines of his own religion, which in his judgment is the only true way of worship: and hence likewise it is, that he who swears by false gods, yet such as were by him accounted true, stands obliged, and if he deceives, is really guilty of perjury, because, whatever his peculiar notions are, he certainly had some sense of the Deity before his eyes, and therefore, by wilfully forswearing himself, he violated, as far as he was able, that awe and reverence he owed to Almighty God; yet when a person, requiring an oath from another, accepts it under a form agreeable to that worship which the swearer holds true, and he himself holds for false, he cannot in the least be said hereby to approve of that worship."

The oath must be always understood according to the belief of the person who takes it; not only Christian writers now, but before Christianity, the world was divided into a vast variety of opinions, and yet every man was admitted to speak according to his own belief, "*Dig. lib. 12. t. 2. f. 5. Omni enim omnino licitum iusjurandum, per quod quis sibi jurari, idoneum est, et si ex eo fuerit juratum, prætori id tuebitur: divus pius jurejurando, quod propriâ superstitione juratum est, standum rescripsit, dato jurejurando, non aliud quæritur, quam an juratum sit: remissa questione, an debeatur, quasi satis probatum sit jurejurando.*" Lord Stairs's Institute 694.

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I do not find any authority has been produced from any other country, that such oath ought not to be admitted: the reason why *Ld. Ch. Jus. Eyre* would not suffer the *Indian* a worshipper of the sun to be sworn upon the Evangelists was, because he did not believe in Christianity; but if he cannot be sworn at all, manifest injustice, and manifest inconvenience must follow.

Heathens bought the goods, heathens sent them, heathens knew the price, heathens kept the account. Would it do honour then to the Christian religion, to say, that you cannot swear according to our oath, and therefore you shall not be sworn at all?

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What must the heathen courts think of our proceedings? Will it not destroy all faith and confidence between the contracting parties? Is the case of the *Turk* or *Jew* swearing according to their religion, different from the *Indians* swearing according to his? The objection is stronger against the *Turk* because he swears upon the alcoran, which we think an imposture; but the *Indians* here swear by one supreme God, without appealing to any particular book or authority in their religion.

It is said a heathen is not to be believed.

Is it not known that all the heathens believe in a God? I will refer them to *Tully* in his *Tusculan Disputations*, lib. 1. s. 13. "*Porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur Deus esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit inmanis, cuius mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio.*" No country can subsist a twelvemonth where an oath is not thought binding, for the want of it must necessarily dissolve society.

2^{dly}, It is objected, that supposing they may be admitted as witnesses, yet under the sanction of the oath thus certified, they ought not to be admitted, for that the form is ridiculous, and their notions of religion not certified by the commissioners.

But the oath they have taken shews it; for the commissioners have certified that they have sworn by one God, and also proves that they think themselves under the tie of an oath.

Look into books of travels, and you will find that heathens, especially *Gentoos*, believe in one God the Creator of the world, though they may have subordinate deities, as the papists who worship saints. *Relig. Cerem. vol. 3.* 380, 381, 398.

No doubt but they all have a notion of a God, according to *Tully*: but to use a greater authority than *Tully*: "They are a law unto themselves, which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another." *St. Paul's epistle to the Romans*, 2 ch. 14th & 15th verses.

The corporal ceremony is a mere matter of form, and not of the essence of an oath: *Du Presne's Glossary* says, that monks swore by kissing the feet of the abbot, nay the abbots swore by their word only, from whence the expression *in verbum sacerdotis*; and I cite this to shew, that as it has varied so much, it is all form.

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Lord Ch. Just. *Lee* desired he would answer the objection as to the form of indictments of perjury upon the holy Evangelists which are necessary words.

Mr. Solicitor General. There is no instance of a *Jew's* being indicted for perjury.

Lord Ch. Just. *Lee*. I have tried a *Jew* myself upon an indictment of perjury.

Mr. Solicitor General insisted, That the indictment would not be wrong against a *Jew* if it was *tacto libro legis Mosaiscæ*. No precedents but what are of indictments against Christians for perjury before the restoration; and since that time it is incumbent on the other side to shew, that it has been held to be

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ill, when the indictment against a *Jew* says, that he was sworn on the Pentateuch.

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Mr. Clarke of the same side.

That religion *ex vi termini* means the belief of the existence of the Deity.

To shew further the necessity of admitting this evidence even with regard to intercourses between Christian countries themselves, *vid. Voet's Commentary on the Pandect.* 602. *Sine evangelii tactu, &c.* If this oath cannot be administered, because not upon the Evangelists, the same objection will hold as to a *Dutchman*, who does not swear as we do on the New Testament.

As to the opinions of the commentators on the civil law, *vide Jacumb.* 4 *sec. c.* 4. *t.* 2. *Mynfingerus.* 6 *Cent. Obs.* 20. *p.* 301.

There was a time when swearing on the holy Evangelists was not the practice here; for when St. *Austin* introduced the Christian religion, the inhabitants were tenacious of their own customs, and therefore he indulged them.

There were not above twelve *Jews* in the kingdom before the restoration. And they deputed one of the principal persons amongst them, in *Oliver Cromwell's* time, to come over hither, in order to find out, Whether *Oliver* was the Messiah or not?

In *Maddox's History of the Exchequer*, in his chapter relating to the *Jews*, *p.* 166, 167, & 174; there are the following passages: "*Benedictus frater Aaronis Judei Lincolnia debet xx mar- cas, pro habenda juratione secundum consuetudinem Judeorum, ad convincendum si Ursellus Judeus Lincolnia sit falsonarius, tali vi- delicet juratione quali alii Judei falsonarii convinci solebant.*" *Mag. Rot.* 5. *Joh. Rot.* 9. *a.* *Lit.*

"*Judei Anglia debent centum libras, ut Judei retentores, latrones, et eorum receptatores, per inquisitionem factam per sacramentum legalium Christianorum vel Judeorum, vel alio modo de predicta malicia convicti, a regno ejiciantur irreditura; sicut continetur in originali.*" *Mag. Rot.* 22 *H.* 3. *Londonia & Midd.*

Si Judeus ab aliquo appellatus fuerit sine teste, de illo appellatu erit quietus solo sacramento suo super librum suum; et de appellatu illarum rerum quæ ad coronam nostram pertinent, similiter quietus erit solo sacramento suo super rotulum suum. *Rot. Cart.* 2 *Joh. N.* 49. *Titulo Carta Judeorum Angliæ.*

Ld. Coke in the 7th Rep. *Calvin's case* 17, saith, "All infidels are in law *perpetui inimici*; for between them, as with the devils, whose subjects they be, and the Christian, there is perpetual hostility, &c." But he meant perpetual enemies in a spiritual sense, and quotes a passage in scripture to that purpose. *What concord hath Christ with Belial? Or what part hath he that believeth with an infidel?* 2 *Cor.* vi. 15.

As to the objection that *Ld. Coke* says, no oath can be altered but by act of parliament, it relates to some particular officers of the crown. And as to the civil consequences of punishment for perjury, *Ld. Coke*, in his third Inst. 164, on perjury, says, that with respect to a person being charged with a breach of oath, the question is, Whether it was lawfully administered?

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Then if the oath administered here is agreeable to the genius of the laws of *England*, will they not be liable to punishment for a breach of it; for I would submit it, Whether the crime may not be stated specially, and recite the ceremony of the witnesses's taking the oath, provided it cannot be laid in the usual common form?

Mr. Chute's reply, who was the leading counsel for the defendant *Barker*.—*Nov.* 12, 1744.

As to the reasons urged from necessity, and enforced from what the law does in similar cases, it is not put in issue, nor proved that there is a necessity for having these witnesses. It is not said by the counsel for the plaintiff, that there is no other way of carrying on business in the *East Indies*, without those persons, nor is it even pretended in the bill itself; if there is no such necessity, the argument from thence can have no weight in this case; and I hope this is an answer to what has been called necessity and a failure of justice, if these witnesses should not be admitted.

The act of 2 *Geo.* 2. c. 21. in the case of murder, where the stroke was at sea, and death at land, or *vice versa*, is to take effect only *in futuro*; so that if a murder of this sort had been committed by a person before, here was certainly a failure of justice; and yet the legislature would not by a law, *ex post facto*, include such person in this act.

I say this with regard only to the particularity of the persons concerned as witnesses. As to the principal question, it is endeavoured to be supported by the other side, by principles of reason, by authority of scripture, and by rules of the civil law.

The cases from scripture are not similar, and arguments *a pari*.

To say it is natural to have a religion, and to believe a God, I think so in some measure; but yet it is otherwise in experience, *Psalms* 115. ver. 4th and 8th. "*Their idols are silver and gold, even the works of mens hands; they that make them are like unto them, and so are all such as put their trust in them.*"

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As to the oath of *Abraham* and *Abimelech*, there was not then any set form existing, nor was it an oath to be taken in a court of judicature. *Laban's oath to Jacob* was of the same kind, and *Jacob* accepted it, as thinking it better than no oath at all.

This therefore is far from convincing that every religion does rest in the belief of a God and all his attributes, for it would be proving too much, *viz.* that there never was a false religion in the world.

Next as to the sort of religion now before the court, nothing is more certain than that the witnesses are *Gentoo*s, and though the commissioners need not have certified all the tenor of their religion, yet they should have certified it, so far as their religion was concerned in taking an oath; and as to their notions of a Deity's being a rewarder of good, and an avenger of evil, *vid. Massens's Hist. Judææ*, lib. 1. fol. 36.

As to the authorities from the civil law, *Grætius*, *Puffendorf*, &c. they are not authorities to conclude upon the common law,
for

for the civil law is not received as the rule of property here, much less as to the rule with regard to our criminal law. The civilians hold different rules of property from us, and differ in nothing more than in admitting evidence, for they reject *histriones*, &c. and whole tribes of people. Much the greatest part of the civil law is only opinions and sayings of great men, but the sayings of the judges in our law are of much greater weight, because they are sayings when the cause was judicially before them.

The Lord Chief Justice *Hale* says, Oaths of Heathens have been admitted in the municipal laws of other kingdoms. How far soever this great man may differ from Lord *Coke*, he rather speaks of special laws for allowing heathens to swear according to their own form; but these special laws have not yet been made here, and the passage of Lord *Hale* is no more than a wish, and not an opinion.

It is material that nothing is certified in this case as to the witnesses' opinion of our oath, or that the witnesses did repeat the oath, or used any words at all; but it seems that they immediately had recourse to their own ceremony. It is said here were the words *so help me God*, but these witnesses do not appear to have said any thing, and yet care is taken that the Quakers should repeat.

Where would have been the harm if they had signified their assent to our oath? It would certainly have been more satisfactory. It does not appear that the *Gentoo*s believe a God of the universe, and Lord *Hale* thinks it necessary they should believe *Deum Creatorem*.

The most material question is, whether these witnesses are admissible by the laws of *England*?

I must own that the authorities are few, but I hope there is no exception to be shewn of the other side, and where it is a general rule, it comes rather of the other side to shew it has been varied.

No one of the instances Mr. Attorney General put of exceptions to the general rules, but where the witnesses were *prima facie* admissible. The statute of Hue and Cry was made, that persons might pass and repass safely in the kingdom. Robberies are committed oftener upon single persons than more, and there is in most instances no other method of proving the robbery but by admitting the evidence of the person robbed; therefore judges were inclined to let in this evidence upon necessity. It is not certain what the rule would be, in the opinion of judges, if a third person was by.

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Lord Chancellor: *This evidence might be allowed notwithstanding, for a third person or servant might be at a distance, and not know the fact of the robbery so well as the person robbed.*

Mr. Chute: *The next instance is, as to letting in a tradesman's books kept by his servant; but there the oath of a living person is to attest them.—The next, of a wife in cases of treason, but here is no authority cited, but it is said to be an opinion of Lord Chief Justice Hale.—The next instance brought is, That the sayings of dying men may be given in evidence. This is no more than giving evidence of a nuncupative will, and not so much*

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words as evidence of circumstances. A man, as he is just leaving the world, may be supposed to have a greater regard to truth; but on a trial for murder this kind of evidence will not alter the sense of the court, if it should appear the deceased was killed fairly: in Major *Oneby's* case it was mentioned by the special verdict, that the dying man said he was killed after the manner of swordsmen; but this had not weight enough to over-rule stronger evidence.

It is said that *in matters of custom and tradition, hear-say evidence is admitted*; and rightly so, for how can tradition be conveyed but from man to man through a suit of ages?

The case of a rape of a child, and her evidence being admitted without oath, was denied by Lord Chief Justice *Lee*, and Lord Chief Baron *Parker*, to be law, and therefore I shall not trouble you on that head.

A great deal of stress has been laid on Lord *Coke's* putting *Jews* on a foot with Infidels; in other places Lord *Coke* calls him an *Infidel Jew*, therefore describes him *secundum quid*, and not generally as an *Infidel*.

As to the authority from *Maddox's* History of the Exchequer, he determines generally that they should be sworn and by their own book, but it is not by force of a charter that they are sworn.

After the restoration, when the *Jews* came over in great numbers, they were admitted to be sworn; and this was doing no more than declaring what was the ancient law.

The *Jews* were once the people of God; great and atrocious crimes were forgiven them; they had certainly the promise of Scripture largely given them, and the *evangelium* is equally applicable to the *Jews* as to the Christians—for the good tidings are not confined to the New Testament, the same being told so early as just after the fall; *Genesis* the 3d and 15th. *And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel.*

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As to the form of indictments, they ought to be adhered to; if there was nothing but conscience to awe a person in taking an oath, I am afraid, from the depravity of mankind, it would not be so binding, for it is the apprehension of temporal punishment which in a great measure prevails upon persons to speak the truth.

There is no authority to shew that indictments have run otherwise than on the holy Evangelists, and said in *Hall's* case, that the Christian religion is part of the law of *England*.

If there is a possibility that the *Jews* may be reconciled to the New Testament, it ought to have weight; and an ingenious author, the Charterhouse *Burnet*, imagines they will; and as they believe a part of the Holy Scriptures, it must give them a superior credit to persons who do not believe at all in the same manner with us.

Suppose a Christian should turn apostate to the *Gentoo* religion, and should say, I am not liable to be indicted? How must he be convicted of perjury, any more than a person who is a *Gentoo* from his birth? This might be attended with bad consequences,
because

because persons of this temper of mind, who are guarded against corporal punishments, will trust futurity as to eternal punishments.

As to the objection of our bringing a cross bill, and that we have thereby admitted the defendants capable of putting in an answer, it will of course fall to the ground, as we do not make any use either of *our cross bill* or *their answers*.

As to the admitting the *Mahometan* as a witness before the committee of the council, it was done without debate upon it; for *Sabine's* counsel, who had a right to make the objection, were satisfied of the truth and justice of *Sabine's* cause, and therefore it passed without opposition; but as the judges sit there rather as advisers than in any other light, it wants the form of an authority.

Mr. Solicitor General mentioned a case which he had from Dr. *Strahan* and Dr. *Andrews*, where a Heathen was admitted as a witness, but the name is not so much as known. Dr. *Audley* and Dr. *Simpson* have informed me, there was a case before the commons in a suit for a divorce, where a black was rejected as a witness, because not of the Christian religion.

As to the charter, nothing is said there, but that a *solemn oath* shall be given. A charter may be granted which may affect a place out of the kingdom totally, and yet may not infringe the general rule here with regard to swearing.

Like the common case of a Pie-powder court, which is a summary way of doing justice during the fair, and is restrained to that particular time, but you cannot follow it afterwards.

That an act of parliament is necessary to dispense with the form of an oath, appears from the 10th of the late king in relation to the *Jews*, this act being made to dispense with their swearing upon the faith of a Christian.

Therefore, if it should be thought proper for reasons of state, and for the sake of trade, to receive such evidence for the future, let it be done by the legislature, and not admitted against an infant, where the plaintiff acquiesced for 4 years, till the person transacting with him was dead.

Lord Chancellor: My Lord Chief Justice, Lord Chief Baron, and myself are of opinion, the cause should stand over till next term, that it may be properly considered, this being a point of the utmost consequence; and in the mean time let a search be made in the crown office for precedents of indictments of perjury, to see whether in the indictment of a *Jew* it has been laid *secundum libro legis Mosaiscæ*, or whether there is any thing particular in the form with regard to the indictments of *Jews*; and as cases have been mentioned in the admiralty (which is a court where such cases are most likely to happen) of Heathens being admitted to swear in their own form, I should be glad to have inquiry made in that court likewise.

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February the 23d 1744.

This cause came on for judgment upon the point above mentioned.

Lord

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Lord Chief Baron : The counsel for the defendant, in support of their objection to the plaintiff's evidence, cited 1 *Inst.* 16. and 4 *Inst.* 279. to shew, *That an Alien Infidel can be no witness.*

If my Lord *Coke* had by an Infidel meant, a *professed Atheist*, I should have been of opinion that he could not be a witness.

I shall shew that persons who profess the *Gentoo* religion believe a God to be the Creator of the world. The generality of mankind believe a God. *Tully* in his *Tusc. Disput. lib. 1. s. 13.* says, "*Quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio;*" and expresses himself to the same effect in his *Treatise de Natura Deorum.*

As to the *Gentoo* religion, *vid. Relig. Cerem. vol. 3. p. 257, 277, 381.* and *Tournefort's Voyages, p. 39, 259.* from which it will appear from the best testimonies, that persons of this religion do believe in God as the creator and governor of the world.

The defendant's counsel cited 2 *Keble* 314. to shew that the Old Testament is the Gospel as well as the New, on one of which the law requires the oath should be administered.

To this I answer, that the ritual or ceremonial part of the *Mosaic* law is not binding, but the moral is, upon Christians; therefore I think the Old Testament cannot be called the Gospel.

As my Lord *Hale's* reason will be the basis of the advice I shall give your Lordship, I shall read the passage, and endeavour to comment upon it. *H. P. C. 2 vol. 279.*

It has been said by the defendant's counsel, that Lord *Hale* misunderstood Lord *Coke*; in answer to this, consider the 3d *Inst.* 165. and you will find Lord *Hale's* consequence is very well founded.

Lord *Hale* says, "*I take it that although the regular oath, &c. is tactis sacrosanctis Dei evangelis, &c. yet in cases of necessity, as in foreign contracts, &c. the testimony of a Jew, tacto libro legis Mosaicæ, is not to be rejected.*"

The books, cited by the defendant's counsel, to shew jurors or witnesses must be sworn upon the Gospel, were *Brañon, Britton, Fleta, &c.* These authors prove no more than that the oaths are adapted to the natives of the kingdom: But by *Maddox's History of the Exchequer, 166.* and *Wilkins's Saxon Laws, 348.* it appears that *Jews* were also sworn; and in the latter author we find something very particular; a *venire facias* is mentioned to have issued to *sex legales homines, & sex legales Judeos.*

A doubt arose after the restoration in what manner a *Jew* should be sworn in putting in an answer. Upon a motion, Lord Keeper *North* ordered he should be sworn upon the Pentateuch, and that the plaintiff's clerk should be present to see him sworn. *Anon. 1 Vern. 263. vide also Francias's Trial in the State Trials.* 'Tis likewise the constant course in trials at bar and *nisi prius*, and, which is still stronger, there is an act of parliament to enforce it.

This overturns Lord *Coke's* opinion so far as *Jews* are concerned, and establishes Lord *Hale's*.

The

The next passage in Lord Hale relates to the special laws in Spain, *Yea the oaths of idolatrous infidels have been admitted in the municipal laws of many kingdoms, especially si juraverit per verum Deum Creatorem, and special laws are instituted in Spain touching the form of the oaths of infidels.*

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Consider now whether there is not such a necessity here as is sufficient to render this evidence admissible.

An objection is made that the plaintiff ought to have shewn he could not have the evidence of Christians.

To this I answer, that repugnant to natural justice, in the statute of Hue and Cry, the robbed is admitted to be a witness of the robbery, as a moral or presumed necessity is sufficient: and that it shall be taken for granted there was the same necessity in the present case, as nothing is stated to the contrary. Besides, it appears that the plaintiff did commence a suit in *Calcutta*, and obtained a decree there, and, what is very material, *Barker* himself, the father of the defendant, in that suit in the mayor's court, insisted that *Omychund* should be asked whether he was of the *Gentoo* religion, and that he should be sworn according to his own notion of an oath, which was done accordingly. This certainly bound *Barker*, and of course his representative. *Vide 2 Roll's Rep. 346. 1 Salk. 283.*

In short, I do not see what should hinder admitting them as witnesses. They are admitted by the civil law—by the law of nations—by the common consent of mankind. (He then cited all the cases mentioned by plaintiff's counsel, and Lord *Stairs's* Institute, to shew what the law of *Scotland* was in this particular.)

Heathens admitted as witnesses by the civil law, by the law of nations, and by the common consent of mankind.

But it is objected, that these witnesses do not swear by the true God, and for this purpose, the defendant's counsel cited *Deuteronomy* vi. 13 and 14 *vers. Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and serve him, and shalt swear by his name. Ye shalt not go after other gods, of the gods of the people which are round about.*

Of the other side, *Jacob*, upon his covenant with *Laban*, swore by the fear of his father *Ishaac*, *Gen. 31. v. 53.*

My answer is, This is not true in fact, for they do swear by the true God, the Creator of the world.

Lord Hale says, *a provision by the laws of Spain for Moors, and oaths particularly adapted to the religion of the Mahometans: but here the oaths taken by these witnesses, is the constant oath, and taken in their own manner exactly.*

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Lord Hale makes a question, *Whether a Turk or a Jew may be admitted to give evidence upon a murder.* I will not give a precise opinion, but I think a Jew a very competent witness to prove a murder.

A Jew a competent witness to prove a murder.

Next as to the form of the oath.

I am very far from saying that this is so solemn and significant as ours is.

The Scripture has upon this occasion been cited, and I will therefore mention the opinion of a very great divine, *Tillotson* in his affize sermon, 1 vol. fo. 194. *The form of an oath is voluntarily taken up and instituted by men.*

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In the case of *Dutton v. Colt*, 1 Sid. 6. Doctor Owen vice chancellor of Oxford being a witness for the plaintiff, refused to be sworn in the usual manner, by laying his right hand upon the book, and by kissing it afterwards; "but he caused the book to be held open before him, and he lifted up his right hand: the jury upon this prayed the opinion of the court, if they ought to think this testimony as strong as the testimony of another witness; and Glin Chief Justice told them, that in his judgment he had taken as strong an oath as any other witness, but said, if he was to be sworn himself, he would lay his right hand upon the book."

By the policy of all countries, oaths ought to be administered to persons according to their own opinion, and laying the hand originally borrowed from the Pagans.

That forms are various, *vid. Selden, T. 2. 1467*, and *Voet's Pand.* Christians were sworn sometimes without laying their hands upon the gospel, by lifting up their hands to heaven: Jews were sworn first with rites and ceremonies, afterwards without any. It is plain that by the policy of all countries, oaths are to be administered to all persons according to their own opinion, and as it most affects their conscience, and laying the hand was originally borrowed from the Pagans.

It is said by defendant's counsel, that no new oath can be imposed without an act of parliament, and for this purpose several cases cited.

My answer is, This is no new oath.

It was objected, that they ought not to be admitted as witnesses from the perpetual enmity between Heathens and Christians, upon the authority of *Calvin's case*, 7 Rep. 17. and the statute of the 21 H. 8.

That Turks and Infidels are *perpetui inimici*, and therefore not to be admitted witnesses here, is a common error founded on a groundless opinion of justice Brooke.

This is to be understood of spiritual discord only: Sir Edward Littleton Lord Keeper, in his readings upon the statute of the 27 Ed. 3. has sentiments there worthy of a great Christian writer: "Turks and Infidels, faith he, are not *perpetui inimici*, nor is there a particular enmity between them and us; but this is a common error founded upon a groundless opinion of justice Brooke; for though there be a difference between our religion and theirs, that does not oblige us to be enemies to their persons: they are the creatures of God, and of the same kind as we are, and it would be a sin in us to hurt their persons." *Salk. 46.*

The necessity of trade has mollified the too rigorous rules of the old law, in their restraint of aliens.

A Jew may bring an action now, who held otherwise formerly.

In *Wells v. Williams*, 1 L. Raym. 282. The court said, "That the necessity of trade has mollified the too rigorous rules of the old law, in their restraint and discouragement of aliens: A Jew may sue at this day, but heretofore he could not; for then they were looked upon as enemies, but now commerce has taught the world more humanity; and therefore held that an alien enemy, commorant here by licence of the king, and under his protection, may maintain debt upon a bond, though he did not come with safe conduct."

It was objected by the defendant's counsel, that this is a novelty, and what has never been done, ought not to be done.

The law of England not confined to particular cases, but governed more by reason, than any one case whatsoever.

The law of England is not confined to particular cases, but is much more governed by reason, than by any one case whatever. The true rule is laid down by Lord Vaughan, fol. 37, 38. "Where the law, faith he, is known and clear, tho' it be unequal, is equitable"

"equitable and inconvenient, the judges must determine as the law is, without regarding the unequibleness or inconveniency: those defects, if they happen in the law, can only be remedied by parliament; but where the law is doubtful, and not clear, the judges ought to interpret the law to be, as is most consonant to equity, and least inconvenient."

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As to the case of *Lee v. Lee*, before the court of delegates in 1692. They gave no opinion whether the witnesses were admissible or not?

The counsel for the defendant mentioned a note of a case taken by Mr. *Bunbury* in the court of exchequer, in a cause between the *East India* company and admiral *Matthews*, "Where *Orangee* a black being offered as a witness there, said he looked upon *Jesus Christ* as a good man, and upon sending to the king's bench for their opinion, they thought he could not be admitted, because he did not believe in *Jesus Christ*."

This was a note of a case taken some time after the cause was heard, upon memory only, which at a distance of time is very treacherous, but I think the reason a very bad one, for the same would exclude *Jews*.

Another objection is, That the witnesses are not liable to a prosecution for perjury.

This is not true in fact; but supposing it was, yet this is not the only case where witnesses cannot be prosecuted, for there is no possibility of prosecuting them, where the depositions are taken out of *England*; but if they were here, I should be of opinion, they might be indicted upon a special indictment, for I do not think *testis sacris evangelis* are necessary words, for several old precedents are, that the party was *juratus* generally, or *debito modo juratus*. *Vide West's Syml.* 2d part, under the head of Indictments and Offences, *sec.* 160.

If these witnesses were here, liable to a prosecution for perjury, and might be indicted upon a special indictment. *Testis sacris evangelis* not necessary words in an indictment of perjury, for several *juratus* generally.

old precedents are, that the party was

As to the precedents of indictments against *Jews*, they are so various that nothing is to be drawn from it: upon the whole, not to admit these witnesses would be destructive of trade, and subversive of justice, and attended with innumerable inconveniences.

[*44]

Lord Chief Justice Willes: As it is a question of great importance, and in some measure a new question, I will give my opinion, first; as to the general question: Whether any Infidel may be admitted as an evidence under some circumstances.

If I was of the same opinion with *Lord Coke*, the consequence would be, that these depositions could not be read; but I am of opinion that some Infidels may under some circumstances be admitted as witnesses.

Some Infidels may, under some circumstances, be admitted as witnesses.

My *Lord Coke* is plainly of opinion, that *Jews* as well as Heathens were comprized under the same exclusion.

Serjeant *Hawkins* in his *Pleas of the Crown*, though a very learned and pains-taking man, is mistaken in his notion of *Lord Coke's* opinion; long before his time, and ever since the *Jews* returned to *England*, they have been constantly admitted as

The *Jews* before their expulsion from *England*, and since their return to it, have been constantly admitted as witnesses.

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The defendant's counsel are mistaken in their construction of Lord *Coke*, for he puts the *Jews* upon a footing with stigmatized and infamous persons: this notion, though advanced by so great a man, is contrary to religion, common sense, and common humanity; and I think the devils themselves, to whom he has delivered them, could not have suggested any thing worse.

Our Saviour and St. *Peter* have said, *God is no respecter of persons.* Acts 10. ver. 34.

Lord *Coke* is a very great lawyer, but our Saviour and St. *Peter* are in this respect much better authorities, than a person possessed with such narrow notions, which very well deserves all that Lord *Treby* has said of it.

I lay no stress upon the authority of *Brañon*, *Briton*, and *Pleta*, for they lived in popish times, when no other trade was carried on except the trade of religion; and I hope such times will never come over again: it is very plain too, these ancient authorities speak only of Christian oaths.

Maddox's History of the Exchequer clears it up beyond all contradiction, that *Jews* were constantly sworn, and from the 19 Car. 1. to the present time, have never been refused.

To this assertion of Lord *Coke*, I will oppose Lord *Hale*, though fully cited by Lord Chief Baron *Parker*; yet I will mention it again, because it is full of the true spirit of good sense and Christianity, and *decies repetita placebit.*

As to the authority of civilians, I shall say once for all, that I do not lay so much stress upon any quotations of the civil law; because I think there is no occasion to have recourse to them.

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Oaths are not
of Christian
institution, but
as old as the
creation.

The last answer I shall give to Lord *Coke's* assertion are his own words in *Calvin's* case and 4th Inst. *If, said he, an oath was clearly of a Christian institution, then I should be forced to admit, that it could not be allowed.*

But oaths are as old as the creation; look into sacred history, and you will find variety of instances, in the book of *Genesis*, in the 30th chapter of *Numbers* throughout.

The nature of an oath is not at all altered by Christianity, but only made more solemn from the sanction of rewards and punishments being more openly declared.

The passage in the 14th chapter of St. *Matthew*, relating to *Herod* and the daughter of *Herodias* is very extraordinary; a person appears there to be so very wicked as not to stick at murder, and yet thought an oath of such a sacred nature, as to choose rather to commit the former than break the latter.

Pythagoras in his golden verses, and *Tully* in several parts of his works, speak of an oath with the highest reverence, *Grotius de Jure Belli et Pacis*, 1 vol. lib. 2. c. 13. *de jurejurando*, 1 sec. *apud omnes populos, et ab omni Ævo circa pollicitationes, promissa et contractus maxima semper vis fuit jurisjurandi.*

The form of oaths varies in countries according to different laws and constitutions, but the substance is the same in all.

Grotius in the same chapter, sect. 10. *Forma jurisjurandi verbis differt, re convenit, hunc enim sensum habere debet, ut Deus invocetur.*

ocetur, puta hoc modo, Deus testis sit, aut Deus sit vindex. In our old law books sic Deus adjuvet, and other expressions of the like nature, and now, So help me God. Vid. the 23d of Matthew, 20th, 21st, and 22d verses.

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There is nothing in the argument, that as Christianity is the law of England, no other oath is consistent with it; and for the reasons already given, this argument carries no weight with it.

Though I have shewn that an Infidel in general cannot be excluded from being a witness, and though I am of opinion that infidels who believe a God, and future rewards and punishments in the other world, may be witnesses; yet I am as clearly of opinion, that if they do not believe a God, or future rewards and punishments, they ought not to be admitted as witnesses.

If infidels do not believe a God, or rewards and punishments hereafter, they ought not to be admitted.

Next as to dispensing with strict rules of evidence: Such evidence is to be admitted as the necessity of the case will allow of, as for instance, a marriage at *Utrecht* certified under the seal of the minister there, and of the said town, and that they cohabited for two years together as man and wife, was held to be a sufficient proof they were married. *Cro. Jac. 541. Alsop v. Bowtrel.*

The rule of evidence is, that such ought to be admitted as the necessity of the case will allow of, to it they please.

but though admitted, must be left to the persons who try the cause to give what credit

It must be left to the jury or judge what credit they will give; for it is a known distinction, that the evidence, though admitted, must still be left to the persons who try the cause, to give what credit to it they please.

The same credit ought not to be given to the evidence of an infidel, as of a Christian; because not under the same obligations.

It is admitted by the defendants that this cause relates to a mercantile affair between *Barker* a merchant and a subject of England, and an *Indian*, a merchant, and the subject of the *Grand Mogul*.

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What could the plaintiff do? He had but only one remedy, that he takes, he follows his debtor into *England*.

There can be no evidence admitted without oath, it would be absurd for him to swear according to the Christian oath, which he does not believe; and therefore, out of necessity, he must be allowed to swear according to his own notion of an oath.

Persons who do not believe the Christian oath, must, out of necessity, be allowed to swear according to their own notion of an oath.

Next as to the commission: the certificate fully answers this objection, *that it does not appear they believe a God.*

I cannot say I lay a great stress upon the authors which give an account of the *Gentoo* religion, because it must depend upon their veracity and private judgment; but I found my opinion upon the certificate, which says, the *Gentoo*s believe in a God as the Creator of the universe, and that He is a rewarder of those who do well, and an avenger of those who do ill.

And lastly, As to the objection of the indictment for perjury.

This has been fully answered already by the Lord Chief Baron, but the plain answer is, that *sacro-sancta evangelia* are not at all material words.

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Upon the whole, I am of opinion, the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses, under the circumstances of this case, ought to be admitted.

Lord Chief Justice Lee: I agree intirely with the opinion of Lord Chief Baron *Barker*, and Lord Chief Justice *Willes*; that where it is returned by the certificate the witness is of a religion, it is sufficient; for the foundation of all religion is the belief of a God, though difficult to have a distinct idea of an infinite and incomprehensible Being as God is; yet mankind may have a relative idea of the being of a God, as dependent creatures upon Him.

Rules of evidence are to be considered as artificial rules, framed by men for convenience in courts of justice, and founded upon good reason.

An oath is a religious sanction that mankind have universally established. I would not be thought to declare an opinion, how far persons under the denomination of Atheists, and believing no religion, may in this country be in some cases admitted, but I do apprehend, that the rules of evidence are to be considered as artificial rules framed by men for convenience in courts of justice, and founded upon good reason: But one rule can never vary, *viz.* the eternal rule of natural justice. This is a case that ought to be looked upon in that light, and I take it, considering evidence in this way, is agreeable to the genius of the law of *England*.

Hearsay cannot be admitted, nor husband and wife as witnesses against each other, and yet from necessity have been allowed.

There is not a more general rule, than that hear-say cannot be admitted, nor husband and wife as witnesses against each other, and yet it is notorious that from necessity they have been allowed; and as Lord Chief Baron said, Not an absolute necessity, but a moral one.

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The rule as to admitting evidence in foreign and commercial matters, differs from other instances in courts of justice.

Where there are foreign parties interested, or in commercial matters, the rules of evidence are not quite the same, as in other instances in courts of justice, the case of *Hue and Cry*, *Brownlow* 47. In Lord Chief Justice *Hale's* Pleas of the Crown, vol. the 1st, 301. a feme covert is not a lawful witness against her husband in cases of treason, but has been admitted in civil cases: a wife admitted to prove a trust: the same as to hear-say evidence. *Skinner* 647.

As to admitting evidence in foreign matters and commercial, this is different from common cases. 2 *Rolls Rep.* 346.

Lord Chief Justice *Lee* of opinion, if the validity of a foreign contract made in the presence of a public notary was in question here, that his testimony would be allowed to authenticate the contract.

The testimony of a public notary is evidence by the laws of *France*; contracts are made in the presence of a public notary, and no other witness necessary to prove the transaction: I should think it could be no doubt at all, if it came in question here whether this was a valid contract, but a testimony from persons of that credit and reputation would be received as very good proof in foreign transactions, and would authenticate the contract, *Cro. Car.* 365. These cases shew that courts always govern themselves by these rules, in cases of foreign transactions. *Preced. in Chanc.* 207. *Tremoult v. Dedire.* 1 *Wms.* 429. In actions of trover, *vid. Comberb.* 340, 366. *Dockwray* and *Dickenson*. In cases of sales of goods a factor is admitted as a witness.

To apply these cases to the present, without delivering an opinion, Whether persons that do not believe in any religion may be admitted; as I think that these witnesses are under the religious

gious tye of an oath, administered in the most solemn manner; as this is a transaction wholly in the country of the *Mogul*; as *Barker* has forced the plaintiffs to have recourse here to the law of *England*, by quitting a country where, by the letters patent of the crown, they were intitled to justice, it would not be consonant to natural equity to deny them the benefit of this evidence.

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In the 13th and 14th of *Cha. 2. chap. 11. sect. 29.* an act for preventing frauds and regulating abuses in his Majesty's customs, there is the following clause: "Provided, that in case the seizure or information shall be made upon any clause or thing contained in the late act, intituled, An act for the encouraging and encreasing of shipping and navigation, that then the defendant or defendants shall, on his or their request, have a commission out of the high court of Chancery, to examine witnesses beyond the seas, and have a competent time allowed for the return thereof, before any trial shall be had upon the case, according to the distance of place where such commission or commissions are to be executed, and that the examination of witnesses so returned shall be admitted for evidence in law at the trial, as if it had been given *viva voce*, by the examinee in court; any law, statute, or usage to the contrary in any wise notwithstanding."

Lord Chancellor: As this is a case not only of great expence, but of great consequence, it will be expected that I should not give an opinion without assigning my reasons for it at the same time.

[48]

First, As to the objection of the defendant's counsel to the certificate and return of the commission, *that the commissioners have not followed the direction of this court; that they should have certified of what religion the witnesses were, and the principles of that religion; whereas they only certify them to be of the Gentoo religion, without shewing what the principles are of that religion*: It was not the intention of the court they should, for it would have been entering into a wide field, and would have been certifying the history of the *Banian* or *Gentoo* religion.

Cases have been determined at common law upon evidence taken from histories of countries, and we have very authentic accounts of this part of the world. A general history is evidence to prove a matter relating to the kingdom in general. 1 *Salk.* 281.

Cases determined
at law upon evidence
taken
from histories of
countries.

My intention was to be certified whether these people believed the being of a God, and his providence. The 6th volume of *Churchill's Voyages* 301. particularly describes this religion and their precepts of morality; the latter precept carries almost the sense of the ninth commandment.

This objection being removed, the next question will be, whether the depositions ought to be read; which depends upon two things:

First, Whether it is a proper obligatory oath?

Secondly, Whether, on the special circumstances in this case such evidence can be admitted according to the law of *England*?

The general learning upon this head has been fully enlarged upon by the Lord Chief Justice.

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The essence of an oath is an appeal to the Supreme Being, as thinking him the rewarder of truth, and avenger of falsehood; and Lord Coke the only writer who has grafted the word *Christian* into an oath.

The outward act is not essential to the oath, for this was always matter of liberty.

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An absolute necessity the first ground for departing from strict rules of evidence, a presumed necessity the second.

The first author I shall mention is Bishop Sanderſon *de jurisjuramenti obligatione*. *Jurisjuramentum*, ſaith he, *eſt affirmati- veligiſa*: All that is neceſſary to an oath is an appeal to the Supreme Being, as thinking him the rewarder of truth, and avenger of falſhood; *vid.* the ſame author, *p.* 5. and 18.

This is not contradicted by any writer that I know of but Lord Coke, who has taken upon him to infer the word *Chriſtian* and is the only writer that has grafted this word into an oath. As to other writers they are all concurring, *vid.* *Puffendorff*, *lib.* 4. *ch.* 2. *ſec.* 4. Dr. Tillſon, 1ſt volume of his ſermons upon the lawfulness of oaths, and *p.* 189, where the very text ſpeaks plainly of an oath among all nations and men, "An oath for confirmation "is to them an end of all ſtrife," *Hebr.* the 6th and 16th. "The "neceſſity of religion to the ſupport of human ſociety in nothing "appears more evidently, than in this, That the obligation o "an oath, which is ſo neceſſary for the maintenance of peace and "juſtice among men, depends wholly upon the ſenſe and belief "of a Deity."

The next thing I ſhall take notice of is the form of the oath. It is laid down by all writers that the outward act is not eſſential to the oath; Sanderſon is of that opinion, and ſo is Tillſon in the ſame ſermon, *p.* 144. "As for the ceremonies in "uſe among us in the taking of oaths, it is no juſt exception "againſt them, that they are not found in Scripture, for this "was always matter of liberty, and ſeveral nations have uſed "ſeveral rites and ceremonies in their oaths."

All that is neceſſary appears in the preſent caſe: an external act was done to make it a corporal act.

Secondly, Whether upon ſpecial circumſtances ſuch evidence may be admitted according to the law of *England*?

The judges and ſages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule of evidence, *the beſt that the nature of the caſe will admit.*

The rule is, that if the writings have ſubſcribing witneſſes to them, they muſt be proved by thoſe witneſſes.

The firſt ground judges have gone upon in departing from ſtrict rules, is an abſolute ſtrict neceſſity. *Secondly*, a preſumed neceſſity. In the caſe of writings, ſubſcribed by witneſſes, if all are dead, the proof of one of their hands is ſufficient to eſtabliſh the deed: where an original is loſt, a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witneſſes who have heard the deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for evidence. 1 *Mod.* 4.

A trademan's books are admitted as evidence, though no abſolute neceſſity; but by reaſon of a preſumption of neceſſity only, inferred from the nature of commerce.

As to admitting hearſay evidence, ſee the caſe of *Compoſend v. Nich.* the 2d of *Q. Anne*, in an action upon a policy of inſurance. There is another inſtance of diſpenſing with the lawful oath, where our courts admit evidence for the crown without oath.

It is a common natural preſumption that perſons of the *Christian* religion ſhould be principally apprized of facts and transactions.

actions in their own country; there is a stronger presumption of necessity here than for admitting a deed of 30 years standing. Besides all this an additional reason is, that the parties who entered into this contract presumed, that if they should be obliged to sue, it would be in their own country, and then they must have been admitted. From hence it follows, that if one of the parties should leave this country and change his domicile, the other would be deprived of his evidence, which would have been admitted there, and by that means deprived of justice.

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As the *English* have only a factory in this country (for it is in the empire of the *Great Mogul*), if we should admit this evidence, it would be agreeable to the genius of the law of *England*. The courts of admiralty have done it *Carth. 31. Beak v. Tyrell, vid. the last section*, "An English ship was taken by a French man of war under colour of a Dutchman, and carried into France, and there condemned by their court of admiralty as a Dutch prize; afterwards an English merchant bought this ship of the French, and conveyed her into England, where the right owner brought an action of trover for the ship against the purchaser; and all this matter being found specially, the defendant had judgment, because the ship being legally condemned as Dutch prize, this court will give credit to the sentence of the court of admiralty in France, and take it to be according to right, and will not examine their proceedings: for it would be very inconvenient, if one kingdom should by peculiar laws correct the judgments and proceedings of the courts of another kingdom."

Courts of law here will give credit to the sentence of a foreign court of admiralty, and take it to be right without examining their proceedings.

And if we did not give this credence, courts abroad would not allow our determinations here to be valid.

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So in matrimonial cases, they are to be determined according to the ceremonies of marriage in the country where it was solemnized.

Suppose a Heathen, not an alien enemy, should bring an action at common law, and the defendant should bring a bill for an injunction, would any body say that the plaintiff at law should not be admitted to put in an answer according to his own form of an oath? If otherwise, the injunction must be perpetual, and this would be a manifest denial of justice.

If a Heathen, not an alien enemy, brings an action, and defendant a bill for an injunction, he shall be admitted to answer according to his own form of an oath.

As to the most material objection of the form in indictments for perjury, the words *supra sanctum Dei evangelium* are not at all necessary. The framers of indictments are apt to throw in words, and to swell them out too much to no purpose; therefore the old precedents are the best; and besides, as has been very justly said, this would prove too much, for it would hold as well to all depositions taken abroad. It has been said by the counsel for the defendant, that the special laws in *Spain*, for taking those oaths, are of the nature of our acts of parliament.

Framers of indictments multiply words to no purpose, therefore the old precedents are the best, and by them it appears *supra sanctum Dei evangelium* are not necessary words in indictments for perjury.

I will not be positive, but I take it to be otherwise. *Selden* upon the laws of *Alphonso* the wise, king of *Arragon*, saith, *It is not a positive law for the Moors, but authenticated by him, and transferred into his code of laws, and originally in the nature of what our common*

OMYCHUND
v. BARKER.

law is. *Moors have their particular oath which they ought to make in that manner.* This form of expression rather shews that it refers to some other law that prevailed long before.

This falls in exactly with what Lord *Stair*, *Puffendorf*, & say, that it has been the wisdom of all nations to administer such oaths, as are agreeable to the notion of the person taking, and does not at all affect the conscience of the person administering: nor does it in any respect adopt such religion: it is not necessary so much a breaking in upon the rule of law, as admitting a person to be an evidence in his own cause.

The case of the
East-India Company and admiral
Matthews, in the court of
Exchequer mis-
stated, for there
is no such thing
as sending one
judge out of a
court to the
judges of another
upon a point of
evidence.

I will just take notice of the case of the *East-India Company* and Admiral *Matthews*. I was counsel myself in the cause, but do not at all remember sending either to the court of King Bench, or Common Pleas, for their opinion. Mr. *Bunbury* has stated it as a trial at bar before Lord Chief Baron *Reynolds*, and therefore it could not be done, for there is no such thing as sending one judge out of a court to the judges of another upon a point of evidence. As to the case before Lord Chief Justice *Eyre*, the person there would not be sworn either upon the Old or New Testament; and therefore as he was not a *Christian*, I would not admit him to be a witness: but, upon the special circumstances of this case, I concur in opinion with my Lord the Judges, that the depositions of these witnesses ought to be read as evidence in this cause, and do therefore order that the objection be over-ruled, and the depositions read.

[51]

Ramkissenfeet v. Barker and others.

November the
24th 1737.

Case 11.

Ante 19. S. C.

A bill brought
for an account
against the repre-
sentatives of an
East India gover-
nor, who plead-
ed that the plain-
tiff was an alien
born, and alien

IT came on upon the joint pleas of the widow, and the son of the late Mr. *Barker*, governor of *Patna* in the *East Indies* who had in his life-time employed the plaintiff in private trade as his banyan or broker: they being made defendants to a bill brought against them as the representatives of *Barker* for an account; it was pleaded that the plaintiff was *an alien born*, *an alien infidel*, not of the Christian faith, and upon a cross bill incapable of being examined upon oath, and therefore disqualified from suing here.

born, and alien infidel, and could have no suit here.

The plea over-
ruled, for being
a mere personal
demand, the
plaintiff may
bring in a bill in
this court.

Lord Chancellor said, as the plaintiff's was a mere personal demand, it was extremely clear that he might bring a bill in this court; and over-ruled the defendants' plea, without hearing on counsel of either side.

C A P. IX.

Amendment.

(A) In what Case allowed or not.

Anon.

Hilligan v. Mitchell
J. M. Craig. 438.

March 24th,
1738. The last
seal after Hilary
Term.

IT was said by Lord Chancellor: That after publication is past, there is no instance of a plaintiff's obtaining an order to amend his bill, without withdrawing his replication (1).

Case 12.

After publica-
tion plaintiff
cannot amend
without withdrawing his replication.

(1) See *Goodwin v. Goodwin*, post. 3 vol. 370, 371.

C A P. X.

Answers Pleas, and Demurrers.

[52]

(A) What shall be a good Plea and well pleaded.

Chamberlain v. Knapp.

Hilary Term,
1735.
February 8th.

A Will having been made for the sale of lands for payment of debts, the present bill was brought by a creditor against the widow of the testator in possession of some of the lands devised, praying a discovery of her title.

Case 13.

Lands devised to
be sold for pay-
ment of debts.
Bill brought by
her in her possession.

a creditor of testator against his widow, to discover her title to lands in her possession.

She pleads, that by a deed of settlement she had a jointure of all the lands laying in a town called and that she was willing to make a discovery, if plaintiff would confirm her jointure, not otherwise (1); the plea did not set out, either the date of the deed, or the particular parcel of the lands contained in it.

She pleads a set-
tlement and
jointure, and
offers to discover
if plaintiff will
confirm it, but
neither sets out
the date, nor

lands contained in the settlement.

Lord Chancellor held the plea bad, for both these reasons, and that a purchaser for a valuable consideration would be bound to set forth those two matters. Plea over-ruled.

The plea over-
ruled, for she
ought to have set
forth both these
matters.

(1) See *Lord Portsmouth v. Lady Effingham*, 1 Ves. 430. *Leech v. Trollop*, 2 Ves. 662. *Scarbouse v. Earl*, 2 Ves. 450. *Ford v. Peering*, Ves. junr. 76.

Duncalf v. Blake.

February the
8th, 1737.

Case 14.

THE plaintiff subscribed a policy of insurance for a considerable sum of money; the ship was lost, and, as suggested, fraudulently, and with a view of charging the plaintiff with the policy.

E 2

The

**DUNCALF V.
BLAKE.**

AN insurer by his bill suggests the ship was lost fraudulently, and in the charging part mentions that, instead of proper goods, there was only wool on board; and in the interrogatory part, prays defendant may set out what kind of goods he had on board.

The bill sets forth, that the ship, instead of having proper mercantile goods on board, being bound from one of the ports of *Ireland*, to one of the ports in *France*, had only wool on board. By the interrogatory part of the bill it was prayed, that the defendant might set out what kind of goods he had on board, which the invoices were, in what manner the ship was cleared, and whether she had not arms on board her.

[53]
Defendant pleads several statutes that make it penal to export wool, in bar to a discovery of all kind of goods on board.

The defendant, as to so much of the bill as sought a discovery of the particular nature and quality of the goods mentioned to be shipped on board the said ship to be sent to *France* and what quantity, pleaded an act of parliament of 1 Will. 1 Mar. That no wool shall be shipped from *Ireland*, or imported from thence to any port but *Liverpool*, and some others in *England* which was afterwards made perpetual by the 7 Will. 3 Mar. and by another act made the 10 & 11 W. 3. it is enacted, That none shall directly or indirectly export from *Ireland* into any foreign dominion any wool, and all offenders against this act are made liable to the forfeiture of the said wool, and also to a forfeiture of 500 for every offence. That the value of the cargo on board the said ship, and insured by plaintiffs, is by the policy ascertained at 3500*l.* by the sum insured thereon, and therefore it can in no way concern the plaintiffs to know the particulars of the goods; but the discovery thereof may occasion several forfeitures, and the bill charging that the goods shipped on board &c. by the defendant, were to be sent to *Pontrefe* in *France* which by the laws and statutes of this realm is prohibited, and highly penal, and the discovery manifestly tending to draw the defendant to accuse himself; he submitted, Whether he should be compelled to make any other answer.

The Attorney General for the plaintiff admitted, that, in the charging part of the bill, nothing was mentioned to be on board but wool; but, by the interrogatory part, defendant asked in general, What kind of goods he had on board? and defendant's plea goes in bar to a discovery of all kinds of goods which were on board.

The plea allowed, because no goods but wool mentioned in the charging part, if there had been others, defendant must have given some answer to it.

Lord Chancellor allowed the plea (1); but agreed, if other kind of goods had been mentioned in the charging part, the defendant might have been obliged perhaps to have given for answer to it, but as there was not, defendant was not obliged to answer that interrogatory part: The only doubt he had was as to the clearing of the ship, and having arms on board, and that part of the bill he thought afterwards might be covered by the plea.

Agreed in this case, that a plea may be bad in part, and yet not so in the whole (2).

(1) See *Harrison v. Southcote*, post 528. and the cases cited there in note under page 59.

(2) *Barri of Suffolk v. Green*, post 451. *Harrison v. Southcote*, post 539. *Earl of*

Derby v. Duke of Athol, 1 Ves. 26. *East India Company v. Campbell*, ibid. 247. *Finch v. Finch*, 2 Ves. 432. *Ship of Sodor and Man v. Earl of Derby*, ibid. 337.

Deggs v. Colebrooke.

February the
19th, 1738.

Vide title Costs.

Morgan v. Morgan.

March the 3d,
1738.

IT was in this case laid down by *Lord Chancellor* as a rule, that where a defendant pleads a decree of dismissal of a former cause, for the same matters, in bar of the plaintiff's demand on his new bill, if the plaintiff does not apply to the court, that it may be referred to a Master to state, whether there is such a decree, but sets down the cause upon the new bill for hearing, it is a waiver of his right of application for such reference, and the court will determine it.

Case 15.

[54]

Chabman v. Turner.

August the 9th,
1739.

LORD Chancellor: The defence proper for a plea must be such as reduces the cause to a particular point (1), and from thence creates a bar to the suit, and is to save the parties expence in examination, and it is not every good defence in equity that is likewise good as a plea; for where the defence consists of a variety of circumstances, there is no use of a plea, the examination must still be at large, and the effect of allowing such a plea, will be, that the court will give their judgment on the circumstances of the case, before they are made out by proof (2).

Case 16.

The defence proper for a plea must be such as reduces the cause to a particular point, and from thence creates a bar to the suit, and every good defence in equity is not likewise good as a plea.

(1) *Whitbread v. Brockbush, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 417.*

(2) *Brownfaword v. Edwards, 2 Ves. 247.*

C A P. XI.

Apprentice.

Vide title Master and Servant.

C A P. XII.

Arrest.

(A) *Where good though on a Sunday.*

Ex parte Kerney.

December the
22d, 1744.

THE petitioner, who had been an assignee under a commission against *Philip Shehan*, was discharged by order of *Lord Chancellor*, and directed to convey to new assignees, and

Case 17.

Q. If a man is liable to be arrested while

under the summons of commissioners of bankrupts.

DUNCALF V.
BLAKE.

An insurer by
his bill suggests
the ship was lost
fraudulently,
and in the charg-
ing part men-
tion, that, in-
stead of proper

good, there was only wool on board; and in the interrogatory part, prays defendant may set a kind of goods he had on board.

[53]

Defendant pleads
several statutes
that make it pe-
nal to export
wool, in bar to a
discovery of all
kind of goods on
board.

The defendant, as to so much of the bill as sought recovery of the particular nature and quality of the goods mentioned to be shipped on board the said ship to be sent to and what quantity, pleaded an act of parliament of 1 W. Mar. That no wool shall be shipped from Ireland, or imported thence to any port but Liverpool, and some others in England, which was afterwards made perpetual by the 7 Will. 3. and by another act made the 10 & 11 W. 3. it is enacted none shall directly or indirectly export from Ireland into any dominion any wool, and all offenders against this act are made to the forfeiture of the said wool, and also to a forfeiture of for every offence. That the value of the cargo on board said ship, and insured by plaintiffs, is by the policy assessed at 3500*l.* by the sum insured thereon, and therefore no ways concern the plaintiffs to know the particulars goods; but the discovery thereof may occasion several injuries, and the bill charging that the goods shipped on &c. by the defendant, were to be sent to *Pontrefe* in which by the laws and statutes of this realm is prohibited highly penal, and the discovery manifestly tending to do the defendant to accuse himself; he submitted, What should be compelled to make any other answer.

The Attorney General for the plaintiff admitted, that, charging part of the bill, nothing was mentioned to board but wool; but, by the interrogatory part, defendant asked in general, What kind of goods he had on board defendant's plea goes in bar to a discovery of all kinds of which were on board.

The plea allowed, because no goods but wool mentioned in the charging part, if there had been some, defendant must have given some answer to it.

Lord Chancellor allowed the plea (1); but agreed, if kind of goods had been mentioned in the charging part, defendant might have been obliged perhaps to have given answer to it, but as there was not, defendant was not to answer that interrogatory part: The only doubt he has as to the clearing of the ship, and having arms on board that part of the bill he thought afterwards might be covered by the plea.

Agreed in this case, that a plea may be bad in part, and not so in the whole (2).

(1) See *Harrison v. Southcott*, post 528. and the cases cited there in note under page 59.

(2) *Earl of Suffolk v. Green*, post 451. *Harrison v. Southcott*, post 539. *Earl of*

Derby v. Duke of Athol,
East India Company v.
24

Ex parte
KERNY.

[55]

to account seven days after he had conveyed to the new assignees and passed his accounts; but being an incumbered person, he begged the commissioners would give him their summons for the next sitting under the commission; the commissioners told him, that as he had done every thing that was necessary in pursuance of *Lord Chancellor's* order, it would be of no use to him; but however upon his importunity they did give him the summons.

Kerny attended on the day mentioned in the summons, and was examined two hours; as he was returning home, or *Lawn* a sheriff's officer arrested him, and notwithstanding *Kerny* shewed him the commissioners' summons, he damned it, and said he did not regard it of a farthing, and kept him in custody several hours.

The petitioner now applies to *Lord Chancellor* to be discharged from the arrest, and that the officer may be censured for his abuse of the commissioners' warrant of summons.

Lawn the sheriff's officer admits the arrest in his affidavit but denies his abusing the summons.

Lord Chancellor : I think this a matter of great consequence.

1st, Material as to commissioners of bankrupt in general.

2^{dly}, Material with regard to the liberty of the subject.

3^{dly}, Material in other commissions under the great seal as of charitable uses, commissions of lunacy, &c. for sham arrests may be set up, even by the persons themselves, in order to prevent their attendance to be examined as witnesses before such commissioners.

Ordered, That *Charles Lawn*, before the next day of petitions, give security, to be approved of before a Master, for his attending *de die in diem*, to answer interrogatories to be exhibited concerning the contempts charged upon him in the affidavit of the petitioner, late assignee of *Philip Shehan*. And if *Lawn* should not give such security, ordered, he should stand committed to the *Fleet* for the said contempts; and *Lawn* shall give such security, then ordered that the petitioner do within a week after such security exhibit interrogatories before the Master, for examining *Lawn* touching the said contempts, and that *Lawn* do attend the said Master *de die in diem* for that purpose.

And as no precedents have been produced of like cases before the court, of arrests, notwithstanding commissioners' warrant, tho' it very probably may have happened; let the petitioner stand over till the next day of petitions, and a search be made for such cases, and what the court have done upon it; and the mean time recommended it to the counsel for the sheriff's officer, to advise him to discharge the petitioner (1).

(1) See *Ex parte Dick*, and *Ex parte Stow*, 2 *Black. Rep.* 1142.

Ex parte Whitchurch.

June the 2d,
1749.

HANCOCK and Hooper, the assignees of Halliday, a bankrupt, obtained an order for a Master to take an account of the dealings between Whitchurch and the bankrupt, who reported 231 l. 5 s. 0 d. to be due from him to the bankrupt; and on arguing exceptions to that report, Lord Chancellor settled the sum at 226 l. only, which Whitchurch was ordered to pay to Halliday's assignees.

Cafe 18. The petitioner was arrested on a Sunday by Lord Chancellor's tipstaff, under a warrant of the court for a contempt in disobeying an order;

he now prayed to be discharged, insisting his arrest and commitment to the Fleet was illegal, being contrary to the statute of the 29 Car. 2. c. 7. s. 6. Lord Chancellor doubtful at first, but on consideration thought it a lawful arrest, though on a Sunday.

Whitchurch not paying the money pursuant to the order, on [*56] the 19th of June his Lordship granted the following warrant for apprehending him and carrying him to the Fleet.

"In the matter of Edward Halliday, a bankrupt,

*Sent to Clarke
1. Reg. v. M. 56*

"Whereas by an order dated the 28th day of November, made in this matter upon the petition of Jonathan Hancock and Richard Hooper, assignees of Edward Halliday the bankrupt, it was ordered, that William Whitchurch should stand committed to the prison of the Fleet, for his contempt in the said order mentioned, and that a warrant for such his commitment should issue accordingly; these are therefore in pursuance of the said order to will and require you forthwith, upon receipt hereof, to make diligent search after the body of the said William Whitchurch, and wherever you shall find him, to arrest and apprehend him, and to carry him to the prison of the Fleet, there to remain till further order, willing and requiring all mayors, sheriffs, justices of the peace, constables, head-boroughs, and all other his Majesty's officers, and loving subjects, to be aiding and assisting to you in the due execution of the premises, as they tender his Majesty's service, and will answer the contrary hereof at their perils; and this shall be to you, or any of you, that shall so do the same, a sufficient warrant. Dated this 16th day of June 1748."

HARDWICKE, C.

To John Eyles, Esq; Warden of the Fleet, or his deputy, attending the High Court of Chancery.

By virtue of this warrant Whitchurch was on Sunday the 9th of October last, between 4 and 5 in the afternoon arrested at Frome in Somersetshire, by James Adlam, his Lordship's tipstaff, by the order and direction, and in the presence of Mr. Stephen Skurray, solicitor for the assignees of Halliday, and by them detained at Frome till Monday morning, and then conveyed by Adlam to the Fleet prison, where he still is charged with that warrant only.

The petitioner insisted that being arrested on a Sunday, by virtue of a warrant founded on his Lordship's order, for non-payment

Ex parte
WHITCHURCH.

[57]

payment of money only, and not for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, it is contrary to the statute of the 29th of Charles the Second, *ch.* 17. intituled, An Act for the better observation of the Lord's day, commonly called *Sunday*, *sec.* 6. "Provided also that no person or persons upon the Lord's day shall serve or execute, or cause to be served and executed, any writ, process, warrant, order, judgment, or decree, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace, but that the service of every such writ, process, warrant, order, judgment, or decree, shall be void to all intents and purposes whatsoever."

And therefore, the arrest being illegal, insisted that he was illegally detained in custody, and ought to be discharged.

Against the petition was read the affidavit of James Adlam who swore that on the 9th of October last, being Sunday the evening, *Whitchurch* came into the yard of the *George Inn* in *Froome*, where *Adlam* was, and he thereupon told *Whitchurch* he had my Lord Chancellor's warrant against him to which *Whitchurch* immediately answered, he knew it, and heard he was there, and came on purpose to be taken up; and that he several times after, both the same night and the next day declared the same."

Adlam's affidavit was confirmed by two others to the same effect. "He likewise says he has often been told, and always apprehended these warrants for contempts might be executed on a Sunday, and he has himself done it several times, and was never complained of before on that account." And it is agreed on all hands that a commission of rebellion may be executed on a Sunday, though it issued for want of an appearance, or an answer only, and it does not appear to the officer by the warrant for what the commitment issues, as may be seen by the copy of the warrant.

Mr. Attorney General against the petition cited 6 *Mod.* 9. *Carth.* 504. and the same case in *Salk. Parker v. Sir William Moore* 626.

Lord Chancellor: It appears from the affidavits, that there is not any occasion for the court to make any stretch in the petitioner's favour, and he was besides endeavouring to defraud the creditors of *Halliday* by absconding.

When this petition came on before, I was a good deal doubtful, and rather inclined to think it was a case within the statute of the 29th of Charles the Second; but upon looking in the matter since, I have in a good measure altered my mind, and think it a lawful arrest, though on a Sunday.

But I will observe first, as to the voluntary surrender of the petitioner to *Adlam* my tipstaff.

A man may
surrender him-
self voluntarily
to any warrant
upon a Sunday.

The strength of the evidence goes to his voluntary surrender for the fact is positively sworn to by three persons, and denied by *Whitchurch's* affidavit only; and there can be no doubt but a man may, if he pleases, surrender himself voluntarily to a warrant on a Sunday.

T

The order of commitment which has been made in this cause, is very different from processes that issue to sheriffs, &c. for it is, *That the party should stand committed*, and is different too from most of the orders, in other courts.

*Ex parte
Whitchurch.*

The order of commitment here, *that the party should*

stand committed, and if petitioner had been present when the order was pronounced, he was instantly a prisoner.

If this man had been present in court when the order was pronounced, he was instantly a prisoner, and the warden might have taken him away to gaol directly.

The books of practice, though I do not say they are of authority, yet all agree in saying it down that the party is considered as a prisoner from the time of the order pronounced.

[58]

This is a warrant directed to the *very gaoler* to take him and carry him to prison, and differs from warrants of other courts, which are directed to sheriffs, and other ministerial officers, and not directed to the gaoler; and I do not know that this is done in any instance, but where the party is considered as the prisoner of the gaoler from the time of the order pronounced.

Escape-warrants are in aid of the gaoler, and command all officers, constables, &c. to assist him.

And this very warrant is drawn up in the same manner, and therefore alike in this respect, and escape-warrants may be put in execution on a *Sunday*.

In the case of Sir ——— *Cecil*, and others of the town of *Nottingham*, Cases in King *William's* time 348. "The question was, Whether serving an attachment upon a *Sunday* for a contempt was within the statute against sabbath-breaking? Said Lord Chief Justice *Holt*, suppose it were a warrant to take for forgery, perjury, &c. shall they not be served on a *Sunday*? And shall not any process at the King's suit be served on *Sunday*? Surely the Lord's Day ought not to be a sanctuary for malefactors, and this case partakes of the nature of process upon an indictment "

Lord Chief Justice *Holt* of opinion a man might be taken upon a *Sunday* on a process of contempt, because in the nature of a breach of the peace, and an exception out of the act of parliament.

So that Lord Chief Justice *Holt* was inclined to think that a man might be taken upon a process of contempt on *Sunday*, because it was in the nature of a breach of the peace, and an exception out of the act of parliament.

7. If a man may be taken on an attachment for non-performance of an award upon a *Sunday* (1) as was held by the court of Common Pleas in a case cited by the Attorney General, why is not a contempt for non-performance of an order of this court, equally a breach of the peace, as the non-performance of an award.

Held that a man might be taken on a *Sunday* upon an attachment for non-performance of an award. A contempt for non-performance of

an order of this court equally a breach of the peace.

8. Therefore, as it seems to be warranted by the words of the warrant itself, that he is a prisoner from the time of the order

(1) In *King v. Myers*, 1 *Durn. & East's Rep.* 266. the case here cited of an attachment for non-performance of an award upon a *Sunday*, was said to have been over-ruled by subsequent cases.

pro-

Ex parte
WHITCHURCH.

Lord Chancellor
dismissed the pe-
tition as he is -
not without re-
medy, for he may bring an *habeas corpus*, or an action of false imprisonment.

pronounced, I will not discharge him, especially as he without remedy; for he may bring an *habeas corpus*, or action of false imprisonment, and therefore order that the petition for his discharge be dismissed.

medy, for he may bring an *habeas corpus*, or an action of false imprisonment.

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C A P. XIII.

Assets.

Vide title Heir and Ancestor, and Executors and Administrators

February the
4th, 1739.

Ryall v. Ryall.

Cause 19.
S. C. Amb. 413.
A. gives several
legacies, and
makes *B.* his ex-
ecutor and resi-
duary legatee.
B. receives all
the assets, and
buys lands with
the money, and
dies, and also bought the equity of redemption of another estate on which *A.* had a mortgage brought by legatees, to be paid their legacies out of *A.*'s real and personal estate. The court on an inquiry, whether part of the assets were laid out in the purchase of an estate, and if the declared they ought to be restored to testator's personal estate. The equity of redemption is to be assets.

THE testator gave several legacies, and made *B.* his executor and residuary legatee. *B.* receives all the and buys lands with the money, and dies, and likewise bought the equity of redemption of another estate on which testator a mortgage. The bill was brought by the several legatees against the administrator and heir at law of *B.* to be paid their legacies out of his real and personal estate.

mirrored as follows
Arms. & Last:
— 489.

First question, If the personal assets are not sufficient, whether the legatees may not come upon the purchased estate for satisfaction?

Second question, Whether the equity of redemption of mortgaged estate bought since the death of the testator, may be considered still as the assets of the testator, and liable to answer the legacies?

For the plaintiffs was cited the case of *Bolney v. Han* before Lord King, July the 4th, 1729.

For the defendant, *Kirk v. Webb*, *Prec. in Ch.* 84. and *K v. Milward*, 2 *Vern.* 440.

Lord Chancellor: Courts of equity have been very cautious how they follow money which has been laid out in land cause it has no ear-mark, though they have done it in cases (1).

The principal difficulty in these cases is, with regard to proof; for the different interests of the parties introduce a variety of evidence, and is no small temptation to perjury.

(1) *Vide Kirk v. Webb*, *Prec. Cha.* 84. 2 *Vern.* 440. S. C. 2 *Eq. Ab.* 744. *Heron v. Heron*, *ibid.* 163. 2 *Eq. Ab.* S. C. *Deg v. Deg*, 2 *P. W.* 744. S. C. *Hakot v. Markant*, *Prec. Waite v. Whitworth*, *post.* 2 vol. 159 *Cra* 168. 2 *Eq. Ab.* 744 pl. 3. S. C. *Bolney v. Hamilton*, *Amb.* 414. *L. Kinder v. Milward*, *Prec. Cha.* 172. *Digby*, *Amb.* 409.

But in the present case I think it is necessary there should be an inquiry, whether part of the assets of the testator have been laid out in the purchase of an estate? Because if it should plainly appear that they have been so laid out, they ought to be restored to the personal estate of the testator.

Supposing the executor had been living, and had by his answer owned that he had laid out part of the assets in such purchase, *it would have removed the objection of fraud, and perjury, by letting in parol proof; but the person now before the court is only the administrator of the executor, and though he does indeed admit that credit is given to the accounts of the executor, yet this is no evidence against the infant heir at law, but it is ground for an inquiry into this fact, and the means of coming at this by way of resulting trust is excepted out of the statute of frauds; if the estate is purchased in the name of one, and the money paid by another, it is a trust notwithstanding there is no declaration in writing by the nominal purchaser (1), and upon enquiry a little matter will do to make it a charge *pro tanto*.

As to the second point with regard to the equity of redemption, I think it is very clear that it must be considered as assets, and liable to the legacies.

RYALL v.
RYALL.

Where an estate is purchased in the name of one, and the money paid by another, it is a trust notwithstanding there is no declaration in writing by the nominal purchaser.

[*60]

(1) *Loyd v. Spillet*, *post* 2 vol. 150.

C A P. XIV.

Award and Arbitrement.

(A) *Parties only affected by it.*

(B) *For what Causes set aside.*

(A) *Parties only affected by it.*

Thompson v. Noel et al.

Easter term,
1738.

FOWLER, one of the defendants, enters into articles previous to his marriage, in consideration of 1100*l.* portion, to vest 1000*l.* in trustees within six months after his marriage, the interest thereof to be received by him and his wife, during their lives, and afterwards the 1000*l.* was to be equally divided between the issue of that marriage; and, as a farther security for the performance of this agreement, gives a warrant of attorney to the trustees to confess a judgment for that sum, which is soon afterwards entered up: *Fowler* after that enters into a partnership in the wine trade with one *Hamilton*, and being

Case 20.
A. by articles previous to his marriage agrees to vest 1000*l.* in trustees; the interest thereof to be received by *A.* and his wife, during their lives, and afterwards to be divided between their issue, and gives the trustees a warrant of attorney to confess a judgment for that sum which was entered up accordingly. *A.* enters into partnership with *B.* afterwards, and being indebted to the partnership estate in more than his interest in that estate, they submit the difference between them to arbitration, and part of the stock in trade is awarded to be lodged in the hands of a third person; any part to be delivered to either of the parties on making it appear, any bond or other debt due from the partnership had been paid by either, the quantity to be delivered in proportion to the money paid.

gives a warrant of attorney to confess a judgment for that sum which was entered up accordingly. *A.* enters into partnership with *B.* afterwards, and being indebted to the partnership estate in more than his interest in that estate, they submit the difference between them to arbitration, and part of the stock in trade is awarded to be lodged in the hands of a third person; any part to be delivered to either of the parties on making it appear, any bond or other debt due from the partnership had been paid by either, the quantity to be delivered in proportion to the money paid.

indebted

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v. NOEL et al'.**

indebted to the partnership estate in a larger sum of money than his interest in the partnership effects, or any other property he had, could satisfy, the two partners submit the difference between them to arbitration, and accordingly a parol award is made, that 40 pipes of wine, part of the stock in trade, should be lodged in the hands of a third person, one *Hayward*; but any part thereof to be delivered to either of the partners on producing any bond, &c. which had been entered into on account of the partnership, paid off by the party producing the same; the quantity of wine to be delivered to be in proportion to the money so paid off.

The trustees in the marriage articles bring a *fiere facias* on the judgment confessed to them, and take a moiety of the deposited stock in execution as the property of *A*.

The 40 pipes of wine were accordingly deposited, with the consent of *Hamilton* and *Fowler*, in the hands of *Hayward*, afterwards a *fiere fa.* is brought on the judgment so confessed to the trustees in the marriage articles, and a moiety of these 40 pipes taken in execution by a *fiere facias* as the property of *Fowler*.

Bill by the partnership creditors to set aside the execution, and to have a moiety of the stock so seized appropriated to payment of their debts, insisting it was specifically bound by the award, and the execution of it. The plaintiffs being no parties to the submission, nor privy at all to the transaction, nor under an obligation of abiding by the award, ought not to have the benefit of it, and therefore bill dismissed.

The bill is now brought by *Hamilton*, who is likewise a separate creditor of *Fowler*, and twelve other creditors on the account of the partnership, to set aside this execution, and to have the value of the moiety of the 40 pipes of wine appropriated to the payment of the debts of these creditors, supposing the pipes of wine specifically bound by the award, and the execution of it, by depositing them in the hands of *Hayward* according to the award.

Mr. *Fazakerley* for the plaintiff, taking it for granted the award with respect to the deposit of the wine was intended as a provision for the creditors on the partnership account, and, as a security for the payment of their debts, insisted that every award, when made, was considered, in point of law, as the very act of the parties submitting to the determination of the arbitrators, and as the agreement of the parties themselves; and it is upon that foot an action of debt lies against the party on the award, for when a submission is made a rule of court, an attachment lies for non-performance of the award, as a breach of his own agreement, which by rule of court he had engaged to perform; and that this case therefore must be considered in the same light, as if the parties themselves in the first instance had, without the intervention of any arbitrators, agreed to make a deposit of these pipes of wine for the purpose mentioned in the award; that in such case the creditors, tho' there might be no alteration in the property made thereby, would have an equitable lien on these wines specifically in satisfaction of their debts, and as such would prevail against any execution afterwards at the suit of any other person; that the judgment creditors here, the trustees, merely as such, had no interest in these wines, but that right must arise, if at all, from the *fiere facias*, which could not take place here, as there was a prior equitable lien upon them: That indeed,

where

e goods are specifically bound in equity, and a purchaser out notice, &c. afterwards gains a legal right in them, he advanced his money at the time upon the credit of those goods, as such purchaser has an equal equitable lien, and law too on his side, his right will prevail; but it is otherwise the creditor at the time his demand first accrued, only on the personal security, and general credit of his debtor; there any legal right which he obtains afterwards in of the effects of his debtor, must be subject to every such prior equitable lien, which they were liable to in the hands of the debtor himself, and such creditor can only stand in the shoes of his debtor; as in the case of bankruptcy, the assignees, tho' perhaps equally creditors with any others (who have obtained an equitable lien on any of the bankrupt's effects specifically) and have the law on their side too, the property of the bankrupt's effects being vested in the assignees, yet must only stand in the place of the bankrupt, and take his share subject to all those equitable charges, which they were liable to in the hands of the bankrupt. *Vide Salk. 449. Taylor v. Taylor, and Eq. Cas. Abr. 320. Burgh v. Francis.*

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Mr. Noel & Co. contra insisted that the creditors had no right to a bill to have this award carried into execution, not being assents to the submission, nor concerned therein, it being a matter altogether transacted between *Fowler* and *Hamilton* only; therefore as the creditors would not at all be concluded by the award, but at liberty still to pursue their remedy as they thought proper, for the recovery of their debts, there was no reason why they should have any benefit from this award, because it happened to be in their favour; he relied likewise on want of sufficient evidence on the part of the plaintiffs, to show the acquiescence of *Fowler* in the award, or even his knowledge what the award was; and indeed the only evidence that it was his purpose was his applying to the arbitrators before the award was finally made, to let him have part of the wine to carry on his trade with (which the arbitrators would not comply with), and his agreement afterwards with *Hamilton* to have the wines deposited in the hands of *Hayward*, but no evidence that he was present when the award was made, nor any other evidence that he was informed of the contents of it.

And Chancellor: A bill to carry an award into execution, where there is no acquiescence in it by the parties to the submission, or agreement by them afterwards to have it executed, certainly not lie (1); but the remedy to enforce a performance of the award must be taken at law: It has been said the evidence here of *Fowler's* agreement to the award after it was made, was not sufficient to found a decree on; but what he actually relied on was, that none of the plaintiffs, the defendants, were parties to the submission, nor did it appear that they were so much as privy at all to the transaction; and there-

A bill will not lie to carry an award into execution where the parties to the submission do not acquiesce in it, nor agree afterwards to have it executed, but must be enforced at law.

See *Norton v. Masfall*, 2 Ch. Rep. after, 1 Eq. Ab. 51. 2 Vern. 444. S. C. 2 Vera. 24. S. C. *Bishop v. Webb*.

fore,

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fore, as they were under no obligation of abiding by the award, they ought not to have the benefit of it; and in reading over the award (which, at the time of making it, was taken down in writing). he observed it was calculated only for the indemnity of *Hamilton* against the failure of *Fowler*, without any regard had at all to the creditors, there being no provision made, that the wines should be sold, or otherwise employed for raising money for the payment of debts of the plaintiffs: that though an agreement made between the two partners, and particular creditors, to appropriate a particular part of the partnership effects for the payment of those creditors, might create a lien on those goods specifically for the payment of their debts, in preference to the rest of the creditors; yet an agreement of that kind between the partners only, would certainly not disable any of the creditors from pursuing their remedy at law against the effects of the debtor, any more than if no such agreement had been made.

The bill dismissed.

(B) *For what Causes set aside.*

June the 18th, 1737. Upon Appeal from the Rolls.

June the 18th,
1737.

Mary Medculfe Widow, and William Ives,
William Ives and Ann his Wife by cross Bill, Plaintiffs.
Mary Medcalfe and Richard Johnson and Wife Defendants.

Case 21.

S. C. cited 7 Vi-
ner, 221. pl. 19.
1 Vef. 11.

A. and his wife
covenant in arti-
cles before mar-
riage, in con-
sideration of
2000l. the wife's
portion, to re-
lease all the right
that might accrue
to them out of
her father's per-
sonal estate, by
the custom of
London.

THE bill in this case was brought to have a specifick performance of articles made on the marriage of the defendant *Richard Johnson*, whereby the said defendant and his wife (1) covenanted, in consideration of 2000l. the wife's marriage portion, to release all the right and interest that might accrue to them out of her father's personal estate, by the custom of the city of *London*, he being a freeman, and also to set aside an award alledged to have been unduly obtained upon a submission of the controversies between the parties, concerning the right to this orphanage part.

As to the first part of the case, the defence made for the defendant was, that the customary part being a mere possibility, and contingency, which might or might not happen, it could not be released, and if it could, that, at the time of the articles, the wife was an infant, and so not bound by them; besides that the 2000l. was no consideration for releasing such an interest, the wife's father, one *Russel*, having died worth upwards of 20,000l.

J^r Braddellbone

Charles

C & F. 43.

Bridges & Sutton

L. M. by H. H.

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Lord Chancellor: Though hardships may happen on my determination, yet these are considerations too loose either for a judge at law, or in this court, to lay any weight upon; and

(1) The articles were dated the 4th then under age. Reg. Lib. B. 1736. fol. day of February 1703, and the wife was 445.

I must

Reverend Reader

Be aware H. H.

must determine according to the facts, by the rules of law, and of this court: in this case there appeared to be a valuable consideration for the agreement in the articles, because, at the time the 2000*l.* was given, the defendant's wife was intitled to no part of the estate of her father, and it was given for her advancement in the world, and it is highly reasonable that such kind of articles should be carried into execution, and that when a father is bountiful to his children in his life-time, that he should have his affairs settled to his own satisfaction.

As to the objection of the customary part being a possibility, and merely in contingency, it is of no weight, for there is no doubt but it might be released in equity (1); but here it is a covenant which the defendant is bound by in all events, and it is no objection to say, the wife was under age; for though in this respect, if the husband were dead, the articles would not bind her, and she would by survivorship be intitled to the customary share, as a chose in action not recovered, or received by the husband; yet he being alive, it is a matter that accrues to him in right of his wife, and he may release it, and his release will bind her; and therefore it was reasonable he should perform his covenant (2). I found my opinion too on an old law well known in the city by the name of *Jud's law*, whereby a husband was authorised to agree with the father for the wife, though she was under age (3).

Upon this another question arose, whether the orphanage share, so to be released by the defendant, should fall into the dead man's part, and go wholly according to his disposition of the residue of his estate, as a thing purchased by him; or, whether it should fall into his personal estate, and be distributed with it according to the custom? And at first I inclined to think that it was in the nature of a purchase by the father, and so wholly in his power to make a disposition of it by his will; but, upon hearing the Attorney-general to this matter, I am of opinion, that as in equity things covenanted to be done, are as things actually done, it must be considered if the husband had actually released, and so is an extinguishment of his wife's right to the orphanage part, and being an extinguishment of the right, it leaves the estate of the father as if had never been charged with it, and must therefore be considered as a part of his general personal estate, and not to go wholly to the executor of the father, as a part of the dead man's share. Cases cited, 1 *Vern.* 6. 2 *Vern.* 665, 666, 1 *Will.* 644, 45. 2 *Will.* 527. (4).

IVES v.
MEDCALFE.

Boy v. Boy
1 *Ormsby* 42

[64]

The husband is bound by his covenant, and though the wife was under age, yet it is a matter that accrues to him in the right of his wife, and he may release it, and his release will bind her.

The husband's covenanting to release, is an extinguishment of the wife's right to the orphanage part, and if so, leaves the estate of the father as if it had never been charged, and therefore must be considered as a part of his general personal estate, and not go wholly to the father's executor, as a part of the dead man's share.

(1) So *Blundel v. Barker*, 1 *P. W.* 639, 46. *Cox v. Beliba*, 2 *P. W.* 273. *Lockwood v. Savage*, 2 *Stra.* 947. *Secus* if a mere voluntary release. *Morris v. Burroughs*, *post.* 399.

(2) *Blundel v. Barker*, 1 *P. W.* 640. *Morris v. Burroughs*, *post.* 402.

(3) See *Hearn v. Barber*, *post.* 3 vol. 213.

(4) So *Pufey v. Desbonverie*, 3 *P. W.* 320. *Morris v. Burroughs*, *post.* 403. *post.* 2 vol. 629. *S. C. Read v. Snell*, *post.* 2 vol. 644. *Hall v. Lumley & other cases* cited, in *Tomkyns v. Ladbroke*, 2 *Ves.* 592.

IVES v.
MEDCALFE.

Where arbitra-
tors are deceived,
or where they
make their award
clandestinely,
without hearing
each party, a
court of justice
will interpose,
and avoid such
award (3).

As to the award, he decreed that it ought to be set aside, in respect that the articles were shewn only to one of the arbitrators, and not to both, and he to whom they were not shewn swore, that if he had seen them, he believed he should not have made such award: His Lordship held therefore, that it was unfairly obtained, but agreed to the general rules in cases of awards that the arbitrators are judges of the parties own chusing (1) and that therefore they cannot object against the award as an unreasonable judgment, or as a judgment against law; but where as in the present case, arbitrators are deceived, or where they make their award clandestinely, without hearing each party; in such cases a court of justice ought to interpose to frustrate and avoid such awards (2).

[65]

Though a bill in
Chancery cannot
be received in
evidence at law,
yet in this court
it may be read,
and has been of-
ten allowed as
evidence.

In this case the plaintiff's bill was offered to be read as evidence for the defendant, and being objected against, it was said, *per Lord Chancellor*: at law, the rule of evidence is, that a bill in chancery ought not to be received in evidence, for it is taken to be the suggestions of counsel only; but in this court it has been often allowed, and the bill was read.

His Lordship reversed the order of dismissal, and declared that by the articles of the 4th of February 1703, the defendant *Johnson* is to be considered in equity, as barred of any customary share in right of his wife, or otherwise, of the person estate of the testator *William Russell* (4).

(1) *Tittenfson v. Peat*, *post*. 3 vol. 529.

(2) *Vide Cornesforth v. Geer*, 2 *Vern.*
705. *Ridout v. Pain*, *post*. 3 vol. 494. 1 *Vesf.*
11. *S. C.* *Tittenfson v. Peat*, *post*. 3 vol.
529. *Anon. ibid.* 644. *Chilcot v. Lequesne*,
2 *Vesf.* 315. *Knox v. Symmonds*, 3 *Bro.*
Cha. Rep. 360. *Kampshire v. Young*,
post. 2 vol. 155. note. 1.

(3) It appearing that Mr. Elleker, the
arbitrator, nominated on the part of the

plaintiff and Mrs. *Metcalf*, was informed of the contents and effect of the said articles, and both bills now hearing, praying to set aside the said award and releases, it was ordered and decreed, that the said award and releases, executed in pursuance thereof, be set aside *Reg. Lib. B.* 1736. fol. 447. See *Norgis v. Ponder*, *Nels. Cha. Rep.* 6.

(4) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1736. fol. 447.

C A P. XV.

Bankrupt.

(A) Concerning the Commission and Commissioners.

(B) Rule as to the Certificate.

(C) Rule as to Assignees.

(D) Joint and separate Commission.

(E) Rule as to his Executor, or where he is one himself.

(F) Rule as to Landlords.

(G) Rule as to Composition.

(H) Rule as to Creditors.

(I) Contingent Debts.

(K) Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills of Exchange.

(L) Where Assignees will be charged with Interest.

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- (M) *Rule as to Partnership.*
- (N) *Rule as to Costs.*
- (O) *The Construction of the Repealing Clause in the Tenth of Queen Anne.*
- (P) *Rule as to Dividends.*
- (Q) *Commission superseded.*
- (R) *Rule as to Bankrupt's Attendance on Assignees.*
- (S) *Rule as to an Apprentice under a Commission of Bankruptcy.*
- (T) *Rule as to discounting of Notes.*
- (V) *Rule as to a Petitioning Creditor.*
- (U) *Rule as to Notes where Interest is not expressed.*
- (W) *The Construction of the Statute of the 21 Jac. 1. c. 19. with Respect to a Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Assignment.*
- (X) *Rule as to Copyholds under Commissions of Bankrupts.*
- (Y) *Where Assignees are liable to the same Equity with the Bankrupt himself.* [66]
- (Z) *What is or is not an Act of Bankruptcy.*
- (Aa) *Rule as to Sales before Commissioners.*
- (Bb) *Rule as to Examinations taken before Commissioners.*
- (Cc) *Who are liable to Bankruptcy.*
- (Dd) *Rule as to his Allowance.*
- (Ee) *Rule as to Solicitors in Bankrupt Cases.*
- (Ff) *Rule as to the Sale of Offices under Commissions of Bankruptcy.*
- (Gg) *What shall or shall not be said to be a Bankrupt's Estate.*
- (Hh) *Where there is a Trust for a Bankrupt's Wife.*
- (Ii) *What is a Trading to make a Man a Bankrupt.*
- (Kk) *Rule as to Acts of Parliament relating to Bankrupts.*
- (Ll) *What is or is not an Election to abide under a Commission.*
- (Mm) *Rule as to Prosecutions against him for Felony in not surrendering himself.*
- (Nn) *Rule as to Contingent Creditors in respect to Dividends.*
- (Oo) *Rule as to mutual Debts and Credits.*
- (Pp) *Whether, during his Time of Privilege, he may be taken by his Bail.*
- (Qq) *Rule as to a Certificate from Commissioners to a Judge.*
- (Rr) *The Effect of Acquiescence under a Commission.*
- (Ss) *Rule as to Debts carrying Interest under a Commission of Bankruptcy.*
- (Tt) *Rule as to Principals and their Factors.*
- (Vv) *Rule as to Annuities under Commissions of Bankruptcy.*
- (Uu) *Rule as to taking out a second Commission.*
- (Ww) *Rule as to an open Account under a Commission of Bankruptcy.*
- (Xx) *Rule as to Principal and Surety.*
- (Yy) *Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors' Act.*
- (Zz) *Rule as to a Bankrupt's future Effects.*
- (Aaa) *Rule as to a cessio bonorum.*
- (Bbb) *Rule as to Deposits under a Commission of Bankruptcy.*
- (Ccc) *Rule as to Relation under Commissions of Bankruptcy.*
- (Ddd) *Rule as to an Extent of the Crown.*
- (Eee) *Rule as to Creditors assenting or dissenting to a Certificate.*
- (Fff) *Bankruptcy no Abatement.*
- (Ggg) *Arrest upon a Sunday for a Contempt regular.*

(A) Concerning the Commission and Commissioners.

Twiss v. Massey.

the 13th,
7.

Case 22.

commission of
bankrupt is an
action and exe-
cution in the first
instance. Sepa-
rate creditors
may come under
a joint commis-
sion, and prove
their debts.

A Father and son join in trade, and have a commission of bankrupt awarded against them jointly; the bill was brought by a plaintiff, suggesting that he was a separate creditor for the sum demanded by the bill; the defendant pleaded his certificate, and that the debt accrued before he became bankrupt.

The question is, How far separate creditors are affected or can act under a joint commission of bankrupt? And Mr. *Brown* for the defendant cited, *ex parte Crowder*, 2 Vern. 706. where separate creditors were allowed to come in under a joint commission, but the joint effects are first to be applied to the partnership debts, and then the separate debts; and as to the separate effects, first the separate creditors, and afterwards the partnership creditors are to be paid out of the same; and therefore the plaintiff might have proved his debt under the commission.

Objection, That it was not affirmed in the plea, that the certificate was signed by four fifths in number and value.

Mr. Attorney General for the plea urged, that such a particular averment was not necessary in this court, though it might be so at law, for it is to be presumed here, till the contrary is proved, as the plea sets forth, that the certificate had been allowed by Lord Chancellor.

Lord Chancellor: As to the objection of its being a joint commission, that is no objection, for it affects joint and separate estates, because it is never taken out but where both are bankrupts; a commission of bankrupt is an action and execution in the first instance. Suppose an action against two partners, and judgment; separate estates are liable to satisfy that judgment so in case of bankrupts, separate creditors may come in under that commission, as well as joint creditors (1).

As this court marshals demands and securities, so joint creditors, as they gave credit to the joint estate, have first their demand on the joint estate, and separate creditors as they gave credit to the separate estate, have first their demand on the separate estate; the joint commission therefore discharges them from all their debts expressly by the act of parliament, and does not mention joint or separate debts (2): but if the bankrupt has since the certificate made a new promise, that de a consideration, and intitles the plaintiff to a discovery therefore his Lordship ordered, that the plea stand answer (3).

If a bankrupt has a certificate under a joint commission, it discharge him from all debts, separate as well as joint.

note. 68.

Ex parte Tale, note A. *ibid.* 1
Strahan, 2 *Sira.* 1157.
Rep. Lib. B. 1737. fol.

Ex parte Sandon.

March the 29th,
1743.

A Petition on behalf of creditors upon the separate estate of two partners, against whom a joint commission is now depending, to be admitted to prove their separate debts under the joint commission. *Lord Chancellor* made an order accordingly, upon their bearing a proportion of the expence according to the value of the two estates: *commissioners, he said, have not a power of doing this without the sanction of the court* (1).

Case 23.
Commissioners have no power of admitting separate creditors to prove debts under a joint commission, without the sanction of the court.

(1) See *ex parte Crowder*, 2 Vern. 706. *Davies* 373. *Twiss v. Massey*, ante 68. *Ex parte Cook*, 2 P. W. 500. *Horsley's* *Ex parte Baudier*, post. 98. In the matter of *Simpson*, post. 138.

Ex parte Simpson the Elder, *Thomas Simpson* and *John Simpson*. August the 1st, the Younger: In the Matter of *Joseph Browning*, a Bankrupt.

1744.

Browning did in his own name contract with the commissioners of the navy, to furnish his majesty's ships with sloop cloths, but the same was in trust for himself and the petitioners. On the 24th of Nov. 1742, articles of agreement were executed by him and the petitioners, whereby all the parties were to have an equal part in the contract, and the accounts were to be settled, and signed every six months: and in case any of the parties should die, or be rendered unable or incapable to carry it on, in his or their own right, then the share of such party dying, or becoming incapable, should be vested in the surviving and capable parties, and the executor of such dying or incapable parties, should on request make a legal assignment to the survivors or capable parties, and they should give bond for the value of his share at the time of the settlement of the last half yearly account, which was to be conclusive to the executors or administrators.

Case 24.
Commissioners upon the day for choosing assignees are not to examine critically into the debt, but to admit creditors for what they swear is due to them, as they are liable to an account afterwards.

Browning being indebted on the contract, and also largely indebted to the petitioners on their private account, made an assignment dated the 21st of January 1742, of his interest in the contract, to the petitioners, in the first place to satisfy such sums as he then owed or any time after should owe to the petitioners on the contract or otherwise, and after such payment, to pay the overplus, if any, to *Browning*.

In November 1743, the contract standing in his name, the commissioners of the navy, for the safety of the public, directed that the petitioners should be made parties to the contract, and that it should be carried on in all their names; and the same was accordingly executed by the petitioners.

On the 6th of Jan. 1743, the last half yearly account touching the contract was settled, valued, balanced, and signed by *Browning* and the petitioners, when it appeared that the increase of stock arising from profits, from the commencement

Bankrupt.

Ex parte
SIMPSON.

to that day, amounted to 4642*l.* 3*s.* 4*d.* and that the bankrupt had received on account of the contract 28,526*l.* 16*s.* and had disbursed 28,146*l.* 10*s.* 5*d.* so that he then remained debtor 380*l.* 5*s.* 7*d.* to the contract.

On the 11th of *January* 1743, *Browning* settled and signed the petitioner's private account, when there appeared to be due on that account to the petitioners 4615*l.* 3*s.* 7*d.* and by the 24th of *April*, the day of his bankruptcy, there was due to them on the separate account 9480*l.* and upwards.

After *Browning's* bankruptcy the Lords of the treasury were pleased to impress to the petitioners to enable them to proceed with the contract 20,000*l.* to prevent any distress to the seamen, which was to be repaid to the treasurer of the navy by defalcation out of their wages from time to time as the ships were paid off.

In *April* last a commission of bankrupt issued against *Browning*, and the petitioners attended at *Guildhall* and offered to prove their debt, but the commissioners refused to admit them, insisting the 20,000*l.* was to be accounted for as to one fourth part to the bankrupt; which the petitioners informed them could not be done, for if credit was to be given for it on one side of the account, it was a debt due to the treasurer of the navy on the other; so that it made no variation therein; however the commissioners thought proper to postpone the choice of assignees, and therefore the application to the court is, that the petitioners may be admitted to prove a debt of 9480*l.* and that the commissioners may proceed to the choice of assignees.

Lord Chancellor: The act of the 5th of the present king says, "The commissioners shall forthwith, after they have declared the person against whom a commission shall issue a bankrupt, appoint a time and place for the creditors to meet, in order to chuse an assignee or assignees of the said bankrupt's estate and effects."

The creditors present at such meeting are intitled to vote unless some material objection against them, and the majority in value to determine the choice, which makes it a considerable question, whether creditors shall be admitted or not.

The application here is, that I will direct the commissioners to proceed to the choice of assignees: this is nothing more than what is their duty, and therefore superfluous.

The cross petition is, that I would postpone the demands of the petitioners, and direct the commissioners to chuse assignees, without admitting the petitioners to vote in such choice.

The petitioners by their affidavit swear to a balance.

But the great objection is, that this is not a complete account, and therefore the whole ought to be taken, before the petitioners are intitled to be admitted creditors under the commission.

Now as to this, the petitioners swear that on the partnership the bankrupt was only a debtor for 380*l.* 5*s.* 7*d.* Whether the account is strictly made up between them I cannot say, but I rather

rather believe not, for it is no more than rests, or like a computation between partners in the brewhouse trade.

*Ex parte
SIMPSON.*

But then it is said, here is a sum of 20,000*l.* paid by the government since the making up of this account, and that this ought to be brought into the calculation.

But I look upon it to be a loan only from the government, for it is stated in the memorial, that whatever sum shall be advanced by the government, the treasurer of the navy has it in his power to retain this again by way of defalcation: so that this is only in the nature of an impress on the part of the government, and therefore may be laid out of the case; and if so, here is a man ready to prove a debt a certain liquidated demand upon a stated account.

But say the petitioners in the cross petition, *There are other accounts not made up, and therefore they shall not be allowed to prove.*

Suppose a debt due on a bond, and an open account besides, the creditor finally is to be admitted a creditor only for the balance; and yet notwithstanding it is every day's experience that he is admitted to prove the bond debt, but still the commissioners may take the account afterwards, and the creditor shall be intitled on a dividend to no more than what appears to be really due to him on the balance.

A creditor by bond, and an open account likewise, shall be admitted to prove the bond, because the commissioners may still take the account, and upon a dividend he shall be intitled to no more than is due to him on balance.

As it would be extremely hard to exclude persons who may perhaps be the greatest creditors, till the account is determined, which may be the work of several years; and as it may be necessary and convenient that assignees should immediately be chosen, the commissioners therefore are not critically to examine into the debt, but to admit creditors upon their oath for what they swear is due to them, as they will still be liable to an account afterwards.

His Lordship therefore ordered that the commissioners should permit the petitioners to make proof of their debts, and that they should at present admit them creditors for what they should so prove, and that they should proceed to the choice of assignees.

Ex parte Simpson and others.

*December the
22d, 1744.*

IN pursuance of the order of the first of *August* 1744, the petitioners attended the commissioners on the 24th of *August* last at *Guildhall*, and a deposition was prepared for the petitioner *Thomas Simpson*, who offered to swear that the sum of 8000*l.* and upwards was then actually due to him and his partners; but two of the commissioners refused to administer the oath, unless he would deliver up the assignment given by the bankrupt, dated *January* 21, 1742; whereupon the choice of assignees was again postponed by order of the commissioners.

Case 25.
A creditor in all cases of open accounts ought not to be excluded till the account is taken, because then the choice of assignees might arise from a minor part in value of the creditors; but still, if commissioners have just grounds to doubt the debt, they do right to admit it only as a claim.

And on the 5th of *December* instant at a meeting under the commission against *Browning*, for the creditors to prove their debts

Ex parte
SIMPSON

debts and chose assignees, the petitioners attended and swore to a debt of 8000*l.* and upwards, due to them from the bankrupt upon balance of all accounts, and in their deposit waved the assignment, and all benefits thereof; but notwithstanding they had sworn to their debt, two of the commissioners refused to allow it, or to permit the petitioners to vote for assignees.

And therefore they now pray that they may be admitted creditors for their debt of 8000*l.* and upwards, and to vote in choice of assignees of the estate and effects of the said bankrupt.

Lord Chancellor: The question is not now whether the petitioner is to be admitted a creditor at all events for 8000*l.* whether he is to be admitted so as to join in voting in the choice of assignees; for there are distinctions in the act of parliament and after voting in the choice of assignees his debt is equally able to be disputed before the commissioners, or in this court notwithstanding it has been so admitted.

And this plainly appears from the clause in the act relating to credit, "And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that when it shall appear to the commissioners, or major part of them, that there hath been mutual credit given by the bankrupt, or any other person, or mutual debt between the bankrupt and any other person, at any time before such person became bankrupt, the commissioners, or major part of them, or the assignees of such bankrupt's estate shall state the account between them, and one debt may be set against another; and what shall appear to be due on either side, on the balance of such account, and on setting such debt against one another, and no more, shall be claimed or paid either side respectively."

How does the matter rest then? There may be in the case of merchants, or as this is, in a matter of contract with government, an open account, and if there does not appear to the commissioners any reasonable objection to the fairness of the debt, the petitioners ought to be admitted, for the assignees may afterwards settle the account, or it may be done in any other way.

If it was to be taken that in all cases of open accounts a creditor ought to be excluded till the account is taken, the choice of assignees might arise from a much *minor* part in value of creditors, or the choice of assignees might be suspended for so long years from the necessity of a previous suit in this court.

But notwithstanding this, if commissioners (tho' the creditor has made a positive oath) have just grounds to doubt the fairness of the debt, they do right to admit it only as a claim (1).

As to this particular case, I think the petitioners ought to be admitted to prove; the doubt arises upon the examination before the commissioners, and upon the affidavit of the bankrupt, and the great objection that there has been no account taken of the profits of the partnership between the petitioners

(1) *Ex parte Wood*, *post*. 222.

and the bankrupt, and it is sworn positively by *Browning* that he has not been paid any thing on account of the profits, nor has it ever been settled between them.

*Ex parte
SIMPSON.*

But I am of opinion this is not true; no strict minute account has indeed been taken of profit and loss; the slops that they send out are in the hands of agents, while fleets are abroad, and therefore no final account could be taken, and for this reason the articles provide, the account shall be taken half yearly, and that if either of the parties become bankrupt, his representatives shall be intitled only to the profits of the last half year's account, and the risque must be deducted as well as all other charges. This therefore does not remain as to the bankrupt an open account, for he is expressly by the articles to be bound by the last half year's account or a stated one.

If the petitioner was not to be admitted as a creditor it would be laying down a rule that every account, where there is mutual credit between bankrupt and creditor, must *first* be settled before he can be admitted to vote in the choice of assignees, and would be productive of very bad consequences.

I do therefore order the commissioners to admit the petitioner's creditors for the sum of 8000*l.* under the commission against *Browning*, and that they be also allowed to vote in respect thereof in the choice of an assignee or assignees of the said bankrupt's estate; but the same is to be without prejudice to any remedy that may hereafter be taken by the assignees who shall be chosen, or any of the bankrupt's creditors to controvert the petitioner's debt.

See 1 Cooke's
Bank. Laws 316.

Ex parte Parsons.

January the
22d, 1746.

Case 26.

THE petitioner states by his petition that he never carried on the trade of a brewer, nor any other trade whatsoever, nor did he ever seek or get his livelihood by buying and selling of any wares, goods, or merchandizes whatsoever, as people in trade usually do; and being advised he is not liable to all or any of the statutes made and in force concerning bankrupts, by the description of a brewer or any other whatsoever: therefore prayed that no commission of bankruptcy might be sealed against the petitioner, till he had an opportunity of being heard by his counsel against the issuing thereof.

Post. 204. S. C.

The petitioner prayed that no commission of bankruptcy might be sealed against him till he had been heard by counsel against the issuing thereof.

Lord Chancellor

did he did not approve of caveats against commissions of bankruptcy from the general inconvenience, as they will give an opportunity to persons against whom the commission is to be taken out to make away with their effects.

*Sept. 1746
1. Mount. 1746
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Mr. *Parsons* the father, by his codicil to his will, directs Mrs. *Parsons* shall carry on the trade of the brewhouse for the benefit of his son, till he arrives at his age of 21.

The son attained his age of 21 in *August* 1745.

Lord Chancellor: I ordered this attendance on the petition, because I do not approve of caveats against commissions of bankrupt before they issue; there have been some few instances, but

*Ex parte
Parsons.*

but I hope this will be the last, because it will be a great inconvenience in general, as it will give an opportunity to persons, against whom the commission is to be taken out to make away their effects.

His Lordship ordered, that the commission of bankruptcy should issue against the petitioner, upon the petition of *William Belchier*, and that the commissioners should be at liberty to proceed so far as to decree the petitioner a bankrupt, and to make a provisional assignment of his estate and effects, to an assignee to be appointed by them under the said commission; but the commissioners are not to issue any warrant of seizure against the petitioner's effects, nor to summon him to surrender himself; and further ordered, that the parties proceed to a trial at law in the king's bench, upon the following issue: Whether the petitioner *John Parsons*, on or before the 19th of *January* instant, was a trader within the true intent and meaning of the statutes in force concerning bankrupts or any of them; in which issue *Belchier* is to be plaintiff, and the petitioner is to be defendant? When, after the trial shall be had, either of the parties are to be at liberty to resort back for further directions.

*November the
4th, 1747.*

Ex parte Thomas.

Case 27.

A note given before an act of bankruptcy though indorsed after, is a debt upon which the indorsee may take out a commission of bankruptcy against the drawer.

THE bankrupt petitioned to supersede the commission against him, because the petitioning creditor's debt arose only from a note that had been indorsed to him; after the petitioner had committed an act of bankruptcy; but as it appeared that the note itself was given before any act of bankruptcy, though indorsed after, *Lord Chancellor* thought it a debt upon which the petitioning creditors might take out the commission (1).

(1) *Anon. 2 Wils. 135. Bingley v. Maddison, 1 Cooke B. Laws 22. See Ex parte Lee, 1 P. W. 782.*

(B) Rule as to the Certificate of a Bankrupt.

Vide the Case of Twiss v. Maffey, under the Division, concerning the Commission and Commissioners.

*January the 21d,
1741.*

Ex parte Fydel.

Case 28.

The certificate of a bankrupt being stayed upon the petition of a claimant under the commission, who suggested fraud and collusion between the bankrupt and his son. At a meeting of the commissioners to examine into this matter, several new creditors came in and proved their debts; but as they did not join in a petition to set aside the certificate as fraudulently obtained, the court would not delay the allowance thereof, but left the claimant to bring a bill if he thought proper.

FOUR parts in five of the petitioner's creditors in *May* 1740 signed the bankrupt's certificate.

But *Anthony Danse* and *Joseph Morson*, who had only claimed a debt of 4000*l.* under the commission, petitioned some time after, suggesting fraud and collusion between the bankrupt and his son. At a meeting of the commissioners to examine into this matter, several new creditors came in and proved their debts; but as they did not join in a petition to set aside the certificate as fraudulently obtained, the court would not delay the allowance thereof, but left the claimant to bring a bill if he thought proper.

Ex parte
FYDELL.

in *December* last against the Chancellor's allowing the certificate, upon suggestion that the bankrupt, by collusion with his son, had conveyed away an estate of 200 *l. per ann.* to the son without any consideration. Whereupon his Lordship on the 22d of *December* ordered, that it should be referred to the commissioners, to inquire into the conveyance made by the bankrupt to *Richard Fydell* his son, and the consideration thereof; and likewise as to the sum of 3863 *l.* mentioned in the affidavits of *Anthony Danse* and *Joseph Morson*, and the disposition thereof; and the bankrupt's certificate for his discharge under the commission, was by the said order referred back to the said commissioners, who were to certify the whole to the court with all the circumstances relating thereto; afterwards the bankrupt and his son were severally examined before the commissioners concerning the matters in the order mentioned, and answered the same to the satisfaction of the commissioners, who by their certificate, dated the 15th day of *January* 1741, certified to the court, that they had reviewed the bankrupt's certificate, and that full four parts in five in number and value had signed the certificate.

The petitioner therefore prays that his certificate may be allowed and confirmed.

Mr. *Fydell*, the petitioner's son, being a member of parliament, the meeting was put off till the middle of *June*, and two days before, *Joseph Morson* died; but at the meeting several other persons came as creditors, who had not appeared till then, and proved debts of 20 *l.* and upwards.

Objected by the representative of *Morson*, that as he died but two days before the meeting appointed by *Lord Chancellor's* former order; there was no person who had any authority to appear before the commissioners in support of the claim of 4000 *l.* or to litigate the consideration of the bankrupt's conveyance to the son, and that none of *Joseph Morson's* relations had any personal notice of this meeting, and that as there are several new creditors, who have come in and proved their debts, the certificate already signed is void, as there are not now four parts in five in number and value who have signed.

Lord Chancellor. Upon looking into the statute of the 5th of the present king, I am of opinion, that every thing which is necessary to make it a good certificate has been done in this case; for the commissioners are in the first place to certify, that the bankrupt has in every thing conformed himself to the several directions required by the several acts of parliament relating to bankruptcy, and are further to certify, that four parts in five of the creditors in number and value, who have duly proved their debts, before them, under this commission, have signed; all which has been done in this case, in the usual form, so that there is no circumstance to distinguish it from the common cases.

If the new creditors who proved their debts at the last meeting had joined in a petition to set aside this certificate as fraudulently obtained, and made out their suggestions, it would have been a sufficient ground to set aside the former certificate; but as they have not done it, and have acquiesced under it, it would be a great

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FYDELL.

hardship upon the bankrupt, to delay him any longer, and therefore I must allow his certificate (1); but at the same time I will not preclude the representatives of *Joseph Morson* from making a further inquiry by bill, if they shall think proper, into the consideration of this conveyance of 200 *l. per ann.* to the son by the bankrupt his father, that if it should turn out to be a fraudulent conveyance, in order to secrete part of the father's effects for his benefit, the residue of the estate, after the mortgagees are satisfied, may be applied for the creditors at large.

(1) See *Ex parte Williamson*, post. 83. 2 *Vej.* 249. S. C.

November the
4th, 1743.

Bromley and others, Creditors of Sir *Stephen Evance*, Plaintiffs,
Goodere, surviving Assignee of Sir *Stephen Evance*, } Defendants.
and others, _____

Case 29.

Where a bankrupt's estate is sufficient to pay all, with a large surplus, creditors whose debts carried interest, shall be allowed interest for their respective debts from the time the computation of it was stopped by the commissioners (1), but such as are creditors by bond, not beyond their penalties.

Ex parte Holland
Lord C. 1743.
Ex parte Holland
1743.
Ex parte Holland
1743.
Ex parte Holland
1743.
Ex parte Holland
1743.

ON the 31st of December 1711, a commission of bankrupt issued against Sir *Stephen Evance* who was found a bankrupt, and his personal estate was assigned to Mr. *Goodere* and others, to whom his real estate was also conveyed; debts to the amount of 60,000 *l.* were proved under the commission, and on bonds and notes 4860 *l.* 13 *s.* 6 *d.* but interest was allowed by the commissioners only to the 31st of December 1711; the plaintiffs' testators paid 3 *d.* in the pound towards the charges of the commission: by four several dividends, all the creditors received 20 *s.* in the pound, and when the last was made, it appeared that Mr. *Gibson* one of the assignees had then in his hands 34,340 *l.* 9 *s.* 8 *d.* and in *Michaelmas* 1738, *Mary Ward*, as one of the next of kin of Sir *Stephen Evance*, brought a bill against Sir *Cesar Child* the heir at law of Sir *Stephen*, and against Mr. *Gibson*, and Mr. *Goodere* for an account, and the cause in November 1739 was heard before his Honor, who declared *Mary Ward* and Sir *Cesar Child* were intitled to an equal share of the surplus; Mr. *Gibson* and Mr. *Goodere* the assignees, have at different times obtained decrees in several causes, whereby Sir *Stephen Evance's* estate is encreased by 30,000 *l.* and upwards, and is sufficient to pay all his debts with a large surplus; and in regard the plaintiffs' demands by law carry interest, and no interest has been allowed after failure of Sir *Stephen*, they pray by their bill, that the court will direct the money paid by way of contribution to be refunded, and give such directions as they shall think proper for the payment of the interest due to the plaintiffs on their bonds and notes, and that what remains now in the assignee's hands, may be retained for the plaintiffs' benefit.

(1) *Ex parte Morris*, 3 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 79. S. P. where Lord *Thurlow* declared, that he would not have allowed interest, if it had broke in upon the bankrupt's

allowance. See also *ex parte Champion*, 3 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 436. *Ex parte Hankey*, *ibid.* 504.

In February 1711, Sir Stephen Evance's certificate was signed by the commissioners; in March following he died, and the 2d of April 1744, the certificate was confirmed by Lord Chancellor Harcourt.

BROWLEY &
GOODRICH.

The counsel for the defendant *Mary Ward* alledged, "that as she was born after the death of Sir *Stephen Evance*, the plaintiffs ought to be put to the proof of the bonds entered into by him, for as the testators and intestates of the plaintiffs who sought relief under the commission, made no other proof of their debts than by their oaths, the plaintiffs shall now be obliged to make strict legal proof.

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"They insisted likewise, that as Sir *Stephen Evance* obtained his certificate, and had been confirmed by the Chancellor, the debts owing by the bankrupt antecedent were discharged, and the plaintiffs are not intitled to interest on such debts, especially as the certificate was signed by the testators and intestates of the plaintiffs; but in case the court should allow interest to the special creditors, then they contended that the same shall not be above the penalties of their securities."

Lord Chancellor: There are two demands in this case, one in behalf of all the creditors, to have the money paid by way of contribution, refunded out of the surplus of Sir *Stephen Evance's* estate; and the other, that the bond creditors, and all those whose debts carried interest, may be allowed interest for their respective debts, from the time the computation of it was stopped by the commissioners.

As to the first, It seems admitted by the defendants, that the contribution money ought to be refunded out of the surplus; the principal question therefore is as to the demand of interest, and I think that ought to be paid likewise.

It came before me originally upon petition, and even then my first apprehension was, that it would bear no great doubt; but as it was insisted, there was no just foundation for the demand, and that, if I determined it that way, my determination would have been subject to no appeal, I chose to have it come before me by way of bill.

But before I enter into the merits of the question, I will take notice of some objections that have been made, in order to lay them out of the case.

It has been objected, that this is not a proper question to come on by way of bill, for the court can have no more power on a bill, than they would have had on a petition; and that therefore it ought to have been determined upon a petition.

It is true the rule of determination must be the same, as if it had come before me by way of petition, but yet it is equally proper, that it should come by way of bill, and bills are frequently brought in cases of bankruptcy for settling the demands of creditors.

Another objection is, That the defendants, the representatives of Sir *Stephen Evance* were not bound by the proof of the debts before the commissioners; but I think they are bound, unless they can prove any particular objection to the debts.

The

Joseph B...
J. Ward Esq.
539
Bower
Stannis
1. Lewis &
351
Harford Esq.
15. Simons.

Where bills are brought to settle the demands of creditors in bankrupt cases, the rule of determination is the same, as if heard upon petition.

**BOONLEY v.
GOODMAN.**

The proof of a debt before commissioners, unless an objection be made in a reasonable time, is conclusive, and the bankrupt's representatives are bound by it.

The common proof before the commissioners is the oath of the creditor, which is binding, unless the bankrupt, or the other creditors object to it, and then it is examined, and an appeal lies from the determination of the commissioners to the great seal by petition; but if no objection is made in a reasonable time, such proof by oath is conclusive.

A certificate allowed in the lifetime of the bankrupt, though not

The next objection was made on the part of the plaintiffs to the certificate, *That not being confirmed till after Sir Stephen Evance's death, it is void.*

confirmed by Lord Chancellor till after his death, is good, for the operative force of it arises from the consent of the creditors, and when confirmed, it has its effect from the beginning.

Though Sir Stephen Evance's certificate was not confirmed by Lord Harcourt, till two years after his death, yet I am of opinion it is as good and valid as if confirmed in the bankrupt's life-time for notwithstanding the statute mentions only the bankrupt, yet it extends to his representatives.

On the death of the king, a commission may be renewed though the bankrupt be dead, (as it has been twice in this case), and if a commission may be renewed against a bankrupt who is dead, it holds much stronger that a certificate may be allowed after his death (1); but then it is said, *the allowance is in nature of a condition, and the condition not being performed, the certificate is void.* The operative force of it arises from the consent of the creditors; the reason of allowance by the Chancellor is to prevent surprize, and is but a condition subsequent if you make it a condition, and when the certificate is confirmed, it has its effect from the beginning.

Having laid these things out of the case, I come now to the main question, Whether creditors for debts carrying interest by contract, are intitled to have subsequent interest? and I think they are.

All bankrupts are considered in some degree as offenders (2), they are called so in the old acts, and all the acts are made to prevent their defeating and delaying their creditors, and it would be an extraordinary thing, that the delay of payment should prevent the creditors from having interest out of an estate able to pay it, when interest in all cases is given for delay of payment.

I will consider this case first upon the old acts previous to the 4th and 5th of Queen Ann, and then upon that statute.

The statute of 13 Eliz. gives commissioners an equitable as well as a legal jurisdiction, and so construed ever since; and on petitions before the Chancellor, he proceeds as in cases by bill, upon the rules of equity.

The statute of Henry the 8th has been so much altered by subsequent acts, that it does not deserve any consideration, therefore laying that out of the case, I will begin with the 13 Eliz. cap. 7

(1) See *Tudway v. Bourn*, 2 Burr. 716. *net, post.* 2 vol. 528. *Cooper v. Chitty* *Troughton v. Githers*, Ambler. 630. 1 Burr. 31. *Tudway v. Bourn*, 2 Burr.

(2) *Ex parte Capot*, *post.* 219. *Ex parte Lingood*, *ibid.* 242. *Ex parte Ben-*

BROMLEY v.
GEOFFREY;

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It is manifest this act intended to give the commissioners an equitable jurisdiction as well as a legal one, for they have full power and authority to take by their discretions such order and direction as they shall think fit; and that has been the construction ever since; and therefore when petitions have come before the Chancellor, he has always proceeded upon the same rules, as he would upon causes coming before him upon bill, *The rules of equity.*

The next direction in the act is, what the commissioners should do in regard to the debts; they are directed to pay to every of the creditors a portion rate-like according to the quantity of his or their debts. And the question is, What debts are here meant? And I am of opinion it means debts due at the time of the bankruptcy, or when the commission issued, which is the same; for, to prevent disputes about the time when he becomes a bankrupt, the commissioners always find in general, that he was a bankrupt at the time the commission issued; but this construction must be confined to cases where there is a deficiency, for it is then only the creditors are to have a portion rate-like.

The act goes on to take notice of the surplus, which it directs to be paid to the bankrupt; and it leaves full power to the creditor to recover the residue of his debt, in like manner and form, as he should and might have done before the making of this act; and as before the act he must have brought his action for the penalty, therefore he must have done the same after the act, and at law he would have had judgment for the penalty; and if the debtor had come here for relief, he would not have had it upon any other footing than the payment of interest to that time.

This shews the surplus to be paid over to the bankrupt, is only the surplus after payment of the whole debts; for it would be vain to pay any other surplus, when it might have been recovered from him again by the creditors.

Thus it stands upon the 13th of *Eliz.* The next is the statute of the first of *Jac. 1. cap. 15.* that has not much in it, but the expression of *full satisfaction* in the clause which gives the bankrupt the surplus and is penn'd in these words: *That the commissioners shall make payment of the overplus of the lands, &c. and goods, &c. if any such shall be, to the bankrupt, his executors, administrators, and assigns, and that the bankrupt, after the full satisfaction of the creditors, shall have full power and authority to recover and receive the residue and remainder of the debts to him owing.*

But the more material act is the 21st of *Jac. 1. cap. 19.* in which there is the following clause: *That the commissioners may examine upon oath, &c. any person or persons for the finding out and discovery of the truth and certainty of the several debts due, and owing, to all such creditors, as shall seek relief under the commission, and that all and every creditor and creditors, having security for his or their several debts, by judgment, statute, recognizance, specialty with penalty or without penalty, or other security, or having no security, shall not be relieved upon any such judgment, &c. for any more than a rateable part of their just and due debts, with the other creditors of the bankrupt,*

BROMLEY v. GOODERE. *bankrupt, without respect to any such penalty or greater sum contained in any such judgment, &c.*

This act only meant to exclude creditors from the benefit of the penalty as *against creditors*, and not as against *the bankrupt himself*.

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But then it is said, the practice has been for the commissioners to ascertain the debts, by computing interest only to the time of issuing the commission, and that being the *cotemporanea expositio*, is to be relied on (1).

There is no direction in the act for that purpose, and it has been used only as the best method of settling the proportion among the creditors, that they might have a rate-like satisfaction, and is founded upon the equitable power given them by the act.

But still it has been said, that all creditors come under the terms of the commission, which is to have interest no farther than the time of issuing the commission; and if that was the rule of law, to be sure they must abide by it; but there is no such rule: it is said creditors have advantages given them by the act, and therefore they must abide by the disadvantages of it; but the advantages are very trifling, for by the 13th of *Eliz.* estates tail in possession and copyholds were given to the creditors, and it is only estates tail in remainder that are given by the 21st of *Jac.* the First, which is a very slight advantage, and for which it has no where directed that they should lose a subsequent interest, and the merely coming in to prove his debt cannot hinder him of it.

A certificate discharges the person of the bankrupt, and his estate subsequently accrued, but not the estate in the hands of the assignees

I come now to consider it upon the 4th and 5th of *Ann, cap. 17.* which was insisted upon as the strength of the case; and the material parts to be considered are,

First, What are made the debts?

Secondly, What is the operation of the certificate?

Thirdly, The clause in regard to the allowance of 5 per cent?

As to the *first*, I do not find the words, *Debts due before the time of the bankruptcy.* Except in the clause of discharge, so that they seem to be left the same as in the former act.

Consider therefore the effect of the discharge, the certificate is not to operate as a discharge of the fund before vested in the assignees, but to extend only to any remedy to be taken against the person of the bankrupt, or his future effects. It is true it will be a discharge of the bankrupt not only as to debts proved, but also as to creditors who have not come in; but that is nothing as to the present fund, for such creditor who has not come in yet, may come in, if he has not lapsed his time, which is a question between the creditors singly; and therefore I am of opinion it was meant to discharge the person of the bankrupt, and his estate subsequently accrued, and not the estate in the hands of the assignees (2).

(1) See *ex parte Bennet*, *post.* 2 vol. *profit of goods*, see *Bromley v. Child*, 528. As to the difference between debts *post.* 259.
that carry interest, and a special de-

(2) See 1 *Cooke's B. Laws*, 222.

To come then to the clause which directs an allowance of five per cent. to the bankrupt, where the effects amount to ten shillings in the pound, &c.

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It is insisted, that the ten shillings in the pound is to be computed upon the debts stated by the commissioners, without regard to the subsequent interest; and so it is, because it proceeds upon a supposition of there being a deficiency of the creditors being paid a rateable proportion.

But suppose there is a surplus, and that it does not amount to 5 per cent. then I think so much should be taken out of the creditors twenty shillings in the pound as will make it up 5 per cent. But then it may be objected, that here is a case where the bankrupt should have a surplus upon the debts as stated by the commissioners, without paying the subsequent interest; but if I am right in the bankrupt's being intitled to that equity, it is not the case, for then it comes again to the rateable proportion.

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But it is said there is no detention in this case, and that interest arises from the detention of the debt; but the law presumes a delay in the bankrupt, and therefore it is due for that reason.

And suppose that from the difficulty of getting in the bankrupt's effects, and by his estate's carrying interest, there should be a surplus, it would be absurd to say the creditors should not have interest likewise.

But it is objected, there will be a difficulty in forming this decree, for, by this way, creditors upon simple contract may have a better satisfaction than creditors by specialty, for the specialty creditors cannot have more than their penalties, whereas creditors by notes carrying interest will have their whole interest; but no objection arises on that account, because it is a frequent case in the disposition of trust estates.

There is in this act a clause of mutual credit; suppose both debts carrying interest, and the creditor comes in late, certainly the commissioners ought to stop interest on both sides at the time of the bankruptcy, or compute interest on both sides till the settling the account; for it is absurd to say they should stop interest on the creditor's debt at the time of issuing the commission, and carry on interest on the bankrupt's demand.

Where there is mutual credit between a bankrupt and creditor, the commissioners ought to stop interest on both sides, at the time of the bankruptcy, or compute interest on both till the settling the account.

I mention this to shew that an equitable rule ought to be followed in giving interest in these cases.

Upon the whole therefore I declare, " That as there is a considerable residue of Sir Stephen Evance's estate above what has been divided upon the principal of the debts, and the interest of debts carrying interest down to the time of the commission, the contribution money paid by the creditors towards charges ought to be reimbursed out of his estate, and that all the creditors of Sir Stephen Evance by bonds, contracts, or notes carrying interest, are intitled to receive interest out of his estate for the principal sums, which were owing at the time the commission issued, from the day of its issuing till they receive full satisfaction, before any surplus shall be conveyed to the representatives of Sir Stephen Evance. Let the

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" Master

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" Master therefore take an account of the estate of Sir Stephen Evance, in the hands of the assignees, and also of the distribution money, and compute interest on the principal sums which were due at the time of the commission issuing on bonds, contracts and notes carrying interest (1); but upon the bonds no interest beyond the penalties thereof (2); and upon such other contracts or notes carrying interest, the interest at the rate therein specified, and wherein no particular interest is specified, at the rate of 6 per cent. until reduced by act of parliament to 5 per cent. and from that time at the rate of 5 per cent.

" I decree the effects of the bankrupt remaining in the hands of the assignees, to be applied in the first place for the payment of the debts of such of the creditors who have not yet proved to the satisfaction of the commissioners, though not disallowed by them, and shall hereafter be allowed by the Master, till paid up equal with the other creditors; and in the next place to pay the contribution money, and then the creditors by bond, contracts, or notes carrying interest, from the time of issuing the commission, *pari passu*, till they receive full satisfaction.

" The Master to take an account of what has been paid to such creditors by way of dividends, and what has been so paid to be applied in the first place to keep down the interest, and afterwards in sinking the principal; and if the residue of Sir Stephen Evance's personal estate shall be sufficient for the purposes aforesaid, then I decree that the remaining real estate of Sir Stephen Evance be conveyed by the assignees to Sir Caesar Child (Sir Stephen Evance's heir at law) and his heirs, and if any surplus is left of the personal estate after the purposes aforesaid, it is to be divided into moieties, and one moiety to be transferred to Sir Caesar Child, and the other to Mary Ward; but if the personal estate be not sufficient, I decree that a sufficient part of the real estate be sold, and the money be applied for the purposes aforesaid, and the surplus (if any) be paid to Sir Caesar, and if any estate remain unsold, that the same be conveyed to Sir Caesar; if no surplus remain of the estate and effects of Sir Stephen Evance after debts and costs, or if there shall be a surplus, which shall not be equal to answer the allowances made to bankrupts, then I reserve the consideration in regard to such allowances till after the master's reports. The costs to be paid out of the bankrupt's estate (3)."

(1) *Secus* where interest is not expressed on the body of the note. *Ex parte Murlair*, post. 151.

(2) *So Tex v. The Earl of Winterton*, 3 Bro. Cba. Rep. 489. *Knigh v. Maclean*, *ibid.* 496. *Vide Godfrey v. Watson*, post. 3 vol. 517.

(3) *Reg. Lib. A. 1743. fol. 192. 195.* This cause afterwards came on upon the Master's report, made in pursuance of this decree, and is to be found in *Reg. Lib. A. 1744. fol. 573.*

Ex parte Johnson and others.

January the
22d, 1745.

An application to stay the bankrupt's certificate, on the petition of *Johnson* and others; four parts in five in number and value of the creditors had signed the certificate, and the hands of the petitioners were not liquidated, but depended on a long account to be taken between the petitioners and the bankrupt; the bankrupt swears positively that the balance owing the account will be in his favour; and the petitioners do venture to swear that there will be any balance in their favour.

Cafe 30.
Where 4 parts in 5 in number and value of the creditors have signed the certificate, the court will not stay it on the petition of persons, whose demands on the bankrupt depend upon an account to be taken, and where they do not swear in favour. See now stat. 18 G. 3. chap. 52. sect. 76.

Lord Chancellor: I will not stay the bankrupt's certificate, but I give the petitioners leave to inspect his books, and in taking account before the commissioners of their several demands, they shall hereafter appear to have a balance, they shall have liberty to come upon the bankrupt's estate for that balance (1).

Sept. Robinson
to D. C. Chetty 44

[82]

(1) See next case 83.

Ex parte *Williamson*, who prayed his certificate might be allowed, and a cross petition for creditors who opposed it.

March the 26th,
1750.

Lord Chancellor: WHEN this matter came before me at a former hearing, I postponed the certificate, from the dislike I have to traders living in Ireland coming over here, and obtaining a commission (by way of action) against themselves, in order to get clear of all their creditors; and therefore I have given a greater latitude, and a length of time, more than usual, in order to allow an opportunity for Irish creditors, if there were any, to send over affidavits to proper authorities to prove debts under the commission; as they have not (1) adopted the bankrupt acts in Ireland, I am willing they should have full time to apprize themselves of the nature of those acts, and send over proper affidavits of their debts. No application has been made to supersede the commission, and even if there had been one, it would have been refused, because if a person carries on a trade in one kingdom belonging to the crown of Great Britain, and comes over to another, a commission may be taken out by a creditor in the place where the bankrupt then happens to be, as he has traded to this kingdom, and contracted debts here. There are several instances of this kind, where persons belonging to the plantations abroad, of which is their sole place of residence, yet happening to be in Ireland, have had commissions of bankrupt taken out against them there (2).

Sept. Robinson
to D. C. Chetty 23
Cafe 31.

2 Vez. 249. pl. 10. S. C.
The bankrupt acts are not adopted in Ireland. Where a person carries on a trade in one kingdom belonging to the crown of Great Britain, and comes over to another, a commission may be taken out by a creditor in the place where he then happens to be, as he has traded to this kingdom and contracted debts here.

(1) They have now by stat. 11 & 12 Geo. 3. c. 8. of the Irish acts. *Anderson v. Vaughan*, Coroner 398. *Ex parte Smith* in Canc. December 25th, 1737.

(2) *Bird v. Sedgwick*, 1 Salt. 110. cited *ibid.* 402. *Anderson*, Raym. 375. Alex.

Ex parte
WILLIAMSON.

Certificates are matters of judgment, and a mandamus would not lie to compel an allowance, for it is discretionary in the commissioners first, and in the Lord Chancellor afterwards.

I must be determined by the acts of parliament in allowing the certificate of a bankrupt.

Certificates are matters of judgment, and I do not know that a *mandamus* would lie to compel an allowance; for it is discretionary in commissioners first, and afterwards in the Lord Chancellor, and yet it ought not to be arbitrary, either in the commissioners or the Chancellor to say, We will, or will not, allow a certificate; but they ought to be governed intirely by fairness or fraudulent behaviour in the bankrupt.

Then one question will be, Whether *Williamson* has been guilty of fraudulent concealments to the prejudice of his creditors.

And another question, Whether the petitioners are persons qualified to be creditors under this commission, and to assent or dissent to the bankrupt's certificate.

Where a bankrupt is a trader in Ireland, signing his certificate in three months after the commission issues, is too precipitate; and Lord Chancellor stopped it on this account.

[*83]

My principal objection, when the matter of the certificate came first before me, was, the great haste that has appeared in signing the certificate, in less than three months after the commission issued, which I thought too precipitate as he was a trader in Ireland, and might be presumed to have large debts standing out against him there; and it appeared also, upon the face of his examination, that the greatest part of his books were then in Ireland; so that he had not made such a full disclosure or discovery, as to intitle him to his certificate.

The objection to the unfairness of the account is now cleared up; for considering the largeness of the petitioning creditor's demand, being no less than 4900 l. it is much more accurately made up from the bankrupt's books, than is usual in bankruptcies; for very frequently the want of correctly keeping books, is the occasion of a person's bankruptcy; and it is a common saying in Holland, if a man fails, not that he is a bankrupt, but that *he kept his books ill*. If there had been creditors in Ireland, who had complained they had no opportunity of coming in, it would likewise have had weight, but there is no complaint of that sort, and from August 1749, to this time, no such creditor has appeared.

The last question is, Whether the present petitioners are qualified to object to and oppose the certificate of the bankrupt. Their first order to prove their debts was as long ago as the 2d of August 1749, and the certificate was stayed in the mean time, and also the dividend; not one of the petitioners but *Sharp* made an affidavit of a debt at the time of the application, for the others had not verified their debts upon affidavit; and therefore, as they did not lay a foundation for it, I could not make an order, that they should go before the commissioners to prove their debts, but I purposely stayed the certificate to give them time to make out their debts in proof.

Sharp when he came before the commissioners only claimed, and although he called himself a judgment creditor, did not so much as produce a copy of the judgment on which he had the bankrupt in execution, and if he had, it would not have done, unless he had likewise

likewise by oath verified his debt; nor ought he to have been-admitted a creditor even then, unless he would have discharged him from the execution, for he must not come under the commission, and prosecute the bankrupt at law likewise.

Ex parte
WILLIAMSON.

No other of the petitioners have so much as claimed before the commissioners, and unless a person proves, or shews a reasonable ground for a claim, they are not within the rule for assenting or dissenting (1).

Unless a person proves a debt, or shews a reasonable ground for a claim, he is not within the rule for assenting or dissenting to a certificate.

I cannot lock up certificates for ever, and deprive a man of his liberty, which the law has given him, after a full time has been allowed for inquiry, and a full time also for creditors coming from Ireland, or sending affidavits over (2).

Nothing fraudulent comes out upon the inquiry, and no debt has been proved in a year and a half's time.

Therefore the certificate must be allowed, and ordered accordingly.

[84]

N. B. It has been objected by the petitioner's counsel, that the allowing the certificate will preclude them from proceeding against the bankrupt's sureties, in the several securities now in their hands, and therefore there ought to be a saving to them of their right, notwithstanding the certificate is allowed.

The allowance of a bankrupt's certificate will not discharge his sureties, but they may be proceeded against, notwithstanding such allowance.

Lord Chancellor said, There was no occasion for such a restriction, for the allowing the certificate of the bankrupt will not discharge his sureties.

(1) *Ex parte Johnson*, ante 81. (2) See *Ex parte Fydel*, ante 72.

Anon.

December the
21st, 1753.

Case 32.

AN application by a person who is a creditor of a bankrupt, that he may be admitted to prove his debt before the commissioners, and to stay the bankrupt's certificate, and to be at liberty to assent or dissent thereto.

The commission was taken out but the 10th of Sept. last, and the certificate signed the 30th of Nov. following.

Lord Chancellor : I disapprove extremely of commissioners being so precipitate in signing certificates.

This appears to me to be what is commonly called a clearing commission; for the assignees are very near relations of the bankrupt.

Such hasty proceedings invert the very intention of the acts of parliament, which were made in favour of creditors, but are too often abused for the service of insolvent persons.

His Lordship therefore directed the certificate to be stayed (1).

An application by a creditor to stay the bankrupt's certificate. The commission was taken out the 10th of Sept. and the certificate signed the 30th of Nov. following. This precipitate proceeding is contrary to the intention of the statutes of bankruptcy, which were made in favour of creditors, but too often abused.

(1) See the preceding and the following case.

November the
2d, 1754.

Ex parte John de Saufmarez, Henry Brock, Matthew de Saufmarez : In the matter of *William Dobree* a bankrupt.

Case 33.

An application
that the allow-
ance of the cer-
tificate might be
stayed.

ON the 6th of *April* last a commission of bankruptcy issued against *William Dobree*, who was declared a bankrupt.

The petitioners, and divers others of his creditors live in *Guernsey*, and from time to time, before he became a bankrupt remitted to him several large sums of money, in order to be invested in the funds in *England*, in their names.

Since the issuing of the commission, the petitioners have discovered that *William Dobree* did not invest the money in the funds in their names, though he wrote them word from time to time that he had so done, and remitted to them the interest as it became due.

[85]

The debts of the bankrupt amount to 81,000 *l.* and the debts of the creditors who have signed his certificate, to 22,904 *l.* 18 *s.* 4

Peter Dobree, nephew of the bankrupt, proved debts under the commission, amounting to 13,688 *l.* 10 *s.* 10 *d.* in different right, part on his own account, part as executor of *Nicholas Dobree*, part as guardian of *Peter Dobree*, another part as guardian to *Rachel Carey Dobree*, another as guardian to *Mary Dobree*, another as one of the executors of *Martha Carey*, and another as father of *Judith Dobree*.

He chose himself and two other persons assignees, and on the 18th of *May* last, the very day the bankrupt finished his examination, the certificate is signed. *Peter Dobree* signed the certificate in right of other persons, four times, having proved delinquent in so many different rights, as guardian and executor to several persons.

There were but 12 of the creditors of *Wm. Dobree*, who proved their debts under the commission, besides *Peter Dobree*, and if he shall be considered but as one creditor, there will not be so many parts in five in number and value of the creditors, who have proved their debts under the said commission, that have signed the certificate ; the greatest part besides of the bankrupt's creditors could not possibly prove their debts at the time appointed for his examination, by reason that they did not know whether the money they had remitted to the bankrupt had been laid out in stocks in their names, or in the bankrupt's.

In 1748, *Wm. Dobree*, the bankrupt, gave upon the marriage of his niece *Miss de Hairland* to his nephew *Thomas Dobree*, 100 *l.* as a marriage portion, at a time when he was insolvent.

The major part of the creditors who had signed the certificate were nearly related to the bankrupt.

For these reasons the petitioners pray that the allowance of the bankrupt's certificate may be stayed.

The second petition, *ex parte John de Saufmarez*, and several other creditors of *William Dobree*, states, that some short time before the commission issued, *Dobree* forgave two of his nephews 187 *l.* which they owed him, and transferred divers stocks

int of 6000*l.* and upwards to several of his creditors, their direction, in expectation of receiving favours of Ex parte
JOHN DE SAU-
MERE. case a commission issued; and prays the matter of this night come on to be heard at the time of the former and that the bankrupt's certificate might be disal-

unsel for the petitioners insisted, that an executor and cannot sign a certificate.

Chancellor as to this was of opinion, that executors might that a person who has a debt in his own right, and lebt as executor, could not, as he apprehended, sign a : in two distinct rights, for both are to be considered n particular debt. A person who has
a debt in his own
right and another
as executor, can-
not sign a certifi-
cate in two dis-
tinct capacities.

[86]

unsel for the petitioner likewise observed, that till they over to *England*, they did not find out the fraud of the in disposing of their stock for his own benefit, and that ces never once thought proper to appoint any meeting, month of *May* till *August*, so that these creditors had unity of proving their debts, which amount to 35,000*l.* ad of four parts in five in number and value, there was outh part had signed the certificate.

y giving a fortune of 1000*l.* to his niece at a time solvent, he seems to be within the meaning of the the 5 *Geo. 2.* where a bankrupt is excepted from the this act, "who hath or shall, for or upon marriage of his children, have given, advanced or paid, above ue of one hundred pounds, unless he shall prove, by ks fairly kept, or otherwise upon his oath, before the part of the commissioners, that he had at the time , over and above the value so given, advanced or paid, ing in goods, wares, debts, ready money, or other eal and personal, sufficient to pay and satisfy unto each ry person, to whom he was any ways indebted, their l entire debts."

The clause in the
5th of *George* the
2d, in which a
bankrupt is ex-
cepted from the
benefit of this
act, who hath
upon marriage
of any of his chil-
dren given above
the value of
100*l.* unless he
hath sufficient to
satisfy all his
creditors, must
be construed
strictly, and not
extended further
than children of
a bankrupt.

orney-general for the bankrupt insisted, this is not e intention of the act of parliament, and was going to asons, when *Lord Chancellor* interrupted him, by saying, y was not; and as it was a penal clause, it ought to be strictly, and confined to the children of a bankrupt, o extend any further.

orney-general then observed upon other parts of the though the debts are considerable, yet the deficiency e so, for there has been a dividend already of eleven n the pound, and that there will be enough in the pay three fourths of this large sum of 81,000*l.*

ere is no objection to the reality of any creditor's debt gnied the certificate.

ie greatest part of the persons in whose names the pe- esented, have by attorney signed the bankrupt's certi- l know nothing of this application; and particularly s, who, as appears by affidavit, is now upon a voyage

Ex parte
JOHN DE SAU-
MERES.

to *Newfoundland*, and that upon application to his wife, so leave to make her husband a party to the petition, she positively refused to give her consent; so that the certificate has been stayed from *August* to this time, by false suggestions and allegations.

The certificate being signed up on the same day with the bankrupt's last examination, and two thirds of the creditors living in *Guernsey*, the allowance of the certificate stayed for these reasons.

[87]

Lord Chancellor: I shall not go upon any particular niceties in determining the question which has been made upon the petitions.

The bankrupt in general seems to have behaved very fairly tho' at the same time I cannot acquit him in the matter of the stock, after receiving express directions from his correspondents at *Guernsey* to purchase the stock in their names, and yet taking upon him to buy it in his own, and then writing word that he had purchased it in their names; but be this as it will, I must not be induced to make a precedent, which, in my apprehension, will be a reproach to the justice of this court.

The most important of the bankrupt's transactions, and the largest of his debts are in *Guernsey*, which, though part of the dominions of the crown of *Great Britain*, are at a great distance from hence; and yet notwithstanding the commission is taken out in *April* only, the certificate is signed on the 18th of *May* after.

Such precipitation in a matter of this kind is very improper.

I will put the case that these creditors in *Guernsey* had heard of this bankruptcy, still they could not come in as creditors, till they had first directed a search in the books of the respective companies, to see in what manner the stock was purchased, whether in their own names, or the bankrupt's.

The creditors who have signed the certificate, and have proved debts to the amount of 22,000*l.* are in number eleven, but there only seven of them have signed for themselves, and in their own right, for Mr. *Dobree* the nephew has signed four times a guardian and executor, and the debts of the *Guernsey* creditors are 35,000*l.*

The admitting such a certificate as this, would be turning the edge of the law against creditors in favour of bankrupts, which is not to be suffered in a commercial country.

Formerly the judge, had the cognizance of certificates, but being found inconvenient, the Great Seal has taken it to itself.

All certificates formerly were referred to the judges; but the Great Seal finding this rather inconvenient, have of late taken the cognizance of it upon themselves, and they must exercise this power in a discreet and equitable manner.

Lord Chancellor stayed the allowance of the certificate.

(C) Rule as to Assignees.

Ex parte Lockyer
in the matter of *Sykes & Allen & Co.*
December the
23d, 1737.
2d. 622.
Case 24.

In the Matter of the Earl of *Litchfield* and Sir *John Williams*.

LORD *Litchfield* and Sir *John Williams* were assignees under a commission of bankrupt; the latter entrusted Mr. *Gurden*, the clerk of the commission, to receive some of the effects of the bankrupt's, and to pay some of the debts and dividend.

Ex parte Griffin
2d. 622.
114.

vidends; no fraud appeared in the assignees, but the clerk afterwards failing, the question upon petition was, If the assignees should make up the clerk's deficiency to the creditors?

Lord Chancellor: The rules of equity in relation to necessary acts done by trustees, where trustees shall not be accountable for losses which happen from those necessary acts, hold not as to persons employed by the trustees, but only to the trustees themselves.

Earl LITCHFIELD.
and Sir JOHN WILLIAMS.

The rule that trustees shall not be accountable for losses which happen from necessary acts does not extend to their agents.

Where assignees under a commission of bankrupt, employ an agent to receive money, or pay, and he abuses this confidence; I will not lay it down as a general rule, but at present I am at a loss to distinguish such assignees from any other trustee, who, if his agent deceive him, *respondet superior* to the *cestui que trusts*; so in the present case, as one of the assignees employed the clerk of the commission, a person of very little credit, to pay dividends, who misapplied and imbezzilled the money, this assignee will be liable to make it good to the creditors, as he did not consult the body of the creditors who are his *cestui que trusts* in the appointment of this agent; for, what is the chief consideration of creditors in the choice of assignees? Certainly the ability of the persons, that they may be responsible for the sums they may receive from the bankrupt's estate, by virtue of their assigneeship; but the negligence of one assignee shall not hurt another joint assignee, where he is not at all privy to any private and personal agreement entered into by his brother assignee; but this I cannot properly determine now: for all the court can do in a summary way under a commission of bankrupt, is in transactions only between the creditors and the assignees, but cannot upon petition adjust any demands that one assignee may set up against another, concerning a private agreement between themselves, independent of the rest of the creditors.

The money imbezzilled by the clerk of the commission was 1000*l.* his bill of fees and disbursements delivered in by him before his death, was ordered to be taxed by the commissioners, and the residue to be applied towards satisfaction of the imbezzilment, and Sir John Williams the representative of the deceased assignee, to pay in 700*l.* or whatever the sum may be, into the bank, to be added to the residue of *Gurdon's* money after taxation, so as together they may be sufficient to make up the imbezzilment of *Gurdon*.

[88]
If an assignee under a commission of bankrupt, employs an agent to receive money, and he imbezzills it, the assignee will be liable to make it good to the creditors, unless he consulted the body of the creditors in the appointment of the agent.

Ex parte Smith
3. *M. C.*
537.

All the Court can do in a summary way under a commission of bankrupt, is in transactions between the creditors and assignees, but will not on petition determine on private agreements between assignees independent of the creditors.

Anon. at the Rolls.

November the 30th, 1739.

THE question before the court, Whether new assignees under a commission of bankrupt upon the death or removal of the former, shall, on filing a supplemental bill, be intitled to the benefit of the proceedings in a suit begun in the time of the first assignees, or must begin again by original bill.

Cause 35.

S. C. post. 575.

Ex parte Smith
2. *M. C.*
Keen. 5.

Master *Ex parte Smith*
Keen
Keen
O'Brien & Co.

ANON.

Where assignees of a bankrupt die, or are discharged, and others are put in their room, they cannot revive, but must bring a supplemental bill, to intitle themselves to the benefit of proceedings in a former suit.

[*89]

Master of the Rolls: In the case of abatements, if you can you must revive; but in the case of assignees of bankrupt where some die, or some are discharged, and others by order of court are put in their room, there is no privity between the bankrupt and the assignees, or at least but an artificial one, and therefore they cannot revive; and it would be hard, if they have been pleadings, examinations, &c. in a former suit, that the new trustees should not have the benefit of them by a supplemental bill.

Suppose the Court, upon the death or discharge of assignees of bankrupts, should say that they all must go for nothing, and you must begin again by original suit, why then all the charges and expences in the former suit are absolutely thrown away but in the present method, though you cannot come against the representative of the former assignee, yet by a supplemental bill you will have the bankrupt's estate liable at all events to answer the costs.

A purchaser pendente lite, on filing a supplemental bill, is liable to all the costs from the beginning to the end of the suit.

I will put a case that comes very near this, and shews the reasonableness of my present determination. Suppose an estate has been in controversy for 20 years in this court, and during the suit it is purchased, the purchaser, on filing his supplemental bill comes into the court *pro bono et malo*, and shall be liable to the costs in the proceedings, from the beginning to the end of the suit. For these reasons his Honor was of opinion, that the new assignees shall have the benefit of the former proceedings, in the suit commenced by the old assignees (1).

(1) *Vide anon. post. 263. See also Hewitt v. Mantell, 2 Wils. 373.*

December the
24th, 1739.

Primrose v. Bromley, Executor of Mead.

Case 36.

S. C. 2 Vef.
102. cited.

Where an assignee dies before he has accounted for what he has received, and leaves no personal asset, the creditors, have a lien upon his real estate.

Mavor

Davenport

Simons. 224.

St. Leonards

D. Chitty. 491.

Thompson

Johnson

24th Dec 22

1739

THERE was a decree in another cause that all creditors as well those who were parties to the bill, as otherwise shall come before the Master to prove their debts against the estate of *Mead*; among the rest there appeared before the Master *Moore*, the surviving assignee of one *Barker*, a bankrupt, and claimed as a debt such money as *Mead* had received as joint assignee with *Moore*, under the commission against *Barker*.

In the deed of assignment, *Moore*, *Mead*, and another assignee of *Barker*, covenanted for themselves, their heirs, executor and administrators, to account for such money as they or either of the shall receive, to the commissioners. *Mead* before his death got in very large sums of money from the bankrupt's estate, and is declared insolvent.

The question before the Master was, Whether the commissioners under this assignment are to be considered as simple contract creditors only; and it came now before the court upon exceptions to this part of his report.

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion that the commissioners ought to be considered as specialty creditors, because the assignees executed a counterpart of the assignment to them, and

the agreement, being under hand and seal, makes it in the nature of a specialty debt; and, as they are considered in this light, though *Mead* is dead without any personal assets, yet they may come upon his real estate.

The words of the assignment, *to account for such money as they or either of them shall receive*, must be so construed, as that the assignees may be jointly and severally bound, so that they are to be considered in this court as mere trustees, and each separately answerable only for what they receive, and it would be of dangerous consequence to hold them otherwise.

There was a case which I determined in this court, where there were two persons jointly bound in a bond, one of the obligors died; and to be sure, at law, it might have been put in suit against the survivor, but as I thought it extremely hard, I decreed the representative of the co-obligor should be charged *pari passu* with the surviving obligor in the payment of the bond (1).

Though the form in the assignment under this commission of bankrupt is the common and usual one, yet I think it very proper that the words *jointly and severally* should be inserted for the future, for the safety and security of each respective assignee.

(1) *Simpson v. Vaughan*, *post*. 2 vol. 371. In the latter case this point was fully discussed.

Ex parte Lane.

October the 22d, 1741.

WOOD, an alehouse-keeper in *Holborne*, became a bankrupt in the year 1729, and a commission being taken out against him at that time, *Fitchet* and *Kirk* were duly chosen assignees, one the landlord, and the other the brewer to the alehouse. In order to continue the trade, they put one *Wadclow* into the house, and allowed him to make use of the bankrupt's goods upon giving a bond for 100*l.* the value set upon them by the appraiser under the commission. *Wadclow* was made a responsible man till the year 1738, and then absconded.

Lord Chancellor: Where the effects of a bankrupt are so inconsiderable that no one creditor may think it worth while to call upon assignees for a dividend, yet if they neglect to make a dividend in a proper time, and are making a private advantage to themselves of the bankrupt's effects, I shall always charge such assignees with interest (1).

His Lordship ordered *Kirk*, and the executrix of *Fitchet*, to account in monies, for the value of the goods, according to the appraisement, and to pay interest for them at the rate of 4 per cent. to be computed from a twelvemonth after the execution of the assignment.

(1) *Treves v. Townsen*, 1 *Coake's B. Laws* 336. 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 364 S. C.

PAIMROSE v.

BROMLEY.

Ex parte Lane.

1741.

Assignees are

mere trustees and

each separately

answerable only

for what they

receive.

[90]

Where a joint

obligor dies, his

representative

shall be charged

pari passu with

the surviving

obligor in the

payment of the

bond.

Proper to insert

the words *jointly*

and *severally* in

assignments under

commissions of

bankruptcy.

Green v. Weston. 3 Myl. H. 385.

April the 1st,
1742.

Ex parte White.

Case 38.

An assignee cannot stop a person's share in a dividend, on account of his own private debt owing to him from that person.

[*91]

THE petitioner who had proved her debt under the commission, petitions against the assignees to be paid her share of a dividend that had been made of the bankrupt's estate.

*One of the assignees insisted that he had a right to stop her share of the dividend, because she is indebted to him for a quantity of coals delivered to a third person, which the petitioner promised to pay.

Lord Chancellor : I will not allow an assignee who is an officer of this court, and an officer of the commission, to stop a person's share in the dividend on account of his own private debt which is owing to him from that person ; he has his remedy by law, and ought not to blend his own private affairs with the commission to which he is only a trustee (1).

(1) But see *ex parte Nockold*, 1 *Cooke's B. Laws* 442.

3c. Hildstone v. Bridson
2. H. Hildstone. 285
August the 13th,
1742.

Ex parte Whitchurch.

Case 39.

Post. 210.

Creditors cannot give a general power to assignees to prosecute suits, or submit matters to arbitration, at their own discretion, but there must be a meeting of creditors, upon a notice given in the London Gazette to consider of each particular suit, or case for arbitration.

WHERE only four creditors were present at a meeting to consider whether they should carry on a suit against a debtor to the bankrupt's estate, they gave the assignees a general power, by a writing signed for that purpose, to prosecute such suits as they in their discretion should think fit.

Lord Chancellor : There is no colour to say that creditors under a commission of bankrupt, can give such a general authority, by virtue of the clause under the act of parliament of 5th of George the Second ; but assignees must have a meeting of creditors, upon notice given for that purpose in the *London Gazette*, to consider of each particular suit, or each particular case for arbitration, before they can proceed in them ; therefore I declare that the power here given by the creditors to the assignees, is not such a one as is warranted by act of parliament, and do order that the assignees be restrained from bringing any suit for the future, till they have a proper authority from the majority of the creditors at a meeting according to the statute.

any suit for the future, till they have a proper authority from the majority of the creditors at a meeting according to the statute.

Commissioners may order a dividend to be advertised, if they think it proper for assignees to make one.

The assignees in this commission having refused to make a dividend, his Lordship ordered, they should attend the commissioners at a sitting appointed for that purpose, and that if the commissioners thought it proper for the assignees to make a dividend, that it should be advertised accordingly.

August the 1st,
1744.

Ex parte Greignier.

Case 40.

The court will not set aside the choice of assignees, because some of creditors live beyond sea, and had no opportunity of voting.

THE application to the court was for new assignees, upon a suggestion in the petition that the time was too short which the commissioners had appointed for the choice of assignees.

signed

assignees, the person having been found a bankrupt only on the 21st of *May*, and the sitting for the choice of assignees was on the first of *June*; that the debts proved at the time of the choice amounted only to 2075*l.* and the petitioners living abroad could not, in so short a time, send over letters of attorney to vote in the choice, though their demands upon the bankrupt's estate will not be less than 11,000*l.* that the assignee already chosen is a hatter, and not to be supposed conversant in foreign affairs, in which the bankrupt's concerns chiefly lie.

Ex parte
GARRIGNIER.

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Ex parte
L.M. (D. & P. 4.)

For the petitioner, the case *ex parte Anderson*, 1724, was cited, which was heard by Lord *Macclesfield* upon petition, who ordered a new choice of assignees, on a suggestion that a great number of creditors could not possibly be present at the first choice.

Lord Chancellor: The words of the act of the 5th of *George* the Second are, "The commissioners shall forthwith, after they have declared the person, against whom the commission shall issue, a bankrupt, cause notice thereof to be given in the *London Gazette*, and shall appoint a time and place for the creditors to meet, in order to chuse an assignee or assignees of the bankrupt's estate and effects."

So that they are immediately to appoint a time and place for the choice of assignees, because it may be necessary to take care of the bankrupt's estate and effects; and I must not lay it down as a rule, that, because some of the creditors are abroad, and beyond sea, therefore I must at all events give them an opportunity of voting in the choice, and direct the creditors to proceed to a new choice.

If this was to prevail, the choice must be postponed to a great length of time which would be directly contrary to the act of parliament; and therefore the true rule is, that the assignees ought to be continued, unless the petitioners can shew there is some objection with regard to the substance or integrity of the person who is chosen assignee; but to do what is prayed by the petition, would be adding to the expence, by making two choices of assignees instead of one.

Assignees ought not to be removed, unless it is shewn that they are not persons of substance or integrity.

I desired that precedents might be searched to see if they could find any case where it had been ordered that creditors should proceed to a second choice, upon a suggestion, merely, that some of them live remote from *London*, or are out of *England*; but no such case is to be found, and besides it would be a dangerous rule, and therefore I am of opinion that the petition must be dismissed, and the assignee continued who is already chosen.

No precedent to be found of an order for creditors to proceed to a second choice, upon a bare suggestion that some live remote from *London*, or are out of *England*.

Ex parte Kerney.

Vide title *Arrest*.

December the
22d, 1744.

1 Mac. Gordon 564.
Young v. Roberts. 2. Bacon 840.

November the
 6th, 1745.

Walker and others *vers.* Burrows.

Case 41.

B. in 1718 after marriage conveys his real estate to trustees, in consideration of five shillings and other valuable considerations, in trust for himself for life, so his wife for life, then to his eldest son if he survived his father and mother, and so to the next son, &c. B. afterwards became bankrupt. This is a conveyance which falls directly within the clause of the first of James the First, cap. 15. and therefore trustees decreed to convey to the plaintiffs the assignees under the commission against B.

Linden
Graham
Nov. 281.

Necessary to prove on the statute of the 13th of Eliz. that at the making of the settlement the person conveying was indebted at the time of the execution of the deed.

THE plaintiff's assignees were under a commission of bankruptcy against the father of the defendant, who in 1739 conveyed all his shop goods, &c. by bill of sale to the defendant his son, and in 1740 becomes a bankrupt. In the year 1718 he, after marriage, conveyed to trustees his real estate, in consideration of five shillings, and other valuable considerations, in trust for himself for life, to his wife for life, then to his eldest son if he survived his father and mother, and so to the next son, &c.

The bill brought to set aside the bill of sale as fraudulent, and that the deed of 1718 might be either set aside as void, or trustees decreed to convey to assignees under the commission against Burrows the father.

The counsel for the plaintiff insisted, that the deed of 1718 was void as against creditors, being voluntary, and after marriage, by virtue of the statute of the 13th of Eliz. or if not under that statute, yet void under the 21st of James the First, ch. 15. relating to bankrupts.

Lord Chancellor: As to the first part of the case, there is not a foundation to set aside the assignment of household goods, because it was many months before the bankruptcy, and the consideration of the assignment proved, and also followed by the possession of the son.

With respect to the settlement by lease and release in 1718, made after marriage in consideration of five shillings, and other valuable considerations, there are two points;

First, A general point, which it is insisted arises upon the construction of the statute of the 13th of Eliz. cap. 5. against fraudulent deeds.

Secondly, Upon the clause in the statute of the 21st of James 1.

As to the first, That statute is not sufficient to prevail against the settlement.

It has been said all voluntary settlements are void against creditors, equally the same as they are against subsequent purchasers, under the statute of the 27th of Eliz. cap. 4.

But this will not hold, for there is always a distinction upon the two statutes: 'tis necessary on the 13th of Eliz. to prove at the making of the settlement the person conveying was indebted at the time, or immediately after the execution of the deed, or otherwise it would be attended with bad consequences, because the statute extends to goods and chattels; and such construction would defeat every provision for children and families, though the father was not indebted at the time (1).

Recital of the act: "For the avoiding and abolishing of feigned, covinous, and fraudulent testaments, gifts, grants, alienations, conveyances, bonds, suits, judgments, and ex-

(1) See *ante* Russell v. Hammond, 15.

"cutions,

"cutions, as well of lands and tenements as of goods and chattels, which feoffments, &c. have been and are devised, &c. to the end, purpose and intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, &c. And it is enacted, that all and every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain, and conveyance of lands, &c. which are made for any intent or purpose before declared and expressed, shall be deemed and taken to be clearly and utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect."

WALKER v.
BARRORS.

Upon this statute, there is no other description of the intent of the conveyance, in the *enacting clause*, but by reference only to the *preamble*, the intent before declared and expressed.

So that unless the conveyance in 1718 was made for that purpose, it will not be void: now here is no proof *Burrows* the father was indebted at the time or soon after, so as to collect from thence the intention to be fraudulent, in order to defeat creditors; for, as Mr. Attorney General said, if he had been indebted at that time, it would have run on so as to take in all subsequent creditors.

Where a man has died indebted, who in his life-time made a voluntary settlement, upon application to this court to make it subject to his debts as real assets, the court have always denied it, unless you shew he was indebted at the time the conveyance was executed.

But upon the statute of the 27th of *Eliz.* which relates to purchasers, there indeed a settlement is clearly void if voluntary, that is not for a valuable consideration, and the subsequent purchasers shall prevail to set aside such settlement; but this can only be applied to the case of subsequent purchasers, and therefore a plain distinction between the two statutes (1).

Upon the statute of the 27th of *Eliz.* subsequent purchasers shall prevail to set aside a settlement that is voluntary and not for a valuable consideration,

The assignees under the commission stand only in the place of the bankrupt, and are bound by all acts fairly done by him, notwithstanding they gain the legal estate; and this proves that assignees of bankrupts are not considered as purchasers of the legal estate for a valuable consideration for every purpose.

Assignees stand in the place of a bankrupt, and are bound by all acts fairly done by him.

It has been said, I must at this time take the deed in 1718 to be for a valuable consideration, because expressed to be for five shillings, and other valuable considerations.

The consideration in a deed of 5s. and other valuable considerations, does not oblige the court to hold it to be for a valuable consideration.

But the consideration of five shillings, and other valuable considerations, does not oblige the court to hold it, at all events, to be for a valuable consideration, and can at most only let the defendant into proof that there were other valuable considerations.

And therefore as to this part of the case the trustees under the deed must convey to the assignees under the commission,

(1) So *Calville v. Parker*, Cro. Jac. *Townshend v. Wyndham*, 2 Ves. 10, 11. 158. *Russell v. Hammond*, ante 15. *Evelyn v. Templar*, 2 Bro. Cba. Rep. 148. *White v. Sanfom*, post. 3 vol. 412. Lord *Vide Oxley v. Lee*, post. 625.

WALKER v.
BURROWS.

for it falls directly within the clause of the first of *James* cap. 15. (1).

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"That if any person, which hereafter is or shall be a rupt, shall convey or procure, or cause to be conveyed of his children, or other person or persons, any n lands, &c. or transfer his debts into other mens' nam cept the same shall be purchased, conveyed, or transfer or upon marriage of any of his children, both the partie ried being of the years of consent, or some valuable co ation, it shall be in the power and authority of the c sioners, to bargain, sell, grant, convey, demise, or otl to dispose thereof, in as ample manner, as if the said ba had been actually seised or possessed thereof."

His Lordship directed the trustees of the deed of 1718 vey to the assignees, under the commission against *Burrows* father of the defendant.

(2) See *Fryer v. Flood*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 160.

July the 3d,
1746.

Drury v. Man, surviving Assignee of *Johnson*, a Bank

Case 42.

An assignee under a commission of bankruptcy, must surrender a copyhold to a purchaser, notwithstanding the lord may exact two fines, for no person can make a common law conveyance of a copyhold.

Johnson being possessed of a copyhold estate, in Nov. 17: a commission of bankruptcy taken out against him, commissioners by bargain and sale convey the copyhold to defendant and another, as assignees under the commission their heirs who entered and received the profits.

The plaintiff entered into an agreement in writing, purchase of the copyhold, with an agent of the defendant on behalf of *Man*, agrees that he, as assignee, shall, with months, by bargain and sale, convey and assure to the plaintiff and his heirs the copyhold estate, and make a good title as the plaintiff's counsel should advise; the plaintiff paid shilling in earnest, and agreed to pay, upon the conveyance made, 449*l.* 19*s.* more.

Disputes arising between the plaintiff and defendant to the manner, and by what deeds the copyhold estate should be conveyed to the plaintiff by defendant; it was agreed case should be stated, and laid before counsel for an opinion what sort of conveyance defendant ought lawfully to make for safety to a purchaser to make; the counsel was of opinion the defendant ought to be admitted tenant of the copyhold afterwards to surrender the same to the plaintiff, upon surrender the plaintiff was to be admitted, and that a conveyance by indenture of bargain and sale, as proposed by defendant, would not be proper, or a fit conveyance for the plaintiff to rest upon.

The bill therefore is brought for carrying the agreement into execution, and that the defendant may be compelled to convey, or procure the copyhold premises to be surrendered to the plaintiff.

The defendant insists that a surrender is not necessary, for that he had stated a case as to the method of conveying the copyhold estates to the Attorney General, who was of opinion, that there is no occasion for the assignee first to be admitted, and then to surrender to the vendee, and submits to convey to the use of plaintiff and his heirs by bargain and sale, but hopes he shall not be compelled to be admitted and then to surrender to plaintiff, as it would be a great expence, and insists plaintiff will be safe under such conveyance.

Drury v.
Man.

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Lord Chancellor : I am of opinion that the assignee under the commission must surrender the copyhold to the plaintiff, though it is very hard the lord should exact two fines, but no person can make a common law conveyance of a copyhold; it must be by surrender; the commissioners by the 13th *Eliz. cap. 7.* have no interest in bankrupt's lands, but only a power to convey, and at first commissioners made sale to the creditors, but that was found inconvenient; therefore they made general assignments to trustees to distribute the whole.

The question is, Whether the general assignee is a vendee within the act of parliament of the 13th *Eliz.* and I am of opinion he is: What would be the consequence if he was not so? Why, the assignee might continue in possession for years before he makes a sale, and yet, by an express provision in the act, he is restrained from receiving the profits, till he has compounded with the lord: if the purchaser under the assignee was considered as the vendee within the statute, the assignee of a debt, who takes from the commissioners, could not sue for the debt; therefore the assignee only can be considered as the vendee.

An assignee under a commission of bankruptcy of a copyhold estate, is a vendee within the 13 *Eliz. cap. 7.* and not the purchaser from the assignee of such estate.

Decreed, the defendant to surrender the copyhold estate to the plaintiff (1).

Lord Chancellor recommended it to commissioners of bankrupts for the future, to except copyholds out of the deed of assignment of the bankrupt's estate, because it would save the expence of two fines; for the commissioners, where the creditors could meet with a purchaser of the copyhold, might convey to him in the first instance; and though there may be occasion sometimes for temporary assignments for the better preserving the bankrupt's estate, yet commissioners are not obliged by the clause in the 5th of the present king, relating to temporary assignments, to appoint an assignee of the whole estate, because the words are in the disjunctive, *immediately to appoint one or more assignee or assignees of the estate or effects, or any part thereof.*

Commissioners ought to except copyholds out of a deed of assignment of the bankrupt's estate, because it will save the expence of two fines to the lord, as they may convey to the purchaser thereof in the first instance by bargain and sale.

And besides, by leaving out the copyhold estate of a bankrupt in a temporary assignment, the creditors will run no risque

No prejudice will accrue to creditors by leaving out copyhold estates in a temporary assignment, for an extent of the crown will not affect it.

tates in a temporary assignment, for an extent of the crown will not affect it.

(1) And the costs and charges in procuring the defendant's admission in order to make such surrender, to be borne by the defendant; but the costs and

charges of the surrender to be made by the defendant to the plaintiff, and of the plaintiff's admission to be borne by the plaintiff. *Reg. Lib. A. 1745. fol. 253.*

**Druy v.
Mad.**

with regard to the crown, for an extent will not effect that in all respects it will be advisable to omit them in full assignments.

Several things
in the bankrupt
laws which want
reformation.

He said there were several things in the bankrupt laws wanted reformation, and whenever the legislature is applied it would be very proper they should remedy this nuisance with regard to copyhold estates likewise.

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Grey v. Kentish.

July the 31st,
1749

Vide title Baron and Feme, under the Division, Rule as to ability of the Wife.

April the 4th,
1749.

*Ex parte Newton, and others, in the Matter of Reeves
ruptcy.*

Case 43.

Where an assignee becomes bankrupt, and is removed, his assignees as well as himself, must join with the commissioners in executing an assignment to the new assignees.

TIMBRELL, an assignee under a commission of 1 against *Reeves*, became a bankrupt himself afterwards thereupon *Newton* and other creditors under *Reeves's* assignation apply by petition to *Lord Chancellor* to remove him out of his own bankruptcy, from being an assignee of *Reeves's* commission, and that they may be at liberty to go to a new choice.

Lord Chancellor granted the petition, and was of opinion not only *Timbrel*, but his assignees must join with the assignors in executing an assignment to the new assignees the commission against *Reeves*; and the order was drawn accordingly.

(D) *Joint and separate Commission.*

After Hilary
term 1736.
In Lincoln's-Inn
Hall.

Beasley v. Beasley.

Case 44.

LORD Chancellor: Where there is a joint commission against two partners, they must be each found bound; and though one of them should die, the commission may go on; but if one of the joint traders be dead, at the time of the commission, it abates, and is absolutely void.

August the 14th,
1742.

Ex parte Turner.

Case 45.

LORD Chancellor in this petition laid it down for that where there is a joint and separate commission against a debtor under the joint commission may come under the joint and assent or dissent to the certificate of the bankrupt under the separate commission (1).

(1) See *ex parte Souden*, ante 68. It is now held, that a joint and separate commission cannot legally exist against the same person. See *Cooke's B. L.* See in the matter of *Simpson*, post.

Ex parte Sandon.

March the 29th,
1743.

Vide under the Division, Commission and Commissioners.

Ex parte Baudier.

December the
23d, 1742.

A Separate commission taken out against each of two persons who had traded in partnership, which was dissolved before their bankruptcy; the joint creditors petition to be admitted to prove their joint debts under each of their commissions.

Lord Chancellor: Where there is a joint commission taken out against partners, separate creditors may come in under such a commission and prove their debts, and joint creditors shall be excluded out of the joint estate, and separate creditors out of the separate estate, because the assignment in that case is of the whole estate (1).

But where there are two persons who have been partners, and yet the commissions are taken out against them as separate traders, there creditors upon the joint estate cannot be admitted to prove their joint debts under each commission, for they have an equitable right, in case there should be any surplus of the estates of the two bankrupts, after the separate creditors are satisfied (2).

Nor do I think it proper to appoint a receiver on behalf of the joint creditors, to get in the joint effects of the bankrupt, but they must proceed in the common course, by taking out a joint commission.

(1) *Ex parte Sandon, ante 68.*

(2) See *ex parte Oldknow*, 1 Cooke's *Laws*, 290. But it seems now to be settled, that joint creditors may prove under separate commissions, and receive a dividend in proportion with the sepa-

rate creditors. *Ex parte Haydon*, 1 Cooke's *B. Laws* 292. 1 Bro. *Cha. Rep.* 454. S. C. *Ex parte Copeland*, 1 Cooke's *B. Laws* 295. *Ex parte Hodgson*, 2 Bro. *Cha. Rep.* 5. *Ex parte Page*, *ibid.* 119. *Ex parte Flintum*, *ibid.* 120.

Ex parte Bond and Hill.

January the 22d, 1745. *Ex parte Bond and Hill*

A Joint commission of bankruptcy was taken out against Hiley and Rogers, and a separate one against Hiley; the bankrupts became jointly and severally bound to the petitioner Bond in 400*l.* and to the petitioner Hill in 300*l.* they prove their debts under the joint commission, and receive a dividend of 11*s.* 6*d.* and apply now to be let in as creditors upon the separate estate, equally with the rest of the separate creditors, in order to receive a dividend there likewise.

are intitled to have a full satisfaction out of both estates at the same time, but must make his election upon which of the estates he will come, in the first place. Such creditor shall have time to look into the accounts of the bankrupt's joint and separate estate, before he makes his election.

Case 47. 22*d.* 6*c.*

A joint commission of bankruptcy taken out against two persons, and a separate commission against one, a creditor upon their joint and several bond, is

Ex parte
BOND and HILL.

Lord Chancellor: The question is, Whether a creditor upon joint and several bond is intitled to prove the debt under both commissions at the same time.

I had some doubt the last day of petitions, but, upon searching, I find it has been determined, where there is a creditor on bond against two persons jointly and severally, and both become bankrupt, he is intitled to receive a satisfaction out of the joint estate, and if the joint estate falls short, he is for the residue intitled to a satisfaction out of the separate estate: but then the court will put him to his election, and if he elects to come under the joint estate, he will with respect to a satisfaction for the residue, be postponed to all the creditors of the separate estate.

There are three cases in which this has been determined.

Ex parte Parminter and others, *December* the 24th, 1736.

Lord Talbot, in that case, declared, as the two bankrupts *Levington* and *Paul* were jointly and severally bound, the petitioners the bond creditors were not intitled to have a full satisfaction out of both at the same time, and ordered them to make such election before they received any further dividend.

The second case on the petition of *Elizabeth Abingdon* and others, *March* the 29th, 1737.

There the petitioners were creditors of both bankrupts, by bond joint and several.

A declaration was made in that case, that the petitioners were not intitled to a satisfaction equally with other creditors of the joint estate, or with other creditors of the separate at the same time, but ordered to make an election, and if they elected to come upon the joint estate, then not to come upon the separate estate, till the other creditors upon the separate estate had been first paid.

The third case in the bankruptcy of *Lomax* and *Ashworth*, on the petition *ex parte Banks*, *August* the 6th, 1740 (1). The same declaration of the court in this case as the former.

I shall only add to my order in the present, more than in the former cases, that the petitioners shall have time to look into the accounts of the bankrupt's joint and separate estates, and see which would be most beneficial for them to come upon, in the first place.

It was objected upon the last day of petitions, that this would be contrary to proceedings at law, upon a joint and several bond where the creditor may proceed against both obligors at the same time, till his debt is fully satisfied, and to be sure it is so at law; but in bankrupt cases, this court directs an equality of satisfaction.

Consider it on the footing of a joint estate first; joint creditors are intitled to a satisfaction out of the joint estate, before separate creditors, but then they have no right to come upon the separate estate for the remainder of their debts, till after the separate creditors are satisfied.

Bankrupt.

100

What would be the consequence, if the petitioners should be admitted to come on both estates at the same time? Why, then, these creditors would draw so much out of the separate estate, as would be a prejudice to other joint creditors, who have an equal right to come upon the separate estate with themselves, and that means I should give the petitioners a preference to other creditors, when the act of parliament and the equity of this court incline that all persons should have an equal satisfaction, and not one more than another (1).
The petition dismissed.

Ex parte
Bond and Hills.

(1) *Ex parte Rowlandson*, 3 P. W. 405. *Blankenbushen*, 1 Cooke's B. Laws 304. *Ex parte Banks*, post. 106. *Ex parte*

Ex parte Edwards.

January the
21st, 1745.

THE petitioner being a creditor under a separate commission against *A.* and debtor to a joint commission against *A.* and *B.* petitioned that the action brought by the assignees of the debt he owed to the joint commission might be staid, and that his demand upon the separate estate might be allowed, as a set off against the debt he owed the joint estate, especially as the same persons are assignees under both commissions.

Case 48.

Doubtful whether a creditor under a separate commission against *A.* and debtor to a joint commission against *A.* and *B.* can set off the debt he owes the latter, by his demand against the former.

Lord Chancellor: I doubt whether this debt could be set off under the statute relating to mutual debts, because different persons are concerned in one debt and in the other, and in different rights; but as the petitioner's case appears to be a hard one, I will refer it to the commissioners of the bankrupts, to see how much the petitioner owed to the joint estate, and how much was owing to him from the separate estate, and to certify the same, and let the action brought by the assignees be stayed, and in the mean time all further consideration reserved till the commissioners have certified (1).

See Ex parte Edwards
1st March 1745-6

(1) See *Lancashire v. Jones*, 1 P. W. 326.

(E) Rule as to his Executor, or where he is one himself.

Ex parte Goodwin.

April the 30th,
1740.

THE executor of a bankrupt, unless the commission against his testator has been superseded, cannot take out a commission of bankrupt for a debt due to the testator, for such debt being in his assignees, and consequently the executor not intitled at law, to be the petitioning creditor.

Case 49.

Executor of a bankrupt, unless the commission against his testator be superseded, cannot take

out one for a debt due to the testator.

Ex parte Goodwin. Where a commission is superseded, merely because there was a defect in form, as to the petitioning creditor, but no manner of doubt as to the act of bankruptcy; the costs of the *superseded* petitioning creditor shall pay costs of *perfection* only, where a commission is superseded merely for a defect in form.

March the 31st, 1742. *Ex parte Ellis* and others, in the Matter of *William Winsmore* a Bankrupt.

Case 50. *WILLIAM Ellis* and *Sarah Hodgekins* are bond creditors of *Philip Hughes*, who made his will, and appointed *Thomas Beetenfon* and *William Winsmore* executors, who jointly proved the will, but *Beetenfon* died before he had possessed any of the assets of *Hughes*, *Winsmore* received part of *Hughes's* effects, to the amount of 300*l.* and afterwards a commission of bankruptcy issued against him, and he was found a bankrupt.

Where assignees have possessed themselves of effects which belonged to the bankrupt, as executor only, the Court upon an application of the testator's creditors, will, for the securing his effects, appoint a receiver, to whom the assignees shall account for so much as they have got in of the testator's estate.

The petitioners applied themselves to *Winsmore's* assignees, to get in the effects of *Philip Hughes*, that they might respectively be paid what is due to them on their bonds; but the assignee insisting that the petitioners ought not to receive the full satisfaction out of the effects, but ought to come in with the other creditors of *Winsmore*, and receive an equal dividend with them: it is therefore prayed, that it may be referred to the commissioners, to inquire what specifick effects of *Philip Hughes* remain unreceived, and that the same may be got in, and the petitioners paid what is respectively due to them before any distribution is made amongst *Winsmore's* creditors.

Lord Chancellor: I cannot make such order as is prayed by the petition, because *Hughes's* debts must be paid in a course of administration, and it does not appear to me, but there may be debts of a higher nature.

But then the question will be, Whether I ought to direct the assignees to deliver over *Hughes's* effects to *Winsmore*, who, though he is a surviving executor, yet, being a bankrupt, may not be quite so proper a person to be trusted.

Indeed, as he acts *in autre droit*, being a bankrupt does not take away the right of executorship, and therefore, strictly he may be the proper hand to receive it; but however, in such a case I ought to secure the effects of the testator, and therefore I will appoint a receiver, to whom the assignees of this commission shall account for so much as they have got in of *Hughes's* testator's assets.

His Lordship referred it to a Master, to inquire what part of *Philip Hughes's* effects hath come to the hands of *Winsmore's* assignees, or which remain unreceived by *William Winsmore* the surviving executor, and that the Master should appoint a receiver of the effects of *Philip Hughes* the testator which are unreceived, and that the assignees of *Winsmore* do deliver over to such receiver, such part of the testator's effects as shall be found to have been received by them.

them, or to be in their hands in specie, and ordered, that the petitioners be paid their respective debts and costs of this application, out of such effects of Philip Hughes the testator, in a course of administration (1).

Ex parte Ellis.

(1) Ex parte Massey, post. 158, 159. 3 Burr. 1369. Ex parte Leake, 2 Bro. Ex parte Lowellyn, 1 Cooke's B. Laws 179. Cha. Rep. 596. The note under Howard and Jemmet,

Ex parte Nutt.

Ex parte Nutt. August the 6th, 1743. 12322. 1743. 1743. 1743.

LORD Chancellor: If a person that is a trader, makes another an executor, who only disposes of the stock of his testator, it will not make the executor a trader, and liable to a commission of bankruptcy; and even if an executor, as in the present case, is the representative of a wine-cooper, and finds it necessary to buy wines to refine the stock left by the testator, it will not make him a trader; but here it is sworn the executrix bought wines herself, and sold them to the customers intire; so that it is not true, that she only bought wines to mix and improve the testator's.

Case 51. 1743. 1743. 1743.

An executor selling off the stock of his testator, tho' it consists of wines, and he buys some others to mix with and fine them, will not make him a bankrupt, otherwise if he buys to his customers.

wines intire and sells them intire

I am of opinion likewise, the act of bankruptcy is plain, but if it had been doubtful, would not have directed an issue, where there has been such a length of time as a year and a half since the taking out of the commission, and where the petitioner has acquiesced the whole time, surrendered herself as a bankrupt to the commissioners, has been examined before them, and, upon her own examination, strong circumstances of bankruptcy have appeared; but if she is really no bankrupt, she is not left without remedy, for she may bring an action of trover against the assignee.

Where a person against whom a commission is taken out, has surrendered himself, and acquiesced a year and half since the taking out thereof, the Court will not direct an issue to try the bankruptcy, but leave him to an action at law.

Ex parte Butler, Assignee of Richardson.

August the 3d, 1749.

Rule under the Division, Rule as to the Sale of Offices under a Commission of Bankrupt.

(F) Rule as to Landlords.

Anon.

April the 30th, 1740. 1740. 1740.

LORD Chancellor: A landlord may distrain for his rent upon a bankrupt's goods, either before or after the assignment under the commission (1); but if he neglects to do it, and

Case 52. 1740. 1740. 1740.

assignee, a landlord can only come in for his rent *pro rata* with the other creditors.

(1) Ex parte Plumbe, post. 103.

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suffices

ANON. suffers them to be sold by the assignees, he can only come upon an average with the rest of the creditors (1).

A mortgagee of a bankrupt's estate, though he pays the arrears of rent, that is due to the bankrupt's landlord, unless he applies to the court for an order that he may stand in the place of the landlord, in consideration of his paying the arrears of rent, shall not be preferred to the creditors under the commission.

(1) *Ex parte Desbarnes*, post. 103. *Devine*, 1 *Cooke's B. Laws* 216. *Br Ex parte Grove*, *ibid.* 104. : *Ex parte v. Ball*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 427.

March the 31st,
1742.

Ex parte Descharmes.

Case 53.
If the landlord of a bankrupt suffers his assignees to sell off his goods, he is not intitled to his whole rent, but must come in *pro rata* with other creditors under the commission.

THE petitioner was the landlord of the bankrupt, : now prefers his petition to *Lord Chancellor* to be paid the assignees under the commission, the rent that was in arrear all the time the commission was taken out.

It appeared in evidence, that the whole estate and effects of the bankrupt were possessed by the assignees, duly chosen under the commission, and sold by them seven years ago by virtue of the assignment.

Mr. Murray, the counsel for the petitioner, insisted that being the landlord is intitled to his whole rent, and is not obliged to come in *pro rata* with the rest of the creditors.

Lord Chancellor: The landlord's demand is too stale, having lost his remedy by distress, as there are no goods on the premises, he can now be considered only as a common creditor, and must come in *pro rata*.

April the 4th,
1732.

Ex parte Plummer.

Cafe 54. A landlord may
distrain for his
whole rent even
after assignment
or sale by the
assignees, if goods
are not removed.

THE question was, Whether after a commission of banks taken out, and the messenger in possession, the land should distrain the goods upon the premises, and so be satisfied his intire debt, or whether he should come in *pro rata* with the rest of the creditors under the commission.

Lord Chancellor : If any goods remain on the premises, are liable to the distress of the landlord, and he may distress them for his intire debt, even after assignment or sale by assignees, if the goods are not removed (1); and this is reason, because no provision is made in the case of bankrupt in the statute, which gives the landlord a year's rent on executions.

Assignment has a retrospect so as to avoid any mesne acts done by the bankrupt. Before assignment the property remains in the bank (and the commissioners have only a power) though the assignment has a retrospect so as to avoid any mesne acts done by the bankrupt.

(1) See *Buckley v. Taylor*, 2 Durn. and East's Rep. 600.

The rent is here a year and a quarter, and I am of opinion that the landlord is intitled to distrain the goods remaining on the premises for his whole rent, notwithstanding the commission of bankruptcy and the proceedings thereon. There was a case before the Lords Commissioners of the Great Seal, where the landlord, though he had made no distress, yet was considered to be within the equity of the statute, which gives him a year's rent upon executions; a commission of bankrupt being an execution in the first instance.

Ex parte
PLUMMER.

The two following cases were cited: *Ex parte Jacques*, Dec. 14, 1730. *The landlord distrained, when the messenger under the commission of bankrupt was in possession before the assignment: afterwards the assignees were chosen, and petitioned Lord Chancellor King to have the goods restored, but the petition was dismissed.*

Ex parte Dillon, Feb. 27, 1733. *The assignees of the bankrupt were in possession, and the landlord distrained; upon the application of the assignees to Lord Chancellor to be relieved, and the goods to be re-delivered, his Lordship confirmed the right of the landlord to distrain, and dismissed the petition.*

Ex parte Grove (1).

April the 11th,
1747.

A Commission issued against *A.* who was a tenant of *B.*'s, and owed him twelve year's rent. *B.* the landlord comes in and proves his debt under the commission, and the assignees sold the whole goods to *Grove* the petitioner, who lived in the tenant's house; the landlord, three years after proving of his debt, distrains upon those goods, as being still upon the premises.

Case 55. *Briff*
Commission *Four*
against *A.* who *De la*
owed *B.* 12 years *729*
rent. *B.* proves
the debt under
the commission,
the assignees sell
the goods of *A.*
to the petitioner
who lives in *A.*'s
house. *B.* 3 years
after proving his

The question was, Whether proving it as a debt under the commission, and swearing he has no security, is not a waiver of his right to the goods as a landlord?

debt distrains on those goods as being still upon the premises. The vendee of the goods is intitled to them, and the proceedings of *B.* upon his replevin restrained and confined to his remedy under the commission.

Lord Chancellor: The issuing a commission against a tenant, and the messenger's possession of the goods of the tenant, does not hinder the landlord from distraining for rent; for this is not such a *custodia legis* as an execution is, and there too the law allows the landlord a year's rent.

Notwithstanding
a commission,
and the messenger
is in possession
of the goods,
the landlord may
distrain for the
rent, even after
an assignment,
if the goods are
on the premises.

The assignment of the commissioners of the bankrupt's estate and effects, is only changing the property of the goods, and while upon the premises they are still liable.

The fact that creates the difficulty is, the landlord's coming in under the commission.

A man who has a debt may come in and prove his debt, and afterwards he may bring an action at law, and the court will

(1) See *ex parte Devint*, 1 *Cookes's B. Laws*, 216. and *Lord Bathurst's* observations on this case.

Ex parte
Good.

not absolutely stop him from bringing an action, but put him to his election, and even then allow him to assent or dissent to the certificate.

A landlord is considered in a higher degree than a common creditor, and it would be hard to preclude him from distraining where there are goods on the premises, and therefore he must be put to his election to waive his proof, or his distress.

But the difficulty lies here, every creditor is to swear whether he has a security or not: if he has a security and insists upon proving, he must deliver up the security for the benefit of the creditors at large, be they mortgages or pledges; but this seems to be a new case, because this is a legal lien which the landlord has, and not upon the same footing with common securities; and the only question is, Whether his proving it as a debt, and swearing he has no security, is not a waiver of the distress?

A creditor, after he has received a dividend under a commission, will be allowed to bring an action at law for his debt, upon his refunding that dividend.

Lord Chancellor directed it to stand over till the next day of petitions, as thinking it a doubtful case, and on that day said he was far from being clear that the landlord was barred of his distress; for there have been instances, where a common creditor, even after he has received a dividend under a commission, has been allowed, upon refunding that dividend, to bring an action at law for his debt; and as a landlord's is a more favourable case than a common creditor's, he ordered it to stand over again for further consideration.

On the 8th of *May*, 1747, this petition came on again, and his Lordship then declared that the vendee of the goods under the assignee is intitled to the goods, and ordered, that the proceedings of *William King*, the landlord, upon the replevin should be restrained, and confined him to his remedy under the commission.

(G) Rule as to Compositions.

November the
6th, 1740.

Spurrett v. Spiller.

Case 56. *A.* being upon an agreement for a composition, gives one of his creditors, who would not consent to it otherwise, a bond for the residue, over and above his composition; such a contract, though not void by the express words of the 5th of *George the Second*, seems to be within the reason and design of the act.

THE plaintiff in this cause being upon an agreement with his creditors in general, for a composition of six shillings in the pound, the defendant, one of the creditors, would not consent to it, unless the plaintiff would give him a bond for the residue of his debt over and above his share of the composition.

The plaintiff, in order to extricate himself out of his difficulties, did give a bond to *A.* in trust for the defendant.

The composition money has been paid to the rest of the creditors, and likewise to the defendant, who has brought an action on his bond in the name of the trustee, and notice of trial is given for the 14th instant.

Mr. Charles Clarke moved for an injunction to stay proceedings at law, till the hearing of the cause in this court.

Lord Chancellor: Take the injunction upon giving judgment, and a release of errors, it being a case very proper to be considered; for suppose a creditor upon a commission of bank-

ruptcy taken out, enters into a private agreement with the bankrupt to sign his certificate, upon his promise or contract to pay this creditor's whole debt, in consideration of his signing the certificate, there is no doubt but such a contract would have been void by the express words of the statute of the 5th of the present King.

STUART v.
SPILLER.

See v. Lockhart
J. May 1801.
302.

The question is, Whether such an agreement as in the present case, though clearly out of the act of parliament, is not within the reason and design of the act, and the very mischief that is expressly condemned by it, and endeavoured to be remedied? For this is not only prejudicial to the bankrupt, but may be hurtful to the creditors in general, because a person who has a composition on foot may (by entering into a contract to pay the whole debt to one or more obstinate creditors, as a consideration of their promising not to appear, or not to oppose the composition) deceive the bulk of the creditors, who imagine the debts standing out against his estate are not so numerous as in fact they are (1).

(1) So *Chesterfield v. Jarlen*, post. 352. *Smith v. Bromley*, and *Jones v. Barkley*, Dougl. 670 Crup. 792. *Cochet v. Bennett*, 2 Durn and East's Rep. 763. *Jackson v. D. Chare*, 3 Durn. and East's Rep. 551. *Jackson v. Lomas*, 4 Durn. and East's Rep. 156. The Case of *Sumner v. Brady* 1 H. Bl. Tr. Rep. 647. contradicts the authority of *Lewis*

v. Chase, 1 P. W. 620. In *Trueman v. Fenton*, Cowp. 544. the creditor received no benefit or dividend under the commission of bankruptcy against the debtor, and the note there given was for a less sum than, though in satisfaction for, what was really due. See *ex parte Burton*, post. 255.

(H) Rule as to Creditors.

Ex parte Banks.

August the 6th,
1740.

A joint commission only taken out against two partners; the petitioner a bond creditor to whom the bankrupts were jointly and severally bound, he may make his election to come upon the joint, or separate estate; if upon the former, he cannot come upon the latter (and so *vice versa*) for the surplus of the debt, till the creditors of the separate estate are first served.

Case 57.

A bond creditor to whom the partners were jointly and severally bound, may make his election to come against the joint or separate estate, but not against both, except for the deficiency, and after the other creditors are paid.

Lord Chancellor founded his order upon this reasoning, because the bond creditors might have brought a separate action at law against each of them, and might have had likewise separate executions, but could not have levied his debt upon both the estates at the same time, but only for the deficiency, where one estate was not sufficient to satisfy the whole (1).

(1) See *ex parte Band and Hill*, ante 98.

April the 20th,
1741.

Corper and others vers. Pepsys and others.

Case 58.

Where a meeting of creditors is properly advertised, and some do not think proper to come, the majority in value who are present have a right to bind those who are absent.

[*107]

WILLIAM REEVES gave notes payable to *Moses Andrees* to the amount of 4500*l.* *Andrees* indorseth them over to several persons, and then goes beyond sea; with the greatest part of his effects, and becomes a bankrupt; the indorsees come upon *Reeves* the drawer for the money due upon the notes, who, being unable to pay them, becomes a bankrupt likewise.

*The assignees under *Reeve's* commission (of whom two were note creditors) give notice pursuant to the act of the 5th of *George* the Second, that there would be a meeting of the creditors under *Reeve's* commission, in order to accept of a composition from the agents of *Andrees*.

Several of *Reeve's* creditors met accordingly, and it was agreed to accept 6*s.* in the pound for the debts due on those notes, and to execute a release to *Andrees* upon those terms; and a proper authority in writing, signed by all the creditors present was given to the defendants, the assignees, to compound with *Andrees*, who on the 5th of *September*, 1735, executed a release accordingly to *Moses Andrees* on payment of the composition aforesaid.

The plaintiffs who are creditors at large of *William Reeves*, in less than four months after the issuing of the commission of bankruptcy against him, prefer a bill in chancery, to which the assignees are made defendants, suggesting it was a fraud in them to agree to this composition, and that they consulted nothing but their own private interest, as being creditors by indorsement of some of *Andrees's* notes.

Lord Chancellor: I do not see any thing fraudulent in the conduct of the assignees, for they have done every thing which the act of parliament prescribes on meetings for a composition of debts, and if some of the creditors do not think proper to come, 'tis their own fault, and those who are present have a right to bind the whole, if the majority in value at the meeting are of opinion to sign the composition.

But with respect to the bill itself, so far as relates to the assignees of *Reeves*, I disapprove of it extremely, because it is an attempt to make the court judges in what manner the estate and effects of a bankrupt should be distributed, before the expiration of 4 months from the date of the commission, whereas the act allows the assignees a complete 4 months from the issuing of the commission to make a dividend; so that it is absolutely changing the method chalked out by the act, and ought to meet with the utmost discouragement.

His Lordship therefore ordered the bill to stand dismissed as against the assignees of *Reeves*, with costs to be taxed.

A doubt arose, whether the creditors who had accepted a composition of six shillings in the pound for their demands or

Where drawer and indorser of notes are both become bankrupt, and the creditors have received a dividend of 6*s.* under the commission against the indorser, they can only prove the remaining 14*s.* under the commission against the drawer.

Andrees,

Andrees, might, notwithstanding, prove their whole debt in the commission against *Reeves*? At first *Lord Chancellor* seemed to think they might still prove their whole debt, but upon looking into two cases in 2 *Wms.* 89*, the first, *ex parte Ryfwicke*, before *Lord Chancellor Macclesfield*; the second†, *ex parte Lefebere* 407. before *Lord Chancellor King*, he altered his opinion, and was very clear that the 6*s.* must go in discharge of so much of the debt, and that they could only prove the remaining 14*s.* under *Reeves*'s commission (1).

COOPER v.
PETER.

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* *Ex parte Ryfwicke*, 2 *Wms.* 89. *A.* drew a bill payable to *B.* on *C.* in *Holland*, for 100*l.* *C.* accepts it, afterwards *A.* and *C.* become bankrupts, and *B.* receives 40*l.* of the bill out of *C.*'s effects, after which he wanted to come in as a creditor for the whole 100*l.* out of *A.*'s effects. *B.* permitted to come in as a creditor for 60*l.* and the Master directed to see whether the other 40*l.* was paid out of *A.*'s effects in *C.*'s hands, or out of *C.*'s own effects; if the latter, then *C.* is a creditor for this 40*l.* also, but if out of *A.*'s effects, then 40*l.* of the 100*l.* is paid off.

† *Ex parte Lefebere*, 2 *Wms.* 407. *A.* gives a promissory note for 200*l.* payable to *B.* or order. *B.* indorses it to *C.* who indorses it to *D.* *A.*, *B.* and *C.* become bankrupts, and *D.* receives 5*s.* in the pound on a dividend made by the assignees of *A.* *D.* shall come in as creditor for 150*l.* only out of *B.*'s effects.

(1) See *ex parte Wildman*, post. 109.

Ex parte Whitechurch.

August the 13th,
1742.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

Ex parte Simpson and others.

August the 12,
1744.

Vide under the Division, Commission and Commissioners.

Ex parte Simpson and others.

December the
22d, 1744.

Vide under the same Division.



Ex parte Kirk.

October the 26th,
1745.

A Creditor under a commission of bankruptcy against *Ovie*, being indebted to the petitioner in 79*l.* drew a note on the assignee of the commission as follows: *Pray pay to Kirk or order the sum of 79*l.* out of my share of the dividend hereafter to be made under the commission against Ovie.*

The assignee accepts it by parol, but before any dividend he becomes a bankrupt himself; the creditors under his commission insist, that *Kirk* ought to come in *pro rata* only, for that it was not a legal acceptance.

B. a creditor under a commission for 79*l.* draws on the assignees for that sum, payable to *K.* or order, out of *B.*'s share of the dividend to be made, assignee accepts it by parol, but

before any dividend becomes a bankrupt himself. *K.* intitled to the whole 79*l.* and not obliged to come in *pro rata* only, under the commission against the assignee.

Lord

Ex parte Kirt.

Lord Chancellor: Though this is not a legal bill of exchange at law, yet it is good in equity, the petitioner having paid a valuable consideration for it, and it was a lien upon the effects of *Orie* as soon as they came to the assignee's hands, and is like the case of a bond assigned by a person before he becomes a bankrupt, which is a good assignment in equity, and the assignee thereof is intitled to retain the bond against the creditors under the commission.

His Lordship directed the 79*l.* to be paid to the petitioner.

March the 19th,
1737.

Twiss v. Maffey.

Vide under the Division, Commissioner and Commissioners.

June the 4th,
1746.

Ex parte Botterill.

Case 60.

Where a bankrupt is in execution for one debt, and the judgment creditor has another against him of a distinct nature, he may prove this under the commission, notwithstanding he refuses to waive his execution upon the other.

THE bankrupt borrowed 100*l.* upon bond of the petitioner, a near relation; the petitioner had arrested him on this bond, and charged him with execution, and had another demand for a year's rent.

The petitioner would not waive his execution upon the bond debt, and yet offered to prove the debt for rent under the commission; but the commissioners refused to admit him, unless he would waive his execution.

Upon this he petitions to be admitted a creditor for the rent.

Lord Chancellor: I think it a hard case upon the bankrupt, but as the debts are intirely distinct, I think he should be allowed to prove, notwithstanding he refuses to waive his execution (1).

But upon looking into the petitioner's affidavit, and finding it defective, as he did not swear to the time when the bankrupt commenced tenant, he dismissed the petition, and said at the same time, that he was satisfied this debt was an after-thought, and trump'd up merely to persecute the bankrupt, by keeping him in gaol, and therefore recommended it to the petitioner's attorney to make it up, and release the bankrupt from his confinement.

(1) *Ex parte Mathews*, post. 3 vol. 817. *Ex parte Crinsoz*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 270.

December the
20th, 1750.
S. C. 2 Ves.
113. pl. 46.

Ex parte Wildman.

Case 61.

The petitioner creditor of a bankrupt who gave him besides bills of exchange on merchants in Holland that made themselves liable by acceptance.

L O R D Chancellor: The present petitioner was creditor of a bankrupt, who had given him bills of exchange on *Vanvillen*, and others in *Holland*, who made themselves liable by accepting them, and afterwards failed and compounded with their creditors.

So that the petitioner had two personal securities.

Consider it in the common case, abstracted from the cases of bankrupts.

Suppose

Suppose several obligors, the obligee may have several actions against them all, several judgments too, and several executions; but he shall not levy more than *one* satisfaction for his debt; if he does, courts of law will step in. The same in bills of exchange, actions, &c. he against drawer and all the indorsers, but only *one* satisfaction for the debt.

Ex parte WILDMAN.
An obligee may have several actions against each obligor, but shall not levy more than one satisfaction for his debt.

So under commissions of bankruptcy, the creditor is intitled to come under the commission against all the obligors, drawers, &c. and this is not a preference given to such a creditor, but a benefit he is intitled to at law, upon all his securities, till he is completely satisfied. There are two persons at stake for this debt, one of them a bankrupt, and the other has made a composition of 10*s.* in the pound.

A creditor is intitled to come under a commission of bankruptcy against all the obligors, drawers of notes, &c. till he is completely satisfied. Petitioner admitted under the commission for

The petitioner had received nothing under the composition at the time he proved his debt under the commission of bankruptcy, and therefore admitted a creditor for the whole.

his whole debt; and before a dividend receives 2*s.* 6*d.* in the pound, under a composition of the acceptors of the bills.

But before a dividend he receives 2*s.* 6*d.* in the pound under the composition of the acceptors of the bills.

The commissioners in the commission of bankruptcy direct he shall be paid his dividend, after deducting what he had received on the bills of exchange.

The assignees say he shall be paid a dividend only on the sum left after deducting the 2*s.* 6*d.*

The assignees insist, he shall be paid a dividend on the sum left only, after deducting the 2*s.* 6*d.*

But this would be taking away from a man the double security he had, and which he may make use of in law and equity, till he is satisfied his whole debt.

As this composition was not paid him till after his debt proved, he shall receive a dividend on the whole debt, and shall account hereafter for what he has received, or shall receive on the bills of exchange; and this will not be any prejudice to the estate, for if he receives more from those bills of exchange than will answer twenty shillings in the pound, he shall account to the assignees for such surplus.

But as the composition was not paid till after the debt proved, he shall receive a dividend on the whole sum.

Ordered therefore the petitioner to be let in to a dividend on his whole debt *pro rata* with the other creditors.

Mr. Clark for the assignees cited the case of *Cooper versus Pepys*, *Vide ante*, p. 106. to shew that the court would not admit a person who had received a dividend of six shillings against the drawer, to prove more than the remaining fourteen shillings as a creditor under the commission against the indorsee.

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Lord Chancellor said, this differed from that case because the creditor there had received the benefit before he had attempted to prove his debt against the indorsee under the commission.

Ex parte Child : In the matter of *Cuff* a bankrupt.

March the 28th,
1751.

Case 62.

Cuff had been for several years a collector of the land-tax for the parish of St.

Dunfins in the *West*, and at the issuing of the commission owed upon the balance 92*l.* 11*s.* to the chamberlain of *London*.

THE petitioner prays, he may, for himself and the rest of the parishioners of *St Dunfins* in the *West*, be admitted a creditor, under the commission against *John Cuff* a bankrupt, for the sum of 869*l.* 8*s.* 1*d.* the balance of the money had and received by *John Cuff* from the said parishioners.

An inhabitant of the parish admitted a creditor, and allowed to prove for himself and the rest of the parishioners.

The bankrupt was duly appointed collector of a re-assessment of the land-tax for 1747. for the first division of the said parish, and since of the whole land-tax for years 1748, 1749, and 1750, and as such received of the several inhabitants for the land-tax and window duties several sums of money, amounting in the whole to 339*l.* 10*s.* and hath only paid to the chamberlain of *London* 252*l.* 1*s.* 11*d.* which left the balance aforesaid.

Mr. *Green* for the petitioning creditor said, the only doubt was, Whether the commissioners according to the form of depositions of debts could suffer one inhabitant to swear, that neither he or any other of the inhabitants had received any security or satisfaction.

Lord Chancellor thought in this case, one inhabitant might prove for himself and the rest of the parishioners, and ordered it accordingly, because he might swear, that neither he or the rest of the parishioners to his knowledge or belief had received any security or satisfaction.

November the
2d, 1754.

Case 63.

Where a person stays till a bankrupt and the assignees are dead, and 15 years after the date of the commission, applies to be admitted a creditor, the court on these circumstances, and in consideration of the length of time, will dismiss the petition.

Ex parte Peachy.

A Commission of bankruptcy taken out in 1739, the bankrupt dead, and the assignee also dead, and now at the distance of 15 years, the petitioner applies to prove a debt which depends upon an account said to be settled between him and the bankrupt.

What the petitioner attempts to prove is over and above his debt for rent. Upon the 26th of December 1739, the goods being on the premises, he made a distress for rent; the bankrupt was the only person who knew what was received under the distress, and it was admitted by the petitioner himself it exceeded the appraisement; and the bankrupt being dead, it was insisted by the counsel for the creditors, that this is an unfavourable application, especially as it rests upon the oath of the petitioner, that he was a stranger to the dividend made under this commission till 1745, and taking into consideration likewise, the great length of time since the suing of the commission.

[*112]

Lord Chancellor : The question is, Whether there is sufficient disclosed in this case to warrant me in making an extraordinary order to admit the petitioner a creditor under this commission.

The court, to be sure, is very liberal in admitting persons to dividends, but the present application seems to be of a very unreasonable nature.

The

The commission issued as long ago as the 9th of February 1730 : the account made up between the petitioner and the bankrupt the 13th of December before, which shews they were very amicable then, and yet, upon the 26th of the same month, the petitioner is so adverse as to take a distress. This is very extraordinary, the arrears of rent for 13 years amounted to 400 l. levies upon the distress 260 l. being about five eighths of the balance of the account ; his ignorance is not of the commission, but of the dividend only ; lies by for 15 years without taking one step, and after the bankrupt is dead, and the assignee, who might give some account of this transaction, is likewise dead, applies to be admitted as a creditor ; so that, taking it altogether, it stands upon very suspicious circumstances.

Ex parte
PEACHT.

The creditors under the commission will not receive above nine shillings in the pound ; the petitioner has had under the distress a large sum, of which he has been making interest, and is much better off than any other creditor.

Upon all the circumstances of the case, I am of opinion he ought not to be admitted a creditor ; and therefore let the petition be dismissed (1).

(1) *Vide* 1 Cooke's B. Laws, 541. sec. 2.

(I) Contingent Debts.

[113]

Ex parte Elizabeth Greenaway : In the Matter of Edward Greenaway a Bankrupt.

December the 1st
1740.

EDWARD Greenaway, previous to his marriage with the petitioner, gave his bond to the petitioner's father in the penalty of 600 l. in trust, that if the marriage should take effect, and the petitioner should survive Edward Greenaway and if he should before his death by will or otherwise give or leave the petitioner 300 l. in goods or other personal or real estate, so as the same should be paid by his executors or assigns immediately after his death to the petitioner, without any claim by any person or persons whatsoever, then the bond was to be void.

In May 1731, the marriage was had between Edward Greenaway and the petitioner, and on the 17th of September last a commission of bankruptcy issued against Edward Greenaway, whereupon he was declared a bankrupt, and on the 28th of September following; the bankrupt died insolvent, before any distribution of his estate, and the petitioner has since duly proved the bond before the commissioners; but the assignees refuse to make any dividend to the petitioner.

She therefore prays, as the husband made no other provision for her in his life-time, that she may be let in to receive her dividend, out of the bankrupt's estate and effects, in equal degree with the other creditors.

Case 64. 1. D.

Petitioner's husband before marriage gave her father a bond in the penalty of 600 l. conditioned for the payment of 300 l. to her in case he survived him, he has a commission of bankruptcy taken out against him, and dies in ten days after. The court thinking it a doubtful case whether she should or should not be admitted a creditor, did not give an absolute opinion : but on assignees consenting she should come under the commission for 150 l. ordered her a dividend accordingly.

Ex parte
GREENAWAY.

The counsel for the petitioner insisted, that though it was a contingent debt, yet the foundation of it was the bond, and therefore notwithstanding the contingency has happened since the bankruptcy, yet the wife was intitled to prove the debt, as well as any other creditor.

The statute of 7 Geo. 1. cap. 31. extends only to creditors at a future day certain, and not to debts on mere contingencies which have not happened at the time of the act of bankruptcy committed.

[114]

The Attorney-general, who was counsel for the assignees, insisted the petitioner is not within the statute of the 7 Geo. 1. cap. 31. as it is not a debt that will at all events become due at a future day, and uncertain whether it can ever take place, and relied upon the case of *Tully v. Sparks*, 2 L. Raym. 1546. where, it being likewise uncertain whether the bond in that case would ever become due or not, being not to take place except upon two contingencies, which had not both happened at the time of the act of bankruptcy committed, it was impossible to make such abatement of the five per cent. as the act directs, and therefore the court of King's Bench unanimously held the bond was not within that act.

Lord Chancellor: The question is, Whether this is not a debt become due before the estate is distributed, and it would be the hardest case in the world, if such a person should not be admitted a creditor before the estate is divided away.

The penalty in an obligation is *debitum in presenti*, and the condition only suspends it, so that it is looked upon as a debt from the time of the execution of the bond.

There are great variety of determinations in the books, and therefore I desire that one counsel of a side may speak to it, on the next day of petitions, unless the creditors, at a meeting for this purpose, will agree to give a sum of money to this poor woman in lieu of her share upon the dividend of the bankrupt's effects.

The petition was set down again in the paper of petitions of the 24th of January 1740, when it appeared that the rest of the creditors, since the hearing of the petition before *Christmas*, had come to an agreement, to let in the wife of the bankrupt as a creditor for 150*l.* half of the bond debt only, and that it was acquiesced under by the petitioner.

All the cases since *Tully v. Sparks*, 2 L. Raym. 546. have been determined against a contingent interest.

Lord Chancellor: I am very glad you have compromised it, for it is a matter attended with great difficulties, and there has not been one case since *Tully* and *Sparks* in the court of King's Bench but what has been determined expressly against a contingent interest.

The distinction taken in this court has been between a trust for the wife, and a bond absolutely given to the wife herself before marriage upon a contingency of her surviving the husband: This is materially different from a trust, because there a person who comes for equity must do equity, as in the case of *Holland v. Culliford*, 2 Vern. 662.

The most material case to the present purpose is, *ex parte Caswell*, *ex parte Cazald*, *ex parte Bateman*, 2 Will. 497, There a trader on marriage gives a bond to a trustee to secure a thousand pounds to a wife, if she survived him; the trader becomes a bankrupt; the debt was to be allowed; nor any reservation to be made for it; nor *stop* it *stop* the distribution, in regard it may never be a debt: But if the

Ex parte
GROOME.

whose debt was contracted before, but did not become due till the act of bankruptcy committed, could not take out a commission but on an appeal afterwards to the house of Lords, it was then determined otherwise.

He cited the case *ex parte Smith*, the 23d of January 1741, in which a contingent creditor, who applied to be admitted to prove his debt, was denied by the court, and another case, *ex parte King*, January 1742 (1), where it was also denied.

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Mr. Solicitor-general in his reply said, that these two cases were not absolutely determined, and there is no one case where Lord King's distinction in *ex parte Caswell* has been controverted.

He insisted that the cases make no distinction between a bond and a covenant, and that there is no clause in any act of parliament which confines the distribution to creditors only at the time of the bankruptcy committed, or excludes creditors whose contingent debts take place before distribution.

Before the statute of the 7 Geo. 1. cap. 31. he said, there was no doubt at all but the creditor might come in when the debt became payable, but the only doubt was, Whether they might come in before; therefore to remedy this inconvenience of the effects being divided away before such creditor could come in, the act enables them to prove their several securities before they become payable.

Lord Chancellor ordered it to stand over till this day, that he might give his opinion at the same time upon another contingent case *ex parte Winchester*, which came on two days after the case *ex parte Groome*.

see Camp? v Jones
Baird v. N. C. 481.

The state of the case *ex parte Winchester* (2).

Previous to the marriage of the petitioner with *Elizabeth Grant*, daughter of the bankrupt, " by an indenture dated the 2d of July 1739, made between the petitioner of the one part, and *John Grant* the bankrupt, and *Elizabeth* the petitioner's wife of the other part, reciting the then intended marriage between the petitioner and *Elizabeth*, and that *John Grant* had before the execution of the indenture paid the petitioner 500 l. and by a bond dated the same day secured 1000 l. more to be paid to the petitioner, his executors, administrators and assigns within 12 months after the death of the survivor of *John Grant* and *Barbara* his wife, together with interest for the same at 4 l. per cent. per ann. by equal half yearly payments, which 500 l. then paid, and 1000 l. secured to be paid, was declared to be in full for the wife's portion: It was agreed, and the petitioner covenanted with *John Grant*, that the petitioner's heirs, executors or administrators should within one month after the petitioner's death, pay to *John Grant*, his executors or administrators, the sum of 2000 l. to be placed out at interest for the petitioner's wife, and the issue of the marriage; and it was also agreed, that the 2000 l. and the 1000 l. when due, should be placed out at interest in the names of two trustees, in trust after the death of the survivor of petitioner and his wife, to distribute the 3000 l. among the

(1) *Davies* 254. S. C.

(2) *Davies* 530. S. C.

" children

"children in such proportions as the petitioner and his wife should direct, and for want of such direction, in trust to divide the same between such children equally, and in case there was no issue of the marriage, to pay 1000 l. part of the 3000 l. to such persons as the petitioner's wife should appoint, and for want of such appointment, to the petitioner, his heirs, executors or administrators.

*Ex parte
Gapomz.*

The marriage was accordingly had between the petitioner and *Elizabeth Grant*, and there was issue of the marriage living three children. *John Grant* regularly paid the interest of the bond to the 25th of December last, but no payment had been since made, and the condition of the bond was broken by the non-payment of the interest, which became due to the petitioner on *Midsummer* day.

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In April last a commission of bankruptcy issued against *John Grant*, and he was thereon declared a bankrupt, and assignees chosen, but no dividend yet made of the bankrupt's estate, and the petitioner has applied to the commissioners to be admitted a creditor for the said sum of 1000 l. but such sum not being payable till after the death of *John Grant*, and *Barbara* his wife, the commissioners refused to admit the petitioner a creditor; and therefore he preferred his petition to be admitted a creditor for the principal sum of 1000 l. and that the dividends thereof might be laid out in the purchase of South-Sea annuities, for the benefit of the petitioner, his wife and children; and also prays to be admitted a creditor under the commission for 20 l. being the half year's interest due on the bond at *Midsummer* last.

Lord Chancellor: These are sometimes cases of value; more often cases of hardship and compassion. It were to be wished that they were provided for by act of parliament, and I hope some gentleman who hears me will consider how to rectify this by some future statute.

There have been a great many cases in this court upon this point; some where a husband before a marriage has contracted with trustees for the wife, to pay a sum of money in his life-time for her benefit, if she survives, and if she dies, for children; and if no children, for the benefit of the husband.

See Davies 535.

There have been other cases where the time of payment does not arise, till the contingency takes effect after the death of the husband.

And there have been other cases, where the father of the wife has entered into a covenant to pay a sum of money after the death himself and his wife, and interest in the mean time, which is the present case, *ex parte Winchester*, and other cases like that, *ex parte Groome*.

They will fall under very different considerations, and I will give my opinion upon all of them.

If a husband becomes a bankrupt after a breach of payment to trustees, they have always been admitted creditors upon equitable terms, and the court has taken care that the interest of the money all be paid to the creditors under the commission, during the

life

Ex parte
GROOME.

life of the husband, and the principal secured to the wife if she survives her husband (1).

If judgment had been given at law by the husband for this 'tis a debt notwithstanding the defeazance, and the true would have been admitted as creditors, though the terms of bond itself be otherwise.

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pland. & Walton
9 Mass. 440. 333.

As to *Winchester's* case, *where the father of the wife has given bond to the husband to pay him the principal sum of 1000l. after death of himself and his wife, and interest at 4 per cent. by half yearly payments in the mean time.* Upon what terms shall the party be believed against the penalty? Why upon paying what is in conscience due out of the estate.

Here was clearly a breach of the condition of this bond by the bankruptcy, for the half year's interest was become due *Christmas*, but not paid till the 10th of *January*, and therefore not being paid at the day, the penalty was forfeited at law.

It has been said, it turns upon the act for the amendment of law the 4th and 5th of *Q. Anne, cap. 16. sec. 12*, "That where an action of debt is brought upon any bond, which hath a condition or defeazance to make void the same upon payment of a lesser sum, at a day or place certain, if the obligor, his heirs, executors, or administrators, have before the action brought paid the principal and interest due, though such payment was not made strictly according to the condition or defeazance, yet it may be pleaded in bar, and shall be as effectual as if the money had been paid at the day and place according to the condition, and been so pleaded."

Before this act of parliament, the bond was forfeited if not paid at the day. *At a day or place certain*, are material words: This is a new defence, and a new plea given by the act of parliament, and therefore the common way of pleading is, that all interest paid before action brought.

But this is not a bond with a defeazance for the payment of a lesser sum at a day certain, for here the principal is to be paid at an uncertain time; for it is to be paid within a twelvemonth after the death of the survivor of father and mother. It is not therefore a bond within the description of the statute, nor did the act of parliament intend to comprehend bonds of this nature.

A bond payable at installments, the obligee, upon breach of payment at the first installment, gets judgment on the whole penalty; on payment of the money due and costs, even a court of law will relieve the obligor.

For suppose a bond payable at installments, the obligee gets judgment on the whole penalty, upon a breach of payment at the first installment; why, even a court of law would in such case relieve equitably, for upon the obligor's applying to the court there, offering to pay the money due at the installment, and agreeing to let the judgment stand as a security for the rest, they will relieve the party, on payment of the money then due and costs.

If this case is not within the act of parliament, then it comes within the construction of the other two heads of cases, and *Winchester* ought to be admitted a creditor.

On the 4th set of cases, which is *Groome's*, I am of opinion (though I am sorry I must go on such niceties) that he cannot

(1) *Ex parte Smith*, 1 *Cooke's B. Laws*, 257. *Ex parte Brown*, *ibid.* 261. *Ex parte M. J. Ford*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Ca.* 398.

admitted a creditor ; in all the other cases there was a remedy at law before such time as the act of bankruptcy was committed, or commission taken out, but here there was not.

Ex parte
GROOME.

As to the case that has been mentioned, *ex parte Caswell, &c.* The case *ex parte Caswell, &c.* was an *obiter* opinion of Lord King's only and not the case in judgment.

'tis barely an opinion of Lord King, and not the case in judgment ; but he did *obiter* declare his opinion only. My Lord Talbot afterwards doubted of Lord King's opinion ; and in a case before me since, I have differed from him intirely, and see no occasion to alter my opinion.

[*119]

The question turns on the new act of parliament of the 5th of George the Second, *cap. 32. sec. 7.* I think that the privilege of creditors to come in, and bankrupts to be discharged from debts, is co extensive and commensurate, and very equitable: for it would otherwise make an inequality among the creditors, for a creditor, whose debt was due before the taking out of the commission, shall perhaps have no more than 5 s. in the pound, and this creditor, whose debt was not due till a second distribution, shall come in for as much as the other creditor, and likewise have a remedy open to him for the rest against the bankrupt.

For the words of the 5th of George the Second are, And every such bankrupt shall be discharged from such debts as *shall be due and owing* at the time of the bankruptcy ; so that this would be a glaring injustice against the creditors at the time of the commission taken out.

Commissioners very rightly declare a man a bankrupt only before issuing the commission, without specifying any precise time.

The clause relating to mutual credit, *sec. 28.* shews plainly the act intended to confine it to creditors at the time of the commission, "That where it shall appear to the commissioners that there hath been mutual credit given by the bankrupt and any other person, or mutual debts between the bankrupt and any other person, *at any time before such person became bankrupt*, the commissioners, &c. shall state the account between them, &c."

I will put this case: Suppose a debt due from Mr. Groome to the bankrupt before his bankruptcy, and that the bankrupt owed him a debt on bond upon a contingency that took place after the bankruptcy, and before the final dividend, would it not be a great hardship upon the rest that such creditor should be at liberty to set off?

A. A debtor to bankrupt before his bankruptcy, and creditor to him upon a contingency, that takes place after the bankruptcy, shall not be at liberty to set off under the clause relating to mutual credit.

To go a step further. By the statute of the 7th of George the First, *cap. 21.* it is enacted as follows, that "All and every person or persons, who now are or shall become bankrupts, shall be discharged of and from all and every such bond, note, &c. and shall have the benefit of the statutes now in force against bankrupts in like manner to all intents and purposes, as if such sum of money had been due and payable before the time of his becoming bankrupt."

In *Tully v. Sparks*, Lord Raymond, 2d vol. 1546, there were two contingencies, and as both had not happened at the time of the act of bankruptcy, it being uncertain whether the bond would ever become due or not, it was impossible to make such abate

ment

Ex parte
Groom.

ment of 5 *per cent.* as the act directs, and therefore the court King's Bench were of opinion the bond was not within the act the 7th of *George the First*.

There is no such thing as drawing a line between the contingency not happening before the bankruptcy, and yet happening before the time of distribution: this would not only be a hardship to the bankrupt, and on the rest of the creditors whose debts were actually due, but would have given the contingent creditor a superior privilege, by leaving it open to him to recover the remainder of the debt against the bankrupt.

The case of *Groom* may have hardships, and I am sorry for it but, as the law now stands, I cannot determine otherwise. I hope however, as I said before, some Gentleman will think of clause by way of amendment to this last bankrupt act, which may remedy and settle this for the future.

The petition of *Groom* was dismissed (1).

And with regard to *Mr. Winchester*, his Lordship ordered that the petitioner be at liberty to prove his debt of 1000*l.* and that he admitted a creditor under the commission for what he shall so prove and be paid out of the bankrupt's estate a dividend in respect thereof ratably with the other creditors of the bankrupt.

(1) *Ex parte Michell*, next case. *Ex Davies* 254. 1 *Cooke's B. Laws*, 27 *parte Cork*, 7 *Fin.* 72. pl. 7. *Ex parte King*,

Ex parte December the *Ex parte Scudal*
1733, 1751. *D. & Chitty* 29 *Ex parte Elizabeth Michell*.
1293 *Wills* 271. S.C. *Monte* 375
Case 66. Monte 375

BENJAMIN MICHELL, in pursuance of articles before his marriage with petitioner, did, on the 27th of January in the 12th year of the late King, execute a bond to *Thomas Michell* and *William Rous*, the trustees under the articles in the penalty of 1000*l.* conditioned to be void if the heirs, &c. *Benj. Michell* should pay to *Thomas Michell* and *William Rous* 500*l.* within three months next after the death of *Benjamin Michell* for the use of the petitioner, in case she should outlive her husband, or in case she should not survive him, to the use of her child or children, if any.

B. M. in pursuance of articles before marriage with the petitioner, executed a bond to *T. M.* and *W. R.* trustees under the articles, in the penalty of 1000*l.* conditioned to be void if the heirs, &c. of *B. M.* should pay to *T. M.* and *W. R.* 500*l.* within three months next after the death of *B. M.* for the use of the petitioner; or in case she should not survive, to the use of her child or children, if any.

A commission of bankruptcy issued against *B. M.* who dies on the first of April, 1749: on the 28th of the same month a dividend is made of 9*s.* in the pound.

A commission of bankruptcy issued against *Benjamin Michell* who lived some time after, and died on the first of April 1742. On the 28th of April 1749, a dividend of nine shillings in a pound was directed to be made of *Michell's* estate.

The commissioners would not admit the petitioner a creditor without an order of the court.

She petitioned to be admitted a creditor, and to be paid out of the money remaining in assignees' hands, a dividend, in proportion to what hath been already paid to other creditors.

Ex parte
Michell.

Lord Chancellor mentioned the case *ex parte Caswell, &c.* 2 P. Wms. 497. a. 499. where Lord chancellor King upon such a contingent debt directed, as husband died before a dividend, the wife to be admitted to prove it; and the case *ex parte Greenaway* (1) before himself, where on his ordering it to stand over to give assignees and creditors an opportunity of coming in, promising it with the wife, they admitted her a creditor for 150l. half her demand.

The petitioner prays to be paid a proportionable dividend.

See Ex parte

Michell

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79.

The assignees being served here with notice, and no counsel attending for them, his Lordship directed she should be admitted a creditor, and to a dividend of nine shillings, *not being opposed*.

Assignees being served with notice, and no counsel attending for them, directed *not being opposed*.

and she should be admitted a creditor, and receive a dividend of 9s. in the pound,

His Lordship declared, that if there had been a judgment, he should have thought this would have made it an immediate debt (2) and she would have been intitled to come in as a claimant before the death of the husband, and assignees must then have retained sufficient in their hands on a dividend day, to answer a proportionable dividend to the petitioner when the event happened, in the same manner as in the case of obligees *in respondentia*, or bottomry bond, or persons on policies of insurance, under an act of parliament of the 19th of George the Second, where it cannot be known whether a loss has happened or not.

If there had been a judgment, it would have made it an immediate debt, and she would have been intitled to have come in as a claimant before her husband's death, and the assignees must then have retained sufficient on a

dividend day, to answer a proportionable dividend to the petitioner when the event happened.

(1) *Ante* 113. (2) See *Ex parte Winchester ante* 117.

January the 22d. 1752.

Lord Chancellor had some doubt after he had pronounced the order last day of petitions, and therefore would not suffer the Secretary to draw up the order, though not defended.

Lord Chancellor King's being an *obiter* opinion as to a wife's being admitted to a dividend, and Lord Talbot doubting of it, and Lord Hardwicke, in a case *ex parte Groome* December 1741, refusing to admit such a person creditor, his Lordship would not suffer the Secretary to draw up the order pronounced at a former day of petitions, tho'

Upon a search at the bankrupt office, there was found the case *ex parte Greenaway*, (1) and the four cases which came on together upon contingencies, by the order of Lord Hardwicke who said that Lord King's was an *obiter* opinion as to a wife's being admitted to a dividend; that Lord Talbot doubted of it, and that he himself also doubted of it; and in a case *ex parte Groome*, (2) in December 1741, was of opinion the creditor could not be admitted, and founded his opinion on *Tully vers. Sparks* in the court of King's Bench; and therefore in this case of *Michell* he declared that he was very unwilling to make a precedent, though this appeared to be a very hard case. The only difference between *Groome* and this, is that *Groome's* case was upon contract,

not defended, but recommended it to the assignees to compromise it with the petitioner.

(1) *Ante* 113. (2) *Ante* 115.

Ex parte
MICHELL.

but this upon bond; and unless you can make it *debitum in presenti solvendum in futuro*, which will be difficult to do, the petitioner will not be intitled to prove it. In those cases where he had let in such creditors, a judgment was given at the time which is an immediate debt at law, and suspended only in equity upon the defeazance. His Lordship ordered it to stand over to the next day of petitions, and in the mean time recommended it to the assignees to compromise with the petitioner (1).

(1) See 3 *Wilf.* 271.

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(K) *Rule as to Drawers and Indorsors of Bills of Exchange.*

December the
23d, 1743.

Ex parte Walton and others; in the Matter of *William Winsmore*, a Bankrupt.

Case 67.
W. draws bills of exchange on *H.* who had no effects of *W.* in his hands, they are transmitted to *R.* and *Co.* and indorsed over by them to several persons; the assignees of *R.* and *Co.* must be admitted as creditors under *W.*'s commission for so much as they have paid to the indorsees of *W.*'s bills of exchange, under *R.* and *Co.*'s commission.

Aaron Richardson and *Edward Stephens*, on the 25th of *Jun* 1740, entered into co-partnership, which was to be carried on in *London*, in the names of *Richardson and Company*; and it was also agreed, that *Stephens* should be at liberty to carry on separate trade at *Bristol*, on his own account, and for his own benefit.

On the 16th of *March* 1740, a joint commission of bankruptcy issued against *Aaron Richardson* and *Edward Stephens*, and the petitioners were chosen assignees.

In *December* and *January*, 1740, *William Winsmore* drew several bills of exchange on *Richardson* and company, payable to *Harper* or order, for different sums, amounting to 2500*l.* which bills were accepted by *Richardson* and company for *Winsmore*'s account, on his undertaking to send them money or effects, to pay and satisfy these bills before they fell due; but he did not keep his promise.

Winsmore, in *January* and *February* 1740, drew several other bills of exchange on *Harris* (who was his agent in *London*), some of which were payable to *Harper*, and others to *Edward Stephens* or order, for different sums, amounting to 2060*l.* which bills were remitted to *Richardson* and company by *Stephens* on his own private account, in order to enable them to discharge bills of exchange, which *Stephens* had, on his separate account, in order to serve *Winsmore*, drawn on *Richardson* and company, and *Richardson* and company negotiated the said bills as *Stephens* directed; and several of them, to the amount of 1565*l.* being drawn by *Winsmore* on *Harris*, *Richardson* and company indorsed the same, not doubting but *Winsmore* or *Harris* would have taken care the same were punctually paid when they fell due, but, instead thereof, *Winsmore* stopped payment, and never remitted *Richardson* and company any money or effects to pay the said bill or any of them.

On the 29th of *April* 1742, before any dividend was made *Winsmore*'s estate, the petitioners, as assignees of *Richardson* and company

Ex parte
WALTON

company, exhibited their claim under his commission for 2500*l.* the amount of the bills accepted, and for 475 *l.* part of the bills which had been indorsed by them the said *Richardson* and company for account of *Winsmore*, which were all the bills that had been proved under the commission against *Richardson* and company; and the commissioners admitted the claim under the commission against *Winsmore*.

A dividend of two shillings and nine-pence in the pound was afterwards ordered to be made to *Winsmore's* creditors who had proved their debts, and also a reservation to answer a like dividend on the petitioner's claim, when they should make the same.

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On the 29th day of *July* 1742, a dividend of five shillings in the pound was made among the creditors of *Richardson* and company, and the petitioners had paid the dividend of five shillings to great part of the bearers of the said bills, and were ready to pay the same to the rest, after a deduction out of their debts to the amount of the two shillings and nine pence in the pound, divided under *Winsmore's* commission. The dividend of five shillings in the pound, in the bankruptcy of *Richardson* and company, on the said bills, amounted to 744*l.* and therefore the petitioners the assignees of that commission pray, that they may be admitted creditors under the commission against *Winsmore*, for the sum of 744*l.* the amount of the dividend of five shillings in the pound, and for all such future sums as should be paid out of the estate of *Richardson* and company, in respect of the said bills, and likewise for all such other bills drawn by *Winsmore*, or by his order and direction, and accepted and indorsed by *Richardson* and company, without consideration or value, which should hereafter be proved under the commission against them, and that the assignees of *Winsmore's* estate might be ordered to pay the petitioners the said dividend of two shillings and nine pence in the pound, and all future dividends rateably with the other creditors, for the sums before mentioned for the benefit of the petitioners, and the rest of the creditors of *Richardson* and company.

Lord Chancellor : The question is, Whether the assignees of *Richardson* and company, the indorsors of these bills of exchange, are intitled to come in under *Winsmore's* commission, for so much as the indorsees of *Richardson* and company have received under the commission against *Richardson* and company.

Winsmore swears that in *January* and *February* 1740, he drew several bills of exchange on *Harris* his agent in *London*, amounting to 2060 *l.* or thereabouts, which bills were transmitted by *Stephens* on his own private account to *Richardson* and company, and indorsed over by them to several persons.

The doubt with me was, whether *Harris* had any effects of *Winsmore's* in his hands, for if he had, there would have been no pretence that the indorsors should come in against *Winsmore's* estate.

In bills of exchange, there is a double contract, the first between the principal debtor and creditor, and also an implied contract, that the principal debtor will indemnify the surety, so that if the creditor the indorsee comes upon the surety the indorser, the indorser

Ex parte
WALTON.

dorfor or his assignees may come in against the original or principal debtor.

Thus it stands between principal and surety, and is likewise case, where an indorfor is barely a surety, and no consideration is paid by the original drawer.

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A. draws a bill on B. who has effects of A.'s in his hands, afterwards it is negotiated and indorfed over; this will not make the indorfor only in the nature of sureties to A. but every indorfor will be considered a new original drawer.

But put another case; *A. draws a bill upon B. who has effects of A.'s in his hands, afterwards his bill is negotiated and indorfed over; there is no suretyship in this case, for A. did not draw upon B. as a surety, but as having effects of A. in his hands, which he was obliged to answer the draft of A. and therefore the indorfsing it over to others will not make the indorfor only the nature of sureties to A. but every indorfor will be considered as a new original drawer.*

But here *Harris* appears to have had no effects of *Winsmore's* in his hands, and therefore accepted it merely to give credit to *Winsmore as a surety*, and consequently the assignees of *Richardson's* company must be admitted as creditors under *Winsmore's* commission for so much as they have paid under *Richardson's* commission to the indorfees of *Winsmore's* bills of exchange.

His Lordship therefore ordered, that the petitioners the assignees of *Richardson* and company be admitted to come in as creditors under *Winsmore's* commission for 744*l.* and that they be paid dividend out of his estate in respect thereof rateably with the other creditors, and that in all future dividends the petitioners be paid in respect of the said sum of 744*l.* rateably in equal proportion with the other creditors of *Winsmore* seeking relief under that commission, in trust for themselves and the several other joint creditors of *Richardson* and company.

November the
4th 1743.

Ex parte Byas.

Case 68.

*D. being indebted to M. K. in 71*l.* gave him the following note: I promise to pay to M. K. the sum of 71*l.* witness my hand, Aug. 28th, 1734. E. D. M. K. being indebted to petitioner in 92*l.* 19*s.* 0*d.* delivers E. D.'s note to*

M*RS. Devereux being indebted to Martin Kankell in 71*l.* goods sold on the 28th of August 1734, gave him the following note: I promise to pay to Martin Kankell at queen Caroline's head in Tavistock-street Covent Garden, the sum of seventy pounds, witness my hand, August 28th 1734. E. Devereux.*

*Martin Kankell being indebted to the petitioner in 92*l.* 19*s.* 0*d.* delivered to him Mrs. Devereux's note, that the petitioner might receive the money due thereon in part of his debt, and took of petitioner a receipt for the same in the words following: Received 20th of Dec. 1734, a bill for 71*l.* which when paid will be on account per Thomas Byas.*

*The assignees of K's estate ought to be considered as trustees for the petitioner with respect to the of 71*l.* and ordered to pay him the money accordingly (1).*

(1) *Vide Tyrrel v. Hope*, post. 2 vol. 558. *Winch v. Keely*, 1 Durn. and East's Rep. 67

The 10th of March 1734, a commission of bankruptcy issued against Martin Kankell, Mrs. Devereux died in 1735, and by her will charged all her estate real and personal with the payment of her debts.

*Ex parte
STAT.
Ex parte Charles
Mont. 110.*

Kankell not having indorsed or assigned the said note to the petitioner, the assignees applied to Mrs. Devereux's solicitor, and received the 71 l. of him on giving security to indemnify him against the petitioner's claim, who had the note in his custody and possession.

*W. B. 1
Reid
2. Har. 24*

The petitioner proved his whole debt of 92 l. 19 s. under Kankell's commission, but at the same time insisted on having the benefit of the note, and that the assignees ought not to have received the 71 l. and that the same having been so received by them in prejudice to the petitioner, ought to be paid over to him, and therefore prays that the assignees of Kankell's estate may, out of the money now in their hands, pay to the petitioner the 71 l. which they received for the money due on Mrs. Devereux's note.

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion that the assignees of Kankell's estate under the commission, ought to be considered as trustees for the petitioner, with respect to the sum of 71 l. which they received on account of the note given by Mrs. Devereux in the petition, and do order the assignees to pay forthwith the 71 l. to the petitioner according to the prayer of his petition.

Ex parte Kirk.

*October the 16th,
1745.*

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Creditors:

Ex parte De Grouchy.

Ex parte Thompson. S. M. 22.

*June the 4th,
1746.*

A. Gives a note of his hand payable to B. two months from the date for 100 l. who gave no consideration. B. indorses it over to the petitioner, but allows a discount of a guinea and a half, being at the rate of 9 l. per cent. when the note became due, the petitioner takes a joint bond from the drawer and indorsor for the 100 l. though he paid only 98 l. 8 s. 6 d. the commissioners had admitted him as a creditor under a commission against the drawer, but finding out this fact afterwards, they ordered his dividend to be stopped.

Cafe 69.

A. gives a note payable to B. two months from the date for 100 l. B. indorses it over to C. but allows a discount of 9 per cent. he proves it under a commission against A.

for the whole sum, but commissioners finding out this fact afterwards, stop his dividend.

He now petitions Lord Chancellor to be admitted to his share of the dividend.

Lord Chancellor would not direct him to be admitted to the dividend, but ordered an issue to try whether the bond was usurious before Lord Chief Justice Willes (1).

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Lord Chancellor rejected his petition and ordered an issue to try whether the bond was usurious.

(1) See *Ex parte Ship*, 2 Ves. 489. *Lowe v. Waller*, Dougl. 708.

November the
4th, 1747.

Cafe 70.

S. C. ante 73.
A note given be-
fore an act of
bankruptcy,
tho' indorsed
after, is a debt
upon which the
indorsee may
take out a com-
mission of bank-
ruptcy against
the drawer.

Ex parte Thomas.

THE bankrupt petitioned to supersede the commission against himself, because the petitioning creditor's debt arose only from a note that had been indorsed to him after the petitioner had committed an act of bankruptcy; but as it appeared, that the note itself was given before any act of bankruptcy, though indorsed after, *Lord Chancellor* thought it a debt upon which the petitioning creditor might take out the commission (1).

(1) *Anon. 2 Wilf. 135. Bingley v. Maddison, 1 Cooke's B. Laws 22.*

November the
25th, 1749.

Bradbury v. Auderton.

J. C. M. C. No. 408 Billon v. Hyde and Michell.

Cafe 71.

1 Vez. 327. pl.
161. S. C.

The plaintiff
and one *Michell*
had various
transactions to-
gether, princi-
pally negotiating
bills of exchange
from 1742, to
the 8th of June
1743, and on
the 18th of
April 1743,
Michell commit-
ted a private act
of bankruptcy;
the sums paid by
Michell for these
transactions to
the plaintiff
amounted to
3000*l.*

LORD Chancellor: This bill is to have an allowance for 712*l.* out of a sum of 3000*l.* which has been recovered in an action at law, by the defendants the assignees of *Michell* the bankrupt against the plaintiff.

The case is, That Mr. *Michell*, who was a merchant, had long dealings with the plaintiff before the 18th April, 1743, when he committed an act of bankruptcy, which the plaintiff insisted was a private act of bankruptcy, and that for some time after Mr. *Michell* appeared in publick in all places where merchants resort, without suspicion of his being a bankrupt.

The dealings between Mr. *Michell* and the plaintiff, as it appears in the cause, commenced in 1742, and continued after the 18th of April 1743, up to the 8th of June following, and the commission of bankruptcy was dated the 30th of November, 1743.

The transactions between them from the 18th of April, 1743, to the 8th of June following were of various sorts, but appear to be fair ones, and were principally in negotiating bills of exchange upon which the plaintiff advanced to Mr. *Michell* money to a considerable amount.

Several sums were also paid by the plaintiff to Mr. *Michell* during this space of time; some paid to Mr. *Michell*'s own hand, some to his order, some by way of loan, and other sums by way of money laid out for his use, for premiums on insurances for his benefit, and for duties on goods imported by him, which sums amounted to 712*l.*

It appeared that the sums of money paid at different times by Mr. *Michell* to the plaintiff for and on account of these several transactions, amounted in the whole to 3000*l.*

The assignees under the commission finding these sums were paid by Mr. *Michell* after the act of bankruptcy committed by

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The assignees
bring an action
against *Billon*
for so much had

and received to their use, and recovered a verdict against him for 3000*l.*

him,

him, they brought their action against the plaintiff for such money had and received to their use, and recovered a verdict against him for that money.

BILLON v.
HYDE.

Mr. *Billon*, the plaintiff here, but defendant at law, insisted on the trial to have the sum of 712*l.* allowed him as paid to and for the bankrupt, and it not being allowed, is the reason of his bringing this bill.

Billon insisted on the trial to have 712*l.* allowed him as paid to and for the bankrupt, but being refused, brings his present bill for it. The plaintiff insisted to have this allowance, and the verdict not conclusive upon him, because it is matter of contract, and of account, and therefore a proper subject for the jurisdiction of this court.

There are two considerations.

First, Whether the plaintiff is intitled to this allowance?

Secondly, If he is intitled, whether he has pursued a proper remedy, or whether this court is concluded by the verdict?

And these questions must depend upon the nature of the demand of the assignees against him, and the nature of the remedy he has pursued.

As to the nature of the demand of the assignees, which is founded upon *the relation* of the act of bankruptcy, it is as hard a case as any in the law, as this *relation* may go a great way back, and over-reach all transactions without regard to their being fair or fraudulent.

It holds in sales of goods, and payment of money, and it overturns not only contracts, but acts upon record, and legal acts, as judgments and executions executed; where these acts happen after the act of bankruptcy committed.

It is said fictions of law shall not enure to the prejudice of any body, but are invented to support rights, and to be sure that is the rule; but this case is taken out of another general rule, which has been adhered to for the sake of publick utility; viz. that it is better a private mischief should insue, than a general inconvenience: *Lex citius vult tolerare privatum damnum, quam publicum malum.* 1 Inst. 152. b.

But since trade has increased, the mischiefs and inconveniences have multiplied, and therefore the late act of the 19 Geo. 2. was made; and this case is within the recital of that act, and one of the principal cases provided for by it, is the negotiation of bills of exchange.

And though the plaintiff may not bring himself strictly within the act, yet he is within the meaning of it, and the court will go as far as it can in support of it.

Secondly, As to the remedy pursued by the plaintiff.

It is insisted by the assignees, he ought not to have a remedy here against them, for that they recovered at law by their own strength; and, as he failed there, he ought not to be assisted here: but it does not appear in what shape the set-off was offered at the trial, and I am apt to believe it was only offered in mitigation of damages.

I think, from the nature of the demand against him, he is intitled to have this allowance in some shape or other.

It appears new to me, to permit assignees to maintain an action of *indebitatus assumpsit* for money paid by a bankrupt to another person after a secret act of bankruptcy: I always thought assignees were obliged to bring an action of *tort*, either *trover*,

BILLON v. **Hydr.** or trespass, and the Lord Chief Justice *Holt, Parker, and Raymond* were of that opinion (1).

I remember Lord Chief Justice *Parker* declared in a cause *Guildhall*, the 4 *Geo.* 1. that he knew no case where a man might not maintain an *assumpsit* for money wrongfully taken from him except two, viz. for money won at play, and for money paid by bankrupt *bona fide* to a creditor after an act of bankruptcy committed. And in cases where trover has been brought by assignee under a commission of bankruptcy, the courts have lean'd again a strict construction of the bankrupt acts, to the prejudice of fair creditor. *Vide* 3 *Lev.* 58. 59, *Rider v. Fowl* on a special verdict.

To raise an *assumpsit*, the assignees must maintain either in fact or by relation a contract, and here the contract upon which the *assumpsit* is maintained, is by the interposition of the bankrupt and therefore I think he ought to be considered as the factor of the assignees; and if they will take this method, and affirm the contract done by the bankrupt, they must take him as their factor in all acts done fairly and without deceit. *Wilson v. Boulter. Raym.*

Upon the authority of that case, I think this a favourable action for the plaintiff to have such allowance, because it makes the assignees affirm the contract of the bankrupt, and am of opinion that the verdict at law, which has not allowed it, is not conclusive upon the plaintiff, because it is a matter of contract and of account, and consequently a proper subject for the jurisdiction of this court, and the plaintiff ought to be allowed, by the interposition of this court, so much as in justice he ought to have; and I recommend it to the assignees to allow the sum of 712*l.* to the plaintiff (2).

(1) But the assignees may now bring an action of *assumpsit* or *tort*, but not *both*. *Kitchen v. Campbell.* 3 *Wils.* 304. 2 *Black.* 830. *Huffey v. Fidel.* 12 *Moul.* 324. *Holt* 95. *S. C. Phillips v. Thompson* 3 *Lev.* 191.

(2) His Lordship adjourned the cause in order that the parties might come to an accommodation; upon which *Hanbury* (the surviving assignee) with the consent of all the creditors entered into an agreement with *Billon*, who was thereby allowed to deduct the whole of the 712*l.* out of the monies recovered under the verdict. In pursuance of this agreement his Lordship with the consent of the parties, ordered, that *Hanbury* should allow *Billon* the 712*l.* 2*s.* and dismissed the plaintiff's bill. *Reg. Lib. A.* 1749. f. 22; See *Ex parte Ockenden, post.* 237. *Ryall's Rolles.* 1 *Ves.* 375. *post.* 185.

February the 24th, 1752. *Richardson and Gibbons, Assignees of Alexander Wilson* } Plaintiffs
a Bankrupt, _____

_____ Defendants
Case 72. *Bradshaw, Taylor, and Wilson* _____

Drawing and re-drawing bills of exchange for large sums, and a continuation of it is trafficking in exchange, and a trading which will make a man liable to a commission of bankruptcy though a loss ensues to the bankrupt by so doing.

A Trial in the court of King's Bench before a special jury for the county of *Middlesex*, upon the following issues out of the court of chancery, directed by Lord *Hardwicke*.

1st, If *Wilson* was a trader or a banker within the meaning of the acts of parliament relating to bankrupts. RICHARDSON
v. BRADSHAW.

2^{dly}, If he had committed any act of bankruptcy within the said statutes.

With regard to the first it was proved, that *Wilson*, who was agent to several regiments from the year 1745 to 1751, drew upon capt. *Johnson*, who was likewise an agent in *Dublin*, by bills to the amount of 281,000*l.* and upwards, and that *Johnson* redrew to the amount of 290,000*l.* and upwards, on *Wilson*, but there was no commission money allowed to either side.

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It was proved in the cause by Mr. *Porter*, Mr. *Linch*, Mr. *Mathias*, Mr. *Tessier*, and others, considerable merchants in the city of *London*, that drawing and redrawing bills of exchange, for such large sums, and a continuation of it, is a trafficking in exchange, and a trading, which in their apprehension would make a man liable to a commission of bankruptcy, though no commission money had been allowed on either side, and notwithstanding a loss ensued by these transactions to the bankrupt.

The evidence of Mr. *Wilson*'s being a banker, was, that he kept a clerk who was in the nature of a cashier, to receive and pay money, and that for several years together, officers and their widows, and other persons, not belonging to regiments, paid money into *Wilson*'s hands, and the cashier gave accountable notes for the same, and these persons drew from time to time upon *Wilson* for such sums, payable either to bearer or order, as they thought proper, but the books were not kept in the same manner as bankers do, and it appeared in proof, that if *Wilson* received any large sum, he paid it into the shop of his own bankers, Messrs. *Drummonds*, and from the year 1740, to 1751, paid 30,000*l.* a month into the said shop, and that he only had in cash by him about 3 or 400*l.* to answer any small drafts; but that for large ones he gave the persons drafts upon Messrs. *Drummonds*.

The jury before they delivered their verdict asked Lord Chief Justice *Lee*, whether such drawing and redrawing as aforesaid, was in point of law a trading?

Lord Chief Justice *Lee* said, it was not so much a point of law, as a fact to be determined by them on the usage and opinion of merchants, and that if they paid any credit to the merchants who had been examined, and were men of character, this was a trading; accordingly a verdict was given for the plaintiffs. The jury on the first issue finding *Wilson* a trader generally within the bankrupt acts: and on the second issue finding him a bankrupt within the said acts (1).

(1) See the distinction between this case and that of *Hankey v. Jones, Cowp.* upon the answer of the Chief Justice *Lee* to the question put by the jury in the 745. and the comments of Lord *Mansfield* upon the former case.

December the

21st 1752.

Part of S. C.

post 131. 262.

Ex parte Marshal and others.

Case 73.

G. drew a great number of bills payable to V.

and A. upon H.

who had no effects of G.'s in his hands, but accepted them

for the honour of the drawer. G. becomes a bankrupt, and H. by means of the great sums he paid account of such acceptance, becomes bankrupt likewise.

The bill-holders prove under both commissions, and receive dividends, but not sufficient to pay all in the pound.

The assignees of H. pray to stand in the place of the bill-holders *pro tanto*, as they had received on H.'s commission against the estate of Garway.

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His Lordship ordered they should be admitted *pro tanto*, as H.'s estate had paid on account of his acceptance of the said bills, but not to receive any dividend from G.'s estate, till the bill-holders had received a full satisfaction for their debts.

M R. Garway of Worcester drew a great number of bills payable to Vere and Aggill, upon Hatton, who had no effects of Garway's in his hands, but however accepted the bills: the honour of the drawer.

* Garway becomes a bankrupt, and Hatton, by means of the great sums he paid on account of such acceptance as before mentioned, becomes a bankrupt likewise.

The bill-holders prove under both commissions, and receive dividends, but not sufficient to pay 20s. in the pound: and April last upon a former day of petitions, Marshal, &c. the assignees of Hatton preferred a petition to Lord Chancellor, and pray to stand in the place of the bill-holders *pro tanto*, as they had received under Hatton's commission against the estate of Garway. Hatton, as was insisted by the petitioner's counsel, being to be considered as a surety for the debt, and Garway a principal; and Lord Chancellor at the former hearing made an order accordingly, but it being strongly objected by the counsel for Garway's creditors, that this would be charging Garway's estate doubly, directed the petition to stand over; and on its coming on again the day, his Lordship ordered, that the petitioners, as assignees of Hatton, should stand in the place of the bill-holders *pro tanto*, as Hatton's estate had paid on account of his acceptance of the said bill, but should not be intitled to any dividend from Garway's estate, till the bill-holders had received a full satisfaction for their debt; and if the surplus of Garway's estate, after the bill-holders were fully satisfied, should not be sufficient to answer what Hatton had paid as the acceptor of Garway's bills, then his Lordship declared that nothing in this order should prejudice any right the petitioners might have by action against the person of Garway for the residue of their demand, notwithstanding Garway had his certificate; for his Lordship said, it seemed to him, as Hatton's demand did not properly arise till after the issuing of the commission against Garway; because, though there is an implied contract between drawer and acceptor, yet there is no breach of the part of drawer till after his bankruptcy, and consequently Hatton is not a creditor under the commission, because his debt is subsequent to it; nor does he fall under the description of persons the 7 Geo. 1. who may sue out commissions, though their debts are payable at a future day. There *debitum in presenti solvenda*

in futuro, but here it was contingent whether it would ever be a debt, as *Garway* might not have failed (1).

Ex parte
MARSHAL.

The counsel for the petitioners mentioned the case *ex parte Walton* (a), Dec. 23d, 1743, in the matter of *Winsmore's* bankruptcy, where, as he stated it, Lord Chancellor made an order, that the assignees under the commission against the acceptor, should come under the commission against *Winsmore* the drawer *pro tanto*, as the acceptor had paid on account of such bills, and to receive a dividend rateably with the rest of the creditors.

(a) *Ante* 122.

Lord Chancellor said, that the order alluded to in *Winsmore's* bankruptcy was not as stated, nor was it applicable to this case, but that supposing the two cases to be something similar, he thought the directions he had now given under the present petition, were the justice of the case; and therefore had ordered accordingly.

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(1) See *Ex parte Ryfawick*, 2 P. W. 89. *Kettier v. Raynes*, 1 Cook's B. Laws 250.

Ex parte Marshal and others: In the Matter of *Hatton* a Bankrupt.

June the 21st,
1753.

Vide preceding
Case.

Case 71.

WATKIN a merchant at *Bristol* had large dealings with Mr. alderman *Garway* of *Worcester*, who had *Hatton*, now a bankrupt, for his correspondent in *London*, and it was agreed between *Garway* and *Hatton*, that the latter should answer all drafts that *Watkin* should draw upon him on account of *Garway*; *Watkin* draws accordingly on *Hatton* for 4000*l.* who accepts it, tho' he had no effects of *Garway's* in his hands at the time: the payee of this draft, upon the acceptor's non-payment, applies to the drawer who pays it. *Watkin* applied to be admitted a creditor under the commission against *Hatton*, the acceptor of the drafts, and is admitted by the commissioners.

Watkin of *Bristol* had large dealings with *G.* of *Worcester*, who had *Hatton*, now a bankrupt, for his correspondent in *London*. It was agreed between *G.* and *Hatton* that the latter should answer all drafts that *Watkin* should draw upon him on account of *G.* *Watkin* draws accordingly up on *Hatton* for 4000*l.* who accepts it, though he had no effects of *G.'s* in his hands; the payee, on the acceptor's non-payment, applies to the drawer who pays it. *Watkin* applies to be ad-

The assignees of *Hatton* petition now against this admission of *Watkin*, as *Hatton* had no effects of *Garway's* in his hands.

Lord Chancellor: I will consider it first as it stands between *Watkin* and *Hatton*: If payee receive the money comprized in the draft of *Watkin*, he may bring an action against *Hatton* in the name of the payee, who will be considered as a trustee for the drawer, or he may bring an action in his own name against *Hatton*, if he had effects of *Watkin* at the time of the acceptance sufficient to answer the draft; but if he had not effects, but only honoured the draft, such action cannot be maintained; or if in this case *Hatton* had paid it, instead of being a debtor to *Watkin*, he would have been indebted to *Hatton pro tanto*; and so it was determined in the House of Lords, a writ of error from the court of King's Bench.

mitted a creditor upon the commission against *Hatton*.

The agreement between *Garway* and *Hatton* puts the latter to all intents in the same situation as *G.* himself, and therefore, though he had no effects in his hands at the time, he has by his agreement made himself liable, and *Watkin* has a right to come in as a creditor under the commission against *Hatton*.

K 2

But

Ex parte
MARSHAL.

But consider it now as it stands between *Garway, Watkin and Hatton*: *Watkin* appears, at the time he drew on *Hatton*, have had effects in *Garway's* hands of more value than the amount of this draft, and as there was such an agreement I have before mentioned between *Garway and Hatton*, the latter is to all intents and purposes just in the same situation as *Garway* himself; and therefore, though he had no effects in his hands the time, has by his agreement made himself liable.

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The same rule will hold therefore under a commission bankruptcy as in an action at law, and upon these circumstances *Watkin* has a right to come in as a creditor under the commission against *Hatton*, and therefore the petition of the assignees must be dismissed.

(L) *Where Assignees will be charged with Interest.*

October the 22d,
1741.

Ex parte Lane.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

(M) *Rule as to Partnership.*

After Hilary
term, 1736:

Beasley v. Beasley.

Vide under the Division, Joint and separate Commission.

August the 6th,
1740.

Ex parte Banks.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Creditors.

March the 29th,
1743.

Ex parte Voguel and others.

Case 75.

A separate commission taken out against persons formerly partners, the joint creditors upon an application to the court are left at liberty, to bring their bill for any demand on account of the partnership

against the assignees of the separate estate, who are directed to sell the whole effects, and deposit money in the bank; but to make no dividend till the suit is determined: The joint creditors to prove their debts under the commission in the mean time without prejudice.

A Separate commission had been taken out against persons who were formerly partners; the petitioners being joint creditors pray by their petition, that the joint effects seized under the separate commission may be divided in the first place among the joint creditors.

The Attorney General, counsel for the petitioners, insists they must have some way of securing the joint effects, that they may not be imbeziled by the creditors under the separate commission.

Lord Chancellor: I leave the petitioners at their liberty to bring a bill for relief for any demand in their petition, or any other

mand on account of the partnership, against the assignees of the separate estate, before the last day of next *Easter* term.

Ex parte
Voguel.

And I direct the assignees under the separate commission, to proceed to a sale of the whole effects seized under the commission, and to deposit the money arising from the same in the bank in the name of the assignees, but to make no dividend till the suit is determined; and in the mean time let the joint creditors be at liberty to come in under the separate commission, and prove their debts without prejudice (1).

(1) *Vide Ex parte Marlin*, 2 Bro. Cha. 298. *Ex parte Hayward*, *ibid.* 299. *Ex Rep.* 15. *Ex parte Tate*, 1 Cooke's B. Laws, *parte Burnaby*, *ibid.* 301.

Ex parte Crisp, in the Matter of his Bankruptcy.

August the 2d,
1744.

IN 1742, the petitioner, *Burnaby* and *Barbut*, became co-partners, and were jointly concerned in erecting an amphitheatre at *Ranelagh*, and in making and laying out gardens for the entertainment of the public; and the copartnership was to continue upon the foot of the said undertaking for a certain term of years, yet subsisting, upon and under certain covenants, provisions and agreements, contained in a certain deed or instrument duly executed by the petitioner, *Burnaby* and *Barbut*. The amphitheatre being erected, and the gardens laid out according to the scheme, the premises were afterwards provided and furnished with all things useful and necessary to make the undertaking compleat, and on that account many large sums of money were laid out, and debts contracted with the different workmen and tradesmen.

Case 76.

A commission may issue against one partner of three for a joint debt though an action cannot be maintained against one, without joining the other two parties.

Some difference afterwards arose between the petitioner *Burnaby*, and *Barbut*, who endeavoured to dispossess the petitioner of his estate and interest in the undertaking, and to get the management thereof wholly into their own hands; and in order thereto, a commission of bankruptcy, on the first of *Feb.* 1742, issued against the petitioner alone, upon the petition of *William Perritt*, whose debt had been contracted on account of the undertaking, and was due from the petitioner, *Burnaby* and *Barbut* jointly, and as partners, and not from the petitioner alone.

By an order made the 18th of *Feb.* 1742, upon a former petition, it was ordered that the commissioners should execute a provisional assignment of the petitioner's estate and effects, and that the parties should proceed to a trial at law in the court of Common Pleas, in an action of trover to be brought by the petitioner against the provisional assignee.

On the 9th of *June* 1743 (1), the action was tried before Lord Chief Justice *Willes*, when his Lordship declared that the peti-

(1) *Crisp v. Perrit*, 1 Cooke's B. Laws, 18. S. C.

Ex parte
Crisp.

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tioner had committed an act of bankruptcy; but it appearing that the debt upon which the commission was taken out was due from the partnership, his Lordship doubted whether the commission issued regularly, and directed a verdict to be found for the petitioner, subject to the opinion of the court of Common Pleas: and on the 5th of May 1744, after hearing counsel on the matter reserved, the court of Common Pleas pronounced judgment, and declared the commission issued regularly (1).

The commissioners afterwards proceeded in the execution thereof, and several debts, amounting to 3065 *l.* 19 *s.* 11 *d.* $\frac{1}{4}$. were proved under the commission, and all of them, except 47 *l.* 3 *s.* 4 *d.* were the debts due from the partnership.

Since the commission issued, *Burnaby* and *Barbut*, by the perception of the profits of the undertaking, received much more than would satisfy all the joint creditors, all of whom, since proving their debts under the commission, had received from *Burnaby* and *Barbut* either a satisfaction, or undeniable security for the same.

The petitioner offers to pay into the bank of *England* such a sum as the court shall think proper, on being allowed a reasonable time for the doing thereof, in satisfaction of the debts so proved under the commission.

And therefore prays that it may be referred to a master to see what the provisional, and other assignees had received of the petitioner's joint and separate estate; and how, and to whom, and for what the same, or any part thereof, have been disposed of and applied; and, after just allowances made, that they might assign to the petitioner such part of his estate and effects as should appear to remain in their hands; and that the master might also inquire which of the creditors had received any satisfaction or security, and from whom, for the debts so by them respectively proved under the commission: and that in case any of them who had received securities for their debts should elect to receive satisfaction out of the money he now offered to pay into the bank, such securities might be assigned to the petitioner, or to persons whom he should appoint, in order to recover the money due thereon; and that upon payment or making satisfaction to the several creditors, who had proved their debts under the commission, the same might be superseded.

Lord Chancellor: I do not blame Mr. *Crisp* the petitioner for not applying sooner to the court for a *superseas*, because by a former order, a trial with regard to the bankruptcy being directed, it was necessary that trial should be had first.

When this case came originally before me, I thought it a pretty new one; a commission of bankruptcy taken out against one partner for a partnership debt, without joining the other partners in the commission, and therefore directed a trial of the bankruptcy before Lord Ch. Jus. *Willes*.

(1) See *Ex parte Caruthers*, 1 *Cooke's B. Law*, 19, *Ex parte Upton*, *ibid.* 20, Whatever

Whatever doubts I might have before, it is now established to be law, on the unanimous opinion of the court of Common Pleas, that a *commission of bankruptcy* may issue against one partner only for a joint debt; though to be sure *in an action at law against one partner*, it could not be maintained unless the other two are joined in it.

Ex parte
CRISP.

The commissioners have certified that this is a proper time to [135] supersede the commission, and that the circumstances are likewise proper for doing it.

But suppose the majority of creditors present at any meeting may have said, We desire you will certify that the commission ought to be superseded, and one creditor has declared he shall be able to prove in a few days, and desired a delay; the court would certainly in that case refuse to supersede the commission, and give such creditor an opportunity of proving the debt, in the first place, or otherwise the bankrupt may remove into a foreign country, and such creditors who were under any incapacity of proving before, from particular circumstances lose their debts.

In the present case *Burnaby* and *Barbut*, the two other partners, suggest that they are creditors for a large sum, and intend to prove their debts under the commission, and therefore oppose the commission's being superseded.

But admitting they are creditors they run no hazard, for I do not find Mr. *Crisp* has much more effects than his share in the partnership, and they have the whole partnership effects in their hands, and therefore I lay no stress upon their objection to the *supersedeas*.

But at the same time I do not think it right to direct, as the petitioner desires, that the securities given by the other two partners to the creditors who have proved debts under the commission, should be assigned to the bankrupt. Indeed where there is a principal and surety, and surety pays off the debt, he is entitled to have an assignment of the security, in order to enable him to obtain satisfaction for what he has paid over and above his own share; but it will be extremely hard if I should order a security given by *Burnaby* and *Barbut* solely and separately to the creditors for the payment of their debts, to be assigned to *Crisp*, and therefore I will give such directions as will effectually answer the intent of all parties.

His Lordship ordered that upon the petitioner's paying within one calendar month from the date hereof, to all the creditors who have already proved their debts under the said commission, the whole of their respective debts so proved by them under the commission, and the costs of the commission and of the proceedings at law, the commission be thereupon superseded: and he also ordered that the several creditors of the petitioner, who have proved their debts under the commission, do assign the several securities that have been given to them by any of the partners, for their respective demands proved under the commission, to a trustee or trustees to be appointed by the commissioners, in trust to secure to the petitioner, and any other of the partners, so much money as he or they have respectively paid or shall pay towards the

Though a majority of creditors agree to certify that commission ought to be superseded at a meeting for that purpose, yet if one creditor say I shall be able to prove in a few days, do not certify yet, the court will not supersede, till such creditor has an opportunity of proving his debt.

Where there is a principal and surety, and surety pays off the debt, he is entitled to have an assignment of the security, to enable him to obtain satisfaction for what he has paid above his own share.

Ex parte
CRISP.

charge of such debts, over and above their respective just portion thereof; and ordered that the assignees under the commission re-assign to the petitioner all his estate and effects which have been assigned to them, and that they come to an account before the commissioners, for the estate and effects of the petitioner come to their hands, and that they pay to the petitioner the balance which upon such account to be taken shall appear to be remaining in their hands. But if the petitioner shall make default making the several payments, within the time before limited, the Lordship in that case ordered that the commissioners be at liberty, and do thereafter proceed in the execution of the commission.

December the
23d, 1742.*Ex parte* Baudier.*Vide under the Division, Joint and separate Commission.*January the 22d,
1745.*Ex parte* Bond and Hill.*Vide under the same Division.*January the
20th, 1746.*Ex parte* Titner.

Case 77.

*H. a silkman,
and F. a dealer
in coals, are
partners in both
trades.*

HAYCOCK, a silkman, entered into partnership with Francis, a dealer in coals, to be mutually partners in both trades

*They afterwards
dissolve the
partnership and
F. gives H. a
release of all demands,
and took upon him the
payment of the
debts due from the coal trade,
and H. the debts from the silk trade,
and the respective debts are assigned accordingly.*

Some years afterwards they agreed to dissolve the partnership and at the time of the dissolution, upon the balancing of accounts Francis gives Haycock a release of all demands, and took upon him the payment of debts due from the coal trade, and Haycock the payment of the debts from the silk trade, and the respective debts were assigned accordingly.

*H. dies, and a
commission is
taken out against
F. and the messenger
attempting to seize
the effects of H. in
the hands of his
representative, is opposed,
and turned out of possession.*

Haycock died, and soon after his death a commission of bankruptcy was taken out against Francis, and by virtue of a warrant of seizure the messenger under the commission attempted to seize the effects of Haycock in the hands of his representative who opposed the messenger, and turned him out of possession.

*The assignee petitions,
complaining of the
force upon the
messenger.*

A petition was preferred by the assignee of Francis, complaining of this force upon the messenger.

Lord Chancellor was of opinion, that by virtue of the release from *Francis* to *Haycock*, the whole property of the silk trade from the dissolution of the partnership vested in *Haycock*, and that the assignee could stand in no better light than *Francis* himself, who had relinquished all his claim, and therefore that the goods of *Haycock* ought not to have been seized at all under the commission against *Francis*.

Ex parte
TITNER.

By the release of *F.* to *H.* the whole property of the silk trade vested in *H.* and the assignees of *F.* standing in no better light

than the bankrupt, the goods of *H.* ought not to have been seized under the commission against *F.*

But though the taking of these goods by the messenger was illegal, yet the turning him out of possession by force cannot be justified, for the owner of the goods ought to have asserted his right by a due course of law; however, the evidence on the part of the petitioner was so slight, that it does not by any means support the charge, and therefore his Lordship dismissed the petition with costs.

Petition dismissed with costs.

In the Matter of the *Simpsons*, Bankrupts.

December the
21st, 1752.

JOHN Simpson the elder, and *Thomas Simpson* his cousin, were partners for a special purpose.

Cafe 78.

John the elder, *Thomas*, and *John* the younger, were also partners.

A commission was taken out against *John* the elder and *Thomas*.

John the elder afterwards died.

A second commission was then taken out against *John* the younger, and *Thomas*.

Afterwards *Thomas* died.

A separate commission was now taken out against *John* the younger.

The present petition was presented on behalf of the assignees under the second commission to supersede the separate commission, as separate creditors may by order come in, and prove their debts under the former commission.

Mr. Solicitor General for the petitioning creditor in the separate commission, cited *ex parte Rollinson*, 4th of February 1735, to shew, notwithstanding a joint commission is depending, that separate creditors might take out a separate commission.

The case cited was as follows: *Rollinson* was a bond creditor of *A.* and *B.* A joint commission was taken out against them, and also two separate commissions; *Rollinson* proved his debt under the joint commission, and afterwards petitioned to be admitted a creditor under each of the separate commissions. Lord *Talbot* would not grant the petition, because it would break in upon the rule of equality amongst creditors under commissions of bankruptcy established in this court, but gave the petitioner a fortnight to make his election, whether he would come under the joint, or the separate commission, and would not supersede the separate commission.

Lord

In the matter of
the *Simpsons*.

Formerly, where there were several partners, the custom was to take out separate commissions against each partner, as well as a joint commission; but this being of late thought a very unreasonable practice, and occasioning great confusion with regard to bankrupt's effects, has been discontinued, and the court keep only one commission on foot, and direct distinct accounts to be kept of the several estates.

Lord Chancellor: Formerly, where there were several partners, they used to take out separate commissions against each partner as well as a joint commission.

This practice being of late thought a very unreasonable one, as occasioning great confusion with regard to bankrupts' effects, has been discontinued. The present case is, one surviving partner of three persons, the joint effects vest in him in law, and under this commission may be properly distributed.

A creditor by bond upon the partnership, after a joint commission is depending, takes out a separate commission against *John Simpson* the younger; so that now here are two commissions against the same person, which will create endless confusion, and seems to me to be only a struggle for the assigneeship and the clerkship, for there is no doubt but this particular creditor may have a satisfaction under the first commission.

His Lordship therefore ordered the last commission to be superseded, and by consent of the assignees the first was superseded likewise; and the creditors in general were ordered to come to a new choice of assignees under the second, the now only subsisting commission.

His Lordship also gave directions that there should be distinct accounts kept of the several estates, and reserved the disposition of the effects for the consideration of the court.

Where there is a joint commission, separate creditors ought not to take out a separate one, but apply to be admitted to prove their debts under the joint,

By this opinion of *Lord Chancellor*, it should seem for the future, that where there is a joint commission depending, separate creditors ought not to take out a separate commission, but apply for an order to be admitted to come in, and prove their debts under the joint commission, as being a means of saving an expence to the creditors.

as being a means of saving expence to the creditors.

Upon application of joint creditors to be admitted to prove their debts under a separate commission, his Lordship ordered it provisionally, that they should be admitted creditors, and assent or dissent to the bankrupt's certificate, as well as separate.

N. B. His Lordship had formerly, upon an application of joint creditors to be admitted to prove their debts under a separate commission, ordered it provisionally, that they should be admitted creditors, and assent or dissent to the bankrupt's certificate, because the certificate otherwise would clear him of the debts of joint creditors as well as separate (1).

Vide ante 98 the case *ex parte Baudier*, December the 23d 1742, which seems to vary from the present case.

bankrupt's certificate, because it would otherwise clear him of the debts of joint creditors, as well as separate.

(1) But it seems now settled, that a joint commission cannot be supported, while a separate one is subsisting. *Ex parte Proudfoot*, *post*. 253. 1 *Cooke's B. Laws* in

margin. *Martin v. O'Hara*, *Corp.* 824. *Sed vide Ex parte Hardcastle* 1 *Cooke's B. Laws* 8.

(N) Rule as to Costs

Anon'.

Mich. Term,
1739. At the
Rolls.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

Ex parte Goodwin.

[139]
April the 30th,
1740.

Under the Division, Rule as to his Executor, or where he is one himself.

Ex parte Smith.

March the 31st,
1742.

An affidavit of service upon the assignee, who was petitioned against to be displaced, in order to swell up the costs, the whole petition verbatim was recited in the affidavit.

Case 79.

If a whole petition is recited in an affidavit of service, the court will make the attorney who drew it, pay the costs out of his own pocket.

Chancellor: I by no means like this practice, and it is pernicious in the country are very apt to fall into; but if it were a custom of it, I shall, for the future, order the costs of the affidavit to come out of their own pockets.

Ex parte Whitchurch.

August the 13th,
1742.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

Re Gulston: In the Matter of *William Gulston* a Bankrupt.

February the 3d,
1753.

An issue directed by *Lord Chancellor* to try the bankruptcy of the petitioner, was accordingly tried before *Lord Chief Justice*

Case 80.

S. C. post. 193.

Lee at *Guildhall*, who certified that the jury have found him bankrupt, agreeable to the judge's directions. Application was made on the part of *Gulston* to supersede the commission that *Dale* the petitioning creditor might pay the costs at law, as well as at law.

An issue had been before directed to try the bankruptcy of *G.* and found him no bankrupt agreeable to the judge's directions a commission of bankruptcy is proceeding at law in the first instance, and if costs are given there, it will follow of course in the proceedings before this court.

Chancellor: I am of opinion that costs here in this case, in consequence of the verdict at law, and that a creditor is intitled to take out a commission against a debtor, unless it be a plain and express act of bankruptcy, especially when there is a more natural remedy, for he might have proceeded against *Gulston* in *Barbadoes* for his debt, as the law is open there; this is quite a different case from a common suit in equity, where it begins first in this court, and is a single proceeding only; but taking out a commission of bankruptcy is a proceeding at law in the first instance, and all that is done afterwards is consequential, and if costs are given at law, it will follow of course in the proceedings before this court.

Ex parte
GULSTON.

His Lordship ordered, that the commission be superseded, : that a writ of *superseades* do issue for that purpose, the exp^e whereof to be paid by *Dale* the creditor, who sued out the commission; and his Lordship further ordered, that it be referred to *Mr Montague* to tax the petitioner *William Gulston* his costs at law and of the several applications to this court in this matter, wh costs, when taxed, *George Dale* the petitioning creditor : thereby directed to pay to the petitioner *William Gulston*.

August the 10th,
1754.

Anon'.

Case 81.

Costs accrued by
protesting bills
before a commis-
sion issues, may
be proved, but
no part of the
costs arisen after-
wards.

THE question in this petition, whether the costs and char accrued by the protesting bills after a commission of bankruptcy issued, can be proved?

Mr. Attorney-general for the bill creditors insisted, that the notes were accepted by the bankrupt, though protested a the commission issued, yet as the protesting was a consequence of the party's accepting not paying the bills, they may by relation be considered as one intire transaction, and consequently the petitioners were intitled to prove the costs and charges thereunder the commission.

Lord Chancellor asked some of the commissioners who happened to be then present in court, whether, if a person has a verdict a debt, and is prosecuting to a judgment, or has recovered damages in an action, and is going on to execute a writ of inquiry but before either of them is completed, a commission of bankruptcy is taken out against the defendant, the costs and charges of such prosecuting to a judgment, or such assessment of damages on a writ of inquiry, have been allowed to be proved under commission.

The court being informed, that it was the constant practice of commissioners to refuse such costs being proved (1) his Lordship made the following order, that the costs of the protest arisen before the commission should be proved by the petitioner but no part of the costs arisen afterwards (2).

(1) *Contra Aylett v. Harford*, 2 Black. 1317. *Blandford v. Foote Corop.* 138. *Ex parte Talbot*, 4 Burr. 2445. *Lansford v. Ellis*, 1 Cooke's B. Laws 227. *Ex parte* *Simpfon*. 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 46. (2) So *Ex parte Moore*, 2 Bro. C. Rep. 597.

Construction of the repealing Clause in the 10th of Queen Anne.

Burchall: In the Matter of Robert Burchall a Bankrupt. April the 2d, 1742.

petitioner was bred a *Money Scrivener*, and had used the trade or profession of a *Money Scrivener* for ten years, preferred a petition, by way of caveat, and prayed to before a commission of bankruptcy issued against him, that as a *Scrivener* he was not liable to be a bankrupt; though by the statute of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. a *Scrivener* is included in the description of a bankrupt, yet this description some others was repealed by the statute of the 10 Ann. which was not a temporary, but an absolute repeal, nor by any subsequent act.

Case 82.
The statute of the 10th of Q. Anne. c. 15. repeals only that part of the statute of the 21 Jac. 1. c. 19. which constitutes a bankrupt, but not the description of the trade or occupation of the person against whom the commission issues.

ause is as follows:
Whereas by an act made in the 21 Jac. 1. it is amongst things enacted, That all and every person and persons, who shall use the trade of merchandize by way of buying, &c. in gross, or by retail, or seeking his or her buying and selling, or that should use the trade and profession of a Scrivener, receiving other mens monies or estate into his custody, who at any time after the end of the said session of parliament, being indebted to any person or persons in the 100*l.* or more, should not pay or otherwise compound the same within six months next after the same should grow due, or within six months after an original writ sued out to recover the said debt, or a copy thereof given unto him, or left in writing, &c. or be arrested for the sum of one hundred pounds or more of the said debt, or should, at any time after such arrest, procure his release by putting in common or hired bail, should be deemed and adjudged a bankrupt to all intents and purposes in the cases of arrest or getting forth by common bail from the time of his or her said first arrest: and as it is found by experience, that many and great mischiefs and inconveniencies have happened, especially of late, in the trade of buying and selling, and credit in general, by reason of the said description of a bankrupt: for remedy thereof for the future, be it enacted, That the said act, and also all and every other act, statute or ordinance of parliament whatsoever, so far as they relate to the description of a bankrupt, be repealed and made void, so that no persons within the said descriptions, or any of them, shall for or by reason of the same be taken and deemed to be within the statute or statutes of bankrupt what-

[142]

Chancellor: My doubt is, whether the 10th of Queen Anne repealed any more than to repeal some part of the statute of the 21 Jac. 1. which constitutes an act of bankruptcy; and not the

Ex parte
BURCHALL.

the description of the trade, or occupation, of the person against whom a commission issues.

Mr. *Brown* the counsel for the petitioner insisted, that the statute of *Queen Ann* repeals the additional description of a trade in the 21 *Jac. 1.* which is not in the precedent acts, and that the description of a *Scrivener* is in this act only.

Now all the bankrupt acts have the description of using the trade of merchandize, and getting his living *by buying and selling* and if Mr. *Brown's* construction should prevail, the description of a bankrupt, by the expression of *buying and selling, is as much repealed as the other.*

The statute of the 21 *Jac. 1.* has superadded a *Scrivener*, and this is merely an addition to the quality of the trade or profession of the person who shall be a bankrupt; one of the descriptions to constitute a bankruptcy under this act, is suing out an original writ, &c. another an arrest, and procuring common or hired bail, &c. these being found inconvenient, gave rise to the clause of the 10th of *Queen Ann.*

Consider how much is recited by this statute, not the whole description of a bankrupt, or the general or common qualifications of the person of a bankrupt, or his buying and selling, &c. if such a construction was right as has been contended, then all the other acts of parliament would be repealed.

It is only *particular acts of bankruptcy* which are made void and not the qualification of the person; and I have no doubt myself, but the construction I have put upon this repealing statute, is the proper and only safe construction.

His Lordship ordered, that the petitioning creditor be at liberty to sue out a commission of bankruptcy against *Burchall* and in case the major part of the commissioners should thereon declare him to be a bankrupt within the intent and meaning of the several statutes concerning bankrupts, then he directed the commissioners to execute a provisional assignment of *Burchall's* estate and effects, to an assignee appointed by them under the commission, and also directed an issue to try whether he was a bankrupt within the true intent and meaning of the several acts concerning bankrupts, at or before the issuing of the commission, the petitioning creditor to be the plaintiff and the issues to be tried the next term before Lord Chief Justice *Willes.*

A *Scrivener* is comprehended in the words *bankers, brokers, and factors*, in the statute of the 5 *Geo. 2. c. 30. s. 39.* and petitioner being one the court ordered the commissioners should proceed in the execution of the commission.

The Chancellor inclined to think that a *Scrivener* is implied in the following clause of the 5 *Geo. 2.* "And whereas persons dealing as bankers, brokers, and factors, are frequently intrusted with great sums of money, and with goods and effects of very great value belonging to other persons; It is hereby further enacted, That such bankers, brokers, and factors shall be, and are hereby declared to be, subject and liable to this and other the statutes made concerning bankrupts." *Bu*

his Lordship did not give a positive opinion as to this point, and ordered all further directions to be adjourned over till the next day of petitions.

Ex parte
BURCHALL.

The next day his Lordship, upon considering the clause, declared he was clearly of opinion, a *Scrivener* was within the meaning thereof, and comprehended in the words *bankers, brokers, and factors*, and therefore directed so much of the order as related to the issue for trying the bankruptcy, to be struck out.

Upon the 8th of *May* 1742, there was a petition *ex parte* *Burchall* and *Tribe* when his Lordship ordered, that the commissioners should proceed in the execution of the commission, and the other petitioner *Thomas Tribe* being present in court, that had *Burchall* in execution at his suit, and acquainting his Lordship, that he now elected to seek relief for his debt under the commission against *Burchall*, and being also the petitioning creditor, his Lordship ordered *Tribe* forthwith to discharge *Burchall* out of the *Marshalsea*.

(P) *Rule as to Dividends.*

Ex parte *Lane.*

October the 22d,
1741.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Assignees being charged with Interest.

Ex parte *Kirk.*

October the 26th,
1745.

Vide under the Division, Drawers and Indorsers of Bills, &c.

Ex parte *Stiles and Pickart.*

February the 2d,
1748.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Allowance to Bankrupts.

(Q) *Commission superseded.*

[144]

Ex parte *Goodwin.*

April the 30th,
1740.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to his Executor, or where he is one himself.

Ex parte *Gulston.*

February the 3d,
1743.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Costs.

Ex parte *Crisp.*

August the 2d,
1744.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Partnership.

December the 22d, 1749. *Ex parte Gayter.*
Ex parte Hall.
2 Mont c Apr. 5/3.

Case 83.

On superfeding a commission, the court may either direct an enquiry before a Master of the damages sustained by the bankrupt, or a *quantum damnificatus* upon an issue at law, and, after damages are settled, may, for the better recovery thereof, order the bond given by petitioning creditor to be assigned to the bankrupt.

MR. Gayter was the petitioning creditor in a commission bankruptcy against *A.* but not being able to prove bankrupt at the time the commission issued, it was superfeded on a former day of petitions, *Lord Chancellor*, upon the application of *A.* made an order for assigning the bond to *A.* giving the petitioning creditor to his Lordship at the time of suing the commission.

The present application is to discharge that order, or a to suspend any action upon the bond, till the damages sustained by *A.* were inquired into.

The consideration of the plaintiff's debt on which he sued the commission, was of a very extraordinary nature, 25 pence being charged for money pretended to be advanced, and 1 guineas for a premium, and other exorbitancies.

Lord Chancellor said it was in the breast of the court, whether the bankruptcy was a doubtful case, and the commission superfeded, either to direct an inquiry before a master of the damages sustained by the bankrupt, or a *quantum damnificatus* upon an issue at law, and after the damages are settled, the court might for the better recovery thereof order such bond to be assigned to the plaintiff, but the present case was attended with such flagrant circumstances, that he would not by a previous enquiry into the damages sustained by *A.* prevent him from seeking an immediate satisfaction, and therefore dismissed the petition (1).

(1) See *Chapman v. Pickersgill*, 2 *Wilf.* 145. *Brown v. Chapman*, 3 *Burr.* 427. S. C.

March the 28th,
1751.

Ex parte Leaverland.

Case 84.

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Ex parte Desanths.

June the 21st,
1753.

Cafe 85.

L the creditors, but two, under a commission against *Penton*, petition to supersede it, upon a suggestion that t of the petitioning creditor was not contracted till after bankruptcy committed.

commission was taken out in 1751, and there was no e that the petitioning creditor's debt was not a just one, nton therefore was declared a bankrupt by the commis-

The commission was proceeded upon in the usual , all the creditors acquiesced in it, and the whole was itly finished.

act of bankruptcy pretended to be committed was a se e in 1750, *a denying himself* when creditors called upon ough at home: the persons who asked for him were number, one was paid afterwards the very day he called, r the next day, the third the beginning of *September*, not call till the latter end of the *August* before.

y one of the persons traded with him as before, and what ore material, *Penton* appeared for months together as y as before, and from the nature of his employment re visible than ordinary, because he kept a garden and f entertainment, after the manner of *Vauxhall*.

petitioner had a judgment against the bankrupt upon a goods sold.

bankrupt, between *June* 1750 and *August* 1751, con- a new debt for wine with the petitioning creditor; he k out execution, and entered upon the garden, &c. but ds taken in execution were not sufficient to pay him l.

October 1751, a commission of bankruptcy was taken out *Penton*, and the petitioner proved his remaining debt of under it.

assignees brought an action against the petitioner to re- ack the goods taken in execution, and upon the evi- f one *Rose*, *Penton* appearing to have committed an act ruptcy before the petitioning creditor's debt was contract- ould have defeated the commission itself of course, and ntiffs therefore chose to submit to a nonsuit.

Chancellor : This seems to be a contrivance from the be- to the end to exclude some creditors, whose debts were ted after an act of bankruptcy committed; and as it the plaintiffs' own breast whether they would submit to a or not, this is not a sufficient determination of the bank- and therefore I will not supersede the commission, ly when the act of bankruptcy pretended to be commit- e the petitioning creditor's debt arose, is of such a nature.

After a commis- sion of bank- ruptcy has been proceeded upon in the usual manner, and all the creditors have acquiesced in it, and the whole compleat- ly finished, the court will not supersede it, tho' the act of bankruptcy com- mitted, before the petitioning creditor's debt arose, is of a doubtful nature.

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August the 14th,
1742.

Ex parte Sydebotham.

Case 86.

A commission
superfeded,
because it issued
against an infant.

IN April last a commission of bankruptcy issued against a petitioner, and he was declared a bankrupt; but at the time of the issuing of the commission, and of preferring this petition, was an infant under the age of 21 years, and therefore by his counsel, that he is not to be deemed a bankrupt, the true meaning of the statutes in force against bankrupts that for this reason the commission ought to be superfeded, that a writ of *superfedeas* should be directed for that purpose, the expence of *Alice Williamson*, the creditor on whose petition the commission issued.

Lord Chancellor: The petition must be allowed, for notwithstanding *Lord Macclesfield* held in the case of one *Whitlock* an infant might be a bankrupt, yet it has been determined otherwise since.

His Lordship ordered that the commission be superfeded, that a writ of *superfedeas* should issue for that purpose (1).

(1) *Rex v. Cole*, 1 *Ld. Raym.* 443. 12 *Mod.* 243. *Bull. N. P.* 38. *Ex parte* *post.* 201.

[147]

August the 3d,
1751.

Ex parte Hylliard.

2 *Vez.* 407. pl.
130. S. C.

Case 87.

A. treated with the petitioner, against whom a commission of bankruptcy hath been awarded for the purchase of the equity of redemption of his estate, in mortgage to *F.*

400*l.* agreed for the purchase, articles signed, and *A.* pays 251*l.* 1*s.* to clear off the mortgage, to pay 150*l.* more on the execution of conveyances.

A Petition to superfedate the commission on a suggestion that *Mr. Alfworth's* debt was not of such a nature, as to entitle him under the bankrupt acts to sue out a commission. *Mr. Alfworth* treated with the petitioner for the purchase of the equity of redemption of his estate, which was in mortgage to *Field*. Four hundred pounds was the price settled for the purchase, articles were signed, and *Mr. Alfworth* paid 1251*l.* 1*s.* to clear off the mortgage, and was to pay him 150*l.* more on the execution of the conveyances.

On petitioner's refusing to complete the purchase, or pay the mortgage, *A.* brought an action against the petitioner, who is carried to gaol, where he lay two months, and upon this declared a bankrupt.

Hylliard refused to complete the purchase, or to pay the mortgage.

On this *Mr. Alfworth* brought an action for 251*l.* against *Hylliard*, who was carried to gaol, where he lay two months; and thereupon *Mr. Alfworth* takes out a commission of bankruptcy, and *Hylliard* is declared a bankrupt on the petition.

Petitioner applies now to superfedate the commission, on a suggestion that *A's* debt is not of such a nature as entitles him to sue out a commission.

Mr. Evans for the petitioner insisted, that this was not a debt as is within the meaning of the bankrupt acts.

That an *indebitatus assumpsit* could not be maintained, 250*l.* was a breach of trust only, and not a debt.

Mr.

Mr. *Clark*, who was counsel on the other side, insisted it was a debt, and money had and received to the bankrupt's use, and an action therefore maintainable as for his debt.

Ex parte
HYLLIARD.

Mr. *Evans* in the reply urged, that there was no pretence that the 150*l.* or one penny thereof was ever tendered to *Hylliard*, but was told that he must either repay the 251*l.* 1*s.* or go to gaol.

No one creditor appeared under the commission; by that means Mr. *Alfworth* has, by virtue of chusing himself assignee, got into his possession all *Hylliard's* effects, although 'tis sworn he does not owe any person besides a farthing.

Lord Chancellor : I doubt extremely whether a commission could be taken out on such a contract, for the remedy should have been a bill for performance of the contract, and no action could in strictness of law be maintained.

His Lordship doubted whether *A.* could take out a commission on such a contract, for the

remedy ought to have been a bill for performance of the contract, and no action could be maintained; but said, if it stood simply on this, he would not have superseeded the commission, but left the bankrupt to try the bankruptcy at law. But as *A.* has, since the issuing of the commission, taken an assignment of the mortgage, he would not suffer him to proceed in the commission; for, as standing in the place of the mortgagee, he may hold till redeemed, and likewise compel a performance of the contract, or petitioner, to refund the 251*l.* 1*s.*

But if it stood simply upon this footing I should not have superseeded the commission, but left the bankrupt to an action at law to try the bankruptcy.

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But as it comes out now that Mr. *Alfworth* has since the issuing of the commission taken an assignment of this very mortgage, I will not suffer the commission to go on; for, as standing in the place of the mortgagee, he may hold till redeemed, and likewise compel a performance of the contract, or *Hylliard* to refund the 251*l.* 1*s.*

The receipt given by *Hylliard*, is nothing but an acknowledgement of receiving 251*l.* 1*s.* in part of the purchase money.

No action in this case could be maintained, and therefore the very foundation for the commission failed; and Mr. *Alfworth* has, by taking an assignment of the mortgage, got the security of the mortgage for the money he has paid.

The affidavits on both sides swear, that the petitioning creditor said, either pay me back the money, or convey to me the equity of redemption, and not a word of the petitioning creditor's offering to pay the 150*l.* the remainder of the purchase money.

The commission therefore must be superseeded, and the petitioning creditor pay the costs; for any expressions of *Hylliard's* that he was able to live in gaol, or any where else, and such like, proceeded from this ill usage, and will not forfeit his costs (1).

(1) See *Medlicot's case* 2 *Str.* 899. *Ex parte Lee*, 1 *P. W.* 783.

(R) *Rule as to Bankrupt's Attendance on Assignees.*

June the 22d,
1742.

Ex parte Turner.

Case 88.

The attendance of a bankrupt on the assignees to assist them in making out the accounts of his estate, seems to be confined by the 5th of the present king to the 42 days, or the enlarged time at most; but if the assignees will undertake for the creditors under the commission, that they shall not arrest him, the court will order him to attend, notwithstanding any risque he may run from his creditors at large.

[*149]

THE assignee under a commission of bankruptcy tice in writing to the bankrupt to attend him in explain several matters relating to his estate after the were expired (during which time, by the 5th of the king, he is to be free from all arrests, restraints or imprisonment), and before the certificate was signed.

The bankrupt would not attend upon any other term signing his certificate, and the application to the court is upon this, that the bankrupt had refused to attend, to the act of parliament made in the 5th of the present

Lord Chancellor: Notwithstanding the 5th of the king has these general words, "That all and every bankrupt or bankrupts, not in prison or custody, shall at after such surrender as aforesaid be at liberty, and is hereby required to attend such assignee or assignee every reasonable notice in writing for that purpose, such assignee or assignees unto such bankrupts, or left her, or them, at his, *her, or their house or place in order to assist, and shall assist such assignee or assignee making out the accounts of the said bankrupt's estate &c." Yet the subsequent clause (which is in these words) "That all and every bankrupt or bankrupts having surrendered shall at all reasonable times before the expiration of the or such further time as shall be allowed to such bankrupts finish their examination, be at liberty to inspect their books in presence of such assignee or assignees, or some person appointed by such assignee or assignees for that purpose to take and bring with him, for his assistance, such person he shall think fit, not exceeding two persons at any one time, and to make out such extracts and copies from them as he shall think fit, the better to enable him to make a full discovery and disclosure of his estate and effects; and thereto the said bankrupt or bankrupts shall be free from all arrests, restraint, or imprisonment of any of his, her, or their creditors in coming to surrender, and from the actual detainer of such bankrupt to the commissioners, for and during the said forty two days, or such further time as shall be allowed to such bankrupt or bankrupts, for finishing his examination," I shall confine it to the 42 days, or the enlarged time at most, therefore the bankrupt's protection from arrests, &c. can be no further.

The Chancellor asked the petitioner's counsel, if they would consent to indemnify the bankrupt from arrests, refusing to do it, his Lordship proposed that he should only undertake for the creditors who have sought under the commission, that they would not arrest him,

so, he would order the bankrupt to attend, for he said, he should not pay any regard to the danger the bankrupt might run, from his creditors at large.

Ex parte
TUNNIE.

This petition, at the request of the petitioner, was ordered to stand over till the next day of petitions, that he may endeavour, in the mean time, to get the rest of the creditors under the commission, to consent to these terms.

Upon the whole, *Lord Chancellor* said, That the clauses in the act of parliament, relating to this matter, are very darkly and obscurely penned, arising chiefly from the words *forty two days* being thrown into the latter clause.

(S) *Rule as to an Apprentice under a Commission of Bankruptcy.*

Ex parte Sandby.

January the
22d, 1745.

THE petitioner, on the 10th of *January 1744*, was put apprentice to *Ward a Bookseller at York*, and the sum of eighty pounds was given with the petitioner as an apprentice for seven years. In *July* following a commission of bankrupt was taken out against *Ward*, and being declared a bankrupt, assignees were chosen who fell off the bankrupt's effects, and he is now the supervisor of the press to the purchaser, and become incapable of performing his part of the contract, nor is the petitioner able to raise any money to put him out apprentice to another master, and the commission being a recent one, probably no dividend may be made in a year, or year and half; so that all this time will be lost to the petitioner.

Case 89.

An apprentice where his master becomes a bankrupt, shall come in as a creditor only upon the remaining sum, after deducting for the time he lived with the bankrupt.

[*150]

Upon these circumstances the petitioner prayed, that on deducting 10*l.* out of the 80*l.* for his board with the bankrupt during the six months he lived with him, that the assignees might be ordered to pay him the sum of 70*l.* out of the effects of the bankrupt already come to their hands, and not oblige him to prove it as a debt under the commission.

Ex parte Tuppell.
J. M. & Bys. 6.

Ex parte Pinder
J. M. & L. 3.

Lord Chancellor was doubtful at first, and seemed inclined to grant the petition, but upon ordering the secretary of bankrupts to search for precedents, and two being produced in *Lord Chancellor King's* time, and two in *Lord Chancellor Talbot's*, where they directed an apprentice should come in as a creditor only (after deducting for the time he lived with the bankrupt) upon the remaining sum, his Lordship was pleased to make the same order, and that the petitioner should be admitted a creditor for 70*l.* only (1).

Barry v Allen
1 Collyer 589

Wright v Tolbo
16 Sim: 620

(1) *Barwell v. Ward, post. 261.* So if a father receives the money and earnings of a child, such child may be admitted as a creditor under a commission against him, *Ex parte Macklin, 2 Ves. 675.*

(T) Rule as to discounting of Notes.

June the 4th,
1746.

Ex parte Thompson.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills of Exchange.

August the 13th,
1746.

Ex parte Marlar, and others.

Case 90.

A person who takes no more for the discount of notes than at the rate of 5 per cent. *per ann.* shall prove the whole amount of those notes, under a commission of bankrupt against the drawer, without being obliged to deduct what he had received of the indorser for the discount.

[*151]

Marlar v. Marlar
& Marlar, l.

THE petitioners being possessed of several promissory notes under the hand of *Thomas Setcole*, payable to *William Dover* or order 6 months after date, and indorsed by him to the petitioners, amounting together to the sum of 975*l.* 17*s.* 0*d.* which *Dover* discounted with the petitioners, and received the full value, after deducting 5 per cent. for the discount. On the 18th of April 1745 a commission of bankruptcy issued against the said *Thomas Setcole*, and he was found a bankrupt, and *Marlar* attended at *Guildhall*, in order to prove the said debt upon the several notes, but having received the sum of 11*l.* 5*s.* 10*d.* for the discount, the commissioners obliged him to deduct the same out of the sum of 975*l.* 17*s.* 0*d.* and the commissioners also refused to let the petitioner prove the sum of 8*l.* 6*s.* 1*d.* being the interest of the said respective notes, when they respectively became due since the issuing of the said commission; and therefore the petitioners pray, that they may be admitted creditors for the said several sums of 11*l.* 5*s.* 10*d.* and 8*l.* 6*s.* 1*d.*

The counsel for *Marlar* insisted the commissioners ought to have admitted him in both these respects, for the whole money contained in the notes, and likewise to be allowed interest on the notes.

Lord Chancellor : I am of opinion that the petitioner is intitled to the first part of his petition, as he swears he took no more for the discount of the notes, than at the rate of 5 per cent. *per ann.* and ordered accordingly.

The rule established by commissioners of bankrupts, that note creditors cannot prove interest upon them, unless expressed in the body thereof is a reasonable one, and the court will not break thro' it.

But as the commissioners have established it as a rule, that note-creditors have no right to prove interest upon them, unless it is expressed in the body of the notes (1); I will not break in upon this rule. Even at law, where notes are for value received, and interest is not expressed, the jury do not give the plaintiff, in an action upon the notes, interest for them, but by way of damages only (2).

Commissioners of bankrupts cannot award damages, and therefore the rule they have established is a very reasonable one, and the petition as to this must be dismissed, but ordered him to be admitted a creditor for the said sum of 11*l.* 5*s.* 10*d.*

(1) See *Bromley v. Goodere*, ante, 80. But upon an application to supersede a commission, and a reference to a master to settle what is due to the creditors, notes will carry interest from the day of

the master's report, tho' no interest is expressed in the body of such notes. *Ex parte Rooke*, post. 244.

(2) *Craven v. Tickell*, Vef. Jun. 63.

(V) Rule as to a petitioning Creditor.

Ex parte Goodwin.

April the 30th,
1740.

*in the Division, Rule as to his Executor, or where he is
one himself.*

re Wilson: in the Matter of *John Wilson* a Bankrupt. *August* the 6th,
1743.

The petitioner states by his petition, that in *May* last a commission of bankruptcy issued against him upon the petition of *Nathan James* and others, upon which he was declared bankrupt, and his estate and effects were assigned to *James* and others, and in *April* last a commission of lunacy issued against *James*, and he was found a lunatick; and standing he is one of the petitioning creditors and an assignee, in the Sheriff's court of *London* for 80*l.*; on the 16th of *June* last, to be arrested in the Sheriff's court of *London* for 80*l.* at the suit of *James*, and afterwards another action for the same sum to be brought in the King's Bench, and kept him in custody from four in the afternoon of the 16th of *June* until eleven o'clock morning, till *Fenwick* had an opportunity to arrest him in the King's Bench action; which being done, he withdrew him from the Sheriff's court, and the petitioner was detained in custody upon the latter action, and was also charged that day with another action, at the suit of one Mr. *Wass*, which he took as his attorney, which the petitioner apprehends is maintained by *Fenwick* purely to oppress him, and therefore he may be discharged out of the custody of the Marshal King's Bench upon the two actions. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the bankrupt *John Wilson*, shews that the arrest at the suit of *James*, as he was a petitioning creditor, is irregular; and being therefore under an immediate arrest, *Wilson* ought to be discharged, not only from this arrest but from *Wass*'s likewise.

The Solicitor for *Wass* read affidavits to shew, that the bankrupt has been guilty of perjury in swearing, that part of his estate was in mortgage for 500*l.* when in fact it was a gross lien on between the bankrupt and the mortgagee, and therefore he should not be discharged, even supposing there was regularity in the proceedings, as they shall never be able to reach him again, if once discharged.

The Chancellor: As to the behaviour of the bankrupt, it is a plain fact, and has nothing to do with the present question, and should come more properly before me upon a petition to discharge.

It is both an action and an execution in the

Case 91.

The clerk of the commission caused the bankrupt to be arrested at the suit of *J.* the petitioning creditor and assignee, in the Sheriff's court of *London* for 80*l.* and also causes another action to be brought in *B. R.* for the same sum and kept him in custody till *J.* had an opportunity of arresting him on the King's Bench action, and afterwards charges him with another action, at the suit of one *Wass*; the bankrupt applies to be discharged from both actions. *J.* and *W.* directed respectively to discharge him out of custody of the Marshal, as the same attorney was concerned in both actions.

A petitioning creditor cannot arrest a bankrupt because a commission of bankruptcy is in the first instance (1).

Ex parte Ward & *Ex parte Leves*, post. 153, 154.

L 4

allow

Ex parte
WILSON.

[153]

allow his certificate: the affidavit besides is not p
uncertain; and if more certain, would not do. Thi
not suffer a petitioning creditor to arrest a bankrupt,
reason, because that a commission of bankruptcy is
both as an action and an execution in the first ins
after the petitioning creditor has laid hold of all the
effects, it would be a great absurdity for the same p
permitted to arrest him likewise. It is too material i
that the whole is done by the same agent, and extreme
that *Fenwick* arrested the bankrupt in the name of *Ja*
ly to found the arrest at the suit of *Wafs*.

Even at law where there is an irregular arrest, an
tage is taken of the irregularity, to charge him in cus
the suit of another person, the courts of law will dif
from both.

So likewise in this court, where advantage is take
jury and oppression a person lies under by an improper
charge him in custody, though for a just debt, this
discharge him from both.

His Lordship therefore ordered that *Nathan James*
Wafs do respectively consent to the petitioner's imr
charge out of the custody of the marshal of the King's
son, at their respective suits, and that they respectiv
proper authorities to the Marshal for that purpose. A
that *James* should pay to the petitioner the costs whi
tioner hath been put to by reason of the arrest at his
he directed to be taxed by a Master.

December the
23d, 1743.

Ex parte Ward.

Case 92.

A petitioning
creditor deter-
mines his elec-
tion by taking
out the commis-
sion, and cannot
sue the bankrupt
at law, though
for a debt distinct
from what he
proved. Where
persons refuse to
prove debt: un-
der a commission,
the barely being
assignees will not
determine their
election, but
they may still
sue the bankrupt
at law.

AN application to the *Lord Chancellor* to discharge
rupt now in the *Fleet*, at the suit of the petitioni
and the assignees, as they have determined their c
coming under the commission.

The petitioning creditor insisted, that the debt upon
founded his petition for the commission, was upon
only from the bankrupt, and that he has sued him up
and distinct note of hand.

The assignees insisted that they had full liberty to su
rupt at law, notwithstanding they are assignees under l
sion, and creditors before his bankruptcy, because th
in value of the creditors had chosen them as assignees
standing they had refused to prove any debt under
mission.

Lord Chancellor: The petition must be allowed as
petitioning creditor, for he has determined his election
out the commission (1), and the affidavit on suing ou
mission is general; nor does it mention the particulars
a bankrupt becomes indebted.

(1) *Ex parte Wilson*, ante 152. *Ex parte Lewes*, the n

But there is no foundation to grant what the petition prays with regard to the assignees, for notwithstanding they are creditors of the bankrupt, yet as they refused to prove their debts under the commission, the barely being assignees, by an appointment of the majority in value of the creditors, will not determine their election; for they can only be considered as creditors at large, since they have not proved any debt (1).

Ex parte
WARD.

(1) *Ex parte Capot*, post. 219. *Ex W. 560. Vide ex parte Hopkinson, Fes.*
parte Dravilliers, post. 221. *Ex parte Jun. 159.*
Lindsay, ibid. 220. Ex parte Salkeld, 1 P.

[154]

Ex parte Lewes.

August the 7th,
1746.

LORD Chancellor: A petitioning creditor cannot keep the bankrupt in gaol, because he has no election, as a common creditor has; for if he was to elect to proceed at law, the commission must of course be superseded, which would affect those creditors who have proved debts under the commission (1).

Case 93.
A petitioning creditor has not the same election as a common creditor; for if he was to elect to

(1) *Ex parte Ward*, ante 153.

Ex parte Hylliard.

August the 3d,
1751.

Vide under the Division, Commission superseded.

(U) *Rule as to Notes where Interest is not expressed.*

Ex parte Marlar and others.

August the 13th,
1746.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to discounting of Notes.

(W) *The Construction of the Statute of the 21st of Jac. 1. cap. 19. As to the Law with respect to a Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Assignment. Casual Convey*

Bourne & al. Assignees of Peele a Bankrupt, v. Dodson.

December the 5th
1740.

JOHNN *Peele* was for several years a merchant, and being in 1731 possessed of two ships, the *Diggs* and *Molly*, sent the same loaded with cargoes in his own name, and consigned to his correspondents in *Virginia* or *Maryland*, for return whereof they were to bring back cargoes of tobacco; 514 hogheads of the said cargoes being consigned to *Peele* in his own right. He upon their arrival possessed himself of the same, and entered them at the custom-house in his own name, and gave his bond for payment of the duties, and lodged the tobaccos in his own warehouses, and kept the keys, and sold and disposed thereof in his own name, and as his property.

Cafe 94.
Assignment of a ship at sea for a valuable consideration may be good against assignees of bankrupts, tho' no possession is taken thereof; but if of goods at land otherwise.

On the 14th of February 1735, *Peel* failed, and a commission of bankruptcy issued against him; *Bourne* and others were chosen

HOWARD V.
DODSON.

sen assignees, and at the time of the bankruptcy *Peele* being in possession of the said two ships, and all the cargoe that was unsold, they were seized under the commission; but the defendant insisted he had a right to the said ships, and to the bankrupt's effects in *Virginia* and *Maryland*, for that he had lent *Peele* considerable sums, and that on the 30th of *May*, 1734, there was due to him 10,500*l.* and to secure the payment thereof, *Peele* had by indenture of bargain and sale that very day assigned to him the said two ships, with their tackle and appurtenants, and all other his estate and effects in *Virginia* and *Maryland*, and also several goods sent to *Maryland* on board the said ships, and also to all the tobacco and effects to be by them brought back from *Virginia* and *Maryland* in return for the goods sent, subject to be void on payment of the 10,500*l.* to the defendant, and therefore claimed all the said effects.

The money received from the bankrupt's estate was, by agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant, paid into the bank, till it appeared to whom the same justly belonged; and the ships were likewise sold, and the money arising from the sale paid into the bank, in the names of the plaintiffs and the defendant *Dodson*.

The plaintiff's counsel insisted, that as *Dodson* did suffer *Peele* to continue in possession of the goods, it was a fraud on the persons who dealt with *Peele*, and that the assignment ought to be set aside, and the defendant come in only as a creditor under the commission, for so much as he shall be able to prove, and receive a dividend *pro rata* only with the rest of the creditors.

They also argued, that a mortgagee of goods, though he has advanced the full value for them, and the day of payment is past, yet if he suffers the goods still to continue in the possession of the mortgagor is equally a fraud, as the letting goods lie in a vendor's hands after he has made a bill of sale, or an absolute conveyance of them, and then afterwards becomes a bankrupt, and by considering the case in this light, they endeavoured to bring it within the 10th and 11th clauses of the statute of the 21st of *Jac.* the First, *cap.* 19.

"And for that it often falls out, that many persons, before they become bankrupts, do convey their goods to other men upon good consideration, yet still do keep the same, and are reputed the owners thereof, and dispose the same as their own:

"Be it enacted, that if at any time hereafter any person or persons shall become bankrupt, and, at any such time as they shall become bankrupt, shall, by the consent and permission of the true owner and proprietary, have in their possession, order and disposition, any goods or chattels whereof they shall be reputed owners, and take upon them the sale, alteration, or disposition as owners, that in every such case the said commissioners, or the greater part of them, shall have power to sell and dispose the same, to and for the benefit of the creditors which shall seek relief by the said commission, as full as any other part of the estate of the bankrupt."

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DODSON.

The defendant's counsel gave it as a reason why *Dodson* chose rather the goods should still continue in the bankrupt's custody, notwithstanding he had a sufficient lien upon them, that he did not care to subject himself to an account, if he had taken the goods mortgaged into his own custody.

Lord Chancellor: This is a case of a good deal of consequence, and not without some difficulties.

The first question is, as to the assignment of some ships and their cargoes by way of security for a large sum of money, 10,500*l.* said to be lent at different times by the defendant *Dodson* to *Peele*, and whether the property of the ships and cargoes passed thereby?

The second question, whether Mr. *Dodson* is intitled to retain two bank notes delivered to him by *Peele* the bankrupt of 400*l.* each (1)?

With regard to the assignment, it is objected, that it is fraudulent, and did not pass the property of the goods to the defendant *Dodson*; for the plaintiffs insist this was an assignment of goods without any possession, and therefore if assignor becomes bankrupt afterwards, that by virtue of the clauses in the statute of 21 *Jac.* 1. the commissioners may sell them for the benefit of the creditors in general.

The fact is, the greatest part of *Peele's* effects at the time of the assignment were beyond sea; now, it would be very detrimental to trade, as it would deter merchants from lending money, if, notwithstanding they should advance a large sum by way of mortgage, the property is not altered, but subject to mortgagor's creditors under a commission of bankruptcy, unless the ships return before the commission is taken out, and the effects are in the actual possession of mortgagees.

As to the construction of the clauses in the statute of the 21 *Jac.* it is a point of very great consequence, and I do not remember in this court, or while I sat in another, that the construction of these clauses were ever made a point in any case.

As to the general case, where bills of sale are made of goods and the purchaser suffers the bankrupt to continue in possession, it is plainly within the letter of the statute, but I do not think this can be construed to extend to a bare loan of money upon the goods by way of mortgage, for the words in the clause are, goods sold for a valuable consideration, and valuable consideration is most properly applicable to an absolute sale.

In the case of pawns, which is something like the present, the pawnee has only a special property in them, in case they shall not be redeemed within the time required.

Pawnee has only a special property in goods if not redeemed within the time.

According to the original agreement, the defendant *Dodson* was not immediately to take possession of the ships and cargoes but at a future day, and if the bankrupt had not a right from the time of the agreement, to exercise such a power over them

(1) This money was paid by the bankrupt a few days after the 14 of *Feb.* 1734, when it was alledged, that *Peele* com-

mitted the act of bankruptcy; *Dodson* by his answer denied notice of the act of bankruptcy. *Reg. Lib. A.* 1740. f. 257

**BOYANE v.
DODSON.**

as he before had, but was now become subject to the mortgage, then this case is not within the clause of the statute.

There is nothing more common than assignments of ships which are out upon their several voyages, as a security for money, and yet the assignee does not look upon it, that he has any property, but the assignor directs the master of the ships as to the voyage, and every thing necessary; and if contracts of this kind had been considered as falling within these clauses, this case must have happened frequently, and would not have been the first time of its being made a point in the courts in *Westminster-hall*.

(a) Vef. 352.
Post 161, 170.
180. S. C.

An owner of
boys mortgage
them, and after
so doing, is suf-
fered by the
mortgagee to use
them for three
years together,
and has money
lent him upon
the credit of be-
ing the owner,
they are liable
to be sold under
a commission of
bankrupt.

These clauses have never been thought of, till the case of *Stephens v. Sole*, before Lord Chancellor Talbot, (a) July the 6th, 1736. *There a person, owner of three boys belonging to the river Thames, mortgaged them, and after he had so done, was suffered by the mortgagee to make use of them in the same manner as before for three years together, and appeared to all intents the visible owner, and persons lent him money upon the credit of his being the owner, and therefore a very strong case; and Lord Talbot, upon these particular circumstances, adjudged it to be within the statute; but as this is only one authority, it would not be at all proper for me to determine a case of such great consequence to trade, without thoroughly considering it; for if it is a void assignment, it is void at law, and then I shall not take upon meir equity, absolutely to decide a matter which is properly triable at law.*

On the other hand, it would certainly be of bad consequence, if I should determine this case not to be within the clauses of the statute of the 21 Jac. because it must necessarily open a door to fraud, for traders then might borrow money to the full value of the goods, and though the mortgagee suffer them to lie in the hands of the mortgagor, the lender will not withstanding secure the property to himself, to the prejudice of all the rest of the creditors.

All that remains is, Whether Mr. Dodson is intitled to retain two bank notes delivered to him by *Peele* the bankrupt of 400*l* each.

Where a creditor
of a bankrupt has
received money
of him, and an
action is brought
by the assignees
to recover back
such money;
they must prove
such creditor had
notice of the bank-
ruptcy, when he
received the same.

Now it is certain, though the act of parliament of the 1 Jac. 1. has provided an indemnity for debtors to a bankrupt who pay their money to him without notice of the bankruptcy, yet that statute does not indemnify a creditor of a bankrupt, unless it appears that he had no notice of the bankruptcy at the time of receiving his money.

Where goods are
delivered to a
creditor after
notice of an act
of bankruptcy,

the proper action for the assignees is trover, because there is a tort in detaining, though he came right fully to the possession of the goods.

The courts of law have considered this latter case as a hard one, and always held the assignees to a strict proof of notice.

Th

The next question will be, In what manner it shall be tried? If the assignees in this case bring an action as for goods had and received to the bankrupt's use, the courts at law will nonsuit them, because the property was certainly out of the bankrupt, as they were transferred for a just debt, and therefore the proper action would be trover, because here is a *tort* in detaining of the goods (though he came rightfully to the possession of them), as they were delivered to *Dodson* after notice of an act of bankruptcy, for from that time they became the property of the general creditors (1).

Bourne v. Dodson.

But if I direct the whole to be tried in trover, it will create a difficulty as to the two bank notes, and therefore it will be better to try it upon a feigned issue.

His Lordship then directed the two following issues:

First, *Whether the defendant John Peele became bankrupt on the 14th of February 1734, or on any other, and what day?*

Secondly, *Whether at the time of Peele's becoming a bankrupt, the two ships, Diggs and Molly, and the goods in the assignment of the 30th of May 1734, or any and which of them were the ships, goods, and chattels of the defendant Dodson; and if found that Peele became bankrupt any other time than that mentioned in the issue, the same to be indorsed on the postea, and all further directions reserved till after trial (2).*

N. B. The parties afterwards compromised it, and the issue was never tried.

(1) See *Bilow v. Hyde*, ante 128.

Brown v. Heathcote, post. 160. *Ryall v.*

(2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1740. *E.* 257. See *Rowles*, post. 165.

Ex parte Marsh.

August the 18,
1744.

MR. *Marsh* a mercer died possessed of goods to the amount of 2000*l.* and upwards, some time after his death, his widow married her husband's journeyman, but before the marriage articles were entered into, reciting that she was entitled to an estate of the value of 600*l.* and upwards, and also reciting that he had taken the money and given a bond for securing the sum of 600*l.* to trustees for her separate use, and that she should have the power to dispose thereof as she should think fit by deed or will, and being also in possession of some plate belonging to her first husband, she had a further power by the articles to sell it, and to pay the money arising from the sale, into the hands of the same trustees for the use of her children by her first husband.

Case 95.

Post. 175. S. C. Marriage without a portion is itself a consideration for an agreement. (1)

The wife is dead, but before her death executes a deed, and appoints the 600*l.* and also the plate, for the use of her children, to be equally divided between them.

(1) *Brown v. Jones*, post. 188. 190. *Lancy v. Ashol*, post. 2 vol. 445.

Ex parte
MARIN.

The second husband is become a bankrupt, and the children the first applied to the commissioners to be admitted creditors for the 600 *l.* and to have the plate delivered up to them.

The commissioners refused, upon the suggestion of the bankrupt, that he was drawn in, and deceived in the opinion he had of his wife's fortune before the marriage.

The application now on behalf of the children that the plate may be delivered up by the assignees, and that they may be admitted creditors for the 600 *l.*

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Lord Chancellor : Here is a man, of the trade of a mercer leaves a stock and goods to a considerable value.

This ought to have been divided according to the statute, distributions, one third to the wife, and two thirds to the children, the wife possesses the whole; on her second marriage, in order to provide for the children of the first, she and her husband enter into articles to secure 600 *l.* for her separate use, &c. as before stated.

This is in consideration of the marriage, and of the fortune she brought; and, unless some fraud appears, it must have its effect.

No doubt but this is a contract for a valuable consideration but then it is insisted on, that this man (who was the journeyman to the first husband, and must be presumed to know what were Mr. *Marsh's* effects) was deceived in the opinion he had of Mr. *Marsh's* circumstances, and said by the assignee's counsel, that, if he was defrauded, this is a ground to relieve the bankrupt, and the creditors have a right to stand in his place.

All marriage agreements differ from other agreements, for these do not arise from the consideration of a portion only, but on account of the marriage.

A woman's fortune falling short of the husband's expectations, is no reason for setting aside a marriage agreement.

A man thinks fit to marry a single woman or a widow and imagines she has such a fortune, and perhaps on a strict account, or by some defective debts, it should fall short, would be very mischievous to set aside marriage agreements for this reason.

No inventory delivered in to the ecclesiastical court by Mr. *Marsh*, as administratrix to her first husband, which ought to have been done, as the children were intitled to two thirds. The second husband and his wife possess themselves of all the stock and goods of her first husband, and never make or deliver in any inventory at all, nor did they make up any account by which the children could have what they were intitled to.

If this came before the court in a cause, would they set aside marriage agreement on such circumstances? They certainly would not.

The plate depends upon another point.

The clause in the 21 Jac. 1. which says, that all goods in the possession of a bankrupt, whereby he gains a general credit, shall be liable to his creditors, relates to goods the bankrupt is in his own right only.

If this was the plate of the first husband, and came into the possession of the administratrix, or into the hands of the person marrying that administratrix, this certainly is not within

the clause, for the bankrupt, whereby he gains a general credit, shall be liable to his creditors, relates to goods the bankrupt is in his own right only.

the meaning of the statute of the 21 Jac. 1. (*which says that all goods in the possession of a bankrupt, whereby he gains a general credit, shall be liable to his creditors*), because here the administratrix had them in *auter droit*, and the husband could have them in no better right, and therefore not at all liable to the debts of the second husband; for the meaning of the statute (if it is possible to put any meaning upon some clauses of this statute, which are very darkly penned) is only with regard to goods the bankrupt has in *his own right* (1).

Ex parte
MARSH.

His Lordship therefore directed the children of the first husband to be admitted creditors under Marsh's commission for the 600l. and the plate to be delivered up to them.

(1) Vide *Ex parte Ellis*, ante 101.

Brown, Assignee of Roger Williams a Bankrupt, v. Heathcote and Martyn. *Ex parte Roubertson*

[160]

October the 22d,
1746.

ROGER Williams, and his partner Jeremiah Wilder, gave a bond to the defendant Heathcote for 1200l. and on the same day executed a deed of assignment, by which it was agreed, if default should be made in payment of the money advanced by Heathcote, Williams and Wilder should make over to the defendant Heathcote or order, the goods in the two ships *Samuel and Molly*, and *Anne Billander*, together with the bills of lading, which might be the proceed of the returns of the said goods and cargo for any port in *England*, and that should be consigned to Williams and Wilder, and that they should put Heathcote in possession thereof; and they also covenanted that after receiving advice from beyond sea of any goods, that they would acquaint the defendant Heathcote with it, and empower him to dispose of the same, and keep the money arising from thence in satisfaction of his bond, and if there should be any overplus, to pay it to Williams.

Case 96.

R. W. and his partner gave a bond to H. for 1200l. and the same day by deed assigned to H. or order, the goods in two ships then at sea, and also 13 bills of lading, and policies of insurance, containing the said goods as a collateral security; the latter indorsed to H. the former not. The bill brought by the assignee of R. W. now a

bankrupt, for these goods, insisted that R. W. acted as the visible owner of the ship and cargo, being not put into the possession of H. and therefore the plaintiff intitled thereto for the benefit of the creditors at large. The court of opinion that every thing which could shew a right to the ship and cargo being delivered over to H. R. W. could no longer be said to have the order and disposition of them, and therefore not within the meaning of the 21 Jac. cap. 19. and consequently H. has a right to retain the ship and cargo, till the principal sum of 1200l. and interest is satisfied (1).

Roger Williams did accordingly assign over to the defendant Heathcote thirteen bills of lading, and several policies of insurance, containing the goods in the ship *Samuel and Molly*, as a collateral security for the sum of 1200l. the latter were indorsed to the defendant Heathcote, but the former were not.

Belcher & Bull.
2 Willby. H.
303.

(1) So *ex parte Matthews*, 2 Vef. 272. *Dirksen v. Malings*, 2 Durn. & East 462. *Lempriere v. Pasley*, *ibid.* 485. *Ex parte Buxton*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 362. Secus if the creditor suffer the ship to come back,

and go upon another voyage. *Ex parte Matthews*, 2 Vef. 272. *Hall v. Gurney*, 1 Cooke's B. Laws, 380. Vide *ex parte Stadgrum*, Vef. Jun. 163.

At

BROWN v.
HEATCOTE.

At the time of these transactions between *Williams* and *Heathcote*, the ship was at sea in a voyage to *Guinea*.

The bill is brought for these goods by the plaintiff as the assignee of *Roger Williams*, who is now become a bankrupt.

The assignment to *Heathcote* bears date the 10th of *Jan.* 1736.

The ship *Samuel and Molly* came home the 19th of *July*, 1738.

The commission of bankruptcy against *Williams* issued the 27th of *October*, 1738.

Roger Williams was found a bankrupt as far back as *November*, 1737.

A separate commission of bankruptcy has been also taken out against *Jeremiah Wilder*.

The counsel for the plaintiff insisted; that this assignment to *Heathcote* will not bind the creditors under the commission, as *Roger Williams* the assignor acted still as the visible owner, for the ship and cargo were not put into the possession of *Heathcote*; and therefore the plaintiff, as the assignee under the commission of bankruptcy against *Williams*, is intitled to the cargo for the benefit of the creditors at large.

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(a) S. C. ante
154.

(b) 1 *Vej.* 352.
ante 157. S. C.

A. being indebted to *B.* assigns over barges to *B.* who suffers *A.* to keep the possession, this is a fraud on the creditors at large, and the barges may be seized under a commission of bankruptcy taken out afterwards against *A.*

For the plaintiff was cited the case of *Bourne*, assignee of *Peck* a bankrupt, v. *Dodson*, (a) the 4th of *December* 1740, and of *Ryal v. Stevens*, *March* the 10th, 1743, and the case of *Stevens v. Sole*, (b) before Lord *Talbot*, who was of opinion that an assignment of barges by a person, who, notwithstanding such assignment, kept possession of these barges, and worked them, was a fraud on his creditors at large, and therefore decreed the barges to be the property of those creditors, and lawfully seized under the commission against the assignor.

Mr. Noel for the defendant *Heathcote*.

At the time of the assignment the ships were actually sailed and gone abroad, and therefore the delivery of the ships and cargoes to the defendant *Heathcote* was impossible. In the case of *Bourne v. Dodson*, your Lordship doubted whether the statute of the 21 *Jac.* 1. c. 19. extended to a mortgage of goods, and was rather inclined to think the act confined it to an absolute sale (1).

The case of *Ryal v. Stevens* was an assignment of a brewhouse and utensils here in *England*; so that the possession there was capable of being delivered, and consequently different from the present.

Stevens v. Sole is also different, for the barges were actually worked in the river *Thames*, and therefore the possession of them might likewise have been delivered.

He further insisted this was an actual assignment, the policies of insurance being indorsed to the defendant *Heathcote*.

Mr. *Wilbraham* of the same side argued.

That such a contract as the defendant made with *Williams* was a perfect and compleat sale, without the delivery of the goods.

(1) See *Ryal v. Rolle*, *post.* 165.

That if it was not a legal assignment, yet the defendant had an equitable lien upon the goods, by virtue thereof, and had a right to retain them against the plaintiff as an assignee under the commission of bankrupt against *Williams*; and in support of this cited *Taylor v. Wheeler*, 2 Vern. 564.

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Lord Chancellor: In the extent in which this case has been argued at the bar, it is a question of very great consequence.

But I would observe in the first place, this is a case which has come seldom before the court, and much stronger in favour of the defendant than such cases generally are.

For the common cases are, where the creditor has pretended to set up a demand for an old debt, and the person owing has at that time been in declining circumstances; and this creditor, in order to gain a preference, has procured an assignment of goods from the debtor, who soon after becomes a bankrupt; yet even in some of these cases, if the creditor appears to be a bona fide one, he has prevailed, though the court leans strongly against such a creditor in favour of the creditors at large.

Here the bond to the defendant *Heathcote*, and the assignment, bear date the same day; therefore this case stands clear of any colour of fraud, with a view to gain to himself a preference to other creditors. I mention this to shew in how much more favourable a light this defendant stands than in the common cases.

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The case of *Jacobs v. Shepherd*, that was originally heard before Sir *Joseph Jekyll*, was an assignment of goods, which at the time of the assignment were actually beyond sea, and yet Sir *Joseph* set it aside, as the borrower was then in failing circumstances; but Lord Chancellor *King* upon an appeal reversed the decree at the Rolls (1).

I will first consider the case on general rules both of law and equity.

It has been insisted by the plaintiff's counsel, that this assignment to *Heathcote* is no legal bill of sale, or legal assignment to him of these goods.

And it must be admitted, as to the homeward bound cargo, it is no legal assignment.

But it has been carried still further by the plaintiff's counsel, for they have likewise insisted the assignment does not amount to a bill of sale of the outward bound cargo, for want of a delivery of the goods themselves to the defendant *Heathcote*.

I am of opinion that a delivery in this particular instance was not absolutely necessary to make it a compleat contract; as in the case of a horse sold in a market overt, if the buyer pays the money for him, he may maintain an action against the seller, without shewing a delivery of the horse. It is true, the want of a delivery is often an objection, and a material one, but how? Why is it a badge of fraud; for where a subsequent creditor has taken the goods in execution, a prior creditor must shew a delivery, as in *Twine's case*, 3 Co. 80.

Where there is an assignment of an outward bound cargo, it is a compleat contract, tho' the cargo is not delivered to the assignee.

(1) This case is cited in *Small v. Oud-* *Mansfield* in 1 Burr. 478.

2 P.W. 431. and more fully by Lord

BROWN v. HEATHCOTE.
Indorsing bills of sale does not amount to an assignment, unless the goods are directed to be delivered to the assignee.

Assignees under commissions of bankruptcy take subject to all equitable liens against the bankrupt himself.

Assignments of choses in action for a valuable consideration, are good against creditors under a commission of bankruptcy.

But it has been also insisted on the part of the plaintiff, that there are no proper words of assignment in the deed; I am so far of opinion with the plaintiff, that what has been done in this case does not amount to a sufficient legal sale. Even if there had been an indorsement of the bills of lading, it is no actual assignment, unless the goods were directed to be delivered to the assignee.

But then the question will come to this, whether the defendant *Heathcote* hath not a sufficient lien upon the goods in point of equity? for it has been truly said, that assignees under a commission of bankruptcy must take subject to all equitable liens against the bankrupt himself. The case of *Taylor v. Wheeler* is exactly in point. 2 *Vern.* 564.

In the case of *Cock v. Goodfellow*, *Trin.* term the 8th of *Geo. 1.* *Ld. Macclesfield* was of the same opinion (1). The ground the court goes upon is this; that assignees of bankrupts, though they are trustees for creditors, yet stand in the place of the bankrupts, and they can take in no better manner than he could; therefore assignments of choses in action for a valuable consideration have been held good against such assignees.

If this is an assignment therefore for a valuable consideration it will prevail in equity in favour of the defendant *Heathcote*. It is very true, the deed is not an actual assignment, but yet there is sufficient upon the face of it to shew, that *Heathcote* had a charge and lien upon the goods, by virtue of the loan of the 1200*l.*

The policies of insurance have been indorsed to him, though the bills of lading and invoices have not.

I will first consider the case on general rules of equity.

Suppose *Roger Williams* had declared only by the deed, though he kept the possession of these goods, they should still remain as a collateral security to the defendant *Heathcote*, it would have been an equitable lien.

It has been further objected by the plaintiff's counsel, that all this was executory only, and no lien gained till the goods came home.

This is by no means a necessary consequence from the clause in the deed, and besides there is one clause which expressly enables *Heathcote* to sell and dispose of such effects, and keep the money arising thereby in satisfaction of his bond, upon returning the overplus to *Williams*.

Therefore taking into consideration the whole of this deed, amounts to an equitable lien upon these goods, as a covenant to execute a power is considered as done. *Vide Ld. Coventry's case.*

(a) And I am of opinion, as this appears to be a fair transaction and money actually paid, and not an old creditor endeavouring to get an undue preference, that it ought to be supported in equity.

I shall, in the second place, consider what has been urged by the plaintiff's counsel upon the clauses in the 21 *Jac. c. 19.* that these goods, by virtue of that statute, are vested in the assignee.

(1) 2 *P. W.* 430. 10 *Mod.* 489. 1 *Burr.* 478. *S. C.*

(a) *S. C.* 2 *P. W.* 222. 1 *Str.* 596. 9 *Mod.* 12. *Mux. in Eq.* last case.

of the bankrupt, for want of the delivery of them to the defendant *Heathcote* by *Roger Williams*, and that the defendant can only come in as a creditor under the commission, and is not intitled to retain them till his whole 1200*l.* is satisfied.

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It has been insisted, that as there was no indorsement of the bills of lading and invoice to the defendant *Heathcote*, they were left under the sole direction and disposition of the bankrupt; and therefore are subject to the clauses in the act of parliament.

If this doctrine should prevail, it would be attended with the most mischievous consequence.

There has been no determination upon these clauses, so that according to the rule in respect to laws in other countries, they might be said to be gone into desuetude.

Such a construction would bind up property, so that it would be a great detriment to trade and commerce in general.

I do not think these clauses were ever meant to extend to mortgages or pledges for money or goods, because it is impossible in an assignment of goods beyond sea, that they can be delivered over to the assignee.

"If any person shall become bankrupt, and, at such time as they shall so become bankrupt, shall, by the consent and permission of the true owner and proprietary, have in their possession, order, and disposition, any goods whereof they shall be reputed owners, and take upon them the sale, alteration, or disposition as owners, that in every such case the said commissioners shall have power to sell and dispose the same to, and for the benefit of the creditors, which shall seek relief by the said commission, as fully as any other part of the estate of the bankrupt." The act does not confine it merely to having the goods left in their possession, but also the order and disposition thereof, which is explained by the words that follow, "*whereof they shall be reputed owners.*"

Clause of the
statute in ques-
tion.

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To apply this to the present case.

With regard to the ship, there is no colour to say it was so fit in *Williams's* possession, as that he could take upon him the order and disposition thereof.

Consider it in the other respects.

The bills of lading and invoice were delivered by *Williams* to *Heathcote*, so that every thing which could shew a right to the goods was delivered over to *Heathcote*; then how could *Williams* be said to have the order and disposition of them?

I am of opinion therefore upon the whole, that this is not within the meaning of the act of parliament of the 21 Jac. 1. without entering into the nicety of the words *true owner and proprietary*, and I do agree with Mr. *Wilbraham*, that in this court the mortgagors, as having much the largest share in the estate, are considered as owners and having the property in it; and for that reason mortgages are not within the intention of this act (1). Let it be referred to the Master, to take an account of what due to the defendant, for the sum of 1150*l.* part of the sum

(1) See *Ryall v. Rolle*, post. 164.

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of 1200*l.* mentioned in the condition of the bond dated the 25th of *January* 1736, and in the indenture of the same date, as for the sum of 25 *l.* afterwards advanced by him, upon advance of the goods mentioned in the said indenture, together with interest for the same, at the rate of 5 *per cent. per ann.* a defendant *Heathcote* and *Martin* are to come to an account the Master for the goods and effects, part of the cargoes two ships called the *Samuel and Molly* and *Ann Billande* the produce of the said ships, and what shall be coming said account of the said goods and effects, and also the part of the said ships is to be applied in the first place, in payment of what shall be found due to the defendant *Heathcote* for his principal, interest, and costs, and to the defendant *Martin* for his part but in case the money that shall be coming on the said account of goods and effects, and also of the produce of the said ships shall not be sufficient to pay unto the said defendant, who shall be found due to him for principal, interest, and costs as aforesaid then the said defendant *Heathcote* is to be at liberty to come for the residue, as a creditor under the respective commissions issued against the said *Roger Williams* and *Jeremiah*, and to receive a dividend in respect thereof, in proportion to the other creditors.

copy dell [165]
January the
25th, 1749.
Michael
C. v. M. Case 97.
180

Sir *Matthew Ryall* and others, Assignees of *William Harveſt* a Bankrupt, — — — } Plaintiffs

Rolle Executor of *Jonathan Stephens*, and others, Defendants

1 *Vez.* 348. pl.
169, 375. pl.
170. S. C.

Upon the construction of 21 *Jac. 1. cap. 19. f. 11.* determined by Lord Chancellor, that if a person advances money upon a conditional sale of goods, and does not insist upon a delivery thereof, he confides in the credit of the vendor, and not on any real or particular security, and ought to come in under a commission of bankruptcy against the vendor, as much as any other person that places a confidence in the bankrupt personally.

LORD Hardwicke Chancellor, assisted by Sir William Lord Chief Justice of the court of King's Bench, Sir Thomas Parker Lord Chief Baron of the court of Exchequer, and Sir Thomas Burnet one of the justices of the court of Common Pleas.

Mr. Justice Burnet: *William Harveſt*, a trader who had become bankrupt acts, being indebted to *Benjamin* and *Joseph* did by indenture of the 2d of *June*, 1732, demise his brewhouse, and out-houses, and coppers and utensils situate and being long to the brewhouse, for a term of 500 years, redeemable upon payment of 1500 *l.* and interest.

On the 15th of *October*, 1736, *Harveſt* entered into partnership with *Jonathan Stephens* deceased, to whom *Rolle* the defendant was executor, and the utensils and stock in trade were appraised at 14,000 *l.* and *Harveſt* conveyed one moiety thereof to *Stevens*; they carried on the trade jointly till the 26th of *October* 1740, when *Harveſt* became a bankrupt.

On the 24th of *December*, 1736, *Harveſt* in consideration of 4000 *l.* did, by way of securing the same, assign over his share of the utensils and stock in trade to one *Potter* in trust for *Stevens*, and there was a clause in that mortgage to secure what should be afterwards lent.

Sir *Thomas Reynell* having entered into two bonds as security for *Harveſt*, he on the 10th of *December* 1737, in consideration

of 1000 l. assigned one seventh of his moiety of the partnership stock, &c. to Sir Thomas Reynell, with a defeazance to be void upon his indemnifying him against the bonds: the house and brewhouse, with the out-houses, had been mortgaged to the Tomkins's in 1725, for securing 1200 l. and in 1731 this mortgage was assigned over to one Baugh, who in November 1736 re-conveyed all the utensils to William Harveſt the bankrupt.

By indentures of lease and release bearing date the 6th and 7th of September, 1738, Baugh in consideration of the principal money, by the direction of Harveſt, assigned over his mortgage to Stevens, and Harveſt assigned over a moiety of the utensils, as collateral security; upon this mortgage 2355 l. is due, so that it is plain, that this mortgage will be preferred, as to the real estate, to the Tomkins's, but their mortgage will be preferred as to the collateral security of the utensils: the last mortgage is of William Harveſt to his son George, dated the 6th of March, 1738-9, of one seventh part of his stock, &c. for 1000 l.

The question is, Whether all, or any, and which of these mortgagees will be intitled to resort to the utensils, &c. for a satisfaction, or whether they must come in under the commission? And it depends upon this, Whether these mortgagees or any, and which of them, did not so permit the bankrupt to continue in possession, as to be within the express words of the statute of the 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19? I will consider this question in three lights.

First, The nature of a mortgage or conditional sale of specific goods or things in possession, (of which there might have been an actual delivery), where the bankrupt is suffered to continue in possession till his bankruptcy, and whether there is any difference betwixt such a mortgage, when made to a stranger or when made to a partner?

Secondly, The nature of three of these mortgages to strangers, as sales partly of things in possession, as utensils, &c. and partly of choses in action, as debts and profits in trade.

Thirdly, Whether there will be any difference as to the general sale, betwixt such a mortgage made to a partner, and made to a stranger.

Although the present question must be determined upon the construction of the statute of the 21 Jac. 1. yet it is necessary to consider the conditional creditors as to their debts before that statute; but it is previously necessary to clear the case of arguments drawn from the nature of pawns, which are foreign to the present question.

It is contended that pawns among the Romans required a delivery, but that mortgages did not.

As to the Roman law, there was an authority cited from Just. lib. 4. tit. 6. sec. 7. Nam pignoris appellatione eam proprie contineri dicimus, que simul etiam traditur creditori, maxime si mortuus sit; at eam, que sine traditione nuda conventionione tenetur, pro vice hypothecae appellatione contineri dicimus. If this passage stood alone, it might go a great way to prove what it was cited for: but when I produce authorities to shew that pignus is as valid

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Rufford v. Bishop
5 Ruffell. 34.

Deane v. Hale

3 Ruffell. 1.

Superior v. Lanyon

Actual v. Compagnie

1. D. O'Chilly. 28

Superior v. O'Chilly

3 D. O'Chilly 765

Superior v. O'Chilly

Montague 110

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Lindley

10 Linnony

350

De Hyam

1. T. O'Phillips

105.

West

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2. Hare 249

3. Hare 249

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Green v. Capper
t. Brigg: N. C. 136

Johnson v. Collins
v. *Johnson*
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Belcher

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Wellsby. H. & G.
313.

Greenham v. Drake

2. H. of Lords 12.
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Wellsby. & Baker
6. Exch. 740.

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5. B. & M. 760

without a delivery as with one, it must be allowed that passages have been so interpreted, that *pignus* can only be of capable of delivery, and *hypotheca* of goods not capable of very. *Domat. l. 1. c. 1. f. 1. Wood, lib. 3. cap. 2. p. Dig. 50. t. 16.*

Delivery is then not of the essence of a pawn in the law; and other countries adopting the *Roman* law have con- chafer for a valuable consideration: but if this had been the distinction, it would have no influence unless the *Roman* *hypotheca* and an *English* mortgage were of the same nature, which are not; for an *hypotheca* gave only a lien and no property a right to be satisfied on failure of the condition; a mortgage with us, is an immediate conveyance with a power to re- and gives a legal property.

If a man gives an *hypotheca* or *pignus* with a condition if the money is not paid at a day, the pawnee shall enjoy the at such a price, that is not in the nature of a pawn, but : *Just. Cod. l. 4. t. 54. f. 2. Si fundum parentes tui ea lege u- runt : [ut] sive ipsi, sive heredes eorum emptori pretium quan- que, vel intra certa tempora obtulissent, restitueretur ; teque satisfacere conditioni dictæ, heres emptori non parer, ut contra- des servetur, actio prescriptis verbis, vel ex vendito tibi dabitur bita ratione eorum, quæ post oblata ex pacto quantitatem ex ad- adversarium pervenerunt. This is the description of an mortgage in the *Roman* law, and as to the sale of move- *Cod. l. 4. t. 54. f. 7. Si à te comparavit is, cujus meministi, venit, ut si intra certum tempus soluta fuerit data quantitas, inempta, remitti hanc conventionem rescripto nostro non ju- tis. Sed si se subtrahat ut jure domini eandem rem retineat : de- tionis et obignationis depositionisque remedio contra fraudem po- tuo consulere.**

All that can be argued from the *Roman* law with reg- pawns will be foreign to the question, and so will what r- argued from the *English* law with regard to pawns, for d- is of the essence of an *English* pawn, 5 H. 7. 1. *Bre- Pledges, pl. 20. Title Trespass, pl. 271. and 2 R. Rep. 421* no authority contradicts these resolutions.

2 Leon. 30. and *Yelv. 164.* are both cases not of but of bailments to a third person, to sell for the use of- tors: and it is true, that, in these cases, the creditor wi- an interest in the performance of the contract, and may t- baillee.

There is scarce any book that treats upon pawns, but co- them as in the possession of the pawnee; as where it is c- whether a pawn may be used; and the difference laid do- tween a pawn and a distress is, that a distress may not b- because the party in that case comes into possession by act- and in the other by the act of the party. *Owen 124. 2 917. Salk. 522. Coggs and Bernard.*

The distinction between mortgages and pawns is laid d- *Noy 137, and in Cro. Jac. 245. 1. There is a difference*

more.

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ing of lands and pledging of goods; for the mortgagee has an interest in the land, whereas the other has but a special in the goods to detain them for his security. *Per Fleming aP*, Sir John Rutchiffe verf. *Davies*.

Iverton 178. The delivery is nothing but the bare custodit is not like to a mortgage; for then he that has the inght to have the money, but in the case of a pledge, it is special property in him that takes it, and the general continues in the first owner, upon tender of the money by the pawn, by the pawner, the property notwithstanding refusal, is reduced constantly to the pawner without S. C. 2 *Bull.* 30.

next question to be considered, will be in relation to the of creditors where the debtor continues in possession of s mortgaged: this was fraudulent at common law, and *Eliz. cap. 5. sec. 1. 2.* provides against it, *that it shall be* here is no distinction whether the sale be absolute or al: courts of equity and juries are to consider upon the idence whether the conveyance was made with a view to or not.

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It does not extend to conveyances upon good consideration unless the circumstances have the appearance of a design e creditors; but where the goods or deeds have been left vendor so notoriously, as that there could be no design to this has never been looked upon as fraudulent.

's case, 3 *Co.* 80. is a leading case upon fraud on this transaction there was held fraudulent, though upon consideration, for that it was not *bonâ fide*, because the vendest in possession, and traded upon the credit of the goods s hard to assign a reason why a buyer should leave goods and of the seller, unless to give him a false appearance nstances and credit.

insisted, that there were several cases that had made a on as to the possession, after a conditional sale, betwixt ditional and an absolute conveyance of lands and goods. shew that the case of lands is not applicable.

§. 226. 1 *Ro. Rep.* 3. resolved, That the grantor's of the land was not fraudulent; but Lord *Coke* said, the grantor had continued in possession of the original at would have made it fraudulent.

on can be no otherwise a badge of fraud, than as it is d to deceive creditors: as to the possession of goods, I way of coming to the knowledge of the owner, but by ho is in possession of them; but the possession of land is rent nature, for a man may be in possession of lands, as at will, as a mortgagor is, to the mortgagee, before the broken.

chafer may call for the title deeds, and need not be de- hless he will: but this is not the case of goods, where left in the possession of the seller: a second mortgagee ner be compelled to discover his title, 3 *Will.* 230. (a).

(a) Head v.
Egerton.

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because the first mortgagee has contributed to draw him in leaving his title deeds in the mortgagor's hands.

There may be a case as in *Eq. Caf. Abr.* 321. pl. 7. wh leaving title deeds with the mortgagor will not be construed badge of fraud, on account of the particular circumstances (1

(a) Bucknal v.
Roulston.

A case was cited *Pr. Ch.* 285 (a). There a supercargo, having shipped goods of his own, borrowed money at 40 per cent and made a bill of sale of the goods to the plaintiff; the goods were carried and sold abroad; and upon a question betwixt particular vendee of these goods, and a judgment creditor of the vendor's, Lord Cowper decreed in favour of the vendee; he took no distinction betwixt conditional and absolute sales, but founded his determination upon the fairness of the transactions; his words are, "That here was no possession calculated to acquire a false credit," which is a plain declaration that a possession calculated as to acquire a false credit, would have made the transaction void. There is a further saying in the report, that if true, in case of a bankrupt, such keeping in possession at a sale, will make the sale void.

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This must mean such possession as would give a false credit and all that is laid down there is, that a possession to acquire a false credit, would make such a transaction void, otherwise not.

Maggot and Wills, 1 *Raym.* 286. and cases in the time of King William the Third, 159. From both these reports it appears that the case was so defectively stated, that the court could find no judgment upon it, but sent it back again for a new trial; the *dictum* of Lord Chief Justice Holt is against the case, which it was cited; no notice of the statutes of bankrupts was taken in the whole case; but Holt takes it up, upon the fraud and gives it as his opinion, that it was not fraudulent, and is very clear, that it was not the distinction betwixt a conditional and absolute sale which weighed with him at all. He distinguished betwixt a bill of sale to a landlord, and to any other creditor; that it was his opinion, that it was not fraudulent in the case of a landlord. From all these cases it appears, that upon the construction of the statute of the 13th of *Eliz.* there is no room to make a distinction betwixt conditional and absolute sales of goods if made to defraud creditors, but a court or jury are left to consider of this from the circumstances of the case.

The legislature have thought necessary to describe what goods were a bankrupt's or not, and for this purpose the 21st of *Jac.* was made, and by that act the tenth section, which is the preamble to the eleventh section, though it is printed with the former section, by mistake, says, "And for that it often falls out that many persons, before they become bankrupts, do convert their goods to other men upon good consideration, yet still keep the same, and are reputed the owners thereof, and dispose of the same as their own."

Now merely considering things in possession, the mischief was, that these persons, before the act, made over their goods and yet were suffered to continue in possession, as if the goods

(1) *Potter v. Russell*, 2 *Vern.* 726. S. C. See also the case of *Towle v. Rand*, 2 *Ch. Rep.* 650.

were still their own; and this was the thing intended to be remedied, and there is no distinction made here between absolute and conditional sales.

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Then consider the enacting clause.

"Be it enacted, that if at any time hereafter any person or persons shall become bankrupt, and, at such times as they shall so become bankrupt, shall, by the consent and permission of the true owner and proprietary, have in their possession, order, and disposition, any goods or chattels whereof they shall be reputed owners, and take upon them the sale, alteration, or disposition as owners, that in every such case the said commissioners shall have power to sell and dispose the same, as fully as any other part of the bankrupt's estate."

It is not to be doubted but as the preamble makes no distinction betwixt absolute and conditional sales, so the enacting clause will take in the one, as well as the other.

The only thing contended for is, whether the mortgagee shall be considered as the true owner, or the mortgagor, and there is no doubt the conditional vendee is the true owner or proprietary, and there is no reason to make a distinction between an absolute and conditional vendee, but by confounding the difference betwixt pawns and mortgages.

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There might some doubt arise, if this was the case of a pawn, as in the case 3 *Bulstr.* 17. but it cannot be doubted in the case of a mortgage, for it is an immediate sale to the mortgagee; and tho' the mortgagor may buy it again, or redeem by favour of a court of equity, yet, till then, the vendee is the absolute proprietor.

On a pawn, the pawn is complete by a delivery; but on a conditional or absolute sale, the sale is compleat by the contract, and the party is intitled to a delivery of the goods as soon as he has paid the price. *Salk.* 113. *Dyer* 20. 203.

If therefore a conditional vendee pays money, and does not insist upon a delivery of the goods, he confides in the credit of the vendor, and not in any real or particular security, and ought to come in, under the commission, as much as any other person that places a confidence in the bankrupt, and not in any other security.

As there is no authority to warrant a distinction betwixt absolute and conditional sales, so there is a case that destroys it. *Stevens v. Sole in Chanc. Trin.* 1736 (a). A trader within the statute having possession of a leasehold estate, assigned it, and made a bill of sale of three hoys redeemable. In May 1731 he became a bankrupt, the defendants were the assignees, and the plaintiff brought a bill to be paid his principal, &c. or to foreclose; and it was admitted that the leasehold was insufficient to pay the plaintiff, but as to the hoys, it was insisted that as the bankrupt had continued in possession of them, they were liable to the commission.

(a) *Ante* 157.
161. & *Post* 352.

Lord Talbot decreed upon this admission, that there should be a foreclosure as to the leasehold, and that the plaintiff should be admitted under the commission, for so much of his debt as the leasehold would not satisfy; and decreed that the money arising

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arising by the sale of the hoys should be applied to the paymer of the creditors under the commission.

(a) Ante 154.
2 Vcl. 361.

But it was insisted, that there has been a subsequent case contrary to this, *Bourne*, assignee of *Peele v. Dodson*, Dec. 4, 1740 in Chancery (a). It is sufficient to say there was in that case no judicial determination. Lord Chancellor did then consider the inconveniences that might arise, if it should be held that ship at sea, of which no possession could be delivered till their return should be subject to a bankruptcy.

(b) Ante 160.
more fully stated.

There was another case before Lord Hardwicke, October 22 1746. *Brown v. Heathcote* (b). *Williams and Wilder*, partner indebted to *Heathcote* in 1200*l.* assigned their ships to him, and delivered over the charter-party, invoice, &c. *Williams* became a bankrupt, and the ships came home, and it was contended that as here was no delivery of the possession, it was within the statutes; but Lord Hardwicke was of a contrary opinion, every evidence of ownership was delivered over to the assignee, and all means were used to obtain an actual delivery as soon as the ships came home; and that the statute was designed against those only, who had neglected some act to put themselves in possession of the goods conveyed, and by that means had led other people into a deceit; that there could be no *consent or dissent*, as to the possession of ships at sea, and so not within the words of the act, nor within the reason of it, which was to hinder persons from gaining a false credit, for here the owner had delivered over every evidence of ownership, and could not prove by any other means that they were owners.

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I should think that the delivering over of the muniments was delivery of the ship, as the delivery of the keys of a warehouse is a delivery of the goods in it.

Now to apply this to the two mortgages.

That of *Tomkins* in 1723.

And that of *Stephens* in 1738.

These mortgages are of a lease with fixtures and moveable goods; as to the fixtures, no body can remove them till the mortgage is satisfied, for though a lessee may remove fixtures during his term, yet if he leases his whole term, he cannot, any more than a lessor during the term, and a sheriff may take them in execution. *Salk.* 368. *Poole's case*.

As to the utensils *not fixed*, they will come under the same consideration as goods granted without a delivery of possession.

A lease of an house with moveables, is only a gift of the utensils during the term. *Spencer's case*, 5 Co. 16, 17. 1 And. 4 Dy. 212. b.

2. As to the fixtures, we need not consider them with regard to the mortgage in 1738, because they will be exempted by the first mortgage; but as to the utensils *not fixed*, they will stand in the same condition as others.

A partner is possessed *per mie &c per tout*, (1) and therefore no actual delivery can be made to him; but the offence against the statute is permitting one to continue in possession, when he has sold all the goods to another, who is thereby intitled to

the possession of the entirety; and *Stevens* permitting *Harvest* to continue as half owner of them, is the case mentioned in the statute.

As to the mortgages of one-seventh share of the bankrupt's moiety of the partnership stock, &c. in trade, before I go into the consideration of this, I will consider the case of an assignment of a mere *chose en action*.

The simplest case is of a bond; such *chose en action* is assignable in equity, and not at common law. The reason is, because the assignor can furnish the assignee with all the means of reducing it into possession, for he can let him sue in his name; why therefore is not the means of reducing any thing into possession as necessary, as the delivery of the thing itself in the other case? Suppose a trader assigns over a bond, and the assignee permits him to keep the bond in his possession, why should not that be within the mischief of the statute?

A bond debt is a chattel, though some doubt has been made of this; but the doubt arises from hence, not that they are not chattels, in their nature, but that they are not grantable to a common person; but if they were granted to the king, they would pass as chattels. *Bro. Prerogative*, 40. 3 *Inst.* 55.

12 Co. 1. *Ford and Sheldon's* case, the resolution there is, that personal actions are as well included within the word goods, as goods in possession; therefore if a bond is a chattel, and the assignment is a conveyance of it, the bond being left in the hands of the assignor, is in his possession, and he may assign it to a second assignee, or may shew it to any creditor, as an evidence of so much money owing to him, and deceive him by it. And as he can have it by no other means, but by the consent of the true owner in equity, he may thank himself for it.

In mortgages of lands possession need not be delivered, but the title deeds must; and so should the deeds and securities of *choses in action*. It is said that a debt in trade is a mere chose in action, and will pass by an assignment even the day before the assignor becomes a bankrupt, as in the case of *Small and Oudley*, 2 *Wms.* 427. Mr. Justice *Burnet* stated this case, and the reason of the judgment.

An observation was made, that this was an assignment of a share in another man's trade, and not in his own; and the only reason of it might be, that here he could give no possession. And a stress was laid upon this.

Every man in his own trade is in possession of the choses in action that arise from his own goods, and can put another in possession either by giving him the securities, or by admitting him a partner for such a share. And it is no uncommon thing to argue against assignees of a bankrupt from the nature of the goods, in respect to the choses in action arising out of them, and also in respect to the new goods or profits. And if this kind of argument will prevail against them, it ought to prevail in their favour.

Suppose goods are consigned to a factor who sells them, and breaks, the merchant for the money must come in as a creditor under the commission; but if the money is laid out in other ways, these goods will not be subject to the bankruptcy.

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1 *Salk.* 160. Suppose, instead of selling the goods for ready money, he sells for money payable at a future day, and before the day, if the assignees receive the money, it will be to the use of the merchant. Or suppose that the factor had taken notes for the goods, if his assignees receive the money upon these notes, it will be to the merchant's use. This was determined in the court of Common Pleas. *Salmon and Scott*, 1. 16 G. 2.

By parity of reason the rule will hold here, that as the specific goods, by being left in the bankrupt's possession, would be subject to the commission, so must the profits be inchoate action, arising from these goods; and therefore these mortgages can come in only as general creditors.

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As to the last point, with regard to the assignment of *Harvest's* whole moiety of the partnership stock in trade to *Potter* in trust for *Stevens* the other partner, it will either fall under consideration of an assignment to *Potter*, as a distinct person, or of an assignment directly to *Stevens*: and the considering it either of these lights will not vary the determination of the case for considered as an assignment to *Potter*, it is difficult to see why *Harvest*, after he had conveyed over all his share of the partnership trade, should continue still acting as the owner of it unless it was done to acquire a delusive credit; and considered as an assignment to *Stevens*, his permitting *Harvest* to continue in possession with him, will be construed as a fraud against other persons. I apprehend that *Stevens* was the true owner of the moiety, and has permitted the bankrupt to continue in possession of it, as if he was the true owner, and that *Harvest* has taken upon himself the disposition of this moiety as the owner thereof and that this comes within the words, mischief, and intent of the statute of the 21 Jac. 1. And if it was not to be so construed, what a door would it open to frauds?

But it is insisted, that partners in transactions with each other have the partnership stock for a security, but not more, or other wise than in the case of strangers, for whether a partner or stranger lends money to the partnership, they are to be first satisfied out of the partnership stock. 2 *Ch. Rep.* 117. *Com' Cran & al' con. Knight & al'* 34 Car. 2. 2 *Vern.* 293, and 706. 2 *Will.* 180. which is as strong as any negative case can be; then stated the case, and said there the executor insisted upon right to retain as executor, but not as partner.

It may be said, that it will be laying trade under a great restraint, if a trader cannot mortgage his goods or stock without quitting trade: and to be sure cases may occur, in which the may be an inconvenience, but the inconveniencies on the other side strike me more strongly.

A man ought to quit his trade, when he has no stock to carry it on; for if it is once established, that the friends of a sinking man may secure themselves by mortgages, upon every thing that he has, without running any risque, commissions of bankrupt will be very useless things.

I must therefore conclude, that these mortgages of goods, &c. capable of a *delivery*, will be liable to the commission by force of the statute of 21 Jac. 1.

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- Sir Thomas Parker, Lord Chief Baron, made four questions.
- 1st, Whether any mortgage or sale upon condition, is within the statute of the 21 Jac. 1?
 - 2^{dly}, Whether mortgages or sales upon condition of specifick chattels, are within the statute?
 - 3^{dly}, Whether mortgages, &c. of particular parts or shares of trade, are within the statute?
 - 4^{thly}, Whether the mortgage of *Harvest's moiety to Potter*, is within the statute?

He laid the cases of pawns and hypothecation out of the question.

Fraudulent deeds he said, might be avoided at common law.

By the 13 Eliz. cap. 5. they are also made void, with a proviso that this does not extend to conveyances made upon good consideration and *bonâ fide*.

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He cited *Twine's* case to shew, that the transaction there was not *bonâ fide*.

He then read the preamble to the clause, and the enacting clause of the 21 Jac. 1.

This clause, though it does not speak of fraud, was intended to prevent that false credit which is the destruction of trade, and meant to give a further benefit to the creditors of a bankrupt, than was given to them by the 13 Eliz. cap. 7.

It extends to conditional as well as absolute conveyances, or else a bankrupt might mortgage for almost the whole value.

The principal difficulty upon this case, arises upon the words of the statute, by the consent and permission of *the true owner*, and it is insisted that they are only applicable to absolute, and not to conditional sales, because a mortgagor, having a right to redeem, is considered as the true owner.

But the words are put in opposition to the false and pretended ownership, the bankrupt appearing to have the true ownership of the goods by *the possession*, and if a contrary construction was to take place, it would be fatal.

This was determined in *Stevens v. Soale*, (a) the 5th of July (a) Ante 170. 1736.

The second question is, Whether mortgages (or sales upon condition) of specifick chattels, are within this clause?

It is allowed to be out of the question, that the stock mortgaged underwent changes, for there is no doubt, but the produce is subject to the mortgage of the stock itself.

1st, It may be a question, Whether the bankrupt's goods only, or the goods of other persons left with him for safe custody, or sale, are within this clause?

2^{dly}, Whether any, and which of the goods are within this clause?

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The enacting clause speaks of any goods, the preamble speaks only of the bankrupt's own goods.

It is laid down 1st 70. 163. *Palmer* 485. on the construction of the statute of the 13 *Eliz.* That the preamble shall not restrain the enacting clause.

But I take it to be agreed, that if the not-restraining the generality of the enacting clause will be attended with an inconvenience, the preamble shall restrain it: and this is the case here for otherwise merchants could not correspond or carry on the business without great danger, and great difficulty.

The case of *L'Apostole v. Le Plaisirier*, 1 *Will.* 318. was rightly determined, I have my account of it from a short note of Sir Edward Northey's (1).

So in the case of *Godfrey v. Furzo*, 3 *Will.* 185. where Lord King took this difference; when a merchant abroad, consigns to B. a merchant in London for the use of B. and draws on B. for the goods, though the money is not paid, the property vests and they are the goods of B. the merchant here, and liable to his debts; but where goods are consigned to a factor, as a servant, no property vests in him, nor will the goods be liable to his bankruptcy (2).

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(a) Ante 158,
S. C.

Ex parte Marsb., 1st of August 1744, (a) a bankrupt received 600*l.* in money, goods, and pieces of plate, the property of his wife, and, by deed before marriage, agreed that the same should be secured to trustees, for her separate use, as if she was a widow, and he gave a bond and warrant of attorney to confess judgment, and conveyed the plate to trustees in trust for the benefit of the children by the former husband, and the wife appointed it by her will accordingly.

It was ordered, that the children the petitioners should be admitted to come in under the commission for the 600*l.* and that the plate in the custody of the bankrupt should be delivered to them; for that the money, having no ear-mark, could not be followed, but the plate might.

In *Copeman v. Gallant* 1 *Will.* 314. I must own that Lord Chancellor Cowper exploded the notion of the preamble's governing the enacting clause, and went upon another reason which was, that the assignment was with an honest intent, and to pay the debts of the assignor. I have great honour for Lord Cowper: but though I approve of the decree, I cannot subscribe to the reasons of it; for notwithstanding an honest intent cannot intitle a person to all due regard, yet an honest intent cannot take a case out of the clause of the statute.

Suppose a person acted by commission only, could there any pretence to say, that persons who advance their money, advance it upon the credit of his stock, for to him the credit is given? So where a person acts partly upon his own stock, and partly as a factor.

(1) See *Post.* 182. 1 *Ves.* 365. 371. 586. *Post.* 232. S. C. *Mace v. Caldwell.* 2 vol. 205. *Cowper* 232.

(2) *Ex parte Dumas*, 2 *Vez.* 585.

2dly, Whether any, and which of the goods mentioned are within the clause; and whether any, and what possession is required to be delivered.

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The goods are, utensils, hops, malt, fixtures to the freehold, and stock in trade.

As to the fixtures, they are like trees, *Hob. p. 173*. Lord Chief Justice *Hobart* says, that by the grant of the trees, by a tenant in fee simple, they are absolutely passed away from the grantor and his heirs, and vested in the grantee, and go to his executors and administrators, being, in the understanding of the law, divided, as chattels from the freehold, and the grantee hath power incident to, and implied from the grant to sell them when he will, without any other licence.

Owen 49. An action is maintainable there, for the trees were re-united to the land by the purchase of the inheritance.

To apply this, the fixtures had been several times mortgaged distinctly from the freehold, but were all re-vested and re-united after that, and there was no occasion to deliver them, but they would well pass by the mortgage of the freehold to the *Tomkins's*.

I admit the case in *Salk. 368*. *Pool's* case, where it is laid down that these things may be taken in execution, but I think a distinction is to be made, for here they could not be removed by *Harveff*, or taken in execution, by reason of the mortgagee's interest. And therefore I think the coppers and fixtures are liable to the *Tomkins's* mortgage.

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With regard to the utensils, &c. *not fixt.*

Where goods mortgaged are capable of an actual delivery, there ought to be an actual delivery; but if they cannot be delivered at the time of the contract, it will be sufficient, if the mortgagee has the documents and muniments delivered to him in order to reduce them into possession.

The delivery of a key, is the delivery of the possession, according to the civil law. *Dig. 41. t. 1. l. 9. p. 5. Vide Domat.* And the case of *Brown v. Heathcote*, mentioned by Mr. Justice *Burnet*, turns upon this principle (a).

(a) Ante 170.

It is objected, that the undivided share of the stock, &c. in trade, will not admit of a separate property, and separate possession, and therefore that the possession of the mortgagor is the possession of the mortgagee.

It is true that partners have a joint stock, but their possession is several, and the interest is to some purposes several; as if a Sheriff seizes a joint stock for a separate debt, he cannot sell the whole. 2 *Mod. 279*. 1 *Shew. 173*. *Salk. 392*. *Heydon v. Heydon*.

I will now consider the cases cited for the defendants. 1 *Raym. 286*. *Maggot v. Mills*. The clause of the statute of the 21 *Jac. 1*. was not considered in this case, and one would imagine from Lord Chief Justice *Holt's* expression, that if the sale there had been made to any other person than the landlord, it would have been fraudulent?

1 *Raym.*

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ROLLE.

1 Raym. 724. Cole and Davis. This case admits of the same observation as the other, and I have some doubt, whether it was not compounded with a trust. And besides, the case was not within the 21 Jac. 1. because the sale was by the sheriff, and not by the party, so that he did not take upon him the sale and disposition as owner.

Small v. Oudley, 2 Will. 427. In this case the Master of the Rolls distinguished betwixt a man's own trade and the trade of another person, and the reason of that was, because the bankrupt was not in possession, and could not deliver the goods, and unless they could pass by assignment, they could not pass at all.

Bucknal v. Royston, Pr.Ch. 285. Was a bill of sale of the produce of a cargo going to sea, and it depended solely on the law of merchants, for there was no bankruptcy in that case, and Lord Cowper says, that in the case of a bankrupt, such keeping possession after a sale, will make the sale void against creditors, so that this is an authority rather against the defendants, than for them.

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In the present case, the possession of the goods was not delivered, though capable of delivery, and the bankrupt had the evidence of the partnership in his hands, and acted as owner, and the mortgage was a secret to every body but the parties; so that all the circumstances mentioned in the act concur to bring this case within it, and consequently I think these are things liable to the bankruptcy.

The third question is, Whether sales or mortgages, on condition, of particular parts or shares of trade, and the produce of trade are within this clause.

I shall confine myself here to *things in action*, as such mortgages are like so much of the balance mortgaged.

It is objected that this clause does not extend to things in action, because it speaks only of things in the possession of the bankrupt at the time of the mortgage.

But chattels comprehend things in action. *Slade's case, 4 Co. 95. a.* Things in action are goods and chattels in a person attainted. *Lit. Rep. 86. 12 Co. 1.*

If goods and chattels will comprehend *things in action*, in the construction of any act of parliament, they ought much more to do so in this, for otherwise a trader might cheat his creditors by assigning over such things; and this is enforced by the first clause of the act, where it is provided, that every thing shall be construed most beneficially for the creditors.

It is further objected, that things in action are not assignable but in equity, and do not admit of a delivery.

If a bond is assigned, the bond must be delivered, and notice must be given to the debtor; but in assignments of book debts, notice alone is sufficient, because there can be no delivery; and such acts are equal to a delivery of goods which are capable of delivery.

Done

l. 1. t. 2. f. 2. par. 9. says, Things incorporeal, such cannot properly be delivered. This is to shew the assignments of debts by notice to the debtor. Cause therefore extends to *things in action*, and all has done that might have been done by the assignee to vest of them in himself, and to take away from the bankrupt power and disposition of them, for no notice has been given to the debtors.

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KOLLE.

Fourth question is, Whether the mortgage of *William* moiety of the partnership stock and trade be within this and this is the most difficult question.

Objected that though *Potter* did not take possession, yet merely a nominee for *Stevens*, and that *Stevens* being before, was in possession as partner *per mie et per*

question still remains, Whether, when *Stevens* became the whole stock, he should not have taken the sole exclusive of *Harvest*, in order to take the mortgage out of the estate? And I think he ought to have taken possession of

According to the fact in this case, *Harvest* at the time of the bankruptcy continued, and appeared to be, in possession of the partnership stock, &c. by the consent of

It is said that the law will construe *Stevens* to be in possession to his right.

There is no reason for such a construction, as *Stevens* suffered to continue to act inconsistently with his right.

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The first difficulty is, that the partnership stock is in the first instance to the partnership account, according to the authority of *Pyke v. Crofts*, 3 Wms. 180, and that this is no reason for applying the partnership fund, which was to pay the partnership creditors, to the use of a partner who has made them his own another way; as where one of the partners is indebted with more than he ought to be, equity gives him a lien on the partnership stock to reimburse himself.

This is not applicable to the present case, because *Harvest* drew away any of the partnership money, or imbezzled any of the partnership effects; nor was the transaction a partnership transaction, or the money lent upon the partnership account. This principle of equity has never been extended to fraudulent loans, but it has always been confined to partnership transactions, and I think it proper it should be so.

Chief Justice Lee: I agree with Mr. Justice *Burnet*, that partnership transactions are to be considered as mortgages, and I shall consider them in that light.

The common law it was left to the jury to consider, whether the transactions of this sort were fraudulent against creditors or not.

N

This

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ROLLE.

This case must be determined upon the statute of 21 Jac. The 13th of Eliz. is only declaratory of the common law, and as all the cases upon that statute have been fully answered by the Chief Baron and Mr. Justice Burnet, I shall say nothing more upon these cases, or upon that statute, but shall confine myself to the 21st of Jac. 1. because I think that there the line is drawn, and the *certi fines* are to be found there.

The question will be,

1st, Whether the mortgagee is not the true owner to whom there should have been a delivery?

2dly, Whether the debts and choses in action should not have been delivered as far as they were capable of delivery?

3dly, Whether *Stevens* has had such a possession, as will exempt him from being considered as an owner, by whose consent the bankrupt has had goods and chattels in his possession, and taken upon him the disposition thereof?

By goods and chattels I mean such as were fixed to the freehold, and might be severed when the mortgage was satisfied.

The general preamble to this statute says, that several defects had been found in the former statute, and that one of them was in the power given to the commissioners for the discovery and distributing of the bankrupt's estate. The particular preamble to this clause recites, "That persons before they become bankrupts do convey their goods to other men upon good consideration, yet still do keep the same, and are reputed the owners thereof and dispose the same as their own."

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The clause now in question is the provision against this mischief, and every word is to be considered; this case is within the preamble, for the bankrupt has conveyed the goods to the mortgagee; and as this falls within the words of the preamble there is no occasion to give any opinion whether the preamble is to restrain the enacting clause or not. By the 13 Eliz. cap. 5 there was an express proviso, that it was not to extend to conveyances *bonâ fide*; and this was the difficulty for the commissioners to discover.

I apprehend that the direction there given, that if any person shall become a bankrupt, and have in his possession goods, &c. was to remedy the inconvenience that arose in injuries upon the former statute, whether the sale was *bonâ fide* or not, by making the reputed ownership of the bankrupt, the real ownership in him for the benefit of his creditors, because if the true owner suffers the bankrupt to become the reputed owner, he deprives himself of the benefit of his conveyance, and the bankrupt having gained a credit by his means, and hurt his other creditors, he shall be in no better condition than they are.

Is the mortgagee then the true owner?

The 21 Jac. 1. s. 13. describes the mortgage in these words: "If any person that becomes a bankrupt shall convey or assign &c. any lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, chattels, or other estate, unto any person upon condition or power of redemption at a day to come, by payment of money or other wise."

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ROLLE.

This is the description that the statute has made of a mortgage, not only of land, but of goods upon condition. *Co. Lit.* 210. a. If a man makes a feoffment in fee, upon condition that the feoffee shall pay the feoffor, his heirs or assigns, 20*l.* at such a day, and before the day the feoffor makes his executors and dies, the feoffee may pay the same either to the heir or the executors, for the executors are his assignees in law to this intent.

But if a man make a feoffment in fee, upon condition that if the feoffor pay to the feoffee, his heirs or assigns, 20*l.* before such a feast, and before the feast the feoffee maketh his executors and dieth, the feoffor ought to pay the money to the heir and not to the executors; for the executors in this case are no assignees in law, and the reason of this difference is given in the book, that the feoffor hath but a bare condition, and no estate in the land which he can assign over; but in the other case the feoffee hath an estate in the land that he may assign over, which is in other words saying, that the mortgagee is the owner, and has the interest in him; and 2 *Cro.* 244. cited by Mr. Justice *Barnet*, as to the difference between a pawn and a mortgage, goes to the same matter.

The difference taken betwixt conditional and absolute sales, and the cases thereon, have been observed upon already. I shall only mention one of them. *Stone and Grasbon*, 2 *Bullst.* 206. That case was a condition upon a future consideration. The words of Lord *Coke* which are relied upon are, that the possession of the mortgagor was not fraudulent, but if it had been an absolute conveyance, it would have been fraudulent.

I look upon this case to have been determined intirely upon the statute of 13 *Eliz. c.* 5. and the common law, the plan of which statute differs from that of the 21 *Jac.* 1. It is against fraudulent conveyances, with a proviso in favour of conveyances *bonâ fide*, whereas the act of the 21 *Jac.* 1. supposes a fair conveyance, but deprives the party of any preference, because he does not give proper notice of his conveyance, and it seems to me that the cases upon this statute are more like the cases that may happen upon the registering acts, where a person does not register, and so loses the priority of the security: so here the chance is not to suffer the donor to continue in such a possession, as is prescribed against by the act. And though the case cited is not material to the point in question, yet I think nothing of what was said in that case establishes a difference betwixt a conditional and absolute sale; yet it is material, that a mortgagor, who continues in possession, is before the condition broken tenant at will to the mortgagee, which shews that the mortgagee must be considered as the true owner of the land.

As to the other cases cited to establish this difference betwixt conditional and absolute sales, I shall not go over them again, because they have been fully answered.

Stevens v. Sole, (a) 5th of July 1736, is a case in point on a mortgage of a personal thing, and Lord *Cowper*'s saying in the other case is an authority upon this question, though upon another point; for he says in *Bucknall and Roylton*, *Pr. Ch.* 287.

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ROLLE.

That "such a keeping possession after a sale as is described in the 21 Jac. 1. which is a possession with the liberty of disposing the goods as his own, would make the bankruptcy sale void against his creditors by the statute: this case therefore must be considered as an authority to the same purpose with that determined by Lord Talbot, and both determine the question with regard to specifick goods."

I am of opinion, it will be the same as to the shares of the partnership stock, partly in possession, and partly in action, and as to all choses in action, as debts capable of being assigned in a court of equity. Some books indeed, as *Swinb.* p. 498. edition the 6th, seem to countenance an opinion that goods do not include bonds, &c. For notwithstanding he says, that by good the civil law understands not only things in possession, but also things for which a lawful action may be had; yet in the same page he lays it down, that, by the laws of this realm, the word goods is otherwise understood, and never includes things which are of the nature of freehold, nor things in action, as a debt upon a promise, or obligation (1). So *Cayle's* case, 8 Co. 32. carries some appearance of the like opinion, where it is said, that an innkeeper is answerable for the loss of a bond, being obliged to keep the goods and chattels of his guest, for though it is there said that goods and chattels do not properly comprehend charters and evidences concerning a freehold, or inheritance, or obligations, or other deeds or specialties being things in action, and yet, in this case, the writ against an hostler or innkeeper is expounded to extend to them: I apprehend that these opinions were grounded upon the notion, that choses in action did not pass even by statute, any more than they were grantable by a bargain and sale, &c. but there are so many authorities to contradict them, that I take that point to be settled.

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A corporation cannot take a recognizance or obligation in their publick capacity, because they cannot take a chattel. *Catalla* comprehends a right of action, and is the only word in the statute to give this right. 12 Co. p. 1. b. *Ford* and *Sheldon's* case. This point was in question, whether choses in action come under the word goods, and it is there said, that personal actions are as well included within this word *goods*, in an act of parliament, as goods in possession.

If *goods and chattels*, in the statute, include choses in action, all things arising from the sale of the joint stock are subject to the assignees, as they follow the nature of the goods themselves, and Mr. Justice *Burnet* has cited cases to shew that they are so, where the thing can be discovered.

Swynb. 506. 6th edition, is upon the same foundation: If a man devises his moveable goods to B. and his immoveable to C. upon a question how the debts shall go? He says, those debts which did arise by occasion of the things moveable, and for the recovery whereof there lies an action personal, belong to the person to whom the testator did bequeath his moveable goods.

(1) See *Chapman v. Hart*, 1 Vef. 273. *Moore v. Moore*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 127. which

ews that the produce of the goods were of the same
ith the goods themselves.

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ROLLE.

Stevens's mortgage, it being made to *Potter* in trust for
it is to be considered as a mortgage to *Stevens*; and as
jection that *Stevens*, being in possession, wanted no
ession to be delivered, the answer has been given, *That*
ad the possession with the consent of *the true owner*,
ought not to have had.

Pyke, 3 *Will.* 180. is the case that was called a ne-
ic.

h this has been no where determined; yet one may
ition from a Civil law book, not as an authority upon
judgment is to be founded, as it has not been re-
re, but as the opinion of learned men, and for this
: cited *Blackborough* and *Davis* from a manuscript
ere Lord Chief Justice *Holt* advances the same thing.
efore mention *Domat. lib. 1. fo. 155.* where he says,
ing by the partnership, and their other charges, are
re out of the common stock; otherwise as to the money
by a partner which has not been applied to the com-
s.

ion this to prove that the partnership stock is no fur-
ct to debts from one partner to another, than as the
s been applied to the partnership trade.

he whole; the statu: is the rule to be followed in this
intent of it was to prevent bankrupts from acquiring
dit, and to punish accessories by the loss of the priority
ebts. Whether this was a wise provision or not, is
now to determine, it must be followed as long as the
ues in force.

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Cardwicke Chancellor: this is a question of great con-
I will endeavour to reduce the grounds I go upon to
ral heads.

hether any mortgage or conditional disposition or
e of any goods and chattels is within the 21 *Jac.* 1.
o, 11.

any is, whether the present mortgages, and which
re so?

Whether the mortgagee of the moiety of the partner-
k, &c. is within the act?

hether any mortgages, or conditional conveyances of
within the act?

this general question, I shall not enter into a particu-
tion of the two points made at the bar.

he enacting clause extends to all goods in the custody
krup, whether his own originally or not, or whether
restrained by the preamble, to goods only, that were
the bankrupt's.

, Whether choses in action are within the clause?

RYAL v.
ROLLE.

For as to the first, the Chief Baron has entered so far into the construction of it, as not to leave any room for doubt: however, let the construction be what it will, the present case, as this point, is within the act, because it is not disputed but that all the goods here in question were originally the bankrupt's and were mortgaged by him.

But still in this respect I shall not scruple to declare that am strongly inclined to be of opinion with Lord Chief Justice Holt, and my Lord Chief Baron, that this clause is to be restrained by the preamble, and differ from Lord Cowper in the case of *Copeman v. Gallant*, 1 Will. 314. (1).

As to the other point, it has been fully cleared up, that *chose in action* are properly within the description of goods and chattels in this clause.

But I will add one argument: It is that the construction which has been put upon this clause is supported by the next immediate precedent clause in the act, it relates to bankrupts who by fraud make themselves accomptants to the king to defeat their creditors, where there is a power given to the commissioners, to dispose of all lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods chattels, and debts of the bankrupt so extended, to and for the use of the creditors, and yet, when it comes to the provision, it rests intirely upon the words *lands, tenements, goods and chattels* and was designed to comprehend all kind of *personal property* whether in possession or action only.

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In 12 Co. Ford and Sheldon's case, it is laid down, that in an act of parliament the words *goods and chattels* take in choses in action, and the contrary opinion seems to have arisen upon questions on grants, and bargains and sales, by which the could not pass; but an act of parliament, which may pass anything, will take in the whole.

The aim of the legislature in all statutes concerning bankrupt was, that the creditors should have an equal proportion of the bankrupt's effects as far as possible.

And it was intended that this act should be construed beneficially for the general creditors, and it is so declared in an unusual manner in the first clause of the act.

The general view of the provision now in question, to prevent traders from gaining a delusive credit, from a false appearance of their circumstances.

The general view of the provision now under consideration, was to prevent traders from gaining a delusive credit from a false appearance of their circumstances, to the misleading and deceit of those who should trade with them, and the legislature thought they had done this by subjecting all things remaining in the possession of the bankrupt, to the creditors under the commission, because where the vendee leaves the goods bought in the possession of the bankrupt, he confides as much in the general credit of the bankrupt, as that creditor who has taken only a bond or note.

(1) So ante 174, 175. 1 Ves. 365, 371. 1 Ves. 243. See *Crespigny v. Wuttem*
Lord Hardwicke seems also to have been of the same opinion, in *West v. Skip*,
4 Durn. and East, 793.

In such cases, the bankrupt had it in his power to sell all the goods the next hour, and the vendee or assignee could not claim them from the buyer, but could only have a personal remedy against the bankrupt.

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ROLLE.

All this holds as well in the case of conditional, as of absolute sales, and if the court should make a different determination, it would be contrary to the case of *Stephens v. Sole*, determined by Lord Talbot, and to *Buckland v. Royson*, by Lord Cowper, and to the implied opinion of the last in *Copeman v. Gallant*.

The statute of the 21 Jac. 1. c. 19. extends to conditional as well as absolute sales.

I chuse to forbear observing upon the words of the clause, because that has been done already.

The legislature has explained it's sense by putting the words *true owner*, in opposition to *the reputed owner*.

The 2d question is, Whether any, and which, of the mortgages are within the statute?

According to the authority of the cases which have been mentioned the mortgages of the 10th Dec. 1737, and of the 6th and 7th of Sept. 1738, and so much of the assignment to *Stevens*, as relates to the utensils not fixt to the freehold, and also the mortgage of the 6th of March 1738, are within the statute, and made void by it.

A share of the partnership trade, &c. mortgaged to a partner, must be delivered, or it is a delusive credit and falls within the statute of the 21 Jac. 1. c. 19.

If it was to be laid down, that a share of the partnership trade, &c. mortgaged to a partner, is not necessary to be delivered, it would let in all the inconveniencies which were to be prevented by this statute.

*As to choses in action, equity ought to follow the law; if it does not, infinite mischief would follow. It is easy to turn a legal into an equitable interest, and if parliamentary provisions as to a legal interest were not to be followed as to equitable interests, it would defeat the act. Thus upon the Popish acts, the penal, the considerations and rules are the same in equity as at law.

The provisions in the 21 Jac. 1. c. 19. sec. 11. with respect to legal interests, must be followed as to equitable ones; choses in action therefore within the meaning of the act, and are included in the words *goods and chattels*.

It was said, that the mortgages to *Potter* for the benefit of *Stevens*, must be considered as a mortgage to *Stevens*, and it may be generally right to consider it so; though yet, as a judge in equity, I am inclined to carry it farther than the judges at common law have done; for whatever interest passed of the personal things, passed in law to *Potter*; and if the case had been at common law, a court of law would not have taken any notice of the trust for *Stevens*, and then by the statute this assignment had been void at law against the *commissioners*, and a court of equity would never set it up here.

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And therefore I make a difference betwixt such things as, being assignable only in equity, gave no title to *Potter* at law; or as to these the mortgage is to be considered as being made directly to *Stevens*, but as to those things, in which an interest passed at common law to *Potter*, I think *Potter* is to be considered as having the legal property.

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ROLLE.
How far partner-
ship stock is lia-
ble to the debts of
partners in the
first place.
Where one part-
ner lends money
to another part-
ner generally,
and it is not
entered in the
partnership
books, he does
not gain a speci-
fic lien upon the
share of the bor-
rower.

As to the question, whether partnership stock is to be li-
able to the debts of the partners, it was never carried furth-
er than to debts contracted relative to the partnership, either after
the bankruptcy, or death of one of the parties.

Where a partner lends money to another generally, and it
not entered in the partnership books, it is said he gains a spec-
ific lien upon the share of the borrower, and shall be preferred
separate creditors; but I find no foundation for this, after
bankruptcy, nor after the death of a partner, where his effect
have become subject to the rule of distributing assets. Where
equity there may be between partners themselves, on settling
account, is another thing.

Crofts v. Pyke, 3 *Wms.* 150, is as strong a negative case
this purpose as can be; all that was contended for there, being
that he might retain as executor.

If it should be determined that one partner should gain a spe-
cific lien, by lending money to the other upon the partnership
stock, it would open a door to great fraud, and give a shock
to this act, which is made on purpose to prevent a false and delu-
sive credit.

I will take notice of one thing mentioned by Mr. Justice
Burnet, and the Chief Justice.

It has been said in this cause, that great mischief might arise to
trade and credit from making securities of this kind void, be-
cause it might prevent persons from using their credit in trade
and that they will not be able to make a security, without exposing
their circumstances to the world, which may hurt their credit.

On the other side it has been argued, that a delusive credit is
still of more dangerous consequence.

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I will not say but some inconveniences may arise on each
part; but I agree with the Chief Justice, that, as it is a law, it
must be adhered to, and we cannot depart from it. If any in-
convenience does arise, it is for the consideration of the legisla-
ture whether it ought to be allowed or not.

But this I will say, that very great inconveniences may arise
by giving an opportunity to people to make such securities
and yet appear to the world as if they had the ownership of all
those goods of which they are in possession, when perhaps they
have not one shilling of the property in them.

And further I will venture to say, that it was the design of this
act of parliament to prevent this; for the act was made in the
simplicity of former times, long before those large and airy
notions of credit prevailed, which have been since introduced.

This act is a law, and I concur with my Lords the Judges in
the opinion that they have given, and the construction that they
have put upon it; and do therefore determine that these mort-
gages and securities are not a lien upon the bankrupt's estate (1)

(1) *Edwards v. Harben*, 2 *Durn. & East*, 587. *Bamford v. Barou*, *ibid.* 594. See also *Falkner v. Case*, 1 *Bra. Ch. Rep.* 125, 2 *Durn. & East, Rep.* 491.

THE cause coming on again for direction, and a question arising, whether a debt could be set off within the provisions of the statutes of bankrupts?

February the 4th, 1749.

1 Vesf. 375-S. C. S. P.

Chancellor said, that under the act of the 5th of George the second, persons might set off debts, as that act extended to mutual debts, though independent of, and not relative to the credit between the bankrupt and other persons in the course of trade, and though the debts were of such a nature as not to be brought into a general account (1).

A person may set off a debt under the bankrupt acts, though not relative to the mutual credit between him and the bankrupt.

(1) *Billon v. Hyde*, ante 126.

Petition of *Richard Flynn and Richard Field*, Merchants, December the 23d, 1748.
in the Bankruptcy of *Hugh Mathews*.

Ex parte Mathews
2 M. D. C. 40: 478.
Case 98.

THE petitioners being at *Liverpool* the beginning of July last, and purposing to be concerned together in purchasing plantation tar, they found on enquiry a quantity thereof to the value of 500 barrels lying on the quay of *Liverpool*, which *Mathews*, a merchant of that town, had then imported for sale. Whereupon the petitioners and *Mathews* came to an agreement on the 8th of July, whereby *Mathews* sold to the petitioners two-thirds of 500 barrels of the said tar at the rate of 9s. per barrel, and the other third he agreed should go and be sold to the petitioners for sale at his risque, on his own account, and that he should be at the charge of cartage and portage and shipping off the said 500 barrels of tar, and that the petitioners should sell his share of tar free from charges of commission.

On Mathews sold to the petitioners two-thirds of 500 barrels of tar, at the rate of 9s. per barrel, and the other third he agreed should be sold to the petitioners for sale at his risque, and on his own account, and that he should be at the charge of cartage and portage, and shipping.

the whole, and *Mathews* accordingly caused the tar to be put into a warehouse of his own, for the use of the agreement: Petitioners at the same time paid *Mathews* in London bills 150*l.* the value of two-thirds, and *Mathews* made them out a bill of parcels. *Mathews* afterwards becomes a bankrupt, and the assignees take possession of the tar, as they found it remaining in his warehouse. Not within the intent of the 21 of Jac. 1. ch. 19. which meant to guard against leaving goods, in order, and disposition of bankrupts; but here was only a mere temporary custody, till the petitioners had an opportunity of shipping it off to Ireland. The petitioners intended to two-thirds of the tar the assignees ordered to deliver the same accordingly.

Ex parte Mathews
Mont. 2d.

It was further agreed that the said tar should be removed from the quay, and lodged in a warehouse until the petitioners should give orders for the shipping the same off as opportunity should offer, they having none at that time; and accordingly *Mathews* caused the said tar to be put into a warehouse or cellar of his own, for the use of the said agreement.

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Ex parte Mathews
Mont. 2d.

The petitioners at the same time paid *Mathews* in London or 150*l.* being the amount of the value of the said two-thirds of the said tar agreed for, *Mathews* also at the same time out and delivered the petitioners a bill of parcels of the tar, in the words and figures following: *Liverpool*, 8th July 1748. *Messrs. Richard Flynn and Richard Field*, bought of *Hugh Mathews* two-thirds of 500 barrels of plantation tar, at 9s. per barrel the whole amount 225*l.* the whole to be sold by said gentlemen for

Ex parte Mathews
2 M. D. C. 40: 478.
259.

Flyn v.
Mathews.

for account as follows, two-thirds their account 150l. one-third Hugh Mathews's account 75l. Hugh Mathews to bear charges of cartage and portorage in sending off, then received bills on London amount 150l. when paid is in full of their part,

per Hugh Mathews.

Mathews the beginning of August last became a bankrupt, and the assignees under the commission issued against him, have taken possession of the said tar as they found it remaining in his warehouse, and being doubtful whether they can deliver the same, with safety to themselves, to the petitioners, the assignees and Flyn and Field have agreed to be determined by Lord Chancellor on petition, which came on now before his Lordship for directions.

The question arose on the following clauses of the 21 of Jac. 1. c. 19.

"For that it often falls out that many persons, before they become bankrupts, do convey their goods to other men upon good consideration, yet still do keep the same, and are reputed the owners thereof, and dispose of the same as their own;

"Be it enacted, that if at any time hereafter any person or persons shall become bankrupt, and at such time as they shall so become bankrupt shall by the consent and permission of the true owner and proprietary have in their possession, order and disposition, any goods or chattels, whereof they shall be reputed owners, and take upon them the sale, alteration, or disposition as owners, the commissioners shall have power to sell and dispose the same for the benefit of the creditors, which shall seek relief by the said commission, as fully as any other part of the estate of the bankrupt."

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Mr. Wildbraham for the assignees.

There are two sorts of persons affected by this clause.

1. Persons who are purchasers of goods, though for a good consideration, or true owners of goods, and who yet leave them in the hands of the bankrupt.

2dly, The creditors of bankrupts.

The intent of this law was to prevent persons intrusting traders with the possession of goods where they have not the property; possession gives a species of property, and a possessory property is a good property against wrong-doers. The possession always creates a presumption of absolute property, it makes a man the visible owner, this specious ownership creates a credit, and draws in innocent persons to give credit upon the faith of appearances; if they are false appearances, they are drawn in to give credit to that which has no reality, but is merely fictitious.

This act of parliament intends to remedy that inconvenience by preventing this practice, and in order thereto imposes a penalty upon such practice, whether it arises from design or inadvertency.

Lord Chancellor: I think this case is not within the intent of the act of parliament, which meant to guard against leaving goods in the possession, order, and disposition of bankrupts; but here

was merely a temporary custody, because the petitioners, the buyers of the tar, had not an opportunity of selling it by shipping it off immediately to Ireland.

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MATHews.

It cannot with any propriety be said the tar was in the order, disposition, or power of the bankrupt, and therefore not within the act of parliament.

Upon the foot of the agreement between the petitioners and Mathews, this is to be considered as an undivided property, of which they were tenants in common; there must be a possession of those goods in one or other of them, and the possession of one is the possession of all, and therefore the petitioners are intitled to two-thirds of the tar, and the assignees must deliver up the same to the petitioners (1).

(1) So *West v. Skip*, 1 Ves. 239. 243. 456. *Walker v. Burnel*, Doug. 303.

(X) Rule as to Copyholds under a Commission of Bankrupts.

Drury v. Man, surviving Assignee of *Johnson*, a Bankrupt. *Juris* the 3d, 1746.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

(Y) Where Assignees are liable to the same Equity with the Bankrupt. [188]

Brown v. Jones and others.

October the 25th, 1744.

THE bill in this case was brought by the assignee under a commission of bankruptcy against *Roger Williams*, to have a real estate belonging to the bankrupt sold.

Case 99.

The questions in this cause arose upon a settlement made by the bankrupt of this estate upon his wife and children after marriage.

Though the court will favour creditors, yet it must be, where they have a superior right to other persons.

The Attorney General for the plaintiff stated the settlement to be made on the 8th of August 1732, between *Roger Williams* and his wife, and *Richard Blencoe*, and the defendant *Brown*, and another person as trustees, recited to be in consideration of a marriage already had, and the sum of 1000*l.* paid as a marriage portion to *Williams* by *Blencoe*, who was brother to his wife and for settling a jointure, and conveyed to the trustees to the several uses following: To *Roger Williams* for life, and from and after the determination of that estate to the trustees to preserve contingent uses during *Roger Williams*'s life, and from and after his decease, to *Elizabeth* the wife for her jointure, and after the decease of husband and wife to the use of the trustees for and during 99 years, on such trusts as herein and hereafter expressed, and after the determination of that estate, to the first and other sons in tail male.

There was no declaration of the uses of the term of 99 years, nor any receipt indorsed on the back of the settlement; and as there

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JONES.

there was no declaration of the trust of the 99 years term, I insisted the resulting use or trust will revert to the husband who gave it, and therefore will enure for the benefit of the creditors of the husband.

Mr. Brown of the same side.

The circumstances of fraud in this case are very strong, the settlement was not made till ten years after marriage; *Roger Williams* the husband never thought of this deed or mentioned it on his last examination, which is very suspicious, and looks like a plank laid hold of to save them from shipwreck.

Mr. Solicitor General for the defendants, the wife and children.

Roger Williams was no trader in 1732, and the act of bankruptcy was not till six years afterwards.

[189] If it was a mere voluntary settlement, perhaps it could not be supported against the creditors; but there are many agreements after marriage, which may be supported as fair, and for valuable consideration. *Scott v. Ball*, 2 Lev. 70. A question between purchasers and the issue of the marriage, whether an agreement after marriage was for a good and valuable consideration? Lord Chief Justice Hale said, the court in family agreements do not nicely estimate the value of the estates, but only whether it is a fair and honest agreement.

The facts in the present case are shortly these: *Roger Williams* was seized of this estate in 1722, had only 150*l.* with his wife at that time, and no settlement then made; Mr. *Blencoe* her brother applied to *Roger Williams* to make a provision for his sister; *Roger Williams* said he would not do it for nothing, on which *Blencoe* agreed to advance 1000*l.* the 24th of June 1732, a receipt was given under the hand of *Roger Williams* to *Pottinghal* an attorney in the following words: Received of my brother *Richard Blencoe*, the sum of 600*l.* by the hands of Mr. *Pottinghal* in consideration of the settlement to be made upon my wife. The settlement was executed in August after: *Richard Blencoe* died the 8th of October following, and therefore the remaining 400*l.* was never paid.

There being no receipt indorsed, is so far from being a circumstance of fraud, that it shews the fairness, because, as the whole 1000*l.* was not paid, they could not properly indorse it.

In answer to the objection of the 99 years term having no declaration of trust, it must be considered as if the husband was contending. All the uses shew it to be a marriage agreement; the limitation indeed is to trustees generally, but is declared to be for such a trust as is thereafter expressed.

The term is to stand no further than it shall be thereafter declared, and the very nature of the agreement shews, that it cannot result for the benefit of the husband, and it is demonstration to a court of equity, that it could never be intended that the use of this term should be for his benefit, because it would make the limitation to the sons of no value: there is no doubt that but the parties meant it as a provision for younger children.

d the want of the formal deed, a lease for a year, not material.

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JONES.

Mr. Attorney General's reply; the fact proved is, that this sum of 600*l.* was in consideration of a settlement to be made. It is pretty extraordinary that this sum should be paid three months before the settlement executed.

To make this a consideration, it is incumbent upon them to shew it was the money of the brother, but it is expressed to be in consideration of 1000*l.* in hand paid for the marriage portion, but not said to be paid by the brother Mr. *Blencoe*; either has he signed the deed; now if he was a party contracting on his own account, could it be thought he would not have signed the deed?

It does not appear that this was a portion which could not be received without coming into a court of equity; therefore it is hard to say, that this is such a consideration, that the creditors of the husband shall not have a sale of the estate without establishing the provision for the wife: this is not a settlement to be carried into execution, therefore the court must take it on the very terms on which it stands.

Lord Chancellor: This case is made out to my satisfaction. Tho' the court will favour creditors as much as they can, it must be where they have a superior right to other persons.

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The questions in the cause are,

1st, Whether the deed is to be considered as a valid settlement?

2^{dly}, If it be, Whether the creditors can claim any benefit under the settlement?

Now as to the first: It depends upon *the consideration*, for it must be agreed; if the bankrupt has made a settlement without consideration, it is not good. This is a question of fact, and is sufficiently proved to satisfy me.

It is admitted, if a settlement is made before marriage, though without a portion, it would be good, for marriage itself is a consideration (1), and it is equally good if made after marriage, provided it be upon payment of money as a portion, or a new additional sum of money, or even an agreement to pay money, if the money be afterwards paid pursuant to the agreement; this is allowed both in law and equity, to be sufficient to make it a good and valuable settlement (2).

A settlement after marriage good, if it be upon payment of money as a portion, or a new additional sum, or even an agreement to pay money, if afterwards paid.

The receipt *Roger Williams* gave for the 600*l.* makes it very clear it was the money of *Blencoe* the wife's brother, for the words are *in consideration of my making her a jointure, or marriage settlement.*

It has been objected, that this is a recital only, under the name of a bankrupt, and therefore suspicious; but to take off the suspicion, the son of *Pottingbal* swears, he saw this receipt

(1) See *Ex parte Marsh*, ante 158. *Marsh*, Ca. temp. Talb. 63. *Hard v. Shalvey* v. *Atbol*, post. 2 vol. 445.

Marsh, Ca. temp. Talb. 63. *Hard v. Shalvey*, 2 Vesf. 16. *Hylton v. Biscoe*, 2 Vesf. 308.

(2) Such settlement good not only against creditors, but against purchasers. *Atbol*, post. 2 vol. 444. 446. *Wells v. Parker*, Cro. Jac. 158. *Jones v.*

Wheeler v. Caryl, Amb. 121. *Lanoy v. Atbol*, post. 2 vol. 444. 446.

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in his father's hands in 1732, six years before *Roger W* bankruptcy.

Another objection is, that the 600*l.* being paid before settlement made, therefore it cannot be deemed as the cation of the settlement.

A consideration executed, is as good to support a sett as it is at law to support an *assumpsit*, to pay money future time.

It is further objected, that it does not appear on the receipt, that it was the brother's money, but might be the wife's, and consequently a chose in action of the wife's the husband might have recovered in possession.

Supposing it had been so, if it had been in the hands of the brother, and the sister had been married indiscreetly, the brother holds his hand till the husband makes a provision honestly done, and is no more than what the court would do, and will equally support it, as if a bill had been brought against the husband to make a provision for his wife (1).

The creditors stand only in the place of the husband, the statute of the 1 Jac. 1. cap. 15. was made to put creditors in a commission of bankruptcy in the same condition with the husband under the statutes of the 13 and 27 Eliz.

It has also been objected, that this is a defective settlement at law for want of the lease for a year (2).

Where creditor
can have no re-
medy at law, but
must come into
equity, this court
will make them
do equity.

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Though in a
conveyance by
lease and release,
the lease is mis-
sing, yet if a
consideration be
proved, the release will amount to a covenant to stand seized.

* But notwithstanding the court will aid creditors against defective or fraudulent conveyances, and without confidence and voluntary settlements, yet if they have no remedy at law but must come into equity, this court will make them do equity, which brings it to the case of *Taylor v.*

2 Vern. 564 *.

The same equity will arise in the case of a conveyance by lease and release, the lease being lost, does not at all affect the substance of the case, and a consideration being proved, though the lease is missing, yet the release will amount to a covenant to stand seized.

* *A.* mortgages copyhold land to *B.* but the surrender not being perfect the time limited by the custom, became void. Afterwards *A.* becomes tenant on a bill by *B.* against the assignees, this defective surrender was made good.

(1) So *Moor v. Rycault*, Prec. Cha. 22. *Middlecome v. Marlow*, post. 2 vol. 519. *Wheeler v. Caryl*, Amb. 121. *Ward v. Sballot*, 2 Ves. 17. *Like v. Berrisford*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 366.

(2) *Vide Negus v. Reynal*, 1 Keb. 12. *Ford v. Grey*, Mod. Ca. 44. 1 Salk. 286. S. C.

(3) i. e. a consideration of Marriage or blood; for a pecuniary consideration will not raise an use by way of covenant to stand seized. For the reasons of this distinction, the reader is referred to the

editor's *essay on Uses and Trusts*. See also *Loyd v. Spillet*, post. 2. Here we must observe, that if a person pays a valuable consideration for and by some defect or omission in the conveyance of the purchased land, him the legal estate is not properly conveyed, in this case tho' the conveyance could not create an Use by way of covenant to stand seized, yet the vendor may be considered a trustee for the purchaser. See *Pollexfen v. Moor*, post. 3.

to stand seised: The settlement therefore must

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JONES.

cond question is, If it be a valid settlement, whether
ors can claim any benefit under the settlement.
signee can claim no more benefit than *Roger Williams*
which is the profits of this real estate, for the life of the

ly question then is on the term of 99 years.

he limitation to the wife for her jointure, then the set-
goes on and limits it to the use of trustees, their execu-
for the term of 99 years for such uses as herein and
expressed.

been objected by the plaintiff's counsel, as here is no
n of the trusts of the term, that it is a resulting trust
usband, and as undisposed of, in law and equity, results
nor in the settlement.

In the case of
voluntary settle-
ments and wills,
if there is no de-
claration of the
trust or a term,

the donor; otherwise where it is a settlement for a valuable consideration, and in the na-
tract for the benefit of a wife, and of the issue.

been determined so, in the case of voluntary settlements
s: but then the question will turn upon this, Whether
a settlement for valuable consideration, and in the nature
ract for the benefit of the wife for her jointure, and a
for the benefit of the issue, which in this case it certain-
therefore, as to this, the assignee can be in no better
than the bankrupt himself.

A limitation in
a settlement to a
husband for life
to trustees to
preserve, &c. to
the wife for life
for her jointure,
and after the de-
cease of both, to
trustees for 99
years, on such
trusts as hereaf-
ter expressed,
and after the de-
termination of
that estate, to
the first and
every other son
in tail. No
declaration of
the uses of
the term. The

court always takes agreements of this kind according to
re of the agreement itself; the limitation to the sons af-
term would not be worth half a crown, if the plaintiff's
should prevail, which would overturn and defeat the
his settlement, and therefore if the husband had been
tiff in the cause, the court would have considered it as a
n only to attend the inheritance according to the limita-
this settlement.

rs takes agreements of this kind according to the nature of the agreement, and therefore
only as a trust term to attend the inheritance according to the limitations in this settle-

: case of *Uvedale v. Halfpenny*, before Sir Joseph Jekyll
151. the trustees to preserve the contingent remainders were
ter a limitation of an estate tail to the son, and yet he de-
e settlement to be rectified without any evidence of the
intention of parties as to the placing of the limita-
).

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present is a thing of the same kind, in the reasoning of
es the words themselves will warrant that construction:

o *Kentish v. Newman*, 1 P. W. *ley v. Earl of Granville*, *ibid.* 333. See
rgus v. Puzet, 2 Ves. 194. *Worfe v. Ridout v. Dowling*, post. 419.

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JONES.

On the whole, the plaintiff is intitled only to the interest husband has in the estate, which is but for his life; and decreed accordingly.

Walker and Others v. Burrows.

November the
6th, 1745.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

July the 31st,
1749.

Grey v. Kentish.

Vide title Baron and Feme, under the Division, Rule as to a Possibility of the Wife.

January the
22d, 1753.

Washington Case 100.

Ex parte Coysegame.

*inter
Miles
v.
Williams
et al.*

1 Cooke's B. Laws 323, S. C. and more fully stated. A bond given to A. in trust to secure the payment of an annuity of 40l. during the joint lives of Sir Edward Smith, and petitioner the bankrupt's wife; he delivers up the bond upon his last examination; she applies to the court, and prays the assignees may deliver the bond to her trustee, and that the arrears of the annuity and all future payments may be made to her.

THE petitioner in 1751 married *Coysegame*, who is now bankrupt, and at the time of his last examination, he delivered up with the rest of his estate a bond which was given to *A.* in trust to secure the payment of an annuity of 40l. a year the petitioner, during the joint lives of *Sir Edward Smith* and the petitioner.

She brought a portion of 500l. to the bankrupt in marriage and has nothing to subsist upon but this annuity, and prays by her petition, that the assignees may deliver the bond to her trustee and that the arrears of her annuity, and all future payments may be made to her.

Lord Chancellor ordered it accordingly.

Lord Chancellor ordered accordingly, considering the creditor as standing in the place of the husband, and not intitled any more than he would have been, in case he was no bankrupt, to the annuity, without making a provision for her.

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Where a bond is given to a trustee for the benefit of a wife, and husband becomes a bankrupt, the assignees cannot bring an action, for by 1 Jac. 1. assignees can only have the like remedy to recover a debt, as the bankrupt himself might have had, the word party in the act being meant of the bankrupt.

For the assignees under the commission it was insisted, that notwithstanding the husband and wife must have brought the action in the name of the trustee of the bond for the annuity yet, according to the opinion in *Miles v. Williams et al.* 1 Will. 255. where a bond was made to *A.* in trust for *B.* who becomes a bankrupt, the assignees may bring the action in their own name, though *B.* must have brought it in the name of his trustee; and this shews that in point of law they are considered as having the absolute property for the benefit of the creditors.

The obiter opinion in Miles v. Williams and his wife, 1 Will. 255. denied by Lord Chancellor to be law.

But *Lord Chancellor* said, he did not remember there was any precedent for such an action by assignees, where a bond was given to a trustee for the wife's benefit, and not to herself: as this opinion in 1 Will. was not upon the principal point in the case, but obiter only, his Lordship denied it to be law, as thought clearly by the manner of wording the clause, relating

Commissioners power of assignment of a bankrupt's effects, *Ex parte*
 1. that assignees can only have the like remedy to recover *COTTEGANE*.
 as the bankrupt himself might have had; the words, *as the*
bankrupt might have had, in the conclusion of that clause, ap-
 plying to him to be meant of the bankrupt. And therefore or-
 der the bond to be delivered by the assignees to the petitioner,
 for arrears and future payments of the annuity to be paid to
 her separate use (1).

Vide *Bosville v. Brander*, 1 P. 1 Cox's P.Wms. 459. *Jewson v. Moulson*,
 158. *Grey v. Kentish*, post. 280. post. 2 vol. 417. *Pryor v. Hill*, 4 Bro.
v. Marlar, and *Bushnam v. Pills*, Cha. Rep. 139.

(Z) *What is, or is not, an Act of Bankruptcy.*

June 11th, 1743.

Matter of *William Gulston* a Bankrupt; upon the Peti-
 tion of *William Gulston*, and a cross Petition of *George Dale*
 Others.

R. *Gulston* residing in the island of *Barbadoes*, on the 20th *Cafe 101.*
 of *May* last preferred his petition to *Lord Chancellor*, *S. C. ante 139.*
 stating, that he being a merchant in *London* traded to *Where there is*
Barbadoes, and other places, and having some years ago a con- *a doubt of the*
 siderable real estate devised to him in the island of *Barbadoes*, did, *bankruptcy, and*
 after he had taken possession thereof, put the same under *the bankrupt is*
 management of an agent there, for his greater convenience *out of the*
 trading to this kingdom, and carrying on his trade and busi- *kingdom, the*
 ness: that in 1737 he resided in this kingdom, and nego- *court will not*
 ciated business in a publick manner as a merchant, and never *superfede the*
 committed any act of bankruptcy; but finding that he was much *commission upon*
 disturbed upon the management of his estate at ** Barbadoes*, he *petition, but*
 was, in order to make the most thereof, determined to re- *send it to trial*
 turn hither with his family sometime about the latter end of *but where the*
 1737, and his intention and determination of so doing *bankrupt is at*
 was well known to all persons with whom the petitioner had any *home, the court*
 dealings, and was concealed from none of them, and particularly *will send it back*
 well known to *George Dale*, who had several dealings with *to the commis-*
 the petitioner, and was with him almost every day, and some- *sioners, to con-*
 times, for six weeks, or two months before the time of *sider, if on evi-*
 the petitioner's going abroad, and who had several goods *dence they can*
 sent up at the house of the petitioner, to be sent abroad with *declare him a*
 what the petitioner did, in *March* 1737, go over with his *bankrupt or not.*
 to the island of *Barbadoes*, and had ever since resided there
 for the better management and improvement of his estate: that
 he remitted to *George Dale* divers considerable sums of money
 amounting of between three and four hundred pounds; and,
 standing this, *Dale* on the 21st of *February* last procured
 a commission of bankruptcy to be sealed against *Gulston*; but se-
 veral witnesses having been examined before the commissioners,
 of opinion, that they ought not to declare him a bank-
 rupt.

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GULFSTON v.
DALE.

rupt, and therefore the present application is, that the commission may be superseded.

The evidence to prove him a bankrupt before the commissioners was a porter, who swore, that, at the time *Gulston* was abroad, he ordered him to deny him to two different creditors *Shipston* and another, and was conveying off his effects on this board: *Shipston*, being also examined before them, swore that the time of *Gulston's* going to *Barbadoes* he was very well apprised of his intention to leave the kingdom; that he saw him several times, and that *Gulston* never refused to see him when he asked for him.

It appeared by affidavits, that *Dale* was with *Gulston* a great many times before he went abroad, and was privy to it.

Mr. Chute, who was counsel for *Gulston*, submitted it to the court, that, if *Dale* had thought him a bankrupt at that time, he would certainly have applied for a commission then; but instead of doing that, he has since received four or five hundred pounds in discharge of his debt, and without any scruple applied it for that purpose, and now after five years acquiescence is attempting to make *Gulston* a bankrupt.

Mr. Chute insisted therefore, upon all these circumstances, that the commission should be superseded, or at least that an issue should be directed to try the bankruptcy.

He relied on a case mentioned in *Wrench's* case, *Cro. Eli* 13. "There a process issued against *J. S.* to arrest him, who kept his house to save himself from arrest, but afterwards went to the market, and to other places, and when he heard again of a new process out against him, he kept his house a second time, but afterwards went at large: the question was, if he was within the statutes of bankruptcy; and all the court held he was not, because he used to go at large, and it might be that his policy would not prevent the serving of the process for he might be met withal unwittingly."

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Mr. Hume Campbell of the same side cited *Hopkins v. Ell Salk.* 110. "Where it was held by *Holt* Chief Justice, that *H.* commits a plain act of bankruptcy, as keeping house, &c. though he after goes abroad, and is a great dealer, yet that will not purge the first act of bankruptcy, but he will still remain a bankrupt." But if the act was not plain but doubtful, the going abroad and dealing, &c. will be an evidence to explain the intent of the first act; for if it was not done to defraud creditors and keep out of the way, it will not be an act of bankruptcy within the statute (1). Also if after a plain act of bankruptcy he pays off or compounds with all his creditors, he is become a new man.

Mr. Attorney General for the cross petition;

Mr. Dale's debt was originally 6000 *l.* and amounts now 5500 *l.* Some time in the year 1737 *Gulston* ordered himself to be denied to his creditors, and not only that, but left the kingdom and went abroad.

(1) *Woodin's Case.* Bull. Ni. Pri. 39. *Raikes v. Portan*, 1 *Cooke's B. Reports*

The creditors, imagining that something beneficial might turn out, have waited all this time, in hopes Mr. *Gulston* might be enabled to pay them; but concluding now that by staying they may make bad worse, have agreed to take out a commission of bankruptcy.

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DALE.

There are two sorts of bankruptcy described under the statute of the 13th of *Eliz. ch. 7.* and the 1st of *Jac. ch. 15* *A beginning to keep his house, or a departing from his dwelling-house, to the intent or purpose to defraud or hinder any of his creditors of the just debt or duty of such creditor or creditors, or whereby his creditors may be defeated or delayed for the recovery of their just and true debts.*

Lord Chancellor: In consideration of Mr. *Gulston's* being out of the kingdom, I think it very proper to direct an issue to try if he was a bankrupt before the taking out of the commission. If he had been in *England*, I should have been of opinion to refer it back to the commissioners, to consider upon the evidence before them, whether they would declare him a bankrupt.

His Lordship ordered, that the petitioners do forthwith proceed to a trial at law in the court of King's Bench in *London*, on the following issue: Whether at and before the issuing of the commission of bankruptcy against *William Gulston*, he was a bankrupt within the true intent and meaning of the several statutes made and now in force concerning bankrupts? And ordered that Mr. *Gulston* should be at liberty from time to time to inspect the commissioners' proceedings, and to take copies or extracts thereof as he shall think proper; and after the trial shall be had, any of the parties are to be at liberty to apply to his Lordship for further directions.

March the 28th, 1747. Last Seal after H. T.

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Lingood v. Eade.

A Motion was this day made on behalf of *Lingood* for a new trial, on a suggestion that the bankruptcy was found entirely upon the evidence of *Vaughan*, an attorney, who gave a quite contrary testimony from what he had done on a former trial in the court of Common Pleas.

Cafe 102.

Ex parte Lingood, post 240. part of S. C.

Lord Chancellor: Lord Chief Justice *Lee* has informed me that the evidence of *Lingood's* bankruptcy was very strong, and did not depend on Mr. *Vaughan* only, and that the jury found him a bankrupt without going from the bar; and as I am thoroughly satisfied with the account the Chief Justice has given me, I shall deny the motion.

Upon a former trial before Lord Chief Justice *Willes*, where the bankruptcy of *Lingood* came in question, he was of opinion that a person's absconding to avoid an attachment upon an award

Absconding to avoid an attachment upon an award for non-delivery of goods

is not an act of bankruptcy within the stat. of *Jac. 1. c. 25.* but it must be departing from the dwelling house to avoid the payment of a just debt, and not the delivery of goods, for that is a duty only.

Lanevood v.
Eade.

for non-delivery of goods pursuant to the award, is not : bankruptcy, because it is not within the words of the 1 Jac. 1. *ch.* 15. which makes it an act of bankruptcy in to keep out of the way, or depart from his dwelling-house to avoid the payment of a *just and true debt only*, and delivery of goods, for that is a duty only: And Lord C declared that he thought the determination of Lord Chief Willes a very right one, and that he was very well warranted by the words of the statute in the distinction he made between absconding to avoid a debt, and absconding to avoid a duty.

December the
24th, 1747.

Ex parte Meymot.

Case 103.

A commission of bankruptcy taken out against the petitioner, who insisted that, as he is a clergyman, he is not liable to become bankrupt: within the intent of any of the bankrupt statutes. Lord Chancellor would not supersede the commission, or direct an issue but left the petitioner to his action at law.

re Heath.
D. c. Chitty. 214.
out. c. 18th
[197]
re Smith.
D. c. Chitty. 230.
re Bandwell.
H. c. Apr. 1792.
re Kirby
H. c. M. 212

THE petitioner applies to supersede a commission of bankruptcy taken out against him, insisting that, as clergyman, and is now, and hath been ever since 1729 of the parish church of *Normanton* in *Derbyshire*, he is not to become bankrupt within the intent and meaning of all statutes made concerning bankrupts.

Mr. *Brown* for the petitioner cited the 21 *Hen.* 8. *c.*

“Whereby ’tis enacted that no spiritual person, secular, of what estate or degree soever, shall from hence by himself, nor by any other for him, nor to his use, and buy, to sell again for any lucre, gain or profit markets or fairs, and other places, any manner of cattle, lead, tin, hides, tallow, fish, wool, wood, or any merchandise, what kind soever they be, pain to forfeit treble the value of every thing by them any to their use, bargained and bought to sell again, to this act, and that every such bargain and contract to be made by them, or by any to their use, contrary to this act, shall be utterly void and of none effect, and the of every such forfeiture to be to the King, and the one to him that will sue for the same.”

And argued, that as this act passed before any man was made bankrupt, and is still in force, no subsequent act could tend to include a spiritual person under the general words of bankrupt acts; and as by these acts he is to be examined with regard to the discovery of his estate, it would be to the petitioner to accuse himself, and lay him open to the penalty of the statute of *Hen.* 8.

Mr. *Wilbraham* of the same side said, The clergy have certain privileges, some belonging to their persons, and some ecclesiastical benefices; therefore though in many cases persons hold lands and tenements, by reason whereof they are liable to be elected to offices, as a reeve, bailiff, &c. the clergy are discharged from such services by reason of their holy condition, and there is a writ in the *Register* which lies for a writ of *exco.* charge, *Reg.* 187. *b.* recites *quod clerici infra sacros ordines non elegantur ad officium.* And Lord Coke, 2 *Inst.* 2 *§* *Magna Charta*, speaking of the privileges of the clergy.

Ex parte
Meymot.

that they are not to be chosen into any temporal office; 1 *Ventr.* 105. there is the following case: One Dr. Lee, and within the level, was made an expeditor by the ioners of sewers in the county of Kent, whereupon he is writ of privilege to the court of King's Bench, and it nted; for, says the *Register*, *Vir militans Deo non impli- negatius secularibus*, and the ancient law is, *quod clerici non in officia*.

was the rule as established by the common law; but it said the statutes of bankrupts are general, and therefore ought not to be exempted, but then the 21 of *Hen. 8.* this order of men from exercising any sort of trade or dize, by buying and selling again, with a view to prevent m being diverted from the proper business of their func- d their contracts are *ipso facto* void with a severe penalty. laws that have the sanction of a penalty annexed to re more regarded than acts of parliament, which are rohibitory, without any penalty.

be intended, when by a former act the legislature had d the clergy from exercising any trades, that they meant le them under the general words *person and persons* in the : acts? There is not a word in these acts that seems to : the clergy.

al words in an act of parliament may be restrained, e reason of the law seems to require it. In the case of *Baker*, 1 *Roll, Rep.* 202. it is laid down as a rule in tion of statutes, that a general law does not make that hich was disabled by a particular statute before; and in 5. the case of *Sheffield v. Ratcliffe*, he says, Judges have in the construction of statutes to mould them to the d best use according to reason and convenience. Acts, in words, have been construed to be but particular, he intent was particular. *Plowd.* 204. *Stradling v.* ; for though the statute of *H. 7.* of fines be conceived al terms, and will bind corporations in general, yet by tion of law the successor of a parson, vicar, or any other oration, shall have five years to make his claim; for if laches they should bind their successors, it would cause tion of ecclesiastical livings; and therefore by construc- the general law they are excepted. 11 *Co. Magdalen Case*, 71. a.

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he bankrupt acts be said to intend *the clergy*, when they persons using the most secular employments which are d to the clergy, and to mean those very persons which not describe, but who by the statute of *Hen. 8.* are for- ll under that description?

had been the construction, there must have been some ; and where the penning of an act is dubious, long a just medium to expound it by, for *jus et norma loquen- terned* by usage.

petitioner should be adjudged a bankrupt, what must Can the commissioners examine him touching an act

Ex parte
MEYMO.

of bankruptcy? This is not to be done, without examining into his buying and selling; this subjects him to a forfeiture, and the bankrupt acts could never intend the power of commissioners to examine, should be so extensive, as to enable commissioners to examine persons, who, if they discover, must subject themselves to a forfeiture.

Could the commissioners assign over his living? No, for the assignee must either have the whole or none; so that there can be nothing left for the performance of divine service in this case, which is, of itself, an argument it was not the intention of the bankrupt acts to include spiritual persons; besides, he may defeat such an assignment at any time, for he may resign, and is not obliged to keep a curate.

And in another instance of sequestering a living, the law has provided that enough must be left of the benefice for the cure, that the parishioners may not be without a person to perform divine service; and therefore in cases of debts, if the sheriff returns that a defendant is *clericus beneficiatus nullum habens laicum feodum*, he can do no more, but then process must go to the bishop to sequester his living. And in such case, as 'tis said in 2 Mod. 256. *Walwyn v. Aubery*, the bishop may retain to supply the cure, and pay only the residue.

Here there can be no such provision, and therefore this becomes a question of conveniency. No general inconvenience can arise from superseding the commission, as this is the first instance since the bankrupt acts; but there may be great inconvenience, if it should not be superseded, because the cures of such clergymen cannot be seized.

Mr. Attorney General, of counsel for the petitioning creditor in support of the commission, said, the trading of the petitioner is a partnership with a potter in *Staffordshire*, and there is no dispute either as to the trade or act of bankruptcy; for Mr. *Meymo* has not ventured to produce any affidavit to contradict these facts.

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Lord Chancellor stopped Mr. Attorney General, and declared, if he could shew him that the petitioner had committed a plain act of bankruptcy, and had traded, he would not supersede the commission, because a man has the hardiness in a court of justice to say, I have been guilty of a breach of one law, and therefore release me from the breach of another.

The affidavits were then read which had been made to support the commission, and were very strong for that purpose.

Lord Chancellor: There has no question been made concerning the debt of the petitioning creditor, nor does Mr. *Meymo* contradict his trading, his having contracted this debt, or his absconding; and therefore the whole for my consideration is, whether a clerk in holy orders is liable to a commission of bankruptcy?

It is not proper for me to determine this question absolutely, because it is a mere matter of law; but I am of opinion I ought not to supersede the commission, or direct an issue, but leave the petitioner to his action at law.

If I was obliged to give an opinion, I am rather inclined to think he may become a bankrupt.

The statute of the 21 H. 8. is rather in the nature of a prohibition, and a prohibition will not exempt him from being a bankrupt; for if a man, with his eyes open, will break the law, that does not make void the contract. It is undoubtedly very improper for a person to say, I have broke the law, and therefore I am exempt from any remedy a creditor may have against me; and the petitioner cannot take advantage of the breach of the law, in order to avoid his being subject to another.

This is different from usurious cases, because then both the borrower and the lender are equally criminal, or the lender rather more criminal, as he takes the advantage of the borrower's indigent circumstances; but it is not so here, for the borrower only acts in breach of the law, and the lender may not know it at the time, or that he is a clergyman.

I will compare it to the case of a person who has dealt merely in smuggling and running of goods, though this is an offence, and contrary to an act of parliament, yet still it will be a trading within the meaning of the bankrupt acts, and such trader is liable to a commission.

Ex parte Mzymot.
The statute of the 21 H. 8. will not exempt a clergyman from being a bankrupt, for he cannot take advantage of the breach of one law, to excuse him from the breach of another.

Smuggling, tho' contrary to an act of parliament, is still a trading within the meaning of the bankrupt

acts, and such person liable to a commission.

Next as to the penalty in the statute of the 21 H. 8.

I am inclined to be of opinion on this part of the act, that the contract shall be void, as to the parson himself only; for it would be a most extraordinary construction of the statute that the bargain shall be void for his own benefit; and it would be very mischievous to construe the act in such a manner.

Many persons in this kingdom deal as graziers in buying of cattle, &c. the seller does not know a grazier to be a clergyman; shall the bargain then be void for the parson's benefit?

Suppose in the counties of *Surry, Kent, &c.* a parson buys a quantity of hops, can the vendor know that he buys to consume only in his house, and not to make a profit by retailing them again? If such a contract therefore was to be made void by the statute of H. 8. it would be a great hardship and inconvenience to vendors. I mention this to shew the mischiefs which would ensue from such a construction, and consequently this part of the act ought to be so construed, as to make it a penalty on himself only.

Next as to the objection of going on with the commission, and examining the petitioner in relation to his estate and effects.

In the case I put before of smuggling, there is no examination by the commissioners, but will subject to penalties; and yet it is no reason why the commission should not proceed, for if a bankrupt has an objection to the question, he must demur to the interrogatories, and this court will judge of the question upon a petition; or if the bankrupt refuses to answer any question, the commissioners commit him, and the delinquent brings *habeas corpus*, the question must be set forth, particularly in

A bargain or contract made by a parson, contrary to the statute of the 21 Hen. 8. sec. 5. is void as to himself only, and he alone is liable to the penalty of the act.

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If a bankrupt has an objection to a question, he must demur to the interrogatories, and the court will judge of it upon a petition, or if he refuses to answer any question, and the commis-

sioners commit him, and the delinquent brings an *habeas corpus*, the question must be set forth, particularly in the return to the *habeas corpus*, that the judges may judge, whether it was lawful or not.

Ex parte
MAYNOT.

Expte. Bardswell
Mont. 11th 208

return to the *habeas corpus*, that the judges may judge whether was a lawful question or not; and notwithstanding all this, commissioners may undoubtedly examine as to his estate effects, what he has, where it lies, &c.

The second objection is, That a clergyman's is a spiritual ferment, and that his living is not within any of the statutes relating to bankrupts.

This is indeed a more doubtful question.

To be sure there are, in the bankrupt acts, no words that relate merely to ecclesiastical estates, and therefore it is said, if the whole living is seized, it may prevent serving the cure; but I do not know this would be the consequence.

1st, A *fieri facias de bonis* issues against the parson, and the sheriff returns *nullum laicum feodum*, then a special *fieri facias bonis ecclesiasticis* issues to the bishop, and he apportions a part to serve the cure, and the remainder is taken under the execution.

This rule has been constantly followed, but I do not know any particular law for it; and yet the court follows the rule law analogically; but though they permit a sequestration to issue yet the bishop in that case allots a sufficient part of the living for the service of the cure.

I do not see (but I give no opinion) why the same method may not be followed under the commission of bankruptcy, for it does not appear to me, that this would supersede the bishop's authority.

A parson holds a living in right of the church, and it is not for his own benefit, but for the good of the church, he is presented to it, and therefore may properly be said to be *in au droit*, as he is seized in right of the church, and in some respects may be compared to an executor who acts *in autre droit* tho' the parson's is not quite so strong a case.

*A commission of bankruptcy formerly issued against a peer an earl of *Suffolk*, for trading in wines, and though there may be some particular powers that commissioners of bankrupt could not exercise against a peer, yet, notwithstanding this, he may be liable to a commission of bankruptcy, if he will trade, and so may a member of the house of commons, though, while he continues a member, there are some particular powers of commissioners that cannot be exercised (1).

Lord *Cowper* and Lord *Macclesfield* carried it so far as to hold that infants were liable to acts of bankruptcy, but it has been since determined otherwise (2).

Upon the whole circumstances of the case, I am of opinion the commissioners should proceed in the commission; but so as not to prejudice any remedy the petitioner may have by action at law (3).

Ecclesiastical estates may be taken in execution, and upon a sequestration likewise, and the method which is pursued in executions and sequestration, may be followed upon a commission of bankruptcy.

A peer or a member of the house of commons if they will trade are liable to a commission of bankruptcy, otherwise as to infants.

[*201]

(1) See Stat. 4 Geo. 3. c. 33.

(2) Ex parte *Sydebolham*, ante 146.

(3) See *Hankey v. Jones*, Cowp. 745.

Ex parte Hall.

December the
21st, 1753.

Case 104.

THIS was a petition on behalf of the bankrupt, praying to supersede the commission.

It appeared upon the affidavit of his wife, that two persons called one night at her husband's house after eleven o'clock, that they were both in bed at that time, and as he did not care to rise, she went to the window and asked who was there, and upon these persons refusing to mention their names, she said "Whoever ye are, if you will come to-morrow, or any other proper time, you may speak with my husband."

The commissioners declared *Hall* a bankrupt on the evidence of these very persons one of whom was a creditor. They only swore generally, that they went upon the day mentioned in *Mrs. Hall's* deposition and that they saw her husband go into his house, and followed him directly, and inquiring for him of his wife, she said that her husband was not at home, though they verily believed and apprehended that he was, and that he kept his house for fear of being arrested by his creditors.

Lord Chancellor : There is no pretence to say that *Hall* has committed an act of bankruptcy, for eleven o'clock at night is a very improper hour for creditors to call, nor can a man's denying himself at such an hour, be said to be done *with an intent to defraud his creditors*, which is the ingredient the acts of parliament require to make a man a bankrupt.

And as the statute of the 5 *Geo.* 2. has declared, "That if it shall appear a commission is taken out fraudulently or maliciously, that then the *Lord Chancellor*, &c. for the time being, shall, and may, upon the petition of the party grieved, examine into the same, and order satisfaction to be made to him, for the damages by him sustained; and for the better recovery thereof may, in case there be occasion, assign the bond (meaning the bond before mentioned, which the petitioning creditor gives to the *Lord Chancellor*, &c. before the granting of the commission, in the penalty of 200*l.* conditioned for proving his debt, and also for proving the party a bankrupt, and further prosecution of the commission) to the party petitioning, who may sue for the same in his name; any law, custom, or usage to the contrary notwithstanding."

I shall therefore order, that it shall be referred to a Master to settle the costs, and to ascertain the damages *Mr. Hall* has sustained, and if the petitioning creditor does not within a fortnight after the Master's report of what is due for costs, and likewise for damages, pay the same to *Mr. Hall*, I will, upon his application to me, direct the bond to be assigned to him, to be put in suit against the petitioning creditor, where at law, the jury may, if they think proper, give to the value of the whole penalty in damages.

A person's denying himself to a creditor who calls at eleven o'clock at night, is no act of bankruptcy, for it cannot be said to be done *with an intent to defraud his creditors*, which is the ingredient the acts of parliament require to make a man a bankrupt.

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Referred to a master to settle the costs and ascertain the damages *Mr. Hall* has sustained, and if the petitioning creditor does not within a fortnight pay the same, the bond to be assigned to be put in suit against him.

N. B.

Ex parte
Hall.

N. B. His Lordship said, the circumstances of this case w
so flagrant, that if any thing of the same sort should e
be attempted again, he would certainly commit the att
ney who sued out the commission.

(Aa) *Rule as to Sales before Commissioners.*

April the 11th,
1747.

Ex parte Green.

Case 105.

Advertisements
in cases of sales
before commis-
sioners of bank-
rupts should not
be general, but
ought to name
the hour as mas-
ters do, and after
the time expired,
if commissioners
are not gone,
should admit a
better bidder, in
order to give cre-
ditors as great
satisfaction for
their loss as pos-
sible.

A Reversionary estate of the bankrupt's has been put up
sale before the commissioners, and, as usual, it w
agreed by the parties present, that the bidding should be clof
by a certain time though in the advertisement for the meetin
it was general, without naming any hour; one Coward was d
clared the best bidder: and after the time allotted by th
commissioners for bidding was expired, a person of the name
Eldridge bid 10*l.* more; but the commissioners and assigne
were of opinion, Coward, according to the terms of the biddin
was the purchaser, and would not admit Mr. Eldridge's to be
proper bidding.

Since the sale at *Guildhall*, the reversion is come into posse
sion, and now in point of value the estate is worth 500*l.* mor
than it was at the time of the bidding.

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion, that commissioners of ban
ruptcy should not be so extremely nice, as to preclude a perso
from being a purchaser, because he happens to have outstaye
the time set by the commissioners; and think this like th
case of estates sold before Masters for payment of creditor
where they always advertise the sale to be at a definite time, i
between the hours of ten and twelve, because they may not b
under the necessity of staying beyond that time; but if a perso
comes to bid, even after that time, before the Master is gone
he is admitted notwithstanding: and the advertisements in cas
of sales before commissioners of bankrupts should not be gener
for a meeting in order to sell a bankrupt's estate, but shoul
name the hour as Masters do, and after the time expired,
the commissioners are not gone, they ought to admit a better bi
der, in order to give creditors as great satisfaction for their lo
as possible; and as matters of bankruptcy are discretionary in th
court, I shall never tie up a bidding to such strict rules; and
order the bidding to be opened again.

in Ex parte
arrington.
245.
Decemr C. 461.
the Tradebotham
D. Chitty 810
[203]
Ex parte Carter
M. a. 1747
583

(Bb) Rule as to Examinations taken before Commissioners.

Eade v. Thomas Lingood a Bankrupt, and *Margaret Lingood* his Daughter, &c. May the 23d, 1747.

THE plaintiff had obtained an order to read the proceedings in the commission of bankruptcy, as an exhibit in his cause, and, amongst the rest, the examination of *Margaret Lingood* before the commissioners. Case 106.

It was objected by the counsel, that *Margaret Lingood's* examination cannot be read where she is a defendant, unless it had been proved over again in the cause. An order had been obtained to read *inter alia* the examinations of *Margaret Lingood*, taken before the commissioners under *Thomas Lingood's* bankruptcy.

They cannot be read, unless proved in the cause, that there were such examinations taken before the commissioners; for the proceedings in a commission of bankruptcy against *Thomas* are, as to *Margaret*, *res inter alios acta*.

Lord Chancellor: Two questions have been made on the plaintiff's offering to read the examination of *Margaret Lingood*.

First question: Supposing the order had been sufficient, whether the plaintiff could have read her examination taken before the commissioners?

Now I am extremely doubtful, if the plaintiff could have read it even then.

The rules in respect to *vivâ voce* examinations are held extremely strict in this court: as for instance, in cases of wills, this court never suffers them to be proved by examinations of witnesses *vivâ voce*, for it is not sufficient to prove a signing and sealing, but the sanity of the person, and all other requisites under the statute, must be proved, and this cannot be done by *vivâ voce* examinations; because the defendant has a right to a cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses.

I will put the case of an affidavit made to contradict an answer; suppose there the plaintiff should produce a copy of the original affidavit from the office, I never knew it allowed as sufficient.

The next question has arisen upon the order obtained by the plaintiff to read the proceedings under the commission of bankruptcy in the present cause, saving just exceptions.

This order is obtained upon the same foundation as an order to read in one cause, the bill; answer, and the rest of the proceedings in another cause, where it is between the same parties; but such an order cannot be extended to a third person, who was no party to the first.

Now *Margaret Lingood* is not at all bound by the proceedings in a commission of bankruptcy against *Thomas Lingood*, for as to her it is *res inter alios acta*.

Upon the whole, his Lordship would not admit this examination to be read, unless the plaintiff had proved in the cause, that there were such examinations taken before the commissioners.

An order to read the proceedings in one cause in another, must be between the same parties.

Parliament
Corinck
2 Simon 56;
House
1. Houston
2. Heer
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EADY v.
LINGOOD.

Where one defendant is charged with a fraud, his deposition cannot be read for another, as it may tend to excuse him with regard to his own costs.

The bill here is brought against *Thomas Lingood*, charging fraud against him, in pretending to have bought a copyhold estate with his daughters' money, when it was in fact v his own.

His daughters are made defendants in the cause, in order to reconvey the copyhold to the assignees under the commission against *Lingood*.

Mr. Solicitor General, counsel for the daughters, in excuse of their costs offered to read the defendant *Thomas Lingood's* deposition, to shew that he led them into the mistake, by informing them that the purchase was made with their money.

Lord Chancellor refused to let *Thomas Lingood's* deposition read, because where one defendant is charged by the bill with fraud, his deposition cannot be read for another defendant, as will be an advantage to himself, and may tend to excuse him with regard to his own costs.

December the
24th, 1747.

Ex parte Parsons.

Case 107.

Ante 72. S. C.

Lord Chancellor on a former application limited Mrs. Parsons's examination before the commissioners to her son's trading only, but upon the present application, refused to restrain the commissioners from inquiring into any circumstances which may make him a trader.

LORD Chancellor upon a former petition had directed commission of bankruptcy that had been taken out against Mr. Parsons the son of the petitioner should proceed, and commissioners were allowed to go so far as to make a proviso in the assignment, but no warrant of seizure to issue, nor any advertisement to be published for the bankrupt's appearing and surrendering himself till further order.

Upon the commissioners proceeding in the commission, examining Mrs. Parsons the petitioner and mother of the bankrupt, an application was made to Lord Chancellor before the next vacation, on the part of Mrs. Parsons, that the examination should be limited to her son's trading only, and Lord Chancellor did limit it accordingly.

The present petition is, that the commissioners may be restrained from asking a particular question mentioned in the petition, concerning her son's trading.

Lord Chancellor said, he did not intend by the former order to restrain the commissioners from asking any question that might be relevant to his being a trader, or any circumstances relating thereto.

She was asked by the commissioners, whether her son was a trader or not, or had any concern in the brewhouse? and answered negatively. He would not therefore restrain the commissioners from inquiring into any circumstances which might make him a trader; as for instance, "Did your son assign to you any share he had in the brewing trade to you? For if she answers in the affirmative, that will shew he was a trader before he executed an assignment.

Suppose in the deeds themselves it should appear he carried on the trade with his mother, this will be a material evidence for the support of the commission.

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Ex parte Beeston
Mont. 11. 24th

His Lordship would not restrain the commissioners from examining Mr. *Parsons* concerning her son's trade, and therefore dismissed the petition, and said further that he would not make any order that Mrs. *Parsons* should be at liberty to be attended by counsel upon her examination, as is prayed by the petition, because it may be made a precedent in other commissions, and he thought an inconvenience would arise if allowed in every case, and therefore only recommended it to the commissioners, in this particular instance, to indulge Mrs. *Parsons* with counsel, but would make no order for that purpose.

Ex parte
PARSONS.

Lord Chancellor would not make an order that Mrs. *Parsons* should have counsel upon her examination, because it might be made a precedent in other commissions, and thought an inconvenience would arise, if allowed in every case.

inconvenience would arise, if allowed in every case.

Ex parte Bland.

Case 108.

THE petitioner is a banker in *Lombard-street*, and had been summoned under the commission of bankrupt against *Lingard*, in order to be examined touching his trade and dealings with the bankrupt.

Mr. *Bland*, instead of attending the commissioners, petitioned Lord Chancellor that he might be examined upon interrogatories, and might have a copy of the interrogatories, and a month's time to prepare himself for this examination, and that the commissioners might be restrained from asking him questions touching notes given for money, or bank notes or goldsmith's notes, or money paid by him for bank bills, or cash notes of the petitioner or other bankers.

Ex parte Bland
Mr. *Bland*, instead of attending commissioners, petitioned that he might be examined upon interrogatories, and have a copy thereof, and a month's time to prepare himself, and that the commissioners may be restrained from asking him particular questions in his business of a banker.

Lord Chancellor dismissed the petition upon the opening of the petitioner's counsel, without hearing the assignees' counsel, and said he would not limit or restrain commissioners in their examinations, for if he did it would be attended with expence and inconvenience from applications of this kind.

Lord Chancellor will not restrain commissioners in their examinations, as it would be attended with expence and inconvenience from applications of this kind.

inconvenience from applications of this kind.

The bare exchanging of notes with a bankrupt, or giving money for bank notes, cannot affect him as a trader with that bankrupt, and consequently Mr. *Bland* cannot be hurt by such a discovery, nor would he presume that the commissioners will ask such trifling and immaterial questions, and therefore would not direct the examination to be upon interrogatories.

The bare exchanging of notes with a bankrupt, or giving money for bank notes cannot affect him as a trader with that bankrupt.

(Cc) *Who are liable to Bankruptcy.*

Highmore v. Molloy.

December the 11th, 1737.

LORD Chancellor: I am inclined to think a pawnbroker within the several statutes concerning bankrupts, and especially within the general words of the 39th clause of the 5th of

Case 109.

Pawnbrokers within the statutes of bankrupts, and seem

particularly included in the general word *brokers*, in the 39th. section of the 5th of Geo. 2. and to is a public officer, as an exciseman, &c. if he will trade.

Geo.

Ex parte Williamson.

*March the 26th,
1750.*

Under the Division, Rule as to the Certificate of a Bankrupt.

(Dd) Rule as to a Bankrupt's Allowance.

*October the 20th,
1744.*

Ex parte Grier.

THE petitioner *Ruth Grier*, the widow and administratrix of *John Grier*, against whom a commission of bankruptcy was awarded, prayed that the assignees of the estate and effect of the bankrupt might be ordered to pay unto the petitioner a sum of 35*l.* being the remainder of the 5*l. per cent.* unrecovered, which the petitioner insists *John Grier* the bankrupt was indebted to as his allowance, in respect to the sum of 800*l.* received from his estate, or that she might have such other allowance as he was intitled unto at his death.

*CASE 111.
A bankrupt is not intitled to his allowance, till he has had his certificate.*

Lord Chancellor : I am of opinion on the construction of the statute in the act of parliament made in the fifth year of the late king, that though *Grier* the bankrupt did surrender and assign, yet that he was not intitled to the allowance given to bankrupts, unless he had had his certificate; for if the creditors did consent to give it him before, it would be of no service, they might take it from him again the next moment; for it should be liable in his hands to satisfy any creditors, till he is cleared by the certificate.

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His Lordship therefore ordered the petition to be dismissed.

Ex parte Trap.

*December the
24th, 1747.*

THE petitioner is the representative of a bankrupt, whose estate had paid a neat 10*s.* in the pound to his creditors under the commission, and thereby became intitled to an allowance of 5*l. per cent.* provided the 5 *per cent.* did not amount to the whole to above the sum of two hundred pounds. The commissioners directed the assignees to pay the bankrupt the sum of 163*l.* being within the sum, his estate amounting to 200*l.* but before the assignees had paid it, the bankrupt dies, which was the reason they did not think fit to pay it to the representative of the bankrupt, without the sanction of the court.

*CASE 112.
A bankrupt's allowance under the act of parliament is a vested interest, and, if he dies, will go to his representative.*

Lord Chancellor of opinion it vested in the bankrupt, and the petitioner consequently as his representative intitled to the 163*l.* (1).

(1) *Ex parte Calcot*, post. 209. post. 3 vol. 814. S. C.

February the 2d,
1748.

Ex parte Stiles and Pickart.

Cafe 113.

Bankrupts are not intitled to their allowance under the 5th of the present king, till a final dividend is made, for it cannot be seen before, whether they will be intitled to any allowance at all.

*Ex parte David
Hunt. M. 36.*

THE petitioners by their petition set forth, that they have paid a dividend of 10s. in the pound, clear of all expence under a joint commission; and therefore prayed they may have the allowance they are intitled to under the act of the fifth of the present king.

A separate creditor, who by order of the Lord Chancellor was admitted to prove her debt under the joint commission, opposes it, and insists the bankrupts are not intitled, as their separate estate is so deficient, as not to produce 2s. 6d. in the pound, and that the bankrupts cannot receive the allowance under the act of parliament, till they have paid all their creditors, as well separate as joint, twenty shillings in the pound.

Lord Chancellor: This application is premature, the commission issued no longer ago than in June last, no final dividend has been made, and before that time any creditor may come, either joint or separate, to prove debts.

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Upon an affidavit of a creditor that he has not read the *Gazette*, he will be admitted so as not to disturb a former dividend, nor

can commissioners proceed to make a second till he is brought up equal to the creditors under the first

And even upon the common equity of this court, if a creditor will make an affidavit that they have not read the *Gazette*, the will be admitted, so as not to disturb the former dividend, and by that means must, in the first place, be brought up equal to the creditors under the former dividend, before the commissioners can proceed to make a second.

So that, till after a final dividend, it cannot be seen whether the bankrupts will be intitled to any allowance at all, for the act of parliament directs that the neat produce of his estate shall be sufficient to pay the creditors of the bankrupt, who have proved their debts under the said commission, the sum of ten shillings in the pound, *over and above such allowance.*

Therefore to grant this petition would be a dangerous precedent, and for this reason I dismiss it, but so as not to prejudice any allowance they may be intitled to after a final dividend.

Ex parte November the
2d, 1754.
Ex parte M. 36.

Cafe 114.

S. C. post 3 vol.
814.

The representative of a bankrupt, who had in his life-time divided 10s. in the pound is, as standing in his place, intitled to the allowance.

Ex parte Calcot, and Others.

THE petitioner is an administrator of one *Tirrell*, a bankrupt, his application to the court for the bankrupt's allowance under the act of parliament, he having made a dividend of 10s. in the pound.

Lord Chancellor ordered the assignee out of the effects in hands should pay the allowance to the petitioner, at the rate 5l. per cent. upon the money got in from the bankrupt's estate not exceeding the sum of 200l. (1).

(1) *Ex parte* Trap, ante 208.

(Ec) Rule as to Solicitors in Bankrupt Cases.

Ex parte Holliday.

June the 17th,
1742.

Petition against *Phelps* the clerk, in a commission of bankrupt for not attending a trial at the assizes upon an indictment against the bankrupt for concealment, notwithstanding he served with a *subpœna* for that purpose; and praying that the costs of the suit may be paid by *Phelps*, as the petitioner ends that the acquittal of the bankrupt was owing to the evidence of *Phelps*'s evidence.

Case 115.

The court cannot, upon petition, make the clerk of the commission pay costs of suit, for not attending to give evidence at a trial, by reason of which the bankrupt was acquitted, the remedy lying at law.

Chancellor: This is not a matter proper for me to determine a summary way, or to interfere in a proceeding before a jury and terminer.

The petitioner has really sustained any damages in this trial for the evidence of *Mr. Phelps*, he may proceed against him by indictment or information, and recover damages for this of *Mr. Phelps*; and therefore as to this part I shall dismiss the petition, as I have no jurisdiction at all in a matter of this kind.

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Ex parte Whitchurch and Others.

June the 7th,
1749.

The Lordship, by a former order in petitions of bankrupts, referred it to a Master to tax *Mr. Skurray*'s bill as solicitor's fees carried on in this court by the assignees of *Halliday*'s bankruptcy.

Case 116.

Ante 91.
Where a solicitor carries on suits for an assignee, without the authority of the majority in value of the creditors, the estate of the bankrupt is not liable to his bill for such suits.

Master taxed the bill accordingly, and reported so much on account of these suits.

One of the creditors of *Halliday* in behalf of themselves and of the creditors, take exceptions to this report, because the assignees engaged in these suits of their own accord, without the authority of the creditors to empower them to commence suits in equity, pursuant to the directions in a clause of the *Act*, intitled, *An act to prevent the committing of frauds in bankrupts*.

Provided always, that no suit in equity shall be commenced by assignee or assignees, without the consent of the majority in value of the creditors of such bankrupt, who shall be present at a meeting of the creditors, pursuant to notice to be given in the *London Gazette* for that purpose."

Chancellor: The exception must be allowed, and as he employed by the assignee, *Mr. Skurray* has a personal remedy against him, but since he acted without the authority of the majority in value of the creditors at a previous meeting for that purpose, the estate of the bankrupt is not liable to pay the costs.

(Ff) *Rule as to the Sale of Offices under a Commission of Bankruptcy.*

August the 3d, Ex parte Butler and Purnell, the Assignees of Edward Richardson a Bankrupt.
1749.

Cafe 117. *EDWARD Richardson* in 1746, and for some years before followed the business of a victualler in the city of London and having acquired some money, and borrowing more, in *Sept. 1746*, purchased the office of the under marshal of the said city for 900*l.* two thirds of which was paid to the then lord Mayor and the other third to the said city.

S. C. Amb. 73. Post 215.
The bankrupt, in 1746, purchased the office of the under marshal of the city of London for 900*l.* a salary annexed to it of 60*l.* payable half yearly, and a freedom of the city, worth annually 25*l.* *Richardson's* effects not amounting to 5*s.* in the pound, his assignees applied to the lord mayor and court of aldermen, for liberty to sell the bankrupt's office; but he being present in court, and refusing to consent, they declared that they could not alienate it without his consent. The present application, that this office may be forthwith sold, and that the lord mayor, &c. may be indemnified in accepting such alienation, on the assignees paying the usual alienation fine. The Chancellor of opinion, that assignees might sell this office of under marshal, and that it is not within the statute of *Edw. 6.* as it does not concern the administration of justice.

[*211] To the office is annexed not only a yearly salary of 60*l.* payable half yearly out of the chamber of the city, but also a freedom of the said city every year, worth 25*l.* and considerable perquisites besides.

On the 22d of *April 1749*, a commission of bankruptcy issued against him; there is not sufficient to pay 5*s.* in the pound from the effects in the hands of the assignees, and therefore they applied to the lord Mayor and court of aldermen, for liberty for them to sell the bankrupt's office, but he being present in that court, and asked if he would consent to such sale absolutely refused to do it, whereupon the court of aldermen declared, that they could not alienate it without the bankrupt's consent.

The petitioners apprehending the interest of the said office vested in them, and that as he might have sold on the usual alienation fine, insist they, as standing in his place, have a right to sell the same for the benefit of the creditors, without the bankrupt's consent, and therefore pray, that the office of under marshal may be forthwith sold for the benefit of his creditors, and that the lord Mayor and court of aldermen may be indemnified in accepting of such alienation on the petitioners paying into the chamber of the city of London the usual alienation fine.

At the time of *Richardson's* admission, it is expressed in the appointment, that he shall have, hold, exercise, and enjoy the said office with all fees thereunto belonging, so long as he shall well and honestly use and behave himself therein.

The business of the under marshal is, for himself and his men diligently to attend the streets, and carry all such vagrant persons as they shall find within the city and liberties to
Bridewell.

dwell, or otherwise to give punishment to them according to

Ex parte
BUTLER.

He is likewise to see that the scavengers in every ward cause streets and lanes to be duly swept and paved, and that the rers of the wards carry away the soil.

It is also required of him, that he should ride or go abroad in night time, twice in every week at least, to see the watches kept.

There are other duties belonging to his office of the like kind, the before-mentioned are the most material.

The principal question is, Whether the place of under marshal office that concerns the administration of justice, and whether by the statute of the 5 & 6 Ed. 6. c. 16. it is or is not law to sell such an office.

It be an office which falls within the description of the above, then the counsel for the bankrupt insisted it cannot be, because by the statute "*If an officer concerning the administration of justice, or king's treasure, castles, &c. sell, or take any promise or assurance, to have any money or profit for any office, deputation, he shall forfeit his office, and the contract shall be void, and the buyer or promiser, &c. shall be disabled to hold the said office.*"

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He counsel for the bankrupt likewise cited the case of *Will. Lowfield*, who in 1722, in consideration of the sum of 400*l.* by the lord mayor and court of aldermen of the city of London, was appointed to the office of a serjeant at mace, to hold quamdiu se bene mereret. The duty of his office is to execute the writs and processes issued to the sheriffs of London, and no salary but what he gets by execution of such process. William Lowfield became a bankrupt, assignees petitioned Lord Chancellor King to have his place sold for the benefit of his creditors, and on the 10th of April, 1733, the report of the petition came on, when his Lordship was pleased to declare, that the place was not saleable, as it concerned the execution of justice, and therefore dismissed the assignees' petition.

The office of serjeant at mace is unsaleable, as it concerns the execution of justice: The same as to a sworn clerk of the six clerk's office.

The place of Mr. *Bristow* one of the sworn clerks of the six clerk's office, who was discharged from his imprisonment by a late act for the relief of insolvent debtors, was held not saleable.

V. B. It appeared by the affidavits which were read in support of the petition, that 150*l.* only of the creditor's money had been laid out by the bankrupt in the purchase of the said office.

Lord Chancellor: This is a matter of very great consequence, when a man is likely to become bankrupt, he may sell all his stock in trade and effects, and invest the produce in one of the saleable offices, and in that manner cheat his creditors.

There are two questions which naturally arise.

1. Whether this office is of such a nature, that the creditor can lay hold of the salary belonging to it?

2. Whether the creditors are bound to wait for these profits till they accrue, or may sell them by anticipation?

*Ex parte
Butler.*

The office of
under marshal is
clearly within
the description
of the 34 & 35
Hen. 8. c. 4.
and 13 Eliz.
c. 7.

[213]

I am of opinion, that this is clearly an office within
ing of the 34 & 35 Hen. 8. c. 4. and 13 Eliz. c. 7.

The words of the preamble to the first act are, “
vers and sundry persons, craftily obtaining into t
“ great substance of other men’s goods, do suddenly fi
“ unknown, or keep their houses, not minding to pay
“ to any their creditors, their debts and duties, but at
“ wills, and consume the substance obtained by credi
“ men, for their own pleasure and delicate living,
“ reason, equity and good conscience.” Be it the
acted, *That the Lord Chancellor of England, or Keeper o
Seal, the Lord Treasurer, the Lord President, Lord Pri
other of the King’s most honourable Privy Council, the Ch
of either Bench, for the time being, or three of them c
upon every complaint made to them in writing, by
grieved, shall have power and authority by virtue of this
by their discretions, such orders and directions as well r
dies of such offenders, as with their lands, tenements, fees
and offices, which they have in fee simple, fee tail, te
term of years, or in the right of their wives, as much a
est, right and title of the said offenders shall extend to b
then lawfully be departed with, and to cause the said land
offices to be appraised and sold, for satisfaction and payment
creditors.*

The statute of the 13 Eliz. begins with a recital of t
act. Forasmuch as notwithstanding the statute made ag
rupts in the 24th year of the reign of our sovereign
Henry VIII. these kind of persons have, and do still in
great and excessive number, and are like more to do, if some
vision be not made for the repression of them; Be it enacted
Lord Chancellor or the Lord Keeper for the time being,
complaint made to him in writing, against such person being
as is before defined, shall have full power, by commission
great seal, to appoint discreet persons who shall take by their
such order, &c. with the body of such person, &c. and al
lands, &c. and cause the said lands, offices, &c. to be apprais
This is an explanation of the former act, and chang
isdiction by vesting it in the Lord Chancellor or Lor
only, the consideration of the former act is taken up,
it were, incorporated into this; the most remarkabl
cause the said lands and offices, &c. to be appraised and
notwithstanding Stone and Billinghamst in their reading
acts say, that only offices of inheritance are within the
of these words, yet I am of opinion this construction is
to the express words of the acts, for terms of years rela
ly to offices, not in lands only, but all other offices.

An office quam-
diu se bene ges-
serit, is an office
for life.

Is this an office for life? It certainly is, for an off
diu se bene gesserit, has always been held to be an office
and as they express it in the Scotch law, it is what a per
out per vitam aut culpam.

It has been admitted at the bar, that if the bankru
not obtain his certificate, that the moment he receives
sit, from his office, it vests in his assignees.

But it is not therefore to be taken for granted, that every thing which does not immediately vest in the assignees, is not able to the creditors under a commission of bankruptcy.

*Ex parte
BUTLER.*

I will put you a case, in which I should not scruple to consider a bankrupt as a trustee for creditors.

Suppose a tradesman is under a will made executor and residuary legatee, and before his bankruptcy collects in enough of the testator's effects, to pay debts, and particular legacies, and the remainder of the assets stood out in mortgages: the assignees could not in law be intitled to get it in, because the bankrupt has in *auter droit* as executor, and yet, if he refused, I should certainly be of opinion the assignees under the commission, notwithstanding the legal interest is not vested in them, *might by the aid of this court get in this part of the assets in the name of the executor, and would direct accordingly.

Where a bankrupt is an executor and residuary legatee, and has paid the debts, and particular legacies out of part of the assets, if he refuses to collect in the rest notwithstanding the assignees have not the legal interest

and in them, the court would assist them to get in the remainder in the name of the executor.

I think clearly therefore, that the assignees may in this case by participation sell the office of the under marshal of the city of London, and that it is not within the statute of *Edw. 6.* which concerns the execution of justice, and for this reason not like *Wifield's* case that did plainly concern the execution of justice, and if it had come before me, I should certainly have made the same order, as Lord Chancellor *King* did, that the petition should be dismissed.

[*214]

The office of under marshal does not concern the execution of justice, but only the police of the city of London, and there have been laid before me several instances of acts of common council for the sale of this office.

Another objection has been started by reason of the words of the act, which restrain it to such a property as *a bankrupt may part withal*, because this must be done by the leave and intervention of the lord mayor and court of aldermen.

This is only a medium, though to be sure, I have no authority to make an order on the lord mayor and court of aldermen, compelling them to accept of a sale.

But what I shall direct here, is like the common case of renewals of leases: I cannot make deans and chapters, &c. grant leases, and yet such orders are every day's experience, and the same likewise with regard to lords of manors in copyhold cases.

His Lordship directed, that the assignees of *Edward Richard* should agree with a person to sell this office, and then propose such person to the lord mayor and court of aldermen, as a purchaser, and if they approved of such purchaser, the bankrupt is to attend the lord mayor and court of aldermen, and to surrender his office to them, to the end the purchaser might be admitted thereto; and the money arising from the sale of the office, is to be applied for the benefit of the creditors; and if the bankrupt refused to comply with this order, his Lordship decreed he would commit him to the Fleet till he thought proper to comply.

Ex parte
BUTLER.
If an officer of
the army should
become bank-
rupt, the court
would lay their hands upon his pay, for the benefit of his creditors.

N. B. Lord Chancellor, in arguing this case, said, if an officer in the army should become a bankrupt, I have no doubt but he had a power to lay his hands upon his pay for the benefit of his creditors (1).

(1) *Contra Cathcart v. Blackwood*, *lum*, 3 *Durn. & East*. 681.
1 *Coke's B. Laws*, 358. *Flarty v. Od-* *v. Montrose*, 4 *Durn. & East*,

December the
22d, 1749. this
matter came on
again.

Ex parte Butler and Purnell, the Assignees of *Edward*
a Bankrupt.

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Cafe 118.
S. C. ante 210.

The bankrupt
being under
marshal of the
city of London,
and refusing to
surrender, the
assignees obtain-
ed an order for
disposing of the
office, *B.* agrees
with assignees
for the purchase
of the office at
850*l.* and on the
17th of October
last was present-
ed to the court of
lord mayor, &c.
who approved of
him, and were
ready to take the
bankrupt's sur-
render, but he
refusing, was
ordered to be
committed for
his contempt,
and hath a bond
ever since.
The present
petition that
Lord Chancellor
would order the
court of lord
mayor, &c. to
admit *B.* in the
room of *Richard-*
son. His Lord-
ship said, he
could not make
an order upon
the lord mayor,
&c. to admit *B.*
as it was intirely
discretionary in
them, but recommended to the lord mayor, &c. upon the bankrupt's non-
compliance, by which his office was forfeited, to dismiss him, and admit *B.*

AT the time of issuing of the commission, *Richard-*
son been before stated, was possessed of the office
marshal of the city of London, and had refused to sur-
render to let the assignees dispose of it, for the benefit of his creditors.

By an order of the 3d of August last, the assignees were
at liberty to treat for disposing of the office, and after
agreed with any person, were to propose him to the
court of aldermen for their approbation, and if ap-
proved of him, the bankrupt was ordered to attend to
surrender the said office to the lord mayor and coun-
cilmen, to the end that such person might be admitted
to the office in the usual manner.

Mr. *Buck* accordingly agreed with the assignees for
purchase of the office, at the price of 850*l.* and on the 17th
of October last was presented to the court of lord mayor and
aldermen, who approved of him, and were ready to take the
bankrupt's surrender, but he refusing to do it, upon an applica-
tion to the Lord Chancellor, he ordered *Richardson* to be committed for
contempt, and a warrant issued accordingly, but he there-
upon absconded, and hath kept out of the way ever since.

It was therefore prayed by the present petition, that
the court would make an order on the court of lord mayor and
aldermen to admit Mr. *Buck*, in the room of *Richardson*, to
the office.

The court of lord mayor and aldermen did not think
justified in admitting *Buck*, without an actual surrender of
the bankrupt, and therefore the principal end of this applica-
tion was frustrated, that they might be safe in doing it, and to supply the
defect of the surrender.

It appeared that a constant personal attendance was
required in this office, and that by the rules and customs of the
court of lord mayor and aldermen, the person who neglects or
gives such attendance, may be totally dismissed, and the
consequence thereof, the court may admit any person they
shall think proper.

It was recommended to the lord mayor, &c. upon the bankrupt's non-
compliance, by which his office was forfeited, to dismiss him, and admit *B.*

Where the legal
interest of a
copyhold is in
one, and the
equitable in another,

Lord Chancellor said, he was in doubt what directions
to give, for he was of opinion, that he could not make

an order upon the lord mayor, &c. to admit *B.* as it was intirely
discretionary in them, but recommended to the lord mayor, &c. upon the bankrupt's non-
compliance, by which his office was forfeited, to dismiss him, and admit *B.*

pon the lord mayor and aldermen to admit Mr. *Buck*, as it is intirely discretionary in them who they would admit, and as he could not supply the want of a surrender here, as in the common case of a copyhold, where perhaps the legal interest might be in one person, and the equitable interest in another, which means the court can order the trustee who had the legal interest to surrender, though *cestuique trust* refuses, but here the legal and equitable interest are both in *Richardson*.

But to the end justice might be done to the creditors, he recommended it to the lord mayor and aldermen, upon *Richardson's* non-attendance by which his office was forfeited and vacated, to dismiss him, and to admit *Buck* in his room, upon payment of the ol. and the alienation fine to the chamber of *London*.

*Ex parte
MUTUAL.*

g) *What shall or shall not be said to be a Bankrupt's Estate.*

rown, Assignee of *Roger Williams* a Bankrupt, v. *Heathcote* and *Martyn*.

October the 27th,
1746.

ide under the Division, The Construction of the Statute of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. with respect to Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Assignment.

Ex parte Richard Flyn and Richard Field Merchants.

December the
23d, 1748.

Vide under the same Division.

(Hh) *Where there is a Trust for a Bankrupt's Wife.*

Ex parte Elizabeth Greenaway.

December the
23d, 1740.

Vide under the Division, Contingent Debts.

Ex parte Groome.

October the 20th,
1744.

Vide under the same Division.

Walker and others v. *Burrows*.

[127]
November the
6th, 1745.

ide under the Division, Where Assignees are liable to the same Equity with the Bankrupt.

Grey v. *Kentish*.

July the 31st,
1749.

ide title Boren and Feme, under the Division, Rule as to a Possibility of the Wife.

Bankrupt.

Ex parte Elizabeth Michell.

under the Division, Contingent Debts.

under the Division, trading to make a Man a Bankrupt.

Higmore v. Milloy.

under the Division, Who are liable to Bankruptcy.

Ex parte Carington.

Vide under the same Division.

Ex parte Meymot.

under the Division, What is or is not an act of Bankruptcy.

and Gibbons, Assignees of Alexander } Plaintiffs.
Wilson, a Bankrupt. ———

and Taylor, and Wilson, ——— Defendants.

under the Division, Rule as to Drawers and Indorsors of Bills, &c.

Ex parte Wilson, and Ex parte Bradshaw.

LORD Chancellor: The clause in 5 Geo. 2. relating to dealers as bankers, &c. took its rise from that part of the 1733 Act. relating to *Scriveners*, who were more numerous than in latter days; for bankers have taken upon them to act as *Scriveners*, and therefore made it necessary for the legislature to add *Bankers*, as being liable to commissions of bankruptcy.

Mr. *Wilson* being an agent to 26 regiments, will not make him a bankrupt, nor will it exempt him from being one.

It is said, he could be no banker because he kept no shop.

A *Scrivener* does not keep an open shop, and yet as he receives money belonging to other people, and places it out on securities, which is the business of a *Scrivener*, he may be a bankrupt.

So may a person acting as banker, though not keeping an open shop.

His keeping his cash with *Drummond*, and paying, from 1739 to 1751, 30,000 l. a month, in all three millions, is insisted to be very strong, if not conclusive evidence, that he was no banker himself.

nconceivable that he could lodge such sums in another hands, and have no profit or allowance.

great point is, That here is a doubt upon the evidence, ie weight of evidence had been against the commission, court will not supersede it, because a commission of banks as much *ex debito justitie* as a writ, (1) and I know no where this court have superseded a commission, without an issue, unless it appears very plainly to be taken out ntly, or vexatiously.

Chancellor directed the issue to be tried in the court of bench in *Middlesex*.

Ex parte
Wilson.

A commission of bankruptcy is as much *ex debito justitie* as a writ, and no instance where the court supersedes it, without directing an issue, unless it appears to be taken out fraudulently or vexatiously.

Backwell's Case, 2 *Ch. Ca.* 191. 1 *Vern.* 152. S. C.

) Rule as to *Acts of Parliament relating to Bankrupts.*

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Ex parte Burchell.

April the 2d,
1743.

r the Division, The Construction of the Repealing Clause of the tenth of Queen Ann.

Ex parte Lingood.

May the 12th,
1742.

r the Division, Rule as to a Certificate from Commissioners to a Judge.

Walker and others v. Burrows.

November the
6th, 1745.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

What is or is not an Election to abide under a Commission.

Ex parte Capot.

April the 4th,
1739.

FER a commission of bankruptcy issued, and two dividends made in consequence, one of the assignees brought against the bankrupt, and laid him in execution for ue of the debt, and upon application to the Lord Chan-ree questions were made by his Lordship.

Case 120.
An assignee upon refunding what he had received under two dividends, allowed to make his elec-

tion, to proceed at law against the bankrupt.

If the creditor was intitled to pursue the person of the, and yet receive a proportionable benefit under the on, which he said he thought was by no means to be

The old laws considered bankrupts as fraudulent insolvents, but the more modern, as un-

ne, and upon these statutes have the applications been made, to compel creditors who pro-able way, to make their election.

done,

Ex parte
CAROT.

done, as the law of bankrupts now stands: The old laws considered bankrupts as fraudulent insolvents, and they are often called offenders, (1) but the more modern laws have considered them as unfortunate insolvents, and upon these statutes, these applications have been made to the court, which has obliged creditors who were proceeding in the double way, to make their election.

The next question was, If he was now at liberty to make his election, or whether he had not made his election by taking the dividends.

But upon refunding what he had received as dividends, his Lordship gave him leave to make his election.

The third question was, If he upon refunding, and electing to proceed against the person, should have liberty to come in under the commission and prove his debt, so as to dissent from, or assent to his certificate (2).

The reason why such creditor who elects to proceed at law, shall still be allowed to assent or dissent to the bankrupt's certificate, is to make the remedy against the person effectual.

Lord Chancellor said, several such orders were made by Lord Talbot, and accordingly such order was made in the present case, and he said the reason of the court for such order was, to make the remedy against the person effectual; for otherwise the person may, by the rest of the creditors, be absolutely discharged from the remedy which this creditor has elected to take.

(1) *Ante* *Bremley v. Goodere*, 77.

(2) See the next cases, *Ex parte* *Lind-*

sey, & *Ex parte* *Dervilliers*, *Ex parte* *Ward*, ante 153.

December the
23d, 1745.

Ex parte *Ward*.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to a Petitioning Creditor.

October the 26th,
1745.

Ex parte *Lindsey the Bankrupt*.

Case 121.

See the preceding Case.

Notwithstanding a creditor under a commission of bankrupt elects to proceed at law, he may still assent or dissent to the certificate.

A Petition to be discharged from a commitment at the suit of one *Henkle*, who has proved a debt under the commission.

Lord Chancellor: The creditor must either waive his proof under the commission, or make his election to proceed under it, but notwithstanding he elects to proceed at law, he may still assent or dissent to the certificate.

It not being clear, whether the debt under the commission is the same for which the action was brought, his Lordship adjourned the petition for want of the proceedings under the commission which were mislaid.

August the 7th,
1746.

Ex parte *Lewes*.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to a Petitioning Creditor.

Ex parte Dorvilliers.

August the 7th,
1751.

AN application by the petitioner the bankrupt, praying that *Moses Moravia*, who has brought an action against him, and also proved a debt of 800*l.* and upwards under the commission, may make his election to continue under the commission, or proceed at law.

Cafe 122.

See the two preceding cases.

Moravia alone, being the majority in value of the creditors, chose himself assignee.

Lord Chancellor was doubtful whether the circumstance of his choosing himself is not making an election to proceed under the commission; but on his electing in court to proceed at law, his Lordship made an order that *Moravia* should be discharged as a creditor under the commission, but still allowed to assent or dissent to the bankrupt's certificate.

Though a person chooses himself assignee, he may elect to proceed at law, or under the commission.

(Mm) *Rule as to Prosecutions against Bankrupts for Felony in not surrendering himself.*

Ex parte Drake
2 D. Chetty. 91

Ex parte Wood; in the Matter of *Comerlan* a Bankrupt.

August the 7th,
1751.

AN application to the court that the commissioners should admit him a creditor for 21*l.* upon a note of hand under this commission, and that the clerk of the commission may be ordered to attend at the *Old Bailey* with the proceedings under the commission, upon a prosecution, against the bankrupt for felony, in not surrendering himself according to the directions of the act of parliament of the 5th of *George* the Second.

Cafe 123.

The petitioner applies for an order upon the commissioners to admit him a creditor for 21*l.* upon note, and that the clerk of the commission may be ordered

to attend at the *Old Bailey*, with the proceedings upon a prosecution against the bankrupt for felony, in not surrendering himself according to the directions of the act of parliament. As the petitioner has not yet proved his debt, if not made out to the satisfaction of the commissioners, it may be rejected; and though such a prosecution may be carried on by a person who is not a creditor, yet, by the words of the act of parliament, it looks as if the legislature intended there should be a concurrence of the creditors under the commission; and as this is a penal law, a court of equity will not lend its aid to such a prosecution, by ordering the clerk to attend with the proceedings at the *Old Bailey*, and therefore would not grant the petition.

The bankrupt is a foreigner, but lived several years in *England*, and went to *Holland* before the commission was taken out, and stayed there till the forty-two days were expired for his surrendering himself, and about six weeks after the time expired returned to *England*.

Lord Chancellor: Though such a prosecution may be carried on by a person who is not a creditor, yet by the words of the act of parliament it looks as if the legislature intended there should be a concurrence of the creditors under the commission.

In the present case the petitioner has not as yet proved any debt, and when he goes before the commissioners, if he does

not

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Wood.

not make it out to the satisfaction of the commissioners, he must be rejected (1).

Affidavits have been read of the assignees and creditors whose debts amounted to 1800*l.* and upwards, that they are very well satisfied with the account he has given them of the state of his affairs, and that they believe he could not have made a fuller discovery or disclosure of his estate and effects, if he had appeared at the third sitting of the commissioners at *Guild hall*, which is the time appointed for the bankrupt's finishing his examination.

This is a penal law, and a severe one, for it reaches to the life of the bankrupt, and therefore a court of equity will not lend its aid to such a prosecution, by ordering the clerk of the commission to attend at the *Old Bailey* with the proceeding under the commission, but the petitioner must go on in such manner as the law prescribes to prove him a bankrupt, and a felon within the intent and meaning of the act of parliament and therefore would not grant that part of the petition, which relates to this intended prosecution of *Comerlan* the bankrupt.

Where a bankrupt did not surrender himself in due time, if there did not appear to be any intention of defrauding his creditors, Lord *Macclesfield*, in several instances, superded the commission, in order to prevent such a prosecution.

Lord *Macclesfield* did in more instances than one superded the commission of bankruptcy, where the bankrupt had not surrendered himself within the 42 days, if there did not appear to be any intention in the bankrupt of defrauding his creditors by not appearing within the time appointed, and where his absence proceeded rather from an ignorance of the consequence or accident; and his Lordship took this method to prevent a prosecution.

But there is no occasion to do any thing of that sort here, as it is not probable the petitioner will be able, upon the circumstances of this case, to support such a prosecution (2).

(1) *Ex parte Simpson*, ante 71.

Rep. 47. *Ex parte Graham*, *ibid.* 48.

(2) See *Ex parte White*, 2 *Bra. Cha.*

(Nn) Rule as to Contingent Creditors in respect to Dividends.

October the 20th,
1744.

Ex parte Groom.

Vide under the Division, Contingent Debts.

December the
23d, 1751.

Ex parte Elizabeth Michell.

Vide under the same Division.

(Oo) Rule as to mutual Debts and Credits.

January the 22d, 1741, and March the 31st, 1742.

parte Henry Lanoy Hunter, Esq. In the matter of *James Hunter and Loth Specht*, Bankrupts.

Case 124.

IR. *James Hunter* and Mr. *Loth Specht* were partners in trade, and the terms of the articles were, that the stock should consist of 4500*l.* and that this sum of money should be in by *Hunter* only, and that he should be intitled to two-thirds of the profit of the trade, and *Specht* to the remaining third; but as to the principal sum of 4500*l.* the articles provided that it should belong wholly to *Hunter*. Under these restrictions the partners entered upon trade, and more money was wanted to carry it on, *James Hunter* applied to his brother Mr. *Lanoy Hunter*, the petitioner, who in the year 1733 advanced him, at three different times, upon his note of hand, sum of 1500*l.* at 4 per cent. and afterwards gave a bond for money, in which he was singly bound; for Mr. *Specht* was then privy to any part of the transaction, but agreed afterwards that *James Hunter* should, in his own name, lend this to the partnership; and in the book intituled, *The private account of cash*, the partnership stock is made debtor to Mr. *James Hunter* for the 1500*l.* and interest for the loan of this money, at the rate of 4 per cent. to be allowed him out of the produce of the partnership trade.

A. lends a sum of money to one partner on his own security, he lends the same to the partnership trade, a joint commission is taken out. *A.* shall not come in as a creditor upon the joint estate of the bankrupts immediately and directly, with the rest of the partnership creditors, but by way of circuitry he is intitled, as standing in the place of that partner who has paid the money to the use of the partnership trade.

Mr. *James Hunter* having in his possession for safe custody twenty-five *South-sea* bonds, and eight *East-India* bonds, which were the petitioner's property, did, without his knowledge, upon the security of the several bonds, borrow of the bank of England in November 1735, 3000*l.* and afterwards lent that money too at the like interest to the partnership trade, and made an entry in the same manner with the former made in the private book.

Mr. *James Hunter* and Mr. *Specht* having become bankrupts July last, a joint commission of bankruptcy issued against them as partners, and they were declared bankrupts, and *Sad Nicholas* chosen assignee.

The petitioner applied to the commissioners to be admitted creditor for the two sums of 1500*l.* and 3000*l.* on the bankrupt's joint estate, who refused to admit him to prove the same; and therefore prays that his Lordship would order that the petitioner should be admitted a creditor upon the joint estate for the several demands; and in case the court should think fit to admit the petitioner a creditor for the several debts under the partnership estate, that then he might be admitted a creditor for the same, upon the respective separate estates of *James Hunter*.

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HUNTER.

To intitle the petitioner to come upon the joint estate, it is suggested that though the money was borrowed by one of the partners, and security given by him only, yet, as it came to the partnership, that he ought to be admitted to come in as a creditor upon the partnership.

Lord Chancellor: My opinion is, that the petition ought to be dismissed, but without prejudice to the petitioner's bringing a bill, if he should think proper, to have the benefit of the same matter which he now insists on.

It has been contended on the part of the petition, that the money in question was jointly lent to the partners; but this is expressly contradicted by their own affidavits, for they admit particularly the 1500*l.* to be lent to *James Hunter* with an intention that he should apply the same for the benefit of the partnership; the consequence of this is, that here are plainly two contracts, one as between *Henry Lanoy Hunter* and *James Hunter*, the other as between *James* and his partner.

As this is the case, there is no ground for the petition coming in as an immediate creditor for this money upon the partnership estate; but then it has been said that by a circuit the petitioner may have the same kind of relief; for if the money which was advanced by *Henry* to *James* was lent to *James* to the partnership estate, then, as *James* might come in as a creditor for this sum upon that estate, the petitioner will be intitled to stand in the place of *James*, and have the same remedy as he would have had.

But I do not know any determination of the court which has gone so far in a case of this nature. *Mr. Murray* has taken this matter in another way; he says that there is no objection for the petitioner to make use of a circuit in this case, that he ought to be let in originally upon the partnership estate, because *Specht* had no interest in the capital, for by the articles, if *James* should happen to die during the life of *Specht*, the whole principal of the 4500*l.* was to go to the executor of *James*.

But it would be going too far to say, that any secret agreement which partners enter into between themselves, can hinder those that immediately trust the partnership estate from having their complete satisfaction out of it.

The only method therefore wherein the petitioner can have his satisfaction out of the partnership estate, is by way of circuit by standing in the place of *James*.

Consider what great inconveniences would follow, in this doctrine should prevail. In the first place, those that plainly creditors upon the partnership estate, must be at liberty to controvert whether the fact is as stated by the articles, that the whole 4500*l.* was brought into the partnership estate by *Hunter* only; in the next place, supposing this was the case, yet, in respect of strangers, the money must be considered as brought into the partnership estate by both (1).

(1) See *Craven v. Widderis*, 2 Ch. Ca. 139.

For these reasons his Lordship said he would not determine his matter in favour of Mr. *Henry Lanoy Hunter*, upon a petition, but would have him to bring a bill for this purpose, if he should be so advised.

Ex parte Hunter.

Upon which the Attorney General, who was counsel for the petitioner, said, that in *Lavington v. Paul*, before Lord Talbot, the best of his remembrance it was determined that in cases of this nature the party might be allowed to have his satisfaction out of the partnership estate. The petition upon this was ordered to stand over to search for precedents.

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Upon the 31st of March, 1742, the petition came on again.

Mr. Attorney General, who was counsel for the petitioner, considered him as standing in the place of the bankrupt, and as he partnership was increased by the money lent by Mr. *James Hunter*, he saw no reason why one partner might not be a debtor to another, and in support of this argument he cited a case, *ex parte Drake*, December the 20th, 1735, before Lord Talbot, where there were two partners, and one had taken out more money from the partnership stock than his share amounted to, and therefore became a debtor for so much; and my Lord Talbot was of opinion, that the partnership creditor had a right to come upon the separate estate of the partner who was so indebted (1).

Where one partner takes out more money from the partnership stock than his share amounted to, the other has a right to come upon the separate estate of that partner *pro tanto*.

Mr. Murray cited a case *ex parte Gilbert Brown*, the 4th of March, 1725. There two partners agreed to borrow a sum of money for the use of the partnership, but one of them only gave a bond for securing the payment, and the other was a witness to it; this money was afterwards entered in the cash book of the partnership, a joint commission taken out against them, and the obligee denied by the commissioners to be admitted a creditor; but Lord King on his petition was of opinion that he ought to be admitted, and directed accordingly.

Two partners agree to borrow a sum of money, but one only gives a bond, and the other only a witness to it, the money afterwards entered in the cash book of the partnership, a joint commission taken out, obligee is intitled to be admitted a creditor.

So in the present case, the partnership being in want of money, one of the partners borrows it, and gives a separate bond for it, but still the money came to the use of the partnership; then the question will be, whether the obligee shall be limited to come in as a creditor upon the joint commission? but suppose your Lordship should be of opinion that the obligee should not come in upon the joint estate, I would submit it to you that he can clearly come in as a creditor upon the separate estate of *James Hunter*, for if there had been no bankruptcy the partners could not have made a dividend of the joint stock, till his money, which *James Hunter* lent to the partnership, had been first taken out of it.

Joint creditors have no right to any thing but what is properly the joint estate, and if this money had not been lent, the partnership fund would have been 4500*l.* less than it is now; and it would be an extreme hard case, where there has been such a large increase of the fund by the means of a third person, that he should not be allowed to come in as a creditor. The rules established in this court in relation to bankruptcies are not founded upon the acts of parliament, merely, but upon equitable

(1) *Vide Ex parte Baisson*, Vesf. Jun. 226. 2 Cha. Ca. 139. *Croome v. Knight*, 2 Cha. Rep.

Ex parte
HUNTER.

constructions; and to lay it down for a rule, that nothing intitle a person to come in as a creditor upon the joint estate where partners are jointly bound, notwithstanding the has been applied to the use of the partnership, is not equitable one.

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Mr. Brown e contra.

There is no foundation for the petitioner to be admitted on the partnership account, as this is a dispute between sets of contending creditors.

No doubt but payment of money may raise a consideration and make it a debt, and so *vice versa* it may not raise a consideration; but it is pretended that at that time this money advanced, Mr. Henry Lanoy Hunter knew the partnership was liable to answer it to him; it appears from his own evidence he lent it merely upon the credit of his brother Mr. James Hunter, and if it should extend further, it would be attended with great inconveniences.

The open and publick books do not mention it as a loan, it is only a private cash account, which they might have set up if they pleased, as it was intended for their private use only. Creditors would never be safe, if near relations of bankruptcy in this case, may set up a demand or not against the partnership, just as the event turns out, viz. whether the separate estate or the joint estate of the obligees will answer best. Mr. Lanoy Hunter, who lent this money, have brought an action against Mr. Specht the other partner? I apprehend clear could not.

The next consideration is, whether the petitioner has a right to stand in the place of James Hunter, and by that to be intitled to recover this money before the joint estate is divided?

I will not dispute the petitioner's right, if the bankrupt has any, and therefore consider it merely as the bankrupt's case supposing there were no separate creditors, then the fund in the first place must go to satisfy the partnership creditors; and the bankrupt, if there is any surplus, is intitled to that only.

Lord Chancellor: 1st, question, Whether the petitioner is intitled to come in as a creditor, upon the joint estate of the bankrupts immediately, and directly with the rest of the partnership creditors?

2d, question. Supposing he is not immediately and directly intitled, whether he is not intitled to come in by a circuituity, as this court allows, as standing in the place of James Hunter, has paid the money to the use of the partnership trade?

The first question ought to be considered in the first place, cause if the petitioner is immediately intitled, then there is no occasion to have recourse to the circuituity.

But I am of opinion that he is not immediately and directly intitled, and the evidence upon his own affidavits rather against him, for a man must be a creditor by force of some contract, either express or implied: as where goods are delivered though no express contract, the law implies one, and an

will lie; but according to the account Mr. *Specht*, the other partner, gives of this transaction, Mr. *Lanoy Hunter* had neither an express nor implied contract with the partnership.

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HUNTER.*

Mr. *Specht* agreeing that *James Hunter* should, in his own name, lend this money to the partnership, explains in what manner *Specht* meant to borrow money for the use of the partnership, and does by no means prove that he intended the partnership fund should be a security to the petitioner.

It is very true there might have been a loan to the partnership, notwithstanding the notes were given by one of them only, and the contract had been originally between the petitioner and the partners, though the bond is executed by one only, yet would be considered as a collateral security, and both of them would have been liable notwithstanding.

Upon the whole of the question *James Hunter* only appears to have lent the 1500*l.* to the partnership, and the petitioner does not seem so much as to have it in his thoughts.

As to the 3000*l.* borrowed of the bank upon the security of *South-sea* stock, and *East-India* bonds, which were the property of the petitioner; Mr. *James Hunter*, by a misapplication and abuse of his trust, has procured this money, and lent it on the same terms, and in the same manner, as he did the 1500*l.* to the partnership trade, as appears by the private cash account.

Now in that book, *James Hunter* is made debtor on one side, and *per contra* creditor, and therefore I cannot call it the account of any other person.

So that upon the first point, I am clearly of opinion, that the petitioner cannot be directly and immediately intitled.

As to the second question, his coming in by way of circuitry, upon formerly I was very doubtful, but now I am of opinion, that Mr. *Henry Lanoy Hunter* is this way intitled.

The principal obscurity in this case has arisen from his counsel insisting, that the petitioner ought to stand in the place of *James Hunter*, who is one of the bankrupts; for by this means they have confined it merely to the several lights in which he stands.

Now it is certain, *James Hunter* himself can have no satisfaction but out of the surplus which shall remain after the joint creditors are paid; but as between different sorts of creditors, it is otherwise.

The truth of the thing is this, *Henry Lanoy Hunter* being a separate creditor to *James Hunter*, is intitled to have his satisfaction out of every thing which can be considered as the separate estate of *James*, and therefore the rules which the court go by, with regard to the distribution of bankrupts' effects, will be a material consideration in this case.

Joint creditors, where there are no separate, may exhaust the joint and separate estate, till their debts are paid, and the bankrupt will not be intitled to a shilling till the joint creditors are paid.

Joint creditors, where there are no separate, may exhaust both the joint and separate estate, and be applied to the separate estate.

But where there are both joint and separate creditors, the joint estate shall be applied to the satisfaction of the joint creditors, and the separate estate, to the satisfaction of the separate creditors.

Ex parte
HUNTER.

ditors are fully satisfied ; but where there are separate as well as joint creditors, tho' as I said before, in the case of the bankrupt the separate estate shall be equally applied ; yet as between joint and separate creditors it is otherwise, for the joint estate shall be applied to the satisfaction of the joint, and the separate estate to the satisfaction of the separate creditors.

Suppose a joint commission against two partners, and a separate commission likewise, and the assignees under the joint, possess themselves of any specific part, the bankrupts themselves could not take away this specific part, tho' they had a distinct and joint property in it, yet it is every day's experience, that the assignees under the separate commission may do it, upon application to this court.

Suppose these partners had never become bankrupt to the end of the partnership, and they had settled accounts, must not the demand Mr. *James Hunter* had upon the partnership be taken out, before a division could be made of it.

If there be a surplus of the separate estate, the joint creditors are intitled to it, for a bankrupt has no right to any thing till they are fully satisfied.

This shews clearly, that Mr. *James Hunter* was a creditor upon the joint stock, then it follows that the creditors of his separate estate have a right to this in the first place (1) indeed if there should be any surplus of the separate estate after this money is paid, the joint creditors will be intitled to it.

And this determination is according to the rule of the court in regard to the distribution of bankrupts' effects upon a view of the different rights of creditors.

(1) *Sed vide ex parte Burrell*, 1 Cooke's B. Laws 556. *Ex parte Pine*, *ibid*.

November 4th,
1744.

Bromely and Others, Creditors of Sir Stephen Evance, } Plaintiffs.

Goodere, surviving Assignee of Sir Stephen Evance, and Others, } Defendants

Vide under the Division, Rule as to the Certificate of a Bankrupt

October 20th,
1744.

Ex parte Groome.

Vide under the Division, Contingent Debts.

June 8th, 1748.

Ex parte Deeze.

Case 125. **M**R. *Norton Nicholls*, a merchant, borrowed of the petitioner the sum of 500 l. for which he gave a note of hand afterwards he sent the petitioner, who was a packer, six bales of cloth to pack and press ; some time after *Nicholls* paid off a part of the 500 l. and interest for the remainder, and then asked the petitioner if he would have the whole paid off, which the petitioner declined, and then the old note was delivered to the petitioner. A packer may retain goods till he is paid the price of packing, and if he has another debt due to him from the same person, the goods shall not be taken from him till he has paid the whole, notwithstanding the debtor is become a bankrupt.

and a new one given for the remainder : before the remainder was paid, - and before the six bales were taken out of the petitioner's custody, *Nicholls* became a bankrupt, and it was agreed between the petitioner, and the assignees of *Nicholls* under the commission, that it should be determined in a summary way, upon a petition to *Lord Chancellor*, whether the petitioner could retain the six bales till his whole debt was satisfied.

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Deeze.*

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N. B. There were no goods in the hands of the petitioner, when he first lent the money, nor had there been dealings between them for many years.

Hudding v. Ruse
6 *Deaz.* 376
Wright v. Fenn
5 *Brig. & C.*

It also appeared there was, at the time of the bankruptcy, 19*l.* due to *Deeze* for the packing and pressing these bales, and there was due from *Deeze* to *Nicholls* near that sum for wine.

Lord Chancellor : I am of opinion that under the circumstances of the present case, the assignees have not a right to take those goods from the petitioner, without making him a satisfaction for his whole debt.

Notwithstanding the rules of law as to bankrupts reduce all creditors to an equality, yet it is hard where a man has a debt due from a bankrupt, and has at the same time goods of a bankrupt in his hands, which cannot be got from him without the assistance of law or equity, that the assignees should take them from him without satisfying the whole debt.

And therefore the clause in the act of parliament of the 5 *Geo.* 2. relating to mutual credit, has received a very liberal construction, and there have been many cases which that clause has been extended to where an action of account would not lie, nor could this court upon a bill decree an account.

There have been many cases to which the clause in the act of parliament relating to mutual credit has been extended, where neither an action of account would lie, nor could this court decree one.

The question then will be, whether there is any specifick lien on those goods in the petitioner's hands, either by express contract, or from the nature of the dealing ; if not, whether there is any mutual credit and account.

To be sure packers may retain goods till they are paid the price and labour of packing, and so other trades may retain in the like manner, therefore these goods were in the petitioner's hands in the nature of a pledge for some part of his debt, that is, the price of the packing ; and what right has a court of equity to say, that if he has another debt due to him from the same person, that the goods shall be taken from him without having the whole paid?

In the case of *Demainbray v. Metcalfe*, before *Lord Cowper*, 1 *Vern.* 691. he said, he looked upon it as an account current between the pawner and pawnee ; the present case I think is stronger, for here the goods are undoubtedly a pledge in the petitioner's hands for part of his debt.

It is very hard to say mutual credit should be confined to pecuniary demands, and that if a man has goods in his hands, belonging to a debtor of his, which cannot be got from him

Mutual credit is not confined to pecuniary demands only, but if a man has

goods in his hands belonging to a debtor, it shall be considered as such (1).

(1) See *French v. Fenn*, 1 *Cooke's B. Laws*, 577. *Smith v. Hodgson*, 1 *Burn. and Esq* 211.

The time of payment on the bond is not yet come, and therefore the condition of it not broken, as there is no debt that can be recovered upon it till the 4th of *March* 1756.

The petitioner insists he is not to be compelled to come in as other creditors to prove the debt of 110*l.* as he pays interest now upon the bond, and in 1756 must pay the principal, but that he has a right to set off, and therefore prays the 110*l.* may be deducted out of the principal and interest of the bond, and founds this right on the clause in the 5 *Geo. 2.* relating to mutual credit.

The words of that clause are, "That where it shall appear to the commissioners, that there hath been mutual credit given by the bankrupt, and any other person, or mutual debts between the bankrupt and any other person, at any time before such person became a bankrupt, the commissioners, or the assignees of such bankrupt's estate, shall state the account between them, and one debt may be set against another; and what shall appear to be due on either side, on the balance of such account, and on setting such debts against one another, and no more, shall be claimed or paid on either side respectively."

It has been objected by the counsel against the petitioner, that this is not a case of mutual debts, because the act means debts actually due; and here one debt is due, and the other not due, and therefore they are not properly mutual debts.

Before the making of this act, if a person was a creditor, he was obliged to prove his debt under the commission, and receive perhaps a dividend only of 2*s.* 6*d.* in the pound from the bankrupt's estate, and at the same time pay the whole to the assignee of what he owed to the bankrupt; to remedy this very great inconvenience and hardship, the act was made.

It is very true, as Mr. *Clarke* says, that the 5th of *Geo. 2.* being a posterior act, must be construed with a reference to the 7th of *Geo. 1. cap. 31.* and both acts considered together.

Taking it upon this foundation, what will be the result?

Suppose for instance there had been a bond from the bankrupt to *A.* payable at a future day, and a debt owing from *A.* on simple contract to the bankrupt for a less sum, the account between *A.* and the bankrupt shall first of all be stated, and one debt set against the other, and *A.* shall be intitled to a proportionable dividend of such bankrupt's estate, *pro rata* with the other creditors, "discounting the bond payable at a future time, after the rate of 5 *per cent.* for what he shall so receive, to be computed from the actual payment thereof, to the time such debt should or would have become payable in and by such bond." These are the words at the conclusion of the clause in the statute of the 7th of *Geo. 1.* relating to creditors whose debts are payable at a future day.

Consider it then the other way, where *A.* is a debtor to the bankrupt by bond payable at a future day, and a creditor upon his estate by simple contract for a less sum, would it be just and equitable that he should be obliged to prove his debt under the

*Ex parte
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Frankley
5. Wright: N.C.
Frankley
Wright
6 Wright: N.C.*

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Bankrupt.
commission, and receive perhaps 1s. only in the pound, and yet when his bond becomes due, which in some instances might be in three months only, pay the whole debt, principal and interest, to the assignee under the commission?
This may indeed in strictness be said not to be a mutual debt, but a mutual credit?

but is it not a mutual credit?

Therefore upon the petitioner's agreeing to pay the balance of the debt to the assignees, which the act of parliament requires the commissioners to take the account of, what shall be for the benefit of the assignees, and therefore I think this case is within the equity of the 5th of Geo. 2.

232] But the bankrupt gives the bankrupt credit for the debt, on a simple contract; and therefore I think this equity of the 5th of Geo. 2.

Therefore upon the petitioner's agreeing to pay the b forthwith to the assignees, which the act of parliament re let it be referred to the commissioners to take the acco tween him and the bankrupt, and let what shall be fo from the bankrupt, at the time of the bankruptcy, be out of what shall be due on the petitioner's bond for and interest, and the balance only be paid by the pei he assignees.

the Matter of Peter Bartholom.

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he assignees.

Ex parte Dumas; in the Matter of *Peter Bartholomew*
a Bankrupt.

August the 9th, 1754

THE petitioners, who were merchants an
dealings with John Fulli
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...and undertook to make remittances of the bills were for the proper account, and he would keep a distinct account, and name at the order of the first partner's name at the amount of \$1465. 111. 11d. remitted therefor, and promise the petitioners the sum of February last. The day being accounted for \$66. 111. 11d. On the 15th of March 1790, the application was made by the son. The application was granted, and the bills of \$1465. 111. 11d. or part thereof, were paid to him. The petitioners drew several bills of exchange in order to pay the same, which they presented to the bank.

ners drew several bills of exchange on and his son, amounting to several hundred pounds, and remittances in order to pay the same. He acquainted them that they were acquainted with the particular account of the said bills, and desired them to open a new account with him, and to keep the same in the name of the said bills, and to distinguish such new bills by the initial letter of the name of the person who have the management of the said bills, and accordingly

who have
and accordingly

merchants in *London*, amounting in the whole to the sum of 146*l.* 11*s.* 11*d.*

Ex parte
Dumas.

Jullian the father and his son, in a letter to the petitioners, acknowledge the receipt of the several bills, and expressly promise to give the petitioners credit in their new account *G*.

On the 25th of *February* last *Jullian* the father died.

On the 27th of *February*, the very day the creditors of the *Jullians* met, a resolution had been taken by *Peter* the son to stop payment, and which he did accordingly. The next day he ventured to get two of these remittances discounted, one for 300*l.* and another for 266*l.* 11*s.* 11*d.* making together 566*l.* 11*s.* 11*d.*

On the 20th of *March* a commission of bankruptcy was awarded, and issued against *Peter Jullian*; and *James Godin* and *Francis Duval* of *London*, merchants, were chosen assignees.

The petitioners insist the said bills were not liable to be applied or converted by *John Jullian* and his son to any other use, or on any other account, than as the petitioners had directed and charged; that the several bills now remain in the hands of the assignees, or if the bills or any part have been applied to any other use, such proceeding was not only a gross fraud, but absolutely illegal.

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They pray therefore that the assignees may be ordered to deliver to the petitioners the several bills, amounting together to the sum of 1146*l.* 11*s.* 11*d.* and in case it shall appear, that any of the bills have been received either by the said *Jullian* and his son before the father's death, or by *Peter* the son since his father's death, or by the assignees since *Peter's* bankruptcy, that in such case the assignees may pay to the petitioners the full value of such bills.

The counsel for the petitioners insisted the bills ought to be appropriated to the particular purpose mentioned in the letter of the petitioners to the *Jullians*, and that while the bills are in being, they belong to the petitioners, and they have a specific lien upon them wherever they are; but as to those which were discounted, as money has no ear mark, they waived their claim in that respect.

The counsel for the assignees relied on the bankrupt's affidavit, in which he denied that *Dumas* and Company did acquaint him or his father, by any letter whatsoever, that these bills were intended for the proper and peculiar account of *Dumas* and Company's house at *Cadiz*, and insisted that all bills are considered as cash, and that merchants have credit for them as such, and that the usual and common course of trade and business amongst merchants is, that whenever they receive any bills from their correspondents abroad, the same are blended with their general stock, so as to answer their daily payments, and that it appears by the bankrupt's affidavit, that he and his father frequently paid several sums to the order of one correspondent in bills, or in money received for the discount of bills of other correspondents; and therefore these bills ought to be considered as the general credit of the *Jullians*, and must be brought into the general account.

Ex parte
DUMAS.

N. B. The bankrupt admitted the receipt of the severals and that the petitioners by the letter that inclosed subscribed they might be carried to a new account to be in G. and that since his father's death he did open such an account in G. and placed the same thereto accordingly.

Lord Chancellor: The present is a very plain case to give the petitioners a title to those bills which remain in specie un-
gotiated.

It has been truly said this is a question of great consequence to the trade of the city of *London*; but then it is of a greater weight in another respect, that the property of or may not be dissipated to answer the debts of other men.

The rule of equality under commissions of bankruptcy extends only to his own estate, and not to matters which are not relative to his estate in law or equity.

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Where goods consigned to a factor continue in specie, and found in his hands at the time of his bankruptcy, the principal is intitled to them, and not the creditors at large.

Where goods so consigned are sold, and the factors took notes instead of money, the principal is intitled to the notes.

The principal view I do admit under all commissions of bankrupts, to put creditors as near as may be on a level, but must be done only with regard to the bankrupt's own estate. * If the matters in question are not relative to his estate in equity, especially in equity, the court will be of opinion that persons who have either the legal interest in any thing, or in action, which is an equitable interest, shall be intitled and assignees in these cases must stand exactly in the same position with the bankrupt himself, or otherwise commission of bankruptcy would be an intolerable grievance.

Suppose the petitioners had consigned over goods to *Ju* their factor, and he had sold them, and turned them into money, the principal then could only have come in as a general creditor under the commission; but if the goods had continued in specie, and had been found in *Julian's* hands at the time of his bankruptcy, it would have been otherwise, as has been so determined in several cases; and even contrary to the express words of the statute of the 21 *Jac.* 1. factors have been excepted out of it for the sake of trade and manufactory (1).

The court of Common Pleas in a case, the name of which I do not remember, determined that notwithstanding the goods consigned were sold, yet as the factor took notes instead of money for them, that the principal was intitled to the notes, and not the creditors at large.

The letter G. appears to be the initial letter of the factor's name at the house at *Cadiz*.

These bills I consider as appropriated to a particular purpose (2), and intended to answer and reimburse the principal what they should pay on this special account, for by being so deposited they could negotiate and discount them; 580*l.* appears to be the amount of the bills left in specie.

Upon all these circumstances it would be the hardest in the world to say these bills should go to the creditors at large.

(1) *Vide* *Godfrey v. Furze*, 3 P. W. 186. *Ryall v. Rolle*, ante 174. *Mace v. Caldwell*, Cowp. 233. *Kruizer v. Wilcox*, and *Gardiner v. Coleman*, 1 Burr. 494. See *ex parte Deere*, ante 228. note.

(2) *Secus* if the bills are sent on a general account between the correspondent and merchant, *Ex parte Flourman*, Ambler 297.

re on the whole I am clearly of opinion that the spe-
amounting to 580*l.* must be delivered up by the
Fullian to the petitioners *Dumas* and Company, or
ons as they impower to receive them, and order ac-
).

Ex parte
Dumas.

Emery, 2 Ves 674. *Ex Lambert*, 1 Cooke's B. Laws, 420. *Ex*
Amb. 297. *D'Aquila v. parte Clare*, *ibid.* 422.

Ex parte Shank and Others.

August thereth,
1754

1 who had repaired a ship belonging to a bankrupt Case 123.
d he had a specifick lien on the ship for the re- A person who
was not obliged to prove it as a debt under the repairs a ship has
no specifick lien,

ed after the ship had been so repaired, the workman if delivered to
the bankrupt who employed him, and therefore the bankrupt; if
repaired in a fo-
reign port, while
out upon a voy-
age, it would
have been other-
wise.
The money arising from the sale of this ship,
mitted to be in his hands, and must come under the
for the debt due to him for repairs, and ordered ac-
).

Ship repaired
3. S. S. S.
9/4

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ip had been repaired in a foreign port, while out
age, it would have been otherwise; but being repair-
e, it falls exactly within the case of *Stevens v. Sole*,
d *Talbot*. *Vide* this case stated in the cause of *Ryall*
Jan. 27, 1749. (a) (2).



(a) Ante 161.

Justin v. Ballam, 1 Salk. 34. 636. *Farmer v. Davies*, 1 Durn. and
cter, 1 Stra. 695. *Watkin- East 108.*
dison, 2 P. Wms. 367. *Bux- (2) Lister v. Baxter*, 1 Stra. 695.
1 Vez. 154. *Watkins v. Car- Watkinson v. Barnardiston*, 2 P. W. 367.
ug. 97. *Rich v. Coe*, Cowp. *Samson v. Bragington*, 1 Vez 443.

Ockenden; in the Matter of *Robert Matthews*, a
Bankrupt.

August thereth,
1754

Shelding v. Rind
6 Bear 376

i petition came on upon the Saturday before, and
adjourned till to day for further consideration.

Case 129.

Matthews, a flour factor in 1752, employed the pe-
his miller, who had considerable dealings with *Ma-*
grinding of corn for him, on which account he was

In March last a *Shelding*
commission of
bankruptcy issa-
ed against *Ma-*
thews, at the
55.

e a bankrupt indebted to the petitioner in 286*l.* 7 s. 10*d.* for grinding of corn, and he
body 36 loads and 3 bushels of wheat belonging to the bankrupt, part ground and part
ide, a great number of sacks. 16*l.* 5*s.* was due to the petition-er for grinding the
in his hands at the time *Matthews* became a bankrupt. The wheat sold by the as-
sessment between them and petitioner, without prejudice to his claim, he now applies
this debt out of the money arising by the sale. Lord Chancellor of opinion the petition-
Mick lien upon the corn and sacks, but only *pro tanto* as is due for grinding the corn in
Rep. 653.

generally

E. parte
OCCENDER.

generally indebted to the petitioner in a large sum of money who always had in his hands corn, meal, and sacks of *Mathews* sometimes more, sometimes less, but for the most part sufficient to answer the sum due to the petitioner; and for this reason the petitioner gave *Mathews* a much greater credit than he would otherwise have done, as he always apprehended the corn, meal and sacks, which he had in his hands, to be a security for the debt due from *Mathews*.

In *March* last a commission of bankruptcy issued against *Mathews*, and being declared a bankrupt, *Stephen Wear*, and three other persons, were chosen assignees.

At the time *Mathews* became a bankrupt, he was indebted to the petitioner in 286*l.* 7*s.* 10*d.* for the grinding of corn, for which he gave two promissory notes of 100*l.* each, and which became due before the bankruptcy, and the petitioner at the same time had in his custody 36 loads and 3 bushels of wheat belonging to the bankrupt, which was sent to be ground, part whereof was then ground into flour, and the remainder was then grinding, besides a very great number of sacks, and which the petitioner depended upon having as a security for his debt.

There was likewise due to the petitioner 16*l.* 5*s.* for grinding of corn, which was in his hands at the time *Mathews* became bankrupt, making in the whole 302*l.* 12*s.* 10*d.*

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The petitioner applied to the assignees to redeem the corn &c. and pay him the 302*l.* 12*s.* 10*d.* which they refused, the corn being a perishable commodity, and an immediate necessity of selling upon that account; the petitioner had delivered all the wheat and sacks to the assignees to be sold without prejudice to his demand of his whole debt, or to the assignees' property in the goods, who have agreed, in case it shall be determined that the wheat, &c. was a security to the petitioner for his debt, to pay the whole.

Therefore the petitioner prays, that out of the money arising by the sale of the corn, &c. he may be paid his whole debt of 302*l.* 12*s.* 10*d.*

Lord Chancellor : In determining of this case, I am equally afraid of altering the consequences and effects of the course of dealings in trade, or of overturning the general rule in the course of bankruptcies.

It lies upon the petitioner to shew he has any lien upon the corn, &c. in his hands; and as to the specifick lien which he claims, I do not see there is a sufficient reason to consider it as such.

In this case no evidence has been produced of any contract that the debt which was owing to the petitioner should be a lien on the corn, &c.

Nor is there any evidence, that there is any general custom with respect to millers that it should be a lien.

There is then no specifick lien, but what arises from the kind of bailment at law, proceeding from a delivery of goods for a particular purpose, as in the case of a horse standing in the stable.

table of an inn-keeper, or cloth in the hands of a taylor, who are each of them a special property.

Ex parte
Ockenden.

Might not *Mathews* in this case before his bankruptcy have made a tender of what was due for grinding the corn, and if *fr. Ockenden* the petitioner had refused to deliver the corn, &c. could not *Mathews* have brought an action of trover for it, and that case would the defendant have been allowed to have pleaded a lien for any other debt, than what was actually due for grinding corn?

The case of *Demainday v. Metcalfe*, *Prec. in Chan.* 419. was a case in which the borrower first on the pawn of jewels, and afterwards three or four several sums borrowed, for each of which the pawner gave him a note, without taking notice of the jewels; it was determined that the executors of the borrower should not redeem the jewels, without paying the money due on the notes: there it must have been presumed the ground and foundation of the pawnee's lending the money, was his having a pledge in his hands, and there is no pretence to say, it would have been a lien, if the money had been lent before the delivery of the goods, and it therefore turned upon it's being a subsequent transaction.

Where *A.* borrows a sum of money on the pawn of jewels, and further sums afterwards upon his note: the executor of *A.* shall not redeem the jewels, without paying the money due on the notes.

The case of *Downman v. Mathews* and others, *Prec. in Chan.* 360. appears to be a transaction between a clothier and a dyer, and there was evidence that they always made up their accounts by giving mutual credit, the dyer on one hand for work done, and on the other hand, the clothier for his cloth.

The case between clothiers and dyers, and clothiers and packers are different from the present, it being always

mutual for them to make up their accounts by giving mutual credit; the dyer for work done, and the clothier for his cloth.

In the petition *ex parte Deeze* (a) the 8th of June 1748, before me there was evidence, that it is usual for packers to lend money to clothiers, and the cloths to be a pledge not only for the work done in packing, but for the loan of money likewise (1).

(a) *Ante* 228.
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Then it must come to the question upon the clause in the act of parliament relating to mutual credit; and I own I am extremely doubtful as to that.

Here is a quantity of corn delivered from time to time by a mill-man or corn-factor, to a miller the petitioner.

The law gives a particular lien *pro tanto*, as is due to the miller for grinding the corn, and no contract appears in this case to extend it further, and I must presume therefore it was not intended to be carried further.

The clause in the act of the 5 Geo. 2. relating to mutual credit, has been carried to be sure further, and rightfully, than a mere matter of account, but I do not know that a court of equity has gone further than the courts of law in the cases of a set-off (2).

Courts of equity go no further than courts of law, in the cases of a set-off, upon the act relating to mutual credit.

These cases go further indeed than cases of account; but can any case be put, where in the present instance there could have been a set-off.

(1) See 4 Burr. 2217.

(2) *Ante* 126. *Billon v. Hyde.*

Suppose

Ex parte
Ockenden.

Suppose the corn-factor had tendred the money for grinding the corn, and Mr. *Ockenden* the petitioner had refused to deliver it, and the bankrupt had thereupon brought an action of trover, could *Ockenden* have set off an antecedent debt? I am clearly of opinion he could not, and would have had only an allowance *pro tanto*, as was due for grinding the corn.

Suppose *vice versa* an action had been brought by *Ockenden* against the bankrupt on account of the debt due for money lent to *Mutheus*, could the bankrupt have set-off the value of the corn in the hands of *Ockenden*? I think clearly not.

These are my grounds, and I confess I am very apprehensive of breaking in upon the common course of dealing, and the rule of proceeding in commissions of bankruptcy.

Adjourned at the request of the petitioner's counsel, to the next day of petitions, being an affair of great consequence to trade and creditors in general (1).

(1) So *Green v. Farmer*, 4 Burr. 2214. *Deeze*, ante 228. and note.
1 *Black*. 651. S. C. See also *Ex parte*

[238] (Pp) *Whether during his Time of Privilege, he may be taken by his Bail.*

Ex parte. Gibbons.

October the 22d,
1747.

Case 130.

Fescie a sheriff's officer, and bail for the petitioner, a bankrupt, takes him during the time of his last examination and surrenders him in discharge of his bail: he

prays to be discharged out of custody, and that *Fescie* may be censured for a contempt of the court. *Lord Chancellor* inclined to think, that the bail's taking the principal coming to a court of justice to be examined, has never been determined to be a contempt of the court, provided they bring him to be examined by that court, and therefore dismissed the petition, but without prejudice to the bankrupt's application to the court of King's Bench. The taking of a bankrupt by his bail, is not a contravention of the 5 Geo. 2. for the act provides only against arrests by creditors, and bail are no creditors till damnified, and therefore not within the description.

Lord Chancellor: This is a question of very great consequence, but merely a question of law, Whether *Fescie* could lawfully take the bankrupt, notwithstanding the statute of the 5 Geo. 2.

It is not absolutely necessary for me to determine it, because it may come in question in another place. But I am of opinion the taking of the bankrupt by the bail is not a contravention of the act of parliament.

The words of the fifth clause in the act are, "the bankrupt shall be free from all arrests, restraints or imprisonments, his creditors, in coming to surrender, and from the act of surrender of such bankrupt to the said commissioners, for so
" during

during the said forty-two days, or such further time as shall be allowed to such bankrupt for finishing his examination.

*Ex parte
Gibbons.*

The act provides against *arrest by creditors.*

Bail are no creditors till damaged, and therefore are not thin the description.

The subsequent words of the clause are, "and in case such bankrupt shall be arrested for debt, or on any escape warrant, coming to surrender himself to the said commissioners or after his surrender, shall be so arrested within the time before mentioned, that then on producing such summons or notice under the hands of the commissioners, to the officer who shall arrest him, and making it appear to such officer, that such notice or summons is signed by the said commissioners, or such assignee or assignees, and giving such officer a copy thereof, shall be immediately discharged."

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It plainly appears, through the whole clause, to be confined to an arrest, restraint, or imprisonment *by his creditors.*

Every person that is arrested in the court of King's Bench is by bill of *Middlesex*, or *Latitat*, which recites the bill of *Middlesex*, and the bail-piece is, such a one defendant *traditur in alium super cepi corpus, &c.* (naming the bail, their additions, and places of abode,) so that in the constant language of that court, the bail are his gaolers, and it is upon this notion the bail have an authority to take the principal, and he may be arrested on a *Sunday*; for as he is only at liberty by the permission and indulgence of the bail, they may take him up at any time.

In the language of the court, the bail are the gaolers of the principal, and upon this notion of law may arrest him on a *Sunday*, as he has his liberty only by the indulgence of the bail.

Therefore to say, that an act of parliament shall prevent a person, who has been so kind as to give the principal his liberty, from taking him up in discharge of himself, would be very hard, especially as there is no sort of danger here to the bankrupt, of his being a felon, as the commissioners may examine him in goal, and consequently it in no sort can be said to be in contradiction to the act of parliament.

But Mr. Attorney General says, it is contrary to a known rule of law, *That* all who are summoned to appear before persons acting in a judicial capacity, shall have a privilege to be safe from arrests *eundo, et redeundo.*

I do not know that the bail's taking the principal coming to a court of justice to be examined as a witness, has ever been determined as a contempt of the court, provided they bring him to be examined by that court.

But I will not be understood to be bound by this opinion, or to have it cited in another place, which is the only proper place, the court of King's Bench, where he is surrendered, and it is that court only that can discharge the process: for I cannot discharge the process of a court of law in a summary way; however, I clearly think I ought not to punish *Fecit* for a contempt in a doubtful case, and especially where the man was in those perilous circumstances of paying the debt, if he had not surrendered his principal.

Therefore

Ex parte
GIBBONS.

Therefore let the petition be dismissed, but without prejudice to any application the bankrupt may be advised to make to the court of King's Bench.

May the 12th, 1742. (Qq) Rule as to a Certificate from Commissioners to a Judge.

Cafe 131.

Ex parte Lingood.

Ante 196.
2 Eq. Caf. Abr.
99. S. C.

The petitioner being declared a bankrupt, and the three sittings at Guildball ad-

UPON the 6th of April last the commission was sued out by Jonathan Eade, who had been formerly a partner with Lingood, but suspecting he was not justly dealt with, he dissolved the partnership, and brought his bill for an account. vertised, the commissioners upon the examination of witnesses, in the intermediate time finding that he was removing and concealing his effects, summoned him to appear before them the next day from the date of the summons, and on his refusing to come, certified this fact to Mr. Justice Chapple, who committed him to Newgate, and on the keeper's sending notice thereof to the commissioners, they brought him before them upon their own warrant, and, on his refusing to be examined, recommitted him to Newgate; the bankrupt petitioned now to be discharged, as being illegally committed. The court of opinion, the certificate is pursuant to the powers given to the commissioners under the statutes of bankruptcy, and that where they have full evidence of his intention to secrete his effects, they may examine him in the intermediate time between the declaration of bankruptcy, and the sittings at Guildball.

ante Jones
Month. 1742
11/10
Deacon 20.536

After the cause had been depending some time in Chancery, upon the proposal of Lingood, all matters in difference were referred to arbitration, and the submission to the award was made a rule of court.

The arbitrators after fifteen months consideration awarded 9400*l.* to be due to Eade on a balance of accounts, and directed this money to be paid by installments, and likewise awarded Lingood to deliver some amber and shells to Mr. Eade; but Lingood not appearing, nor any agent for him, on the day and place appointed for the delivery of the amber and shells, and for making one of the payments according to the award, attachments were made out against him into London and Middlesex, for a breach of the award; and upon his absconding to avoid his being arrested under the attachments, a commission of bankruptcy was taken out against him, and he was declared a bankrupt.

After the three sittings at Guildhall, viz. the 27th of April, the 8th and 22d of May, had been advertised in the Gazette for the bankrupt to surrender, and to discover his estate and effects, the commissioners in the intermediate time having met, and examined witnesses upon interrogatories, and finding upon such examination, that the bankrupt had been removing and concealing his effects, and fraudulently conveying away his real estate in order to defraud his creditors, thought proper to summon him by their messenger on the 14th of April, to appear before them the next morning; and it appearing that he had been served with the summons, and refused to attend, the commissioners in pursuance of a clause in the 5th of the present King certified this fact to Mr. Justice Chapple, who committed him to Newgate, and upon the keeper of Newgate's sending a writ

notice to the commissioners, that he had *Lingood* in his custody, they immediately sent their own warrant to bring him before them, and upon his refusing to take the oath in order to his being examined, the commissioners re-committed him to *Newgate*, where he has lain ever since.

*Ex parte
Lingood.*

Upon the 27th of *April*, *Lingood* preferred his petition to *Lord Chancellor*, suggesting that he had been illegally committed to *Newgate*; that he was not indebted to *Eade* the petitioning creditor, and praying that he might be discharged from his confinement, and that his Lordship would please to direct an issue at law to try whether the petitioner was a bankrupt at or before the issuing of the commission of bankruptcy against him, and that all proceedings on the said commission might be stayed in the mean time, and that his Lordship would enlarge the time for finishing his examination for 49 days, over and besides the 42 mentioned in the *Gazette*.

Lord Chancellor: There are three things which are proper to be considered upon this petition;

1st, Whether the bankrupt has been illegally committed, and therefore ought to be discharged?

2^{dly}, Whether an issue should be directed to try the bankruptcy?

3^{dly}, Whether the petitioning creditor's is a just and proper debt?

The last ought to be considered first, because if there is no foundation for the petitioning creditor's debt, all the proceedings under the commission must of course fall to the ground.

I think there can be no doubt as to the petitioning creditor's being a just debt, while the award stands, for the arbitration bond is a debt at law, and binds the parties, until it is set aside for corruption or partiality, &c. And the bill which has been brought by *Lingood* for that purpose, cannot be a foundation to suspend it; for if it was, a person then has nothing more to do but to file such a bill, and frustrate the effect of the award; and therefore I think the debt is very sufficient to support the commission.

An arbitration bond is a debt at law, and binds the parties, till set aside for corruption or partiality, and is also a sufficient debt to support a commission of bankruptcy.

The act of bankruptcy likewise is extremely plain, and attended with fraudulent circumstances; I have not met with stronger in any case whatever, for *Lingood* appears to have acted intirely by the advice of his attorney *Mr. Vaughan*, who contrived the whole scheme of his going away to avoid the attachment of this court; and likewise the conveying away and secreting his effects is made out very clearly, from the depositions of several persons who were examined before the commissioners; so that, in reality, there are no less than two distinct acts of bankruptcy; the one arising from his absconding, and the other from his fraudulently conveying away his goods; and therefore there can be no reason for staying the commission, or to direct an issue, as there is a general affidavit of the bankrupt, that he is not one, which is by no means sufficient; for he ought to have given a particular answer to the facts charged in the depositions taken before

The court will not supersede a commission, or direct an issue, upon a general affidavit of the bankrupt, that he is not one, but will leave him to bring a *habeas corpus* if he thinks proper.

Ex parte
Lipgood.

Where a person apprehends he is aggrieved by a commitment of commissioners of bankrupt, the ready way is to sue out a *habeas corpus*, that the legality thereof may be determined by the judges of the common law.

The old acts of parliament considered a bankrupt as a criminal, and commissioners might at their discretion imprison him; but though the rigour of the law is taken away, yet as to his person, the power of examining still remains, and a greater punishment is inflicted if he does not surrender, *viz.* felony without benefit of clergy.

before the commissioners, and in the affidavits on the other side.

As to the legality of the commissioners' certificate to Mr. *Jus Chapple*, and proceedings upon it, 'tis an entire new question, and quite a new case; and therefore at the first opening of it I had a great doubt, whether I could properly determine the legality of the commitment, as a *habeas corpus* might have been sued out and have been decided by the Judges of the common law, which is the ready way. But I do remember a case of *John Ward* before Lord Chancellor *King*, not unlike the present, where he determined a commitment by commissioners of bankrupt to be justifiable, after he had taken some time to consider of it.

I think therefore the certificate which has been made in this case is pursuant to the powers given to commissioners under the statutes of bankruptcy, for by the old acts, which consider him as a criminal and fraudulent person (1), commissioners "have full power and authority to take by their discretions such order and direction with the body and bodies of a bankrupt wheresoever he or she may be had, either in his house, sanctuary, or elsewhere, as well by imprisonment of his or her body or bodies, as also with all his or her lands, &c. and all with his or her money, goods, chattels, wares, merchandizes and debts whatsoever." 13 *Eliz. ch. 7*.

The rigour of the law indeed as to his person is taken away and yet the power of examining still remains; but though the severity of the old acts is removed, yet a greater punishment is inflicted for a bankrupt, if he does not surrender; it is now made felony without benefit of clergy, but then he has to the last day to conform himself to this and the other acts.

The 5 *Geo. 2.* appoints three sittings at *Guildhall* in the space of forty-two days, for particular purposes; but would it not be a very great absurdity, if the bankrupt might make use of the forty-two days to imbezil his effects and to quit the kingdom and that the commissioners, though apprized of his intention should have no power to prevent it, by summoning him before them in the intermediate time, and committing him if he refuses to be examined?

It has been objected by the petitioner's counsel, that the commissioners have made the certificate variant from the summons for the latter is general for the bankrupt to attend, and the certificate mentions the cause for which they summoned him namely, to examine him upon an imbezilment of his effects.

But there is no weight in this objection; for the commissioners were not under any necessity of mentioning the cause of summoning the bankrupt in their certificate, because the judge, upon their barely certifying that he refused to attend, is obliged to commit him.

The judge, upon the bare certificate of commissioners that a bankrupt refused to attend, though the cause of summoning is not mentioned, is obliged to commit him.

(1) *Anst. 77. Bramley v. Goodere.*

As in this case the commissioners had full evidence of the bankrupt's intention to secrete his effects, and to make fraudulent assignments of them, they have done *rightly, wisely, and discreetly* in the method they have taken to prevent it, by summoning the bankrupt, and committing him for disobeying their summonis.

Ex parte
LINGOOD.

I do not say this to encourage commissioners of bankrupt to use this power wantonly; but upon such circumstances as appear in the present case, I am of opinion it was very properly exercised, and the proviso which immediately follows the clause that relates to the certificate of the commissioners of bankrupt to the judges, &c. in the 5 Geo. 2. makes it extremely clear, that the commissioners at their discretion may examine a bankrupt in the intermediate time, between his being declared a bankrupt and the sittings at *Guildhall*.

For the words are, " Provided always, that if any such person or persons so apprehended and taken, shall, within the time or times allowed by this act for that purpose, *submit to be examined*, and in all things conform as if he, she, or they had surrendered, as by this act such bankrupt or bankrupts is or are required, that then such person so submitting and conforming shall have and receive the benefit of this act, to all intents and purposes, as if he, she, or they, had voluntarily come in and surrendered himself, herself, or themselves; any thing herein contained to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding."

But though I have no doubt as to the construction of this act of parliament, yet I do not mean to preclude the bankrupt from his *habeas corpus*, which I shall leave him at full liberty to bring, if he thinks proper.

His Lordship ordered, that so much of the petition as prays that the bankrupt may be discharged from his confinement, and which controverts his being a bankrupt, be dismissed; but the time for the bankrupt's surrendering himself and disclosing and discovering his estate and effects, and finishing his examination before the commissioners, be directed to be enlarged for the space of forty-nine days, to be computed from the 22d day of May instant.

(Rr) *The Effect of Acquiescence under a Commission.*

Ex parte Desanthonis.

June the 21st,
1735.

Vide under the Division, Commission superseded.

(Ss) *Rule as to Debts carrying Interest under a Commission of Bankruptcy.*

Bankrupt.

November the
4th, 1743.

Bromley, and others, Creditors of *Sir Stephen Evance*, Plaintiffs.
Goodere, surviving Assignee of *Sir Stephen Evance*, } Defendants
and others, ——— ——— ———

Vide under the Division, Rule as to the Certificate.

August the 13th,
1746.

Ex parte Marlar & al'.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to discounting Notes.

December the
22d, 1753.

Ex parte Rooke.

Case 132.

On the 10th of
April, 1744, it
was referred to a
Master to settle
what was due to
the creditors un-
der the commis-
sion against *Rooke*,

and upon payment by the bankrupt the commission to be superseded. The bankrupt now offers to pay what is reported due, but the creditors insist upon interest likewise from the date of the Master's report. The creditors here are equally intitled, as if they were in the common case of a reference to a Master in a cause to state what is due for principal and interest, to be paid interest from the time of the Master's report, when the sums due are liquidated. And the bankrupt ordered to pay in a month accordingly.

On the 16th of *March* 1744, the Master certified there was due to the executors of *Smales* for his debt, and charges under the commission 277*l.* 1*s.* 8*d.* $\frac{1}{2}$. and to the other creditors several sums as are stated in the report.

The present petitioner, the bankrupt, offers to pay what is reported due, but the agent for the executor *Smales*, and the rest of the creditors, refuse to take the 20*s.* in the pound, unless they have interest likewise from the date of the Master's report.

N. B. The debt to *Smales* was a draft given by the bankrupt to him for value received, but not expressed in the body of it that it should carry interest.

Lord Chancellor: It is very near ten years ago since the pronouncing the last order, and the Master's report is ever since *March* 1744.

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The petitioner's excuse is, that when he made the offer of paying 20*s.* in the pound, he had a reversion in a freehold estate only, which is now fallen into possession; but this will not avail him; because at the time I directed the commission to be superseded, I did it altogether upon his offering to pay immediately the whole debts to the creditors under the commission.

Therefore they are equally intitled as if they were in the common case of a reference to a Master in a cause, to state what is due for principal and interest, to be paid interest from the time of the Master's report when the sums due are liquidated.

Ed.

His Lordship ordered the petitioner to pay the principal and interest in a month accordingly, to all his creditors (1).

Ex parte
Rooke.

(1) *Bromely v. Goodere*, ante 75. *Ex parte Marlar*, ante 151.

(Tt) *Rule as to Principals and their Factors.*

re and Baxter, Assignees of the Estate of *John Tollet*, a Bankrupt.

} Plaintiffs. February the 23d, 1743.

refcot, Dawson, Julian and Le Blon, Thomas Elder and Younger, and Tollet,

} Defendants. *Spalding v. Rudo*
8 Bear. 376.

THE plaintiffs made the following case by their bill: Case 133.

That *Tollet* in 1740 consigned to *Ragueneau* and company, *Where agents abroad are in dis-*
ding at *Leghorn*, *German* ferges amounting to 2062 *l.* 11 *s.* burse for their
ides the insurance made by *Tollet*, with directions to the principal, and
tners to sell the goods as soon as they could; and also con- upon being
ced to them other goods to the value of 181 *l.* 14 *s.* 6 *d.* doubtful of his
tners not being able to sell all the goods, *Tollet* gave orders to make bills of
er them for *Italian* goods, and the copartners agreed that lading to their
of the goods should be disposed of for those of the growth own order indor-
italy to half the value of the *Italian* goods, and the other to sed in blank,
aid for in money; and afterwards, by letter of the 18th of notwithstanding
ember 1741, they advised *Tollet* thereof, and that they these bills of
ld load the goods, which were silks, on board the *Prince* lading come to
yard, and inclose a bill of lading for 12 bales. *Tollet* in 1741 the principal's
ived the bills of lading indorsed by the said partners, but in- hands, yet if the
ed for the use of *Tollet* only. agent's partner
in *London* writes
them word that
their principal is
become bank-

and desires them to send the bills of lading, and an order to the captain to deliver the goods to him, and retain them for himself and company against the assignees under the commission till paid, and asked so much as the partnership is in advance.

Tollet, in 1741, borrowed of the defendants *Julian and Le*
505 *l.* and by way of security assigned the bills of lading
the 12 bales. *Tollet* being also indebted to the other defend-
the *Thomas's* in several sums, for securing thereof he assigned
ices for five bales and three bales, and delivered the same to
Thomas's.

Wilsonhurst & Co.
5 King's St. C. S.
Johnson & Co.
2 New St. W. S.

soon after a commission of bankruptcy issued against *Tollet*,
the plaintiffs were chosen assignees, and received a letter,
Aded to *Tollet* from *Ragueneau* and company, mentioning that
y had bought four bales of silk more for him, and had given
payment for it four bales of ferges, and sent him the invoice
1448 dollars, which they had placed to *Tollet's* debt (1).

On the 10th of *February*, 1741, *Dawson* the captain of the
maid, on board of whose ship were the bales of silk, arrived,
these goods were consigned to *Tollet*, and were shipped at the
name and in the name of *Tollet*; the defendants *Julian and Le*

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But the bills of lading were not sent. *Reg. Lib. B. 1743. f. 280.*
R 2 *Blon,*

SNIE V.
PRESCOT.

Blon, and the *Thomas's* shewed *Dawson* the bills of lading, and demanded the goods, but he refused to deliver them, and *Prescot* partner of *Ragueneau* who lived in *London*, on *Tollet's* being a bankrupt, wrote to his partners, desiring them to send the bills of lading that *Dawson* had signed and left with them, which they sent to him accordingly, and at the same time sent an order to *Dawson* to deliver the goods to *Prescot*, (1) who sets up a right thereto.

But the plaintiffs insist, that the bills of lading, though made to the order of *Ragueneau* and company, yet being indorsed by them in blank and sent to *Tollet*, it did, according to the custom of merchants, vest the property in *Tollet*. And further, that it is the custom of merchants at *Leghorn*, to send bills here filled up as aforesaid, in order to conceal the persons' names to whom the goods are sent, that the publick may not know the persons in *England*, with whom such houses deal, or to whom the property belongs.

That at the instant the goods were loaded on board the *Prince Edward*, the property vested in *Tollet*, who was then in good circumstances, and the reason of the master of the ship's signing several bills of lading, is for fear of losing one: That it is the custom of merchants to borrow money upon bills of lading, which have been looked upon as a good security: That *Tollet* was made debtor for the goods in *Ragueneau* and company's books, and the delivery to *Dawson* was for the use of *Tollet*, whose loss it would have been, if lost in the voyage.

That the defendants *Le Blon* and the *Thomas's*, notwithstanding they have an assignment of the bills from *Tollet*, yet do admit they were only pledged to them for what was owing on the same they had lent, and upon payment of that, and the expence of the insurance, they are willing the goods should be delivered to the plaintiffs, who pray by their bill, that the goods brought by *Dawson*, and delivered to *Prescot*, may be sold, and after paying what shall appear to be due to *Le Blon* and the *Thomas's*, that the remainder may be paid to plaintiffs for the benefit of *Tollet's* creditors; and also, that the bills of lading for the four bales sent in the *Mermaid*, may be delivered to the plaintiffs.

The defendant *Prescot* insisted, that the bills of lading in the *Prince Edward*, were not to deliver the goods to *Tollet*, but to the order of *Ragueneau* and company, and that it is usual among merchants, to require the master of the ship, by which the goods are consigned, to subscribe his name to three parts of every bill of lading, and that there is a clause in each, that one being accomplished, the other two shall be void, and says, on the delivery of the goods, he wrote a receipt for them, by indorsement of the bills of lading transmitted to him, and delivered the same to *Dawson*.

That it is usual among merchants and factors at *Leghorn* when they ship goods for persons who have not remitted the money before-hand, or for which they draw bills of exchange

(1) Who received the same.

Steele v.
Prescot.

they run a risque, not to fill up the bill of lading direct-
: order of such person, but to the order of the shippers
rs; so that if any accident happen to their principal, be-
delivery of the goods, they may get back the same, and
reimburse themselves, and that there was the greater rea-
such precaution, in regard *Ragueneau* and company had,
e to draw on *Tollet* for 2757 *l.* 19*s.* 3*d.* for money ad-
in the barter of the woollen goods for silk.

being informed *Tollet* had stop't payment, and was in dan-
iling, and that the silk was about to be shipped by the
at *Leghorn*, for the account of *Tollet*, he resolved to pre-
silk falling into *Tollet's* hands till satisfaction was made,
upon wrote by the next post to his partners, who in-
ver sent the two parts of the bill of lading to be delivered
in, and an order for him to deliver the silks to *Prescot*,
g to the bills of lading, in preference to any other claim.
his partners at *Leghorn* having notice of *Tollet's* circum-
oon after shipping the four bales of goods, applied to
n with whom they made the barter, and prevailed with
elinquish the bargain, and they took the serges back
id the silks to their own account, and paid for them in
and then sent them to the defendant *Prescot* in *London*,
ts he hath a right to claim the same for himself and his
(1).

answer he saith he his willing to sell the silks he received
in as the court shall direct, but submits that the delivery
ks to *Darufon*, was not a delivery to the use of *Tollet*.
efendants the pawnees insisted that *Ragueneau* and com-
dorisement on the bills of lading was, according to the
merchants, as much a transfer of all their right to *Tollet*,
same had been sold in an open exchange, and that the
at assignment made by *Tollet* to them, vested the proper-
goods in the defendants for repayment of the money

Chancellor: This is as harsh a demand against *Ragueneau*
pany, as can possibly come into a court of equity: to
taking their goods for which they have paid half the
thout reimbursing them what they are out of pocket,
telling them that they shall come in as creditors, per-
half a crown in the pound only, under the commission
pty against *Tollet*, notwithstanding they have the goods
eir own custody, and a specifick lien upon them; and
; in such a case, a court of equity will lay hold on any
ave this advantage to *Prescot* and the partnership,
t the bankrupt had gained any legal property in the silks,
e by his assignment, or pledge or pawn to the defendants
Ec. call it which you will, and if it had not been for
mstance of their being so pledged, the assignees' bill
have been dismissed with costs. [248]

the bill as to these four bales was dismissed. *Reg. Lib. B.* 1743. *f.* 283.

SNEL v.
PASCOOT.

But this court is obliged to retain bills for redemption, because the parties have no other way of coming at justice.

There are twelve parcels or bales for which bills of lading are sent, and four parcels or bales for which no bills of lading were sent, and therefore I will deliver the case from the latter, as there can be no pretence that *Tollet* had a legal property in these for a promise to send a bill of lading, if it amounted to any thing would be only to be carried into execution in equity.

As to the twelve bales, they will fall under a different consideration,

Ragueneau and company having advanced a moiety of the price for the silks, there can be no question, while the goods remained in their hands, but they were liable to this debt, (a) and *Tollet* could never have compelled them to deliver the goods, without paying the money so advanced.

(a) See ante ex
parte Dumas
234, note 1.

A factor who
sells goods for a
principal, may
bring an action
in the name of
the principal
against the
vendee, and
make himself
a witness, or a
vendor of goods
to a factor for
the use of his principal, may maintain an action against the principal, and the factor may be a witness for the vendor.

If a factor sells goods for a principal, he may bring an action in his own name, or an action may be brought in the name of the principal against the vendee, and the factor may make himself a witness.

On the other hand, a vendor of goods to a factor for the use of his principal, may maintain an action against the principal for goods sold, and the factor may be made a witness for the vendor; it has been often so settled at *Guildhall*.

Therefore while the goods remained in the hands of *Ragueneau* and company, no doubt but they had a lien upon them, for the moiety of the price advanced by them; and he who would have equity, must do equity, by reimbursing them first, before he can intitle himself to the silks, and thus it would have stood, if there had been no consignment; which it is insisted makes a considerable alteration, and vests the property in *Tollet*.

If goods are
delivered to a
carrier, &c. to
be delivered to
A. and are lost
by the carrier,
&c. the consignee
can only bring
the action. But
if before delivery
consignor hears A.
is likely to become
a bankrupt, or is
actually one, and
gets the goods
back again, no
action will lie for
the assignees of A.
because, while in
transit, they may
be countermanded.

I admit the case mentioned by the plaintiff's counsel, of inland dealers in *England*, that if goods are delivered to a carrier or boyman to be delivered to A. and the goods are lost by the carrier or boyman, the consignee can only bring the action, which shews the property to be in him, and it is the same where goods are delivered to a master of a vessel.

But suppose such goods are actually delivered to a carrier to be delivered to A. and while the carrier is upon the road, and before actual delivery to A. by the carrier, the consignor hears A. his consignee is likely to become a bankrupt, or is actually one, and countermands the delivery, and gets them back into his own possession again, I am of opinion that no action of trover would

would lie for the assignees of *A.* because the goods, while they were in *transitu*, might be so countermanded (1).

SNEE V.
PRESCOT.

In the present case there was no consignment to any particular person, but bills of lading indorsed in blank to the order of consignor, and therefore rather in the nature of an authority than any thing more.

Promissory notes and bills of exchange are frequently indorsed in this manner, *Pray pay the money to my use*, in order to prevent their being filled up with such an indorsement as passes the interest. Mr. *Lutwyche*, who was an experienced practiser in his court, always did so in his bills of exchange.

Notes or bills indorsed in this manner, *Pray pay the money to my use*, will prevent their being filled up with such an indorsement as passes the interest.

The question of law is, Whether before the actual delivery of the goods it was not in the power of the consignor to countermand it?

This must depend upon the custom of merchants, and here indeed there is a contrariety of evidence. For the defendant *Prescot* the evidence is, that if agents are in disburse for the goods bought for their principal, they generally make bills of lading to their own order, indorsed in blank, especially where they are in doubt of the principal's circumstances, that they may by this means have it in their power, if they should see occasion, to vary the consignment.

The evidence for the plaintiff is, that indorsing bills of lading in blank does not retain the property in the consignor, any more than if they were indorsed to the consignee by name, but is done only to conceal the amount of the quantity of the goods consigned, it being detrimental to the consignee that it should be known.

But then the proof on the part of the plaintiff does not speak to the particular circumstances, where the agents suspect their principals to be failing.

The question is, On which side the evidence is strongest?

The strongest proofs are certainly on the part of the defendants, and there is no occasion to send it to law on this account.

Though goods are even delivered to the principal, I could never see any substantial reason why the original proprietor, who never received a farthing, should be obliged to quit all claim to them, and come in as a creditor only for a shilling perhaps in the pound, unless the law goes upon the general credit the bankrupt has gained by having them in his custody.

The reason the law goes upon in compelling an original proprietor of goods, after delivery, to come in as a creditor under a commission, must be on account of the general credit a bankrupt has gained by having them in his custody.

But while goods remain in the hands of the original proprietor, I see no reason why he should not be said to have a lien upon them till he is paid, and reimbursed what he so advanced; and therefore I am of opinion the defendant *Prescot* had a right to retain them for himself and company.

It has been objected, that in case of any loss or accident to the goods, it was *Tollet's risque only*.

But suppose any damage had happened to these goods during the voyage, and in *transitu*, there had been an alteration of the

(1) *Birkis v. Jenkins*, cited *Comp.* 296. *Ellis v. Hunt*, 3 *Durn. and East*, 464.
R 4 consignment,

SNEE V.
PRESCOT.

consignment, the loss clearly must have been borne by the signor.

Consider this case in the next place, under the act of Parliament of the 5 Geo. 2. upon the clause of mutual credit.

"Where it shall appear to the commissioners that there
"been mutual credit given by the bankrupt and any
"person, or mutual debts between the bankrupt and any
"person, at any time before such person became bank-
"the commissioners or the assignees shall state the account
"between them, and one debt may be set against another,
"what shall appear to be due on either side on the balance
"such account, and on settling such debts against one another
"and no more, shall be claimed or paid on either side
"pectively."

The construction on this clause has always been, that account must be taken of their respective demands, and the balance only, if in favour of the bankrupt, shall be proved to the commission.

Suppose *Tollet* had never assigned these goods and the assignees under the commission of bankruptcy had brought an action of trover in his right, and by strictness of law had recovered, would even the courts of law have suffered execution to be taken upon the whole goods? I think they would not; and in such case I would have directed that out of the damages, upon a verdict of inquiry, there should have been deducted the half price, by *Ragueneau* and company for the silks; *a fortiori* this ought to be done in a court of equity.

As to the cases cited, *Wiseman v. Vandeput*, 2 Vern. 20 much stronger than the present. There "*A.* being beyond the sea, consigns goods to *B.* then in good circumstances in London; but before the ship sets sail news came that *B.* was failed, and thereupon *A.* alters the consignment of the goods, and consigns them to the defendant; the court held, that *A.* could by any means prevent the goods coming into the hands of *B.* or his assignees, it is allowable in equity, and *B.* or his assignees shall have no relief in equity." And so is the case *ex parte Clare*, before Lord Chancellor *King*, for the goods there had been actually delivered.

If the defendant *Prescot* had got the goods back again by any means, provided he did not steal them, I would not blame him, and I am of opinion, that to take them from him would be extremely unequitable.

In the case *ex parte Frank*, before Lord *Talbot* the goods were actually delivered, here they are not.

Upon the whole, from the justice of the case, and from evidence on the custom of merchants, I declare as to the bales of silk, that the same being in the possession of *Prescot* and his partners, the said bales or the value ought not to be taken from them without satisfaction made them for the money laid out by them for the last mentioned bales and charges incident thereto, and for the commission thereon.

Let the Master take an account of the money received by *Prescot* by sale of the silks, and he and his partners to be charged with the same.

ne. Let the silk remaining in specie be sold, and the Master is to signify what is the produce of the silk comprized in the pledges to several pawnees, let the same be rateably applied to pay what shall be due to Prescott and partners, for the money advanced for the mentioned sales, charges and commission, according to the proportion which the same bears to the respective values of the particular lots of silk comprized in each of the pledges, and after such proportion is to be borne out of the value, the residue to go towards paying Julian and Le Blon, for their principal and interest, and also after like deduction to Prescott for the silks pledged to the Thomas's, the residue to be applied towards payment of principal and interest to the Thomas's, and if not enough to pay Julian and Le Blon and the Thomas's, they to come in as creditors under the commission in proportion; and if any overplus by the sales of the silk, the same to go towards paying the costs of Prescott and partners, Julian, Le Blon, and the Thomas's; if no overplus, the Master to rate the silks between them; and if any overplus after payment of the said debts and costs, the same to be paid to the assignees of the bankrupt, for the use of the other creditors (1).

SNEE v.
PRESCOT.

(1) Reg. Lib. B. 1743. fol. 280. 283. See *Lickbarrow v. Mason*, 2 Durn. and East 63. and *Salomons v. Nissen* *ibid.* 4. By the judgment of the King's Bench in the former of these cases the principles laid down in the above case of *Snee v. Prescott* were much shaken; but its judgment was afterwards reversed by the Exchequer Chamber; and the foregoing doctrine in *Snee v. Prescott* was

established in its fullest extent, viz. that a consignor may stop goods in transitu, though the consignee assign the bills of lading to a third person for a valuable consideration and without notice. *Hen. Black. Rep. C. B. 357.* However the House of Lords have since ordered, that a *venire facias de novo* should be awarded in this case. 5 Durn. & East, 367. *Vide Fearon v. Bowers*, *Hen. Black. Rep. 364.*

(1) Rule as to Annuities under Commissions of Bankruptcy.

Ex parte Le Compte.
1783.

Ex parte Le Compte.

August the 1st,
1738.

Case 134.

IN the year 1720, the petitioner gave three hundred pounds for an annuity of 30*l.* per ann. for her life, payable out of the estate of the person who is now a bankrupt, which she not being able to pay her by reason of the commission, she petitioned to be admitted a creditor for the whole 300*l.*

The Lord Chancellor ordered that it be referred to the commissioners to settle the value of her life, and that she be admitted creditor for such valuation, and the arrears of her annuity, being unreasonable she should have the whole 300*l.* when she had enjoyed the annuity 18 years (1).

C. in 1720 gave 300*l.* for an annuity of 30*l.* per ann. for her life, payable out of a person's estate who becomes a bankrupt in 1738. Commissioners directed to settle the value of her life, and C. to be admitted a creditor for such valuation and the arrears of her annuity, and not for the whole 300*l.*

(1) *Ex parte Belton*, the next case. *Ex parte Aris*, 2 Vesf. 489. *Perkins v. Kempson*, 2 Black. 1106. *Wyllie v. Wilkes*, 100*l.* 501. Where an annuity is secured

by covenant in a deed, See *Fletcher v. Bathurst*, 7 Vin. 71. pl. 4. *Cottrell v. Hooks*, Doug. 93.

August the 18,
1744.

Cafe 135.

See the preceding case.

Where a bankrupt is under an agreement to pay an annuity, a value must be put upon it, and proved as a debt under the commission.

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Ex parte Belton.

533.

Ex parte Belton.

A Bankrupt before the time of his bankruptcy entered an agreement to pay an annuity of 20*l.* a year for maintenance of an infant till his age of fourteen, with a penalty on non-payment.

By his failing in one of the payments, the penalty became forfeited.

The guardian of the infant who had maintained him, applies to the court by petition to have a value set on this annuity, and that the infant may be admitted a creditor for that value.

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion that a value ought to be put upon the annuity, that it should be proved as a debt under the commission.

January the
22d, 1753.

Ex parte Coylegame.

Vide under the Division, Where Assignees are liable to the Equity with the Bankrupt.

(Uu) Rule as to taking out a second Commission.

March the 20th,
1743.

Cafe 136.

No second commission can be taken out before a bankrupt has his certificate under the first, for till then nothing can pass to the second, at least of personal estate.

Ex parte Proudfoot.

Ex parte Devan.

Mon. d. Rep. 436.

4 Dracoon d. R. 366.

Ex parte Welsh.

West. 276.

Ex parte Chamber.

M. & A. 294.

ONE *Jackson* became a bankrupt in 1732, and assigned where chosen under the commission; upon *Jackson's* assigning forty pounds to defray the expences of the commission, a hundred pounds more to be divided among his creditors, 1 parts in five of them in number and value signed his certificate but the commissioners refused to sign it; upon which the creditors returned the money to *Jackson* again, and nothing further was done under that commission.

Jackson after this sets up a different trade, in a different part of the town, and being largely indebted, a second commission is taken out against him in 1736, and assignees were chosen under it, and his certificate signed and allowed by Lord Chancellor. Before the certificate was signed, an advertisement, by order of the assignees under the first commission, was put into the *Gazette* for *Jackson's* creditors to meet the new assignees, to give their assent or dissent to the certificate, and 39 letters were also written to the creditors under the first commission, to appear at a meeting. Great numbers of them came, and did all assent to the certificate; and at the same meeting, by agreement, the sum of 65*l.* was paid to the assignees under the first commission to defray the charges thereof, by the assignees of the latter.

The present petition was presented by two of the creditors under the first commission to supersede the second.

Lord Chancellor : *The first question*, Whether the second commission can have any effect, and if it ought to be superseded?

Ex parte Proudfoot.

The second question, Whether the agreement made in this case will preclude the court from superseding it?

As to the first question, I am of opinion that if this case stood clear of the agreement, the second would have issued irregularly, and I should without scruple have set it aside, and *the certificate likewise; because when assignees are chosen under a first commission, all the estate and effects of the bankrupt are vested in them, and he is incapable of carrying on any trade, and all his future personal estate is affected by the assignment, and every new acquisition will vest in the assignees (1); but as to future real estates, there must be a new bargain and sale.

All future personal estate is affected by the assignment, and every new acquisition will vest in the assignees; but as to future real estate, there must be a new bargain and sale.

The bankrupt is incapable of acting, and therefore no second commission can be taken out before he has his certificate under the first, for till then nothing can pass under the second, at least of personal estate; consequently the certificate here can have no operation at all, and I am of opinion it would have been void at law.

[*253]

There may have been instances where second commissions have been taken out, when former commissions have been deserted, and the assignees perhaps, and the commissioners dead, and this innocently, and may have passed *sub silentio*, but is by no means a rule to govern the court.

The second question is, Whether the acts done by the assignees under the commission, will give a sanction to the certificate.

The second commission was taken out four years after the first, the certificate signed three years ago, and allowed by me two years and three quarters; nothing clandestine appears; but an advertisement has been put into the *Gazette* as usual, for creditors assenting or dissenting to the certificate, and was plainly intended that the creditors under the first commission should meet because the advertisement was put in by the assignees under the first, the two assignees under the first, and several of the creditors met accordingly, and accept of 65*l.* towards the charges of the first commission, and the expence of a law-suit, and in consideration of this sum, the assignees of the first commission withdrew their petition, which was filed before this meeting for superseding the second commission.

I am of opinion therefore, on the circumstances of this case, that I cannot set aside the second commission, because it would be a great prejudice and injustice to those persons who have given Jackson credit ever since his certificate was confirmed, which is no less than two years and three quarters ago.

(1) *Ex parte Simpson*, ante 138. 1 *Cooke's* Cowp. 824. *Ex parte Hurdcastle*, 1 *Cooke's* B. Laws, in margin. *Martin v. O'Hara*, B. Laws 8.

Though

Ex parte
PROUDFOOT.
 Assignees may
 advertise a meet-
 ing upon any
 extraordinary
 occasion, that
 concerns the
 creditors, as well
 as for the parti-
 cular purposes
 directed by the
 acts of parlia-
 ment.

Though the acts of parliament relating to bankrupts do direct the assignees to advertise a meeting of creditors in relation to commencing suits, and for particular purposes, yet the assignees are very much to be commended for advertising me upon any other extraordinary occasion, that concerns the creditors, because, where they are numerous, there is no way so to collect the whole body together.

The present is a stronger case than usual, for the assignee trustees for all the creditors, and if they have acted improperly the persons who prefer this petition, may have their remedy against them at law, for a breach of trust.

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Upon the whole, after all that has been transacted between the assignees under the first, and the creditors under the second commission, in relation to the certificate, and after the bankrupt has been once more enabled to trade, and gained a new lease of life by my confirming his certificate, I should do very wrong to set aside the second commission under all these circumstances and therefore the petition must be dismissed.

(Ww) *Rule as to an open Account under a Commission in Bankruptcy.*

December the
 22d, 1744.

Ex parte Simpson and others.

Vide under the Division, Concerning the Commission and Certificates.

(Xx) *Rule as to Principal and Surety.*

August the 2d,
 1744.

Ex parte Crisp.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Partnership.

March the 26th,
 1750.

Ex parte Williamfon.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to the Certificate.

(Yy) Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors Act.

Ex parte Burton.

October the
26th, 1744.

Case 137.

THE petitioner was a bond creditor for fifteen hundred pounds of *Stevens* the bankrupt, who had lived formerly in *Holland*, and exercised a trade there, but failed, upon which there was a *cessio bonorum*. *Stevens* comes afterwards to *England*, and had interest enough to be appointed a governor of a settlement abroad, belonging to the *African* company, and applies to the petitioner to be his security to the company, and to advance him a sum of money to equip him properly in his office: The petitioner agreed to do it, but insisted, as he run a risque of forfeiting the security to the company on *Stevens's* misbehaviour, that the bond should comprize the remainder of the old debt, as well as the further sum advanced, which was done accordingly: *Stevens* becomes a bankrupt here, and a commission is taken out against him; the commissioners on the application of *Burton* to be admitted a creditor, for the whole money on the bond, being doubtful whether he was so intitled, refused to admit him, and he now petitions for that purpose.

Stevens formerly a trader in *Holland* fails there, upon which there was a *cessio bonorum*: He comes to *England*, and is appointed a governor abroad; he applies to the petitioner to be his security to the company, and to advance him a sum of money, who agreed to it, provided *Stevens* would give him a bond, that should comprize

the remainder of an old debt due before the *cessio bonorum* as well as the further sum advanced, which was done accordingly: *Stevens* becomes a bankrupt, and the commissioners doubting if *Burton* ought to be admitted a creditor for the whole money, he now petitions for that purpose.

Lord Chancellor, on the circumstances of the case, of opinion he was intitled to be admitted a creditor for the whole money upon his bond.

Lord Chancellor: The question is, Whether this be such a debt as to intitle the petitioner to come in amongst the rest of the creditors under the commission of bankruptcy against *Stevens*, and that will depend upon another question, Whether the composition in *Holland* was an absolute discharge of the bankrupt? and if it was, Whether there is still a sufficient consideration for this bond? for if it was not an absolute discharge in *Holland*, no question can arise.

A man indebted to several persons becomes a bankrupt in *Holland*, where there are the same proceedings upon an insolvency, as on a *cessio bonorum* among the *Romans*: The question is, Whether this proceeding is a discharge of his effects, as well as of his person? for if it was, it would be an absolute discharge of this debt.

Upon what appears before me, I do not take it to be the law of *Holland*, that it is an absolute discharge of the effects as well as of his person: it certainly was not so even by the law of *England*, till the statute of the 4 & 5 Ann. which was temporary at first, and never intended to be a perpetual law, but was made in consideration of two long wars which had been very detrimental to traders, and rendered them incapable of paying their creditors; but I much question whether it is so by the law of any other country except *England*; the exempting his wear-

ing

Ex parte
BURTON.

ing apparel or tools of his trade, was left to the discretion of the *Roman Prator*, but was not a binding law upon him there, it is here.

If a debtor cleared under the insolvent acts afterwards gives a bond for the residue of the old debt, this will be binding upon him.

Can it then be doubted, that if the bankrupt gives a new security, that his effects are all liable? Suppose by our law under the insolvent acts, the debtor delivers up his all, as the statute requires, which is the *cessio bonorum* of the *Romans*, and the justices of peace discharge his person, and he afterwards gives a bond for the residue of the old debt; will not this be binding upon him, notwithstanding his being cleared under the insolvent act?

If a bankrupt, after his discharge, gets future effects, in point of justice he ought to make good the deficiency, tho' no court will compel him.

In the present case, I think I might rest here, without going any further; but supposing, by the law of *Holland*, his person and effects were actually discharged, I am very far from being clear, whether a bond given, as this was, for the residue of the debt, would not make his effects liable to answer it; for if a bankrupt after his discharge gets future effects, in point of justice and conscience he ought to make good the deficiency, tho' no court of equity or praetor would do it for the creditor.

Here is a man wants a security to the *African* company, for his exercising an office of governor in one of their settlements and likewise a sum of money; was it not very reasonable for the petitioner upon such an application to say, if I do this, you shall give me a bond for the residue of my old debt, since I run the risk of forfeiting to the company if you misbehave?

I am of opinion on such a case so circumstanced, that the petitioner is intitled to be admitted a creditor for the whole money upon his bond, and lay no stress upon the word composition, in the determination in *Holland*, for it was a disposition made by the judge, and not a voluntary composition by the bankrupt.

Lord Chancellor seemed to think, if a bankrupt, after a discharge, applies to an old creditor, to lend him a new sum of money to carry on his trade, or to be his security for any office, this would be a good consideration for his giving bond for the remainder of the old debt, and the whole may be proved under a second commission.

If a bankrupt applies to an old creditor, after a discharge by certificate, to lend him a new sum of money, to carry on his trade, or to become a security for any office; I am inclined to think that this ought to be a good consideration for his giving bond for the remainder of the old debt, and that he ought to be admitted a creditor for the whole debt under the second commission; but I will not be bound down by this opinion, though as I am at present advised, I think it would be so (1).

The law of *Holland* with regard to a *cessio bonorum* follows the *Digest*, and is no discharge of effects, but only of the person.

The next day *Lord Chancellor* said, he had looked into *Voet et the Pandect*, under the head of *cessio bonorum*, 2 tom. lib. 43 tit. 3. who lays down the law of *Holland* exactly as the *Digest* does in such cases, that it is no discharge of effects, but only of the person, some few trifles, as wearing apparel, &c. excepted

(1) See *Spurrett v. Spiller*, ante 105, note 1.

Ex parte Green.

*August the 7th,
1746.*

THE petitioner is an assignee under a second commission of bankruptcy against *Bowler*, who had been discharged before under a former commission, afterwards again under the insolvent debtors act, and now by a certificate under a second commission, taken out by his friends for that purpose.

The prayer of the petition is, That the bankrupt's certificate may not be allowed, and insisted by the assignee's counsel, that according to a clause in the act made in the 5 Geo. 2. relating to future effects, he cannot be discharged by a certificate, as to his estate under a commission of bankruptcy, if he has been before charged under the statute for relief of insolvent debtors.

That clause is as follows:

"Provided always, and be it further enacted, That from and after the 24th of *June* 1732, in case any commission of bankruptcy shall issue against any person or persons, who, after the said 24th of *June* 1732, shall have been discharged by virtue of this act, or shall have compounded with his creditors, or delivered to them his estate or effects, and been released by them, or been discharged by any act for the relief of insolvent debtors, after the time aforesaid, that then and in either of these cases, the body and bodies only of such person and persons conforming as aforesaid, shall be free from arrest and imprisonment by virtue of this act; but the future estate and effects of every such person and persons shall remain liable to his creditors, as before the making of this act, (the tools of trade, the necessary household goods and furniture, and necessary wearing apparel of such bankrupt, and his wife and children only excepted), unless the estate of such person or persons against whom such commission shall be awarded, shall produce clear, after all charges, sufficient to pay every creditor under the said commission, fifteen shillings in the pound for their respective debts."

Unless some fraud had been shewn, this man seems to me to be intitled to his certificate, but of a special nature.

This act of parliament has made two provisions, one with regard to the person of the bankrupt, the other with regard to his estate, for before the making the said act, neither were discharged, but both were liable.

Then comes this clause, and makes a particular kind of discharge in this special case; an absolute one as to his person, but with regard to all his creditors before the commission, but upon a particular circumstance only, with regard to his estate.

Therefore some kind of certificate he must have, the present seems to be a general one, and I do not find that the form of the certificate is settled.

The certificate being read, appeared to be a general one, upon which *Lord Chancellor* made it special, by ordering this certificate to be allowed a discharge of the bankrupt's person only, not of his future estate and effects.

Case 138.

Where a person discharged by the insolvent debtors act, becomes a bankrupt afterwards, his certificate must be special, and will be allowed only as a discharge of his person, but not of his future estate and effects.

(Zz) Rule as to a Bankrupt's future Effects.

March the 20th,
1743.

Ex parte Proudfoot.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to taking out a second Commission.

October the 26th,
1744.

Ex parte Burton.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors Act.

August the 7th,
1746.

Ex parte Green.

Vide under the same Division.

(Aaa) Rule as to a Cessio Bonorum.

October the 26th,
1744.

Ex parte Burton.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors Act.

[259] (Bbb) Rule as to Deposits under Commissions of Bankruptcy.

October the 19th,
1744.

Bromley v. Child.

Case 139.

A. intitled to navy bills in 1711, deposits them with Sir Stephen Evans, who gave a note to be accountable for them, and in six months afterwards becomes bankrupt. The representative of *A.* petitions to be admitted before the Master to prove both principal and interest to the time of the decree, as navy bills in their nature carry interest. As this is a special deposit, a calculation shall be made of the value of the whole intire thing deposited, both principal and interest at the time of the deposit, and interest not to run as in a simple debt.

A Petition on the behalf of the representative of a person who was intitled to navy bills to the amount of 6000*l.* and who had in the year 1711 deposited them in the hands of Sir Stephen Evans and his partner Hale, who gave a note specifying them, and promising to be accountable. In six months after Sir Stephen Evans becomes a bankrupt.

The representative of *A.* petitions to be admitted before the Master to prove both principal and interest to the time of the decree, as navy bills in their nature carry interest. As this is a special deposit, a calculation shall be made of the value of the whole intire thing deposited, both principal and interest at the time of the deposit, and interest not to run as in a simple debt.

The application now was, that the petitioner be admitted before the Master, to whom the cause stands referred between the assignees and representatives of Sir Stephen Evans, to prove both the principal and interest to the time of the decree, as navy bills in their nature carry interest.

When the petitioner appeared before the commissioners of bankruptcy, they set a value upon the navy bills, according to the market-price they bore at the day of the deposit, which was only 4200*l.* because there was a large discount, as there was no publick fund appropriated for the payment of them.

Lord Chancellor : I cannot allow the petitioner to come in as a creditor before the Master for the *interest* upon the navy bills as well as the principal, because there is a plain distinction between debts that carry interest and a special deposit of goods and stock; for in the former the interest shall be continued down to the date of the commission (1); but in the latter 'tis otherwise, for the interest stops from the time of the deposit, and a calculation shall be made of the value of the whole entire thing deposited, both principal and interest, be it stock or goods, according to the market price at the time of the deposit, and interest not allowed to run on as in the case of a simple debt.

BROMLEY v.
CHILD.

The petition dismissed.

(1) See *Bromley v. Goodere*, ante 79. *Ex parte Bennett*, post. 2 vol. 528.

(Ccc) *Rule as to Relation under Commissions of Bankruptcy.* [260]

<i>Barwell</i> and Others,	—	—	Plaintiffs.	<i>March</i> 5th,
<i>Ward</i> and Others,	—	—	Defendants.	1744.

THE defendant's brother conveyed the moiety of a reversionary estate for less than half the value to her, and in a month afterwards surrenders himself to prison, and during his lying there, before the two months were expired, he turns his book debts into notes, and indorses over one from Sir Roger Burgoyne, and another from Sir Francis Shipworth to Barbara and Margaret Ward.

Case 140.

Where the act of bankruptcy is lying in jail for two months, a person shall be deemed a bankrupt from the first day of his surrender to prison by relation, so as to over-reach all intermediate transactions.

A commission of bankruptcy was afterwards taken out against Ward, and the plaintiffs were chosen assignees, who have brought this bill to set aside the conveyance, and pray that the plaintiffs, and the other creditors may have the benefit of the said estate, and that the deeds relating thereto may be delivered to them, and that the said notes and securities may be also delivered to them, and that they may have a satisfaction from such of the defendants to whom the same were indorsed, assigned, or delivered.

Sept. 1744
3. My l. cl.

The counsel for the plaintiffs insisted, that the conveying lands for half the value is an act of bankruptcy of itself, and that the sister of the bankrupt ought to be directed to convey the same to the assignees, and that the notes being transactions during the intermediate time between his imprisonment and the lying there *two months*, that when the *two months* were expired, he shall be deemed a bankrupt from the first day of his surrender to prison by relation, so as to over-reach all intermediate transactions.

On the part of the defendants it was urged, that the several debts, and the indorsement of the notes, were previous to Ward's bankruptcy, and that the bankrupt being indebted to the defendant *Martha Doughty* in 450*l.* on bond, did, in September 1741, execute a warrant of attorney to confess judgment for the said debt, and that being also indebted to his sister *Barbara*

BARWELL v.
WARD.

bara Ward in 60*l.* he did, by indentures bearing date in *tember* 1741, convey to her and her heirs his reversionary interest of the said premises, who did then deliver up a bond which had been given her for 150*l.* to be cancelled, of which debt 60*l.* remained due, and the deeds were executed a few days after they bore date, but before *Ward* had committed any act of bankruptcy.

Lord Chancellor : The present is a plain case, and appears to be a fraudulent conveyance to cover the estate, for the deed was executed at a time when *Ward* was in declining circumstances, having in the *October* following surrendered himself in discharge of his bail, and was confined in prison.

[261]

No more than 60*l.* paid for the moiety of an estate in reversion, of the value of 39*l.* a year, which is pretended not to be redeemable on payment of 60*l.* but no clause of this kind in the deed itself, for it is an absolute bargain and sale.

The court in this case ought to do no more than to let the deed stand only as a security for the money really and bona fide advanced.

It is not disputed but that *Mr. Ward* was a bankrupt at the end of the *two months*, and that the act of parliament by which it makes him so at the time he indorsed the two notes ; but it has been said by the defendant's counsel, the assignees might have brought an action of trover, but it would have been very difficult to have described the notes at law properly, and therefore the plaintiff is right to come here for a discovery.

It has been also said, the bankrupt indorsed the notes to a sum of money to put out his apprentice to another master for the rest of his time.

The most equitable method is to allow him a gross sum for the bankrupt's effects, and commissioners of late years have commended it to creditors to allow it, and in my opinion rightly, for it would be hard to make him come in as a creditor under the commission (1).

His Lordship declared that the lease and release of September 1741, *ought to be set aside as an absolute conveyance, and to stand only as a security for what (if any) was really due from Ward bankrupt to defendant Barbara Ward upon the bond, and referred to a Master to inquire whether at the execution of the said deed such bond was subsisting; and what money was bona fide due from Ward bankrupt to Barbara thereon, and if no money due at that time Barbara should then convey the said premises to the plaintiffs in trust for the creditors.*

His Lordship also declared, that the assignment of the notes, being after *Mr. Ward* was in point of law a bargain and sale, is void, and directed the Master to see if the notes are in the hands of *Martha Doughty*, or in whose hands, and whether she hath received any money thereon, and to inquire what sum is due in consideration of the said notes, and whether the same will be applied to procure another master to the apprentice, and if it

(1) See *Ex parte Sandby*, ante 149.

much was proper to be allowed (according to the usual course of proceedings under commissions) for turning over the apprentice of a bankrupt to another master, and so much to be allowed to *Martha Doughty*, and the surplus she is to pay over to the assignees, and deliver up the said notes, and decreed the defendant *Barbara Ward* to pay costs, so far as relates to the conveyance to her, to this time (1).

BARWELL v. WARD.

(1) Reg. Lib. A. 1744. f. 233. *Tribe* Assignee of *Langman v. Leith*, 2 Durn. & v. *Webber*, *Davies* B. Laws, 376. *King East*, 141.

(Ddd) Rule as to an Extent of the Crown.

[262]

Ex parte Marshall and Others; in the Matter of *Garway's* Bankruptcy.

March the 28th, 1751.

HATTON was surety in a bond with *Garway* to answer particular debts; *Garway* becomes a bankrupt, and an extent of the crown is taken out against *Hatton*, who pays the debt after disputing it for some time, and is put to an expence thereby.

Case 141. Part of S. C. ante 129, 131. not S. P. An extent of the crown is taken out against a

surety of a bankrupt who pays the debt, after disputing it some time, and being put to an expence thereby. He shall, notwithstanding he disputed the payment of a just debt, be admitted to prove the expences of such suit under the commission against the principal.

Hatton is since dead, and his representatives apply now to be admitted creditors under *Garway's* commission, and to prove the expences he was put to in the dispute with the crown; the counsel for the assignees opposed it, and insisted that notwithstanding as between debtor and creditor, the latter is intitled to have compleat satisfaction against the surety as well as the principal; there is no rule, that if a surety disputes a just debt, and occasions an expence by that means, that he shall charge the estate of the principal with the expences of such a suit.

Lord Chancellor : I know of no such distinction, and it would be a very hard case here, as the failing of *Garway* was in all probability the sole occasion of the difficulties that *Hatton* was under, and made him incapable of paying the demand of the crown; and as an extent is both an action and execution in the first instance, *Hatton*, in his situation, could not be supposed prepared to pay it immediately, and therefore no pretence to say his representatives shall be precluded from proving the expences *Hatton* was put in the suit with the crown.

An extent of the crown is an action and execution in the first instance.

Anon'.

Ogden the 26th, 1745.

A Petition on behalf of a bankrupt to be discharged from a commitment under an extent of the crown, having surrendered himself to the commissioners, and conformed himself according to the acts of parliament relating to bankrupts.

Case 142.

A bankrupt, though he has conformed in

himself to the acts relating to bankruptcy, cannot be discharged from a commitment under an

Bankrupt.

ANON'. *Lord Chancellor* : The crown is not within the statutes of bankrupts, and therefore he cannot be discharged from a commitment on behalf of the crown.

[263] (*Ecc*). *Rule as to Creditors assenting or dissenting to a Certificate*.

August the 14th,
1742.

Ex parte Turner.

Vide under the Division, Joint and Separate Commission.

Ex parte Lindsey.

October the
26th, 1745.

Vide under the Division, What is, or is not, an Election to abide under a Commission.

Ex party Williamson.

March the 25th,
1750.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to a Certificate.

In the Matter of the Simpson's Bankruptcy.

December the
21st, 1752.

Vide under the Division, Rule as to Partnership.

(*F f f*) *Bankruptcy no Abatement.*

Anon'.

November the
20th, 1748.

Case 143.

*ignia
v
Innocent
and
the
871.*

An order for dissolving an injunction nisi will be made absolute, notwithstanding the plaintiff is a bankrupt, unless he shews cause.

MR. *Wilbraham*, where the defendant had an order for dissolving the injunction nisi, moved it might be made absolute, unless cause shewn before the rising of the court.

Mr. *Sewell* of the other side said, the cause was abated by the plaintiff's having become a bankrupt since the granting of the injunction, and that the assignees under the commission have not as yet revived.

Lord Chancellor : Bankruptcy is no abatement (1), and therefore if he had any cause to shew he must go on, or he would

solv

(1) *Bramhall v. Cross, Exchq. Hill. Term, 1790.* This was a motion to dismiss the bill with costs for want of prosecution unless cause. The cause shewn was the bankruptcy of the plaintiff after the bill filed, and before the bill became dismissible. The case of *Tait v. Carwick*, 27th of June 1786, was cited, wherein the bill had been dismissed (but without costs) for want of prosecution notwithstanding the bankruptcy. The Lord Chief Baron thought, that the circumstances of this case were such as to entitle the plaintiff to no favour; and the bill was dismissed with costs. In *Sellas v. Dawson, Chan. December the 8th, 1790.*

a motion was made to discharge an order for dismissing the bill, which was filed in 1788. The answer was put in in February 1789. The sole plaintiff became a bankrupt in March 1789. In December 1789 the defendant without notice to the assignees of the bankrupt obtained an order to dismiss the bill for want of prosecution with costs. The plaintiff gave notice of a motion to discharge the order of dismissal for irregularity. The defendant's solicitor undertook in writing not to proceed on the order of dismissal and offered to pay the costs, but he did not pay them. Now notice was given by the plaintiff to discharge the i

the injunction: Upon which he shewed exceptions for ANON'.
which were allowed upon the common terms of procur-
: Master's report in four days.

being at present a bar to the af-
continuing the suit by supple-
bill. The cases of *Tait v. Car-*
d Bramhall v. Crofs were cited.
Thurlow at first doubted whether
ld discharge the order: but the
tion to have the order of dismiss-
charged was renewed the 14th
ary 1791, when his Lordship said,
d not make an order dismissing
mer order, because that would
ledge, that there could be an
ade after bankruptcy and when
t, as he conceived, was abated.
ught it was abated, by analogy
ment at law, which always takes
n a bankruptcy before judgment
nal or interlocutory; and so it
the case of *Monk v. Morris*,
. 93, and *Waugb v. Aulsen*,
n Rep. 437. He said, that
standing the Exchequer prac-
is was an order improper to
een made, and improper to be
now: that it was a mere
and that the bankruptcy before
nt or decree was equally an abate-
equity, as well as at law: *that*
in Atkins 263, where Lord Hard-
was reported to say, it was no abate-
vas ill reported; for the order,
ad been examined, did not warrant
t: that the assignees should now
r supplemental bill, which would
the proceeding from the very
the bankruptcy, and so cast out
intermediate order totally. His
p admitted, that this was not a
ll of revivor, nor even of supple-
but an original bill in nature of
emental bill: and that there must
ree in the supplemental suit it-
it still he thought, that the ori-
uit was gone by the bankruptcy
at law, and yet that such new
the assignees might take never-
the benefit of the former suit.

He therefore refused the motion to dis-
charge the order for dismissing the origi-
nal bill for want of prosecution. *Da-*
vidson v. Butler, in the Exchequer the 28th
of April 1793. A motion was made to
dismiss the bill for want of prosecution
unless cause. Mr. Cooke now shewed for
cause, that the bill was filed for an in-
junction against the defendant's proceed-
ing at law upon certain notes, which
were in the defendant's possession and
drawn by one *Baker* as the co-partner of
the plaintiff, after the dissolution of the
co-partnership for a subsequent debt, and
at a time the defendant knew the co-
partnership was dissolved; and that the
plaintiff became a bankrupt since the
filing the bill: he therefore insisted,
1st, that the suit was absolutely abated,
and therefore not liable to be dismissed,
for which he cited the case of *Sellas v.*
Darwin: 2dly, that if the bill should be
dismissed, yet that it ought not to be
with costs. *Tait v. Cartwick*, June 27th
1786. Mr. Abbot contra said, that there
were cases in the Exchequer, where the
bill had been dismissed, viz. *Tait v. Car-*
twick, and *Bramhall v. Crofs*. The Lord
Chief Baron said, it was the clear esta-
blished practice of that court not to con-
sider Bankruptcy as an abatement: that
the only difficulty arose from the case in
Chancery; but as that case did not ap-
pear to have been so fully debated on au-
thorities, they thought it ought not to
prevail. He said, that equity should
follow the practice of the courts of law
in this respect; and that in reason the
mere bankruptcy of the plaintiff ought
not to prevent the defendant from being
reimbursed, if he can, for the expence
of the suit. *Hobham* Baron, and *Thomp-*
son Baron, concurred, and the bill was
ordered to be dismissed with costs. See
also *Lingard v. Wegg*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep.
435.

Ggg) Arrest upon a Sunday for a Contempt regular.

Ex parte Whitchurch.

JUNE the 2d,
1749.

Arrest, under the Divison, Where good on a Sunday.

C A P. XVI.

Baron and Feme.

- (A) *How far the Husband shall be bound by the Wife's Acts before Marriage.*
 (B) *How far a Feme Covert shall be bound by the Acts in which she has joined with her Husband.*
 (C) *Concerning the Wife's Pin-money and Paraphernalia.*
 (D) *How far Gifts between Husband and Wife will be supported.*
 (E) *Concerning Alimony and Separate Maintenance.*
 (F) *Rule as to a Possibility of the Wife.*

[265] (A) *How far the Husband shall be bound by the Wife's Acts before Marriage.*

March the 2d,
1737.

Davenport
9ishopp
24th Ch. 451.

Samuel Newstead, Stokes and Susannah his Wife, } Plaintiffs.
 Atkinson and Elizabeth his Wife, and others, }

Samuel Searles, Miller and Balls, and others, — Defendants.

March 14th
Herberts
-R. 9aff
24th Ch. 451.
De Hebble
1. West
4 LTR 375

Cafe 144.

TH E plaintiff *Newstead* is the eldest son and heir of *Elizabeth*, late the wife of *Newstead senior*, who was the eldest daughter and coheir of *Elizabeth Searles* deceased, by *John Martyn* her former husband, and the plaintiff *Susannah* is the youngest daughter, and another of the coheirs of *Elizabeth Searles* deceased, by *John Martyn*, and the plaintiff *Elizabeth* the wife of *Joseph Atkinson*, is the daughter of *Susannah Stokes*, and grandchild of *Elizabeth Searles*.

and being in possession, in her own right, of freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, by articles before her second marriage, to which her husband was a party, and by his consent, conveys the whole to trustees, that they should divide the freehold, copyhold, and leasehold, if no issue of the marriage, in moieties, one to the plaintiff her grandson, his heirs and assigns, the other to her granddaughter in fee, provided if there should be any child or children of the marriage, that child or children to have an equal share of the said estates, with the grandson and granddaughter.

The husband and wife afterwards mortgage the settled estates, to persons who had notice of the settlement. Declared, that the settlement is no voluntary agreement, but a binding one, and no instance where such a limitation has been held fraudulent, and void against subsequent purchasers, or creditors; for if it should, no widow, on her second marriage, would be able to make any certain provision for the issue of a former.

Mr. *Cornwallis* seized in fee of freehold and copyhold, and possessed of leasehold, held of the bishop of *Norwich* in *Suffolk*, of the yearly value of 150 *l.* made his will in 1698, having first surrendered his copyhold estate to the use of his will, and thereby gave to *Grace* his wife all his freehold, copyhold, and leasehold, for so long as she should continue his widow, and after her decease, then he gave the freehold, copyhold, and leasehold

estates

o *Elizabeth Searles*, then *Elizabeth Martyn* his daughter, NEWSTEAD v.
SEARLES.
heirs; the testator died soon after.

Elizabeth Searles, before her marriage with the defendant *Searles*, by indenture dated the 30th of April, 1709, bearing of the first part, *Samuel Searles* of the second part, and *Maltynward* of the third part, reciting the will of *Cornwallis*, and that a marriage was intended between *Grace* and *Samuel*; and that it was agreed *Elizabeth* should have the disposition of her estates after the death of *Grace*; with the consent of *Samuel* for the settlement of her portion on such children, and grandchildren, as *Elizabeth* should have living, either by her late husband *John Martyn*, or *John Searles* at the time of her death, did covenant with *Samuel Maltynward*, that they and their heirs should after the marriage, and the death of *Grace*, stand seised of the premises held by lease of the bishop of *Norwich*, and all other estates of *John Cornwallis*, given by his will to *Elizabeth* after *Grace's* decease, to the uses therein and after mentioned, that is to say, when the freehold and copyhold lands should come to be vested in *Elizabeth*, to permit *Samuel Searles* to have to his own use, during the coverture, the rents and proceeds thereof, and if *Elizabeth* survived *Samuel*, then she to remain during her life, with a power to *Elizabeth* to charge the said estates by her will, or any other writing, with 200*l.* to be paid after her decease, as she should appoint, and for want of appointment, to be paid to *Samuel*, and after the deaths of *Samuel* and *Elizabeth*, that the trustees and their heirs should divide the said freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates in manner following, (that is to say, if no issue between *Samuel* and *Elizabeth* living at her death then they should convey one moiety of the said premises to the plaintiff *Newstead*, his heirs and assigns, and the other moiety to the use of the plaintiff *Susannah Stokes* her daughter for her life, and after her death to her granddaughter the plaintiff *Elizabeth Atkinson*, and assigns; provided, if there should be any child or children between *Samuel* and *Elizabeth*, that then each such child to have an equal share of the said estate, with the plaintiff *Newstead* and *Elizabeth Atkinson*.

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The marriage took effect, and the defendant *Searles* entred into possession of the freehold, copyhold, and leasehold lands, and received the rents thereof, upon the death of *Grace*, which happened in the month of September 1733, without leaving any issue by the defendant *Searles*; the plaintiff on the death of *Elizabeth*, became entitled to the said moiety under the settlement, and *Susannah Stokes* the other for life, with remainder to *Elizabeth Atkinson* and her heirs, and insist the same ought to be conveyed accordingly that the deed of the 30th of April, 1709, ought to be put into execution; and therefore by their bill pray an account of the rents, &c. received from the freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, since the death of *Elizabeth Searles*, and that the profits of the residue of the profits may be paid to the plaintiff.

NEWSTEAD v. SEARLES. tiff *Newstead*, the other to the plaintiff *Stokes*, and *Susannah* wife; and that the legal estate of the said freehold, copyhold and leasehold estates may be granted, surrendered, and conveyed to such of the plaintiffs as are intitled to the same, according to the settlement of the 30th of *April*, 1709.

The defendant *Searles* in 1719, together with *Elizabeth* wife mortgaged the freehold estate for a term of years, for 20 to *Pindar*, and the leasehold estate was afterwards assigned him, as a further security, and *Searles* and his wife levied at that time, and afterwards, fines, whereby the freehold and leasehold became vested in *Searles* in fee, after *Elizabeth's* death, subject to the mortgage.

[267] *Searles* insisted that he was intitled to the equity of redemption, and that his wife executed such deeds and fines out of affection to him, and also that *Elizabeth* dying without appointing the two hundred pounds under the deed of the 30th of *April* he ought to have it paid to him.

The defendant *Miller* claims as assignee of *Pindar's* mortgage term, which after several mesne assignments became vested in him the 26th of *March*, 1733, at which time he advanced a further sum to *Searles* and his wife, and that there is now due to him for principal 1310*l.* besides interest, and says that he never had any notice, till after the death of *Elizabeth Searles* of the plaintiff's claim, nor of the indenture of the 30th *April*, 1709.

Lord Chancellor : The question is, Whether the articles of the 30th of *April*, 1709, are for a valuable consideration ; binding, or ought to be considered as voluntary and fraudulent with respect to subsequent creditors or purchasers?

If I was to lay it down as a rule that such articles as these are not binding, it would become impossible for a widow on her second marriage to make any certain provision for the issue of the former, and the second husband might then contrive to defeat the provision made for those children (1).

I am of opinion these articles ought not to be considered as voluntary agreements, and that the plaintiffs are intitled to relief in this court. This is the case of a widow, who has two children by a former husband, and no provision made for them, and those two children have each of them a child, and the mother being in possession in her own right of freehold estate, leasehold and copyhold, the second husband, if there had been a child born alive, would have been intitled to be tenant by the curtesy of the freehold, and also to the leasehold and copyhold immediately upon the marriage.

To prevent this, by the articles before the second marriage 200*l.* is allowed to be raised by the wife out of the estate, and in case there should be no children of the second marriage, the one moiety thereof was to go the plaintiff *Newstead* his heirs assigns, and the other to *Susannah Stokes* for life, remainder to *E*

(1) *Vide Cotton v. King*, 2 P. W. 358. 674. *Countess of Strathmore v. Dow* 2 Bro. Chs. Rep. 345.

Elizabeth Atkinson, her heirs and assigns, the former her grandson by the first marriage, and the latter her daughter and granddaughter; but if there should be any child or children of the second marriage, then they were to have an equal share with the plaintiffs.

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SEARLES.

Upon the mortgage to *Pindar*, by the contrivance of some country attorney, *Elizabeth Searles* and her husband levied a fine, and in the deed to lead the uses there is a compleat recital of the will, under which the wife claimed, and of her marriage settlement in so ample a manner, that the will and settlement must necessarily have been laid before him, and he must consequently have had full notice of it as agent for the mortgagee.

The children of the first marriage stand in the very same plight and condition as the issue would have done, if there had been any of the second marriage, and even are provided for before them.

Supposing there had been issue of the second marriage, and they had brought their bill to carry these articles into execution, upon a decree in their favour, would not the children by the first marriage have been equally intitled to a benefit from the decree?

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Taking the case with all its circumstances, I think the settlement no voluntary agreement, but a binding one; the statutes of the 13 and 27 *Eliz.* that make conveyances fraudulent, are voluntary conveyances, made against purchasers upon a valuable consideration, or *bonâ fide* creditors: but it would be difficult to shew that such a limitation, as in the present case, has been held fraudulent, and void against subsequent purchasers or creditors * (1).

The present is a stronger case, for here are reciprocal considerations both on the part of the husband and wife, by the provision under the articles for the children of the second marriage.

* *Yenkins v. Keymis*, 1 *Low.* 150. & 237. there Sir *Nicholas Keymis*, being tenant for life, remainder to his son *Charles* in tail, in 1631, in consideration of a marriage to be had between his son and *Blanch Mansell*, and 2500*l.* portion, levied a fine to the use of Sir *Nicholas Keymis* for life, remainder to *Charles* and *Blanch* for their lives, remainder to the heirs of the body of *Charles* begotten, remainder to the heirs of the body of *Charles*, with power for Sir *Nicholas Keymis* to charge the premises with 2000*l.* Sir *Nicholas* and *Charles* in 1642, joined in a lease and release to *David Jenkins* and his heirs for 2000*l.* on condition of payment of 2000*l.* with interest some years after, to be void, *Blanch* afterwards dies without issue, *Charles Keymis* marries another wife, by whom he had issue the defendant, and dies, the mortgagee dies, and his heir brought an ejectment, and adjudged the lease and release was no good execution of the power at common law. He then brought his bill in equity on these grounds; 1st, that the consideration of the marriage of *Blanch*, and the 2500*l.* paid with her, did not extend to the defendant, being an issue by the second wife, and so the estate in remainder whereby he claimed was voluntary; (two other grounds not material to this case) but on the first Lord Keeper *Bridgman* declared that the consideration of 2500*l.* paid on the first marriage, should extend to the issue by the second wife.

Hardr. 395.
Ch. Caf. 103.
Ch. Rep. 275.
Gilb. see Pract. 303.

(1) See *ante Walker v. Burrows* 94. *Doe ex dem. Watson v. Routledge*. *Corp.* 705.

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The mortgagees had notice that the lands were liable articles, and therefore the plaintiffs are intitled to have profit of them against the defendants who are affected by and his Lordship decreed an account to be taken of what for the principal sum of 200*l.* and interest, from the *Elizabeth* the late wife of defendant *Searles*, and to tax his costs so far as relates to the mortgage of 200*l.* and being paid what shall be reported due, ordered the defendants *Miller* and *Searles* to convey the freehold, and to assign the hold, and surrender the copyhold free of all incumbrances by them, to the plaintiff *Newstead*, *Susannah* the wife of and *Elizabeth* the wife of *Atkinson*, according to the several interests therein provided and limited to them by marriage articles (1).

(1) Reg. Lib. B. 1737. fo. 478.

[269] (B) *How far a Feme Covert shall be bound by the Acts in which she has joined with her Husband.*

JUNE the 18th,
1737.

Metcalf v. Ives.

Vide Title Award and Arbitrament, under the Disson, &c. Causes set aside.

perite Green (C) *Concerning the Wife's Pin-money and Paraphernalia*

D. C. Chitty 115. *Mar. 6 the 25th, 1738.* *Shrupp v. Harman* 513 *Ridout v. Lewis.*

Cafe 145.

S. C. post.

2 vol. 104.

A. had 300*l.* per

ann. pin-mo-

ney, the husband

for several years

before his death

paid her 200*l.*

only, but prom-

ised her she

should have the

whole at last.

If the wife accepts less, or lets her husband receive what she has a right to receive to her

use, it implies a consent in her to submit to such a method. But where the pin-money is

ex nomine, her agreement with the husband relating to her separate estate amounts not to a new

and his promising she should have it at last is an undertaking to pay the arrears.

MRS. *Lewis* had three hundred pounds per annus on her for pin-money; for several years before *Lewis's* death he paid her only two hundred pounds per ann. and there was evidence read, that often, on Mrs. *Lewis's* complaining of being paid short, Mr. *Lewis* told her she would have it at last.

The question was, Whether she should be let in to the arrears of her pin-money, made a charge on the estate of Mr. *Lewis*.

perite

Shrupp v. Harman

13. Nov. 1738.

Lord Chancellor: I allow that it is a general rule, where a wife accepts a payment short of what she is intitled to, or where the husband and wife have cohabited together time after; but here is no pretence that the pin-money

parted from by the wife, for there is evidence of several payments *eo nomine*; and though a wife may come to an agreement with her husband in relation to any thing she is intitled to separately, yet this does not amount to a new agreement, for here was a promise she should have it at last, which was an undertaking to pay the arrears; she is therefore intitled to have the arrears of her pin-money raised by the trustees out of the estate, which was by settlement charged with it.

Ripout v. Lewis.

Howard v. Dig. 26. p. 311. 184.

His Lordship therefore decreed, that an account should be taken of the arrears of the three hundred pounds a year due to the defendant, and what shall be found owing on the balance of that account was to be considered as a charge on the term of 500 years created by the marriage settlement, for securing the payment of the three hundred pounds a year (1).

(1) Reg. Lib. B. 1740. fol. 35. See 267. 2 Ves. 7. 190. See also *Offley v. Countess of Warwick v. Edwards*, 1 Eq. Offley, Pre. Cha. 26. *Porter v. Hankey*, Ab. 140. pl. 7. But in general a wife is only allowed to come in as a creditor for one year's arrear of pin-money. 1 Ves. 341. *Thomas v. Bennet*, ibid.

(D) How far Gifts between Husband and Wife will be supported. [270]

Sarah Lucas, only Child of *John Lucas*, by *Mary* } Plaintiff. July the 12th, 1738.
his first Wife, }
Isabella Lucas, Widow of the said *John Lucas*, } Defendants.
and *Isabella Lucas* an Infant, their Child, }

MARY *Lucas*, in her last illness, requested of *John Lucas* her husband, that her wearing apparel, gold watch, pearl necklace, rings, ornaments, and several pieces of plate, coins, and other things in her possession, and used by her, might be given to the plaintiff, and put into the hands of Mrs. *Dunster* (a friend) for the plaintiff's use; which *John Lucas* promised, and after her death he gave the said things to the plaintiff, and made an inventory and valuation of the same, to the amount of 187l. 8s. 6d. and locked them in a strong chest, and after making three copies of the inventory, put one into the chest, and gave the key with another copy to Mrs. *Dunster*, and the third to *James Lucas* his brother, to the intent it might be known what was given: in the presence of several persons he sent the chest, with the things therein, to Mrs. *Dunster*, for the plaintiff's use, and she accepted the same on the plaintiff's behalf.

Case 146. *Mary Lucas* in her last illness requested of her husband that her wearing apparel, gold watch, pearl necklace, rings, &c. in her possession, and used by her, might be given to her daughter, and put into a friend's hands for her daughter's use, which the husband promised, and, after his wife's death, gave the said

things to his daughter, and made an inventory, and locked them in a strong chest, and gave the key to his wife's friend, and sent the things therein to her for his daughter's use. Tho' the husband afterwards took some of the things into his possession again, that is not sufficient to invalidate the gift, which was perfect by the former act.

John Lucas, after his first wife's death, by articles of the 26th of June, 1734, between him of the first part, and *Holmes* and defendant *Isabella* of the second part, reciting an intended marriage between

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between him and *Ifabella*, and that *Holmes* had agreed to pay 2000*l.* and that he had a daughter (the plaintiff) by a former wife; the said *Lucas* agrees that if he should die in the life of *Ifabella*, and there should be any child between them, or the plaintiff should be then living, that then *Ifabella* should receive one third of his personal estate, after payment of his debts, funeral expences, and her widow's chamber, according to antient custom of *London*; and that the children of such marriage, together with the plaintiff, if living, should enjoy one third of his personal estate for their respective use, and the provision made for *Ifabella* was in full of her dower and third.

John Lucas in 1736 died, leaving *Ifabella* his wife, and only child by her, *Ifabella* the infant, and also his daughter the plaintiff, and by his will of the 10th of *June*, 1736, directed that the surplus of his estate and effects, after his marriage tract was duly provided for, and all his personal estate, should be divided between his wife and daughters, the plaintiff, and *Ifabella* the infant.

The defendant *Ifabella* the widow, insists on 1000*l.* South-sea annuities, which the testator in his life-time transferred to her, and as she says intended thereby to give them to her, and by word of mouth declared that she should hold and enjoy them to her own use, and before the transfer promised often to transfer them to her own use, and gave instructions to an attorney to execute a deed to declare them to her own use, who accordingly vest them in trustees, in trust that they should transfer the same to the defendant for her own use, but that testator (on information that it would be better) transferred them to the defendant, and assured her that such transfer would effectually secure them to her, and which he did as a further provision, and to make it secure to her fortune.

And as to the watch, pearl necklace, and other things claimed by the plaintiff, insists that the testator voluntarily, and of his own accord, sent for the chest, and disposed of and altered the things therein, as he thought fit, and that he made her a present of the snuff-box, and a pearl necklace out of the chest.

The bill prayed a delivery of the chest, and the things therein contained, and a distribution of the estate according to marriage articles, and the will of the testator *John Lucas*.

Lord Chancellor: As to the first part of the bill, I am of opinion that the delivery by *John Lucas* of the things in a chest to Mrs. *Dunster* for the use of his daughter, who was the only child left by the first wife, according, as he said, to the promise made to his wife in her life-time, is a sufficient delivery, to vest the property in the daughter, and though he did afterwards restore some of the things into his possession again, as the watch and necklace, that was not sufficient to invalidate the gift, which was made perfect by the former act.

As to the transfer by *John Lucas* of 1000*l.* South-sea annuities to his wife in her own name, I am of opinion this is a good transfer, so as to affect the marriage articles, by making any alteration in the gross estate of the testator, the whole will be void.

Gifts between a husband and wife will be supported in this court, tho' the law does not allow the same.

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which was liable by the marriage articles to be divided into such proportions, which he could not voluntarily alter; and therefore this is as much a fraud on the articles, as it would be on the custom of the city of *London*, yet it is good as against the testator himself, and to be answered out of his testamentary share, if sufficient; and in this court, gifts between husband and wife have often been supported (1), though the law does not allow the property to pass (2); it was so determined in the case of *Mrs. Hungerford* and in *Lady Cowper's* case, before Sir *Joseph Jekyll*, where gifts from Lord *Cowper* in his life-time were supported, and reckoned by this court, as part of the personal estate of *Lady Cowper*.

"His Lordship declared that the jewels and other things given by the testator to the plaintiff, and delivered in a chest to *Mrs. Dunster*, for her benefit, are not to be considered as any part of the testator's personal estate, and that what should appear to be the clear personal estate, after payment of debts, should be divided into three parts; one third to be retained by defendant *Isabella* in her own right, by virtue of her marriage articles; another third to be the testamentary part of testator, and the remaining third is to be divided into moieties, one to belong to the plaintiff, the other to *Isabella* the testator's daughter, by his second wife.

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"And his Lordship declared, that the transfer of the 1000 *l.* *South-sea* annuities, by the testator to his wife, ought not to take effect in prejudice of the marriage articles, but to be brought into the personal estate before the division be made, but that such transfer ought to be considered as a good gift against the testator *John Lucas* himself, and that the defendant *Isabella* the widow ought to receive a satisfaction for the 1000 *l.* *South-sea* annuities out of the testator's third or testamentary part of his personal estate, so far as that will extend, and doth therefore order that the testator's third part be applied in the first place, to make good to the defendant *Isabella* the value of the *South-sea* annuities, and the dividends thereof from the death of the testator." The jewels, &c. his Lordship directed to be delivered to the defendant *James Lucas* for the benefit of the plaintiff (3).

(1) *Slanning v. Style*, 3 P. W. 338. *Mare v. Freeman*, Bunb. 205. *Bletislow v. Sawyer*, 1 Vern. 244. *Watkins v. Watkins*, post. 2 vol. 97. note 1.

(2) See *Moyse v. Giles*, 2 Vern. 385. *Beard v. Beard*, post. 3 vol. 72.

(3) Reg. Lib. B. 1737. fol. 421. See *Graham v. Londonderry*, post. 3 vol. 393.

(E) Concerning Alimony and Separate Maintenance.

February the
17th, 1737.

Moore v. Moore.

Case 147.

A. before, and
in consideration
of a marriage
and a portion
with his intend-
ed wife, conveys
lands to trustees,
upon trust to pay
100*l.* per ann. to the Lady for her separate use. She many years after the marriage, upon dispute between her and her husband, leaves him and goes abroad. The trustees (there being great arrears annuity) bring an ejectment for recovery of the terms, and the husband his bill for an injunction the proceedings in ejectment.

Lord Chancellor was of opinion he could not relieve against the payment of the annuity, notwithstanding the husband by his bill offers to receive his wife again, and pay her the annuity, if she would with him, but directed an account, and on payment of the arrears of the annuity, the injunction be continued, or otherwise, dissolved; and if default in the growing payments, the wife to be berty to apply (1).

Star v. Crowden
Annual Comp^y
y 405.
Trichsedge
Cochsedge
House 397.

The marriage took effect, and after living above twenty with great harmony, upon some differences and disputes at between the husband and wife, she went privately from him January 1728, and got into France, and now resides there; having prevailed with her trustees to bring an ejectment the recovery of the term, there being great arrears of the annuity due, they were proceeding to judgment and execution when the husband thought proper to bring his bill in equity complaining of his wife's withdrawing herself, and insisted she is intitled to the annuity only during her cohabitation with him, and offers to pay the annuity if she would live with him, and to receive her kindly, and forgive what is past; and therefore prays that he may be relieved against the payment of annuity, and may have an injunction to stay the proceedings in ejectment.

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After the ejectment brought by the trustees, the husband commenced a suit in the ecclesiastical court, for a restitution of conjugal rights, and upon the wife's not appearing to the orders of the court, a sentence of excommunication was pronounced against her.

For the plaintiff in this case, there were two points which he insisted upon.

First, That his wife by her misbehaviour, in causelessly deserting her family, had forfeited her pin money.

Secondly, That it was intended for her only to spend in her family.

(1) See *Sidney v. Sidney*, 3 P. W. 269. *ter*, 3 Cox's P. W. 276. *Watkins* 2 Eq. Ab. 29. pl. 37. *Blount v. Win- Watkins*, *post*. 2 vol. 96.

Upon which it was argued, that by the marriage contract, she is obliged to cohabit, and that failing in this, she ought not to have her annuity, and that therefore it is equitable to restrain her from the returns, and lives with her husband, and behaves as she ought to do, and that he has no remedy to get her back but by stopping this pin-money.

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MOORE.

That this allowance was only to promote harmony between the plaintiff and the defendant, and to enable her to do acts of bounty in her family, therefore, when the reason for it ceases, the allowance ought to cease likewise.

That in many cases the court have interposed to make a provision for a wife, on the misbehaviour of the husband, *pari ratione* they ought to interpose, where the wife misbehaves, as in the case of *Colemore v. Colemore* (1), and *Oxenden v. Oxenden*, *Vera*. 493. and that, in the present case, the Lady's deserting her family, in the manner she has done, is a sufficient reason for the court to interfere so far as to stop the payment of the pin-money, in order to induce her to return to her duty.

Mr. Cox, for the defendant, argued that these three considerations naturally arose upon this case.

First, Whether the settlement shall be taken strictly, or whether it shall be taken to intend a benefit to the defendant, in condition only of cohabitation.

Secondly, If to be construed conditionally only, then whether in cruel usage, she is not justifiable in separating from her husband.

Thirdly, Whether the usage here has been such as may justify her separation. -

He argued, that according to the words and legal operation of the deed, there is a provision at all events for the defendant of 100*l.* a year, and *quoad hoc*, she is to be considered as a feme sole, and as a stranger to the plaintiff; and to take in other matters extrinsic, and not appearing from the words of the deed, would be judging of another deed, not of this. In the case of *Wills*, which generally allows the greatest scope, in order to let in the intent, the construction has always been bounded and circumscribed to the words, for the general rule has uniformly been, that unless the intent can be collected from the words, it is in vain to urge it, for that otherwise it would be making a man's will, not construing it, and deeds are to be construed more strictly, and the rule of law is, that they are to be taken most strongly against the grantor, and most beneficially for the grantee (a). That *nemo contra factum suum venire potest*. 2 *Inst.* 66. but to come into the construction contended for on the part of the plaintiff, would be to invert both these rules.

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(a) 5 Co 7. b.
and Co. Lit. 183.
a. and 197. 2.

In *Astry v. Ballard*, 2 *Mod.* 193. it is said men's grants must be taken according to usual and common intendment, and where words may be satisfied, they shall not be strained further than they are generally used, for no violent construction shall be made to prejudice the right of any one, contrary to the plain meaning of the words.

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MOORE.

(c) 5 Co. 118. b.

If the words then in the present case are to govern, they are so express and plain, that they leave no room for construction and to put a meaning upon them, contrary to the plain sense would be bringing things to the utmost uncertainty. In *Edrick's* case (a) the judges said they would not make a construction against express words, and yet there was a strong equity in the case, to induce them to do it.

If, in the present case, the defendant stood in need of the aid of this court, from any defect in her settlement, it might with some colour of reason be said, that she had forfeited her right to it by her elopement, but even in such a case, though it appeared that a wife had lived in open lewdness, yet she was not dismissed with such an answer; for in the case of *Mildmay v. Mildmay*, 1 Vern. 53. and 2 Chan. Caf. 102. the plaintiff a female covert, who had 50*l.* per ann. settled on her by her husband, he paid out of certain rents, suggested by her bill that he had purpose to defraud her of this annuity, procured the tenants to surrender their estates, on which the said rents were reserved, and prayed that it might be made good to her by decree of the court; and notwithstanding it appeared that she was a very lewd woman, and had eloped, the Lord Chancellor ordered, that the husband should stand in the place of the tenants, and admit the rent payable, and she to recover it at law as well as she could: there the settlement was merely voluntary, and after marriage, and the wife charged not only with elopement, but open lewdness, and yet it was thought reasonable to decree in her favour, and give her such relief, that without it she must have failed at law: In the present case, the settlement appears to be upon the highest considerations, that of marriage, and a large portion, and the utmost charged upon the Lady is a bare elopement; if therefore, in *Mildmay's* case, it was reasonable to aid her legal remedy, a fortiori it would be unreasonable in the present case, to restrain her from pursuing it.

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As to the offer of the plaintiff to receive her, and on her return to pay the annuity, there are many cases, where such an offer, against the express contract of the party has been rejected, as in the case of *Seeling v. Crawley*, 2 Vern. 386. and numberless more to the same purpose: for if a man will with his eyes open make a bargain, that he after finds reason to repent of, he is not intitled to relief here, it is the effect of his own folly, and he must take the consequences.

It may besides be material to consider, what species or kind of offence it is that the defendant stands charged with; it is at most but a simple elopement, which is an offence not taken notice of, or any way punishable by the law of the land: by the Common law, a wife was intitled to dower, notwithstanding an elopement accompanied with adultery, and though by the statute of *Westminster* (b) adultery and elopement are made a bar to dower, yet it has always been taken so strictly, that the one without the other, has often been held to be not within the statute (c), certainly both together, tho' a bar to dower, would be no bar to her claiming a provision made for her by a jointure.

(b) West. 2.
ch. 34.

(c) Perk. pl.
335.
Fitz. Abr. tit.
Dower pl. 153.
Fitz. N. B. 150.
1st. H.

MOORE v.
MOORE.

gh, in the spiritual court, the husband may sue her for of conjugal rites, and for refusal she may fall under res of the church, yet that is not in respect of elope- such a suit may be as well where there is a cohabitation, ife.

then, that in equity she is punishable, or that she his respect be deprived of any of her legal privileges, to set up an arbitrary legislative power in the court, to fences, and to punish them by no other measure than ifcretion.

woman is justifiable in deserting her husband, where r with cruelty, cannot be disputed; but then another will arise, whether the usage which the defendant hath in the present case, be sufficient to justify her conduct

ars evident from the proofs on both sides, that there inual quarrels between the plaintiff and the defendant pin-money, and they became so publick, that one ears, the plaintiff himself declared, his wife had been a clergyman to go away from him, and many of the fully prove, that the plaintiff divested her of all kind of ent, and made her not only as a cypher in his family, rom her even the respect due to her from his servants; his be such usage as may justify her conduct, must be

erved by *Puffendorff*, in his book of the Law of Nature ns, in the chapter of Marriage, that in case a husband wife the respect due to her sex, and her relation, fo r himself not so much a kind partner, as a troublesome enemy, it should seem very equitable, that she might d by divorce. *Barbeyrac* in his note (d) cites, to con- the *Theodosian Code*, lib. 5. tit. 17.

laws of our own country, there are hardly any foot- o by, or on which it may be said with any certainty, uelty in the husband. In the case of the wife of one *Hetty* 149, it was so far held, that spitting in her face ty in the husband, that the court refused to grant a n to the spiritual court, on a suit for a separation, and founded on this cause, and said by *Richardson* chief rtainly the matter alledged is cruelty, for spitting in ; punishable in the star-chamber.

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Chancellor: This is entirely a new case, and I do not any like it that hath ever yet come in question. None cited, and I believe there are none; but it is not this, er difficulty in the case itself that makes it necessary rticularly to speak to it, but because some things have ted of a much higher nature that require it.

ints to be considered are,

Whether in any case this court ought to restrain a legal which a wife, or her trustees have, to recover a separate ace against the husband?

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Secondly,

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Secondly, If from the evidence, in the present case, there be any reason to lay this restraint upon the defendant?

Upon the first it has been argued, that the defendant *h* causelessly deserted her family, and stood out contumacious against the proceedings in the spiritual court.

Though this be a bill *primæ impressionis*, I should think there might be cases, where a husband would be intitled to come into this court, to restrain the trustees of his wife, by a decree here, from proceeding at law for her separate maintenance; and it would be reasonable to do this, especially when she elopes out of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court, for that would be defeating their power, and there have I believe been cases where there has been a sentence for alimony in the spiritual court, in which this court have awarded *ne exeat regnum* in aid of the spiritual jurisdictions.

These separate maintenances are not to encourage a wife to leave her husband, whatever his behaviour may be; for, was this the construction, it would destroy the very end of the marriage contract, and be a public detriment.

If a wife should elope, be guilty of adultery, or a criminal conversation, or should leave her husband without any cause, and the ecclesiastical court can only punish her for contumacy, but she is intirely out of their reach as to any other punishment, I should think a husband right in his application to this court, to prevent her trustees from proceeding at law to recover her separate maintenance (1); but then the relief must arise from a very plain case, where there is a criminal conversation plainly proved, and plainly put in issue (2).

But this is not the present case, for here is no incontinence, and nothing but the bare elopement is put in issue; so that it will turn upon the second point, whether, upon the circumstances of this case, there be any reason to lay such a restraint upon the defendant?

Two things have been urged in behalf of the plaintiff.

First, That the wife has eloped without any cause.

Secondly, That she has been duly summoned in the ecclesiastical court, on the part of the plaintiff, for restitution of conjugal rights, and has continued in contumacy, and as she has been thereupon *excommunicated*, which is all the ecclesiastical court can do, as she is out of their jurisdiction, the husband cannot have any fruit from his suit there.

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As to the first, I am afraid these separate provisions do often occasion the very evils they are intended to prevent, and if the plaintiff hath made his wife uneasy in respect of the pin-money, as there is great reason to believe he did, though this will not justify her going away, yet it may be an excuse, and possibly this agreement before marriage might be designed to provide for the wife, if such dissention should happen between the parties

(1) See *Watkins v. Watkins*, post. 2 vol. 97. *Watkins v. Watkins*, post. 2 vol. 97; *Clarke v. Periam*, *ibid.* 337. *Lord*

(2) See *Sydney v. Sydney*, 3 P. W. 276. *Lady Dowerail's case*, *ibid.* 335, 338.

as would be a just inducement for them to separate, though their quarrels should be of such a nature as are not proper to be laid before a court.

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MOORE.

As to the objection, that the plaintiff can have no effect from his ecclesiastical suit, I lay no great stress upon it, for it was not instituted in the spiritual court till eight years after her going away, and after the ejectment brought by the trustees; and tho' the spiritual court only fix citations upon the church door, or some other place, yet the husband, who knew where she was, might have given notice to her, or at least to her attorney, who was employed in the suit at law. It has therefore the appearance of being commenced, in order to lay a better foundation for a suit here.

I do not find that the husband has ever made any application to the wife, since she separated, to induce her to return, and therefore this case is distinguishable from *Whorwood v. Whorwood*, 1 Ch. Ca. 250. because there the husband, before the bill brought; offered to be reconciled, and desired to cohabit with her, and use her as his wife; nor was there any separate maintenance in that case on the contract of the parties.

There is another thing that has great weight with me, the husband's paying the annuity since the separation, for six months after the wife was gone from him; when she petitioned the court for other money upon a different trust, he, upon an application by a cross petition to stop this, expressly says, that he had constantly paid her the annuity ever since she left him, and offered to continue it: This is a strong presumption that he thought at least she was excusable in separating herself from him.

These being the circumstances of the case, I am of opinion there is not sufficient foundation to give the plaintiff the general relief prayed by his bill, against the payment of the rent-charge of one hundred pounds a year, but that he is intitled to be relieved against the ejectment, on the terms hereafter mentioned; and therefore do in the first place direct the Master to see what due to Lady Moore for the arrears of her annuity, and to tax the costs at law, and upon the plaintiff's payment of what the Master shall certify to be due to the defendant for the arrears of her annuity, and the costs at law, and continuing the growing payments of the said annuity, according to the marriage settlement, the injunction to be continued; but in default of payment of the arrears of her annuity and costs at law, then the injunction be dissolved, and the plaintiff's bill dismissed with costs to be taxed; and if the plaintiff shall make default in continuing the growing payments of the annuity, then Lady Moore is to be at liberty to apply to the court. And I do further order, that the plaintiff in a fortnight's time pay to the defendant's solicitor a hundred pounds, on account of the arrears of her annuity now due: (1).

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(1) Reg. Lib. B. 1736. fol. 314.

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MOORE.

N. B. Mr. Attorney General, after the decree was pronounced, said, this was so uncommon a case that probably it will never happen again.

Lord Chancellor replied, If you think so, you must have a good opinion of the ladies; for

*In amore hæc omnia insunt vitia, injuriæ,
Suspiciones, inimicitia, induciæ,
Bellum, pax rursus.*

February the
27th, 1737.

Thomas Cecil, and Mary his Wife, and Mary Fuxon, } Plaintiff
the Wife of Emanuel Fuxon, by her next Friend, }

The said Emanuel Fuxon, Moses Fuxon, Thomas } Defendant
Fuxon, and Samuel Fuxon, }

Case 148.

S. C. cited, 3
Burr. 1778.

The defendant Emanuel Fuxon some few years after his marriage, left his wife and two small children, and went abroad and did not see her or them in fourteen years; the wife's mother during this time intrusted her with millinery and other goods, and permitted her to maintain herself and children out of the profits. The husband upon his return breaks open the wife's house, and takes away all her goods and produce of the stock so lent as aforesaid. The bill therefore (*inter alia*) brought for the re-delivery of the goods. What she acquired in her husband's absence to subsist herself and family, is her separate property, and not to the disposition of the husband; and what he has forcibly taken, he must deliver in specie, but if he cannot, must pay her the value set by the Master.

IN 1708, the plaintiff Mary Fuxon, then Mary Egginton, daughter of Ann Egginton, intermarried with the defendant Emanuel Fuxon, and had issue a son and two daughters. One of the daughters died an infant, and the son in 1731, and plaintiff Mary Cecil the other daughter in 1733 intermarried with the plaintiff Thomas. The defendant Emanuel Fuxon, few years after the marriage with Mary Fuxon, left her and small children, and went abroad and did not see or send to for fourteen years; and upon their being so deserted, Ann Egginton, in 1714, intrusted the plaintiff Mary Fuxon with a bill of sale, in consideration that her son Richard Egginton undertaken to provide for her during her life, sell to him executors, &c. the goods, chattels, and personal estate then mentioned, and desired him to be assisting to the plaintiff Fuxon, by lending her, as she had done, such of the goods as should have occasion for, to support herself and children. Another bill of sale in 1722, Ann Egginton conveyed to the plaintiff Mary Cecil, the residue of her goods and chattels, household stuff, and all other her substance whatsoever, to her own use. Ann Egginton soon after died.

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In 1725, the plaintiff Mary Fuxon, who had been constituted assisted by her daughter the plaintiff Mary Cecil, did by her separate trade, and entirely out of the stock so lent, save the twenty pounds, which she intended to place out at interest.

This sum the defendants Moses, Thomas and Samuel Fuxon offered they might have on their bond, and she consenting, executed a bond, and gave the same to her, and she afterwards advanced to the said defendants another twenty pounds, and

gave her a note for the same: *Mary Juxon* never read either the bond or note, and it appeared that the said defendants had made the bond and note payable to the defendant *Emanuel Juxon*, and to mention or notice taken that the money was the property of *Mary Juxon*.

The defendant *Emanuel Juxon*, upon his return to *England*, broke open the door of the wife's house, and took away the goods that belonged to *Thomas* and *Mary Cecil*, and also the very goods and the produce of the stock which had been lent by *Ann Egginton* to the plaintiff *Mary Juxon*, and were comprized in the said bill of sale.

Therefore the bill is brought, among other things, for the principal and interest of the bond and note, and for the redelivery of the goods, which the defendant *Emanuel Juxon* had forcibly taken away, and that his wife the plaintiff *Mary Juxon* may be quieted in the possession of what she had acquired by trade, during the absence of her husband.

The defendant *Emanuel Juxon* insisted, that in her dealings she made use of his name and credit, and that though he was out of the kingdom, yet the plaintiff *Mary Juxon* knew where he was (1), and notwithstanding they lived separately, yet it was no separation by agreement, and therefore he being liable to be arrested for the debts contracted by her in trade, was intitled to the profits and produce of the trade.

Sir *Joseph Jekyll* was of opinion, as the desertion of the defendant *Emanuel Juxon* was fully proved, this court would look upon any thing acquired by the wife in his absence, to subsist herself and family, as her separate property, and not liable to the disposition of the husband, when he should please to come home and plunder her, and therefore declared that the plaintiff *Mary Juxon* is intitled to the goods that were in her possession, and also to the stock in her separate trade, before the same were taken away by the defendant *Emanuel Juxon*, for her separate use, and that she is also intitled to the bond and note, and therefore ordered it to be referred to a Master to see what was due for principal and interest, and that the same be paid to the plaintiff *Juxon* for her separate use, and to see what goods and stock in trade were taken away, and the defendant *Emanuel Juxon* to deliver the same in specie, to plaintiff *Cecil* and his wife, in trust for the plaintiff *Juxon*, and if the goods are disposed of, the Master to put a value on them, and the defendant *Emanuel Juxon* to pay the value in the same manner. 'No costs of either side (2).

(1) That he used to send her money, and sometimes came to see and stay with her.

(2) *Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 701.*

(F) Rule as to a Possibility of the Wife.

July the 31st,
1749.

Grey v. Kentish.

Case 149.

Where a particular assignee took with notice of an equity in a wife, and the assignees under a commission

AARON Wood gives by his will the moiety that he was entitled to of General *Wood's* estate, to *Elizabeth Clark* for life, and then to *Elizabeth Kentish* for life, and afterwards equally divided among such of the children of *Elizabeth Kentish* as should be living at her decease.

of bankruptcy against the husband, take subject to the same equity, the court is her property, will decree it to be transferred to her (1).

See v. Thornely
Simons 167.
See v. Hart
Russell 360. This was afterwards, by a decree of the court of Chancery directed to be laid out in *South-sea* annuities, and the interest thereof to be paid to *Elizabeth Clarke* for life, and after her death to *Elizabeth Kentish* for life, and after her death to her children.

The husband of *Elizabeth Kentish* (2) assigns this legacy to *Jackson Barret*, for securing 150l. upon a contingency mentioned in the deed of assignment, which also recites the decree.

Russell 1.
See v. Morton
Russell 65.
See v. Hattwell
Phillips 342. The husband afterwards becomes a bankrupt, and the contingency upon which the wife was to take not having happened at the time of the bankruptcy, *Barret* waived his assignment and chose to come in as a general creditor, and assigned the legacy to the assignees under the commission of bankruptcy against *Kentish*.

The petitioner (one of the children of *Elizabeth Kentish*, is now dead) prays the *South-sea* annuities may be transferred to her, she being intitled thereto under the will of *Wood*.

A husband cannot in law, assign a possibility of the wife, nor a possibility of his own, but this court will support such assignment for a valuable consideration (3).

Lord Chancellor : A husband cannot assign in law a possibility of the wife, nor a possibility of his own, but this court will withstanding support such an assignment, for a valuable consideration, though I do not know any case where a person claimed under a particular assignee, has been obliged to make such provision as is prayed here.

(1) See *Ex parte Coysegame*, ante 192.
Jewson v. Moulson, post, 2 vol. 417.

(2) This part of the case is not stated exactly right. *Elizabeth Kentish* had a daughter, named *Elizabeth Kentish*, who in her mother's life-time married one *Crisp*. *Crisp* made no settlement on his wife, and in the life time of *Elizabeth Kentish* the mother and without the privity of his wife, made the assignment to *Barret* upon the contingency of his

wife being alive at her mother's death. *Crisp* became a bankrupt and died in the life-time of the mother *Elizabeth Kentish*. *Barret* came in as a general creditor under the commission, and assigned the legacy to the assignees. When upon *Elizabeth Crisp* petitioned to the annuities transferred to her, it was ordered accordingly. Reg. A. 1748. fol. 532.

(3) *Bates v. Dandby*, post. 2 vol.

As to assignees under a commission of bankruptcy, and the wife of the bankrupt, the court has interposed, and obliged the assignees to make a provision.

What makes this case particular is, that there was a decree which ordered the money to be paid to the usher of the court, and it is also in another respect particular, that his was not an absolute assignment, but in the nature of a security only, and is now come back into the hands of the assignees of the husband.

What then is the equity arising to the wife under the decree? It will neither let the husband, if he remained *sui juris*, or, if he becomes bankrupt, his assignees touch the money unless they first make a provision for the wife.

I will put this case; suppose the husband living and no bankrupt, and he had paid off the 150*l.* and had died, would the representative of the husband have been intitled? I am of opinion not, as it was in the nature of a pledge, but would have been the wife's by survivorship.

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Or if the husband had died without redeeming the estate of the wife, she would have been intitled to have this estate discharged, and the estate would have survived to her.

The particular assignee, having taken with notice of the equity of the wife, and the assignees under the commission taking it subject to the same equity with the particular assignee, I am of opinion it is her property, and therefore shall direct the *South-sea* annuities to be transferred to her.

His Lordship made an order accordingly.

Vide title Infant, under the Division, How far favoured in Equity, Smith v. Low.

Vide title Dower and Jointure.

Vide title Injunction.

Vide title Partition.

Vide title Evidence, Witnesses, Proof, Cotten v. Luttrell.

C A P. XVII.

Bills of Exchange.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills of Exchange.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Principal and Factor.

(A) *Rule as to an Indorsee.*Between the Seals after *Hillary Term 1736.**Standaish v. Hutchinson*
*1 Simon. 398.**Lake v. Hayes.*

Case 150.

Every indorsee is
a new drawer.

LORD Chancellor: His Lordship said, there has been a difference of opinion amongst judges, Whether a demand must be made upon the drawer of a bill of exchange, to intitle an indorsee to an action, but that he was very clear in his own judgment, there is no occasion to make that demand, for he considered every indorsee as a new drawer (1).

Rule as to the
statute of limitations.

*It was adjudged by the late Master of the Rolls, that a bill in Chancery, which had been depending almost six years, ought not to be considered as a sufficient demand of the debt, so as to take it out of the statute of limitations (2).

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(1) *Harry v. Peritt*, 1 Salk. 133.
Bromely v. Frazier, 1 Stra. 441. *Lawrence v. Jacob*, *ibid.* 515. *Heylyn v. Adamson*, 2 Burr. 674. *Sed contra*, *Sidebotham v. Smith*, 1 Stra. 649. *Collins v. Butler*, 2 Stra. 1087.

(2) *Craddock v. Marsh*, 1 Cha. Rep. 205. *Hurdet v. Calladon* *ibid.* 214. *anon.* 2 Cha. Cas. 217. *anon. post* 2 vol. 1. *Contra, anon.* 1 Vern. 73.

C A P. XVIII.

Bill.

- (A) *Bill of Peace to prevent Multiplicity of Suits.*
- (B) *Bills of Discovery, and herein of what Things there shall be a Discovery.*
- (C) *Who are to be Parties to it.*
- (D) *Bills of Review.*
- (E) *Cross Bills.*
- (F) *Supplemental Bills.*
- (G) *Bill to perpetuate Testimony of Witnesses.*

(A) *Bill of Peace to prevent Multiplicity of Suits.*

Mayor of York v. Pilkington and others.

December the
5th, 1737.

Cafe 151.

S. C. post. 2 vol.

302.
Where there has
been a possession
of a fishery for a
considerable
length of time,
a person who
claims a sole

A Bill was brought in this court, to quiet the plaintiffs in a right of fishery in the river *Ouse*, of which they claimed the sole fishery for a large tract, against the defendants, who, as it was suggested by the bill, claimed several rights, either as lords of manors, or occupiers of the adjacent lands, and also for a discovery and account of the fish they had taken.

right to it, may bring a bill to be quieted in the possession, though he has not established his right at law, and it is no objection upon a demurrer to such bill that the defendants, have distinct rights, for upon an issue to try the general right, they may at law take advantage of their several exemptions, and distinct rights.

The defendants demurred to the bill, as being a matter cognizable only at law.

Lord Chancellor: Such a bill against so many several trespassers is improper before a trial at law, a bill may be brought against tenants by a lord of a manor for incroachments, &c. or by tenants against a lord of a manor as a disturber, to be quieted in the enjoyment of their common; and as in these cases there is one general right to be established against all, it is a proper bill, nor is it necessary all the commoners should be parties (1); so likewise a bill may be brought by a parson for tythes against parishioners (2), or by parishioners to establish a *modus*, for there is a general right and privity between them and consequently it is proper to institute a suit of this kind (3).

There is no privity at all in the case, but so many distinct trespassers in this separate fishery; besides the defendants may claim a right of a different nature, some by prescription, others by particular grants, and an injunction here would not quiet the possession, for other persons, not parties to this bill, may likewise claim a right of fishing.

It is more necessary too in this case, there should be a trial at law, for it does not clearly appear, whether there is a right even in the plaintiffs (4), and if it should eventually come out that the corporation of *York* are lords of this fishery, then would be the proper time to have an injunction to prevent their being disturbed in their possession. His Lordship therefore allowed the demurrer.

This demurrer was set down to be re-argued on the 13th of *March* 1737, when, in support of it, it was urged, that though

(1) *Vide Rudge v. Hopkins*, 2 *Eq. Ab.* 170. pl. 27. *Poore v. Clark*, post. 2 vol. 515.

(2) *Brown v. Vermuden*, 1 *Ch. Ca.* 272.

(3) A Bill will not lie to direct an issue to ascertain boundaries between two parishes. *Parish of St. Luke v. Parish of St. Leonard*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 40.

(4) *Vide Cressett v. Mytton*, 3 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 481.

Mayor of YORK
v. PILKING-
TON.

it is charged in the bill, that this bill is to prevent multiplicity of suits, yet that was never allowed in this court, where the defendants have all different titles, and depend upon various matters and rights, and is not like the case of lords and tenants, or parsons and parishioners, nor properly under the rule of bills of peace, for no other party who has a title or right of the same nature, could be bound by this bill: the plaintiffs say, they have a prescriptive right, this being a publick royal river, the defendants, being lords of manors, may have the same right, or for the same reason they cannot prescribe for that, unless for some consideration paid.

Mr. Attorney-General *e contra*. The defendants never attempted to set up this exclusive privilege till now, but have always applied for leave to the plaintiffs; the defendants are owners of lands and lords of manors adjoining to this river, and it may properly be determined, whether the plaintiffs have that sole and separate right of fishery, and that is incumbent on the plaintiffs to prove; such bills have been brought by the city of London for some certain duties, and though a great many particular rights have been insisted on, yet a general issue has been directed to try the right. In the case of *v. Carter*, 1734, a bill was brought by the lord of the manor of Stepney, for sixpence on every load of hay carried to *Whitechapel*, though the lord, house-keepers, and scavengers claimed each some right in the sixpence, yet one general issue was directed by lord Talbot to try that question, and the demurrer in that case was over-ruled.

Lord Chancellor: When this case was first argued, I was of opinion to allow the demurrer, but I have now changed my opinion.

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Here are two causes of demurrer, one assigned originally, and one now at the bar, that this is not a proper bill, as it claims a sole right of fishery against five lords of manors, because they ought to be considered as distinct trespassers, and that there is no general right that can be established against them, nor any privity between the plaintiffs and them.

In this respect it does differ from cases that have been cited of lords and tenants, parsons and parishioners, where there is one general right, and a privity between the parties. But there are cases where bills of peace have been brought, though there has been a general right claimed by the plaintiff, and yet no privity between the plaintiffs and defendants, nor any general right on the part of the defendants, and where many more might be concerned than those brought before the court: such are bills for duties, as in the case of the city of London *v. Perkins* (1) in the House of Lords, where the city of London brought only a few persons before the court, who dealt in those things whereof the duty was claimed, to establish a right to it, and yet all the king's subjects may be concerned in this right; but because a great number of actions may be brought, the court suffers such bills, though the defendants might make distinct defences.

and though there was no privity between them and **Mayor of York v. Pilkington** 10 M.

herefore this bill is proper, and the more so, because here are no other persons but the defendants who set on against the plaintiffs, and it is no objection that separate defences; but the question is, whether they have a general right to the sole fishery, which extends to the defendants; for notwithstanding the general right is established, the defendants may take advantage of their options, or distinct rights.

cause of demurrer is, that the plaintiffs have not their title at law, and have therefore brought their bill to be quieted in possession. Now it is a general rule that a man shall not come in to a court of equity to establish his title, unless he has tried his title at law, if he can (1); not so general an objection as always to prevail, for there are many varieties of cases both ways.

See two cases reported together in *Prec. in Eq.* 530. *Turner v. the Duke of Dorset v. Serjeant Girdler* (a); (a) 2 Eq. Ab. 181. pl. 3. C. or it was held, that a man who has been in possession for sixty years, may bring a bill to be quieted in possession, although he had not established his right at law; that a man who is in possession of a fishery, may bring a bill to examine his witnesses *in perpetuam rei memoriam* to establish his right, though he has not recovered in law; otherwise, if he is interrupted and disturbed then he had his remedy at law. In the present case the demurrer was over-ruled (2).

10 M. 1 Vern. 120. *East India Company v. Sandys*, *ibid.* 127. *Pawlet v. East India Company v. Cba. Ca.* 165. *Whitchurch v. Lord Teynham* 2 vol. 391. *Lord Teynham v. Bert*, *post.* 2 vol. 483. *anon.* 2 Vef. 414. *Waller v. Smeaton & Bro. Cba. Rep.* 572. (2) See the difference between this case and that of *Lord Teynham v. Herbert*, *post.* 2 vol. 483.

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Others, ———— Plaintiffs.
Tenny and Others, ———— Defendants

by the plaintiff for an injunction to stay the proceedings of the defendants at law till the hearing of the bill in court, upon a suggestion that this is a bill of peace, favoured in equity, for the principal prayer of it is, that the defendants who have only a small interest in that part of the manor of Tunbridge, which is in dispute, may accept of such compensation as this court shall think reasonable, for the houses which they have built upon the waste.

and that they may accept of such a compensation as the court shall think reasonable.

Lord

November the 16th, 1738.
Case 152.
A bill of peace praying an injunction to stay the defendants, who have an interest in the manor of Tunbridge, from proceeding at law against the plaintiffs for building houses on the manor.

CONYERS v.
LD. ASHERGAVENNY.

The court dissolved the injunction, as they cannot be applied to as an arbitrator, nor have any legislative authority, but act in a judicial capacity.

Lord Chancellor : I do not see how this court can act a power, unless they had a right of being applied to arbitrator, or had a legislative authority lodged in either of which belong to them; for they act only in capacity.

A bill of peace may as well be brought by tenants against a lord, as by a lord against tenants.

The proper bill of peace was a former one, brought tenants of this manor, for such a bill may as well be by tenants against a lord, as by a lord against tenants that bill was dismissed, upon the suggestion of this very Mr. Conyers himself, that they ought regularly to proceed and therefore thither let him go, and not apply for relief in that court, which he had absolutely insisted power of relieving. This comes very near the case of for he has chosen to proceed at law, and therefore let his remedy there.

His Lordship for these reasons ordered the injunction dissolved.

(1) See the *Mayor of York v. Pilkington*, post. 2 vol. 483. notes. ante 282. *Lord Tynham v. Her-*

(B) *Bills of Discovery, and herein of what Things there is a Discovery.*

February the 5th, 1737.

Phipps v. Steward (1).

Case 153.

SIR Robert Cowan, intending to leave England, to the plaintiff he had made his will, and that of his personal estate to his daughter and the heirs of her had limited the same to the plaintiff.

(1) Sir R. Cowan resided at Bombay, and being about to sail for England made his will dated the 4th of January 1734, and thereby directed his personal estate to be laid out in the purchase of lands to be settled to the use of his brother in tail, remainder to his sister in tail, remainder to the plaintiffs in fee; and in case of his brother's death he directed that his personal estate should be remitted to the plaintiffs for the purposes aforesaid. Sir R. Cowan before his death in 1736, told the defendant Steward, that he had made his will, but had left it at Bombay, and had only a copy of it with him. The brother died in the East Indies. After the testator's death, Stew-

ard married the sister, and acquired letters of administration for her, and possessed himself of the books, part of the personal estate of the testator. Pending the suit in the local court, the plaintiffs brought a bill for an account of the personal estate and to have the same laid out in annuities until the same could be in the purchase of lands. To the defendant demurred; which was over-ruled. The defendant restrained from receiving or any part of the said testator's estate till further order. Reg. 1737. fo. 136.

Some time after Sir Robert Coxan died, the daughter married the defendant, and upon a supposition that there was no will, administration was applied for by the daughter in the spiritual court; pending a suit there, the present bill was brought by the plaintiffs to have an account of the personal estate.

an account of the personal estate. The reason why a bill is allowed to be brought before probate is, that the ecclesiastical court have no way of securing the effects in the mean time.

To this bill the defendant demurred, for that there was a suit now depending in the spiritual court for administration to the personal estate of Sir *Robert Cowan*.

Lord Chancellor over-ruled the demurrer ; and said, in the case of *Powis v. Andrews*, a bill of this nature was allowed before probate, and that determination was founded on a former case of *Japhet Crooke*, in the time of Lord *Harcourt*, relating to the will of Mr. *Hawkins* (a).

PHIPPS v. STEWARD.
While a suit is depending in the ecclesiastical court for an administration, a bill may be brought here for a probate is,

A devise of personal estate to A. and the heirs of her body, it has never been solemnly determined, that where money is so entailed, the whole shall go to the first taker.
(a) 1 Vern. 106.
v. Jackson (1).

Wright v. Blick, and 2 Vern. 49. Dulwich College v. Jackson (1).

The reason for these cases is, that the ecclesiastical court have no way of securing the effects in the mean time, nor did he know there was any solemn resolution, where money is entailed in the manner the testator has done here, that the whole of it shall go to the first taker (2). The case of *Colvel v. Shadwell* in the time of Lord Cowper is to the contrary (3).

His Lordship restrained the defendants from receiving any more of Sir *Robert Cowan's* personal estate till further order.

(1) *Andrews v. Powis*, 2 Bro. Par. Ca. 476. *Morgan v. Harris*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 121. See *Montgomery v. Clarke*, post. 2 vol. 378. *Smith v. Akywell*, post. 3 vol. 566.
(2) *Vide Seale v. Seale*, 1 P. W. 290. *Dod v. Dickenson*, 8 Vin. 451. pl. 25. *Buttfield v. Butterfield*, 1 Vef. 133. 154. *Daw v. Pitt*, *Fearn* 347. *Ivie v. Ivie*, post. 429. *Saltern v. Saltern*, post. 2 vol. 376. *Stratton v. Payne*, 3 Bro. Par. Ca. 527. *Earl of Chatham v. Torbill*, 6 Bro. Par. Ca. 450. *Hodgeson v. Buffey*, post. 2 vol. 89. note 1.
(3) 1 P. W. 470. 485.

Woodcock v. King.

January the
23d, 1738.

IT was in this case laid down by *Lord Chancellor* as a general rule, that where a bill is brought for a discovery merely, and prays no relief, you cannot move to dismiss it for want of prosecution, but can only pray an order upon the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the costs of suit to be taxed by a Master (1).

(1) See *anon.* post. 2 vol. 15. *Jones v. Jones*, post. 3 vol. 111.

February the 28th, 1738. *Stuy & Moore v. Atkins* v. Farr. 2 Vol. 260

Case 155. **T**HE plaintiff in the original bill, and daughter of the present plaintiff, did thereby charge, that being a single woman, she became acquainted with the defendant, who made his addresses to her by way of courtship, and for marriage, and she consented thereto; and that on the 9th of February 1732, he voluntarily executed to her a bond in the penalty of 1000*l.* on condition that if the defendant did not marry her within a twelve month after date, he would pay her 500*l.*

S. C. 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 247. pl. 32. 25 Vin. Abr. 296. pl. 3.

The defendant voluntarily gave the plaintiff a bond in the penalty of 1000*l.* on condition that if he did not marry her within a twelvemonth after date he would pay her 500*l.* Soon after, under pretence of reading it, he took it against her consent, and carried it away with him. The bill brought for the delivery of the old bond, or, if cancelled, that he may execute a new one. The plaintiff in the original bill dying intestate, the mother, as administratrix, and thereby intitled to the 500*l.* revived against the defendant. The plaintiff, as the bond was gone by the default of the defendant, is therefore intitled not only to a discovery here, but relief by payment of the money, and the defendant agreed to pay what is due for the principal sum of 500*l.* in the condition of the bond, with interest for the same at the rate of 4 per cent. from the day of filing the original bill (1).

On the 17th of March following paying her a visit, and saying he was desirous to read the bond, she fetched it him, and at the defendant's request gave it him to read, who took it, and against her consent put it into his pocket, and immediately went away with it; but coming to her again the next day, she insisted on the bond, but he pretended he had burnt it, and would execute another bond of the like purport, and desired her to get it drawn. She accordingly applied to the person who drew the former bond, and he in pursuance of the defendant's directions ingrossed a new bond to the same effect with the other, and the defendant promised to execute the same, but afterwards absolutely refused to do it. And she therefore by her bill prayed that the defendant might be decreed, if he had not cancelled the bond, to deliver the same again, and in case he had destroyed it, then to execute a bond of the like tenor.

The defendant, by his answer to the original bill, admitted that in 1732 he became acquainted with *Mary Atkins*, but that she was then, and before, a woman of very bad fame and character; and had been an orange girl in the playhouse, and that he never made any addresses to her, except such as are usually made to women of ill character, and that during his acquaintance with her he did execute a bond conditioned for a marriage within twelve months, but, when he executed it, apprehended it would not be of any validity against him; and that about two months after the execution of the bond, some difference arising between them, she of her own accord delivered him the bond, telling him at the same time she had a gentleman would do better for her, and that he then put the bond into his pocket, and that she did not within 12 twelve months after her giving up the bond inquire after, or ask for the same, till the demand set up by her

(1) See *Woodhouse v. Shepley*, post. 2 vol. 535. *Key v. Bradshaw*, 2 Vern. 10

and that he never promised to give her any bond of the like
 A, or ever gave directions for any other to be drawn, and
 its, as she delivered it up voluntarily, that he ought not to be
 ged to execute any other bond.

ATTORNEY
 FARR.

The plaintiff in the original bill dying intestate, and the mo-
 r having taken out administration, and thereby become in-
 d to the 500*l.* due from the defendant by his bond, brought
 bill of revivor against him.

Lord Chancellor : The plaintiff in the original bill had cer-
 tly an equity founded on the bond's being gone by the default
 the defendant, on which she might have had her remedy at
 , and therefore was intitled not only to a discovery, but relief
 the payment of the money; and though the proof of the
 d's being forced from her is by one witness only, it is
 objection in this case, for the plaintiff herself was intitled
 take oath of the loss of the bond, and that it was thus taken
 n her; and as this fact is proved by the oath of one witness
 inst the oath of the defendant in his answer, and as there is
 wise proof of the defendant's offering to execute a new bond,
 is a circumstance supporting the evidence of this single wit-
 , sufficient to take it out of the general rule; nor are there
 collateral circumstances to bar her, for no other averment
 necessary to be made at law, if she had the bond, than
 the money was not paid; and as she has by the defendant's
 t lost the bond; she has sufficiently averred it in her bill;
 was there a necessity that the promise should have been re-
 vocal in this case, or any occasion for the court to relieve
 nst the penalty of the bond, because it is not insisted on by
 original bill, which is brought merely for the five hundred
 nds, which must be considered as the stated damages between
 plaintiff and defendant.

His Lordship therefore ordered that it be referred to a Master
 ompute what is due for the principal sum of 500*l.* men-
 ed in the condition of the bond, with interest for the same
 n the day of filing the original bill, at the rate of 4 *per cent.*
ann. And decreed the defendant to pay what shall be fo
 nd due to the plaintiff, and also the costs of this suit (1).

1) *Reg. Lib. A. 1738.* fol. 310. See of *Woodhouse v. Shepley*, *post.* 2 vol.
 difference between this case and that 539.

us and Others, _____ Plaintiffs. November the
 24th, 1738.
 for and Balguy, _____ Defendants.

Wood v. Atkinson & 2. Beauvais
 HE defendant had instituted a suit in the ecclesiastical Cafe 156.

court, for a church rate, to which there was a custom
 ded of something done in lieu of the rate, and that plea
 itted.

8 Vin. Abr. 337,
 pl. 9. S. C.
 2 Eq. Caf. Abr.
 78. pl. 11. id.
 629. pl. 1. S. C.

must will not admit a bill of discovery in aid of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court, because
 us capable of coming at that discovery themselves.

T.

And

James v. Moore
 20 11 2. 2

DUNN v.
COATES.

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Remington
Oct. 176.

And now a bill is brought here for an injunction to stay the defendant's proceedings in the ecclesiastical court, and to be relieved against the rates, and to compel a discovery from the defendant *Balguy* of the value of the respective real and personal estates of the several inhabitants of the several parishes and places in the bill mentioned, and how the money collected by means of the said rates had been disposed of.

The defendants demurred to so much of the bill as sought to stay the proceedings in the ecclesiastical court by injunction, and also as to the discovery prayed thereby, as the matters contained in such part of the bill as they demurred to, were properly cognizable in the ecclesiastical court; and, if true, ought to have been insisted on there, or at common law, and was not a proper foundation for a bill in this court.

Where there is a custom pleaded to a suit in the ecclesiastical court for a church rate, and the plea admitted, they may proceed to try the custom; but if denied, 'tis a ground for a prohibition.

Lord Chancellor: This court will not admit a bill of discovery in aid of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court because they are capable of coming at that discovery themselves.

If there is a suit instituted in the ecclesiastical court for a church rate, and a custom pleaded of a certain sum in lieu of the rate, or something done in the room of it, and that plea admitted, they may proceed to try that custom in the same manner as a modus; but if the custom is denied, it would be a proper ground for a prohibition, *propter triationis defectum in curia ecclesiastica*, for the trying of the custom is the province of the common law (1).

His Lordship was of opinion it was a good demurrer, and therefore ordered that the same do stand and be allowed (2).

(1) *Auen.* 2 *l'cf.* 451.

(2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1738. fol. 49.

Hilary Term, 1747.

Case 157. *Boden* and others, Assignees of *Dellow* a Bankrupt, v. *Dellow* and others.

Where a bill is brought for the discovery of concealments of a bankrupt's estate, the court will not allow the defendants to look into their depositions taken by the commissioners before they put in their answer.

THE assignees suspecting the bankrupt had made concealment, examined a great many of his relations at *Guildhall* and have now brought a bill against the same persons for discovery of those concealments.

Mr. Green moved on the part of the defendants, that they might be allowed to look into their depositions before the commissioners, in order to make their answers consistent.

Lord Chancellor: I will not grant the motion (1) for as truth is always uppermost, they may, if they please, put in an answer consistent with what they have already sworn in their depositions, supposing they are true; if false, they swore, at their own peril,

(1) The defendants prayed to be at liberty to take copies of the depositions in order to put in their answers, and for a month's further time to put in their

answers. Ordered, that the said defendants have a month's further time to put in their answers to plaintiff's bill. *Reg. Lib. A.* 1747. fol. 167.

ll not give leave to see them, merely for their own security they should not swear differently in one, from what is done in the other.

BODEN v.
DELOW.

(C) *Who are to be Parties to it.*

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Herring v. Yoe.

February the
8th, 1737.

marriage settlement having been made of certain lands for the husband for life, remainder to the wife for life, and the husband's heirs remainders over; the present bill was brought by the wife and in order to have the opinion of the court whether the parcel of land was not intended to be included in that settlement. A husband tenant for life, remainder to his wife for life, he brings a bill alone for the opinion of the court upon the settlement; objection for want of making the wife a party allowed.

There was an objection taken at the hearing of the cause, that the wife was not made a party. Chancellor allowed the objection, for he said if the court were of opinion against the husband, such decree would not be made; his Lordship therefore ordered the cause to stand at the wife might be made a party (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 198.*

(D) *Bills of Review.*

June the 29th, 1738. At Lincoln's-Inn Hall.

Catterall v. Purchase.

Cause that came before the court upon a bill of review to set aside some charges out of the original bill, the plaintiff offered to show some errors in the decree. To this it was objected, that the errors in the decree were cognizable, but what appeared on the face of the decree, and therefore any evidence of errors but not the decree itself was opposed. Case 159.

Chancellor: It is true, on arguing a demurrer to a bill of review, nothing can be read but what appears on the face of the bill; but after the demurrer is over-ruled the plaintiff may read any evidence as at a rehearing, the cause being now equally open; to which purpose the case of *Jackson v. Francis* was cited by Mr. Brown.

On arguing a demurrer to a bill of review, what appears on the face of the decree can be read only, but after a demurrer over-ruled, a plaintiff may read any evidence as at a rehearing.

(E) *Cross Bills.*

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Creswick v. Creswick.

January the
12th, 1738.

As in this case laid down by Lord Chancellor as a general rule, that where the defendant in a cross bill, who is plaintiff in the original, is in contempt for not putting in an answer to the original bill, is in contempt for not putting in an answer, the proper motion is to bring in a bill of review after the answer is come in to the cross bill. Case 160.

Where a defendant in a cross bill, but plaintiff in the original, is in contempt for not putting in an answer, the proper motion is to bring in a bill of review after the answer is come in to the cross bill.

CRESWICK v.
CRESWICK.

the cross bill, it is irregular to move to stay proceedings in the original cause, till such answer comes in, but the plain cross bill, may have publication in the original enlarged night after the answer to his bill is come in (1).

(1) *Ramkissen v. Barker*, ante 21. *Aylet v. Eady*, 2 V

(F) *Supplemental Bills.*

March the 19th
1736.

Brown v. Higden.

Case 161.

It is a constant rule, that matters subsequent to the original bill, must come by way of supplemental bill and revivor (1).

Wigley v. Whitaker
Simon. 469.

Wigley v. Whitaker

Simon. 469.

AN original bill was brought by a creditor against *Aden* as administratrix of *A.* who being a married woman her husband was also made a party.

Before the cause was heard the wife dies, and the executor took out administration *de bonis non*, &c. of *A.* upon which the plaintiff amended his bill against the husband, to which the defendant demurred. *For any matter which he brought subsequent to the original bill, cannot be put into an amended bill of revivor and supplemental bill ought to be brought.*

Mr. Verney for the plaintiff insisted that in equity the bill should be abated only against the wife, and cited the case of *Humphreys v. Wms.* 3 Wms. 349. there the bill charged, by amendment, matters which arose after filing of the bill, and therefore seemed a proper case for a supplemental bill, this was pleaded to the bill, yet the plea was over-ruled, and such matters may be charged either by way of supplemental bill or by way of amended bill.

Though by the 8 Will. 3. a suit shall not abate upon death of one defendant, yet it must be taken with this restriction, that the subject matter of the bill is not hurt thereby.

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion that the demurre should be allowed (2); for I take it to be the constant rule, that a bill subsequent to the original bill, must come by way of supplemental bill and revivor: besides the suit abated entirely by the death of the wife; for the husband who was before joined in the bill, has an interest now, and tho' by the statute 8 Will. 3. a suit shall not abate upon the death of one defendant, yet it shall go on against the others, yet it must be taken with this restriction; provided, the subject matter of the bill is not hurt by the death of such defendant.

(1) See *Jones v. Jones*, post. 3 vol. (2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1736. fol. 217.

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(G) *Bill to perpetuate Testimony of Witnesses.*

Vide title Evidence, Witnesses, Proof.

Bill. Vide title Award.

Bill. Vide title Answers, Pleas, and Demurs.

Bill. Vide title Amendment.

C A P. XIX.

Bonds and Obligations.*Ramsden v. Jackson.*February the 18,
1737.

Case 162.

A voluntary bond for the payment of a sum of money after the death of the obligor in the nature of a legatory disposition is a valid bond (1).

NNAH Ramsden having entered into a bond for the rent of a considerable sum of money to the defendant at 1, in the nature of a legatory disposition of so much second, and the defendant having obtained judgment on against the plaintiff her executor, the bill was brought to have the bond and judgment set aside, suggesting there consideration for entering into it, and that it was obtained by improper means.

Chancellor : I am of opinion against the plaintiff on the at the bond is a good one, and therefore the only question is on what terms the plaintiff should be relieved against cry at law, and some relief he is clearly intitled to, the being for the whole penalty of the bond.

The plaintiff it was insisted, that he had a right to be relieved only against the penalty, but likewise against the principal in the condition of the bond, or part of it at least, it was suggested that there is a deficiency of personal assets, and that the plaintiff is chargeable no further than he had assets.

As to this was, that the plaintiff here pleaded *non est* the bond at law, and had a verdict against him, and in the usual form, *de bonis testatoris, sed non de bonis*. And it was admitted the plaintiff in this respect stands in the same light as he would at law, and the question is, when an executor pleads *non est factum, non assumpsit*, and has a verdict against him, that will not amount to an admission of assets, or if after such verdict, he may still defend himself by denying assets, and that matter be controverted on the return to a *scire fieri* inquiry or otherwise.

The defendant for the defendant insisted that the verdict was a confession of assets, and that this case was the same with a confession by an executor, or had against him by default upon his memory referred to a case in *Salkeld's Reports* where it had been so ruled: He admitted the executor was chargeable *de bonis propriis* in respect of his false plea, and said, and it was agreed by *Lord Chancellor*, held only in case of *ne unques executor pleaded*. But that the executor here having thought fit to put his defence on the denial of execution of the bond, and not having pleaded *plene adfactum*, or by plea admitted assets to such sum, and relying on the made use of any defence of that kind, he cannot be intitled to any such matter, or have the benefit thereof by any proceeding; that executors were in this respect only

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(1) *Fide Drakeford v. Wilkes, post. 3 vol. 540.*

RAMSDEN v.
JACKSON.

upon the same foot with all other persons, and nothing is better established than this rule, that no advantage can ever afterwards be taken, of what might have been insisted on by way of defence, and pleaded to the action: Nothing pleadable *puis darrim continuance*, which was *in esse* at the time of the plea pleaded: He observed likewise that the disability a defendant at law was under, of making a double defence, gave occasion to that provision in the statute for the amendment of the law, the 4 Ann. c. 16. §. 4. with regard to pleading several matters; there was no occasion otherwise for any such law in the case of executors, nor any reason for pursuing it now in those cases, though it is every day's practice: For if an executor, after a verdict against him on such a plea as this or any of the like kind, may afterwards say he has no assets; that method of proceeding will be equally beneficial to him, and there would be no occasion ever to apply to the court for leave to plead *plene administravit*, and any other plea. That the executor here might have applied to the court for leave to plead double, but not having done so, the case stands upon the same foot it would have done before the act.

Lord Chancellor: I agree with Mr. Fazakerly, the statute for the amendment of the law is quite out of the question, the name of the case hinted at by Mr. Fazakerly, is *Rock v. Leighton*, Salk. 310. but on looking into that case, I find the resolution there, goes only to a judgment had against executors, either by confession or default (1), but no further; that the rule is in general as has been laid down, that advantage cannot be taken afterwards, of what might have been pleaded to the action; as for instance, in the case of a *scire facias* on a judgment, nothing can be pleaded thereto, which might have been pleaded to the action; but though I am inclined to think the verdict was an admission of assets, yet I will not give an absolute opinion, because the cause must be postponed at present, in order that the will may be produced, and the state of the assets laid before the court, and the disposition by the testatrix of her real and personal estate; the fact, whether there were assets or not, being disputed by the parties (a).

† 294 1
(a) Cro. Jac. 294.
Legate v. Pin-
chion.

A voluntary bond in equity shall be postponed to debts on simple contract, and if claimed for money lent, and the person fails in proving his consideration, it cannot be set up afterwards as a voluntary bond. Chan. 17.

N. B. The bond against which the relief is prayed, being a voluntary one, it was admitted clearly it must be postponed in equity to debts by simple contract (2), and also that where a bond is claimed in consideration of money lent, and the person fails in proving his consideration, he shall not be allowed afterwards to set it up as a voluntary bond (b).

(b) Prec. E. 1

(1) *Skelton v. Hawling*, 1 Wils. 258. S. C. *ibid* 152. pl. 4. S. C. *Craye* ✓

(2) *Fairbeard v. Bowers*, 2 Vern. Roke, Ca temp. Talb. 153. *Blount* ✓
202. S. C. 1 Eq. Ab. 143. pl. 15. *Doughty*, post. 3 vol. 483.

This point coming on again, whether the plea of *non est factum* admitted assets, Lord Chancellor held it did, and said he had seen Chief Justice Holt's report of the case of *Rook v. Leighton*, where the very case now in question was put by Holt Chief Justice, who said the law was the same as in the case of a judgment by default against an executor, though that is not mentioned in report of the case by *Salkeld* (1).

RAMSDEN v. JACKSON.

If an executor pleads *non est factum* to a bond, and not *plene admittitur* likewise, he cannot after verdict take advantage

that might have been pleaded to the action. The plea of *non est factum* only is an admission of assets, and held the same as in case of a judgment by default against an executor.

Decreed that the plaintiff should be relieved against the penalty of the bond, on payment of principal and interest, &c. without any regard had at all to the question, whether the executor admitted assets or not to pay such principal and interest.

Can be relieved only against the penalty of the bond, by paying principal and interest, without regard to his having assets or not.

(1) See *Erving v. Peters*, 3 Durn. & East 685.

Michaelmas Term, 1738.

Bower v. Swadlin.

When obligee gave a release to one of the obligors in a bond, the bill brought by the representative of the obligee, and raised by a trustee under the assignment of this bond, for the bond conditioned to be paid by the bond.

Case 163.

The defendant insisted by way of plea, that a release to one obligor, is a release to all.

A release to one obligor, is a release to both in equity as well as at law (1).

Lord Chancellor: There is no doubt but a release to one obligor is a release in equity to both, as well as in law; but if there is an assignment of the bond in trust for the benefit of others, precedent to the release, though the assignment be with or without consideration, it will be a material question, whether the release could release, or if it could operate to the releasee, as he is presumed to have notice of this assignment, being himself a trustee in the assignment, and every man is supposed to be a party to a deed to which he is a party.

Where there is an assignment of a bond in trust for others, precedent to a release, though without consideration, it will be a material question, whether the obligee could release, or if it

could operate to the releasee, as he is a trustee in the assignment. Every man is supposed to be a party to a deed, to which he is himself a party.

His Lordship directed that the cause should stand over till the defendant had answered to the date of the release; for it does not appear at present, whether the release was precedent or subsequent to the assignment.

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(1) *Shep. Touch.* 335. *Har. Co. Lit.* W. 237. *Steph. v. Hucy*, post. 3 vol. 2. note 1. *Ex parte Smith*, 1 P. 91.

Atkins v. Farr.

February the 28th, 1738.

The title Bill, under the Division, Bills of Discovery, and herein of what there shall be a Discovery.

C A P. XX.

Bottomree Bonds.

January the
18th, 1750.

The Earl of *Chesterfield* Executor of *Spencer* v. *Janfon*.

Vide title *Catching Bargain*.

C A P. XXI.

Canon Law.

June the 9th,
1737.

Sir *Henry Blount's* case.

Case 164. **L**ORD Chancellor: A suit was instituted in the court of chivalry against Sir *Henry Blount*, baronet, for assuming and usurping arms, &c. as his own proper arms, which neither he nor any of his family ought to bear. In the progress of this cause, an allegation was exhibited by the defendant, setting forth that all pedigrees whatsoever must be signed by the proper hands of the parties, requesting such entries to be made in the books belonging to the college of arms, and then objects to the validity of some of the entries in the said books, as not being signed, and therefore no credit to be given to them; but this allegation was rejected by the judge of the court of Chivalry and the defendant petitioned the court of Chancery, in order to obtain a commission of Delegates to determine the said appeal; on the other side there is a cross petition, insisting that no appeal lies but only from a definitive, or final interlocutory decree, having the force of a definitive sentence.

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Lord Chancellor: I observe no objection has been made to the jurisdiction of the court of Chivalry, but only an appeal from an act of that court in their ordinary jurisdiction, and therefore as it is not insisted on, in Sir *Henry Blount's* petition, it must be thrown out of the case.

There are two questions arising upon the present case.

First. Whether an appeal will lie from any sentence of the court of Chivalry, except a definitive one, or from such a sentence as is termed in the Civil law, *gravamen irreparabile*.

Secondly, Whether this particular sentence of the court of Chivalry, is a *gravamen irreparabile*.

It has been admitted on all sides, that the court of Chivalry proceed according to the rules of the Civil law, except in cases omitted, and there they are governed by the course and custom of chivalry and arms, and it is so laid down in 4 Co. 425.

The court of chivalry proceed according to the rules of the Civil law, except in cases omitted, and there they go according to the course and custom of chivalry and arms.

The

ath been no precedent cited in the arguing of this case
ustom or course of the court of Chivalry in this parti-
ct, therefore it must be brought under these rules of
w with regard to appeals, that is, so far as the Civil
en admitted in *England*.

BLOUNT'S
Case.

Canon law, you are admitted to appeal from all grie-
general, but in the Civil law only where *gravamen est*

By the canon law
an appeal is ad-
mitted from all
grievances in ge-
neral; but as the

dry is governed by the Civil law, this court will not grant a commission of delegates
l from any interlocutory order of that court, except only where there is a definitive sen-
a one as is termed in the civil law, *gravamen irreparabile*.

hors upon this head are very numerous; but to shew
has been allowed in *England*, I shall mention only
ixis Curia Admiralitatis Angliae, who is an author of
credit, and very full upon this head. His Lord-
cited several instances out of the 50th and 51st

ules are extremely clear, and very applicable to the
rpose; for says the author, although the party pro-
ceptions to witnesses, and the court of admiralty re-
yet there can be no appeal; for in the appeal from
ve sentence, you may equally propound the same ex-
ior are you precluded from it.

the rule then of the Civil law, in the proceedings of
f admiralty, and founded upon very good reason, for
ld make causes there unnecessarily tedious, if appeals
allowed upon every trifling or supposed grievance;
great weight with me in the argument, and upon
le in the court of admiralty by both sides there is no
o be found of an appeal of this kind.

Paul cited a case of *Grundel* and others, against *Garwe*
ny.

it commenced in the court of admiralty in *January* [297]

heard at the delegates in *March* 1706, it was brought
due to the plaintiffs as mariners, and prayed that the
might set forth, whether they were owners of the
vell, bound on a voyage from the port of *London*, to
ndies; this libel or summary petition was admitted,
endants gave in an answer upon oath, but insisted they
obliged to discover upon what voyage the ship was
cause it would subject them to the penalties of the
he 10 *Will.* made in favour of the *East India* company;
hstanding the judge of the court of admiralty decreed,
ould make further answer as to their respective in-
the said ship, and whether they were or were not
the time in the summary petition mentioned. From
he defendant appealed to the delegates, who pro-
gainst the appeal, remitted the cause, and condemned
l company in costs.

But

BLOUNT'S
Case.

But this differs widely from the present case, for the judge of the court of admiralty there had committed an error, which was *gravamen irreparabile*, for if the defendant had answered, the cause would have been at an end, for, by the confession they must necessarily have made, their own answer would have destroyed them.

In the case of the earl of *Coventry* in 1701, against *Gregory King*, which was in the nature of a criminal prosecution, for having contrary to his oath, and the duty of his office, as *Lancaster* herald, caused the arms of his father to be impaled with false arms, &c. *King* gave a negative answer to the libel; but it being insisted on behalf of lord *Coventry*, *King's* answer should be on oath, so far as he was obliged by law to answer, it was alledged by the defendant that the said libel contained criminal matter, and therefore lord *Coventry's* petition ought not by law to be admitted, and prayed the same to be rejected; but the judge decreed he should give his answer on oath to such of the articles, as he was obliged by law to answer. Upon an appeal to the court of delegates in 1702, they allowed the appeal from the interlocutory order.

This too is very wide from the present case, for if *King* had made a confession upon oath, the cause would have been over; and therefore it was *gravamen irreparabile*, and cannot be used as an authority for *Sir Henry Blount*, for his case depends upon different circumstances.

Then the question will be, Whether this decretal order be *gravamen irreparabile*.

By the laws of the college of arms, all pedigrees entred in their books, must be signed by the parties requesting such entries to be made, and all the ancient books are so; and it has been held, that no pedigree in law is good without it; and then *Sir Henry Blount* goes on, and applies this to books produced in his cause.

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This is rather an allegation of a matter of law, and must necessarily be open, even after a definitive sentence, nor will *Sir Henry Blount* be precluded from any advantage he may make of it before the court of delegates; all courts have a right to enquire of their officers, what is the usual practice of the courts; this is the constant method in the King's Bench, as at trials at *nisi prius*; in 1 *Salk.* 281. it is laid down, that upon an appeal from a definitive sentence, the judges delegates will certainly admit of this very allegation or allegations to the full effect.

The present case is not near so strong, as the instances put by Mr. *Clark* in his *Praxis*, &c. who is clear of opinion, that the instances he mentions no appeal would lie.

An objection was taken in the arguing of this case, that if *Lord Chancellor*, upon a petition for an appeal, is not to try the merits of the cause; this is undoubtedly true, but then the *Lord Chancellor* must determine, whether an appeal will lie or not, though he will not enter into the merits, or decide whether the judge

the court of chivalry has properly rejected the alle- Blount's
Case.

been said there can no great mischief ensue, if such a
on should issue out of the court; but what weighs with
making a precedent for future applications to Chan-
his kind; for it would be of mischievous consequences
of such dilatory appeals, because, as the court of admi-
ceeds by the same law, it would be an authority for
of appeals from the interlocutory orders of that court,
d create great expence and delay, and the suitors there
ecessitous for the most part to allow of any affected

ese reasons I am clearly of opinion, that there is no
n for Sir *Henry Blount's* petition, and therefore it must
led.

Jones v. Bougett.

*March the 30th,
1739.*

Case 165.

l. *Bougett* instituted a suit in the ecclesiastical court, up-
on a contract of marriage, against Mrs. *Ann Tubert*, who
that suit intermarried with the appellant; a sentence
ounced in favour of the contract, a child of that mar-
s born, and the wife was dead.

A person ag-
grieved by, or
interested in a
sentence in the
ecclesiastical
court may have
a commission of
delegates, tho'
he was no party
to the original
suit.

Jones, who with the child was very much interested in
ence, though no party to the original suit, petitioned
nmission of delegates to review the sentence on the sta-
he 25 *Hen. 8.*

citing several authorities from the canon and ecclesiastical
ere persons aggrieved by, and interested in a sentence,
e a commission of delegates to review, though no parties
iginal suit. A commission was directed.

C A P. XXII.

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Carrier.

l *Baxter*, Assignees of *Tollet*, a Bankrupt, Plaintiffs,
and others, ————— Defendants.

*February the
23d, 1743.*

c Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Principal and
Factor.

C A P. XXIII.

Cases.

- (A) *Where they are misreported.*
 (B) *An Anomalous Case.*
 (C) *Cases imperfect, or denied to be Law.*

(A) *Where they are misreported.*

November the
24th, 1738.

Boycot v. Cotton.

Vide title Portion, where the Case of Cave v. Cave, 2 Vern. 5 is mentioned.

(B) *An Anomalous Case.*

November the
24th, 1738.

Boycot v. Cotton.

Vide title Portion, where the Case of Jackson v. Farrand, 2 Vern. 424. is mentioned.

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(C) *Cases imperfect, or denied to be Law.*

January the
22d, 1753.

Ex parte Coysgame.

Vide title Bankrupt under the Division, Rule as to Annuities & Commissions of Bankruptcy, where the obiter Opinion in Mile Williams and his Wife, 1 Wms. 255. is mentioned.

August the
24th, 1750.

Ex parte King.

Case 166.

ugcum v. Gerard
y C. 119.

Bank v. H. v. v.
H. (D. 173. 44. 510)

The case of
Pope v. Onslow,
2 Vern. 286.
very imperfect,
and not to be
cited for the fu-
ture, till it has
been compared
with the Regi-
ster.

IT was said by Mr. Ord it was determined in the case of *v. Onslow, 2 Vern. 286.* where A. had two mortgages & different independent estates of the mortgagor, one a defective security, and the other more than sufficient: that the mortgagor should not redeem the last, without making good the deficiency of the other security.

Lord Chancellor said he was not satisfied that this was established rule of the court, and upon looking into the case ab found it very imperfect, and therefore declared he would have it cited for the future, till it had been compared with entry in the Register's office (1), and said farther he was apt to believe that the tenements were parcel of and of the manor of *Dale*, and that was the reason Lord *Cousp* determined.

- (1) The Editor has not been able to meet with this case in the Register's book. But see *Purefoy v. Purefoy, 1 Vern. 29. Shuttleworth v. Laywick, ibid. : Mergraves v. Le Hroke, 2 Vern. 207. B ley v. Hammond, 2 Cha. Ca. 23.*

C A P. XXIV.

*Stoman & Kelly
44 & C. 169.*

Catching Bargain.

June the 18th,
1750.

Earl of *Chesterfield* and Others, Executors } Plaintiffs.
John Spencer, Esq; ———
Abraham Janssen, Baronet, ——— Defendant.

5 Bac. Ab. 411.
 S. C.
 2 Vez. 125.
 S. C.
 1 Will. 286.
 S. C.

bancello,

sted by { The two Chief Justices,
 { The Master of the Rolls, and
 { Mr. Justice *Burnet*.

Case 167.

I E time in the year 1738, the defendant was applied
 by Mr. *Backwell* on Behalf of Mr. *Spencer*, to advance
 to Mr. *Spencer* 5000*l.* in consideration of which he would
 give the defendant a security to pay him 10,000*l.* at the death
 of the duchess of *Marlborough*, in case Mr. *Spencer* should
 survive her; the defendant desired he might consider of it,
 he did accordingly, and being again applied to, to lend
 5000*l.* on the terms aforesaid, the defendant at last con-
 sented hereto, and on the 17th of *May*, 1738, carried the
 money in bank notes to Mr. *Spencer*, and paid the same to him,
 whereupon executed to the defendant a bond dated the
 17th, in the penalty of 20,000*l.* conditioned for the pay-
 ment of 10,000*l.* to the defendant, at or within some short
 time after the Duchess's death, in case Mr. *Spencer* should sur-
 vive her, but not otherwise.

The 17th of
May 1738, de-
 fendant paid
 5000*l.* to *Spen-*
cer, and the same
 day took a bond
 from him in the
 penalty of
 20,000*l.* condi-
 tioned for the
 payment, of
 10,000*l.* to the
 defendant, at or
 within some
 short time after
 the Duchess of
Marlborough's
 death in case
Spencer should
 survive her, but
 not otherwise.

The Duchess of *Marlborough* died the 18th of *October* 1744,
 the month of *December* following, on the defendant's de-
 mand to Mr. *Spencer* the bond above mentioned to be cancelled,
 and a new bond, whereby he became bound to the de-
 fendant in the penalty of 20,000*l.* conditioned for payment to the
 defendant of 10,000*l.* with lawful interest on the 19th of
April next, and at the same time executed a warrant of
 attorney to empower a judgment to be recorded against him in
 King's Bench, at the defendant's suit, for the said 20,000*l.*
 and said bond; the defendant, by virtue of the said warrant
 of attorney, caused a judgment to be made out on the said bond
 against Mr. *Spencer*, at the defendant's suit, for the said 20,000*l.*
 and recorded in the King's Bench of *Hilary* term next ensuing
 of the said bond.

The Duchess
 died Oct. 18,
 1744, and in the
 month of *Decem-*
ber following,
 on the defend-
 ant's delivering
 to Mr. *Spencer*
 the bond to be
 cancelled, he ex-
 ecuted a new one
 in the penalty of
 20,000*l.* condi-
 tioned for pay-
 ment to the de-
 fendant of
 10,000*l.* with
 lawful interest,
 on the 19th of
April next, and

the same time executed a warrant of attorney to empower judgment to be recorded against him in
 the 20,000*l.* which was done accordingly.

the month of *December* 1745, the defendant, by the in- In Dec. 1745,
 of Mr. *Spencer*, being with him in his house at *Windsor*, *Spencer* paid de-
 fendant 1000*l.*

in part and on
 the 21st of *March* 1000*l.* more.
 he,

Wm Taylor
Bar. 103.

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he, on the 14th of that month, gave the defendant a bill for 1000*l.* on *Hoare* and Company, in part of the defendant's debt, and on the 21st of *March* following sent the defendant 1000*l.* more by his steward.

On the 19th of *June*, 1746, *Spencer* died; but before his death made his will, and after payment of debts &c. gave the residue of his personal estate to his son, and appointed plaintiffs his guardians and executors in trust, during his minority.

On the 19th of *June* 1746 *Mr. Spencer* died; but before his death made his will, and, after payment of his debts and legacies, gave all the residue of his personal estate to be at his son's disposal, the present *Mr. Spencer*, provided he left no younger child, and appointed the plaintiffs to be guardians of his son, and also executors in trust for him during his minority.

Bill brought to be relieved against defendant's demand as an unconscionable bargain, and usurious contract.

The court relieved only a against the penalty, and judgment, by directing the defendant to deliver up the bond to be cancelled, and to acknowledge satisfaction on the judgment, upon being paid by plaintiffs what should be due at law but would not give him costs, as there was *probabilis causa litigandi*, and defendant's case far from being a favourable one.

The executors of *Mr. Spencer*, finding his specialty debts very considerable, and that such as were upon simple contracts only, which likewise amounted to a very large sum, would receive but little satisfaction through the deficiency of testator's assets, after payment of such sums as were really and *bonâ fide* due on specialties, brought a bill to be relieved against the defendant's demand, as being an unconscionable one, charging that the condition stipulated by his security was absolute, and independent of any other contingency than that of a grandson of 30 years of age surviving a grandmother of 80; and as the period or point of time limited for the payment (which was in one month after the death of the *Dutchess*) could not, by reason of her great age and infirmities, be removed to any great distance, but was every day approaching, and in fact happened soon after; so the requiring such a large sum as 10,000*l.* for the forbearance of 5000*l.* for so short a time, being at the proportion of 200*l.* for every 100*l.* was a most unreasonable and usurious contract, and such as will never meet with the approbation or countenance of a court of equity, especially where the demand is made upon the assets of an insolvent person, to the prejudice and defeating of his other just and honest creditors, and of an infant heir and residuary legatee, and that the executing a new bond to the defendant, after the death of the *Dutchess* of *Marlborough*, is only a continuance of the former transactions, and partook of the original fraud, and that being an unrighteous and usurious bargain in the beginning, nothing which was done afterwards could help it, but on the contrary, defendant, in acquiring such new security and judgment, and thereby seeking to conceal the true transaction, did, as far as in him lay, add to the first fraud, and ought to be restrained from taking out execution on his judgment, till the court have first inquired into and determined upon the fraud, and therefore 'tis prayed, that the defendant may be adjudged by the court to be a creditor of *Mr. Spencer* only, for such sums as he shall appear to have *bonâ fide* advanced, with interest from the time of advancing the same, after deducting what he hath received, and that

that he may be decreed to come in, and receive a satisfaction for the residue of such principal sums only and interest, *pari passu* with Mr. Spencer's other creditors, according to the nature of his demand, and for an injunction to stay his proceedings at law till the hearing of the cause.

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July the 21st, 1747, the injunction was continued upon the writs till the hearing.

Mr. Noel for the plaintiffs,

The question is, Whether or no the executors are intitled to be relieved, on payment to the defendant of the principal really advanced, and legal interest?

Contracts of this nature can be founded only on two principles, extravagance and distress on the one part, and the exorbitant desire of lucre on the other, and taking advantage of the necessity of the person borrowing.

Mr. Spencer, by a riotous course of life, run behind-hand; and it is proved he owed above 20,000l. At this time his chief dependance was on the Dutchess dowager of *Marlborough*, who was then 78 years of age, beyond the common date of man's life, and Mr. Spencer himself only 30.

It can bear no doubt but these were the only motives and principles of Mr. Spencer's application, nor any doubt but the view of securing to himself so large a gain on such a probable contingency, were the motives of the defendant; for, to use the words of a great author, it was an abundant shower of *cent. per cent.*

The defendant says it was not of his seeking, but an application on the part of Mr. Spencer, and that he was a stranger to his person and his affairs; but, notwithstanding his pretences, he cannot be said to be ignorant from the moment of the proposal to him; for in offering such an exorbitant advantage, spoke stronger than thousand circumstances, that Mr. Spencer was necessitous, a transaction too unequal and enormous to bear the light, and therefore the defendant was fixed upon to carry it on with secrecy, or fear, if such a transaction should be publickly known, and come to the ears of the Dutchess of *Marlborough*, it might be prejudicial to his future hopes.

Mr. Spencer was of an age to dispose thereof, says the defendant, and might act as he thought proper, as he was *sui juris*; but notwithstanding this, as the Dutchess of *Marlborough* was alive, and his father and mother dead, she stood *in loco parentis*, and consequently he had a parental dependance on her, and therefore, for fear of her knowing it, he durst not seek a remedy against this iniquitous bargain, because of the risque he run of divulging the secret.

The defendant must know Mr. Spencer to be in distress, for a man of affluence and estate could have got money on the common terms, and therefore the proposal itself spoke his situation.

This is become a case of publick concern, as it tends to the ruin of many other families; but then, says the defendant, consider the risque I run; if it turned out against me, I had lost my money. When I compare the ages of the persons, one 78, the other 30, 'tis

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'tis a farce to call it a *risque*; the Dutchess of an age few arriv-
at, and indeed no one would wish to arrive at. This is certain
not a fair and just transaction, but unequal, and therefore n-
believable in a court of equity. *But then the defendant says, M.*
Spencer, though only thirty years of age, was of a weak and decay-
constitution, and therefore there was an equal chance whether he su-
rvived the Dutchess of Marlborough. This was an after-though
for Mr. Backwell, examined for the plaintiff, does not say it w-
at all considered at the time.

'Tis proved in the cause, that Mr. Spencer was then, and son
years before, and after, of a robust constitution, prior to h
marriage naturally so, but by an improper conduct brought in
a decayed state. *But, says the defendant, all these observations a-*
out of the case, as Mr. Spencer, after the Dutchess of Mar-
borough's death gave a new bond, and warrant of attorney to ent-
judgment, and therefore became a common creditor.

The original bond was to pay 10,000*l.* if Mr. Spencer su-
vived the Dutchess of Marlborough. When he gave the secur-
bond, he was not free and at liberty, nor did he know he cou-
be relieved; and this subsequent transaction is, therefore, a
confirmation or sanction of the original bargain.

Then, says defendant, it is no fraud. Though it be not so-
the particular signification of the word, yet if it be unjust,
its nature exorbitant and extravagant, this court have consid-
it in the nature of fraud.

I will mention cases of this complexion, in which the cou-
have proceeded on these principles, where a contract has be-
exorbitant and unequal, and have relieved, though nothi-
illegal in the case, as where avarice has appeared on the one si-
and poverty on the other; and have also taken into their co-
sideration the fatal tendency such cases have, with regard to
publick. There are likewise other cases in which the court
determined a subsequent act shall not establish a contract origi-
ly bad.

The case of Sir Thomas Meers before Lord Harcourt;
Sir Thomas bad, in some mortgages, inserted a covenant, that
interest was not paid punctually at the day, it should from then
and so from time to time, be turned into principal, and bear i-
Upon a bill filed, the Lord Chancellor relieved the mo-
against this covenant, as unjust and oppressive (1). This
mentioned in *Bosanquet v. Dabwood*, before Lord Talbot
Eq. in his time, 40. This, said he, in giving his op-
an authority in point, that this court will relieve in cas-
(though perhaps strictly legal) bear hard upon one p-
reason is, because all those cases carry somewhat of fi-
them; I do not mean such a fraud as is properly d-
such proceedings as lay a particular burden or har-
any man: It being the business of this court to re-
offences against the law of nature and reason.

(1) So Lord *Offulton v. Lord Tarr- Stonehouse*, 2 *W. J.* 445. See
ib., 1 *Salk.* 449. *Broadway v. More- Evans*, *post.* 2 vol. 330.
n. Moxley, 247. *Miford v. Feather-*

1 Vern. 121. *Wiseman v. Beake*, A. tenant for life, remainder to his first and every other son in tail, remainder to his nephew B. B. enters into several statutes to C. for payment of ten for one upon the death of A. in case he died without issue male in the life of B. C. in the life of A. brings a bill to compel B. either to pay principal and interest, or to be foreclosed of any relief against the bargain. B. by his answer declares the bargain fairly made, and intends to abide by it, and that he would seek no relief against it. A dies, and B. brings a bill against the executor of C. and notwithstanding B.'s former answer, he is relieved against the bargain, on payment of principal and interest without costs.

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Wiseman was then 40 years of age, a man in business, a proctor in the commons, and yet the bargain was set aside upon general reasons of equity, and publick inconvenience, a stronger confirmation too there, than here, and yet he was relieved.

James v. Oades, 2 Vern. 402. there A. borrowed 200 l. of B. and gives B. a mortgage defeazanced, to be void on B.'s paying A. 40 l. per ann. for eight years by quarterly payments; the court declared it to be an agreement against conscience, and decreed a redemption on payment of the 200 l. with simple interest, and said, if this should be allowed, it might be carried to nine years, and so on, without any stint or bounds.

So in the present case, if the court should say it would do at 78 years of age, it might as well do at 90, and therefore no limits could be set to it.

The case of *Curwyn v. Milner*, the 19th of June 1731, before the Lord Chancellor King, 3d Wms. 292. marginal note. There an heir of about 27 years of age, and who had a commission in the guards, borrowed 500 l. on condition to pay 1000 l. if he survived his father and father-in-law; but if he died before his father, or father-in-law, the lender to lose the 500 l. The heir survived his father and father-in-law, and was relieved, though after he had paid the money, it being for fear of an execution.

1 Vern. 167, *Nott v. Hill*. A purchaser of a reversion from an heir in the life of his father, at an under value was set aside, though if the heir had died before his father, the purchaser would have lost all his money (1).

It may be said, *Nott's* was the case of a young heir, and therefore not like the present; but that is not the sole reason courts of equity go upon, but on general rules: however, for argument's sake, I will suppose it to be on the first principle, the Dutcheſs of Marlborough may then be considered in loco parentis.

The Earl of Ardglass v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 237. Thomas Earl of Ardglass for 300 l. in 1675, granted to the defendant a rent-charge of 300 l. per ann. out of lands of 1000 l. per ann. to hold to the defendant and his heirs, and to commence from the first Michaelmas or Lady-day after the Earl's death without issue male, afterwards the Earl settled his estate for 300 l. consideration, to the use of himself for life, remainder in tail to all his issue male, remainder

(1) 1 Vern. 271. S. C. 2 Vern. 27. S. C. 1 Eq. Ab. 275. S. C. 2 Ch. Ca. 120. S. C.

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in tail to the plaintiff his uncle, and then the plaintiff and Earl Thomas both brought their bill to be relieved against the grant of the rent-charge, as obtained by fraud and practice, after which bill brought the defendant obtained a release of that suit from Earl Thomas, and the now Earl's bill was (Earl Thomas being dead) to set aside the grant and release, upon payment of 300*l.* with interest. At the first hearing Lord Keeper North doubted it might be too great a violation on contract to set it aside; but upon re-hearing, after some days consideration, he decreed a re-conveyance or release of the rent-charge, and that the same should be set aside, and a perpetual injunction awarded, upon the plaintiff's paying the defendant 300*l.* and interest; and the defendant obtaining a re-hearing afterwards, the Lord Keeper then declared he was fully satisfied with the decree, and that if he were to die presently, he would make it, and so confirmed it.

Your Lordship observes that after the bill brought for relief, the plaintiff released it, therefore he knew he might be relieved; and on the bill brought by the uncle afterwards, the court relieved notwithstanding the release: for wherever it is a mischief that affects the publick, as the present does, the court will, without regarding what is done by the private parties, relieve.

I have considered this case hitherto as an unreasonable and unconscionable contract, and that the bargain ought to be set aside upon principles of equity, regarding the publick; but I shall now endeavour to shew it is illegal.

Lord Coke, in his 3d *Inst. ch. 70. 151.* says, If any person after his death was found guilty of usury, his goods were forfeited to the crown. Thus it stood as an offence at common law, but the statutes have indulged it to such and such points, and yet wherever there is an attempt by a transaction to procure an exorbitant gain, it is certainly illegal, and immaterial whether it falls exactly within the statute of usury, for still there is something unconstitutional and illegal in it.

But I will go further, and insist it is illegal within the statutes of usury themselves.

21 *Jac. c. 17. s. 2.* None shall, upon any contract, directly or indirectly, take for the loan of any money, &c. above the rate of 8*l.* for 100*l.* for one whole year, in pain to forfeit the treble value of the money due, &c. *s. 5.* This law shall not be construed to allow the practice of usury in point of religion or conscience.

Clayton's case, 5 *Co. 70. a.* The plaintiff requested Reignolds to lend him 30*l.* and on communication betwixt them, Reignolds lent Clayton 30*l.* 6 Dec. 34 Eliz. till the second of June following, to pay him for the principal and loan of it 33*l.* at the said second of June, if the son of the obligee be then alive, and if he die before the said day, that then he shall pay him but 27*l.* which was 3*l.* less than the principal. Resolved by the whole court, that it was an usurious contract within the statute, for the reason given by Popham on Burton's case, 5 *Co. 69.* that if it should be out of the statute for the uncertainty of the life, the statute would be of little effect.

I cite this to shew that if bargains were contingent, and risque run, yet even then they have been held to be usurious.

So in the case of *Burton v. Downham*, Cro. Eliz. 642. where agreed with J. S. to give him 10*l.* for the forbearance of *l.* for a year, if B.'s son were then alive, it was held to be void by reason of the corrupt agreement, and it is the intent *whether it be so, or not so.* 2 *Anderson* 121. pl. 65. S. C. [307]

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So in *Mason v. Abdy*, 3 Salk. 390. the obligor was bound in a sum of 300 *l.* conditioned to pay 22*l.* 10*s.* premium at the end of the first three months after the date, 8*c.* and sixpence in the pound, at the end of six months as a further premium, together with the principal in case the obligor be then living, but if he dies within that time, the principal to be lost; adjudged this as an usurious contract, because there was a possibility, that the obligor might live so long, and there is express provision to have the principal again, in *Carthew* 67. S. C. adjudged upon a general demurrer, that this was an usurious contract, if such contingency of the death of a man in full health, should prevent the usury, contingencies might be extended to the death of two or three more, and so the statute be of little use.

We have full evidence to shew the circumstances, and situation of health of Mr. *Spencer*, at the time the defendant lent the money, and Mr. *Backwell* examined for the defendant, says that he does not remember that when he applied to the defendant to advance the 5000 *l.* he said any thing of Mr. *Spencer's* health, or of his living, but on being pressed to do it, said he would consult of it, and consult his brothers about it, and afterwards proceeded to lend it.

John Griffiths, a servant of the old Dutchess of *Marlborough*, says that in 1738, Mr. *Spencer* lay under great necessities for want of money, and did owe several debts to the amount of several thousand pounds; speaks too as to *Spencer's* expectations of the Dutchess, and as to his concealing his debts, and owning to him that he secreted these affairs from the Dutchess, for that it should prejudice him in her favour; and hurt him in regard to the hopes he had from her will.

Another witness, *William Loftin*, swears, Mr. *Spencer* was indebted to different persons in or about May 1738, in 20,000 *l.* he was not then able to pay them, or any part thereof; and that he took all possible care to prevent the Dutchess's knowing that he was in debt, and likewise to keep all other debts, that he afterwards contracted, secret from her, for fear he should forfeit his kind intentions to him.

It is admitted in the cause, that Mr. *Spencer*, in May 1738, was only 30 years of age, and the Dutchess 78.

James Napier who attended Mr. *Spencer* as a surgeon, swears, that in and before May 1738, he was not of a broken constitution, but was his life a precarious one, but very strong and healthy, and that he was likely to live many years, and that five years after that time he had a fever, but got soon well, and from 1736, to 1743, enjoyed perfect health; and *John Griffiths* before mentioned says, that on asking the apothecary who attended him, as to his judgment of the state and condition of Mr. *Spencer's* health, that if *Spencer* could refrain from chewing tobacco, and drinking brandy, he might still live a great while, being born with a better

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better constitution than most men; and several other persons swear, Mr. *Spencer* enjoyed a good state of health in general, till a few months before his death.

The Dutchess of *Marlborough* died *October* the 18th, 1744, and Mr. *Spencer* *June* the 19th, 1746.

Mr. *Clarke* of the same side.

First, I beg leave to insist that if this contract had been examined into at law, it would have been considered there as an usurious one.

Ever since money has been made the medium of trade and commerce, all civilized governments have laboured to prevent exorbitant gain upon the loan of it.

The statute of the 11 *Hen. 7. c. 8.* was the first act that tolerated the taking of interest. By the 21 *Jac.* the courts of law are invested with a kind of equitable jurisdiction, as it requires them to take into their consideration the particular circumstances of the case.

I will lay down the inferences first, before I cite the cases.

First, The intention of parties at the time of the bargain, will have great weight in determining the court, and if it is plainly a loan of money, then *usurious*.

Another principle is, that wherever a security is taken for a larger sum of money than is really advanced, it is usurious, unless the borrower, by doing some collateral act, might be at liberty to pay legal interest.

Another principle is, that the whole sum must be lent, or repaid within the usurious statutes.

Moore 397. *Beecher's* case, cited in the case of *Reynolds v. Clayton*, as adjudged in *B. R.* there *B.* delivered wares of the value of 100*l.* and no more, and took a bond with a condition to re-deliver the wares to *B.* within a month, or to pay 120*l.* at the end of a year; the obligation was adjudged void under the statute of usury.

This rests upon the intent of the bargain, and I mention to shew what opinion courts of justice had of contingent bargains.

Burton v. Downham, *Cro. Eliz.* 642. The intent of this was to have a shift.

Burton's case, 5 *Co.* 69. *Roberts v. Tremain*, *Cro. Jac.* 507.

Cottrel v. Harrington, *Brownlow* 180. *Fuller's* case, 4 *Lew.* 208. but care is to be taken, said the court in that case, there is no communication for the loan of money, for that will make usury.

Considering the great number of cases on this head, there has been an extraordinary uniformity of judgment in the judges of the several courts.

Comberb. 125. *Mason v. Abdy*, taken notice of by Mr. *Nesbitt* before, but I mention it again for the sake of what Lord Chief Justice *Holt* said very humourously, You do run a great risk upon your deed, not of the death of the person, but of the loss of your

r. Justice *Dodderige* said in *Roberts v. Tremain*, casualty it is usury, but casualty of principal is not. [309]
 stands upon the cases; to apply them in their inference present case.

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tention of parties at the time of the bargain, will have light in determining the court, and if it is plainly a loan, then it is usurious.

only thing in view here, upon the first communication the parties, was a borrowing; for Mr. *Backwell* examined the defendant says, that when he applied to him, he said if he would lend Mr. *Spencer* the 5000*l.* on the terms

and itself is a direct security for paying double the sum in the contingency happening; there is an agreement paying a larger sum than lent; another mark! and cri-

Spencer could not have delivered himself from paying this paying a less, because the bond did not put it in his hands so.

as to that part of the case which is hazardous.

of the cases cited, do the court enter into the discussion of the nature of the chance, but reject this, as being inconsistent, for not considering the transaction of the parties in the act; for if they should give this latitude, in the words of Lord Chief Justices *Popham*, *Holt*, &c. it would be the acts of usury mere waste paper.

what ought to be the fate of this bargain, now it comes under consideration in a court of equity.

first place, this court will not lay down any express rule so far they will go in relieving against such bargains, for should teach persons, how far they may safely go, and if it is a spark of oppression, a court of equity will relieve; equity too will make freer with these bargains, than law will do.

Woods v. Cockerill, Noy 151. The court mediated, by requiring the borrower to pay the principal only.

principles now established, were established with deliberation, even two of the Judges who doubted of these principles, were forced afterwards, from the growth of this evil, from their former opinions.

Cas. 276. *Waller v. Dalt*, before Lord Nottingham. A young gentleman and two others, employed one Willis to buy 50*l.* Willis employed Wiltshire, who spoke to Dalt a silk-bought of him silks for 500*l.* The plaintiff gave bond and gave the money, Wiltshire sold the silks for 250*l.* and kept the balance and Willis's pains, and paid 200*l.* to the plaintiff: Willis never treated with the plaintiff, and denied on oath, that he treated about the loan of money, and deposed the silks to be of value or thereabouts, but proof was given to the contrary. Judgment 200*l.* and interest, (quære, for the interest,) and relief to the defendant quoad residuum (1).

1) See *Barker v. Vansommer*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 149.

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2 Chan. Caf. 136. *Barney v. Beak*, Lord Keeper Noverfed Lord Nottingham's decree, as it was a hazardous only, and no proof of fraud, for coming recently out of of law, Lord North was at first strictly legal, but afterwards relaxed.

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Berney v. Pitt, 2 Vern. 14. The plaintiff being a young man his father tenant for life only of a great estate, which by law was to come to the plaintiff as tenant in tail, and allowing the plaintiff but scantily, he borrowed 2000 l. of the defendant in 1667 entered into two judgments of 5000 l. a-piece, defeasanced them, that if the plaintiff outlived his father, and within a year after his death paid the defendant 5000 l. or if the plaintiff marry in the life-time of his father, then if he should from surriage, during his father's life, pay the defendant interest 5000 l. the defendant should vacate the judgment, with this clause in the defeazance, that it was the intent of the parties plaintiff did not outlive his father, that the money should not be paid. In 1679, the plaintiff's father died, and to be relieved from the judgments, upon payment of the 2000 l. lent, together with interest, was the bill, which complained of a fraud, and an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's necessity, when in straits.

The cause came first to be heard in Hilary term 27 Car. 2. Lord Nottingham, who in regard the judgments were for money and not for wares taken up to sell again at an under-value, on the request of the express clause in the defeazance of the defendant's law, if the plaintiff died before the father, did not think fit to restrain the plaintiff against the bargain itself, without paying the 5000 l. interest from a month after the plaintiff's death.

The cause was re-heard before Lord Chancellor Jefferies made no difference in the case of an unconscionable bargain, whether for money or wares, and though there was not in this case proof of any practice used by the defendant, or any on his behalf to draw the plaintiff into this security; yet, in regard merely to the unconscionableness of the bargain, he reversed Lord Nottingham's decree, and decreed the defendant Pitt to refund to the plaintiff the money he had received of him, except the 2000 l. originally lent, and the interest for the same.

In *Burney v. Tison*, 2 Vent. 359. Lord Keeper Nottingham confirmed Lord Nottingham's decree, but added a *non retrahat exemplum*; what seemed to stick with him, was setting aside the bargain.

(a) Ante 305.

Nott v. Hill, 1 Vern. 167 (a). This was the case of a purchase in reversion from an heir in the life of his father, where if the father died before his father, the purchaser would have lost all his money; yet Lord Nottingham upon the first hearing decreed a redemption on a re-hearing, Lord Keeper Guildford reversed it, and Lord Chancellor Jefferies reversed Lord Guildford's decree, and confirmed Lord Nottingham's, declaring he took Hill's purchase to be an unconscionable bargain in the beginning, and that nothing which happened afterwards could help it.

Johnson executor of Hill v. Nott, 1 Vern. 271. the bill brought by Hill's executor, setting forth, that the defendant was

tail, and had covenanted to make further assurance, and might be compelled to perform his covenant in specie, and be levy a fine. Lord Keeper Guildford seemed now to remit strict legal notions, for he denied the plaintiff any relief, and advice of purchasing from heirs was grown too common, and he would not in any sort countenance it, and dismissed the bill, [311] the plaintiff to bring his action of covenant at law.

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Earl of Ardglass v. Muschamp, Lord Guildford remitted ly from his strict legal notions; many precedents in the here's, Lord Bacon's, and Lord Coventry's times and since used, whereby it appeared, that unconscionable bargains, which made with young heirs, had been set aside by decree of this ' after some days consideration had, he decreed a reconvey- upon a rehearing declared he was fully satisfied in the decree, use of this remarkable expression, that if he were to die pre- would make it, and so confirmed it.

3 of precedents induced him to give the relief he did.

Price, 1 Vern. 467. The defendant had for many years young heirs, by selling them goods at extravagant values, and five for one, and more, upon the death of their fathers, obtained from the plaintiff and two other young gentlemen, old estates, several securities, wherein they were bound se- jointly, in 4000l. for payment of great sums of money. Lord Jefferies decreed the plaintiff's security to be delivered ment of what the defendant really and bona fide paid and for his own proper use.

gh v. Smith. 2 Vern. 77. Wiseman v. Beake, 2 Vern re lords commissioners. James v. Oades, 2 Vern. 402 John Trevor, Twisleton v. Griffiths, 1 Wms. 310. be Cowper, who grounded his opinion chiefly upon the case of Pitt, and said that Lord Jefferies's decree, standing there every one thought the same was just, and that there was attempt in parliament to reverse it.

Chancellor King in Curwin v. Milner, as well as Lord strictly legal at first coming to the Seal, determined against the bargain, tho' an exceeding strong one.

mention only one case more with regard to the pre- s of the bargain, Lawley v. Hooper, Nov. 19, 1745, r Lordship (1), The plaintiff a younger son, and intitled ty of 200l. a year for life, out of the estate of his elder bro- involved in debt, and a prisoner in the Fleet, and having ans of delivering himself from a gaol, than by disposing of or part of the annuity, sold to Mr. Davenant 150l. a thereof, for 1050l. In the deed there was a proviso, that time the plaintiff should desire to repurchase the said three he annuity, and should give six months notice to Davenant of his intention so to do, and at the expiration of such to Davenant, his executors, &c. 1050l. then Davenant assign to the plaintiff or his assigns; after this deed was in- when all parties were met for the execution, Davenant

(1) Poff. 3 vol. 278. S. C.

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insisted upon an indorsement, and to be signed by the plaintiff, that in case he should repurchase the said three fourth parts, the same should be upon payment of 1050 l. and 75 l. and all arrears, which the plaintiff charged he consented to by reason of his distressed circumstances.

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Davenant being dead, the plaintiff brought his bill for an account of what was due to the defendant for principal and interest of the 1050 l. and what defendant had paid for the insurance of the plaintiff's life, which by the bill the plaintiff submits to allow, and that, upon payment of what should be due, the defendant might re-assign the said annuity.

Your Lordship, upon the circumstances of the case, thought this was, and is to be taken as a loan of money, turned into this shape only, to avoid the statute of usury, and that it ought to be set aside as a sale, and made a security only, and that the plaintiff was intitled to redemption on payment of 1050 l. with legal interest for the same.

Thus it stands on the cases; and the rule they go by is the unconscionableness of the bargain, and the inconvenience to the publick, for they speak of it as a growing evil.

These cases, and principles, obviate the objection that, from the answer of the defendant, may be presumed to come from the other side, as that Mr. *Spencer* was not a young heir, nor supposed to be in necessitous circumstances, for he had several thousand pounds a year.

Many of the cases cited, were not determined on the rule of relieving young heirs, particularly the Earl of *Ardglass* v. *Mutchamp* and others.

Mr. *Spencer's* expectations were as great from the Dutchess of *Marlborough* as if he had been her son, and she might have been considered as a *mater-familias* standing in *loco parentis*, and he as *filius-familias*.

A man who has a considerable estate, if his expences exceed his income, is a necessitous man, where he is under difficulties of raising money, and is in great want of it; several witnesses prove the great streights Mr. *Spencer* was in, but this evidence is not the only evidence, for the contract itself speaks it, nor did any of the cases cited require evidence, that he was necessitous: In *Berney v. Pitt*, tho' no proof of practice used by the defendant, or any on his behalf, to draw the plaintiff into the security, yet Lord *Jefferies* reversed Lord *Nottingham's* decree.

Such bargains are always done in secret, and if the court was to require proof extrinseck to the bargain, it would be saying at once we cannot relieve.

I shall consider next, as to what the defendant may insist with regard to the hazard.

The inequality is extremely great, the Dutchess of *Marlborough* was 78 years of age, and Mr. *Spencer* was only 30; there is evidence of his health brought down as low as within ten months of his death, and of his being of a strong constitution for many years before this bargain, his life was insured only in 1744 which could not have been done, if he had been in a bad state of health.

In the case of marriage-brochage bonds, the court does not decree for the sake of the plaintiffs, because they may be said to act perfidiously, but to avoid the inconvenience which would otherwise happen to the publick.

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The same as to the cases of bonds to women of bad character (1).

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The same as to premiums of attorneys, and guardians by clients, and infants after coming to age, *Laro v. Laro*, before Lord Talbot (2). *Seiwyu v. Honeywood*, 20th of October, 1743 (3), *Stepley v. Woodhouse*, 17th of March 1742 (4). *Pierce v. Waring*, before Lord Hardwicke (5).

On the last point, whether the subsequent acts have established the bargain, the case of *Cole v. Gibbons*, 3 Wms. 290. is extremely strong in favour of the plaintiff *Cole*. There *A.* having 500*l.* given him by his uncle in case he survived the testator's wife, sells it for 100*l.* to be paid by 5*l.* per annum, but that if the testator's wife should die before *A.* and the legacy become due, in such case, the rest of the money is to be paid within a year then next; *A.* does survive the testator's wife, and knows the legacy was become due to him, and being fully apprized of the whole fact, confirms the bargain; he shall be bound thereby, and yet Lord Talbot said, that, had all depended on the first assignment, he would have set it aside, as being an unreasonable advantage made of a necessitous man. But after *Martin* was fully apprized of every thing, and yet chose to execute a deed of confirmation, and not the least fraud or surprize appearing on the part of the defendant, it was, he said, too much for any court to set all this aside.

There a man was intirely *sui juris*, and did not owe the release a groat, and therefore his act was merely voluntary. Here Mr. *Spencer* was indebted to *Janssen* upon bond (the Dutcheffs of *Marlborough* being dead) for the payment of the money, and therefore was in his power, and the new bond and judgment only a sequel of what was done before, and must be taken to be upon the same circumstances, and as was said in the case of *Berney v. Pitt*, is no excuse, but rather an aggravation.

As to the defendant's saying in his answer, that Mr. *Spencer* did not at all want to set aside the bargain, but desired him to get a bond, and judgment, forthwith for the 10,000*l.* he owed him, the case of *Wiseman v. Beake*, is very strong.

The prudence and policy of the courts of law and equity here do no more than what other nations have done in the same cases.

Dig. lib. 14. t. 6. lex 1. Verba senatusconsulti Macedoniani hæc sunt; ne cui, qui filiofamilias mutuam pecuniam dedisset, etiam post mortem parentes ejus, cujus in potestate fuisset, actis petitiisque daretur; si scirent, qui pessimo exemplo fœnerarent, nullius posse filii-familias nomen exprelata patris morte fieri.

(1) *Post.* 333, notes.

(2) *Ca. 1emp. Talb.* 140. 3 *P. W.*
1. S. C.

(3) *Post.* 3 vol. 276. S. C.

(4) *Post.* 2 vol. 535. S. C.

(5) 1 *Vesj.* 380. S. C.

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Lex 3. sec. 3. Is autem solus senatusconsultum offendit, qui tuam pecuniam filiofamilias dedit: Nam pecunie datio permixta parentibus eorum visa est.

** Lex 14. Etiam si verbis senatusconsulti filii continerentur, tamen & in persona nepotis idem servari debere.*

June the 19th
1750.

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14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

MR. Wilbraham for the plaintiffs made two points. First, Whether this is a good contract in point of law?

Secondly, If good in point of law, then, Whether a court of equity can, upon its principles and powers, relieve against this contract?

Our laws allow a certain moderate profit to be taken for money, but if we exceed it by any subterfuge, or what is called a shift, if it be for a loan of money, acts of parliament have rescinded a contract of this kind, tho' it has something of a chance in it.

Lord Chief Justice *Anderson*, in his second report, 15 pl. 8. says, Where there is a borrowing of money, and a communication for interest, the devise to have beyond the rate of 10 per cent. is fraudulent, and within the 37 Hen. 8.

It may be objected in all cases of contingency, where greater than legal interest is taken, these have not been held to be usurious, and bottomree bonds will perhaps be mentioned.

But those are regarded chiefly in respect of trade, and that is their principal foundation of being allowed.

The statute of 21 Jac. makes usurious bonds void in as many cases as possible.

The life of a gentleman of thirty is by this contract set against a life of seventy-eight; and a wager, whether that life will last beyond this, must at the first view appear to be greatly for the advantage of the lender: I hope therefore the court will see it in the light of a shift or subterfuge to avoid an act of parliament, made with a good design, and within the meaning or intention of the statutes of usury.

If stopping a commerce of this kind, which is become a growing evil, will be of publick service, it is time for this court to interpose: by these sorts of contracts men pledge their estates before they have them, and before they know the value of them; no one, who has a present power over his fortune, ever makes contracts of this kind. He who has money at interest or in the stocks, he who has a real estate in fee simple, never deals in this way, which shews 'tis the necessity of the case that forces them to have recourse to these methods, and shews too that this sort of commerce must generally be practised by young and unexperienced persons, who have expectations of succeeding to the old.

It is an observation generally true, and a melancholy truth it is, that mankind have not near so much regard to great rever-
sionary inconveniencies as to small present gratifications; young
men

men know not how to estimate what they never felt the benefit of, and by this sort of traffick, their estates, like their pleasures are gone before they are enjoyed. That this commerce promotes and encourages extravagance, that extravagance in general is contrary to the policy of the law, is not to be disputed, because men spend not their own, but the estate of others; for generally, in the ruin of one of these great prodigals, a large number of poor creditors are included.

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I admit that against this sort of extravagance there is no immediate remedy in our law; the *Roman* law put their prodigals under curators, *prodigo interdictitur rerum suarum administratio*. The magistrate has no such power here, 'tis true; but this shews the wisdom and utility of the restraint.

What is the effect of this extravagance? A trade of annuities, of jointures, of *post obits*, is established as a staple, to encourage young gentlemen to undue themselves. This commerce has been exclaimed against ever since I knew the world, and mankind have wished that some stop might be put to it. Whoever engages in these schemes, his ruin is pronounced not far off, and by these means they destroy their estates, though they spend but half of them.

How far then this sort of contract may be regulated by a court of equity, is the next consideration.

The law in case of usury rescinds the contract *quoad* the borrower, and gives a forfeiture of treble the value of the loan. This is severe! A court of equity moderates the case, allows the lender the loan, and interest for it whilst lent (1); but prevents him from receiving that unjust price, which his avarice had set upon the risque he run. Upon these principles it is to be considered, whether this species of contracts is not within the reasoning of other cases, which bear an analogy to it, and governable by the same rules.

There are contracts of several kinds which are not suffered to prevail. Marriage-brochage bonds are set aside, though a marriage be fairly procured, though it is a great service to the party who gives such bond, though the man and woman are both of age, and no disparagement, and though they neither of them disapprove of the marriage. In the case of *Hall v. Potter*, *Parl. Cases* 76. the House of Lords, on account of the dangerous consequences to families, reversed a decree of the Lord Keeper's, who was of opinion not to relieve against a marriage-brochage bond.

If contracts allowed to be good at law, have been set aside in equity, because dangerous to families, *a fortiori* they should be so where they are destructive to families.

The principle on which this court has set aside contracts with young heirs, is where they have sold their reversions or remainders, or bound themselves to pay unreasonable sums on the death of their ancestors.

(1) So: *Ves.* 320. 2 *Ves.* 489. 567. 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 648.

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In the case of *Twifleton v. Griffiths*, 1 Wms. 310. Lord Cropper relieved against an agreement to sell a reversion at an under price, declaring that these bargains were corrupt and fraudulent, and tended to the destruction and ruin of families, and that the relief of the court ought to be extended to meet such corrupt practices, and unconscionable bargains. And in *Curwin v. Milner*, Lord King grounded himself on this, that the court would set aside contracts of this kind, where the person contracting had expectations after the death of another. And in the case of *Cole v. Martin*, 3 Wms. 293. Lord Talbot said, That as to the case of young heirs making bargains, it was the policy of the nation to prevent what was a growing mischief to antient families, seducing them from a dependence on their ancestors, and therefore the policy of the nation has thought fit to set aside such bargains with young heirs.

This is the general principle, a man if he has any reversion, in effect sells it, and the present case tallies with those I have mentioned, in all the pernicious consequences.

What inconvenience then can arise in putting a stop to this trade? for as it is the same sort of men who are concerned in every one of these contracts, the laying an embargo upon this commerce will not at all hurt the constitution; for they are only fuel to extravagance.

The defendant, in his answer, objects the plaintiffs are not intitled to relief, because there is no pretence of fraud.

I do not say there is any, but public inconvenience alone may induce the court to interfere, though there is no apparent fraud.

It is insisted too Mr. Spencer was not a young heir, for he was thirty; but although of that age, yet not old enough to manage his fortune, so as to keep within bounds.

Mr. Twifleton was 34 at the time his contract was made, and yet the court did relieve him notwithstanding.

Though it be true Mr. Spencer was no heir to the Dutchess of Marlborough, yet from her constant declarations he was looked upon to be quasi her adopted heir; the defendant considered him as such, else why should he be more able to pay at her death than at any other period? So that he was quasi heres, and as an heir has only a ground of expectation, if Mr. Spencer had the same, that is a foundation for a court of equity to relieve.

Mr. Spencer was indisputably the sole favourite the Dutchess of Marlborough had; her common expression was, *Jack is my beau, nor is he a courtier, but he is an honest man*. I never was but four times in her company, and yet I heard her make this observation every time.

The next objection, that Mr. Spencer was not under those necessities that persons generally are, who enter into these sort of contracts, and that this is the main ingredient in the relief given in cases of this nature.

But the fact is clearly otherwise; he who has a great estate, but lives at double his income, who has a multitude of footmen at his gates, but more duns, is poor, is under pressing necessities; it is proved that Mr. Spencer owed in 1738 above 20,000*l.* and

was under the greatest difficulties; and is not the evidence of Mr. *Jackwell*, that he had hawked this proposal about, the strongest proof of his extreme necessities? Whoever suffered a traffick of his kind to be made publick, unless he was necessitous? Did he not run a much greater risque than the defendant? Did he not risque his whole expectations? He may be said to be poor who is in debt, and cannot pay; nor do I know an instance of a person's granting a *post obit*, without his being reduced first to the greatest extremity.

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The last objection is, that Mr. Spencer, though he lived a year and eight months after the death of the dutchess, yet he never thought proper to seek relief against it, but on the contrary ratified the bargain.

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As to Mr. *Spencer's* not seeking relief against it, it is no wonder, this was in the nature of a debt of honour, a debt depending on chance, and the false notion of honour which prevails in the world, would engage a man to pay this sort of debt, whilst the poor creditor who furnished him with the very bread he eats, turned away without a penny.

Mr. *Spencer* had not a sum of money left him under the will of the dutchess of *Marlborough*, but only a large investment to be laid out in land, so that there was an immediate payment to be made to the defendant, and no personal assets to answer it, and though the rents of his estate were great, and with good œconomy might have cleared him, yet there must have been a length of time first.

I use these arguments to shew, Mr. *Spencer* was under the same pressure he was before, with this aggravation, the debt was become greater, and no money could be raised off his estate, but by rents and profits.

I do not throw out any thing against the person of the defendant, I only press the relief in this case, for the sake of Mr. *Spencer's* tradesmen, who as they are only simple contract creditors, have no chance of being paid any other way.

I lay it down as a rule, that this species of traffick is a publick inconvenience, and as it grows into a trade and commerce, I know of no method but the application to this court to remedy it, for it is of such a complicated nature, that even the legislature cannot help it; and therefore as this court can only meet the mischief, we hope they will give their assistance to put a stop to it, and relieve upon the terms prayed by the bill, on paying the money really lent only.

Mr. *Crowle* of the same side.

The question in this cause is in fact between the butcher, baker, poulterer, and other tradesmen of Mr. *Spencer*, and the usurer.

The relief that is prayed by this bill, never prayed before in any bill, that this contract should be set aside here for usury.

But the defendant insists this contract is not illegal, nor usurious.

From the 27 C. 2. to this time, there are not above two determinations at law on usurious contracts, and the reason is, this

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this court have under the notion of frauds taken cognizance of these cases.

Draper v. Dean and Jason, Finch's Rep. 439. The plaintiff lent Sir Robert Jason 1000l. who for securing the repayment thereof with interest, mortgaged the lands in the bill mentioned, and afterwards the defendant Dean set up some prior incumbrances to defeat the mortgage, and particularly a statute of 5000l. against which the plaintiff now exhibited his bill to be relieved, for that the defendant Dean having furnished Sir Robert Jason in his father's life time with goods, and with five horses, valued the same at 2500l. for which this statute was given, but that the horses and goods were afterwards sold by Sir Robert Jason for 280l. which was the utmost value thereof. The court declared this to be a case of great hardship, and that dealings of this nature ought to be discouraged, and that if Sir Robert Jason had been the plaintiff, he might have been relieved: however they decreed an account, and to compute what was due to Dean for horses and goods, and the real value thereof to be sold, at the respective times when the same were sold and delivered, with interest from such time, and on payment thereof, the statute to be vacated (1).

Here was a most corrupt scandalous agreement, and one would have thought they could not miss the statutes of usury, in a case undoubtedly within them, and yet not insisted upon.

Ld. King in the case of *Curwin v. Milner*, might very well doubt whether he could give relief, because, tho' they argued very prettily on the circumstances, and fraud in the case, that was not sufficient to satisfy him; but if he had happened to fix upon the steady basis of the statutes of usury, he would have decreed upon an unshaken foundation.

I will consider the case next upon the statutes of usury, and whether this is not such a shift or device as is within the statutes, a shift to avoid and evade them.

The preamble to the 37 H. 8. c. 9. says, *Where before this time divers acts have been ordained for the avoiding and punishment of usury, and of other corrupt bargains, shifts, and chevissances, which acts have been so obscure, as to be of little force or effect; for reformation thereof, Be it enacted, That all and every the said acts shall from henceforth be utterly void.*

The third section is, *That no person of what estate, degree, quality or condition soever, by way or mean of any corrupt bargain, loan, exchange, chevissance, shift, or interest, of any waies, &c. or by any other corrupt or deceitful way, or means, or by any covin, engine, or deceitful way or conveyance, shall have, receive, accept, or take in lucre or gain, for the forbearing, or giving day of payment, of one whole year, of or for his or their money, &c. above the sum of 10l. in the hundred.*

The fifth section, *If any person shall do any thing contrary to this statute, he shall forfeit the treble value of the wares, and other things sold, &c.*

(1) See *Waller v. Dalt*, 1 Cha. Ca. 276. *Barker v. Vanfommer*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 149.

This was the first statute that allowed any lucrative interest, confirming statute of the 13 *Eliz. ch. 8.* makes 37 *H. 8.* Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen.
 actual.

Then comes the 21 *Jac. 1. c. 17. s. 2.* "No person shall take for loan of monies, above eight for a hundred for one year, &c."

Every shift, device, &c. to evade the statute of usury falls in this statute.

The question is, Whether, at the time of this contract, Mr. Ten did not mean to secure himself a larger interest than the laws allow, if he did, it is a void bargain.

The *cotemporanea expostio* is properly laid down to have the weight, and the judges, at that time, were some of the great men that ever filled the Bench. [319]

Clayton's case, 5 *Co. 70.* it is said, every device, shift, &c. where there is an agreement or communication for loan of money is within the statute of usury. The concurrent opinion of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Court of Exchequer, *Clayton's case* is a right determination, and the judgment within 12 years after making the statute of *Elizabeth*.

10. Eliz. 643. Button v. Downham, a mistake or omission in late of this case; but *Lutw. 469. in Mason v. Fulwood* has fixed the error; for speaking of *Button v. Downham's case*, says, *I have seen the entry in the roll, by which it appears that all the interest as the principal was in hazard, though it does not bear in the books where this case is reported.*

Mortuary is not a communication for the loan of money, but partnership for the honest intention of seeking a livelihood by it; and a plain distinction in *Hardres 418.* The case of *Joy Kent*, an action of debt upon an obligation, conditioned to pay so much money, if such a ship returned within six months, from Ostend anders to London, which was more, by the third part, than legal interest of the money, and if she do not return, then the obligation to be void: The defendant pleaded it was a corrupt agreement, and that the obligation was entered into by covin, to evade the statute of usury, and the penalty thereof. Lord Chief Baron Hale clearly, this bond is not within the statute, for this is the commodity of insurance, and if this were void, said he, by the statute of usury, trade would be destroyed, and not like the case, where the condition of a bond is to give so much money, if such or such a person be alive, for there is a certainty of that at the time; but it is uncertain, and a casualty, whether such a ship shall ever return.

Miller's case the 29 *Eliz.* a grant of an annuity, not within the statute, for no communication of loan.

Kingfield's case, the 42 *Eliz.* the principal there supposed to be liquid. *Noy 151. Symmonds v. Cockerill*, 9 *Jac. 1.* A rent of 20l. per ann. for 100l. for eight years on a contingency, if on loan, tho' principal in hazard.

Oberts v. Tremain, 14 *Jac. 1.* held usury though on contin-

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King v. Drury, 2 Lev. 17. No usury where in the power of grantor to avoid.

Grange v. Swain, 3 Jac. 2. Principal in hazard, Lutw. 464.

Mason v. Fulwood, Lutw. 469. Principal also in hazard.

Mason v. Abdy, 3 Salk. 390. Principal there also in hazard.

(a) Sir Dudley
Rider.

Mr. Attorney General (a) for the defendant.

The counsel for the plaintiff would, in the first place, set aside this contract as usurious, and if not void at law as usurious, yet it is insisted ought to be set aside in equity, as improper and unconscionable.

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It is in vain to lay down a rule to restrain every man, and every family from ruin, while the law allows every person to be *sane*, till by his crime or his contract, he ceases to be so.

As to the first point they have been pleased to make of legal usury, it's novelty does not recommend it much.

The notion of usury originally was the taking any sort of premium, for the loan of money; but as the law stands now, it is taking an illegal premium only; the statutes forbid a higher premium than the legal interest.

The statute of the 21 Jac. 1. c. 17. s. 2. None shall upon any contract, directly or indirectly, take for the loan of any money, or other commodities, above the rate of 8 l. for 100 l. for one whole year, in pain to forfeit the treble value of the money, or other things lent.

In order to make it usury, there must be a loan of money, which money is also to be repaid, and there must be a premium for the loan of that money more than 5 per cent.

Nor shall any artificial contrivance whatever evade the statute, and if this contract is a colourable agreement only, to avoid the statutes of usury, and is really a communication for the loan of money, it is within the statutes.

But this is no contract for a debt due, when it depends upon a contingency that may never happen.

Serj. Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown, book 1. ch. 82. of Usury, sec. 16. "No contract is usurious, by which the lender runs the hazard of losing all his money, both principal and interest, as in the case of *bottomry*."

Cro. Eliz. Bedinfield v. Ashley, A. delivered to B. 100 l. who by indenture covenanted with A. to pay to every one of A's children, which then were, and should be living at ten years end, 80 l. A. having then five daughters, and for assurance mortgaged a manor, and was bound in a statute of 500 l. it is not usury, but a mere casual bargain.

I mention the case of *Roberts v. Tremain*, Cro. Jac. 507. for the sake of Mr. Justice Dodderidge's observation. If, said he, I lend 100 l. to have 120 l. at the years end, upon a casualty; if the casualty goes to the interest only, and not to the principal, it is usury, for the party is sure to have the principal again, come what will; but if the interest and principal are both in hazard, it is not then usury.

Cro. Jac. 208. Sharpley v. Hurrel. A ship going in the fishing trade to Newfoundland, (which voyage must be performed in eight months), the plaintiff gave the defendant 50 l. to repay 60 l.

upon

the return of the ship to Dartmouth, and if by leakage or tempest, should not return in eight months, then to pay the principal money (2. 50l.) only, and if she never returned, then he should pay nothing. All the court held, that this is no usury within the statute, if the ship had sailed at Newfoundland, two or three years, he is to pay but 60l. upon the return of the ship, and if she never returned, then nothing; so as the plaintiff run a hazard of having less than the interest, which the law allows, and possibly neither principal interest.

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It is not within the statute, because no debt, till the accident happened of the ship's return, as both principal and interest were unpaid.

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The distinction, Wherever the contract on the loan of money upon a contingency, *that is colourable or so slight*, as is contrived only to avoid the statute, the statute shall have its effect; when the ground is applied to the cases cited on the other side, it will return the consequence they draw from them to the present.

The agreement must be corrupt, or it will not be usurious.

Reynolds v. Clayton, Mo. 397. the ground the court went on really was the original contract, being really for a loan of money, and the fact in that case a mere evasion to avoid it being a loan.

2ro. Eliz. 643. Button v. Downham. It is the intent that makes it so or not, for if it is a wager, it is not usury: every contract which is a real contingency, is a wager; and is not done merely colourable to avoid the statute.

Watterell v. Harrington, Brownlow 180. A. for 110l. granted a rent of 20l. for eight years, and another of 20l. a year for two years, if *B. C. and D.* should so long live. In reply the defendant avowed for the rent, and the plaintiff pleaded the statute of usury, and set forth the statute and a special usurious contract; said in this case, If it had been laid to be upon loan of money, then it was usury; but if it be a bargain for an annuity, it is no usury, but that this was alledged to be upon a bargain.

Fuller's case, 4 Leon. 208. A. gives 300l. to *B.* to have an annuity of 50l. assured to him for 100 years, if *A.* and his wife and four of his children shall so long live. *Per Cur.* this is not within the statute of usury; so if there had not been any condition. The care is to be taken that there be no communication of borrowing any money before.

Mason v. Abdy, in Shew. Rep. Lord Chief Justice Holt said in that case, *that a dying in six months was no hazard, and therefore not usurious.* This is very material for my argument, because it implies strongly, if it had been a real hazard, it had been no usury.

A bottomry bond is admitted by the other side to be a hazardous contract, but said not to be within the statute, because allowed the sake of trade.

I do

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I do not take this to be the reason, the true ground of the allowance in courts of justice: the lender is to be paid for a *bona fide* risque, and all turns upon this, whether a colourable contract to avoid the statute.

In the case of *Joy v. Kent*, in *Hard.* the *lottentry* contract was put upon the same footing with other contingent contracts, and within former cases, *because it was* merely colourable.

The true point therefore on which the present case must turn is whether the contract between Mr. *Spencer* and the defendant was for the loan of money, and whether more interest was originally meant to be taken than legal, and if merely colourable, and a device to avoid the statute?

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First, The contract here, upon the face of it, is not a contract for any thing, but merely a contingent bargain.

Secondly, Nothing that can shew it to be otherwise, either from the circumstances of Mr. *Spencer* at the time, or the light he stood in with regard to the Dutcheſs of *Marlborough*.

No pretence that the defendant made any agreement he should have the 10,000*l.* on any other contingency, but Mr. *Spencer*'s surviving the Dutcheſs of *Malborough*.

It is objected that this is a loan, because the word *lend* is made use of by Mr. *Spencer* to Mr. *Backwell*.

The word *loan* makes no difference; it is a communication only between the parties on a corrupt agreement to avoid the statute, upon which it turns. The word *borrow* here makes no difference, for supposing he had said *to sell*, this court would equally have judged whether it was usury, and it must be the *bona fide* intention of the party advancing must determine the nature.

As the defendant took it altogether upon the contingency, I will now consider the nature of the contingency, which is said to be so totally disproportionate, *Spencer* being only 30, and the Dutcheſs 78 years of age; and on this account so glaring, that it must be a gross fraud and imposition.

Mr. *Spencer*, as is proved in the cause, was at that time of a bad constitution, according to the judgment of persons experienced in these things, broken by an intemperance with women, an intemperance in wine, and an obstinate continuance in it, and when he was told it, said *I desire to live no longer than while I am capable of following this course of life*. The Dutcheſs of *Marlborough* indeed was 78 years old, but in point of constitution extremely likely to live many years; and supposing Mr. *Spencer* was understood then to be in a consumption, and known to be so in the opinion of eminent physicians, will your *Lordship* say this contract was so very disproportionate? But we do not go upon mere supposition, for he actually died in ten months time after the Dutcheſs, not in a common way, but with a broken constitution.

Upon a computation at the time this money became due, interest upon interest, and insurance at 5 *per cent.* only, brings it to 963*l.* so that if the Dutcheſs of *Marlborough* had lived six months

months longer, the defendant would have been a loser, and is too upon a supposition the defendant could have insured at *per cent.* but no evidence he could have done it at this rate. Lord *Mountfort*, who has been examined, and understands these things extremely well, said in *May 1738*, he looked upon Mr. *Spencer's* life to be so bad, he would not advance money on any terms; no body therefore besides the defendant would have advanced any money upon this contingency.

Having stated thus much, I will now come to the next point, consideration of the case as it stands on the foot of equity. I will first consider it on the original contract, and secondly the acts that have been done to confirm it, and hope to show it was a fair bargain in the beginning, or if not so, Mr. *Spencer*, who could give up this advantage, has done it by subsequent acts.

The general principle laid down on the other side, that this is an unconscionable bargain, is from the manner of obtaining

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The last consideration is, whether it be such a contract as, dependent of fraud, iniquity, and unfairness, ought, for the public good, to be set aside?

The defendant at the time was a total stranger to Mr. *Spencer*, sworn by himself in his answer, and no evidence to the contrary, in no shape whatever a person who has been looking out for young gentlemen to draw them into schemes of this kind, not of the defendant's seeking, but sought out by Mr. *Backwell*, Mr. *Spencer's* agent. He did not look upon it as a beneficial bargain, but absolutely refused it, and was pressed to accept it.

It is not pretended Mr. *Spencer* was a weak man, or liable to be imposed upon; nay more, they do not so much as charge him with imposition in their bill: not a young man, not under the care of a parent, married, not wanting an estate, had then very near 100*l.* a year in land, 2000*l.* *per ann.* long annuities, 10,000*l.* settled on his marriage, an interest in it to himself for life, at 400*l.* a year more, a leasehold estate of 120*l.* a contingent interest in the sum of 30,000*l.* which was left to the Countess of *Derland* by her husband, with a power to dispose among such of his children as she should think fit, a great personal estate in furniture, pictures, &c. besides.

What then was his necessity?

He wanted this sum to pay tradesmen only. It is proved in the cause, he hated gaming, and never lost 100*l.* at any one time in his life; it proceeded from an honest principle to pay his debts, and if he had advised with his best friends (I do not mean his enemies), and had stated how his affairs were situated, and there was no other way of raising it, would his friends, or even the law, say, You shall not raise it, because you can only do it in this way?

It is objected, he is a young heir, and compared to several cases, therefore, said Mr. *Clarke*, here is now a general rule or principle, which this court can determine it to be a void contract. But no such inference as he endeavours to draw from it. It is said

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said too there was a person who in 1743 insured Mr. Spence at 5 per cent.

This was not a publick office but only an under-writer might not know the state of his health, for they are no cautious in insuring; we shall shew an application to the insurance office, and they would not insure his life at all.

There is not any one of the cases but what will turn up principle, that there was *fraud and imposition*, and if no fraud here, nor implied presumptive fraud, there is no to relieve upon. The very foundation the common law upon to get rid of the statute *de donis*, and for which the of a common recovery is introduced, was for the sake of a being impowered to pay his debts.

It is said Mr. *Spencer* had very great expectations.

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And yet the will, under which he took, was not in the time of this bargain, but was made several years after.

I shall now take notice of the cases cited for the plaintiff *Waller v. Dalt*, 1 Ch. Caf. 276. The court relieved upon a very gross imposition, and was even within the of usury.

Berney v. Beak, 2 Ch. Caf. 136. It was determined for the same reason; there wine was palmed upon the p. when he wanted money, valued too at 700*l.* and he 360*l.* only.

Berney v. Tison, 2 Ventr. 369. there was also a gross fi

Batty v. Loyd, 1 Vern. 141. the reason Lord Keeper gives at the end, makes it a material case for the defendant *said he, is the common case; pay me double interest during and you shall have the principal after my decease.*

Because persons apply for money, and cannot get it the terms they would with, that is no reason for a co equity to interpose.

Nott v. Hill, 1 Vern. 167. the court relieved there, but it was an unrighteous bargain in the beginning, and notwithstanding could help it, and did not go at all upon the contingency.

The earl of *Ardglass v. Muschamp*, 1 Vern. 75, 135, most extravagant imposition in that case.

Bill v. Price, 1 Vern. 467. went altogether upon imposition extravagantly on young men, by taking five for one.

James v. Oades, 2 Vern. 402. set aside because against science, not because contingent.

Twissleton v. Griffith, 1 Wms. 310. the court relied on this was the case of an heir who was left upon his guardian being seduced from his parents; and was besides a growing imposition too by a person under a pretence of friendship, by him from his father.

Berney v. Pitt, 2 Vern. 14. the court there went upon the unconscionableness of the bargain, which they considered it as fraudulent, and therefore these cases are no more than relieving against fraud.

Mr.

Mr. *Clark* concluded, that the court would consider the nature of the bargain, and determine upon reasons of publick inconvenience; but Mr. *Wilbraham* said rightly, no certain rule can be laid down, because that rule itself would be attended with dangerous consequences, when applied to other cases, and that even the legislature could not reach it, and if so, it is strange to say this court can meet the mischief,

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—pudet hæc opprobria nobis,
Et dici potuisse, et non potuisse refelli.

It is said, wherever there is a private clandestine contract or marriage, contrary to the original proper contract, the court will relieve the very *particeps criminis*.

But the ground the court goes upon there, is, that there cannot be such a case without fraud in it, and wherever there is a fraud, it is impossible to put a case in which the court will not relieve.

Another case has been put of attorneys, while their clients are in distress, and in those circumstances prevailing upon them to enter into an unconscionable agreement, as in the case of *Jahet Crooke*, (a) where your Lordship relieved on the second hearing, tho' on the first, you doubted whether you could do it.

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(a) Post. 334

But in this case, though the party had paid the money to an attorney, the court will relieve upon general principles, his being supposed to be more knowing than his client, and therefore made the contract with his eyes open.

A man may contract on a future contingency, a mere possibility: I am considering then upon what general grounds your Lordship will proceed. Will the court lay it down for a rule that Mr. *Spencer* could not have disposed of a contingency on the oath of father and mother, or grandmother? Will the court say, that a man shall not dispose of an expectation? The case of *Hobbs v. Trevor*, 2 Wms. 191. is a strong authority, to shew that a contingent or hazardous bargain, will be decreed in specie in equity.

A man cannot at law sell an interest in an estate, but he may contract, and judges have been *astute*, as Lord *Hobart* said in another case, by introducing common recoveries to give people a power, for the sake of the publick convenience, to dispose of a reversionary interest.

In every case, where it is necessary, a court of equity will relieve, and if they do not, I will venture to say, it is not such a case as is really and substantially necessary: but if your Lordship should determine in the manner the plaintiff's counsel desire, it would be determining, that a person, in the same situation with Mr. *Spencer*, cannot for the best purpose in the world, the payment of debts, enter into such a contract.

I shall consider next the point of confirmation by subsequent acts.

My first position is, that Mr. *Spencer* had a right to release any demands he had upon another.

He has not only ratified it, but established it upon terms, though I will allow at the same time, this judgment, as well as

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any other contract, is capable of being set aside: but then it must be upon the original contract being founded in fraud.

It is objected, that at the time of the latter transaction, he was under the same necessity.

This is clearly contradicted in evidence. It is said too, he was under the pressure of debts, but is that a reason for setting aside every particular contract; the judgment here given in the freest manner: Mr. *Spencer* himself sent for Sir *Abraham Janssen*, nor is there even a suspicion, Mr. *Spencer* thought the defendant had done any thing contrary to the nicest notions of honour.

Lord *Talbot* in the case of *Cole v. Gibbons*, 3 *Wms.* 290. said, he could not relieve, because the person there, after being fully apprized of every thing, executed a deed of confirmation of the former assignment.

[326] The impossibility of Mr. *Spencer's* being imposed upon at the time he confirmed the bargain, is the strongest circumstance that can possibly be in our favour.

In the case of *Standard v. Medcalf*, which came first before Lord *Talbot*, and afterwards went up into the house of Lords, his Lordship thought it a fraudulent transaction, and said, if it depended only on the settlement, he would have relieved, but the will takes off from it, because she has done that voluntarily, and shews the fairness of the former contract: the present is a much stronger case, for there was nothing fraudulent in the original transaction, and therefore a voluntary confirmation will have still the greater weight with the court.

(a) Mr. *Murray.* Mr. *Solicitor General* (a) for the defendant.

The first question is, Whether the bond, taken as it stood originally, was a void bond at law, by reason of the statutes of usury, and if it was, I would not take up the time of the court in arguing on the subsequent transactions.

The second question is, Whether, on the head of equity this court can set aside a legal contract on the ground of the defendant having acted unconscionably.

If both these are against the plaintiffs,

A third question *has been made*, that supposing it to be good in law, and in conscience, whether the court shall not set it aside on political reasons.

I will endeavour to shew hereafter, why such a ground of determination is impossible in this court, but at present beg leave to insist, this is as honest, as fair, and conscientious a bargain as could be made of the contingent kind.

First, I shall take notice of the circumstances, character and situation of life of the obligor.

Secondly, The same as to the obligee.

Thirdly, The motive, or reasonableness of it, under his situation then, to solicit such a bargain.

Fourthly, The manner in which it was proposed, and brought to a conclusion.

, The fairness and equity of the price, according to ability at the time, and the event which has happened

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, The opinion Mr. *Spencer* had of it, in his private, even down to the last moment of his life.

As to circumstances, which are always material in

Mr. *Spencer's* understanding, he is not charged by the weak, nor likely to be imposed upon, nor that he was

Spencer was then turned of 30, no heir of any sort, at had no father, but was himself the father of a family; state of disobedience with grandmother, uncle, or any tion; never gamed in any part of his life; never lost his life, put it all together.

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aterial, that he had then taken up, and was grown more

er sort of circumstance is, that of fortune.

ed of a fine family seat, park, &c. an estate in land of year, had the interest of 10,000 *l.* reversion to himself r want of younger children, and he had no younger had a right in 2000 *l.* exchequer annuities, a chance in 30,000 *l.* a hope or expectation from the dutchess of *gh*; he had plate, jewels, &c. fit for his rank; so that s personal estate, and his expectations from the dutchess, that time 7500 *l.* a year for life.

s a younger brother, and a commoner, and yet had year more than the estate of the family had ever been, the honour and title.

ll the evidence in the cause, he was addicted to women, but reclaimed two years before he entred into this

have as many ways of running out, as getting estates, table how: He had contracted 20,000 *l.* debts, and adefmen, as is insisted on our side; the witnesses swear as pressed by tradesmen, and that the debts amounted n.

uintiffs should have adapted their interrogatories to this o was he indebted to?

, The motive, or reasonableness of it, &c.

ht very properly say, justice obliges me to pay them; alous not to pay them; it debases a man of figure and

r motive was, that the clamour might not reach the : dutchess of *Marlborough*.

ic have had the assistance of all his relations, nay if he ic honour and happiness of consulting your Lordship, s you are, could he have been better advised in his

t have done it by selling his reversion, and chance on of the dutchess, either on single or junctim annuities.

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No man would have advised him to sell his personal estate, family pictures, jewels, &c. This is disgraceful, and would have been rejected by the whole family.

Could he have paid it out of the annual profits of his estate, how must he live in the mean time? Besides, the clamour of tradesmen would have continued, for they would not have stayed till the money was raised in this manner.

But why should he, at the age of 30, pinch for the sake of a son, who, at 21, will be master of 30,000*l.* a year.

The next consideration is, the point of a single or joint annuity.

Whoever wants such a contract must pay for it. If a man sells an annuity for his own life, the price of middle age and good health never exceeds above seven years; but if the same man wants to buy, he gives 14 years, 15, and in one case, proved in the cause to have happened in 1743, sixteen or seventeen years. If the life is a bad one, he is made to abate in proportion; take it at the common price, he must have paid 1000*l.* a year for 7000*l.* at the best.

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These reasons would have dissuaded him from dealing in annuities.

Should he have sold his reversion?

There was a chance of his having another son, nay, his son's marrying under age, and having a son.

Could he have sold the chance under Lord *Sunderland's* will?

He could not have sold it for any thing; and yet he had a chance, if lady *Sunderland* died without appointment, or should make a void one; and a bill is now depending here, whether the appointment she has made is good.

One thing more left, the hope from the dutchess of *Marborough*.

It has been said, that from the hatred of the dutchess of *Marborough*, as well as her love, he had almost a certainty of very great advantages.

Suppose he had said, I will live frugally for the future, and pay my debts with money raised out of my income, rather than mortgage my expectations; I should have thought his reasons just; but still if he had not taken this method, would he not have been liable to an execution? where the finest pictures sell by the yard, besides the infamy of it.

These being his circumstances, the next consideration is as to the circumstances of the defendant.

No charge in the bill, either as to his condition, character, or manner of dealing; if he had made another bargain of the same kind, it was material to have charged it; he was not personally acquainted with *Spencer*, was no companion in any extravagance that might create the debt, nor did he partake of it afterwards by living with him: He cannot therefore be said to be a devoted and to be lying in wait for that purpose: Is his property then to be taken from him, *because there may be such a man?* His character in every respect stands clear and unimpeached.

Why

When Mr. *Spencer* had engaged so far as to desire a bargain of this sort, *he forms himself* what he thinks the fair price, and was not haggled into it. Afterwards, by his friends and agents he proposes to any one who would buy it, and was refused by several persons, because it was not an advantageous one.

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Fourthly, The manner in which it was proposed, and brought to a conclusion.

The offer sent to Sir *Abraham Janssen*; and proposed in the first moment, as a conditional bargain: in one event a certain loss, in another a very probable, but uncertain gain, if Mr. *Spencer* and the Dutchess both lived many years: he considered not only the age of the parties, but their manner of life. If he had bought upon lives without knowing something of them, it would have been a ground for a commission of lunacy; the proposal simply accepted of by defendant, without tacking any one condition of his own.

Fifthly, The fairness and equity of the price, &c. and now [329] the actual event.

Whoever buys on a life, must have a particular regard to the constitution and manner of life, and age of the person. Mr. *Louther*, who has been examined in the cause, and is a Director of the *London* insurance, says, unless all these circumstances concur, they never will insure at the publick offices. As to the objection of inequality, the bargain itself supposes an inequality, and that the Dutchess of *Marlborough* would die first, otherwise no money ought to have been paid; but it should have been, I say you a wager of 5000*l.* the Dutchess of *Marlborough* dies first, supposing it equal.

The Dutchess of *Marlborough* took more care of her health than most people; Mr. *Spencer* was intemperate in wine and women. Mr. *Middleton* the surgeon proves he would not forego his pleasures, for any advice with regard to health, *for on his taking the liberty to tell Mr. Spencer, that if he went on in his irregular course, or did not alter his way of life, he would destroy himself; he desired Mr. Middleton would not trouble himself about it, for as he did not desire to live longer than his constitution would enable him to live in the manner he liked.*

Mr. *Spencer* had frequent venereal disorders, and in their severity; and insurance offices, let it be whose life it will, deduct 20 years, when a person has gone through such a shock to his constitution. He was careless of his health; for if he heated his blood with sitting up the night before, he, next morning, frequently appeared to his friends in the night-gown he brought to the world with him: he was afflicted with the rheumatism from August 1739, and some part of 1741, and salivated in the November of that year: two witnesses indeed say, he was hale and sound till within ten months before his death; and yet others say, he was but a twelve-month before his death very ill; his complaint of want of appetite and indigestion carried him to this; these were notoriously the effects of former drinking and rotten constitution, and not sudden disorders.

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Physicians are not certain, nor infallible, they prone people dead, and yet they recover and bite them. Sir *Scipio* after he was given over, lived 24 years, and annuities were on his life: every body looked on the Dutchess's life as good, and Mr. *Spencer's* very bad, at the time of the bargain for a common rheumatism, the grand relief a very uncorrected remedy; it certainly was the ill consequences of former perance, so inveterate as to get into his bones, and yet come at the root of it. In 1744, he drank drams and smokes in the morning.

Did not the defendant then run equal risque? Take it event of deaths, the Dutchess of *Marlborough* lived six years a half, and Mr. *Spencer* only 20 months more; he dies without want of care, and she of old age.

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It is difficult to say, what the risque was equal to; the defendant endeavoured to shew for the plaintiffs, Sir *Abraham Jansse* have insured *Spencer's* life, during the Dutchess of *Marlborough* for 5*l.* per cent. but have examined only *Stephen Loftin* particular, and it is very material that they might have examined many more; and material too, that *Loftin* does not say, enquired into his health and manner of life before he insured argument's sake, I will suppose the defendant could have insured at 5*l.* per cent. He must so insure as to have all his money; he must insure the principal, interest and premium; must be computed on interest, and no other way of doing if I lend at 5*l.* per cent. and am not paid till the end of five years I have not 5*l.* per cent. for my money: bishops' leases are computed on this footing, so in this court between tenant and reversioner, not an equal computation, for the advantage against the reversioner.

Suppose interest and premium insured the first year, upon interest and premium, and interest on that the second year, and so to the Dutchess of *Marlborough's* death, it have amounted, the *October* in which she died, to 966*l.*; he must have insured another year.

The bargain, therefore, in all circumstances fair; an equal bargain whatever does this court weigh it on nice rules of equity; as for instance, if a man wants a particular piece of land contiguous to his own, and gives 30 years purchase, it will not set it aside for that reason only.

The plaintiffs have not gone into evidence, to shew *Mr. Spencer* could, in any time of his life, have had this more than a better bargain.

Sixthly, The opinion *Mr. Spencer* had of it in his own thoughts.

He knew whether he was handsomely or unhandsomely imposed upon: There were numberless indications of his in private, that he had been fairly dealt by: None of the witnesses say, they heard the least insinuation, he ever complained of his bargain: he writes himself to Sir *Abraham Jansse* after the death of the Dutchess of *Marlborough*, to bring the bargain to judgment; the defendant, as is proved in the cause.

that though he wanted the money, he would not distress him; on which *Spencer* replied, how much more handsomely you use me than other people do; he afterwards pays the defendant 1000*l.* in part, and then another 1000*l.*; all these actions shew his own private opinion of the defendant, and that he did not think himself under any distress or influence.

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Lord Chancellor asked, how soon after the Dutchess of *Marlborough's* death the money was to be paid?

Upon turning to *Mr. Backwell's* deposition, he gives the following account, that he told *Sir Abraham Janssen*, *Mr. Spencer* would pay him 10,000 *l.* at the Dutchess's death.

And therefore, said the Solicitor-general, though the defendant's answer says, it was proposed to pay him 10,000*l.* at, or some short time after the death of the Dutchess of *Marlborough*, yet, as there is no evidence to contradict it's being liable to be paid at the time of her death, it makes an end of any question that might arise from the payment being postponed to a further time.

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The use that was to be made of this money is very material, it was for payment of debts, and so likewise was the application, for the money was paid into *Lofin's* hands, for the discharge of his tradesmen.

To say that the defendant thought, at the time, there might be a dispute on the validity of the contract, is impossible, because that is making him a lunatic; for then it was saying, one way you win, but every way I lose.

The next question, Whether the contract is void in law.

And I agree with *Mr. Crowle*, if void in law, it is putting it upon a clear solid foundation: a bargain for a contingency, and no objection made that it is not lawful, and for any contingency that is lawful, you may even at law contract: if any objection at law, it must be upon the statute of usury, where a greater interest than the rate allowed is taken.

A notion prevailed for many years, that it was not lawful to take any hire for money; this was adopted from the canon law, and even prevails to this day in many catholick countries. It is astonishing how prejudice should have kept common sense so long out of the world! Why is not money a commodity, as well as any thing else? And yet a very sensible civilian *Domat* argues against it.

Harry the Eighth, towards the latter end of his reign, had a mind to get the better of it, not in a direct way, but by fixing the rate of usury, which continued down to *Queen Ann's* time.

Mr. Locke, in his considerations upon reduction of interest, seems to think, for political reasons, the rate of interest should not be fixed at all, but left to find it's own rate of value in the market; and being of this opinion, he never lent or borrowed.

A contract of usury, is the hire of money at a certain price, for the use of it: there must be a principal, and there must be, to bring it within the statute, a rate of interest exceeding what is allowed; if of another nature, not within the statute; at com-
mon

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mon law, a condition on hazard, and peradventure is not within it; some old statutes call it *dry exchange*.

(a) Cro. Jac.
252.

Contracts on bottomry are not excepted out of the statute, but depend on the nature of the thing: discounting of notes, no principal due from discounter, which is forebore; so buying up securities at a lower rate, when paid, it comes to more than legal interest, compared with what the buyer gave; so in the case of annuities for life, or lives, where money is not to be returned. The case of *Fountayne v. Grimes* (a). So in the particular sort of insurance, interest, or no interest, which is only a wager, and not within the statute.

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If in the truth and real substance of the contract, the agreement be for the payment of a principal sum, with forbearance and a higher rate, then certainly it is within the words, and no shift or shape can secure it; all colourable sales, and colourable exchanges are within it; no contract between man and man, but may be turned to a *shift*. No contrivance can exceed the rate of interest; it is absolutely void.

All the cases that have been cited prove this, that where the treaty is upon a contract for usury, and more is taken than the legal interest, no evasion can secure it.

Clayton's case came on upon demurrer, and confesses a corrupt agreement, the contingency there next to nothing; and this was fixed by evidence.

In *Mason v. Abdy*, if the person die within six months, and there the man was in good health, and the corrupt agreement pleaded, and no objection to the pleading, therefore must be taken as admitted.

The case of *Button v. Downham* was also on demurrer, and the corrupt agreement admitted. The rest are all cases of higher interest taken than the act of parliament allows.

Consider the present case, and apply it to the statute.

What is it on the first proposal and communication? A bargain upon a contingency.

Is there a principal due? No.

Is there a rate for forbearance? No.

It has been objected, That the witnesses say, borrow, lend, and loan, and that these expressions shew it is a contract for money.

A loan, says Mr. *Crowle*, not consumed by the using, is called *commodatum*, as if I lend a horse, house, &c. it is gratuitous.

Another sort of loan called *mutuum*, as oil, wine, &c. here something is taken for it.

But was the present ever proposed as a loan upon usury? Or as a proposal for principal and forbearance?

I hope it will not be heard out of *Westminster-hall*, pray advance me a sum of money on this contingency, and then it will be good; but if you had said, pray lend me a sum of money on this contingency, then it would be bad.

Suppose an action on this bond, could they declare on a corrupt agreement? Suppose they set out the whole transaction in pleading

reading, and conclude it to be done with a corrupt intention, Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen.
 would a jury, upon the evidence, believe this to be a forbearance
 the principal.

The very rate of interest depends upon the contingency itself,
 no man alive could say, what would be the rate of interest.

If no contingent bargain can be made upon a life, but what is
 within the statute of usury, *that*, I will allow, would put it for the
 sure upon clear grounds and solid foundations.

I will next consider, upon what rules of equity they are intitled
 to be relieved.

Courts of equity administer justice out of a conscientious
 principle, therefore every case must stand on its own circum-
 stances: no fraud here, or over-reaching, nor any charge of
 that kind in the bill, or suggested at the bar, no evidence from
 hence imposition is presumed: it must be submitted then as be-
 tween man and man, whether Sir *Abraham Janssen* has been
 guilty of any misbehaviour. [333]

They were aware of this on the other side, and therefore have
 gone on another principle; that though good in law and in con-
 science, yet this court ought to set it aside on principles of poli-
 tics, and make this the foundation of the jurisdiction of this
 court, as applied to these cases.

But this court will never say they exercise a legislative autho-
 rity. If a contract be good at law, or in conscience, this court
 will not set it aside. As for instance, *the South sea Company's*
debts and bears in 1721, could not be set aside till the legislature
 interposed, neither could it prevent or relieve against *laying wa-*
rrants in political matters; but an act of parliament in *Queen Anne's*
time put a stop to it. So as to gaming; as for instance, *fair hazard*
on the dice: it is an easy matter to shew it very detrimental to
 the publick, and yet can any case be cited where the court has
 relieved against money fairly lost, before the late act of parlia-
 ment interfered.

The legislature has made a law, that buying chances before
 it is known what they are, shall be set aside; this court could not
 do it.

Miseram servitus est ubi lex est vaga. Nothing more miserable
 than that rules of property should be precarious and uncertain,
 and yet, according to the arguments of the plaintiff's counsel,
 though my contract is legal, and equitable too, it may be for
 speculative reasons bad: this is punishing a man who has done
 no wrong.

There are a great many instances alluded to, but no fixed rule
 produced; but 'tis said the court will set it aside, for reasons
 concerning the publick.

It is a misfortune attending a court of equity, that the cases
 are generally taken in loose notes, and sometimes by persons who
 do not understand business, and very often draw general prin-
 ciples from a case, without attending to particular circumstances,
 which weighed with the court in the determination of these
 cases.

If

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If a trustee properly, and *bonâ fide*, agrees with the *cestui qui trust*, that will take off the presumption of unfairness.

If a common prostitute, hackneyed in the ways of men, get a contract from a person for her benefit, there arises a presumption she is making a gain; it is her daily trade (1): but if a *mistress* only, who is true to him, the court will not relieve, for she may be presumed to be imposed upon, as well as imposing upon (2).

So in marriage-brocage bonds, the relation who takes money is bribed; and from such a bias on his mind, he cannot give her the advice he ought as a relation. Suppose I treat with the father of a lady for marriage, and I make a private agreement to give him a part of the fortune, is not this a fraud?

In the case of Sir *Abraham Eiton*, he engaged to pay a sum of money on his marriage, but as there arose no presumption of fraud, the court would not relieve, but decreed him to pay it.

The same as to selling of places, where there is no leave to sell, bad, because a breach of trust; but if leave to sell, it will not be set aside.

[334] Another instance of gratuities or securities to attornies pending the business, set aside.

The misfortune, as I said before, is laying down these as general rules; when in the principal case of this kind, *Walmsley v. Booth* (3), before Lord Chancellor, 2d of May 1741, circumstances had great weight, even the character of *Japhet Crooke* had great weight, who was *more likely to impose, than be imposed upon*; but I never understood that the court has said that an attorney shall take no gratuity, above common fees, before a cause is finally ended, as suppose a verdict obtained by his care and conduct.

In *Woodhouse v. Shipley*, (4) before Lord Chancellor, the 17th of March 1742, there is no general rule laid down about bonds on account of marriage, but the court was of opinion there was an imposition in that case on the father, and decreed relief; but desired not to be understood to say, what would be the case, if such bond had been given by two persons *sui juris*, or *emancipated*.

I have reserved for the last what are called *post-bills*.

It is said they have relieved on this ground singly, that no heir shall be allowed to make such contracts.

But I say they relieve on the misbehaviour of the person who seduces a young man, and makes a bargain with a *filius-familias*, by feeding his extravagance.

He then cited *Domat*, under the head of loans, and his comment on the *lex Macedoniana*; to shew that the civil law does not extend it to a person emancipated.

(1) *Bainham v. Manning*, 2 Vern. 242. *Waiker v. Perkins*, 3 Burr. 1568. *Rooke, Ca. temp. Talb.* 153. *Hill v. Spencer, Amb.* 641.
(2) See *Whaley v. Norton*, 1 Vern. 483. (3) Post. 2 vol. 25. S. C. Barn. Ch. Rep. 475. S. C.
(4) Post. 2 vol. 535. S. C.
(1) *Bainham v. Manning*, 2 Vern. 242. *Waiker v. Perkins*, 3 Burr. 1568.
(2) See *Whaley v. Norton*, 1 Vern. 483. *Bainham v. Manning*, 2 Vern. 242. *Spicer v. Hayward*, Prec. Ch. 114. *Annan-dale v. Harris*, 2 P. W. 432. *Cray v.*

As to the cases cited, Lord *Nottingham* relieved upon evidence; Lord Keeper *North* thought he went too far; Lord *Jeffreys* not so enough. Earl of CHESHAM
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A man's natural temper, though ever so able, will give a nature to his notions of evidence.

In the case of *Berney v. Fairclough*, and others, the 32 Car. 2. says Lord *Nottingham* (according to his own manuscript from whence I cite it) made him pay the principal money borrowed before I would grant the injunction, and at the hearing I relieved, because such infamous trade should be discouraged, and in the star-chamber was punishable corporally. But his Lordship did not relieve the same plaintiff in another cause against *George Pitt*, tho' his advantage was three to one, because the father was in good health at that time, nor did he put it on the difference between money and wares.

Lord *Jeffreys* laid a different stress on the evidence than Lord *Nottingham* did, and relieved for this reason, and affirmed the decree.

In *Twissleton v. Griffith*, circumstances too had weight. Did not the defendant stay till the father was ill? Did not he take him out of the father's hands? This was a misbehaviour, and of great weight.

In *Curwin v. Milner*, Lord *King* said he was tied down by precedents, and therefore he would not certainly have carried it any farther beyond the precedents. It is probable too there were circumstances in that case, because there was a double contingency.

But it is going a great way to say a man cannot sell a reversion; Mr. *Spencer* is not *filius-familias*—Shall no man sell an estate in jointure to his mother?—Shall no man join in selling remainder?—Is it possible to support this?—No! it cannot.

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The case of *Batty v. Loyd*, 1 Vern. 141. never contradicted. I have a note too of a case where an heir sold a contingency, and it was not thought unfaleable. In the case of *Whitfield v.* (1), where an heir sold in the life-time of father and mother, there was no dispute, but this was fairly obtained, and the court decreed further assurance by the heir, and gave leave to make use of his name.

An instance with regard to an officer who assigned his future salary, came on to be heard, and discountenanced, because it was against the earnings of his daily pay, before he has it (2).

Courts of law allow them good as contracts, but not as contingencies; a court of equity goes farther.

Then what is this public good, this rule they so much insist on, that no man shall spend above his annual income? How can it be prevented? Is it in human nature? He will spend it; men of the best sense have done it; where will be the public utility? where the encouragement to industry? Will the court consider every man as a lunatick who exceeds his income? Ano-

(1) 2. If not *Whitfield v. Fauisset*, (2) See *ante* 214. note 1. *Id.* 387. S. C.

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ther end perhaps, to lock up property for another age; is this desirable? Will it procure money on easier terms? It is directly the contrary, and as clear as any proposition in *Euclid*; and I refer them to Mr. *Locke* in the treatise before mentioned. If Mr. *Spencer* could not have it on these terms with any security to the defendant, he must have distressed him much more by taking pledges of plate, &c.

It is extremely material that the court should not determine upon this last ground, whatever may be their opinion as to the validity of the contract in law, or the conscionableness of it in equity.

June the 22d, 1752.

Mr. Noel in reply :

THE general question is, Whether the facts in the present case afford a reasonable ground for relief in a court of equity? It is admitted to be a matter of great moment; first, in respect to preserving families from ruin, under pretence of relieving present want.

I will shew that the court may relieve, without infringing the liberties of mankind, or hurting property.

No man has a right in his own property beyond the limits of conscience; men are bound to use their own, so as not to hurt or prejudice another. I set out with this principle early; it is laid down in the case of *Bosinquet v. Daffwood, Cas. in Eq. in the time of Lord Talbot* 38. the court may relieve, where the case is not strictly illegal, upon rules drawn from the cases of nature and reason. It is allowed, no written law can possibly take in a case of this kind, as they cannot possibly foresee every emergency. By politicks Mr. *Solicitor General* must mean only public utility.

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I will consider it first on the statute of usury, and hope to shew it is clearly within it.

Usury within the statute is securing a higher premium of gain than the statute allows.

They object the statute means, where the principal lent is to be repaid.

But here it is double the principal to be paid.

They would establish likewise, that it must be a communication of borrowing and lending of money, and that there was no communication here, on the one part, for borrowing, or for lending to the other.

The terms upon which the defendant did it can make no alteration, for if the original proceeding is for borrowing and lending, terms cannot make it cease to be a communication for money.

Has not every case laid it down that there must be no communication for money? And though the penalty be severe, yet the statute must be construed liberally; then has care been taken here, that there was no communication for money?

Th

They have attempted to lay down another rule, *that where the principal is risked, it is not usurious.* Earl of Ches-
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In *Burton's* case, 5 *Co.* held to be usury notwithstanding the risk, and nothing said there of the greatness, smallness, or extent of the risk.

A principle indeed laid down in the books, that it is not usury any uncertain gain, and left to the honour of the person if he will pay more than legal interest; but if the lender ties down the borrower to pay more, *hoc est vitiosum.*

The statute goes upon another principle, that contingent gains are bad, reserving more than legal interest, unless for convenience of trade and commerce, and reasons of public utility.

Serjeant *Hawkin* in his *Pleas of the Crown*, when he speaks of the cases on usury, lays it down, it is usury notwithstanding the risk, and makes no distinction whether great or small.

In the present case Mr. *Spencer* absolutely was bound to pay, and could not be relieved against the double payment at any time.

Principles of property are to be drawn from the general purview of the statute, and such as are most likely to meet with the mischief.

Meet with it then! If a sum stipulated to be lent, be it with or without risk, exceeds the legal bounds, let it be construed within the statute.

A life of *thirty* against *seventy-eight* is too strong, and looks too much like a *shift*.

They are forced by this great inequality to have recourse to another thing, *that the young life was broken, and therefore the old a match for it.*

Mr. *Buckwell* does not remember a syllable said about the goodness or badness of Mr. *Spencer's* constitution, at the time of the application to the defendant, nor does he say in his answer, that he refused to lend the money, but that he did it on weighing and considering the proposal.

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What is the material result of this? Why that, upon inquiry, he did not find the report of Mr. *Spencer's* declining health true, and therefore the risk not being so great as at first imagined, it determined him to comply with the proposal.

The effects of his intemperance, as appears by evidence, sufficiently removed; for his last relief, for a particular disorder, was in 1732, six years before this contract, and then the witnesses say he was of a strong robust constitution. *Lofin* and *Thompson* say he was of a sound strong health, and therefore likely to outlive the Dutchess of *Marlborough*: these are their own witnesses who were connected with him, and in the service of his family.

Another reason they urge is, a person must be calculating how much interest they lose in the mean time while the contingency is depending.

Very hard driven! for they compute interest upon interest, premium for insurance, interest upon that, and interest too upon that interest, and so round the compass, and yet, after all this labour, falls

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falls short some hundred pounds of the gains the defendant makes.

I would not desire a stronger proof of the usurioufness of this contract, than the hard shifts they are put to in order to save it out of the statute.

Judging by events I always understood to be the worst rule of judging; the only proper way, What was the chance at the time? And Lord Mountfort says, the Dutchess of Marlborough's life was not worth more than three years purchase, and therefore her living six years is of no weight.

It is said no imposition is charged by the bill.

The contract is charged to be usurious, and charged to be exorbitant, and that the defendant took advantage of Mr. Spencer's necessities; therefore what do they mean by saying, We have not charged imposition? if not in terms, yet necessarily implied.

As to Mr. Spencer's great property, he was only tenant for life; *as to his personal estate,* he was not in effect and substance *sui juris*, because his fears of blowing up his hopes in the Dutchess of Marlborough prevented him from making use of the *personal estate*.

It is then said, *he wanted money on a just cause for paying debt,* and that his best friends would have advised this method; nay, *your Lordship* would have done it.

Lord Chancellor: *I will relieve you from this part of the argument; I would not for my own part have advised it in any circumstances.*

Mr. Spencer was bound to pay it, even if the Dutchess did not leave him a shilling! What would have been his condition then? Is it not clear he staked his ruin on this engagement?

No mention made that he was indebted to tradesmen at the time the money was borrowed; his own private justice might indeed lead him to apply the money in this manner, but it is no sort of excuse to the defendant, because *he* had not this view in advancing it.

The defendant was engaged to keep it a secret on the principle of Mr. Spencer's dependance on the Dutchess of Marlborough, this therefore was putting him under fetters. No body pretends that Mr. Spencer did not know the terms, or ignorant that he was only 30, and therefore it was his apprehension of the Dutchess that subdued him to the imposition.

I do not dispute but that a son may dispose of a reversion, but that is not the case here, it is the hard severe terms we object to, and in the judgment of a court of equity, is a fraud where the relief does not infringe on the just rights of mankind.

Wife's case, a risque on the death of an uncle.

Here on the death of a grandmother, therefore why not stronger?

It is admitted arguments of publick mischief are laudably adopted into this court.

Is not this a growing evil? all mankind feel it!

As to the transactions which are subsequent to the bargain, being a confirmation, the defendant's counsel rely on *Case v. Gibbons*, 3 Wms. 390.

the executors here do the duty much better by endeavour-
to be relieved.

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In next case, *Standard v. Medcalf*, turns strongly against
her though the house of lords affirmed the decree, and by
affirmed the will, yet if she recovered her senses, did it
prejudice to any alteration she might make in that dis-
therefore this not properly a confirmation of the
it.

Pencer acknowledging the debt, that he could not pay it,
should execute a new security, and pay the defendant at
views his necessity, and that he had no prospect of doing
indulgence.

A new bond produced by the defendant, antedated to the
the Dutchess of *Marlborough's* death, but charged by the
it was to be paid in a month after the death of the
; and though by his answer he swears he cannot be
act as to the time of payment agreed, yet, in order to
the interest, carries it back to the day of her death.

The court cannot relieve where it is double the sum, for ille-
ney cannot relieve if five times the sum; and therefore
ment of publick mischief must have great weight, as
can say what bounds may be set to extravagant contracts
nd, unless it meets with a check from this court, in the
we have prayed by our bill.

Justice was ordered to stand over till *Michaelmas* term, and
can time a search directed to be made after the original
, if that cannot be found, a copy of it.

1 of *Chesterfield*, and Others, Executors of } Plaintiffs.
Pencer, ————
Janssen, Baronet, ———— Defendant.

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February the
4th, 1750.

cause stood for judgment.

and Chancellor in court,

Assisted by { Lord Chief Justice Lee,
The Master of the Rolls, and
Mr. Justice Burnett.

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6. Feb. 1752

Justice Burnett: The counsel for the plaintiffs in
his cause have insisted principally upon three things.

That the original contract is usurious, and contrary to the
usury.

Secondly, That, supposing it be not an usurious contract, it is
an undue advantage taken of a man's necessity upon an expectancy,
and will relieve against it as an unconscionable bargain.

Thirdly, That the new security ought to be considered in the same
as the old, and a continuation of the fraud.

On the part of the defendant it is insisted, this is a mere con-
tract, and in the nature of a wager only; no circum-
stance

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stance of a distressed heir seduced from parental government; no fraud or imposition, and therefore not warranted by former precedents, to set this contract aside.

And that if the court could have relieved on the original agreement, yet cannot, consistent with the rules of equity, do it, when the party has voluntarily taken upon himself to confirm it.

As to the first question, Whether a loan of 5000 *l.* to be paid 10,000 *l.* on the death of the Dutchess of *Marlborough* in the lifetime of Mr. *Spencer*, be such an usurious contract as is within the statutes, or only a mere casual contingent bargain and not usurious.

This court has adopted the use of the word loan, in cases of *bottomree*, as well as in common money transactions, and therefore shall make use of that term likewise.

To make this contract usurious, it must be either, because it is within the express words, or an evasion or shift, to keep out of the statutes.

[340] It would be mispending time to give the opinion of Civilians and Canonists, upon the head of usury, because trade and commerce have made great alterations with regard to money; Lord *Coke*, in his 2d *Inst.* 89. says, *At the time of the statute of Merton and also before the conquest, it was not lawful for Christians to take any usury, as appeareth by the laws of St. Edward, &c. and Glanville, and other ancient authors and records; and no usury was then permitted but by the Jews only.* In Lord *Coke's* 3d *Inst.* 152. he saith, *that by the statute of 37 H. 8. and 13 Eliz. all former acts, statutes, and laws, ordained, and made for the avoiding or punishment of usury, are made void, and of none effect; so at this day, neither the common law, nor any statute is in force, but only the statute of the 37 H. 8. 13 Eliz. and 21 Jac. Hardr. 420. e contra, for per Lord Chief Baron Hale, Jewish usury was prohibited at Common law, being 40 l. per cent. and more; but no other.*

Nothing is legally usurious but what is prohibited by the statutes, and to make a contract so, must be within the express words, or an evasion or shift to keep out of them.

It must be agreed then, nothing is legally usurious, but what is prohibited by the statutes; and the material ones are the statute of the 37 *H. 8. c. 3. sect. 3.* *No person by way of any corrupt bargain, loan, exchange, chevifance, shift, or interest, of any wares or other things, or by any other deceitful ways, shall take in gains for the forbearance of one year for his money, or other thing, that shall be due for the same wares, or other thing, above 10 l. of the hundred.* And the statute of the 12 *Ann. ch. 16.* varies nothing from the former acts, but the reducing of legal interest for in the penal clauses all the words of the statute of *H. 8.* are taken in.

So that the cases determined on the first of those statutes, are looked upon as authorities upon all the subsequent statutes.

Whatever shift is used for the forbearance, or giving day of payment, will make an agreement usurious, and is by a court and jury esteemed a colour only.

Suppl

Suppose a man purchase an annuity at ever such an under price, if the bargain was really for an annuity, it is not usury. If on the foot of borrowing and lending money, it is otherwise; for if the court are of opinion, the annuity is not the real contract, but a method of paying more money for the reward or interest, than the law allows, it is a contrivance that shall not avoid the statute, by giving the avarice of one kind of men an opportunity of preying on the necessities of another. 4 Leon. 208. 2 Lev. 7. King v. Drury. Noy 101. Cro. Eliz. 642, 643.

Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen. If a bargain was really for an annuity, tho' bought at ever so under a price, no usury; if on the foot of borrowing and lending money, otherwise (1).

A bargain on a mere contingency, where the reward is given for the risque, and not for the forbearance, is not usurious; for how can it be said, with any propriety to be for the forbearance, when the day of payment itself may never come.

If money is lent to be paid with more than legal interest; as for instance, in the case of Clayton, 5 Co. 70. where it was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant, on the 14th of December, that the plaintiff should lend the defendant 30 l. to be repaid the first of June following, and that the plaintiff should have 3 l. for the forbearance, if the plaintiff's son should then be living, and if he died, then to repay but 26 l. of the principal money; this may be usurious, for if there is a borrowing of money, and a communication for interest, the device to have gone beyond the rate of 10 l. per cent. said the court, is fraudulent, and within the statute, otherwise the statute would be vain. For he might as well have made the condition, that if 20 persons, or any of them, should be living at the day, &c. then he should have 33 l. [341]

He then mentioned several of the most material cases on this point, and which were chiefly relied on by the plaintiff's counsel, to make this an usurious contract, and concluded with *Caslon v. Abdy*, 3 Salk. 390. and laid a stress upon the last reason of the resolution of the court, because there is an express provision in the bond to have the principal again, 5 Rep. 69, 70. id 15. and the same case in *Moor. Carth.* 67. *Comb.* 25. *Showers* 8.

The slightness or reality of the risque seems to be the only guiding rule, that directed the court in the case of *Bedingfield v. Asbley*, Cro. Eliz. 741. There A. delivered to B. 100 l. who, by indenture, covenanted with A. to pay to every one of A's children, which then were, and should be living at ten years end, 80 l. A. having then five daughters; it is not usury, said the court, but a mere casual bargain. But if he had been to pay 400 l. at ten years end, if any were living then, it would be a greater doubt; or if it had been to pay 300 l. if any were living at one or two years end, that had been usury, because of the probability that one would continue alive so short a time, but in ten years are many alterations.

The case of *Long v. Wharton*, 3 Keble 304. though ill reported, seems to be good law: For there, in error upon a judgment in debt upon obligation to pay 100 l. on marriage of the daughter, if either plaintiff or defendant die before, nothing. The defendant

(1) So *Richards v. Brown*, Cowp. 770.

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pleads the statute of usury, and that this was for the loan of 30l. before delivered, to which plaintiff demurred; and per cur. This is such a kind of casual bargain as bottomree, and the judgment affirmed.

I should be glad to know, why a bond on a man's life is not as much an adventure, as on the bottom of a ship; a ship may sink the day after the bargain is made; a man may die the next day after his life is insured; but whatever favour courts may shew in contracts beneficial to commerce, they will not establish contracts of another kind to the prejudice of the statute.

There can be no forbearance, for what may never be due, as the ship may never return; so that it is merely a contract upon the risk.

The rule that governs the court in bottomree bonds is the risk of the principal, but may be so contrived, as to be construed an evasion of the statute, as well as any other contract.

But suppose a contract was made for a ship's return to Newcastle from London, or to Dover from Calais, at a season of the year when there is little or no danger, would not the court look on this as colourable, and a mere evasion of the statute?

And in the case of *Joy v. Kent* in *Hardr. Reports*, it appears very plainly from what the court did there, that even a bottomree bond may be an evasion of the statute, as well as any other contract, or Lord Chief Justice Hale would never have sent it to trial.

The first case of bottomree is *Sharpley v. Hufwell*, *Cro. Jac.* 208. there the rule that governed the court, was the real risk of the principal, and the hazard the lender run of having less than the interest which the law allows, and possibly neither principal nor interest.

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Mr. Justice Dodderidge in *Roberts v. Tremaine*, *Cro. Jac.* 509, makes very proper distinctions between contracts usurious, and not usurious: Mr. Attorney General, in his argument for the defendant, has stated these distinctions, as to what contracts are usurious.—As to contracts not usurious: *If I lend to one 100 l. for two years, on condition to pay for the loan there 30 l. but if he pay the principal at the year's end, that he shall pay nothing for interest; this is not usury, for the party hath his election, and may pay it at the first year's end, and so discharge himself.*

In the case of *Scame v. Gleon*, *Siderf.* 27. Debt upon obligation for 300 l. in which there was a condition, that if a particular ship went to Surat in the East Indies, and returned safe to London; or if the owner or the goods return safe, that then the defendant pay to the plaintiff 40 l. for each 100 l.; but if the ship, &c. is lost by unavoidable casualty of sea, fire, or enemies, to be proved by sufficient testimony, then the plaintiff to have nothing. The question was, if this contract was usurious within the statute, as defendant has pleaded it.

Resolved per cur.' This is not usury within the statute, but a good bottomree contract; and the Chief Justice Bridgeman took a difference between a bargain and a loan; for where there is a plain bargain as here, and the principal hazarded, this cannot be within the statute of usury, for there are apparent dangers of the sea, fire, and enemies between this and the East Indies, which endanger the loss of the prin-

I such contracts, called bottomree, tend to the increase of this realm; but otherwise it is of a loan where the is not hazarded; judgment per totam curiam, that this is furious.

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it therefore but be of opinion, that this is not a contract usurious, but a contingent bargain, and founded on only.

cond question is, That supposing it be not an usurious yet, whether it is not such an undue advantage taken of necessity, upon an expectancy, that this court will relieve as unconscionable.

as necessary to give an express opinion on this point, I under great difficulties; but when the cases come to d, I may be relieved from this necessity.

ld be too hard to say, that an heir or expectant should w money, let his necessities be ever so great, or, which ie thing, that the person advancing shall not be suffered extraordinary premium for an extraordinary risque; on hand, it might be dangerous to give a sanction to such

The court need not determine whether a person advancing money to an heir or expectant, should have an extraordinary premium, for an extraordinary risque, because it might be made an ill use of out of the court.

ate the arguments of plaintiff's counsel, and then shew is under no necessity to determine this point, and I am court would willingly give an opinion, that might be ll use of out of the court.

Say they, it makes two of the worst passions in the least meet, avarice on the one side, and craving appehe other.

, A man shall be providing a liberal supply for a son, r relation, as he imagines, when he is, at the same fact laying up for, perhaps, twenty money-lenders; rebly deluded to give away to strangers what he inr his own family.

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pplying the necessities of young heirs, for lucre, has been g practice, and the court, from time to time, have exee remedy to meet the mischief.

. *Hill, 1 Vern. 167.* is one of the first cases Lord Notrelieved on the gross unreasonableness of the bargain, plied no man could be drawn into it but by imposition. per North reversed this decree, because there did not ny express imposition. Afterwards Lord *Jeffreys* conie decree made by Lord Nottingham, declaring he took chase to be an unrighteous bargain in the beginning, and that ibich happened afterwards could help it.

ourt in process of time extended the remedy, where the alone of the person borrowing induced the contract. first case of that kind was *Berney v. Pitt, 2 Vern. 14.* ttingham, when it came before him, relieved against but the penalty. In *H. T. 1686*, Lord *Jeffreys* held it amable bargain, discharged Lord Nottingham's decree, ed the defendant to refund to the plaintiff all the money he had f him, except the 2000l. originally lent, and the interest for

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In *Twissleton v. Griffith*, 1 Wms. 310. *there were marks enough of an imposition to warrant relief on that foot, but Lord Compt chief rather to establish it on general principles, to prevent a growing practice of devouring an heir; and Lord Jeffrey's decree in Berney v. Pitt, standing, shewed that every one thought the same was just, and that there was therefore no attempt in parliament to reverse it. His Lordship also took in the whole objection, that at this rate an heir could not, without difficulty, sell a reversion, and said he saw no inconvenience in the objection, for this might force an heir to go home, and submit to his father, or to bite on the bridle, and endure some hardships, and in the mean time he might grow wiser and be reclaimed.*

In *Curwin v. Milner*, 19th of June, 1731, 3 Wms. 392 marginal note, Lord King relieved, but said, *if the thing had been new, he would not have gone so far, but thought himself bound by precedents.*

These are the cases principally relied on by the plaintiff's counsel. It is insisted on the other side, that none of these cases bear any similitude with the present, for here are no practices of fraud and imposition; Mr. Spencer out of parental authority, and not in bad circumstances, for he had 7000*l.* a year at that time, and said too, the risque here is equal, and not as in *Curwin v. Milner*, where the contingency was double to pay 1000*l.* for the 500*l.* lent, if defendant survived his father, or father-in-law. The offer here was sent by the borrower, and accepted on his terms; therefore it is the borrower's own seeking. This too is so equitable a bargain, that if the court would enter into the just proportion or calculation of such a bargain, and the usual rate for insurance of principal, interest, and premium, it will appear to a demonstration, that if the Dutchess of Marlborough had lived half a year longer, the defendant would have been a loser. And also it is not yet laid down that heirs should not borrow on the expectancy, and that a contract must either stand or fall upon its reasonableness or unreasonableness, and that will be a sufficient terror to the lender.

And indeed it might be difficult to give an opinion on this; for it may be thought too rigid to say, that an heir shall not borrow upon an expectancy; as some persons are so niggardly and sparing to their children, that a poor heir may starve in the desert, with the land of Canaan in his view, if he could not relieve himself this way.

Mr. Spencer besides has taken away the argument of necessity, by considering the whole himself, and in the freest and most voluntary manner imaginable has confirmed the contract, and may be therefore said to have established it with his eyes open, which brings me to the

Third question, *Whether the new security shall be considered in the same light with the old, and a continuation of the fraud (1)?*

I know of no case where this court, though they might have relieved in the original contract, have relieved against the con-

Though the court might have relieved upon the original contract, yet will not relieve against the confirmation of it, if fairly obtained.

formation of it, where there is no pretence of fraud or imposition in obtaining it; but if there was any thing of that complexion in the confirmation, there indeed it is considered only as a continuation of the first fraud.

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And of this kind is the *Earl of Ardglass v. Muschamp*, 1 Vern. 37. and *Wiseman v. Beake*, 2 Vern. 121. where the court looked on it as a mere contrivance and colourable proceeding, and made use of a very strong expression, *It is a double hatching and cheat*. These were cases heard before the Lords Commissioners.

But can the confirmation here be said to be obtained by force, imposition, or contrivance? The defendant was far from being willing for his money, even after the death of the Dutchess of Marlborough; for he stayed from October to December before the said contract was confirmed.

And though there is no case to warrant relieving against such confirmation, yet there is a strong case to support it. *Cole v. Gibbons* and others, and *Martin v. Cole* and others, 3 Wms. 390. where Lord Talbot admitted, that had all depended on the first assignment, he would have set it aside, as being an unconscionable advantage made of a necessitous man; but when the person, after being fully apprized of every thing, chose to execute a deed of confirmation of his former assignment, and not the least fraud or surprize had appeared on the part of the defendant, it was, he said, too much for any court to set all this aside.

At the bottom of this case there is another, that goes upon the same principle, where Lord Cowper said, that after the plaintiff had coolly, and without any pretence of fear or duress, entered into a bond to the defendant, he had thereby ascertained the damages, and might not to be relieved.

Upon the whole, therefore, I submit it to your Lordship, that there is nothing usurious in this contract, which can warrant setting it aside upon the statutes. [345]

And supposing any thing unconscionable in the thing originally, yet Mr. Spencer taking upon him voluntarily to confirm it, I cannot help thinking it would be too much for a court of equity to overturn such a bargain, and therefore my advice is to relieve only against the penalty of the bond.

* Sir John Strange.

*The Master of the Rolls: **

The first question is, *Whether the defendant's originally advancing 500l. in the manner deposed by Mr. Backwell, and admitted by himself in his answer, and the bond taken upon it, are to be considered as usurious and void in law?*

The second question is, *If the bond be not within the statutes of usury, whether the bargain is of such a nature as will intitle the parties to relief, on the circumstances of this case, in a court of equity?*

The third question is, *Whether what appears to have been done by Mr. Spencer, after the death of the Dutchess of Marlborough, will vary the case, or influence the determination of this court?*

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I agree with the reverend and learned judge, that the contract is not within the statutes of usury.

The 12th of Q. Anne, cap. 16. appears to me to be calculated for such loans, where two principal circumstances must concur.

First, Where there is an agreement for payment at a future day.

And *secondly*, Where the premium for forbearance is greater than the statute allows.

The contingency here, a wager, Whether Mr. Spencer or the Dutchess of Marlborough died first?

In the present case, if the contingency happened one way, the whole money was lost, and therefore may be properly called a wager between the parties, whether Mr. Spencer or the Dutchess of Marlborough died first?

It is said, if the design of the parties were, one should borrow, and the other lend 5000*l.* the colour, or shift to evade the statute, will not avail.

But whether an agreement be usurious or not, may be determined two ways.

First, On the verdict of a jury, on a plea of a corrupt agreement.

Secondly, By the court's exercising their own judgment on the particular circumstances of the case.

Where a bond is lost, no action can be maintained, because not assignable with a *profer hic in curia* (1).

But on a *scire facias* against the executors of Mr. Spencer, no action could be maintained, for the bond being lost or destroyed, could not be pleaded with a *profer hic in curia*; and it was so laid down in the case of *Foot* and others, against *Jones*, Easter term 9 Geo. 2.

The other method of the court's exercising their own judgment is still open, as in the case of *Roberts v. Tremaine*. *Clayton's* case, 5 Rep. shews what sort of shifts they must be that a court will consider as an evasion of the statutes of usury. *Comb.* 125. shews what are, what are not hazards; and, amongst other things, Lord Chief Justice Holt said, dying within half a year is no hazard. But if there be a wager between two, it is not usury; for the bargain was *bonâ fide*, and so laid down in several of the old cases.

The present case is fully before the court. In order to make it usurious, it must be determined to be a shift to get an exorbitant premium, and colourable only to evade the statute.

Now it appears to me to be a mere bargain on chance, a wager which out-lived the other, Mr. Spencer or the Dutchess of Marlborough.

Some stress has been laid by the plaintiff's counsel on the word *lend*.

But I think that concludes nothing as to the nature of the contract itself, but is a playing on words only. Every bargain of this kind is a loan, even bottomrice contracts are so, and expressly called loans by act of parliament.

(1) See *anon. post.* 2 vol. 61.

Therefore

re it is not the expression, but the nature and intent of which must determine, whether this contract be a loan or risque.

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The intent of the agreement,

and not the expression, determines whether a contract be a loan or risque.

ure, one reason why so large a premium has been allowed on bottomree bonds, was out of regard to commerce; but another reason must have been, that they are not within the law of usury, because the whole money is in *bazard*.

Bottomree bonds not usurious, because the whole money is in *bazard*.

Early of opinion therefore on the first point the bond was not usurious, and consequently not void in law.

The next question is, If the bond be not within the statute of usury, whether the bargain is of such a nature as will intitle the plaintiff to relief, on the circumstances of the case, in a court of law.

The case here will be grounded intirely on what was done by the Dutchess of Marlborough, and therefore I cannot say anything on this head, which I would have at all commended to an absolute determination; and yet I see no reason to think that the principal cases that have been cited, because they do not come up to the present, nor would I be understood to say that the force of them in any respect.

There are many circumstances on the part of the defendant which may make his case in a favourable light. There was no intention to defraud him; the scheme came from Mr. Spencer, not from the plaintiff; money was advanced on the borrower's own terms, and not refused by others, and not thought a good bargain according to the rules of calculation of chances.

I think there may be cases where this court will interfere to prevent improvident persons from ruining themselves, though no express fraud appears.

There may be cases where the court will interpose to prevent improvident persons from

ruining themselves, though no express fraud appears.

A prudent and considerate person must see the sad necessity of the court's keeping a strict hand over agreements of this sort, but then they must still depend on their particular circumstances; and it is not at all adviseable to give too particular determinations of such cases.

Agreements of this sort must depend on their particular circumstances.

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The next question is, *Whether what appears to have been done by the Dutchess of Marlborough, in this case, or influence the determination of this court (1)?* In answer of opinion, the plaintiffs are intitled to no other relief in respect of the penalty, on payment of 10,000*l.* upon it, from the death of the Dutchess of Marlborough.

We now take a view of the different situation of Mr. Spencer, and 1738.

(1) *Post.* 354. note.

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In 1738, notwithstanding he had a large income, he was involved in great difficulties, and extremely embarrassed how to pay his creditors: he was obliged to mortgage his expectations from the Dutcheſs, which was a dangerous experiment, as it might have defeated them intirely: but in 1744, upon the death of the Dutcheſs, he came into the poſſeſſion of ſo great an income, as enabled him to diſcharge his debts ſoon; all he deſired for doing it, was time, and he had it.

It is not material who took the firſt ſtep towards the new agreement; two months elapſed before it was abſolutely completed, and *Loſtin*, Mr. *Spencer's* agent, wrote to the defendant by his maſter's order, the 31ſt of *October*, to bring a bond and judgment; there was not the leaſt circumſtance of undue behaviour in the defendant, or force upon Mr. *Spencer*; and it appears in evidence, that Mr. *Spencer's* fixed deſign was to pay off the whole, as ſoon as he could, with a preference to the defendant, who Mr. *Spencer* himſelf ſaid, had treated him as a Gentleman.

In conſequence of this intention, he paid the defendant 1000*l.* at one time, and a ſecond 1000*l.* at another, and there are frequent declarations of Mr. *Spencer* proved, of his being extremely well ſatisfied with this tranſaction from firſt to laſt.

But perhaps it may be ſaid, Mr. *Spencer* was not fully apprized of the nature of the bargain, and that he might have been relieved on the firſt bond.

Even this circumſtance is not wanting in the preſent caſe, for *Loſtin's* depoſition is, that on aſking Mr. *Spencer* in 1738, what ſecurity he was to give *Sir Abraham Janſſen*, he replied, *Janſſen* much doubted if a bond would be valid at law, and therefore ſeemed inclined rather to take a note or memorandum for it only.

This ſhews Mr. *Spencer* was apprized of the nature of this contract, and the doubtfulneſs of its validity in point of law.

Mr. *Spencer* continued in the ſame mind from the beginning to his death, and, to the laſt, ſhewed a reſolution to confirm the bargain.

Contracts of a *poſt obit* nature in general, are by no means to be encouraged, are of a dangerous tendency, a publick miſchief, and not to be countenanced in a court of equity: but I ground my advice only on the particular circumſtances of this caſe, and think there may be relief given in other caſes, where ſuch ſtrong circumſtances do not concur.

I am very far from blaming the plaintiffs for ſubmitting the caſe to the conſideration of the court, but think they did extremely right; and my humble advice upon the whole is, to relieve only on the penalty of the bond.

Lord Chief Juſtice *Lee*: The firſt point is, As to the nature of uſury, conſidered either according to the Common law, Divine law, Civil law, or Canon law. It would be miſpending

Poſt obits in general, not to be countenanced in a court of equity.

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The idea of uſury in this country fully fixed, by the premium for forbearance of money being ſettled.

time

mention any thing on this head, because the idea of usury in country is fully fixed, and the premium for forbearance settled by statute.

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And. 15, and Mason v. Aldy, Comb. 126. and Carth. 68. distinction is taken between a colourable and a fair and hazard of the principal money; if of the former sort, gain is usurious, if of the latter, it is out of the statute. material and true reason why bottomree bonds are not is, because they are not within the statutes of usury, and of trade were the only inducements to the court to enforce this kind of contracts.

Bottomree bonds are not usurious, because not within the statutes of usury.

defendant's contract can be considered only as a real and it does appear to me very clearly, on looking into books, that courts of law have always held, where the lender is to have, is for the hazard, and not for the price, the contract is not usurious.

Where the profit is for the hazard, not the forbearance, the contract is not usurious.

Alloy de jure maritimo, lib. 2. cap. 11. sect. 14. he says, certain it is, that the greater the danger is, if there be a venture, the greater may the profit be of the money advanced, and so hath the same been the opinion of the Civilians, beavise some divines, though others seem to be of opinion, that profit or advantage ought not to be made of money so lent, no than those that are advanced on simple loan, and on the peril borrower. However all, or most of the trading nations of the world do at this day allow of the same, as a matter most reasonable, on account of the contingency or hazard that the lender and therefore such money may be advanced several ways, profit may arise, so that there runs a peril on the lender."

I say no more on this head, but on the second point: to your Lordship, whether it will not be worth while, in cases of equity to consider, how they may prevent bargains, where the lender runs away with double what he advanced, and to conform within the measure prescribed by the legislature, the premium for money.

Recommended to courts of equity to consider how to prevent bargains, where a lender runs away with double what he advanced.

look of the second point in this general manner, because Mr. Spencer has done with regard to the confirmation, has shown what might have been objected to the bargain's being unenforceable, as it stood originally.

if the contract at first should appear to be attended with circumstances as might induce a court of equity to rescind it, or moderate it only; yet the new agreement would give it a strength which it had not before.

mat. fol. 136. sec. 4. intitled, *Of the prohibitions to lend money to sons living under the paternal jurisdiction.*

lending of money to sons, who are still under the power and obedience of their fathers, being to them an occasion of debauchery, is one of the pernicious effects of usury, and it was by reason of the facility with which money of usurers, that the corruption of the manners of the Romans was come to such a height, and attended with such vices, that, to restrain this disorder, a regulation was made by

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By decree of the Roman senate, all obligations of sons, living under the paternal jurisdiction, contracted by the loan of money, are declared null and void, except the creditor advanced it for a cause that was just and reasonable.
a decree

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a decree of the senate, called, The Macedonian Decree, from the name of the usurer who gave occasion to it, by which all obligations of sons living under the parental jurisdiction, contracted by the loan of money, were declared null without any distinction. But if any creditor had lent money for a cause that was just and reasonable, sufficient to support the equity of the obligation; it was by a favourable interpretation of the decree of the senate, that this case was to be excepted from the general prohibition, according to the quality of the use to which the son put the money which he had borrowed.

The defendant had this exception in his favour, for the contract was made in order to empower Mr. Spencer to pay just debts to his tradesmen, and applied accordingly.

It appears by the authority of *Cole v. Martin*, in 3 Wms. a subsequent deliberate act, where the party is fully informed of every thing, makes the bargain good.

In the case of *Cann v. Cann*, 1 Wms. 727. Lord Macdfield makes use of these expressions, *Indeed if the party releasing is ignorant of his right, or if his right is concealed from him by the person to whom the release is made, these will be good reasons for the setting aside of the release; but solemn conveyances, releases, and agreements, made by the parties, are not slightly to be blown off and set aside.*

But here the right was not concealed from Mr. Spencer, for the subsequent agreement appears to be made deliberately, there was no kind of fraud in any one circumstance attending it; and therefore I concur in offering my advice in the same way with the Master of the Rolls, and Mr. Justice Burnet (1).

Lord Chief Justice Willes being ill, signified his concurrence in the same opinion by letter to Lord Chancellor.

Lord Chancellor: Before I proceed, it is proper to mention that Lord Chief Justice Willes, being ill, has furnished me with his reasons by letter, and authorized me to say, he concurs in opinion with me in the three points that are made in the cause.

In the next place, the able assistance I have had in this cause makes my task much easier, and, unless the novelty of the case called upon me to give my reasons, I might very well be excused from saying any thing on a subject, that has been so fully and learnedly discussed already; and if I could have foreseen on what points this matter would have turned, should have spared the learned judges their trouble.

The first point, *Whether the first bond is void in law, by virtue of the statutes of usury?*

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The second point, *If it is valid in law, Whether it is contrary to conscience, and relievable upon any head or principle of equity?*

The third point is, *Whether the new security given by Mr. Spencer after the death of the Dutchess of Marlborough, amounts to a confirmation, and is sufficient to bar the plaintiffs of relief.*

The first is a mere question of law, on the construction of the statutes, and therefore to be considered exactly in the same light, as in a court of Common law, and as if an action had been brought on the bond.

(1) *Post.* 354. note.

My Lords the Judges are very clear in their opinion, the bond was not usurious, and if I had been doubtful myself in this point, I should have thought notwithstanding, I was as much bound by their judgment now, as if I had sent it to be tried at law.

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But I have no doubt at all of this contract's being out of the statutes of usury, and do not intend to go through the authorities on this head, as they have been fully observed upon already: It is a plain fair wager, and not within the statutes, (1). because no loan.

This contract a
wager and not
within the sta-
tutes of usury

But if a loan, it has been argued for the plaintiffs, that an agreement to receive more than principal and legal interest, on any event, is usurious, and contrary to the statutes.

1 Domat. 115. title. 5. The civil law has very nice distinctions on *commodatum* and *mutuum*. As to *commodatum*, it is understood in the same sense the law of England understands it; but by *mutuum* the civilians mean a loan, where the thing lent is to be restored in *genere*; when any thing was to be paid for hire, it came under the head of *locatio & conductum*. The Common law has not adopted these nice distinctions. On actions for money lent, it is expressed by *mutuo data & accommodata*.

Even money on a risque is called a loan, as in the case of a bottomree bond, the 11 H. 7. c. 8. The statute contains a general prohibition of all usury, but says, without condition and adventure; from hence it appears they understood 'an advantage might be inserted in a loan of money, and therefore the inserting of a contingency, will not prevent it's being a loan.

If there has been a loan of money, and an insertion of a contingency, which gives a higher rate of interest than the statutes allow, and the contingency goes to the interest only, though real and not colourable, and notwithstanding it be a hazard, yet it has been held to be usurious: Where the contingency has related to both principal and interest, and a higher rate of interest taken than allowed by statute; the courts have there inquired, whether it was colourable or not, and within the distinction taken in the case of *Roberts v. Tremaine*, by Mr. Justice Doderidge.

If there be a
loan of money,
and a contingen-
cy inserted,
which gives
more than the
legal interest,
though real and
not colourable,
and a hazard,
yet it is usurious
(2).

First, (said he) if I lend 100*l.* to have 120*l.* at the year's end upon a casualty, if the casualty goes to the interest only, and not to the principal, it is usury, for the party is sure to have the principal again, come what will come: but if the principal and interest both are in hazard, it is not usury.

If a casualty goes
to the interest
only, it is usury;
if principal and
interest both in
hazard, other-
wise.

Secondly, If I secure both interest and principal, if it be at the will of the party who is to pay it, it is no usury; as if I lend to one 100*l.* for two years, to pay for the loan thereof 30*l.* and if he pay the principal at the year's end, he shall pay nothing for interest, this is not usury; for the party hath his election, and may pay it at the first year's end, and so discharge himself.

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(1) *Lamego v. Gould*, 2 Burr. 715.

(2) See *Morse v. Wilson*, 4 Durn. & East, 353.

Although

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Reason for ad-
mitting bottom-
ree bargains, is,
their being out
of the statutes of
usury.

Loans upon a
real and fair
contingency, no
more usurious
than bottomree
bonds.

Contracts of this
kind *vitia tem-
poris*.

Although this contract has been called a loan, yet it is merely a case of chance, and I agree with my Lords the Judges, the sound and fundamental reason for admitting bottomree bargains, is, their being out of the statutes of usury; for considerations of commerce cannot support them, if held to be within the statutes.

The counsel for the plaintiffs, by way of objection, laid great stress on *dictums* of Judges, that particular care must be taken there is no communication for the loan of money; therefore, say they, this being originally an agreement for borrowing on one part, and lending on the other, is usurious.

A very good answer has been already given to this, that the real and substantial foundation of the agreement must be considered, and not mere expressions only; but I will add to it, that loans upon a real and fair contingency cannot be said to be usurious, any more than in the case of bottomree bonds.

And the very stating of the fact, on the purchasing of an annuity, or on the sale of goods, will prove the observation.

A man may purchase an annuity, on as low terms as he can; but if he sets out at first with borrowing a sum of money, and then turns it into the shape of an annuity afterwards, this is a shift, and an evasion to avoid the statutes (1).

It is lawful likewise for a man to sell his goods as dear as he can, in a fair way of sale; but if *A.* applies to *B.* to lend money, and offers to allow more than the legal interest, and *B.* says, no! I will not agree to your proposal on these terms, but I will give you such a quantity of goods, and you shall pay me so much at a future time for them, beyond the price I now fix, and then charges an extravagant profit; this is a shift to get more than the legal interest, and is usurious.

On the second head. I shall follow the prudent example of Mr. Justice *Burnet*, by not giving any direct opinion, but at the same time, the arguments in this cause have made it necessary to say something.

No wise and good man will assert such bargains deserve encouragement, for as they are productive of prodigality on the one hand, so do they beget extortion on the other; want and avarice always generating one another, and these contracts may be truly said to be *vitia temporis*.

This court can certainly relieve against all kinds and species of fraud.

Fraud may either be *dolus malus*, a clear and express fraud, or fraud may arise from circumstances, and the necessity of the person at the time.

There are also hard unconscionable bargains, which have been construed fraudulent (2), and there are instances where even the common law hath relieved for this reason expressly.

(1) *Ante* 340. *Richards v. Brown*, 133. *Gwyne v. Heaton*, 1 Bro. Ch. Rep. 770. *Sed vide Willis v. Jernegan*, *post*. 8

(2) *Barnardiston v. Lingood*, *post*. 2 vol. vol. 251.

James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111. was a case of this kind. *Assumpsit* to pay for a horse, a barley corn, a nail, and double every il, and avers that there were 32 nails in the shoes of the horse, each, doubling each nail, comes to 500 quarters of barley; and upon *non assumpsit* pleaded, the cause being tried before Mr. Justice Hyde at Hereford; he directed the jury to give the value of the horse in damages, being 8*l.* and so they did; and was afterwards moved in arrest of judgment upon a slip in declaration, which was over-ruled, and judgment given for plaintiff.

Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen.

But this court will relieve against presumptive fraud, so that equity goes further than the rule of law, for there fraud must be proved, and not presumed only.

Fraud must be proved at law, but equity relieves against presumptive fraud.

To take an advantage of another man's necessity, is equally bad, as taking advantage of his weakness, and in such situation, incapable of making the right use of his reason, as in the *per.*

In the marriage brokerage bonds, one of the parties to the marriage only is deceived and defrauded, and not either of the parties to the marriage-brokerage bond, and yet the court have relieved, they hold it infected by the fraud, and relieve for the sake of publick, as a general mischief.

In like manner, where a debtor enters into an agreement with a particular creditor, for a composition of 10*s.* in the pound, provided the rest of the creditors agree, and this creditor at the same time makes a private clandestine agreement for his whole debt, and though no particular fraud to the debtor, yet as it is a fraud on the creditors in general, who entered into the agreement, on a supposition the composition would be equal to them, the court has relieved (1).

So in bargains to procure offices, neither of the parties is deceived or unapprized of the terms, but it serves to introduce unwholesome objects into publick offices; and therefore, for the sake of the publick, the bargain is rescinded.

Political arguments, in the fullest sense of the word, as they concern the government of a nation, must, and have always had, of great weight in the consideration of this court, and though there may be no *dolus malus*, in contracts as to other persons, yet as the rest of mankind are concerned as well as the parties, it may properly be said, that it regards the publick utility.

Political arguments, as they concern the government of a nation, of great weight in the consideration of this court.

In the cases before this court, there have been sometimes proof of actual fraud, such as *Berney v. Pitt*, the Earl of *Ardglass v. Schamp*, and several others.

In these cases too, fraud has been constantly presumed, or inferred from circumstances, and conditions of parties; weakness and necessity on one side, and extortion and avarice on the other, and merely from the intrinsic unconscionableness of the bargain.

The next kind of deceit is, upon other persons who were not parties, as ancestor and father, and the heir and expectant,



Surrett v. Spiller, ante 105. 2 Vef. 156. See *Middleton v. Onslow*, 1 P. W. 768.

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where by contrivance an heir or a son have been kept from disclosing his affairs to a father, or other relation, and by that means prevented from being set right, and undeceived; and the ancestor or father, have likewise been seduced to leave their fortunes, to be divided among a set of dangerous persons, and common adventurers.

That there was unconscionableness in the very nature of the bargain, the *hawking* it about shews, that there was also a deceit and delusion on the Dutches of *Marlborough*, who stood in *locu parentis*, appears from the evidence of Mr. *Backwell*, who swears it was intended to be carefully concealed from her, and that she should never hear of it.

And yet I do admit more circumstances appear here in favour of the defendant, than have concurred in the rest of the cases: Mr. *Spencer* was 30 years of age, there is no foundation to say he was a weak man, nor any charge in the bill of that kind, the bargain was unfought for by the defendant, and intirely proceeding from the borrower, who was of a broken constitution; the money too was borrowed for an honest purpose, to pay debts, and yet, I would by no means have it understood, that this intention alone will in all cases sanctify such a bargain.

In those cases where it has been inserted in the defeazance, that the lender should lose his money, if the borrower dies before father or grandfather; I always thought there was good sense in the words of the court upon those clauses, *that this does not difference the case in reason at all, for in these cases, if the tenant in tail died, living the father, the debt would be lost of course, and therefore expressing it particularly in the defeazance, made the bargain the worse, as being done to colour a bargain, that appeared to the lender himself unconscionable.*

Law-makers, in *Rome* thought it necessary, to put a prodigal under the care of a curator.

Mr. *Attorney General* said, that it was a vain and wild imagination, to think any general law can prevent prodigality and extravagance, and yet the law-makers in ancient *Rome*, though they were not so weak as not to know, that laws to restrain prodigals might be useless in many instances, thought it necessary still to put a prodigal under the care of a curator, and also made their famous *senatus-consultum Macedonianum* merely with a view to prevent it.

Whatever may be called a legislative authority in this court, I utterly disclaim; but so far as the court have already gone in cases, so far as Lord *Nottingham*, Lord *Cowper*, Lord *King*, and Lord *Talbot*, have gone in the several cases before them, I think myself under an indispensable obligation of following.

I have spent so much time *principally* with this view, that the work of this day may not be misunderstood, as if the court had departed from their former precedents, and established a new one for unconscionable bargains.

Brokers for *post obit* bargains, and *jointim* annuities, ought to be discouraged in equity.

Post obit bargains, and *jointim* annuities, have got their brokers and factors about this town, and I would willingly shut the door against such persons, and am not ashamed to own, I shall always be ready, consistent with the rules of equity, to correct such enormities.

The

third point is, *Whether the new security given by Mr. Earl of CRESS-TERFIELD v. JANSEN.* after the death of the Dutchess of Marlborough, amounts nation, and is sufficient to bar the plaintiff of relief.

first bond had been void at law, no new agreement re made it better, the original corruption would have t throughout.

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bargains that are not cognizable at law, are properly New agreements it of this court's consideration, new agreements and may confirm, s may confirm what might otherwise have admitted a what was at first is to the fairness of it (1). a doubtful bargain.

idence seems to prove clearly, that there was no com- Mr. *Spencer* at this time, his necessities were intirely 21,000 l. a year was by the disposition in the Dutchess's l to 7000 l. a year he had before, so that a little more rd of his annual income would have discharged the de- whole demand.

next place, the Dutchess being removed out of the way, r of her coming to the knowledge of it was gone, fo as delivered from that circumstance likewise; and fur- e was no anceltor or relation living, on whom any de- uction could be practised.

evidence of Mr. *Spencer's* declarations as to Mr. *Janf-* ting, whether the first contract was legal or valid, is a cumittance to shew Mr. *Spencer* was fully apprized of : of it, and no fraud or imposition therefore can be sug- this head.

nfirmination here is much stronger than in the case of *Martin*, because the original bargain here is attended h fairer circumstances.

encer here is a debtor, and Sir *Abraham Janssen* might essed him by bringing an action, and yet so far was he ng this advantage, that he waited two months without ne step in the affair.

aintiff's counsel have said, there has been only one case nation, where this court have decreed in favour of it, l, where the court have set aside bargains notwithstanding- mations, and instanced in the *Earl of Ardglass v. Mus-* nd *Wifeman v. Beake*.

ie circumstances in the first of these cases are not at all : to the present, the same fraud attended the confirma- he original bargain; and in the second of the cases, the ion was still more extraordinary, and the person just in

Stapleton v. Stapleton, ante 10. " will give a new bond, that will main-
v. *Ballard*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. " tain the possession of the right of the
rd *Thurlow* thus expresses him- " holder of the bond, and this act shall be
the subject of confirmations. — " said to be a confirmation; but not any
entleman of rank, fortune and " act done under the influence of the for-
, under age, in distress or other- " mer transaction, and the opinion that that
ives a bond; and afterwards con- " bond is good." Vide etiam *Delonaine v.*
that he has made a hard bar- *Brown*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 633.
nd knowing that the bond is bad,

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the same distressed situation as at first, and in both of them the original transactions were grossly fraudulent.

But here the original transaction was doubtful at least, if not entirely clear of imposition.

Upon the whole, I am of opinion the only relief the court can give, is against the penalty and judgment, and as the plaintiffs have *probabilis causa litigandi*, and the defendant's a case far from intitling him to the favour of the court, I shall not therefore give him costs against the plaintiffs; for I agree intirely with the Master of the Rolls, that the plaintiffs, as trustees, are to be greatly commended for submitting a question of this nature to the consideration of a court of equity.

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Let it be referred therefore to a Master to take an account of principal and interest due on the bond in 1744, and the judgment thereon and to tax the defendant his costs at law, and on payment to the defendant by the plaintiffs, of what shall be due at law, let the defendant deliver up the bond to be cancelled, and let satisfaction be acknowledged on the judgment, at the expence of the plaintiffs.

C A P. XXV.

Charity.

*Witty Gen. v. The Bank
2. 4. 8. Coll. 701*

(A) The Power of this Court with Respect thereto.

Jan January the
27th, 1737.

The Attorney General v. Jeanes.

Case 168.
The court will
give a proper di-
rection as to a
charity, without
any regard to an
impropriety in
the prayer of
an information.

IT was said by Lord Chancellor in this case, that in an information by the Attorney General for the regulation of a charity, it is the business of the court to give a proper direction to the charity, without any regard at all to the propriety or impropriety of the prayer of the information (1), and that this herein differed from all others, wherein the decree must be founded on the prayer in the plaintiff's bill (2).

- (1) *Attorney General v. Parker*, 1 *Ves.* 43. *Attorney General v. Scott*, 1 *Ves.* 418. *Attorney General v. Governors of Harrow School*, 2 *Ves.* 552. (2) The relief should in general agreeable to the case made by the 1 *Grimes v. Finch*, post. 2 vol. 141.

Jan January the
27th, 1738.

Attorney General v. Pile.

Vide title Devise, under the Division, Of things Personal, and what Description, and to whom good.

Michaelmas Term, 1738.

The Attorney General v. Gleg.

MR. *Wright* having by will left several sums of money to be distributed in charities therein described, at the discretion of his executors, named three persons executors, one of whom died before the filing of the information; and the question was, Whether this was only a bare authority in the executors, or coupled with an interest. S. C. Amb. 584. W. leaves money to be distributed in charity at the discretion of his executors, three named, one of whom died before the information filed. Case 169.

Lord Chancellor : I am of opinion that the executors, as taking the whole personal estate, out of which the charities were to issue, had an authority coupled with an interest, as executors have been always held to have in the case of legacies; and therefore the power of nominating the several persons who were to partake of the charity, is continued to the survivor of them. This is not a bare authority, but coupled with an interest, and survived to the other two executors (1).

But though this is such an authority coupled with an interest as would survive, yet it is so far a trust, that in case of misbehaviour the court may interpose, for it must be allowed, that the court has a particular free and extensive jurisdiction in the case of a charity, and not confined to the proper or formal methods of proceeding requisite in other cases. This court has a particular extensive jurisdiction in the case of a charity.

I am of opinion that the executors could not divide the charities into three parts, and each executor nominate a third absolutely, because the determination of the property of every object was left by the testator to the direction of all the executors, and so much of the information as seeks a specific performance of a pretended agreement to that purpose, was dismissed with costs, to be paid by the relators. The information here was dismissed with costs against the relators.

N. B. This was said to be the first instance of such a direction.

(1) With respect to *naked powers*, and powers coupled with an interest. See *Har. Co. Litt.* 113. a. note 2.

After Hilary Term, 1736.

The Attorney General v. Hayes.

LORD Chancellor : Where a legacy is given to a charity, interest shall be paid from the death of the testator (1). Case 170.

(2) This position is not warranted by the decree in this case. The case was thus.—*Judith Cale* by her will bequeaths 100*l.* to the ministers and churchwardens of the parish of *Chelsea*, in trust to invest the same with the approbation of her executors in the purchase of lands and tenements, and in some good security, and to distribute the yearly interest thereof unto and among six poor widows of the said parish of *Chelsea*, as the said ministers and churchwardens should approve of. She appointed her son *John Cale* and her daughter *Pere* the wife of the defendant *Hayes*.

Hayes executors, and died. Before payment of the legacy of 100 *l.* *John Cale* also died, and by his will appointed his brother *R. Cale* and *Hoyes* and his wife executors. The relators applied for payment of the 100 *l.* with interest from the testator's death: which the executors refused to comply with. Lord *Hardwicke* decreed that the charity should be established; and directed the Master to compute what was due for the said legacy of 100 *l.* with interest for the same after the rate of 4 *l.* per cent. from the end of one year

after the death of the said *Judith Cale*. Such interest to be added to the principal and laid out in government or other securities with the consent of the said *Phebe*, in the names of the said ministers and churchwardens, in trust for the charity. *Reg. Lib. A. 1736. fol. 346.* The same decree was made as to the time, when the interest commenced, in the *Attorney General v. Pearce*, as it appears in the Register's Book. *Reg. Lib. A. 1740. fol. 216.*

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C A P. XXVI.

Chose in Action.

Under the 27th, *Brown*, Assignee of *Roger Williams* a Bankrupt, v. *Heathcote* and *Martin*.
1746.

Vide title *Bankrupt*, under the Division, *The Construction of the Statute of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. with respect to Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Assignment.*

C A P. XXVII.

Church Lease.

Hilary Term, 1737.

Norton versus *Freckler*.

Vide title *Occupant*.

C A P. XXVIII.

Commission of Delegates.

June the 9th,
1737.

Sir *Henry Blount's* Case.

Vide title *Canon Law*.

Conditions and Limitations.

- (A) *In what Cases the Breach of a Condition will be relieved against.*
- (B) *In what Cases a Gift or Devise upon Condition not to marry without Consent, shall be good and binding, or void, being only in terrorem.*
- (C) *Who are to take Advantage of a Condition, or will be prejudiced by it.*

(A) *In what Cases the Breach of a Condition will be relieved against.*

Easter Term, 10 Geo. 2. May 11.

The Attorney General v. Doctor Stephens.

THE defendant had been regularly elected under Doctor Ratcliffe's donation, and had received the salary for five years, and then instead of travelling beyond sea, pursuant to the directions of the will, upon a suggestion of ill health, resigns, and the trustees accept the resignation.

Above five years have incurred since the resignation of the defendant, and the acceptance thereof by the trustees.

and then instead of travelling beyond sea for five more, as the will requires, upon ill health resigns, and the trustees accept the resignation, and put another in his room. This is a dispensation of condition. If they had said, when *A.* offered to surrender, we will not accept of your resignation unless you must comply with the terms, or refund, it would have been otherwise.

Lord Chancellor: The *Attorney General* is certainly a necessary party, and the information is properly brought in his name.

Nothing, to be sure, should be done in this court, to invalidate the design of this donation; and on the other hand, I must proceed in such manner as I am warranted to do, by the rules of law or equity.

There are three considerations in this case.

1st, What was the intention of Doctor Ratcliffe by his will?

2^{dly}, Whether Doctor Stephens has complied with it?

3^{dly}, If not, Whether it gives the relators a right to come into this court, to make the defendant refund what he has received?

Doctor Ratcliffe by his will gives several manors, upon trust, *inter alia*, to pay 600 *l.* yearly, to two persons, of *University College*,

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lege, who shall be elected out of the physick line, by the Archbishop of *Canterbury*, &c. for their maintenance for the space ten years, in the study of physick, and to travel half the time for their better improvement, and in case they should die, or place be vacant, then the vacancy to be filled up by two others, and the whole overplus to *University College*.

I think if the defendant had forfeited, the college would certainly be intitled to it, let it come to them by any means whatever: but as to the construction of Doctor *Ratcliffe's* will, was manifestly the design, that they should travel, and that they should travel five years, but it is truly said, there is no particular time appointed when they should begin their travels.

The words are, "the half of which time they should spend "travelling for their better improvement," and therefore it is most natural to intend that he meant the last five years for their travelling, because he imagined they would, in the first part of the time, be laying in a proper stock of knowledge.

But then it can never be understood that he intended in the events they should travel, for there might be accidents which would utterly incapacitate them for travelling, and therefore he did not expect they should refund when such accidents happen but left it at large to be judged of by the circumstances; besides this is given not only for the expence of travelling, but for other views likewise, for maintenance, &c.

The next question, Whether Doctor *Stephens* has complied with the intention of the donor?

Now it cannot be said, that Doctor *Stephens* has complied with Doctor *Ratcliffe's* intention; but then it must be considered, whether he has a reasonable excuse for not doing it; upon this there is no doubt, but that natural disabilities are a good excuse, such as becoming *non compos*, sickness, or other natural disabilities: but then it has been insisted upon, that the defendant has fraudulently accepted of this employment, in order to put the money in his pocket, without any intention even to do the duties of it: if this had been proved, I should have no doubt but that I might decree the defendant to refund; that is not the case, for there is not one single circumstance given in evidence to shew he took it upon such a fraudulent design; instead of that, there is very strong proof to the contrary, even by persons of good credit in the profession, that he had diligently applied himself to the study of physick, and besides, that he was in an ill state of health, in a walking and decayed condition, which threatened a consumption; and even suppose that he was actually able to travel, but in his own mind he did not think himself capable, yet he would not be guilty of a fraud for an imaginary as well as a real distemper would equally incapacitate him.

I do not think the clause in the will can possibly amount to a condition, but is merely directory, that half of the time they shall travel, and is not like an executory consideration: As when *A.* pays money upon such a consideration and it is not performed, an action at law lies for *A.* for money had and received to

use, which is expressed thus by the *Scotch* law, *causa data sed non secuta*.

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GENERAL W.
STEPHENS.

The agreement is to pay 300*l.* *per ann.* for ten years, if during that time he travel five years; will the not travelling oblige him to refund? No! unless the electors had suffered him to continue in this post the whole ten years, then possibly the relators would have had a right to call him to an account, and might have obliged him to refund for five of the years.

Doctor *Stephens* communicated his illness first to the Archbishop of *Canterbury*, and lodged a formal resignation with him. I think the trustees are the electors, and the persons whom Doctor *Ratcliffe* intended should have the whole management of this donation; they have accepted of this resignation, without insisting upon Doctor *Stephens's* going on, and it is certainly a dispensation of the condition: if they had said we will not accept of this resignation, but you must comply with the terms, *or refund*, then the case would have appeared quite different; but, instead of that, they have accepted of the resignation, and actually put another in his room.

Therefore I think as Doctor *Stephens* has taken the burden of this upon him, and as at the end of five years the trustees accepted a surrender from him, and did not insist then on his refunding, it would be unreasonable to require it now.

But even if it was a condition, yet suppose this case, a patron presents to a benefice, and takes a bond, as he may, from presentee to reside for ten years, and he, after five years are expired, should resign the living for the residue of the term, and the patron accepts it, and presents another, no one will say that he has forfeited the annual income of this living, during that part of the ten years he was resident upon it, for the acceptance of the patron has dispensed with the breach of the condition, and no action could be maintained on the bond.

Therefore I should think it too hard in the present case, to decree an account against the defendant.

There are two other points.

1st, Consideration, Whether the travelling fellows must be members of the college?

2^{dly}, Whether they have a power to let the chambers which they hold in the right of their fellowship.

As to these matters, they are not properly the objects of this court's jurisdiction, but ought rather to be determined by the visitor, and the will besides is extremely incorrect in this respect.

As to the being members of *University* College, it is natural to suppose no body would reside in the college, unless they were actual members; but this is out of the case, for Doctor *Stephens* has complied with that part of it.

And as to the power of letting their chambers, I do not think that Doctor *Ratcliffe* had laid his fellows under greater restrictions than those of the other colleges are liable to; and if I was to inquire whether a fellow of a college has a right to let his chambers, I should make wild work, and give an opportunity to half the university to bring bills against particular persons to dis-

Whether a fellow of a college has a power to let his chambers, is a point determinable by the visitor only.

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Conditions and Limitations.

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cover, whether they have not forfeited their fellowships by thus letting out their chambers.

Decreed the information to be dismissed, but without costs, as Doctor *Stephens* has had a very large benefaction already from Doctor *Ratcliffe's* donation, and *University College*.

(B) *In what Cases a Gift or Devise, upon Condition not to marry without Consent, shall be good and binding, or void, being only in terrorem.*

*April 30th, and
May 2d, 1737.*

ley v.
Goldson
are 570.

Henry Harvey, and *Catherine* his Wife, and *Ann Clutton*, Widow, Two of the Daughters of } Plaintiffs.
Sir Thomas Aston, Bart. deceased,

Lady *Aston*, Widow of the said Sir *Thomas Aston*,
 Sir *Thomas Aston*, Bart. Son and Heir of Sir
Thomas deceased, Sir *John Chesbreyre*, Henry
Wright, and *Andrew Kendrick*, Esqrs. } Defendants.

ing a Picket
No. 179
Cafe 172.

The (a) Sir Joseph
Jekyll.

Ca. temp. Talb.
12. S. C.

Com. Rep. 726.
S. C.

13. 5 Vin. 89. pl.
10. S. C.

5-11-15 Vin. 272.
pl. 28. S. C.

See the note at
the end of this

Cale.
The trust of a

from term under a
settlement was,

that if there
should be two or

~~more~~ more daughters
of the marriage;

THIS cause came on upon a petition to discharge an order made by the Master of the Rolls (*a*) for raising the fortune of the plaintiffs: The case was this.

Sir *Thomas Aston* by lease and releafe limits his estate, to the use of himself for life, then as to part to Lady *Aston* for life, for her jointure, then to his first and other sons in tail male, and for want of such issue, to trustees for the term of 1000 years, with power of revocation, this term is by a codicil made to take effect immediately after his death, and before the estate of the son, and declared the trust of the term to be, that if it should happen that he should have no son, but two daughters living at the time of his death, then the trustees, out of the rents and profits of the said estate, should raise and pay to the youngest of such daughters 5000*l.* if she marry with the consent of her mother, if living, and continuing his widow; if not, then with the consent of the trustees, or the survivor of them, his executors, administrators or assigns, and should pay to such daughter the yearly sum of 100*l.* for her maintenance till her marriage with such consent.

And in case it should happen, that he should have a son and two or more daughters, then that the trustees should raise and pay to each of such daughters the sum of 2000 *l.* if *she* marry with such consent as aforesaid; and till such marriage should pay each of such daughters the yearly sum of 50 *l.* till such daughter should attain her age of 18, and afterwards the sum of 70*l.* for her maintenance as long as Lady Affon shall live, and from and after her death shall pay to each the yearly sum of 100*l.* till their marriage

marriage: and in case any of the said daughters should happen to die before the said portion was paid, that it should not go to her executor, but the estate should be exonerated thereof, or, if raised, should go to him on whom the reversion of the premises is limited to descend; proviso that the term should cease in case of no son or daughter: or in case of the death of all the younger sons and of all the daughters without marriage. *N. B. Here, the words, with consent, were not added.*

HARVEY v. ASTON.
And in case any of the daughters die before the portion was paid, that it should not go to the executor, but the estate should be exonerated thereof, or, if

raised, should go to him on whom the reversion of the premises is limited to descend.

Afterwards by will Sir Thomas Aston, taking notice of the settlement, directs, that out of his personal estate, there should be paid to each of his daughters the further sum of 2000 l. as and for an augmentation of their portions, subject to the same conditions, provisos and limitations, as their original portions, and in case any of the daughters should die before the original portions became payable, then his will is, that this legacy of 2000 l. should not be paid to her executor, but that his Lady and executrix should have the *residuum* of this money, if any, and makes her residuary legatee and guardian of his children.

The father afterwards by his will gives the further sum of 2000 l. to each of his daughters, as an augmentation of their portions, subject to the same conditions, &c. as the original portions. And if any of the daughters die before the

original portions become payable, then he wills that this 2000 l. should not be paid to her executor, but that his Lady and executrix should have the *residuum* of this money, and makes her residuary legatee.

Sir Thomas died leaving eight daughters, and soon after his death a bill was exhibited in this court to have the will proved, and the trusts performed, and it was decreed, that the trustees should raise the maintenance immediately, with liberty to the parties to apply for further directions.

The plaintiff Harvey married one of the daughters without consent, and Clutton another also without consent. They are not intitled to the portions under the settlement or will.

In 1734, the plaintiff Harvey married one of the daughters without consent, and Clutton married another without consent, and a bill of revivor was filed, to which Lady Aston answers, that she had before such marriage given notice to the plaintiffs, that they would not be intitled to their portions, in case they married without her consent, and that she could not in conscience consent to her daughter's marriage with the plaintiff Harvey, because he could not make her any suitable settlement; but that notwithstanding this caution they both married without her consent.

And, upon a hearing at the Rolls, it was decreed, that the plaintiffs were well intitled both to their original and additional fortunes, and an order pronounced by his Honor accordingly (1); the present application was made by way of petition to discharge that order.

Lord Chancellor, thinking it a case of great doubt and difficulty, declared that he would be assisted by Lord Chief Justice Lee, Lord Chief Justice Willes, and Mr. Justice Comyns, and appointed the 21st of Nov. 1737, for the hearing thereof, when it came on accordingly.

(1) See the case as reported in *Cases temp. Talb.* 212.

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Mr. Attorney General for the plaintiffs argued, that this restraint in the present case ought not to be considered as a necessary qualification, but that it ought at all events to be raised and paid whenever the daughters married.

That, while alive, parents have a natural controul over their children; but though the law allows them such a power to restrain the children in marriage, yet it is not to be delegated to any other person, and it is absurd to say, that this power shall descend to any assignees whatsoever, or executors or administrators.

Parents may be fond of extending their power, even after their children come of age; but the law leaves marriages as free as possible, and therefore does not encourage parents in this extent of their power. *Swinb. part the 4th. 12th chapter, God. Orph. Leg. 380.*

The only difference between the Civil law and ours is, that where there is no devise over, we call it a devise *in terrorem*, but the civil law says, such a condition is absolutely void. *Jervais v. Duke, 1 Vern. 20. Bellasis v. Ermine, 1 Cha. Ca. 22.*

It has been insisted that this is a condition precedent, and the legacy could not vest, because the condition has not been performed; but allowed, if it had been a subsequent condition, it might have been otherwise.

He argued, that in these cases, the court had made no difference between conditions precedent and subsequent. *Gregg v. Luther, More 857.* In the present case, the thing that is to be done is marriage, and in all cases of conditions precedent there must be performance, or the estate can never vest; here the most material part has been performed, which is marriage, and consequently the estate vested. *Scamhill v. Baily, Pra. in Chan. 562.*

"If any of my daughters should die before the original portion becomes payable, then he wills that this legacy of 2000*l.* should not be paid to her executor, but that Lady Aston his executrix should have the *residuum* of the money."

This cannot be called a devise over, which is only saying, that it should fall into the *residuum* of the personal estate, and would have done so if this had not been provided for.

So much as to the additional portions. Next as to the original portion; the words which are to make a limitation over here, are different from the words in the will, "In case any of the said daughters should happen to die before the said portion was paid, that it should not go to her executor, but the estate should be exonerated thereof, or, if raised, should go to him on whom the reversion of the premises is limited to descend."

It has been objected, that this was a case where the money is to be raised out of the land, and the civil law had nothing to do with it.

This would be a good objection, if it was a question to be determined at common law, in an ejectment, or merely a question at common law, but it is manifestly a creature of equity, for

is concerning the execution of a trust, which is not a proper subject for the common law to enter into. HARVEY v. ASTON.

The principles and rules in this case which govern a court of equity, must be consistent with similar cases; though this money is to be raised out of land, yet it ought to be considered as money, and to be governed by the same rules as money.

If money is to be turned into land, it shall be devised no other way, nor considered any other way but as land (1) here the money is to be paid out of this land, into the hands of executors, and the very fund out of which the money is to be raised, becomes a personality; for though it is a term of inheritance, it is personal estate, therefore neither in law nor equity is it to be considered as land, and equity will reverse the very order of things to come at the intention.

The heir at law is favoured upon many occasions, but never to the prejudice of younger children, where the heir is otherwise sufficiently provided for; and tho' the father here has annexed terms to the plaintiffs taking of their portions, yet they are terms which are contrary to the policy of the land, and contrary to the law, and absolutely void.

The great fund out of which portions are to arise is land, and therefore restrictions of this kind, which make this fund precarious, ought to be discountenanced, especially as they likewise discourage marriage, which is a much more probable way of introducing a virtuous education, than if they were born out of stock.

I will not say the mother will abuse this power, but if she marries, it devolves on the trustees, and though they are men of honour, and will not, I believe, injure the daughters; yet if they die, it goes to executors or administrators, and even assigns, who may possibly be knaves and fools, and consequently very improper to be intrusted with such power.

The court has already determined that this is contrary to the common policy, and have fixed bounds by precedents, from which they will not depart. *Fleming v. Walgrave*, 1 Chan. Caf. 3. *Aston v. Aston*, 2 Vern. 452.

Cases of forfeiture never receive any countenance in this court, for in all conditions that are a restraint upon marriage, not performed, there must be an express limitation over to some other person, or it is no forfeiture; now in this part of the case, it would equally have sunk in the land for the benefit of the heir, if it had not been so expressed in words.

Dr. Strahan of the same side.

I shall state the rules of the civil law, and consider it first generally as a provision for daughters.

The civil law has apportioned a father's estate, which it is not his power to take away; if he should give it away, he must sign some satisfactory reason; he could not clog it, or put any restraint upon marriage.

(1) See *Guidot v. Guidot*, *post*. 3 vol. 254.

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The writ, *de rationabili parte bonorum*, shews the civil law has been received and countenanced in *England*.

With regard to marriage portions, the civil law has a particular law for that purpose, *Cod. lib. 5. title 11. de dotis promissione & nudâ pollicitatione, lex 7. Dig. lib. 23. 2 Tit. de ritu nuptiarum, lex 19. de patribus cogendis in matrimonium collocare. Qui liberi, quos habent in potestate, injuria prohibuerint ducere uxores, vel nubere, (vel qui dotem dare non volunt, ex constitutione divorum Severi & Antonini) per proconsules, præfides provinciarum coguntur in matrimonium collocare & dotare.*

If parents had been allowed to annex conditions to portions, it might, perhaps, have been an unreasonable one, and have frustrated the design of portions. This was contrary to the policy of the republic of *Rome*, the *jus trium liberorum*.

Marriages ought to be free, *libera. debent esse matrimonia*, and it is a general rule in the civil law, where a condition is annexed to a legacy by way of total prohibition of marriage, that it is absolutely void.

Jacobus Gothofredus de fontibus juris civilis, p. 291. mentions the *Julian law de patripropria* in the time of *Augustus*, that if any person adds a restraint to marriage, let them be free from the condition; they endeavoured then to find out conditions which would not in direct words restrain marriage, but in the implication would have the same effect, by making the consent of a third person the condition of marrying. This was declared to be eluding the design of the *Julian law, Dig. lib. 35. 1 Tit. de conditionibus & demonstrationibus et causis & modis eorum quæ in testamento scribuntur, lex 72. Si arbitratu Titii Scia nupserit, meus hæres ei fundum dato; vivo Titio, etiam sine arbitrio Titii eam nubentem legatum accipere, respondendum est, eamque legis sententiam videri, ne quod omnino nuptiis impedimentum inferatur, &c.* This is *Papinian's* determination, who was looked upon to be the brightest of all the *Roman lawyers*; and *Cujacius*, in his comment upon this very law, says, His authority is of great weight, and has such regard paid to it in our court, that conditions restraining marriage are held by us, upon his authority, to be absolutely void. *Mantica, lib. 1.1. n. 8. Grafius, lib. 1. n. 9. Covarruvius, n. 3.* takes a difference between marriages with the consent, and the advice of another. *Sanchez de sanct. matrimon. sacramento disputat. 34. n. 19. Non tantum conditio non incundi matrimonium, rejicitur a legato, sed etiam conditio ineundi arbitratu, vel consensu tertii, et ratio est, quia qui tenetur consensum vel licentiam alieni petere, tenetur sequi, atque ita matrimonii libertas impeditur.*

Swinbourn, part the 4th, *sec. 12.* lays it down as a general rule, that all conditions against marriage are unlawful, contrary to the procreation of children, repugnant to the law of nature, and detrimental to the commonwealth.

In the present case *Lady Aston* will have the benefit, who is the person to refuse. *Dig. lib. 30. tit. 1. de legatis & fidei commissis, lex 43. perag. 2. Legatum in aliena voluntate poni potest, in heredis non potest.* The heir in this case is to have the benefit also by refusal.

therefore *nunquam presumetur velle obligari*, and ought not receive any countenance.

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The emperor *Justinian*, *Cod. lib. 6. tit. 43. Communia de legatis fidei commissis* & *de in rem missione tollenda*, saith, *Rectius esse ut censemus in rem quidem missionem penitus aboleri; omnibus vero legatariis quam fidei commissariis unam naturam imponere, et non in personalem actionem prestare, sed et in rem, quatenus eis liceat in res sive per quodcunque genus legati, sive per fideicommissum inter derelicta, vindicare in rem actione instituenda.*

Where a condition is null and void, the question will then, Whether any devise over or limitation will be good?

When the validity of the condition which is annexed to the conveyance is taken off, it becomes absolute, and no devise over affects it. *Dig. lib. 35. tit. 1. de condit. & demonstrat.*

22. *Quotiens sub conditione mulieri legatur, si non nupserit, et idem fideicommissum sit, ut Titio restituat, si nubat: commode videtur, et si nupserit, legatum eam petere posse et non esse cogendam fideicommissum prestare*, the condition being void in law, the legacy discharged of it.

Supposing such consent should be necessary, yet it must be a reasonable objection to the marriage, that is intended by this condition. Here the plaintiff Mr. *Harvey* has 300*l. per ann.* in possession, and as much in reversion, and was ready and able to make proper settlement, and therefore there could be no reasonable grounds for Lady *Aston's* refusal.

Mr. *Brown* of the same side.

As marriage was the only thing that was really and substantially the consideration of the parties, that has been performed, and the rest is *in terrorem*.

The whole direction to raise the portion is upon the consent of the mother, and not a word of the father; there are several instances which might be put where this settlement should not take place. Suppose Lady *Aston* should have been seduced by the hand of God, and had become a lunatick, how could her consent have been had? Or suppose there had been an assignment of the term, and an administrator appointed the trustees at the same time, whose consent was necessary, how could it be had?

As it stands on the foot of the settlement, it is a mere penalty, and only *in terrorem*.

Here the children might possibly wait the greatest part of their lives for the consent of persons, to whom they are interested; in 1 *Mod.* 310, Lord Chief Justice *Hale* takes notice of a case cited by the defendant's counsel in *Fry v. Porter*, where the consent was to be had in writing, and tho' no such consent, yet decreed a good marriage; and his Lordship said there was great equity it should be so, because (said he) the consent was only a provident circumstance and wisdom

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of the devisor, for the more firm obliging the party to ask consent, which the devisor considered might be pretended to be had by slight words; and in the *Earl of Salisbury v. Bennet* 2 Vern. 223. there was a marriage contrary to the express terms of the condition on which the daughter was to take, and yet the whole portion decreed. In *Jackson v. Ferrand*, 2 Vern. 424. a portion was decreed to be raised out of land, though the devisee died before the time appointed for the payment.

The common law has paid a great regard to the rule of the ecclesiastical court, with respect to cases of restriction on marriage, *Moor* 857. *Gresley v. Luther*, 11 Jac. 1. I mention this to shew that these sort of cases have been very anciently taken notice of, for Mr. Justice *Winch*, in giving his opinion, cites a case before this, where there was a condition annexed to a daughter's legacy, that she marry with the assent of the mother, and she sued in the ecclesiastical court for the legacy; it was pleaded in bar that she did not marry with the mother's assent, and, notwithstanding this, she had sentence for the legacy.

The cases of portions are what this court have exercised a peculiar jurisdiction over, contrary to the other side of *Weshminster-hall*; and though it is a rule *equitas sequitur legem*, that must be confined to cases which arise from a legal point, and incidentally come before the court; a mortgage in equity is not considered as a revocation of a will, tho' it is at law; nor will this court consider a mortgage as land, nor allow it to be irrevocable.

I put it upon the gentlemen of the other side, to shew where this court have suffered penalties to take effect, which are in restraint of marriage.

It is not said, any where in the deed, to whom the portions shall go over, provided the daughters marry without such consent; and in *Hayward v. Paget*, Nov. 12, 1733, it was held a general devise of the *residuum* is the same as no devise over at all.

The money given by the will is as an augmentation of the daughters' portions; and where a legacy is given to a person upon marriage, and the legatee marries accordingly, it vests, though without the consent of a particular person, *Scmpbill v. Bayly*, *Prec. in Chanc.* 562. and where a person who takes it over, takes it as a residuary legatee, it is plainly distinguishable from the cases where it is devised over to a specifick legatee; and therefore this case must fall within the reason of those determinations where the devise is *in terrorem* only.

Dr. *Andrews* for the defendants.

Deeds are undoubtedly of a stricter nature than a will; and as the will in the present case plainly refers to a deed, it must be construed with the same strictness as a deed.

It is a legacy uncertain, but to be made certain by a fact; **HARVEY v. ASTON.** it is not daughters by name, but to a daughter only who marries with the consent of the mother, and no body can take but those bringing themselves within the description. I do maintain it this is a legacy which has never vested, because the condition on which it is given by the testator has not been performed, and, according to the law of the twelve tables, *voluntas aitoris in testamento totum facit*, and though a prohibition of marriage hath not been allowed, yet the civil law permits a raint upon it. *Cod. lib. 5. tit. 4. lex 1. Cum de nuptiis puellaritur, nec inter tutorem et matrem & propinquos de eligendo futuro ito convenit: arbitrium præsidis provincie necessarium est.* *Swinb. 4. sec. 12. par. 14.* "When that which is given with condition of not marrying, is to be distributed in pious uses, in case the condition be not observed; here the condition is not rejected as unlawful, and if he marries, he loses his legacy; the reason is, for that the law doth more favour piety than the liberty to marry."

A variance between the old law, and the law in *Justinian's* code, vide *Institut. lib. 2. tit. 20. de legatis, sect. 36.* In the old law, legacy restraining marriage, void; but in the latter law, such legacies, notwithstanding the condition annexed, shall be equally subject to the condition, as any other legacy would be if it is left subject to a condition.

The rule in our court is, that the civil law, so far as is consistent with the *jus gentium*, shall prevail. *Grotius* lays it down, that after the death of the father, the mother is intitled to the obedience from the children as the father, founded upon the fifth commandment.

The *jus trium liberorum* is not in force with us; if a Roman had three children, and not able to maintain them, the commonwealth maintained them; but the publick here takes notice, the parishes must support them. In the *Roman* law was provided not for natural children; but in our law, if a man marries, though he has lawful children, yet he may dispose of his estate to the illegitimate issue, in prejudice of the legitimate. By the *Roman* law, the portion was the woman's independent property; here it belongs to the husband, and here it could be considered as if the father had said, I give 2000*l.* to such a man as shall marry my daughter with the consent of the mother.

Mr. Fazakerly of counsel also for the defendants.

This court will consider the consent to be a material ingredient, and without which it could not be a marriage, consistent with the intention either of the deed or devise.

It is said this must be construed *in terrorem*, but I hope the court will not construe men's intentions into such a phantom story; for if this is the known construction of this court, and any man be so void of understanding, and so trifling, to make use of a restriction which he is sensible will be void? A restriction which can hardly meet with any person

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person so weak and ignorant as to be terrified at it. As to the case of *Jackson v. Farrand*, in 2 *Vern.* it is doubtful if that case would be determined as it now stands, if it was to be re-heard.

If this court will construe the intention contrary to the express words, it is impossible they can operate at all; the law will not make an exposition against the express words and intention of the parties, which stand with the rule of law, *quod in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla expositio contra verba expressenda est.*

The laws of nature are so strong upon fathers, that the national law has not obliged them to make any provision, but left it intirely to their discretion, and has given up the children in this respect to the absolute power of the father: Who so proper to make a prudent provision for children as the father, who knows the disposition and temper of each child? Different restrictions may be necessary in one case, which may be unnecessary in another.

The 12th of *Car.* 2. *cap.* 24. *sect.* 8. has given a father an absolute power to dispose of the guardianship of his children, until the age of 21, which shews the sense of the legislature as to parental authority; by the custom of the city of *London*, whoever marries an orphan without the proper consent, though living intirely out of their jurisdiction, yet he is not intitled to the portion; would this custom be permitted, if it absolutely contradicted the known rules of law, as is pretended by the other side? This court, only upon a bill filed, and affidavits produced, that a disadvantageous marriage is apprehended, will prevent the person from marrying without the leave of the court.

It has been said, wherever there is a condition that is *malum in se*, it will make it void, and several instances have been put, as to murder a person, or where it is repugnant to a grant; but this being a collateral thing, and not preventing a marriage, can never be construed or brought within this rule.

They have not cited one authority out of the common law, and with respect to legacies, *your Lordship* has a concurrent jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical court, and if this court follow their rules in similar cases, it is for this reason, that there may be a conformity in the resolutions, and that the subject may have the same measure of justice in which court soever he sued. *Abr. of Ca. in Eq.* 295.

Where a legacy charged upon land is once vested, it becomes money, and goes to the person to whom it is given; but before it is vested, it is a common law charge, and is not for the consideration of the civil law, or the ecclesiastical court. A trust term must be considered as a parcel of the inheritance, till the purpose for which it is raised is satisfied, and the legacy actually vests.

1 *Ch. Ca.* 58. *Fleming v. Walgrave*, is not at all to the present purpose; the case is very short, and very obscurely stated; the dispute there was besides upon a mere personal trust. The case in *Finch's Reports* fol. 62, too much honoured by being

ord *Nottingham's Reports*, there, if the daughter never she might be allowed to improve the estate, as there probability of her marriage at that time; and as she had ute property, if she did not marry at all, upon giving that she would comply with the terms, she was allowed ve.

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is no law to prevent widows from marrying, but y marry *ad infinitum*: and yet conditions in a will to them from marrying, have been held to be binding, ough enough to do great service to the publick in point n.

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vil law was never received so far as to controul property t the construction with regard to charges upon land, ays been adapted to the rules and distinctions of our : In personal legacies indeed it may be otherwise, and may be influenced by the rule of the civil law; but hich is to be raised out of a trust upon land, cannot to exist, till the condition, for which the trust was complied with, and can never be called *debitum in olvendum in futuro*: this rule is applicable indeed to because there the debt immediately commences from ation, but the defeazance is not to take place till a y; we insist that this never vested, because it is only pon marriage *with consent*; and therefore all that has with relation to a forfeiture, is an argument without lusion.

y, As to the will, if there had been no word but *aug-* it could not be taken without a compliance with the the original portion in the first place; a case deter- fore the Master of the Rolls (a) has been insisted on; (c) Sir Joseph here are two cases of equal authority, being both de- Jekyll. he same person, which are adjudged different ways, the is still as much open, as if this had been a case *prime* is.

the testator's intention to give it over equally clear by it should sink in the personal estate, where he has ap- residuary legatee, who will consequently have the bene- he had actually in words and by name given it to *the legatee*.

is a provision of 70*l.* *per ann.* to the daughters during f the mother, and after her death 100*l.* which they will itled to, though they have married contrary to the restric- l therefore the argument of their being destitute falls to id.

never has been any case in the ecclesiastical court, has been determined, that a legacy given upon a con- shall be a good legacy, before *that contingency happens*, r *Andrews* informs me.

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Mr. Attorney General's reply.

It is insisted, that the intention of the parties is clear and plain.

Secondly, If so, that this intention ought not to be over-ruled in law or equity.

There are no negative words, that this shall not be raised if the daughter marries without consent, and if the term is to continue notwithstanding the marriage without consent, who is it to continue for? For the daughter only! as it was created for no other end and purpose.

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The known construction, that the devises in restriction of marriage, are *in terrorem*, unless there is a devise over, has, in a good measure, been allowed by the defendant's counsel; this has been the general and unshaken rule of the court, and therefore, if not entirely founded on reason, ought to be acquiesced under; but I do maintain, it was established on great reason, for the court supposes the father did not intend to leave the daughter destitute of a portion, but guarded it only by intimidating a child from marrying improvidently, though a child should be told afterwards, this is designed as a terror only and does not debar you of your portion, yet this is not contrary to the intention of the father, for he imagines when they are apprized of this, that they are then of years of discretion, and incapable of making this restriction ineffectual.

It is said, the construing these restrictions void, arises from the principles of the civil law, which is not in force in *England*, and to be sure, considered merely as the *Roman* civil law, has nothing to do here; but the question is, whether the same words in any case before one court of justice, ought not to have the same construction in every court.

It has been insisted, this is a constraint not at all contrary to the rules in law and equity.

The parental authority, when confined to it's just bounds, I will readily allow; but no body will say, the father in *England* has the power of life and death, or that he can imprison, or deprive his eldest son of his estate by right of heirship and inheritance: it will not be denied, but that there is a time, when a child may be as fit to govern himself, as the parent can be to advise him.

It is said, that the law has given the parent, who is the natural guardian, the power of appointing another guardian; and arguments have been drawn too from the custom of *London*, which I allow has been supported upon wise reasons, but they are not applicable here, because at 21 the custom ceases, and here they cannot marry at 30, 40, &c. or at any age without the consent of the mother; in the other instance, the law does not extend their view beyond the age of 21; but the parent has carried his power so far, as to controul his children even after they come to years of discretion: What is this? but *striaining* a person who is of an age equally capable of judging his own, and is like an attempt to settle an estate in *perpetuity*.

fter destroying the end, by the very means themselves, and generally goes much sooner out of the family, than otherwise it might have done.

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It is objected, that the court in devises *in terrorem* have proceeded only in pursuance of the ecclesiastical court, that the two courts, who have a concurrent jurisdiction, may not clash, but will not hold, if this court should construe it a condition that binding, though there is no devise over.

The learned doctors allow, though there is a limitation over, it is void in the civil law, except in one case, a limitation pious uses, because there the interest of charity is preferable to the interest of children; this shews that the reason of this court founded differently from the civil law, for here it goes upon the general policy of the kingdom.

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Mr. *Fazakerly* said, there was no instance of any case of this nature in the ecclesiastical court. I am very glad no instance can be produced there, for then the consequence is, this court is nothing to borrow from the proceedings in the ecclesiastical court.

Tho' the money is directed to be raised out of the land, yet it is to be considered only as money, but it has been insisted by Mr. *Fazakerly*, it must first vest, before it can be considered as money; notwithstanding it is not, as they say, vested, yet it does not follow, that it should not till then participate of money, and vesting or not vesting makes no difference; nor can it be raised by any other court, for it is trust-money, and properly the creature of this court, and it has been held here more than once, that the construction of trusts ought to be favoured in the same manner as the construction of wills.

The case of *King v. Withers*, in Lord *Talbot's* time, was, on an appeal to the House of Lords, affirmed (a); there what was called on the other side a general rule, seems to be broken through, for it is determined, that money to be raised out of land, shall not sink for the benefit of the heir, where marriage, and end of the portion was answered, though the whole of the condition for raising it, was not complied with.

(a) Cases in
Chan. in Lord
Talbot's time,
117. Prec. Chan.
348. S. C.

The cases cited of a devise over, are not applicable here, because in the present instance there is no legal proper devise over.

Needham and Sir *H. Vernon*, resolved in Lord *Nottingham's* case, is in point for us, and tho' the book itself is of no authority, yet the manuscript under his hand, not differing from the printed case in any essential point, will surely have its weight. *Aston v. Aston*, 2 *Vern.* 452. of the same kind, and authority given for performing the condition, because there was a devise over.

Lord *Harcourt* saying in *King v. Withers* (b) that a portion to be raised out of land, is to be considered as land, can have no weight, for there is a great difference to be made between the saying of a judge, and a *dictum* upon which the judge gave judgment; but in that very case the determination was con-

(b) Eq. Ca. Abq.
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trary to the *dictum*; for the portion was decreed to be raised, and consequently a *dictum* not necessary to the judgment, and of no authority.

It has been insisted on the other side, there is a devise over.

Can it be said, this is a giving over, where it would have fallen of course into the inheritance, if this had not been said? A man devises an estate to his heir, he does nothing by it, for it would descend to him without it.

The rule of considering conditions in restriction of marriage, as *in terrorem*, is a rule of this court only, and founded upon the policy of the land, and not in conformity to the reasoning of any other court.

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As to the portions under the will, it is said, if they are not intitled to the original portions, they are not intitled to the *augmentation*.

It does not follow, because the testator calls it an *augmentation*, that they shall not have this portion, in the same manner as portions have been decreed in other wills: suppose the very words of the settlement had been inserted in the will, yet it shall have a different construction where it is applied to the landed estate, and where to the personal; and therefore, what ever may be your Lordship's opinion as to the settlement, you will not determine on the will by the same way of reasoning.

It has been insisted by Doctor *Andrews*, that these words are intended as descriptive, and that no persons can take, but who bring themselves under this description.

Is not saying *daughter* in the precedent words, as descriptive as if he said, my daughters *Mary, Ann, &c.*

It is said, that this is given over, and to the remainder man of the estate, but the words are, *In case any of my said daughters should happen to die before the said portion was paid, that the estate should be exonerated thereof*: this is not giving it over, but makes it a nullity, for it ceases, if the contingency of marrying fails, and nothing is to be raised.

Can it be supposed that a child will always continue an infant, that they will never arrive at years of discretion, never capable of judging for themselves? Shall they be thought fit to preside in the great assembly of the nation, be placed at the head of armies, nay even preside in this court, and yet incapable of judging, where marriage is concerned?

Doctor *Strahan's* reply.

How far the civil law should have weight, is in the breast of the person presiding here, but it is certain the civil law is interwoven in the original institution of this court; what I insist upon is, that being tied up to marry with the consent of another, was by that law considered as a total prohibition, and held to be null and void.

It has been objected, notwithstanding the general rule, that some restrictions were allowed upon marriage, with regard to point of time, or restriction to particular persons; but this is

nt that a total prohibition is allowed, for they are still d to marry, observing the direction of time, or direction ons: the principal alteration that I know of, was re- g a woman from a second marriage, and this was re- the general law, for the interest and preservation of the of the first marriage, in the *Julia Marcella*, but the em- *Justinian* repealed and abolished the *Julia Marcella*, and uch condition, whether in restraint of widows, or in re- of others, absolutely void.

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lib. 33. tit. 4. De dote prelegata, lex 14. is very far ming up to the present case; there the testator had two rs and a son, the eldest of which married in his life- and taking notice of his youngest daughter in his codicil,

Filiam meam Crispinam, quam vellem tradi nuptui cuicunque ei & cognati approbarent, providebit tradi Pollianus sciens meam, in equalibus portionibus, in quibus & sororem ejus

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this amounts at most to a wish that she would marry ie approbation of his friends and relations, but not that married without it, she would forfeit her portion. s been said, that the father had a very great power, and might delegate it to others.

w it to be very great, though it was very much abridg- t whatever power he might have in his life, I apprehend, the civil law, he could not delegate if after his death: spect to paternal authority in the point of guardianship, i not appoint a tutor to his child, beyond the age of 14, r that age, the *Roman* law thought the child of sufficient y in judgment, to chuse for himself. In the present ey must be continually under guardianship, under their , while she lives, and under others after her death: I according to the passage cited out of *Grotius*, the chil- ight to be under the obedience of their parents, and in f marriage too, so far as to take the direction of their , but not under such a servile obedience, as to refrain arrying at all, if the parent should advise it.

e are no printed reports of cases with us, but there have, ist have been cases of this kind; but what is the conse- if there had been no case at all of this nature determin- n it must be adjudged according to the standard rule be- s case.

r the counsel had finished, the court declared they would ne to consider before they delivered their opinion; and se by order of *Lord Chancellor*, stood in the paper for nt the 5th of *June*, 1738.

Justice *Comyns* (1) who on that day delivered his opinion ster stating the case *ut supra*, said, he thought it very hat it was the intention of Sir *Thomas Aston*, that his rs should not have their original portions, if they mar- thout such consent as prescribed, and this intent appears very clause of the deed.

the argument of Mr. Justice *Comyns* more fully reported *Com. Rep.* 726.

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Where any act is previous to any estate or trust, and consists of several particulars, every particular must be performed.

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It is agreed, that the portions were not payable till marriage and there is no direction in the deed that they shall be paid at marriage only, but expressly on marriage *with consent*.

It is a known rule, that where any act is previous to any estate or trust, and that act consists of several particulars, every particular must be performed before the estate or trust can vest or effect, and to this purpose there are many cases, but it is sufficient to cite one only, and that is *Sir Cesar Wood v. The Duke of Southampton, Shower's Parliament Cases*, 83, 87, which comes up to this point as to the performance of both parts.

But *the objection* which has been most relied on at the bar, *that* in the civil law, these restrictions are looked upon as unlawful, and that the doctrine of the civil law has been admitted into this court: I think some regard is to be had to the civil law and what *Selden* lays down in his dissertation upon *Fleta*, *lib. 5.* seems to direct how far it shall be admitted.

It will therefore be proper to take some notice of the ground of this maxim in the civil law, *that* conditions of marriage with consent, annexed to legacies, are void conditions.

It was the rule of *that law*, that nobody should devise an estate without leaving something to the heir; so also by a statute of the 32 H. 8. there is a particular saving of one part not devisable: The provision of the *lex Falcidia* was *detur legatum, ne minus, quam partem quartam hereditatis coheredes capiant*. And it was called *legitima portio*: this was endeavoured to be evaded two ways, first, upon leaving the whole to the heir upon condition of marrying with the consent of such person, who it was known would never consent, secondly, Where the parties were in the power of the testator forcing them to marry such persons only, as they could marry with honesty and credit, so that this was looked upon as an evasion of the law; but the law always was, that where the condition was not a total restraint, as where a particular person only is excepted, *then* the condition was good.

But as it has been insisted, that *this court* has adopted this rule, I shall mention the cases on that head,

It is now fully settled, if a pecuniary legacy is given on condition of marriage with consent, and there is no devise over, such condition is void.

(a) 1 Ch. Caf. 20, 58.

(b) 2 Vern. 293.

(c) Eq. Caf. Abr. 112.

I take it to be now settled, that if a pecuniary legacy is given on condition of marriage with consent, *and there is no devise over*, that such condition is void, *Bellasis v. Ermine* (a). *Fleming v. Walgrave* and *Garret v. Pritty* (b). But none of these cases come up to the present, which is the case of a portion on land. *King v. Withers* (c) was also cited, but there the testator appointed two periods of time to intitle the daughter her portion; marriage, or the age of 21, and as she had attained that age it became a vested interest,

Where a condition has been performed to a reasonable intent, the court will dispense with the want of circumstances, as where the major part of the trustees consent, &c. they give an implied, not an express consent.

So where the condition has been performed to a *real intent*, the court has dispensed with the want of circumstances, as where the major part of the trustees consent, or where

they give an implied, not an express consent.

trustees give an implied, not an express consent; so where the father has made the marriage himself (1). The case in *More* 857 (a) seems to have been determined in the ecclesiastical court, neither does it appear there was any devise over: the chief reason on which the court went in the determination of *Fleming v. Walgrave*, 1 *Chan. Caf.* 58. seems to be that a distinction was taken (as is said in 2 *Vern.* 573. *Creagh v. Wilson*,) between a condition that she shall not marry without consent, and a condition that she shall not marry against consent, or contrary to their liking: the case of *Needham v. Vernon* in Lord *Nottingham's* time (b), seems to have been determined by consent, and though it was said in that case, that all conditions in restraint of marriage are void by the civil law, and that this court only considers them *in terrorem*, yet this is rather taken *pro confesso*, than any express determination on that point: that they are not so by the common law, is evident from the case of *Fry v. Porter* (c). The reason the court went upon in *Scrimphill v. Bailey* (d) was, that the condition was looked upon as a loose, inconsiderate expression, and intended to be by way of caution only, for there was no devise over.

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(a) *Gressly v. Luther.*

(b) *Eq. Caf. Abr.* 111.

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(c) 1 *Mod.* 300.

(d) *Proc. in Ch.* 562.

None of these cases however come up to the present; *pecuniary legacies* being suable for in the spiritual court, is the reason, why that law in some respects governs as to them. But is undoubtedly true, that this court has not universally followed the maxim of the civil law, even upon this point, for it has been always agreed, that where there is a devise over, it shall take effect. It is said in this case, there is no particular devise over to any particular person, but I think it is equally strong, for it is declared the estate shall be exonerated, or if the money be raised, shall be paid to the person who is intitled to reversion.

Pecuniary legacies being suable for, in the spiritual court, is the reason why that law governs as to them in some respects.

It is a known maxim, that where the estate is to arise upon a condition precedent, it cannot vest till that condition is performed; and this has been so strongly adhered to, that even where the condition is become impossible, no estate or interest will grow thereon (e).

Where an estate is to arise on a condition precedent, it cannot vest till that condition is performed.
(e) *Co. Lit.* 206. a.

but it is said, the civil law has no such distinction as that of conditions precedent, it is true they have no such term, but they have the thing in effect: *Conditio* (they say) *suspendit legem*, and saith *Ulpian*, *Legata sub conditione relicta non statim, cum conditione extiterit, deberi incipiunt; ideoque interim de legatione potuerunt.* *Dig. lib.* 35. *tit.* 1. *De Condition. & Demon. lex* 41. They distinguish between three sorts of legacies. 1. A pure legacy.—2dly, One payable at a day future, but uncertain.—3dly, One payable on a condition that is uncertain in event. As to the first, they say, *Dies legati venit.* As to the second *Dies cedit, sed non venit.* As to the third, *Dies nec nec venit.* And in the last case, if the legatee die before

Though the civil law has no such term as condition precedent, yet the rule in that law, *conditio suspendit legatum*, is the thing in effect.

(1) See *Daily v. Desbouverie*, post. 2 vol. 261. and note.

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Since the case of *Amos v. Horner*, the devise of the surplus of the personal estate held to be a devise over.

(a) Eq. Ca. Abr. 312.

(a) is a later case, and it is there held, that the devise of the surplus of the personal estate, is a devise over.

It would be a contradiction in this court to say, they are not intitled to the first, and yet to the second, which are to be paid together with, and at the time of the original portion and are made subject to all the same conditions, limitations and provisos, and it would be likewise contradicting even the course of the civil law, for by that, if a legacy is payable on a contingency, and the party dies before the contingency happens, lapses.

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Lord Chief Justice *Willes*: I am of opinion, if a stranger imposed a condition, it is as strong as if a father had imposed it and the law is not founded on the consideration of the person giving, but on the thing given; the rule is, *Cujus est dare ejus est disponere*.

Upon this case, two points have been very properly made.

First, If it was the intention of Sir *Thomas Aston*, that his daughters should have their portions, whether they married with consent or not?

Secondly, If it was his intention that they should not, the whether this intent be agreeable to the rules of law and equity?

As to the first, I think there can be no doubt, either upon the will or settlement.

As to the second point, to begin with the will, the rule is that *voluntas testatoris totum est*, if not inconsistent with the rule of law and equity, and they should be very plain indeed, ever to defeat the intention of the testator: We must agree with *Dye* (says Lord Chief Justice *Treby*, 2 *Vern.* 337.) that men's wills by which they settle their estates, are the laws that private men are allowed to make, and they are not to be altered even by the King in his courts of law, or conscience.

Let us now consider the difference between a portion payable out of lands, and one payable out of personal estate, and the difference is, that if money be given to a man, payable when he comes of age, and he dies before the day of payment, it shall go to his executors; but if it be a portion to be raised out of lands it shall sink into the estate, for the benefit of the heir.

* Eq. Abr. 267. pl. 1.
2 *Ventr.* 366.
Ventr. 321.
2 *Ch. Rep.* 286.

Powlet v. Pawlet, 1 *Vern.* 204. and 2 *Ventr.* 397. and *Tourney v. Tournay*, *Pres. in Ch.* 290. 2 *Eq. Ca. Abr.* 654. pl. 6.

In the present case it must be taken to be either a condition precedent, or a limitation of the time of payment; if the first be the case of *Bertie v. Falkland* † is in point and that of *Fry Porter* † goes farther, for there it was held that a condition subsequent

† 3 *Ch. Caf.* 120.
† 1 *Ch. Caf.* 138.

sequent cannot be relieved against without a compensation, which a marriage without consent cannot have.

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If it be taken as a limitation of the time of payment (and that seems the proper construction), then even the civil law will not say they are now intitled, because the time is not yet come. *Tournay v. Tournay*, *Pawlet v. Pawlet*, are in point. The case of *Salisbury v. Bennett*, 2 Vern. 223. is more properly the case of a personal estate, but has some similitude to the present, as the surplus was to be laid out in land; but the court there went upon this foot, that there was a dispensation by the father as to one part, and a consent of the mother and trustees as to the other part. In the case of *King v. Withers* there were two periods of time to intitle the daughter, and one of them had happened.

It is laid down as a rule that governs in devises of personal estates, that where there is no devise over, the condition is only *in terrorem*; but I rather take it this is laid down as a rule to construe the testator's intention, but not that it is in all events a general rule, that such conditions shall be *in terrorem* only, unless there are words of limitation over, for the testator's intent may be known other ways. *Paget v. Haywood*, Novem. 1733.* does indeed contradict the opinion now declared, for there it was held that a general devise of the *residuum* or a devise to the person intitled to the *residuum*, were the same as if no devise over at all; but the case of *Amos v. Horner*† is to the contrary: There is indeed no decree found in the *Register*, but it appears by the *Calendar* that a decree was made, but being against the plaintiff, I suppose has never been drawn up. The author of the book however told me, he had a note of the case from a very able person who was present at the hearing.

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* At the Rolls before Sir Joseph Jekyll, post. vol. 365. S. C. cited.

† Eq. Caf. Abr. 112.

Lord Chief Justice Lee declared himself of the same opinion, and said there are three sorts of conditions to be rejected.

First, such as are repugnant.

Secondly, Such as are impossible in their creation.

Thirdly, Such as are *malæ in se*.

But this condition of marrying with consent does not come under any of these heads. And in *Fry v. Porter*, and 1 Roll. Abr. 418. it is admitted such a condition is good in respect of land; though where a compensation can be made, it is true, there is but little difference between conditions precedent and subsequent; yet where a condition is annexed to a portion in order to have a marriage with consent, there is an equitable difference. In the case of a condition subsequent, the thing is vested, and though in the nature of a penalty, yet the intent should be clear and plain by an express devise over to divest it; but in the case of a condition precedent, for which there can be no compensation, it would be giving an estate against the intent of the donor to dispense with the condition. Here are no words to vest the portions in the daughters till a marriage with a consent, and I very much govern my opinion in the present case by the particular penning of this deed, which has made this a condition

The particular penning of this settlement makes it a condition precedent, and vests nothing in the daughters till a marriage with consent.

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HARVEY v. ASTON. precedent, and has vested nothing in the daughters till a marriage with consent.

The only true question upon this case seems to be, Whether such a condition as this can be annexed to a portion? For if it can, then all those cases where the portion is to sink into the inheritance are in point, and that such a condition may be annexed hath been already shewn.

As to the question upon the will, all that is material upon it is the consideration of the cases; *Bellofs v. Ermine* * was considered on a plea only, where the court does not use to consider matters so thoroughly, and there indeed the court looked upon it as a portion vested. But the condition in the present case does not operate by way of defeating the estate, but hindering its vesting. It appears by *Aston v. Aston*†, that even in the case of a condition subsequent, the length of time during which the restraint is to continue, is not a reason to relieve against a forfeiture. In the case of *Garret v. Pritty*‡, the portion was plainly a vested portion, and the proviso comes in afterwards, and is to be considered as a condition subsequent.

Upon the whole therefore I am of opinion that a condition to marry with consent is a lawful one, and that it is annexed to these portions; that it is a condition precedent, and that nothing can vest in the plaintiffs till that condition is performed; and shall conclude with the advice of *Puffendorf*, that parents ought to use this power mercifully and cautiously§.

§ *Puffend. B. 6. Ch. 2. p. 381.*

It is the established rule, since the case of *Pawlet v. Pawlet*, that portions charged on lands do not vest till the time of payment comes. The rule that a condition to marry with consent is in *terrorem* only, where no devise over, must be understood of legacies only, and not of portions.

Portions arising out of land subject to the rules of the common law only.

If the daughter or a freeman of *Lord* marry against his consent, she loses her or his share.

Lord Chancellor: I agree with my Lords the Judges in opinion, and do hold nothing is more fixed since the case of *Pawlet v. Pawlet*, than that portions charged on lands will not vest till the time of payment comes, which in this case is not till a marriage with consent, and there is no rule in law or equity that can excuse the want of such consent; that there is no such rule where they are given over, has been clearly proved, and the ordering that the estate shall be exonerated, I think is equal to a devise over. But admitting there is no devise over, then the question will be, Whether this condition is in *terrorem* only? And I own I do not know that this rule obtains so generally as has been laid down; I have understood it only of legacies, and not of portions, and of this sort was the case cited in *Mor* 857.

These portions arise out of lands, and have nothing testamentary in them, so are not subject to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court, nor to be governed by the rules of the civil law, but are subject only to the rules of the common law.

An estate may be limited to a woman *dum sola & innupta* *erit*, and this is mentioned by *Swinburn* himself. If an infant under the wardship of the court marries without the consent of the court, it is the common practice to commit those that are concerned in it. The custom of *London* goes further, for if a daughter of a freeman marries in his life-time against his consent,

her father be reconciled to her before his death, she shall have her orphanage part. * And this is more to the purpose because this custom is generally thought to have been taken up from the writ *de rationabili parte bonorum*, from whence the argument was drawn at the bar in favour of the plaintiffs in *se*.

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* *Foden v. Harvey*,
1 Vern. 354.

Sir *Thomas Aston* had expressly limited the term to his sisters on their marrying with consent, the term could never fail if they were so married, as is evident from the case of *Fryer*; and why has he not the same power over the trust of *se*, as over the term itself?

Another material difference between portions out of lands and personal legacies, is, that in the first case, if the party dies before they become payable, they shall not be raised; in the latter, the legacy shall go to the executor, and the ground of this distinction is, that the court for uniformity follows the ecclesiastical courts in the one case, and the common law in the other. It was another reason given for this distinction, that it is in favour of the heir, but that can be no reason at all, because in a case of justice there ought to be no favour shewn to one more than to another.

If the party dies before a portion becomes payable, if out of land, it shall not be raised; but if a personal legacy, and legatee dies before the time of payment, it shall go to the executor.

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As to the precedents that have been cited for the plaintiffs, all of them depend upon the particular penning, or some evidence arising upon the facts, and have not been determined upon general rules. *Fleming v. Waldgrave* seems to be a judgment of a leasehold estate, which, if so, was a mere personal case. *Needham v. Vernon* seems rather an award between the parties, than a decree in an adversary suit; for in a manuscript I have seen of Lord *Nottingham's*, "To avoid questions (says he) I decreed the portions to be paid, upon the giving security and recognizance not to break the conditions." As to the reasoning in that case, I lay no great stress upon it, as it goes on the supposition that the portions were vested; and the case of *Aston* goes on the same foundation.

It must be admitted on the other side, that no case, exactly similar, is cited for the defendants, the meaning of which may possibly be, that the general doctrine has always been, that in cases of portions arising out of land, this court can give no relief, but can take away, or set aside such conditions as are annexed; in the case of *Parulet v. Parulet* it was so determined.

As to the additional legacies under the will, they will fall under the rule of personal legacies, unless something is done by the testator that will prevent it; and *this is done* by annexing to them some condition that governs the deed.

The testator mentions the legacies as an *augmentation* of their portions under the deed, which shews they are to attend the original portions; for how can they be intitled to an augmentation, if not to the thing augmented.

As to what has been said, that Lady *Aston* being residuary legatee under the will, is the person that will take benefit by releasing her consent; I shall be glad to have the opinions of the judges, whether it may be proper to send this matter back to an inquiry

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inquiry into the reasonableness of that refusal; for my own part I am extremely doubtful, whether I can now direct such an inquiry, as the cause stands before me. Lady *Aston* has by her answer given an account of the reasons of her refusal, and this answer, having been replied to, was at the hearing read as proof, and therefore I think, I must take it, that she used all the caution in her power.

Some unreasonable behaviour on her part should have been proved in the cause, or some special case have been made in the bill, and unless that had been done, I do not see how I can direct such inquiry, and if no corruption appears in her, this court cannot take from her the trust reposed in her.

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Upon hearing Lady *Aston*'s answer read the three Judges were of opinion that the subject matter of the inquiry is already admitted, by the plaintiff's not replying to the defendant's answer: and therefore an inquiry now could be of no effect, and also that Lady *Aston*'s dissenting should have been made a matter of original complaint. The Lord Chancellor being of the same opinion, he decreed that the order of the Master of the Rolls should be dissolved, but that the annuities should be paid (1).

(1) With respect to the subject of the above case, the following observations occur. When a condition in restraint of marriage affects lands, if such condition be precedent, the estate cannot vest, till the condition be strictly performed, whether there be a devise over, or no (*Berrie v. Lord Falkland*, 3 *Cha. Ca.* 129. 2 *Vern.* 333. S. C. 2 *Frem.* 220. S. C.); or if in such case the condition be subsequent, then the breach of the condition operates by divesting the estate before vested. 1 *Roll. Ab.* 418 pl. 6. *Fry v. Porter*, 1 *Cha. Ca.* 138. 1 *Mod.* 86. 300. S. C. 2 *Cha. Rep.* 26. S. C. see also *supra* 377, 378. *Pullyn v. Ready*, *post.* 2 vol. 527, 590. The same rule applies to such portions charged upon or interests arising out of land, as are not in their nature testamentary, or subject to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. *Harvey v. Aston*, *supra* Com. Rep. 726. S. C. *Manfell v. Marsell*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 473. But on the other hand, where a personal or pecuniary legacy is subject to a condition of marriage with consent, and there is no devise over, such condition is only considered in *terrorem*, whether it be precedent, (see particularly *Harvey v. Aston*, *supra* and in *Ca. temp. Taib.* 212. S. C. *Daily v. Desbouverie*, *post.* 2 vol. 261. *Reynolds v. Martin*, 1 *Wils.* 130. *post.* 3 vol. 330. S. C. *Elton v. Elton*, 1 *Wils.* 159. 1 *Ves.* 4. S. C. *post.* 3 vol. 504. S. C.), or subsequent. *Bellasis v. Ermine*, 1 *Cha. Ca.* 22. *Sempbill v. Bayley*, *Proc. Cha.* 562. *Jervois v. Duke*, 1 *Vern.* 20. *Underwood v. Morris*, *post.* 2 vol. 184. *Pullyn v. Ready*, 1 *Wils.* 21. *post.* 2 vol. 587. S. C. In this last rule however a known distinction prevails as to the operation of a condition subsequent and one precedent; the former being in *terminum* does not tend to divest the legacy before vested (see cases *supra*); but the latter (tho' in *terminum* also) will necessarily prevent the legacy from vesting, until the marriage (tho' without any consent obtained) be performed. *Garbut v. Hilton*, *post.* 381. *Atkins v. Hiccocks*, *post.* 500. *Pullyn v. Ready*, *post.* 2 vol. 590. *Elton v. Elton*, 1 *Wils.* 159. 1 *Ves.* 4. S. C. *post.* 3 vol. 504. S. C. *Hemmings v. Manckley*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 303. *Knox v. Noyes*, *Amb.* 602. But in all cases of personal legacies, where there is a devise over, whether the condition be precedent or subsequent, the right of the devisee will prevail against that of the legatee. *Sutton v. Jewke*, 2 *Cha. Rep.* 95. *Priget v. Morris*, *Ser. Ca. Cha.* 26. *Bellasis v. Ermine*, 1 *Cha. Ca.* 22. *Strait v. Grimes*, 2 *Vern.* 357. *Aston v. Aston*, 2 *Vern.* 452. *Wrottesley v. Wrottesley*, *post.* 2 vol. 584. *Chauncey v. Grey*, *post.* 2 vol. 616. *Scot v. Tyler*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 431. Note, the case of *Underwood v. Morris*, *post.* 2 vol. 184. (which

: *contra*) is denied to be law, *Rep.* 303. 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* same doctrine is equally applies, where a legacy (*personal* or in its *creation*) is afterwards *rye* upon *lands* upon performance precedent. *Reynish* 1 *Wils.* 130. *post.* 3 vol. 330. if a condition be precedent, and *lessor* for a greater legacy; for : be *no devise over*, yet as the cy cannot *vest* till the condition met, upon breach of such he *lessor* legacy will *vest*; the in this case not being *conerely in terrorem*. *Craigh v. Fern.* 572. *Gillet v. Wray*, 4. Secus if the condition be *Garrat v. Pritty*, 2 *Vern.* *secler v. Bingham*, *post.* 3 vol. 1 *Wils.* 135. S. C. If how- idition be *subsequent* (although

there be a *devise over*), yet such condition may be dispensed with, if the performance of it become *impossible*. *Peyton v. Bury*, 2 *P. W.* 626. *Graydon v. Hicks*, *post.* 2 vol. 16. *Jones v. Suffolk*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 529. It is observable, that the bequest of a *residue* is such a *devise over*, as to be within the above rules. *Amos v. Horner*, 1 *Eq. Ab.* 112. *pl. 9* *Seal v. Tier*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 431. This was formerly held otherwise. *Semphill v. Bayley*, *Prec. Cha.* 562. *Garrat v. Pritty*, 2 *Vern.* 293. *Paget v. Haywood*, *supra*, 378. *post.* 3 vol. 365. *Wheeler v. Bingham*, 1 *Wils.* 135. *post.* 3 vol. 364. S. C.

As to cases, where the court has dispensed with the *forfeiture*, tho' the condition has not been *strictly* performed, See *Dalley v. Desbouverie*, *post.* 2 vol. 261, and note thereto.

November, the 26th, 1739. At the Rolls.

Garbut v. Hilton.

IPPA Downs devised (*inter alia*) as follows, "I give *Cafe* 173. I bequeath unto *Jane Garbut*, daughter of *Thomas Gar-* S. C. 1 *Ves.* 5. : sum of 200*l.* provided she marries with the consent and P. D. devises to : ion of her said father and mother, or the survivor of them", *J. G.* daughter of *T. G.* 200*l.* defendant *Hilton* executor in trust for infants, who provided she mar- : residuary legatees. ries with the

consent of her father and mother, or the survivor of them.

arbut before marriage, and during the lives of her fa- *J. G.* before : mother, brought her bill against the defendant as execu- marriage, and : this legacy paid, alledging it was a vested interest, and during the lives : of consent only *in terrorem*; there being no devise of of her father : over, if she should marry otherwise. The father and and mother, : ere made defendants to the bill, who consented the brings her bill : should have the legacy paid to her. against the ex- : the father and : mother by them

nting. Marriage here a condition precedent, plaintiffs therefore too early, and bill dis-

fter of the Rolls : This is the first bill of the sort that I : of, for a legacy given on marriage before any marriage : not to be considered as a condition merely to create a : if she should marry without consent, but is double;

yns v. Hicocks, *post.* 500. 1 *Ves.* 4. S. C. *post.* 3 vol. 504. S. C. : S. C. *Pullyn v. Ready*, *post.* *Hemmings v. Munkley*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* : *Elton v. Elton*, 1 *Wils.* 159. 303.

GARRUT v. MILTON. *first*, appointing the time when the legacy shall be due, and *secondly*, some circumstances to be observed; and tho' the court may in particular cases dispense with the circumstances, yet it must keep to the first, the appointment of the time.

If the words had stopped at *provided she marries*, it would not have vested till then; and adding the circumstance of *consent* cannot vitiate the whole condition. Every case cited establishes this general doctrine, and marriage was actually had in all of them; the present a limitation of time annexed to the substance of the legacy, and a condition precedent to the vesting, which time is not come: and consequently the plaintiff's application is too soon.

His Honour therefore dismissed the bill.

[382] (C) *Who are to take Advantage of a Condition, or will be prejudiced by it.*

Sellard v. Edgar
3 Beav. 486.

July the 2d,
1739.

Wigg v. Wigg.

Cafe 174.
S. C. cited
1 Ves. 137.
E. W. devises
lands to his second son *Thomas*, upon condition that *Thomas* or his heirs shall pay

to his grandchildren (the children of the said *Thomas*) 90*l.* to be equally divided among them, and in default of payment, a clause of entry and distress. *Thomas* died in the testator's life-time; the son of the eldest son of the testator entered on the lands as heir at law, and sold them. The legacy to the children of *Thomas*, the testator's second son, is a continuing charge on the lands in the hands of the purchaser, and they are intitled to be satisfied for the same with interest (1).

Wigg v. Wigg
2 Hare. 156.
The question was, Whether this is a continuing charge on the lands in the hands of the purchaser?

Wigg v. Wigg
3 Hare. 221.
Mr. Erskine and Mr. Noel who were counsel for the defendant, the heir at law of the testator, insisted, that this was only a personal condition on *Thomas*, the devisee and his heirs, there being no words in the will to give a legacy to his children, otherwise than depending on such personal condition, and that where a person claims under a will, but claims nothing except under an estate given by that will to another person, if such estate did never arise (as here it never did), nothing intended to be annexed to it can survive, that this was an estate given upon express terms of condition, and not within the rules of being construed a conditional limitation, as not being to be performed by him who could receive a benefit from the non-per-

(1) So *Hill v. Wainley*, post. 2 vol. 605. *Oke v. Heath*, 1 Ves. 135. 141.

mance, and that as it is not limited over, it ought to be construed strictly, as being to disinherit an heir at law, and the beneficial interest cannot be separated from the condition, but they must both stand and fall together; and relied principally on the case in *Dyer's Reports* 348.*

Wigg v. Wigg.

Lord Chancellor : I think the plaintiffs have a strong case both their legacies and interest : There are three questions,

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First, If the plaintiffs have any continuing charge on the

Is.

Secondly, If they are proper to come into this court.

Thirdly, If there is sufficient notice to affect the purchaser.

The two first depend on the will, and a great deal arises from the nature of the disposition in favour of the plaintiffs. It manifestly appears that the testator intended not only to make a provision for *Thomas* and his heirs, but also to make a provision for six children who were then in being; and it would be very fortunate, if not only *Thomas's* heirs should lose the benefit intended, but the six children also lose their small provision by act of God; and this is such a construction as the court will make but when necessitated to do it. But on the contrary the present is a case so circumstanced, as will induce a court of law, as well as equity, to make as strong a construction as is possible to support such a charge.

The defendants insist that this is only a condition annexed to estate of *Thomas*, and his estate not taking effect, is void.

But this is not a mere condition, but a conditional limitation, there being an express limitation over to the legatees in case of non-payment, who were to enter and hold in the nature of tenants by *elegit* (1); and there are many nice distinctions on these conditions arising by wills. *A.* devises lands to *B.* on condition that *B.* shall pay *C.* a sum of money, and no clause of entry; this is no charge on the estate to give the legatee of the money a lien on the lands, but the heir at law shall enter and take advantage of the breach of the condition (2), and yet in this court he shall be considered only as a trustee for the legatee (3).

A. devises lands to B. on condition to pay a sum of money, and no clause of entry; the legatee at law has no lien on the lands, but the heir of testator shall enter for a breach of the condition, and yet in this court is but a trustee for the legatee.

A man having no issue, devises certain tenements in *London* to two of his friends, to hold in common, upon condition that they and their heirs should pay an annual rent of 7*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* out of the said tenements, at four quarter days, to the wife of the testator during her life, and that if the rent should be in arrear by the space of three weeks after any of the days of payment (and lawfully demanded), that it should be lawful for his wife to distrain upon the tenements. The rent is in arrear, and no demand is made upon the tenements by the wife; and for that cause the heir of the testator entered, and the question upon a special verdict in ejectment was, if his entry was lawful, or whether the penalty of the express condition annexed to the estate of the testator be qualified, and altogether destroyed by the penalty of the distress, and by that means a limitation of payment of the rent to the wife, and the heir to take no advantage of the breach of the condition; the majority of the Judges clearly of opinion that the entry of the heir was lawful, and that both the penalties, (that is to say) the condition of re-entry, and the distress given to the wife for non-payment, are good remedies and securities for the firm payment of the rent to the wife, according to the intention of her husband.

(1) *Emes v. Hancock*, post. 2 vol. 507.

(3) *Avelyn v. Ward*, 1 Ves. 423.

(2) *Sherman v. Collins*, post. 3 vol.

Hodgson v. Rawson, ibid. 47. See also *Underwood v. Swain*, 1 Ch. Rep. 161.

(3) *Hil. Sep. T.* 131. 146.

Widd v.
* 100.

But then the question will be, As *Thomas* died in the testator life-time, and the estate descended to the heir at law, if the charges continue on the lands?

I think it is the same thing; whoever entered, it was to be only till payment of the legacy; and the heir at law might in this court redeem them; but the court will not put the legatees to such a circuitry, but permit them to bring a bill to have the lands sold and the money raised.

A man by will may make an equitable as well as a legal charge on his estate, and this court will maintain it against the heir at law.

This has been compared to a defective surrender of a copyhold pursuant to a will; but here it is different, for there the will is void, but sure a man may, by will, make an equitable as well as a legal charge on his estate, and this court will maintain it against the heir at law, and therefore the children are intitled.

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As to the second question, *Whether the remedy is proper in this court?* it is consequential from what has been laid down before to prevent circuitry.

Though a purchaser did not know of an incumbrance before he paid his money, yet as he knew it before the deed was executed, it affects him, with notice (1).

As to the third question, *Of notice to the purchaser*, it appears he had notice, for though he had no notice before he paid his money, yet he had notice before the execution of the conveyance, and it is all but one transaction.

I do therefore declare that the plaintiffs are intitled to the sum of 45*l.* being one moiety of the sum of 90*l.* charged by the testator's will on his estate, with interest for the same, to be raised out of the estate and decree. Let an account be taken of what is due to the plaintiffs for the 45*l.* with interest, for their respective shares from the time the plaintiffs *Anne*, *Sarah*, and *Edward Wigg*, attained their ages of 21; and in case the defendants shall not pay unto the plaintiffs what shall be so found due, then I direct the estate, or a sufficient part thereof, to be sold, and out of the money arising by such sale, the plaintiffs to be paid what the Master shall certify to be due, and the residue of the money arising by such sale to be paid to the purchaser; but this without prejudice to any remedy he may have against the defendant the heir at law to be indemnified under the covenant in the purchase deed.

(1) See *Tourville v. Naiff*, 3 P. W. 306.

C A P. XXX.

Contract.

Vide title, Catching Bargain.

C A P. XXXI.

Copyhold.

what Cases a defective Surrender, or the want of it, will be supplied in Equity.

Smith v. Baker (1).

*July the 12th,
1777.*

E custom in the manor of that whoever purchases in it, the estate shall go in succession; the husband the plaintiff purchased for his own, and two lives; and ill, after giving some few legacies, he, in general words, *to his estate, real and personal, in possession or reversions, to* *Case 175.*
A. buys a copyhold estate for his own, and two lives, in the manor of —, where the custom was, that whoever
uses in it, the estate shall go in succession, and by his will devises all his estate, real and
his wife.

insisted for the plaintiff, that by these general words entitled to this copyhold estate, and that the court will be want of a surrender; and notwithstanding the custom manor, as the purchaser paid the whole purchase-money, two persons are to be considered as merely nominal, there is an implied trust for himself, though he purchasing of the custom of this manor, and therefore had to devise it. *Clarke v. Danvers, 1 Cha. Cas. 210.* relied case in point for the plaintiff.

Wazakerly for the defendants argued, that the successors, to the custom of the manor, are to be regarded as *acti*, and that there are many instances where they are

1713 the lord of the manor of *Somersetshire*, granted the copyhold lands within the said copyhold lands within the said *Gabriel Baker*, deceased, to hold to the said *Gab. Baker, John and W. Baker*, from and after 1 of *Mary Palmer*. The bill t by the custom of the manor, purchaser had an absolute power to render, or otherwise dispose of copyhold premises (this custom itted by the defendant *John* case the purchaser made a *sur-* previous to such disposition) and er of the lives therein named, chasers have such lives, are by custom to enjoy successively as named in the copy of the Court This custom was denied by case the purchaser made no osition as aforesaid). *Gabriel* the plaintiff *Joan*, with whom

he received a marriage portion, but upon whom he made no settlement: after the marriage he made his will without having previously made a surrender, and thereby gave the residue of his estate either real or personal, possessions and reversions to his wife. The testator died, and then *Mary Palmer* died, *Joan* the widow married the plaintiff *Smith*. It was decreed, that an equitable interest passed to *Joan*, and that she should enjoy the premises during the life of *John Baker*, who was the survivor mentioned in the said lease. *Regs Lib. B. 1736. fol. 476. Vide Greenwood v. Hare, 1 Cha. Rep. 272. Howe v. Howe; 1 Vern. 415. Clarke v. Danvers, 1 Cha. Ca. 310. Rundle v. Rundle, 2 Vern. 252. 264. Anon. 2 Freem. 123. Benger v. Drew, 1 P. W. 781. Dyer v. Dyer, 1 Cox's P. W. 112. note 1. Withers v. Withers Amb. 157.*

C c

favoured

SMITH v.
BAKER.

favoured in a court of equity, and an estate shall not be taken away from them by implication, where they are not provided for some other way; that it can never be imagined the testator, by putting reversions in the plural number, had an intention by that one single letter S. to pass his copyhold, however literally the gentlemen on the other side may extend it to carry the copyhold.

Though the legal interest be according to the custom of the manor, yet A. has an equitable interest from being the sole purchaser, and shall be construed as a trust for him, he having advanced the money.

Lord Chancellor: The husband of the plaintiff having purchased this estate, tho' his legal interest be not according to the custom of the manor, yet he has an equitable interest from being the sole purchaser, and it may be brought near the case of a purchase at law of an estate, descendible to the heirs, in the name of a third person, yet it shall descend notwithstanding, for it shall be construed as a trust for the purchaser, he having advanced the money.

The next question is, Whether, supposing there was not a general resulting trust, yet, as the purchaser has made a will, and devised this estate, a court of equity will supply a surrender.

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The first consideration, Whether these lands are comprized in the will.

I think they plainly are.

Where a man devises all his estate, real and personal to a wife or child, and has no other real estate but the copyhold, it shall pass by those general words (1).

Where a man devises all his real and personal estate in possession and reversion to a wife or child, and has no other real estate but the copyhold, it will pass by the general words; but this depends upon the circumstances of the case.

There are words at the outset of the will which have not been taken notice of, *As to all my temporal estate, which it has pleased God Almighty to bless me with, I dispose of as follows.*

Here is a plain intention to dispose of his whole estate, and the subsequent words are general enough to carry it; his leasehold estate for years can never satisfy the word real in the will, for it is called a chattel real only, as it is derived out of the real estate.

The next consideration, Whether she is intitled to have the want of a surrender supplied.

Where a copyhold is devised to the wife, the court will supply the want of a surrender, even though she has a provision under a settlement.

As to the objection, that she is not a wife unprovided for, it has not appeared to me there is any settlement; but even allow-

(1) Note, where there is a surrender to the use of the will, or where the devise operates upon the equitable interest, the general words above-mentioned will always pass copyhold lands. *Scot v. Alberry*, Com. Rep. 337. 9 Mod. 72. 75. *Tendril v. Smith*, post. 2 vol. 85. *Car v. Ellison*, post. 3 vol. 73. But when there is no surrender

to the use of the will, then comes the question, whether equity will supply the want of a surrender in favour of the devisee; for at law they certainly do not pass by the general devise. See *Hawkins v. Leigh*, post. 388. *Milburn v. Milburn*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 64. *v. Down*, post. 2 vol. 304.

ing she has another provision, yet the husband might not think it sufficient, and therefore I do not look upon this case to be out of the common one, where the court will supply the surrender if he devises the copyhold to her.

SMITH v.
BAKKA.

It has likewise been objected, that the court will not supply the surrender against an heir; but this rule must be applied solely to an heir in blood, and not to a *heres factus*, for the defendant here is merely nominal, and not even the least relation, but barely of the same name; therefore I must decree for the plaintiff.

The rule that the court will not supply a surrender against an heir, must be applied solely to an heir in blood, and not to a *heres factus* (1).

(1) See *Hawkins v. Leigh*, post. 388. note.

July the 18th, 1737. Trin. Vacation.

Taylor v. Taylor.

Sidmouth v. Sidmouth
2. Broun 447

A Father purchased copyhold lands in his son's name, his son being then 18 years of age, the father continued in possession till his death.

Case 176.

his son being then 18 years of age, the father continued in possession till his death: this shall be considered as an advancement for the son, and not a trust for the father.

A father purchases lands in his son's name,

Crabb v. Crabb
1 M. & S. 511

The question was, Whether this should be considered as an advancement for the son, or a trust for the father?

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion it should be considered as an advancement for the son, and found my opinion greatly on the case of *Mumma v. Mumma*, 2 Vern. 19. † and though two receipts are produced under the son's hand, for the use of the father, I think that will not alter the case, for the son, being then under age, could give no other receipt in discharge of the tenants who held by lease from the father; and in this case I am of opinion, parol evidence may be admitted, tho' indeed improper, when offered against the legal operation of a will, or an implied trust, but here it is in support of law and equity too (a).

Parol evidence tho' improper when offered against the legal operation of a will or an implied trust, admitted in this case, because here it was in support of law and equity too.

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The son had devised these copyhold lands in these words:

"As to my copyhold which I have or intend to surrender to the use of my will, I give (1), &c. and the remaining third I give to the child or children with which my wife is now

(a) 1 Vern 487.
Eq. Caf. Abr. 382.
Shales v. Shales,
Gray v. Gray,
1 Ch. Caf. 296.

Hale v. Hale
Don v. Don

† There the father purchased a copyhold in the name of the defendant, his eldest son, an infant of a 1 years old, and enjoyed during his life, and afterwards having surrendered it to the use of his will, devised it to his wife for life, remainder to his younger children, and made other provisions for the defendant, who having recovered in *equity*, the bill was to be relieved against it. Lord Chancellor *Jeffries* conceived that he being but an infant at the time of the purchase, though the father did enjoy during his life, that the purchase was an advancement for the son, and not a trust for the father. Eq. Ca. Abr. 382. pl. 8 (2).

(1) Two thirds thereof unto my wife &c.

(2) *Vide Stileman v. Ashdown*, post. 2 vol. 480.

C 2

"enient,

TAYLOR v.
TAYLOR.

"enseint, and to the heirs of such child or children for ever;
"and if such child or children should not be born alive, or be-
"ing born alive should die, without leaving lawful issue, or
"before he or she has disposed of the same, I give it to my
"wife."

The wife was *not* with child.

Lord Chancellor : I am of opinion it was well devised, and passed by the will, so as to have a surrender supplied, and that it ought to be construed as if he had said, *And if no child be born alive.*

His Lordship declared the copyhold estate at *Little Shellwood* was purchased by *John Taylor*, for the benefit of, and by way of advancement for *Thomas Taylor*, the son, and that in equity the plaintiffs are intitled thereto under his will, and ought to have the defect of the surrender to the use of his will supplied, and decreed the defendant, the heir at law of testator, to surrender the copyhold land to her (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1736. fol. 488. See 3 *Bro. Cba. Rep.* 231. 232.

November the
29th, 1734.

Avenant Hawkins, an Infant, by his next Friend, Plaintiffs.

George Leigh, William Hawkins, and Elizabeth Hawkins, Infants, } Defendants.

Cause 177.

A. gives all his lands unsettled, and all his goods and chattels to his wife for life, and afterwards to his younger children in such manner as she should think fit to dispose of the same. Testator died seised of freehold lands and customary messuages, which were unsettled, and not surrendered to the use of his will. The lands settled being only freehold, naturally the lands unsettled must be the same, and therefore the copyhold lands did not pass.

EBENEZER and *Mary Hawkins* had issue, the plaintiff, their eldest son and heir, and the defendants *William and Mary Hawkins*. The father made his will in this manner:
"As for my worldly estate and goods, I dispose thereof as follows,
"videlicet, In regard a great part of my lands are already settled,
"and the great tenderness and affection, and prudent management I have always found in my wife *Catherine*, for the kindest
"return and acknowledgement, therefore, I give all my lands
"unsettled, and all my goods and chattels of what nature or
"kind soever, to my said wife for life, and afterwards to my
"younger children, in such manner as she shall think fit to dispose of the same."

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The plaintiff's father died seised of freehold lands in fee-simple, and also seised to him and his heirs of customary messuages, held of the manor of *H. and B.* and are *unsettled* lands, and the latter not surrendered to the use of his will.

The bill brought for an account, and that the plaintiff's interest in the several estates may be ascertained and settled.

Lord Chancellor : The only question is, as to the copyhold estate, whether it passed by the will, and this must depend upon circumstances.

When

there is a general devise of lands, and there is no surrender of the copyhold lands to the use of his will, the construction is, that they do not pass by the will, especially, where there are other words which may answer the intention of the testator, mentioned in the will, for copyhold lands are not the subject of a devise, as they pass by the surrender, and by the will.

It is not to think the outset of the will, *my worldly estate and* carry it further than the subsequent words, *all my lands and all my goods, &c.* for as the lands settled were only naturally the lands unfettered must be of the same kind: I am of opinion upon the words of the will, the copyhold will not pass.

It has been said, a will is sufficient to pass an equity in copyhold, as well as an equity in freehold lands, though there is no surrender to the use of a will; and the observation is; but that is not the present case, for here there is no equity, because the copyhold lands actually descend to the son, as heir to his father.

The general rule of this court, that they will not supply the defect of a surrender of copyhold estates, even in favour of younger children, to the disinheritance of an heir, where no provision is made for (3).

or younger children, to the disinheritance of an heir unprovided for.

The word *disinheritance* is not merely confined to an heir who is of his descent; for if he is provided for by settlement, in any other way, he cannot be said to be *disinherited*; but here there is no such provision at all for the heir.

Disinheritance not confined to descent, for if an heir is provided for by settlement, or any other way, not disinherited.

I therefore declare, that the plaintiff is intitled to the lands in question, the same not passing by his father's will.

Allen v. Poulton, 1 Ves. 122. *Milbourn*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 64. *Downes*, post. 2 vol. 314. See *Aswell*, post. 500. *Car v. Ellison*, post. 3 vol. 75. the case of *Chapman v. Gibson*, 3 Rep. 229. most of the cases on this are collected. By that and of *Pike v. White*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. it appears, that equity will

supply the want of a surrender in favour of a wife and children against the heir, tho' not provided for by the testator, if otherwise provided for. But the same reasons do not seem to apply if the heir be totally unprovided for. The reader is referred to the Master of the Rolls's argument in the former of the above cases, and to note 1. 1 Cor's P. W. 60. a. 10 *Banks v. Denham*, post. 3 vol. 585.

December the
7th, 1739.

Richard Macey and others v. Nicholas Shurmer.

Case 178.

N. S. by will
devise to his
wife and her
heirs, all his
freehold and
copyhold lands,
being well as-
sured she would,
at her decease,
dispose of the
lands amongst all,

NICHOLAS Shurmer by his will "devise to his wife, "her heirs and assigns, several lands therein mentioned, "and all his copyhold lands in *Surrey*, and his freehold and "copyhold in *Midalesex*, to his wife *Mary*, her heirs and as- "signs for ever, being well assured she would, at her decease, "dispose of the lands amongst all or such of his children as she, "in her discretion, should think most proper, and as they by "their conduct, should deserve."

lands amongst all, or such of his children, as by their conduct should deserve it.

The wife devise
all the freehold
and copyhold
lands, except the
copyhold in
Hampton, to her
daughter and her
heirs, and that
copyhold to the
heir at law of
the testator and
his heirs.

Mary Shurmer, by her will, "gave to her daughter in the "following words, I hereby give and devise to my dear daugh- "ter *Martha Shurmer*, all my freehold and copyhold messuages, "lands, and hereditaments whatsoever (except the copyhold "in *Hampton* aforesaid), to hold to my daughter, her heirs and "assigns for ever, subject nevertheless to the payment of the "just debts that are still due and owing from my late husband, "and also to the payment of my own just debts. And I give "to my son, *Nicholas Shurmer*, and to his heirs and assigns for "ever, all that copyhold messuage, with the appurtenances, in the "manor of *Hampton*. And I give to my daughter, *Martha* "Shurmer, all my goods and chattels whatsoever, and do make "her my sole executrix."

Verdict 11th 1739
St. Michael
1. 2. 3.

Testatrix gave
directions for
surrenders of the
respective copy-
hold estates to
the use of the
will, but died be-
fore they were
perfected. The
heir not being

At the time of her executing the will, the testatrix gave di-
rections that the surrender to the use of the will should be drawn
up by two copyholders of the respective manors, but no such
tenants being present, the same, though written, was not per-
fected; she afterwards went to the steward, but he was not in
town, for the surrender to be presented, and she soon afterwards
died suddenly.

totally unprovided for, the court supplied the surrender. The word *such*, gave the wife the power to
devise the whole to one child, if she had thought fit.

The defendant, the heir at law, insists the copyhold estates
belong to him, for want of a surrender (1).

Therefore the end of the bill was to restrain defendant from
being admitted tenant to the copyhold, and that the freehold and
copyhold lands, or a sufficient part, may be sold, and the money
paid to the plaintiffs, the creditors, and the remainder to *Martha*,
the only child unprovided for.

Lord Chancellor: It is clear, that under the word *such* of his
children, the wife of the testator, though a trustee in some sort,
had a full power to devise the whole to the daughter (2), if she
had thought fit.

(1) The bill was brought by the cred-
itors of *Nicholas Shurmer* and *Mary Shur-*
mer, the freehold and copyhold estates
being purchased with the money lent by

the creditors of the former. *Reg. Lib. B.*
1739. fol. 75.

(2) See *Swift v. Gregson*, 1 *Dan. and*
East, 432.

the want of a surrender, the wife being no more than
the trust only of a copyhold not necessary to be sur-
rendered, but if it was necessary, I should be inclined to sup-

**MACKEY v.
SHURMER.**

The trust of a
copyhold not
necessary to be
surrendered (1).

It might have been doubtful, whether the mother
had subjected the estate for payment of her own, or even
her husband's debts, but the devisee of the wife submitting to
the sale, desiring it might be sold for payment of debts, the court
interposed.

As there had been totally unprovided for, I should have
considered whether a surrender could be supplied; but it appears
that one copyhold descended to him, and another had been
under the mother's will, and no proof of the value, I
refuse to supply the surrender.

I therefore declare, that the wills of *Nicholas Shurmer*, and
Shurmer are well proved, and ought to be established, and
that a sufficient part of the freehold and copyhold, de-
pendant on *Martha*, be sold, and the money applied in fa-
vor of the creditors of *Nicholas* and *Mary Shurmer*, and the
balance be paid to *Mary Shurmer*, and in case part of the com-
mons unfold, I direct that the defendant do surrender
to *Martha*.

(1) See *Car v. Ellison*, post. 3 vol. 75.

Ex parte George Caswell.

*August the 18th
1744.*

*Power, under the Division, Of the right Execution of a
Power, and where a Defect therein will be supplied.*

*Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Copyholds, under
Commissions of Bankrupts.*

C A P. XXXII.

Creditor and Debtor.

(A) *What Conveyance or Disposition shall be fraudulent as to Creditors.*

(B) *What Conveyance or Disposition shall be good against Creditors.*

(C) *General Cases of Creditors and Debtors.*

(A) *What Conveyance or Disposition shall be fraudulent as to Creditors.*

November the
27th, 1738,

Edward Ruffel, William Hayward, and others

Plaintiffs.

Elizabeth Hammond and others

Defendants.

Vide title Agreements, Articles, and Covenants, under the Division, Voluntary Agreements, in what Cases to be performed.

November the
6th, 1745,

Walker and others v. Burrows.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

(B) *What Conveyance or Disposition shall be good against Creditors.*

October the 25th,
1744.

Brown v. Jones and others.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Where Assignees are liable to the same Equity with the Bankrupt.

October the 27th,
1746.

Brown v. Heathcote.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, The Construction of the Statute of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. with respect to Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Assignment.

(C) General Cases of Creditors and Debtors.

Frederick v. Aynscombe.

December the
5th, 1739.

By articles previous to the marriage of the defendant's son Philip with *Valentina Wright*, the defendant covenants, that his heirs, his executors or administrators would, at the end three years after the solemnization of the marriage, or on *Valentina's* attaining 21, pay to *Roberts and Malyn*, their executors, 12,000*l.* or convey to defendants, their heirs, &c. lands in simple within 50 miles of *London*, to make up the value, as plaintiff should not pay in ready money.

Case 179.
S. C. post. 627.
but not S. P.
S. C. 2 Eq. Caf.
Abr. 594. note.
S. P.

A father, by articles previous to the marriage of his son, covenants at the end

three years after the solemnization thereof, to pay to trustees, their executors, &c. 12,000*l.* to be settled to husband for life, to the wife for life; then to the use of the first and other sons in male, remainder to the daughter and daughters in tail general, remainder to the right heirs of the band.

Provided, if there should be but one daughter, and no other child, and the heirs, &c. of the husband should, within three calendar months after his death, pay to the trustees 4000*l.* Then all the uses limited to the daughter, and the heirs of her body in the 12,000*l.* should cease and be void, and from thenceforth should be to the use of the heirs and assigns of the husband.

The husband dies, leaving no child but a daughter, and by will devises the 12,000*l.* and all his property in the same, and to the lands to be purchased therewith, subject to the trusts, to the defendant, heirs, &c. and appoints him executor. He lets the three months elapse, without paying the 4000*l.* He denies he ever had assets sufficient to have paid it.

The plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the husband, brings his bill to be paid principal, interest, and costs, out of the personal assets, and if not sufficient, insisted that the husband's reversionary interest in the 12,000*l.* ought to be deemed real assets, and applied in payment of his demand.

The reversionary interest in the 12,000*l.* together with the benefit of discharging the same from the tail limited to the daughter, is to be considered as real assets, and the plaintiff, notwithstanding the six months lapsed without payment of the 4000*l.* ought not to be prejudiced thereby, but let into the bill of the redemption (1).

To be settled to *Philip Aynscombe* for life, without impeachment of waste, to *Valentina* for life, without impeachment of waste; then to the use of the first and every other son of the marriage, and the heirs male of their bodies in tail male, remainder to the daughter and daughters of the marriage, and the heirs of their respective bodies, remainder to the right heirs of *Philip*. And by the said articles it was agreed, that if there should happen to be but one daughter, and no other child of the said *Philip Aynscombe*, by the said *Valentina*, and the heirs, executors, administrators of the said *Philip Aynscombe*, should, within three calendar months after his death, pay to *Roberts and Malyn*, trustees therein named, the sum of 4000*l.* Then all the lands and estates therein before limited to such daughter, and the heirs of her body, in the lands and hereditaments to be purchased with the 12,000*l.* or of the 12,000*l.* in case no lands were purchased, should from thenceforth cease and be void, and from thenceforth the 12,000*l.* or the lands purchased should be to the use of *Philip Aynscombe*, his heirs and assigns for ever.

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Philip Aynscombe dies, having no other child than a daughter, infant, and by his will had devised his manors, messuages,

(1) See *Wallis v. Crimes*, 1 Ch. Ca. 89. 1 Eq. Ab. 107. pl. 1. lands,

FREDRICK V. LANDS, &c. in possession or reversion, remainder or expectancy, and also the sum of 12,000*l.* and all his property in the same, and to the lands to be purchased therewith, subject to the trusts in the said articles, to the defendant *Aynscombe*, his father, his heirs, executors, and assigns, and appointed him and *Wall* executors.

The defendant, *Thomas Aynscombe*, let the three months elapse after the death of *Philip*, without paying the 4000*l.* to revoke the uses limited by the articles to the daughter, and denies that he ever had assets of *Philip Aynscombe* in his hands sufficient to have paid the 4000*l.*

The plaintiff, who was a creditor of *Philip Aynscombe*, by two several judgments, in large sums of money, brought his bill against the defendant as devisee of the real estate, and executor under the will of *Philip*, to be paid his principal, interest, and costs, out of the assets of the testator, and insisted, that if the personal were not sufficient, that *Philip's* reversionary interest in the 12,000*l.* agreed by the marriage articles to be laid out in land, together with the benefit of discharging the same from the estate-tail limited to the daughters ought to be deemed real assets, and applied in payment of the plaintiff's demands.

Lord Chancellor: There are, in this case, two points to be considered.

1st, What is the true construction of the marriage articles.

2^{dly}, What equity arises to the plaintiff and judgment creditor out of these articles.

The articles in the whole are very oddly penned, but however the proviso in them, is the single foundation for the present question, and the doubt is, what may be the proper construction, whether *the daughter* shall have the estate tail absolutely upon the failure of issue male, or whether it shall be considered only as a security for the payment of the 4000*l.*

And I am of opinion, that from these words in the articles, "if there be one only daughter, and no other child of the marriage, and the heirs, executors, or administrators of *Philip* should, within three calendar months after his decease, pay to the trustees the sum of 4000*l.* Then all and every the uses, &c. before limited to the daughter in the 12,000*l.* should cease." That it was intended merely to create a security for the 4000*l.*

There is no trust declared of the 4000*l.* and to be sure the articles are inartificially drawn, but however the court must put a reasonable construction on this proviso.

If the bill had been brought in the life-time of *Philip*, the court would have construed it as a security only for the 4000*l.* and perhaps this is more for the daughter's advantage than any other, for she might otherwise wait till the death of her mother, before she received any thing, and now she will have the 4000*l.* at all events.

Though the 12,000*l.* did not originally move from *Philip Aynscombe*, yet it is to be laid out for the benefit of *Philip* and

The husband, by purchase from his father, is made owner of the fee in the land, and

estate to be bought with the 12,000*l.* and therefore in nature of a right of redemption, not a mere naked power.

his family, and *Philip*, by purchase from his father, is made owner of the fee in this estate, and therefore it is in nature of right of redemption in the son, and not a mere naked power; might have been a very considerable point, if this reversion had been sold in the life-time of *Philip Aynscombe*.

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As to the second point, *What equity arises to Mr. Frederick, the plaintiff and judgment creditor, out of these articles.* I am of opinion that he must be relieved, notwithstanding the three months after the decease of *Philip* (in which time, by the articles the 4000*l.* was to be paid to the daughter, by his executors) he actually expired. The case of *Marks v. Marks, Eq. Cas. ltr. 106.* is very strong to this purpose (1).

The heir or executors of the testator not doing it, can never be to the prejudice of a fair creditor, and to determine it so would be contrary to all rules of equity; for if the heir or executor will not pay within the time limited, the creditor shall be admitted to do it himself; and so it is laid down in the case of *Jordan v. Savage, Nov. 17th, 1732, before Lord Talbot* (2).

Where an heir or executor have omitted to do an act within a limited time, it shall never be to the prejudice of a creditor, but he shall be admitted to do it himself.

Upon the whole, the plaintiff shall have this right of redemption, but it is certain, as to the manner of it, he cannot have to the prejudice of the widow, nor can he intitle himself to it, it upon payment of the 4000*l.* with interest, to the daughter, the rate of 4*l. per cent.* from her father's death.

His Lordship therefore directed an account to be taken of what was due to the plaintiff, for principal, interest, and costs on his two judgments, and an account also of the personal estate of *Philip Aynscombe*, and the plaintiff to be paid out of the personal estate, but if that is not sufficient, then the real assets of *Philip* be applied.

And his Lordship declared, that the reversionary interest of the 2,000*l.* agreed by the marriage articles to be laid out in land, and tiled as mentioned, together with the benefit of discharging the same from the estate-tail, agreed to be limited to the daughter, ought to be considered as part of such real assets.

And that the defendant, *Thomas Aynscombe*, the executor of *Philip*, not having paid the 4000*l.* within the three months mentioned in the articles, the plaintiff being a judgment creditor of *Philip* ought not to be prejudiced, but is intitled to be let into the benefit of such redemption.

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And directed that an account should be taken of the 4000*l.* and interest, and upon payment thereof within 6 months after the report made, by the plaintiff, to a trustee to be appointed by the Master, he declared that 12,000*l.* and 11,027*l.* South-sea annuities that had been purchased therewith, were discharged and exonerated from the limitation in tail to the daughter, and that the same be sold, and that the money arising by such sale be applied in satisfaction of what the plaintiff shall pay the sum of 4000*l.* and in the next place, in satisfaction of

(1) *Pres. Cba.* 486. S. C. 10 *Mod.* (2) 2 *Eq. Ab.* 101. pl. 8. S. C. 10. S. C. 3 *Str.* 129. S. C.

FREDERICK V. ATYNCOMBE. shall remain due to the plaintiff for principal, interest and cost, upon the two judgments, and the surplus of the money arising from the sale of the *South-sea* annuities, be paid to *Thomas Atyncombe*, in part of his testators' real estate.

¶ *Vide 2 Rolls Rep. 304* Sir Robert Dudley's case cited in the cause of Sir Christopher Hatton, and Sir Edward Coke, which was mentioned by Mr. Frederick's counsel, seems to be a very strong case for him (1).

(1) That case was in effect thus. Sir Robert Dudley 7 Jac. 1. made a feoffment with a power of revocation, and having afterwards forfeited all his lands to the crown, it was held, that this power of revocation (and by the exercise of it, of course the lands) vested in the king by the forfeiture. See 2 *Roll's Rep. 304*.

April the 13th,
1747.

Ex parte Grove.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Landlords.

Easter term, 1737.

Powell v. Monier.

Vide title Trade and Merchandize.

Vide title Executors and Administrators, under the Division, What shall be Assets.

Vide title Devises under the Division, Devise of Lands for Payment of Debts.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Partnership.

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C A P. XXXIII.

Watts v. Manning!
1 W. C. H. 21-
February the
19th, 1738.

Costs,

Deggs v. Colebrooke.

Cafe 180. **L**ORD Chancellor said in this cause, that he would not, in any one particular case, oblige a plaintiff to pay more than 20s. costs, bills 20s. cost to a defendant (after answer put in) on the amendment may be amended after answer put in, but Lord Chancellor said he would consider how to make a more adequate compensation to a defendant for the future, after a long answer, and other necessary proceedings on the part of the defendant (1).

(1) Tho' a plaintiff amends his bill of particular oppression. *Maffers v. Lyndon*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 291. several times, yet he shall not pay taxed costs, but only 40s. unless it be a case

bill, because it had been the constant rule of this court, established at first, to prevent the inconvenience of entering generally into the merits of the cause, before the proper time for amending the merits.

Lord Chancellor King's time, there was an attempt to vary from this rule, but it did not answer; but Lord Hardwicke would notwithstanding consider how to make a defendant amend for being put to a great expence, by allowing more adequate compensation, than only twenty shillings on the plaintiff's amending his bill, after a long answer, and necessary proceedings on the part of the defendant.

DEGGS v.
COLERBROOK.

Bower v. Cooper.
2 Hare 1108.

Vide title *Bankrupt*, under the Division, Rule as to Costs.

Vide title *Evidence, Witnesses, and Proof.*

Vide title *Charity.*

C A P. XXXIV.

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Courts and their Jurisdiction.

How far Chancery will or will not exert a Jurisdiction in Matters cognizable in inferior Courts.

Re Butler and Purnell, Assignees of Edward Richardson.

August the 3d,
1749, and
December the
22d, 1749.

Re Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to the sale of Offices under a Commission of Bankruptcy.

C A P. XXXV.

Court of Chivalry.

Vide title *Canon Law.*

C A P. XXXVI.

Curtsey.

Vide title *Tenant by the Curtsey.*

C A P. XXXVII.

Custom of London.

(A) *Concerning the custom with respect to the children of a freeman, and here of advancement, bringing into hotchpot, survivorship and forfeiture.*

(B) *What disposition made by a freeman of his estate shall be good, or void, being in fraud of the custom.*

(C) *What is or is not an advancement.*

(A) *Concerning the custom with respect to the children of a freeman, and here of advancement, bringing into hotchpot, survivorship and forfeiture,*

June the 18th,
1737-1

Metcalf v. Ives.

Vide title Award and Arbitrament, under the Division, For what Causes set aside.

[399] (B) *What disposition made by a freeman of his estate shall be good, or void, being in fraud of the custom.*

February the 3d, Samuel Morris and Elizabeth his Wife, — Plaintiff.
1737-

Gyles Burroughs and John Burroughs, Samuel Wol-
laston and Mary his Wife, Edward Rose and } Defendants.
Ann his Wife, — — —

Case 181. *JOHN Burroughs*, having five children, and living in the country, enters into the following agreement with them, which was drawn up and executed by the father and three of the children, who were then of age; the other two were infants, and therefore it was not executed by them.

A father having five children, three of age, and two infants, enters into an agreement with them, that he would come to London and take up his freedom, provided they would release any right or demand they may be intitled to, in respect of the father's personal estate, by virtue of the custom of the city of London. An agreement drawn up and executed by the father and the three children who were of age. The bill brought by the plaintiff, and his wife, one of the daughters who was of age at the time of the agreement, for her customary share of the father's estate, he having in his life time taken his freedom (1).

(1) *By 11 Geo. 1. c. 18. s. 17. it shall be lawful for all persons, who after the 1st June 1725, shall become free of the city, and for all who at that day shall be un-*

married, and not have issue by any former marriage to dispose of their personal estate.

The

The agreement, dated the 11th of September, 1718, recites,
 "Whereas *John Burroughs* of *Thame*, in the county of *Oxford*,
 "draper, is of opinion he may greatly improve his estate by fol-
 "lowing his trade in the city of *London*; and for the better per-
 "forming the same, apprehending it necessary to buy his free-
 "dom of the said city: And whereas the said *John Burroughs* is
 "informed, that in case he could purchase his said freedom, he
 "should thereby disable himself from absolutely giving, or dis-
 "posing of his personal estate by will or otherwise, in such
 "manner (to and among his children) as he can now do, not
 "being a freeman: And whereas we whose names are hereunto
 "subscribed, children of the said *John Burroughs*, are desirous
 "our said father should become a freeman of the said city, in or-
 "der to improve his estate, and are contented and agreed that
 "our father should have and retain to himself full power
 "and authority to give and dispose of his personal estate, in such
 "manner as if he was not a freeman of the said city: *Now know*
 "all men by these presents, that we *George Burroughs, Elizabeth*
 "*Burroughs, and Phillis Burroughs*, children of the said *John*
 "*Burroughs*, do hereby for ourselves, executors, administrators
 "and assigns, severally and respectively release, discharge and
 "disclaim any right, title, interest, claim, and demand whatso-
 "ever, of, in, and to all and every part of the personal estate of
 "the said *John Burroughs*, that he shall die possessed of." And
 "they agree that if *John Burroughs* the father shall leave a will, they
 "will not claim any other share of the estate than what shall be
 "given respectively to them by such will; but upon payment of
 "what shall be respectively given them by such will, they re-
 "spectively, and their respective executors, &c. will execute a
 "release of all claims, &c. to any part or share of the personal estate
 "of their father, whereof he shall be possessed at the time of his
 "death.

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*Copied at 11.00
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S. C. 49.3.
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John Burroughs the father removed to *London*, and in 1718 became a freeman, and continued so to his death; and having made a will, thereby declared, that in case any of his children, their husbands or representatives, should not abide by his will, but endeavour to have his estate divided according to the custom of *London*, and should not execute to his executors, within six months after his decease, releases of all claims to any part of his personal estate, under the custom of *London*, that then the legacies thereby given for the benefit of such children, and to their husbands, child, or children, shall be void and sink into the residuum of his personal estate. He appointed *Gyles Burroughs* (among others) his executor, who has alone proved the will.

The bill is brought by the plaintiff and his wife, one of the daughters of *John Burroughs*, who was of age at the time of the agreement, and party thereto, in order that the agreement and will may be set aside, (in regard the plaintiff *Elizabeth* and her brothers and sisters had no consideration for the agreement, but was a mere involuntary act, being intirely under their father's power) and also that *Gyles Burroughs* may account with the plaintiffs for the testator's personal estate, and that he having given

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given the plaintiff *Elizabeth* no more than 900*l.* on her marriage, which is far short of what he gave the rest of his children: that the plaintiffs may be at liberty to bring their advancements into hotchpot, and be paid their customary shares of the testator's personal estate, and also their shares of the dead man's part.

The defendant *Gyles Burroughs* admits he was advanced in his father's life-time with 1800*l.* and submits, whether, by virtue of the agreement, the testator had not a power to dispose of his personal estate, and that the reason the defendant and his sister *Ann Rose* did not execute the same, was, because they were both under age at the time of the testator's purchasing his freedom.

The defendant *John Burroughs*, by his answer sets forth, that his father advanced him 1500*l.* and no more, over and above 100*l.* that his father made a present of to his wife soon after the defendant's marriage, and which he insisted ought not to be reckoned any part of his advancement, nor what his father has made presents of to this defendant's children.

The defendant *Samuel Wollaston* and *Mary* his wife, who was one of the children of *John Burroughs*, insisted, that a farm called *Brill*, in *Buckinghamshire*, purchased by *John Burroughs* at the time of *Mary's* marriage, and settled on *Samuel* and the uses of the marriage, ought not to be considered as money advanced by the father, but as a settlement of real estate, and therefore is not to be brought into hotchpot.

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For the plaintiff it was urged, there was no colour that the words of *release* in the agreement could operate as such, even tho' the father, at the time of the agreement, had been a freeman, there being no pretence of any right to any part of the father's estate vested in any child, whereon the release could operate; much less as the father here was not so much as a freeman at that time, nor could this agreement be binding as such in a court of equity, for want of a consideration; and likewise the inequality of the thing with regard to the children among themselves, that three of them should thereby be deprived of their orphanage part, and the other two by that means might have ingrossed the whole.

Et contra, It was insisted, though this should not be good as a release for the reasons given, yet that it was binding as an agreement: That this bill was brought to deprive the parties of the legal remedy which they had at law for breach of the covenant, and is a very different case from what it would have been, if the bill had been brought to carry the agreement into execution: That here was a consideration moving from the father, the disability he laid himself under with regard to any wife, and two of his children, of disposing of his estate at his discretion: That the father, in confidence of this agreement, took up his freedom, and the agreement was thereby executed on his part: there was no reason therefore why the children should be discharged of their engagement: That on the marriage of the plaintiff *Elizabeth*, and 900*l.* given her as a marriage portion,

er very probably would have taken care to have declared, and ded that on her, expressly in exclusion of her from any orphanage share, if he had not apprehended she was before barred any claim. That the plaintiff cannot now object to the infancy the other children, being as fully apprized of that at the time entering into the agreement.

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Lord Chancellor: As to the objection that this being a voluntary agreement, a court of equity will not interpose, it is certainly a general rule, where it has been entered into without any fraud, but is not applicable to this particular case, for here the father is brought to have a distribution of the orphanage share which the plaintiff is intitled to, and is a legatee likewise under the will of her father; and the whole matter appears on the face of the proceedings. The plaintiff therefore has a right, in one capacity or the other, to part of the personal estate of the father, and has taken a proper method in applying to this court for the recovery of it, and I must of necessity determine the merits of the case one way or other; and as incident thereto must enter into the nature of this agreement, and consider the validity of it without having any regard to its being voluntary or not. This is frequently done in similar instances; in the case of an agreement of redemption, no decree can be made without determining first in whom the right of redemption is. The same rule will where the benefit of a trust is in controversy between volunteers.

A court of equity will not interpose in voluntary agreements, where they have been entered into without fraud.

As to the agreement, the question is, How far it is binding, in the first place, if it may operate as a release? It has been held, that it cannot, for want of an interest in the children, for any release to operate upon, because the children had neither *jus in re*, nor *ad rem*, the whole being in the father during his life (1); and this point has often been determined, where a release has been given by a child to a parent, *tho' a freeman at the time*; *a fortiori*, ought the rule to hold here.

The agreement could not operate as a release, for want of an interest in the children for it to operate upon; for they had neither *jus in re*, nor *ad rem*, the whole being in the father during his life.

It is said the act of the father in taking up the freedom, was a consideration moving from him towards the children; but the father does not so much as covenant by the agreement to take up the freedom. The *recital* is, that the father was of opinion he could improve his fortune by so doing; but whether he should do so or not, was a matter altogether in his discretion, and he might have taken it up at a period of life most agreeable to himself, or not at all: Nor can that act of his, at that time, be considered as a thing beneficial to the children; for in making the agreement to be binding, whatever acquisitions the father made would have been entirely at his own disposal; he might have spent every shilling of it, might invest it all in land in order to

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1) *Tho' it could not operate as a consideration, see Cox v. Balitha, 2 P. W. 273. Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Stra. 947. Metcalfe v. Ives, ante 64. Ives v. Barker, 1 P. W. 639. 645.*

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evade the custom; so that any advantage accruing to the children must be merely contingent and accidental.

But the most material part of this case, and what I lay the greatest stress upon, is, that the end proposed by the agreement was nugatory, and could not possibly be obtained on either for want of making all the children parties to the agreement which could not be done here, two of them being infants affects the consideration of the agreement, with regard to children among themselves; for if the two who were infants did not consent when they came of age, they then might engrossed the whole orphanage part in exclusion of the rest.

Agreements of this kind ought not to receive any encouragement, and it was founded manifestly on a mistake of the father. It is a rule in equity to relieve against such agreements as are founded on mistakes.

The custom of London admits of no such bar, for nothing but actual advancement of a child will have that effect. But if a daughter, who has a portion

given by a father on marriage, agrees to take it in satisfaction of any demand she may at have on his estate, this amounts to a bar. * *Vide ante* 33.

A father's preferring a child in marriage, or advancing money to set up a son in trade, may amount to a bar of his customary share; but in all these instances there must be a valuable consideration moving from him, and an actual benefit accruing to the child.

(a) 1 P. W. 624.
† *Lucas v. Lucas*
in *Laro and*
Equity, 455.

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The agreement is founded likewise manifestly on a mistake of the father, and must, in the nature of the thing, be altogether ineffectual, the father being under the same difficulty of disposing of his estate, as he would have been though no such agreement had been made. Agreements of this kind ought not to receive no encouragement or favour, and it is a rule in equity to relieve against such as are founded on mistakes. The custom of London itself admits of no bar of this kind; nothing but an actual advancement of a child by a father will have that effect, where the money is declared to be given as such, a quantum of money not ascertained. Courts of equity have decided gone further, that when a father on the marriage of his daughter has given her a portion, and that is agreed between the parent and child to go in satisfaction of any demand the child may afterwards have on the father's estate: This has been held to amount to a bar of any claim of that kind, and has been determined in the case of *Metcalf v. Ives*.*

*It was so held also in the case of *Blundell v. Barker* (a) in the Rolls, tho' on appeal to Lord Macclesfield, the matter was finally determined; and there is a great deal of reason to think should be so, for the children have no right till after the death of the father, his advancement of a sum of money for their maintenance in marriage, is a meritorious act in the father, a valuable consideration moving from him. I should think it would be so, if a father should give money to put a son out apprentice or advance him in life by setting him up in trade, &c. that would have the same effect (1). But as the parental authority is to prevent any undue influence it may have in prejudice to the children, there must, in all instances of this kind, be a valuable consideration moving from the father, and an actual benefit accruing to the child (2).

However, in the present case, what I ground my objection upon, is, that the children are not, nor could they all of them be, made parties to the agreement; if they had been all of them and had entered into this agreement, such a case might have

(1) *Hall v. Hall*, 2 Vern. 277. See (2) See *Heron v. Heron*, post. 2. vol. 62. 377.
Smith v. Fellowes, post. 2. vol. 62. 377.

or very different considerations; but two of them being infants, **MORRIS v. BURROUGHS.** leaves it open to several chasms and absurdities.

As to what is insisted on by the defendant *Woolleston*, (he having signed a note given to the father to this effect, *Received, &c. 778l. 15s. being so much more money advanced for my wife's fortune*; and by his answer confessing that 638 l. the purchase money of the estate so settled was included in the 778 l. 15s.) **Lord Chancellor** held clearly that transaction was to be considered as money advanced by the father, and must be brought into hotchpot. It was resolved in this case likewise, that where a wife is compounded with on marriage, by having a jointure settled on her in lieu of her customary share, or has some other equivalent given to bar her of such claim, the husband in such case is not to be deemed a purchaser of her third, so as to have a right of disposing of it in prejudice to the children, and they to come in only for a third part as their orphanage share. But it is to be considered as if there was no wife in the case at all, and the orphanage share then becomes a moiety of the father's estate (1).

A on his marriage with one of the daughters of *John Burroughs*, had an estate in land settled on him, but signed a note to the father as a receipt for so much more money advanced for his wife's fortune; this must be considered as money, and brought into hotchpot. Where a wife is compounded with on marriage, by having a jointure in lieu of her customary share, the husband shall not be considered as a purchaser of her third, but the shall then be a moiety of his estate.

Where money is expressed to be given in part of a portion, though of small amount, yet it is an advancement, and must be brought into hotchpot.

It was likewise resolved, that where money is expressed to be advanced in part of a fortune, though of small amount, yet it must be looked upon as an advancement; but if petty sums are given, at different times, by a father to a child, and not said to be as a portion, but by way of present, or otherwise, they are not to be brought into hotchpot; and so determined in the case of *Whitcombe v. Whitcombe* at the Rolls, 1718, with which the **Lord Chancellor** concurred (2).

The father in this case had reserved an annuity to himself, out of the estate purchased by him, and settled on the marriage of his daughter to one of the defendants as before mentioned, and on the question, Whether in the money to be brought into hotchpot a regard ought to be had to that annuity so reserved, and the defendant for that reason not obliged to bring the whole money into hotchpot? **Lord Chancellor** held clearly that the whole must be brought in, and it was agreed to have been so determined in the case of *Edwards v. Freeman* (3), that all must be brought in which the child was intitled to at the death of the father, for at that time the annuity ceased.

The children who were infants at the time of the agreement, but are now of age, having a large share of the father's estate under the will were very ready and willing to acquiesce under the agreement; but it was held clearly, the validity of the agreement must depend on the circumstances at the time, and cannot be made better or worse by subsequent facts.

(1) *Metcalf v. Ives*, ante 64. note *Elliot v. Collier*, 1 Ves. 16. post. 3 vol. 528. S. C.

(2) See *Hume v. Edwards*, post. (3) 1 Eq. Ab. 249. pl. 10. 2 P. W. vol. 452, and 3 P. W. 317. n. O. 435. S. C.

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A provision by will that a legatee controverting the disposition of the estate shall forfeit his legacy, is *in terrorem* only.

A person cannot take by the custom, and under the will.

must depend on the circumstances of things at the time the testament was made, and cannot be made better or worse by any subsequent facts.

There was a provision made by the will, that any legatee controverting the disposition the testator had thereby made of estate, should forfeit his legacy, this was held clearly to be *in terrorem* only, and that no such forfeiture could be incurred by testifying any disputable matter in a court of justice (1).

The plaintiffs must renounce the legatory part, for there is no taking by the custom, and under the will too, in any instance whatever (2).

His Lordship declared the agreement of the 11th of September 1718 was voluntary, and, under the circumstances of the present case, ought not to be considered as binding between testator and his children, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to their customary share of the orphanage part of the said testator's estate, which is a moiety of the clear personal estate, but they, electing to claim by the custom of London, are not to take any benefit by the testator's will, and that 630*l.* paid by the testator for the farm at Brill in Buckinghamshire, for the daughter Mary Woollaston, is to be looked upon as so much repaid towards her advancement; and therefore ordered a account to be taken of the personal estate of the testator coming to the hands of his executors; and after such account shall be taken, the defendants Gyles and John Burroughs, Mary Woollaston and Ann Rose, the children of the testator are to be at liberty to make their election as between themselves, whether they will take by the will of the father, or by the custom of London (3).

- (1) See *Mosely v. Mosely*, 2 Ch. Rep. 528. *Cleaver v. Spurling*, 2 P. W. 528.
105. *Powell v. Morgan*, 2 Vern. 90. *Webb v. Webb*, 1 Cox's P. W.
Lloyd v. Spillet, 3 P. W. 344, post. 2 vol. note 1.
148. S. C. *Contra* where there is a devise over upon breach of such condition. (2) *Pugh v. Smith*, post. 2 vol.
(3) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1737. fol. 50

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(C) *What is, or is not, an Advancement.*

November the 30th, 1739. At the Rolls.

Fawcner and his Wife v. Watts.

Case 182.
S. C. post. 406.

THE bill was brought by John Fawcner and Mary his wife, for an account of the personal estate of John Everett, a freeman of London, the father of Mary, and of her orphanage share in such estate. He, by his will, gave to the plaintiff Mary the whole of his estate, and afterwards by a codicil changed the disposition entirely, and gave it in fee to the sons of his daughter by Mr. Paxton her former husband, two-fifths to one son, and three-fifths to the other.

died since the filing of the bill, and the husband, as ad-
tor to her, claims one moiety of *Francis Everett's* estate,
his wife was never so advanced as to be debarred of her
ry share.

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WATTS.

sitions were read on the part of the plaintiff to prove her
freeman; and it was admitted by the defendant, that
as the *only* child of this freeman, which circumstance
fel for the plaintiff insisted made it a very strong case in
ar, and distinguished it from all the other cases; and for
ose cited *Shepherd v. Newland*, (a) before Lord *Maccles-*
l afterwards re-heard before Lord *King*.

(a) Vide 2 P.W.
194.

Brown counsel for the defendant: It is not disputed,
but *Mary's* marriage with *Paxton* was with her father's
and likewise admitted that there was a sum of money
anced by her father, and that the exact sum does not

onstant rule is, said he, where a daughter of a freeman
d with the father's consent, and is advanced; but it
appear with how much that she shall be said to be *fully*

indeed been objected by the counsel on the other side,
Mary was the *only* child, she shall not be said to be fully
so as to give the father a right to dispose of the residue
tate to the prejudice of such child. But the rule of ad-
it will hold as well, where there is but one, as where
many children; for what the custom goes upon is, that
r, by advancing the daughter upon the marriage, which
not have done till the time of his death, gains an abso-
er over his estate, and therefore the circumstance of an
l does not alter the case.

ed the cases of *Civil v. Rich*, 1 *Vern.* 216. *Stanton*
2 *Vern.* 753. *Dean & Ux' v. Lord Delaware*, 2 *Vern.*

of the *Rolls*: As it is in the case of infants, and the
ts have laid some foundation to shew (by suggesting
ent of the freeman to the daughter's first marriage)
y *Fawkner* was advanced, let the cause stand over, to
infants an opportunity of putting in a second answer,
ging advancement.

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March the 1st, 1741. At the Rolls.

(*Loughlin v. Andrew*
12. Beav. 310.)

Fawkner v. Watts.

E advancement of *Mary* upon her first marriage, being
w fully charged in the answer of the defendants, it stood
nent in the paper of this day.

Case 183.

S. C. preceding.
If a child or
children of a

London are advanced in the father's life-time, they shall be said to be fully advanced, unless
of the advancement appears in writing under his hand (1).

alk. 426. S. P. *Civil v. Rich*, 213. *Hume v. Edwards*, *post.* 3 vol.
16. *Dean v. Ld. Delaware*, 2 451. *Elliot v. Collier*, 1 *Ves.* 16.
1. *Cleaver v. Spurling*, 2 P. W. 1 *Wilf.* 168. S. C. *post.* 3 vol. 527. S.C.
raham v. Phillips, cited, *post.* 2 *Har. Co. Litt.* 177. b. note 8.
rn v. Barber, *post.* 3 vol.

D d 3

Master

**FAWKNER v.
WATTS.**

Master of the Rolls : There can be no manner of doubt *but* the plaintiff, if *Mary* had any right to the orphanage share in the personal estate of her father *Mr. Everett*, is equally intitled (1).

It is insisted on behalf of the defendants, that *Mary*, before her marriage with *Fawkner*, had a former husband *Paxton*; that the first marriage was with the intire approbation of her father; and that he had advanced her at that time, and that the *quantum* of the portion does not appear; and that the rule laid down in all the cases is, that if a daughter marries with a father's consent, and is advanced, but the *quantum* of the advancement is not ascertained by some writing under the father's hand, it must be considered as a full advancement, and will bar the child of its orphanage share.

The first case cited on the part of the defendants was, *Civil v. Rich*, 1 *Vern.* 216. "A child advanced in marriage with a portion, is barred of the orphanage part, unless the certainty of such portion appears by writing under the father's hand."

The next case which is subsequent in point of time, is *Chace v. Box*, *Eq. Cases Abr.* 154, 155. *Vide* the custom of London certified there.

In the first case, it is said, *by a writing under the hand and seal of the father; in the second, signed with his name or mark* : But as this is not a circumstance in the present case, I need not take any notice of it.

There is another case in 1729, *Cleaver v. Spurling*, 2 *Wms.* 526. "If a freeman has advanced his child on marriage, and the certainty of that advancement does not appear under the freeman's hand, this is to be taken as a full advancement."

The result of these cases is, that if a child or children are advanced in the father's life-time, they shall be said to be fully advanced, unless the *quantum* of the advancement appears in writing under the father's hand.

But then the counsel for the plaintiff have endeavoured to make a difference when there is only *one child*, as in the present case, to distinguish it from all other cases; and for this purpose have cited the case of *Shepherd v. Newland*, before Lord *Macclesfield*, and re-heard afterwards before Lord *King*.

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This custom will hold equally with regard to an *only child*, as where there are many children.

But notwithstanding the rule as laid down there is certainly true, yet it does not come up to the present case; for I take the custom to be the same with regard to an *only child*, as where there are many children, and that if a father advances such a child, and the *quantum* does not appear in writing, it is a full and complete advancement.

The next consideration will be upon the evidence, *Whether* the first marriage was with the father's consent, and *whether* there was any advancement (2)?

(1) *Elliot v. Collier*, 1 *Vef.* 16. *post.* 3 vol. 526. S. C. 1 *Wils.* 168. S. C. the father's consent, that alone will bar the orphanage part. *Hume v. Edwards*.

(2) It seems if the marriage be against *post.* 3 vol. 451.

Now from the proofs that have been read, there is no manner of doubt but the father was well satisfied with the match; for it appears he was cheerful on the wedding day, dined with his daughter, and her husband after the ceremony was over, and expressed great satisfaction at the match.

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As to the proofs of the father's declarations of sums of money advanced as a portion with *Mary* to Mr. *Paxton*, I do not think they are proper evidence in the present case, for it would be extremely hard, if *parol evidence* of a father's declaration should be allowed to debar a child of her orphanage share.

Parol evidence of a father's declaration will not be allowed to debar a child of her orphanage share; but

proofs of declarations by the husband, in regard to an advancement in marriage with the daughter of a freeman, will be admitted. Proofs also of declarations of the wife, made during the coverture of her first husband, may be read against the second (1).

But the same rule will not hold as to any declarations of the husband, in regard to an advancement in marriage with the daughter of a freeman, for the proofs of Mr. *Paxton's* declarations here, are very strong, and must be admitted as evidence; and it was so held in the case of *Dean v. Lord Delawar* (a), (a) 2 Vern. 628. and there is great reason it should be so, because it is a declaration against his interest, as it cuts him off from the orphanage share, which he is intitled to in the right of his wife. S. C.

I am likewise of opinion that the declarations of the wife, of which there are several proofs, are evidence to bind the husband, for being made during the coverture with the first husband, I see no reason why it should not bind as much as if the declarations had been made after the death of the first husband, and before her marriage with the other.

There is a circumstance too in this case of the testator's borrowing 100*l.* the very day of his daughter's marriage with Mr. *Paxton*, and putting it into a purse with 200*l.* more, in order to give it to the husband, and the husband went into another room with the father, who had the purse in his hand, and when they came out, he declared he had received part of his wife's portion; this has a good deal of weight, assisted with the rest of the evidence.

There has been no writing attempted to be shewn on the part of the plaintiff, under the hand of the father, to ascertain what the advancement was; but his counsel have insisted, tho' there is no particular writing, yet that it may appear what the advancement was by some of the father's books, and therefore the court ought to order his books to be brought before a Master, to inspect, as was done in the case of *Dean v. Lord Delawar*.

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If it did appear to me in the present case, what it was that the father had advanced by some book written in his own hand, it might be a ground to direct such an inquiry, whether it was a full advancement, upon being compared with the orphanage share; but as there is no such suggestion at all by the bill, that there is any such book, I should not be justified in directing such an inquiry.

Unless it appears by some book written with a freeman's own hand, what he has advanced to a child, the court will not direct an inquiry, whether it was a full advancement.

(1) *Cleaver v. Spurling*, 2 P. W. 527.

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Upon the whole, I do not think the plaintiff intitled to any orphanage share of the late Mr. *Everett's* personal estate.

The next question is, with regard to maintenance, whether there shall be any allowance for the time *Francis Everett Per-ton*, an infant, and the son of *Mary* by her first husband, lived with his mother.

Where father or mother are in low circumstances, the child ought to be maintained out of a provision left by collateral relation.

I shall not dispute but every father and mother, by the law of nature, is under an obligation to maintain their own children, but yet this may be varied by circumstances; for suppose the father or mother should be in a low or mean condition in the world, the court will order, especially in the case of a mother, that the child should be maintained out of a provision left to it by a collateral relation (1).

But here the maintenance was only for six months, which is so small, that it will not bear the expence of sending it to a Master; therefore, let this demand for maintenance be set against the costs for the demand of the orphanage part, and the bill be dismissed without costs generally.

(1) See *Butler v. Butler*, post. 3 vol. v. *Hughes*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 386. *An-Go. Roach v. Garvan*, 1 Vesf. 160. *Hughes v. Parlington*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 60.

C A P. XXXVIII.

Decree.

Robert v. LePage
5 Decr 1737

Michaelmas Term, 1737.

Morgan v. —

Case 184.

An original independent decree may be had in this court, where all the facts are stated by the bill, notwithstanding a former decree for the same matter in *Wales*.

A Bill was brought for a legacy in the court of equity in *Brecknock* in *Wales*, before the *Welch* Judges at the assize, and the legacy decreed to be paid; the defendant appealed from the decree to the House of Lords, and insisted there was an omission in the decree; for notwithstanding an account was directed to be taken, yet it was not ordered that all just allowances should be made in such account to the defendant: upon the appeal, the decree, as to the payment of the legacy, was affirmed, but varied as to the just allowances; and the House of Lords ordered their decree to be carried into execution by the court in *Wales*.

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The defendant afterwards fled, to avoid the execution of the decree into *England*; and the bill now brought, sets forth the will by which the legacy was given, and the proceedings and decree in *Wales*, and the appeal to the House of Lords, and their decree, and that the defendant had, to avoid the decree and payment of the money, fled into *England* out of the reach of the process of the court in *Wales*.

To

To this bill the defendant demurred, and for cause shewed that it appeared the plaintiff had obtained a proper and compleat decree, and that this court always refused to assist the decree of an inferior court.

MORGAN v.

On the other hand it was said, that an action of debt will lie upon a judgment, in an inferior court, in the court of King's Bench, or court of Common Pleas.

Lord Chancellor was inclined to over-rule the demurrer, and said, that the bill having stated the will, and all the proceedings in *Wales, &c.* for the recovery of the legacy, an original independent decree might be had in this court for the legacy, but would not absolutely determine it now; and therefore reserved the consideration of the demurrer till the hearing of the cause.

C A P. XXXIX.

Deeds and other Writings.

A) *Deeds and Instruments entered into by Fraud, in what Cases to be relieved against.*

*Warrick v. Ham
1 Drury 175*

Michaelmas Vacation, 1737.

Nicholls v. Nicholls.

THOUGH a man is arrested by due process at law, if a wrong use is made of it against the person under such rest, by obliging him to execute a conveyance, which was never under consideration before, this court will construe it a duress, and relieve against a conveyance executed under such circumstances (1).

Case 185.
Though a man is arrested by due process, yet if obliged to execute a conveyance while under arrest, this court will relieve.

Vide title Heir and Ancestor.

Vide title Voluntary Deed, and it's Effects.

(1) The statement of and decree in such case (which are too long to be stated here) appear fully to warrant the above conclusion. *Reg. Lib. B. 1737. fol. 508. 1 Roll. Ab. 687. cites 43 Ed. 3. 10.*

b. *Wilkinson v. Stafford, Ves. jun. 43. Vide etiam anon. 1 Lev. 68. Knight v. Norton, 3 Leon. 239. Roy v. Duke of Beaufort, post a vol. 193. 2 Ves. 635.*

C A P. XL.

Devises.

- (A) *Of void Devises by Uncertainty, in the Description of the Person to take.*
- (B) *Of Devises of Lands for Payment of Debts.*
- (C) *Of Executory Devises of Lands of Inheritance.*
- (D) *Where a Devise shall, or shall not, be in Satisfaction of a Thing due.*
- (E) *What Words pass an Estate Tail.*
- (F) *Of Things Personal, as Goods, Chattels, &c. by what Description, and to whom good.*
- (G) *What Words pass a Fee in a Will.*

(A) *Of Void Devises, by Uncertainty in the Description of the Person to take.*

Michaelmas Term, 1737.

Rivers's Case.

Case 186.

Blindell v. Lord Chancellor Rivers 1737

A Testator by his will gives an equal share of his real estate (which shall be his due, when the said estate shall be sold) to his two sons *James* and *Charles Rivers*.

Lord Chancellor: First question, Whether, as it appears that *James* and *Charles* are illegitimate children of the testator, this is such a description of their persons as will intitle them to take under the will?

Though bastards strictly are not sons, yet, if they have acquired that name by reputation, in common parlance they are; though a person's name be mistaken in a devise, yet if made out by averment to be the person meant, the devise to him is good.

In the case of a devise, any thing that amounts to a *designatio persone* is sufficient, and tho' in strictness they are not his sons, yet, if they have acquired that name by reputation, in common parlance they are to be considered as such (1).

It has been said, the testator has likewise made a mistake in their names, and therefore they cannot take; but the law is otherwise, for if a man is mistaken in a devise, yet if a person is clearly made out by averment to be the person meant, and there can be no other to whom it may be applied; the devise to him is good (2).

(1) See *Dyer* 323. a. pl. 29. *Jenk. Gynes v. Kemfley. 1 Freem. 293. See Baylis v. The Attorney General, pag. 2 vol. Cent. 239. S. C. With respect to deeds, see 3 Leon. 48, pl. 69. 239.*

(2) *Pittcairne v. Bray, Finch Rep. 403.*

The second question is, What interest in the estate devised *James and Charles Rivers* take by this will? The words *an equal share of my real estate*, must mean in equal shares, share and share alike, or it cannot be made sensible; and these words can be no further extended than to the surplus due to the testator from that estate which was to be sold, and will not reach to any other estate.

Rivers's Case.

Minshull v. Minshull.

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February the 4th, 1737.

Case 187.

RICHARD Lester the testator, uncle of *Randal Minshull*, who had *Randal* his eldest son, *John* his second son, and several other children, devises an house, &c. in *hæc verba*, viz. "I give and devise the house, &c. to *Randal Minshull*, eldest son of my nephew *Randal Minshull*, and the heirs males of his body lawfully begotten, and the heirs males of his body, and in default of such issue, I give, &c. to the second son of the said *Randal Minshull*, and the heirs males of his body and their issues; remainder over, &c." There is a provision made in the will, "that to whomsoever the estate, should come, he should pay, on his entry upon the estate, to each of his brothers and sisters 20*l.* a piece, and to *John*, and the several children of his nephew, naming them particularly, 20*l.* a piece likewise."

R. L. devises to *R. M.* eldest son of his nephew *R. M.* and the first heirs males of his body, and the heirs males of his body, and in default of such issue, to the second son of the said *R. M.* and the heirs males of his body, and their issues; remainder over, &c. these words, the second

son of the said *R. M.* do not mean the second son of the devisee, but *John* the second son of the testator's nephew *R. M.*

The devise in the present case was of a reversion, which did not take effect, till many years after the testator's death.

Randal, the first devisee, dies without issue; *John* enters and dies, having devised the premises to the defendant his younger son, in prejudice of the plaintiff his eldest son.

The bill was brought for an account of the rents, &c. and at the hearing at the Rolls, the question was, Whether in the devising words, *To the second son of the said Randal Minshull*, the son of the nephew *Randal Minshull* is meant, or the son of the nephew's eldest son; for supposing the latter, the particular limitations in the will extending only to the issue of *Randal* the devisee, who was dead without issue, the reversion on his death taking effect in possession in *John* as heir at law of the testator, the disposition of *John* by will was good; but supposing the will to mean the son of *Randal* the nephew, that *John* being tenant in tail under the will, and not having done any act to bar the entail, the plaintiff has a good title as being the eldest son of *John*.

The master of the Rolls (a) decreed in favour of the plaintiff: on appeal to Lord Chancellor, he directed an issue to try the matter of fact, which of the two persons was meant by the testator, and said, it was a matter that lay properly in averment, and was determinable by circumstances, proving the

(a) Sir Joseph Jekyll.

inten-

MINSHULL v.
MINSHULL.

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intention of the testator, one way or other; the will was made in 1658, and the parties not being able of either side to furnish themselves with any evidence, tending to clear up this point; it was agreed between them to bring the matter on, for the opinion of the court, upon the legal construction of the words as they appeared on the face of the will.

The Attorney General for the plaintiff insisted, that Randal the devisee was tenant in tail; the use he made thereof was by inferring from thence, that if the testator had made the devisee tenant in tail, an estate which in it's nature included a limitation to all the issue of the devisee, he could never intend likewise to limit a remainder by purchase to the second son of the devisee, who could otherwise take as issue in tail, nor was it possible else that remainder could ever take place in possession, because it could only take effect on the death of the first devisee without issue, which supposes the remainder man then dead.

To prove that the subsequent words of limitation, viz. *the heirs males of his body*, annexed to the preceding limitation to the first heirs males of his body, would not controul the former words, and make such first heirs male take by purchase, who would otherwise take by limitation; he cited the case of *Goodright v. Pullen*, B. R. 13 Geo. 1. (1). *Nicholas Lisle* devised the premises to his wife for life, remainder to his kinsman *Nicholas Lisle*, for the term of his natural life, and after his decease, to the heirs males of the body of the said *Nicholas* lawfully to be begotten, and his heirs for ever. But in case the said *Nicholas* die without such heir male, then he devises to his kinsman *Edward Lisle* for life, and, after his decease, to the heirs males of his body lawfully begotten, and his heirs for ever; and in default of such heir male, remainder over, &c. it was held there, that *Nicholas* the first devisee was tenant in tail.

Mr. Fazakerly of the same side, to prove that the words *first heirs males* were proper words of limitations, cited the case of *Dubber v. Trollop* (2). Sir *Thomas Trollop* having five sons, devises the manor of *Caswick* to his eldest son *William* for life, and, from and after his decease, to the first heir male of his body; it was held in that case by the court of common pleas, that *William* was tenant in tail, and on a writ of error brought, that judgment was affirmed in B. R. M. T. 1735.

Mr. *Chide e contra*: Both the cases cited are distinguishable from the present; in that of *Goodright v. Pullen* there is no such word as *first*; in that of *Dubber v. Trollop*, no subsequent word of limitation annexed to the first.

Lord Chancellor: This case will depend on the words of the will with regard to the person intended by the testator, by the name of *Randal*, and the legal operation of the words made.

A court never construes a devise void, unless it is absolutely dark, that they cannot find out the testator's meaning.

(1) 2 *Sira.* 729. S. C. 2 *Ld. Raym.* (2) *Post.* 433. S. C. cited. *post.* 3
1437. S. C. 2 *Eq. Ab.* 315. pl. 26. S. C. 292.

of; and a court never construes a devise void, unless it is absolutely dark, that they cannot find out the testator's meaning.

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The provision of the payment of the legacies (by the person from whom the estate should come) to his brothers and sisters, to *John*, &c. is, as has been insisted on for the plaintiff, a strong expression of the intent of the party; for as here is a specification of the children, it must mean the brothers and sisters of *Randal Minshull*, the eldest son of *Randal Minshull* the testator, and could never intend to mean every taker. For using the words to mean the second son of the devisee, as is plainly an estate tail created prior to any interest he can have (whether the words *first heirs males* are construed words of limitation or purchase), an estate which may continue for a number of years, in all probability, without any failure of issue, it would be a most absurd thing to charge a person, at such a great distance from the estate, with the payment of legacies to persons then in being, whom the testator could hardly suppose would be living at the time of the title accruing to the second son. On the other hand there is nothing extraordinary in charging *Randal* the first devisee, or upon a supposition of his death without issue, in the life of *John*, in charging with the payment of those sums, which raises a very strong presumption, that *John* was the person intended to take the limitation to the second son of *Randal*.

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It has been objected against this construction, that *John* will be devisee of the estate, and intitled to the 20*l.* likewise, and that the testator could never intend; but the words must be construed *reddendo singula singulis*, and *John* to have the 20*l.* only in case of the first devisee's right taking effect in possession, and the termination of the preceding estates then in being at the time of making the will. It is much more natural likewise that a testator, when he was making a disposition of his whole estate, having a nephew who had two sons, should settle it equally on both the sons, than stop at the first, without extending the entail, or disposing of the reversion.

Whether the first devisee was tenant for life or in tail, is a question proper to be considered, and the determination of that will certainly give great light into this matter, and the way towards the construction of the will on the other side, in the manner it has been insisted on.

In my opinion the words of limitation, superadded here to the preceding words of limitation, will certainly not of themselves make the first words of purchase, but the subsequent words must be rejected as redundant and superfluous.

*Archer's case**, an estate was limited to *Robert Archer*, the first taker, expressly for life, to which great regard is always to be made in determining whether an estate for life, or in tail, passes.

* 1 Co. 65. b. Subsequent words of limitation affect not the legal operation.

the preceding words of limitation, unless the word *heir* is used in the singular number, or an estate for life limited to the first taker (1).

See *Fearn's Rem.* 283, 284, 285. the 4th edit. See also *Wylde v. Lewis*, post. 432. 2d'y,

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* 1 Co. 93. b.
and 95. c.

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No stress to be
laid upon the
word *first*, means
only that they
should take in
succession, ac-
cording to pri-
ority of birth and
seniority of age.

2dly, in that case it was to the next *heir male* of Robert only, not *heirs* as here; nor will the subsequent words of limitation affect the legal operation of the preceding words in any case of this kind, unless the word *heir* is made use of in the singular number, or there is an express estate for life limited to the first taker. It is true, in *Shelly's case*,* *Anderson Ch. Just.* puts this case, If there be a limitation to the use of a man for life, and after his decease to the use of his heirs, and of their heirs females of their bodies; in this case, these words (his heirs) are words of purchase and not of limitation, for then the subsequent words (and of their heirs females of their bodies) would be void. That appears to be a case only put by *Anderson*, and no resolution of that kind; but besides there, the subsequent words vary essentially the preceding limitations, and alter the course of succession and enjoyment of the estate.

There are subsequent words of limitation annexed likewise to the devise to the second son, which shews the testator had no intention they should operate in destruction of the former words. No stress at all is to be laid on the word *first*; there are many authorities for that purpose, and the case of *Dubber v. Trellop* is a very strong one; there the word *heir* too was used, not *heirs*. The word *first* means only that they should take in succession, according to priority of birth and seniority of age, and is unnecessarily providing for what the law itself does.

Decreed for the plaintiff (1).

(1) Decreed, that the premises were father, which John was father of the devise in remainder to John Minshull now plaintiff. *Reg. Lib. B.* 1737. the second son of Randal Minshull the fol. 144.

October the 28th,
1738.

Purse v. Snaplin. Et c contra.

Case 188.

S. C. 1 Vef. 424.
cited S. C. 2 Vef.
563. cited.

Robert Rowland
gives to his
niece A. S.
5000*l.* in the
old S. S. an-
nuity-stock of
the S. S. compa-
ny, and to his
nephew R. P.
5000*l.* in the
old S. S. annui-
ty stock of the
S. S. company.
At the time of
making his will,
and at his death,
the testator had

only 5000*l.* in old S. S. annuity stock. They are to be considered as two distinct legacies, and A. S. and R. P. are intitled to have them made good out of the testator's assets, and the executor directed to purchase, out of the personal estate, 5000*l.* old S. S. annuities, and transfer one moiety to A. S. and the other moiety to his own use, and the 5000*l.* old S. S. annuities, which the testator died possessed of, to be applied proportionably towards payment of the legacies to A. S. and R. P. (1).

(1) Lord *Hardwicke* determined this standing one of the identical legacies case upon the principle, that notwithstanding *actually* existed at the time of making

ator, at the time of making his will, and at his only 5000 *l.* in old *South-sea* annuity-stock, which, now the wife of *Charles Townsend*, claims under *Robert Rowland*; and *Robert Purse* brings his bill and account of the estate, insisting to retain the same in his own use, for his legacy of 5000 *l.* old *South-sea* stock: in which case the defendant *Anne* insisted, that the plaintiff should, out of the testator's personal estate, pay 5000 *l.* in old *South-sea* annuity-stock, and transfer the same to her, and pay her the dividends from the death of the

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aplins, the residuary legatee, insisted that the testator intended to give away so much old *South-sea* annuity-stock as was actually possessed of at the time of making his will, and that no part of the personal estate ought to be applied in satisfaction of 5000 *l.* in old *South-sea* annuity-stock.

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Verdict of the Rolls decreed an account of the personal estate of the testator; and as to the two legacies of 5000 *l.* in old *South-sea* annuities, reserved the consideration thereof to the Master reported that the personal estate was sufficient to pay all legacies.

Judgment coming on the 22d of *December* 1738, his Honor *Lord Macclesfield* said that there could be but one 5000 *l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock by the will, and that the 5000 *l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock which the testator had at the time of his death; and that the same must be divided between the plaintiffs *Robert Rowland* and *Anne Snaplin* (wife of *Townsend*), and that *Purse* should have one moiety of the said 5000 *l.* *South-sea* annuity, and the other moiety of the interest to *Charles Townsend* and *Anne*

Purse and *Anne Snaplin*, because they had not 5000 *l.* in old *South-sea* annuity-stock each made good to them, appeals from the decree.



as the testator had not so described either of them as to distinguish them from all other things of the same kind (see post. 417), they were considered merely as legacies of a certain sum of money. So *Partridge v. Partridge*, 1 *Temp. Talb.* 226. *Lawson v. Lawson*, 1 *Temp. Talb.* 507. *Abney v. Miller*, 1 *Temp. Talb.* 599. *Sleech v. Thorington*, 1 *Brynjolson v. Winter*, *Amb. General v. Parkins*, *Amb. Wright v. Mortlock*, 1 *Bro. 120*. But in *Jeffreys v. Jeffreys*, 1 *Bro. 120*, the testator having made his will actually as would exactly answer the legacies which he thereby bequeathed were both held to be where a legacy of this kind

is particularized by the word *my* (as *my* stock), or by any other expression or description, which indicates the testator's intention of making it *specific* or *individual*, (as money in such a bag, &c.) then it shall be deemed a *specific* legacy. *Ashton v. Ashton*, *Ca. Temp. Talb.* 152. 3 *P. W.* 384. *S. C. Lawson v. Stiech*, post. 508. *Heath v. Perry*, post. 3 vol. 103. *Door v. Geary*, 1 *Ves.* 255. *Avelin v. Ward*, 1 *Ves.* 424. *Sleech v. Thorington*, 2 *Ves.* 563. *Drinkwater v. Falconer*, 2 *Ves.* 623. *Stafford v. Horton*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 482. *Asburner v. Marquise*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 108. For further distinctions between *general* and *specific* legacies, the reader is referred to *Mr. Cox's* note to *Hinton v. Pinke*, 1 *P. W.* 540.

Lord

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Lord Chancellor : The general question here is, If the two legacies of 5000 *l.* are to be considered as two gifts of the same individual sum and quantity, or different sums and quantities?

If they are gifts of the same individual sum, the decree is right; if they are different and distinct sums, the reason on which that decree is founded, totally fails.

The first and primary thing to be considered is the intention of the testator; and as to that I can have no doubt, he has, in very plain words, given 5000 *l.* to the one and to the other. I believe it will not be denied that when he wrote the first clause, he designed to give *Anne Snaplin* 5000 *l.* how can it then be thought that he had not the same intent as to *Robert Purse*, when he wrote the second clause, where he has used the same words?

Mistakes in making wills are never to be supposed, if any construction that is agreeable to reason can be found out.

It was urged that the testator had mistaken what stock he had, and what he had before given; but mistakes in making wills are never to be supposed if any construction that is agreeable to reason can be found out. If a man devises a specific individual thing which he has not, this is a plain mistake; but such argument is never to be used except through necessity, and where it is not to be avoided: so a testator shall not be charged but from necessity with forgetfulness, and here there are scarce two lines intervening between the two legacies now in question, so that there was no possibility of the testator's forgetting.

The first objection is, that the testator by the second clause intended to dispose of the same 5000 *l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock, and to make *Anne Snaplin* and *Robert Purse* joint tenants.

But this argument is inconsistent with the former way of accounting for it, either by mistake or forgetfulness, and makes the testator guilty of the greatest absurdity. If that had been his intent when he wrote the second clause, he might have used very plain and expressive words to shew the change of his intention.

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I think therefore his intent was clearly to give 5000 *l.* *South-sea* annuity-stock to *Robert Purse*; and the question now is, If such intent can have its effect?

Every clause in a will shall be construed so as to take effect according to the testator's intent, if it is consistent with the rules of law.

Every clause in a will shall be construed so as to take effect according to the testator's intent, if it is consistent with the rules of law; and a testator's power over his personal estate is exceeding free and clear from many restraints, which the law lays upon real estates.

This brings me to the second objection, which is, that the testator had only 5000 *l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock, either at the time of making his will, or his death, and the will is relative to what the testator had at those periods of time.

In answer to this it is to be observed, that the testator has not used in either bequest the word *mine*, so as to determine the particular property; and the civil law makes great use of the inference

insertion or omission of this word in legacies: * and where the words are general, it may be taken as an injunction to the executors to purchase and make up out of the assets what he had bequeathed, though he had it not in specie at the time of his death, and as an indication how the testator would have his assets disposed of; and these legacies to *Anne Snaplin* and *Robert Purse* may very consistently take effect as directions to the executors to purchase 5000 *l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock, or so much as was wanting to make up the sum bequeathed. In *Domat*, title *Legacies*, p. 159. sec. 18. Devise of a thing not *rerum natura*, during the testator's life, held good. * *Vide* *Winburne's* third part, last edition, 173, 179.

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These resolutions are grounded on the rule of the civil law, regard to legacies consisting in quantity and number; and there is a great difference between the testator's describing the quantity in general, and his determining and particularising it by the word *mine*.

If the surplus of the testator's personal estate would not have paid out sufficient to make up their legacies, it would have been very strong objection; but the case is delivered from that difficulty by the Master's report, that it is sufficient, and then in conscience all his legacies ought to be satisfied and paid.

The third objection is, that this legacy to *Robert Purse* is a specific legacy, and therefore, if not found among the testator's assets, must fail.

To this I answer, that there are two kinds of gifts, which are reckoned under the name of specific legacies.

First, When a particular chattel is specifically described, and distinguished from all other things of the same kind (1).

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Where a particular chattel is specifically described, and

distinguished from all other things of the same kind, and is not found among the testator's effects, it or if given first to *A.* and then to *B.* they must divide it; or if disposed of in the testator's life-time, is an ademption of such legacy.

Secondly, Something of a particular species which the executor may satisfy, by delivering something of the same kind, as an annuity, &c.

The first kind may be more properly called an individual legacy, and if such so bequeathed is not found among the testator's effects, it fails (2); or if given first to *A.* and then to *B.* they must divide it; or if it is disposed of in the life of the testator, it is an ademption of such legacy.

In this gift is not confined to the particular 5000 *l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock which the testator had, and therefore does all within the first rule, but the second, which is of a more

Domat, 2d vol. 159. sec. 21. When a testator bequeathes a certain thing, which signifies as being his own, the legacy will not have its effect, unless that thing be extant in the succession. For example, if he had said, "I bequeath to such a my watch, or my diamond ring," and that there were not found in the succession a diamond ring or watch, the legacy would be null. But if he had said, "I bequeath to such a diamond ring, or a watch," the legacy would be due, and would have its

See *Laws v. Strick*, post. 503. (2) *Drinkwater v. Falconer*, 2 Ves. 624: liberal

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liberal nature, it is a legacy consisting in quantity and number, and not confined to the strictness of the first rule.*

The latter part of the opinion in *Partridge v. Partridge* (1) is an authority directly in point with the present case; and I think there is no real difference between the case of a testator's having only one 5000 *l.* stock and devising two 5000 *l.* stock, and the case of a testator's having no stock at all, and devising 1000 *l.* or any other quantity of stock.

The fourth objection is, that in the other parts of the will the testator had given to several persons several quantities of several stocks, and in each had given the exact sum he was possessed of, and therefore it must be intended in the present case he meant to give no more than he really had: but I think that objection turns quite the contrary way.

The fifth objection is, that one of these two legacies is a specific legacy, and it is absurd to say that the same words shall make one a specific, and one a general legacy.

But the ground of this objection fails, for neither of these is a specific legacy, within the strict rules, for the reason before mentioned. The testator intended 5000 *l.* *South-sea* stock, which he was possessed of, should be applied in satisfaction of these legacies as far as it would go; as if he had given 5000 *l.* in money to *Anne Snaplin* and *Robert Purse*, and had only 5000 *l.* that must have been applied as far as it would go; and the executors, if the assets were sufficient, must have made up the rest: so it is in this case.

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The sixth objection is, that this case was like money given in such a chest, and that the stock was *descriptio loci*; but here it must be taken as the description of the thing given, for the reasons before mentioned.

The seventh objection is, that there was no reason why 5000 *l.* *South-sea* annuity-stock should be given to *Robert Purse*, any more than 5000 *l.* in money, there being no particular trust or use created.

But these, though true, are no objections. We are not to account for the testator's reasons, but to follow his intent as near as it can be found out; but if a conjecture may be allowed, it was to preserve an exact equality between the two legatees, as they were equal in degree of relation to the testator.

* In the case of *Partridge v. Partridge*, November 1736, "the testator bequeathed 1000 *l.* *South-sea* stock to his wife for life, with a power to dispose of it among his children. At the time of making his will he had 1800 *l.* *South-sea* stock; he afterwards sold out 1600 *l.* and then repurchased enough to make up the sum given. Then came the act of parliament for converting some part of *South-sea* stock into annuities. One question was, If the altering the stock according to the act of parliament was an ademption *pro tanto* and adjudged not. The sale by the father was likewise adjudged no ademption, for the devise of so much *South-sea* stock was descriptive of the nature and kind of the thing devised not of the particular stock which the testator had; and if at the time of making his will, or death, the testator had no stock, this would have amounted to a direction to the executors to purchase so much, according to the terms of the devise."

(1) *Ca. temp. Talb.* 226. S. C.

The eighth objection is, that if this construction prevails, here will be little or no surplus; but if that should be the case, it is of no weight, for in our law particular legatees are always preferred before the residuary legatees (though it was otherwise in the *Roman law*), the *residuum* being by us considered as the gleanings of the testator's estate: besides, here all his real estate is given expressly to the residuary legatee by name.

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In our law particular legatees are always preferred before the residuary legatees (though otherwise in the *Roman law*), the *residuum*

being considered by us as the gleanings in the testator's estate.

These two legacies therefore are to be considered as two distinct legacies, and *Anne Snaplin* and *Robert Purse* are intitled to have them made good out of the testator's assets. But this is not such a general rule, as that stock always shall be considered a legacy of quantity and number; and therefore I perfectly agree with the case of *Ashton v. Ashton*, where the stock was to be sold and land purchased; the testator *there* intended to give only what he was actually possessed of, and it was of great weight in that resolution, that a trust was declared to be made of, and it could not be supposed that the testator intended his executor should buy stock, and immediately sell it again, and buy land with the money*.

His Lordship directed that so much of the said order as relates to the 5000*l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock, given to *Robert Purse* and *Anne Snaplin*, should be reversed; and declared that they were intitled each of them to 5000*l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock to be made good to them out of the testator's personal estate; and that the 5000*l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock, which he was then possessed of, ought to be proportionably applied towards payment thereof, and *Robert Purse* to transfer one moiety of the stock, and the dividends to *Townsend* and his wife; and that *Robert Purse* do, out of the personal estate, purchase 5000*l.* old *South-sea* annuity-stock, and transfer one moiety to *Townsend* and his wife, and the other moiety to his own use: the Master to compute how much the dividends of 5000*l.* stock, from a year after the testator's death, would have amounted unto, and *Robert Purse* to pay a moiety thereof to *Townsend*, and retain the other himself (1).

* *Vide* Cases in Equity, during the time of Lord Talbot, 15. 3 P. W. 42. 83. S. C.

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(1) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1738. fol. 24.

(B) Of Devises of Lands for Payment of Debts.

Mary Ridout Widow, and Executrix of *William Ridout*, Plaintiff. *November the 8th, 1737.*
and others (1), ——— Defendants.

WILLIAM *Ridout* who died seized in fee of the reversion of several estates in *Somersetshire*, conveyed them to two persons and their heirs, to the use of himself for life, and afterwards to the use of such person, and for such purposes, as he should appoint, and did accordingly devise the said estates to *Robert* and *Richard Tyte*, and their heirs, in trust

Case 189.
Campbell v. Hards
2 *Kings Bench* 391

(1) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1737. fol. 99.

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DOWDING.

for the plaintiff for life, and afterwards for a term of years, in trust, by and with the consent *and direction* plaintiff, testified in writing under her hand and seal, presence of three witnesses, for raising such sums as she thought necessary for discharging his debts, with remainder, and appointed the plaintiff executrix and residuary legatee, and died soon after without issue.

The defendants set up several demands upon the estate of William Ridout, and particularly the defendant Dowding, claimed by bond and otherwise.

A. by his will, first gives an estate for life to his wife, and in the latter part creates a trust term for payment of debts to take place from the day of his death.

Lord Chancellor: A testator in the first part of a will gives his wife an estate for life in particular lands, and in the latter part creates a term for years, to take place from the day of his death, in trust for raising sums of money to discharge his debts, in such manner as the wife should direct.

The question is, Whether the wife is intitled to have the estate for life discharged of the term.

The term, though subsequent, shall take place of the wife's estate for life, especially as it is a trust term for raising money. It is immaterial how a testator places the several devises in a will, because the whole must be construed together, so as to make it consistent (1).

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Notwithstanding the testator has in the outset of his will given his wife an estate for life, yet I am of opinion the term, though subsequent, shall take place of the wife's estate for life, as plain it was his intention it should be so, by making use of the words, *the term to take place from the day of his death* (2). It is immaterial how a testator places the several devises in a will, because the whole must be construed together, so as to make it consistent, and here it is not subject to a bare and naked trust of a term to raise money for discharging the testator's debts, and the words that follow, *in such manner as his wife shall direct*, do not intend the wife shall have a power of executing her estate for life, but only that she may raise it in the most convenient method, either by mortgage, or otherwise.

His Lordship decreed, If the personal estate of William Ridout is not sufficient to pay his debts, that the trustee should sell the term of 2000 years to make good such deficiency.

(1) See *Uvedale v. Halfpenny*, 2 P. W. 151. *Worfeley v. Glanville*, 2 Ves. 333. directs the sale of the 2000 years term, generally, as mentioned in the case of *Brown v. Jones*, ante, 188.

(2) These words do not appear in the Register's book: nor does the decree take any notice of the point here mentioned.

May the 3d,
1738.

Blatch and Agnir, in behalf of themselves, and all other Creditors of Francis Elliot deceased, } P
Wilder and others, } De

Case 190.

A testator devises all his real and personal estate to be sold for payment of his debts, and appoints the defendant executor; the personal estate not being sufficient, a bill brought by the creditors of the testator, to be paid their demands out of the real estate. The executor can sell the same, as the testator had given it generally to be sold, without

FRANCIS Elliot being indebted to the plaintiffs and note, and to several other persons, and being seized in divers lands, part freehold, and part copyhold, and a considerable personal estate, having duly surrendered the same

to the defendant executor; the personal estate not being sufficient, a bill brought by the creditors of the testator, to be paid their demands out of the real estate. The executor can sell the same, as the testator had given it generally to be sold, without

will, and thereby devised all his real and personal whether freehold or copyhold, to be sold for payment of debts, and appointed the defendants *Wilder* and *Agnis*; *Wilder* alone proved the will, and took upon him the execution thereof, and the personal estate not being sufficient to pay his debts, the plaintiffs bring their bill to be paid their demands out of the testator's real estate.

The defendants admit the will, but *Wilder* the executor refused to go to the court, whether he can safely proceed to a sale of the real estate, in regard the testator had only given it to be sold, without directing who should sell the same.

The plaintiffs insist the executor ought to sell, and for this they pray judgment, 2 Jo. 25. 2 Leon. 220.

Chancellor: I am of opinion, that money arising from the sale of lands devised to an executor for that purpose, or which the executor is empowered to sell, are legal assets in his hands, and administrable as such (1), and such money, &c. be likewise in the same manner in the present case, it is a reasonable construction, that the executor should be the person who should make the sale; and therefore I decree that the personal estate should not be sufficient to pay the debts, but that then the real estate of the testator, both freehold and copyhold, shall be sold, and likewise that the executors or administrators shall join in the sale, and all other proper parties as they shall direct (2).

BLATCH v. WILDER.

White v. Vile
2 Russell. Lib.

Brown v. Swan
1 Russ. & Latimer
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Herring v. Bess
9. Bear. 31

Cook v. Fuller
8. Bear. 25

The money arising from the sale, is legal assets in the hands of the executor.

Newton v. Bennet, 1 Bro. Cha. Lord *Thurlow* said, that there was a mistake in the above case, for it was held, that an estate devised to an executor to sell was equitable, and not legal, as in the old cases, and in the above statement of Lord *Thurlow's* decision. *Burwell v. Cordell*, 405. *Girling v. Lee*, 1 Vern. 106. *Shaker v. Buckland*, 2 Vern. 106. *Powell*, 2 Vern. 248. *Anon.* 25. *Cutterback v. Smith*, Prec. Chanc. *Bickham v. Freeman*, Prec. Chanc. *Deg v. Deg*, 2 P. W. 416. *Meager*, 2 P. W. 552. But now to be settled, that power is given to executors and administrators (whether that power be coupled with an interest, whether vested to them and their heirs, or to them quasi executors), the effect to such power will be unaffected by a trust, the executors, and the monies arising by the sale of equitable assets. *Hickson v. Finch* 196. *Anon.* 2 Vern.

133. *Challis v. Casbourn*, Prec. Cha. 408. *Levin v. Okeley*, post. 2 vol. 50. *Newton v. Bennet*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 135. *Silk v. Prime*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 138. in note. *Barker v. Boucher*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 140. in note. *Batson v. Lindegreen*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 94. Notwithstanding it was held in the cases of *Fremoult v. Dedire*, 1 P. W. 430. *Plunket v. Penfon*, post. 2 vol. 293, and *Allan v. Heber*, 2 Stra. 1270, that where lands charged with the payment of debts descend to the heir at law, they are legal assets, because the descent is not broken, as it would be in a devise to a stranger, yet that doctrine was expressly exploded in *Hargrave v. Tindal*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 136, in note. And in *Batson v. Lindegreen*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 94. Lord *Thurlow* said, that a devise to an heir to sell would make the produce equitable assets; and a charge is a devise pro tanto. See *Gilpin's Case*, Cro. Car. 101. In what cases an equity of redemption shall be legal or equitable assets; See *Plunket v. Penfon*, post. 2 vol. 290. (2) Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 380.

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Where lands are devised to trustees to be sold for payment of debts, and the heir is an infant, he has no day to shew cause when he comes of age, but if the lands are not devised to any particular

It was agreed in this case, that where lands are devised to trustees to be sold for payment of debts, and the heir at law is an infant, he has no day given him to shew cause on his coming of age; otherwise where there is no devise of lands expressly to any particular person, for in that case he has; and this being one of these cases, his Lordship directed the infant the customary heir of the copyhold premises to join in the sale thereof on attaining 21, unless within six months after he shall attain such age, he shew good cause to the contrary, and the purchaser of the copyhold in the mean time to hold and enjoy the same.

person, it is otherwise.

November the
21st, 1739.

Bateman v. Bateman and Others.

Cafe 191.

A proviso in the will of R. B. that if his personal estate, and house and lands at W. should not pay his debts, then his executors to raise the same out of his copyhold premises.

The rents not being sufficient to discharge the testator's debts, these words will give the trustees a power to sell the copyhold lands to satisfy his intention of paying his debts.

ROBERT Bateman by his will taking notice that he was seised of a copyhold, and that he had surrendered the same to the use of his will, directs that the said copyhold should remain, one third to his wife for life, and the other two thirds to his son, paying to his two daughters 150*l.* a-piece at 21, but by a latter clause in the will, says, *Provided*, that if my personal estate, and my house and lands at *W.* should not pay my debts, then my executors to raise the same out of my said copyhold premises.

Lord Chancellor : The question is, Whether this latter devise will intitle the executors to sell the copyhold estates, and I am of opinion it will, for as the rents are not near enough to discharge testator's debts, these words will give the trustees a power to sell, to satisfy the testator's intention of paying his debts : therefore let an account be taken of the rents and profits of the copyhold estate, devised by the will of *Robert Bateman* for payment of his debts ; and if there is not sufficient to pay his debts, I do decree *that the copyhold estate be sold*, and the money arising by such sale be applied towards satisfaction of what shall be found due (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. A. 1-39. fol. 259.* The testator upon his marriage had settled some freehold lands upon his wife and children, and covenanted, that they were free from incumbrances. It happened however, that these lands were subject to a prior mortgage. Decreed

that the plaintiffs are intitled to have the ~~jettled~~ estate exonerated of the mortgage out of the personal estate and ~~copied~~ estate devised for payment of debts. *Galton v. Hancock*, *post*. 2 vol. 424, 427, 430, and notes.

(C) Of Executory Devises of Lands of Inheritance.

Michaelmas Term, 1737.

Hayward v. Stillingfleet.

WALTER Hayward senior by his will gave the sum of 550*l.* between his three daughters payable within 4 years after his decease in manner therein mentioned, and then devises his lands, in trust for a term of 99 years, with a power to raise a less term upon this special trust and confidence, that if his wife should within 4 years after his decease pay off, or secure to be paid, the said sum of 550*l.* to the said trustees, for the benefit of his said daughters, then he gives all his lands to his wife for her life, and after her death to *Walter Hayward* his son, and his heirs male and female, and for want of such issue, to testators own heirs for ever, the said term to wait on the inheritance, and the trustees to convey over as afore said, and the fortune of each daughter upon her death before marriage to go to the survivor.

Case 192.

W. H. by will gave 100*l.* to his daughter *Frances*, and 450 *l.* between two other daughters, and then devises his land in trust for a term of 99 years, with a power to raise a less term upon trust, that if his wife should within a 4 years pay off the 550*l.* then

the lands to go to her for life, and after her death to *W. H.* his son and his heirs male and female, and for want of such issue, to him and his heirs for ever.

This is a conditional limitation in the wife, taking place as an executory devise, and the freehold descended to the son as heir at law to the testator, till the 4 years were elapsed, or his wife had performed the condition, as a part of the inheritance undisposed of, and by this devise the son had a good estate tail in the inheritance, expectant on the determination of the term of 99 years.

The wife did not pay the money.

And some years ago a bill was brought against *Walter Hayward* the father of the plaintiff, for the 550 *l.* and a decree was made for the sale, and after the payment of this sum, the residue was to be laid out for the benefit of *Walter Hayward* then an infant, and father to the plaintiff. The estate was accordingly sold to *Mrs. Stillingfleet* for 610 *l.* the 550 *l.* first paid off, and the residue applied according to the decree.

Case by a Vice-Chancellor
15 Beav. 196.

The plaintiff's father when he came of age, in consideration of his confirming the purchase to *Mrs. Stillingfleet*, and conveying the remainder of the term, to prevent the merging thereof, to trustees appointed by her, received the 60*l.* being the residue after the sum of 550*l.* raised, and paid to the daughters.

Mrs. Stillingfleet devises the estate to the defendant in fee.

The present bill is brought by the grandson of the testator, and heir at law of the son, for the reversion of the inheritance after the term for 99 years, and for an account of what timber has been cut down, and for an injunction to stay waste for the future, and for the delivery of the deeds and writings, and for an assignment of the said term, against the defendant the devisee of the purchaser of term, and inheritance from the plaintiff's father, the son of the testator, there being no fine levied to the

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FLEET.

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purchaser by *Walter Hayward* (1), and she having notice, at the time of the purchase, of the estate tail.

Mr. *Brown* for the plaintiff insisted, that this is not such a precedent condition with respect to the estate tail, as must be performed by the tenant in tail, before he can be intitled, but at most a charge only upon the estate.

That the testator, in consequence of his wife's paying the 550*l.* gave her an estate for life, and if she did not pay it, could never intend that the son should not have the estate upon paying this 550*l.*

A term of 99 years created, with a remainder over, if the tenant for life paid not the 550*l.* is a refusal of this estate, and it shall not go over to the remainder man.

The trustees have a power to raise it by sale or mortgage of all or part of the estate, and after the money was raised, they were to assign over the trust, either at the request of the wife, or the son.

If the wife should not request, then at the request of the son, which shews plainly, that the father had provided for the contingency of the mother's not paying.

The intention of the testator was, that the money should be raised at all events, and to make a complete settlement of his whole estate,

It is not pretended by the defendant, that there has been a fine levied, or recovery suffered of this estate, but only a covenant by the plaintiff's father, who sold it to levy a fine, and no covenant by tenant in tail can bind the issue in tail (2).

Mr. *Attorney General* for the defendant.

I have often heard it laid down here, that this court will not entertain a bill, where the demand is under 10*l.* and the plaintiff's own witnesses do not pretend to say that the timber cut down amounts to more than 30*s.* in value.

The father of the plaintiff conveyed the estate to a fair and bona fide purchaser, and therefore the plaintiff who is a mere volunteer, claiming under a person who might have barred him by a fine, shall not overturn a purchase for a valuable consideration.

The whole inheritance of the estate was sold for 660*l.* can it be said then that the wife had any benefit from an estate for life, chargeable with 550*l.* where the whole inheritance is worth but 660*l.* so that it appears plainly to be the intention of the testator, to make a provision for his daughter, without regarding any of the limitations of this estate.

(1) But there was a covenant to levy a fine. *Note.* The conveyance of the reversion was for 275*l.* over and above the 650*l.* the purchase money of the term.

(2) So *Stapleton v. Stapleton*, ante 10. *Saville's Case*, 1 *Vel.* 224. 2 *Vel.* 634. 662. But where a tenant in tail made

a conveyance, and covenanted for further assurance, and then became a bankrupt, such covenant was held to bind the lands in the hands of the assignees. *Edwards v. Applebee*, 2 *Bro. Cba. Rep.* 652. in note. See *Sutton v. Stone*, *post.* 2 vol. 101. note 3.

He then called for the deed in which the plaintiff's father conveyed the estate to Mrs. *Stillingfleet* the purchaser, and read out of it the covenant on the part of the seller, to levy a fine in the term following.

HAYWARD v.
STILLING-
FLEET.

He concluded with saying, that the estate for life to the wife, and all the estates concomitant upon it, depended on a contingency, the payment of the 550*l.* and as that was not paid, the limitations cannot be said to have taken place.

Lord Chancellor : The only question is upon the title, and when that is determined, the decree as to the matters prayed by the bill will follow of course, and it depends upon the limitations in the will of old *Walter Hayward*.

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He plainly declares his intention in the beginning, to dispose of his whole estate at all events, after this he gives to his three daughters 550*l.* to be paid out of his lands in *Cranbourn*, and then appoints the manner of raising it, and says, if his wife pay the 550*l.* within four years after his decease, then he gives her an estate for life, out of the inheritance of his land.

If it be a condition, it is insisted it is annexed to the term for 9 years, and that he intended to give his wife an estate in the term, but I think this cannot be so construed contrary to the words, for tho' it is awkwardly expressed, yet he meant to carve an estate for life out of the inheritance of the estate, and not out of the term.

The question is, Whether the words of payment amount to condition, or a limitation, and whether a condition precedent or subsequent?

Now I think they cannot create a condition subsequent, for the heir at law to whom an estate tail is after given, must be the person to enter and defeat the condition, because an estate of freehold cannot cease without an entry for a breach of the condition, and here has been no entry, and this would destroy the whole intention of the will, which would not at all serve the plaintiff, nor can it be a condition precedent, for as I said before, if there was a breach, no body can take advantage of it but the heir at law, for a devisee cannot, and such a construction would defeat the estate tail (1).

And wherever there is a limitation with remainders over, made in the words of a condition, which would be construed as a condition, if they could effect, it ought to be construed as a limitation, if they cannot.

I am of opinion that this is a conditional limitation in the wife, taking place as an executory devise: for it cannot be a contingent remainder, for that can never depend upon an estate for years, but must have a *freehold* to support it.

And though this is an executory devise to the wife, which never took effect, yet the estate tail to the son is well limited, and took place (2).

The

(1) See 1 *Fearn* 406. *et seq.* 4th edit.

(2) The principle, that a remainder over shall take effect, notwithstanding the

ate, by his will bequeathed an annuity of 20*l.* to his daughter Anne Hunterford, and the heirs of her body quarterly, without any abatement; and in case she died without issue, then to his two sons Edward and William, whom he made his executors. William Heather died intestate, and left issue Edward the plaintiff, and three other children. Edward Heather, the uncle, by his will gave an annuity of 20*l.* to his sister Anne Hunterford and her daughter after her, to be paid quarterly, without any abatement, out of his freehold houses in Holborn; but in case they die without issue, then the said 20*l. per annum*, to return to his nephew Edward the plaintiff, and gave him besides all his real estate which he had from his father.

HEATHER v.
RIDER.

Poupe
William
Simonds

And by a codicil says, "I hope the 20*l.* to my sister Hunterford herein will not be taken for another 20*l. a year*, but to settle and confirm the 20*l. per annum*, her father left her and her daughter; and if they die without issue, let it come to my heir Edward Heather."

The codicil was not executed according to the statute of frauds and perjuries, for it was only an indorsement upon the back of the will, and with a pencil.

The question was, Whether these are to be considered as two distinct annuities?

Lord Chancellor: The testator's intention is most plain, (if the court can take notice of it) by the indorsement that his sister should have only one annuity, and that he was only willing to confirm and settle it on a more secure fund than a fluctuating personal estate, by charging it on his real estate, which was not done by the father's will.

executed according to the statute of frauds and perjuries.

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The indorsement of no weight, as nothing can either enlarge or diminish what affects a real estate, unless it be executed according to the statute of frauds and perjuries.

If it had been inserted in the will, there could have been no doubt; but as nothing can be taken either to enlarge or diminish what affects a real estate, unless it be executed according to the statute of frauds and perjuries; and as the testator has not complied with the directions of that statute, this indorsement cannot be of any weight.

I very much question if this last annuity can be taken as a satisfaction of the annuity given by the father's will, it being charged on a different fund, and given in another manner; for regard has been always had to the particular circumstances, limitations, and funds out of which legacies are to arise: yet I think she is not intitled to both annuities, but not so much on account of the codicil, as by way of exoneration of the personal estate of the father. He was the only person chargeable by way of personal demand, and might by codicil or testamentary bequest, which affects a personal estate according to the rule of the civil law, direct that in case his sister should take the annuity under his will, she should not have it out of his father's personal estate, but that his personal estate should be discharged therefrom; and taking it in that light, it does not contradict the

In construing one legacy to be a satisfaction for another, regard must be always had to the particular circumstances, limitations, and funds, out of which the two several legacies are to arise. The daughter of A. not intitled to both annuities.

HEATHER v. RIDER. the statute of frauds and perjuries, and for that reason his Lordship altered Sir Joseph P's decree (1).

(1) Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 569. *Newman v. Newman*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 186.
This case seems to have been determined upon the same principle as that of

February the
11th, 1737.
Case 194.

R. B. on his
marriage in
1713, settled
exchequer annuities for 99
years, amounting to 300l.

per ann. in trust
to himself for
life, remainder
to his wife for

life, remainder to his children in such manner as he should appoint. By the marriage there was only one child, a daughter. In 1720, R. B. devised all his real and personal estate to his wife and her heirs, charged with 10,000l. as a portion for his daughter, payable at eighteen. After the death of R. B. his wife makes her will, and gives all her real and personal estate to her daughter and her heirs; but if she die before she was of age to dispose thereof, then to trustees to raise 6000l. for a charity, the residue thereof, if her daughter die unmarried, to the sisters of the testatrix. The daughter, after the mother's death, marries the plaintiff, has issue a daughter, and dies about the age of twenty. The plaintiff, as representative of his wife, and in his own right, brings a bill for an account of the real and personal estate of R. B. and his wife.

Bellasis v. Uthwatt.

IN 1713, on the marriage of *Rupert Billingsley* with *Mary* his wife, he made a settlement of some exchequer annuities for 99 years, to the amount of 300l. per ann. in trust for himself for life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder to his children, in such manner as he should appoint; and if no children, to his executors, administrators, and assigns. By this marriage there was only one child, *Bridget*.

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Rupert was likewise seized of a considerable real and personal estate, and in 1720, devised all his real and personal estate to his wife and her heirs, charged with the payment of 10,000l. as a portion for his daughter, payable at the age of 18 years; and in case his wife should marry again, that then the estate should stand charged with a further sum of 5000l. for his daughter.

Soon after the death of *Rupert*, *Mary* made her will, and thereby devised all her real and personal estate to her daughter and her heirs, but in case she should die before she was of age to dispose thereof, then she gave the same to trustees for raising the sum of 6000l. for founding an hospital for seamen's widows at Dryton; the residue thereof, in case her daughter should die unmarried, to go to the sisters of the testatrix of the whole blood (1).

Mary died soon after she made her will, leaving *Bridget* her daughter, an infant between eleven and twelve years of age. In a few years after her mother's death, *Bridget* marries *William Bellasis*, by whom she had one daughter, and died, being about the age of twenty.

The plaintiff, as administrator to his wife, and also in his own right, together with his infant daughter, bring a bill against the sisters of the testatrix *Mary*, and against the trustees of

(1) The words in the Register's book are, "And in case my said daughter shall die unmarried my desire is that she should be buried there, and the residue above the said 6000l. to be divided among my own sisters." Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 323.

charity.

Joddy Shyane v. S. of Glasgow
E. H. of Lord Co. Ex.
Leithbridge v. Thunlow

charity, praying an account of the real and personal estate of *Rupert and Mary*.

BELLASIS v.
UTHWATT.

Lord Chancellor : The first point that has been made in this case is, Whether *Bridget* was intitled to these annuities under the settlement, tho' there was no appointment of them to her by the father, or whether the whole interest therein was not vested in the father, and the daughter not intitled to the same without an appointment in her favour by the father.

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I am of opinion the daughter was intitled under the settlement (which was recited to be made in pursuance of marriage articles) to the exchequer annuities, as an interest vested in her, and that the father had only a power reserved to him of making such disposition thereof among his children as he thought proper, and there being only one child that she was intitled to the whole, and the plaintiff her husband intitled thereto in her right (1).

The daughter intitled under the settlement to the exchequer annuities, as an interest vested in her, and the father had only a power of disposing thereof among his children as he

thought proper, and there being only one child, she is entitled to the whole.

opinion
in 547

Another point has been made, whether the 10,000*l.* devised by the father to *Bridget*, should be taken to be in satisfaction of these annuities, and so the annuities be considered as part of the father's personal estate, which he had a right to dispose of by his will (2).

The 10,000*l.* devised by the will of the father to the daughter, shall not be taken to be in satisfaction of the annuities.

I am

(1) So *Witts v. Bodington*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 95.

(2) The question of satisfaction generally comes before the court upon two occasions; 1st. Where a portion or provision is secured to a child by marriage settlement or otherwise, and the parent or person *in loco parentis* afterwards by will gives the same child a legacy, without expressly directing it to be in satisfaction of the portion; and 2^{dly}. Where a parent or person *in loco parentis* by will bequeaths a legacy to a child or grandchild, and afterwards gives a portion to or makes a provision for that child or grandchild *in his life-time*, without expressing it to be in lieu of the legacy (for it seems, that an express declaration or perhaps evidence of the intent will in either case repel the general presumption). *Vide Cuthbert v. Peacock*, 2 Vern. 593. *Graves v. Byg*, post. 509. *Rojewell v. Bennet*, post. 3 vol. 77. *Debeze v. Mann*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 165. *Ellison v. Cookson*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 307. 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 61. S. C. As there are cases expressly upon both these points, they should be considered separately.

With respect to the first, the general rule is, if the latter provision be as great as, or greater than the former portion or provision, then it is a complete satisfaction; if not so great, then a satisfaction *pro tanto*. But this rule only applies, where the subsequent legacy or provision is attended with the same degree of certainty as the former portion. *Blais v. Blais*, 2 Cha. Rep. 162. *Jesse v. Jesse*, 2 Vern. 255. *Thomas v. Kyns*, 2 Vern. 349. *Breuen v. Breuen*, 2 Vern. 439. *Herr v. Herr*, 2 Vern. 555. *Walpole v. Conway*, Bro. Cha. Rep. 153. *Copley v. Copley*, 1 P. W. 147. *Warren v. Warren*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 305. *Adamsworth v. Actworth*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 307. (note). *Bale v. Hyde*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 309. (note). *Somerjet v. Somerjet*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 30. (note). *Finch v. Finch*, 4 Bro. Cha. Rep. 38. So this rule (as also the rule, which governs the second instance above alluded to) is only applicable to cases, where the latter provision is of the same nature (*ejusdem generis*) with the former. *Goafillaz v. Burchett*, 2 Vern. 298. *Ray v. Stanhope*, 2 Cha. Rep. 159. *Bellis v. Uthwatt*, 1 Bro.

BELLASIS v. UTHWATT.
Tho' the court leans against double portions, yet regard must be had to circumstances; as where there is an eldest son, or more children and the demand would be to their prejudice, but here it is an only child.

I am of opinion it cannot be taken to be in satisfaction, but that *Bridget* is intitled to both as a double portion; and though there are a great many cases where the court inclines against them, yet regard is always to be had to the circumstances of the case: As for instance, where there is an eldest son or more children, and the demand is made of such double portion to their prejudice; but it is otherwise here, the case of an only child, and the question, whether this shall be implied a satisfaction, when it is not so expressed by the father.

The thing given in satisfaction must be of the same nature, and attended with the same certainty, as that in lieu of which it is given, and land is no satisfaction for money, nor vice versa; and tho' they are both of the same nature here, yet the legacy of 10,000*l.* is subject to a contingency of her arriving at 18, and a mere contingency shall not take away a portion absolutely vested, especially in the case of an only child.

infra 428. *Saville v. Saville*, *post.* 2 vol. 458. *Grace v. Earl of Salisbury*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 425. *Holmes v. Holmes*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 555. *Forfist v. Grant*, *Fej.* jun. 298. A small variance in the time of payment (provided both payments agree as to certainty) will not alter the rule; as if the first portion be made payable at 21 years, and the second provision at 18, &c. *Jessen v. Jesson*, 2 Vern. 255. *Thomas v. Keymish*, 2 Vern. 349. *Spinks v. Robins*, *post.* 2 vol. 493. *Clark v. Sewell*, *post.* 3 vol. 98. *Warren v. Warren*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 310. But this last observation strictly applies to satisfaction of portions, and not to satisfaction of debts. *Nicholls v. Judson*, *post.* 2 vol. 300. *Clark v. Sewell*, *post.* 3 vol. 96. 98. *Richardson v. Greefe*, *post.* 3 vol. 65. *Haynes v. Mico*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 129. *Devese v. Pontet*, *Prec. Cha.* 240. (note.) So a contingent legacy or provision cannot satisfy an absolute portion; or vice versa. *Duffield v. Smith*, 2 Vern. 258. *Bellasis v. Uthwatt*, *supra* 426. *Jeacock v. Falner*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 295. *Hanbury v. Hanbury*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 352. 529. *Quere* whether the bequest of a residue is within the rule. *Rickman v. Mergan*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 63. 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 394. S. C. *Baret v. Beckford*, 1 *Fej.* 519. *Allyn v. Allyn*, 2 *Fej.* 37. *Devese v. Pontet*, *Prec. Cha.* 240. (note.)

In regard to the second point the rule seems to be, that where a legacy is given to a child, who afterwards upon marriage or otherwise receives from the testator in his life-time the like or a great-

er sum, that sum shall be deemed a satisfaction of the legacy. *Irod v. Hurst*, 2 *Freem.* 224. *Hale v. Acton*, 2 Cha. Rep. 35. *Hofkins v. Hofkins*, *Prec. Cha.* 263. *Hartop v. Whitmore*, *Prec. Cha.* 541. 1 P. W. 681. S. C. *Jenkins v. Porwell*, 2 Vern. 115. *Scotton v. Scotton*, 1 *Stra.* 235. *Bigg'ston v. Grubb*, *post.* 2 vol. 48. *Farnham v. Phillips*, *post.* 2 vol. 215. *Tapper v. Charlevoix*, *post.* 2 vol. 492. If the money to advanced be not equal to the legacy, then it appears, that it will be a satisfaction *pro tanto*. *Hofkins v. Hofkins*, *Prec. Cha.* 263. *Shad v. Jekyl*, *post.* 2 vol. 518. The rule only extends to portions or monies actually paid, or secured to be paid at all events; and not to those secured to be paid upon a contingency. *Chapman v. Salt*, 2 Vern. 616. *Hale v. Acton*, 2 Cha. Rep. 35. *Spinks v. Robins*, *post.* 2 vol. 491. *Clark v. Sewell*, *post.* 3 vol. 99. Neither does it extend to a portion given expressly in satisfaction of a different claim; or to a portion given absolutely, when the legacy is under certain limitations. *Roome v. Roome*, *post.* 3 vol. 183. *Bangh v. Reed*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 192. So it is applicable to the cases of parents, or a person in loco parentis, but not to strangers. *Spinks v. Robins*, *post.* 2 vol. 492. *Shad v. Jekyl*, *post.* 2 vol. 518. *Powell v. Cleaver*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 500. Where the devise is of a residue the rule is inapplicable according to *Farnham v. Phillips*, *post.* 2 vol. 215.

As to satisfaction of debts, see *Nicholls v. Judson*, *post.* 2 vol. 300.

ing given in satisfaction must be of the same nature, and attended with the same certainty, as the thing in lieu of which it is given, and land is not to be taken in satisfaction for money, money for land. It is true, here they are both of the same nature, both personal estates; but the legacy of 10,000*l.* is subject to a contingency, and not payable unless *Bridget* survived the age of eighteen years, and besides she might have lived till the annuities were run out, as several of the years were already gone; and as the 10,000*l.* legacy might never have become payable, it will be hard to say that a mere contingency shall take away a portion absolutely vested, especially in the case of an only child. If indeed the father had disposed of these annuities to some other person, it might have been a question whether the 10,000*l.* should not be taken to be in satisfaction, and whether in those circumstances *Bridget* ought to be allowed to insist on her demands?

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Another question is made, whether the husband is intitled in right of his wife to all the personal estate devised to her by her mother, *in case she should die before she is of age to dispose thereof*? As at the age of 14 she might have disposed of the personal estate, as the law now stands, it must be the intention of the testatrix that she should at that age have it absolutely; and if she made no disposition, it is proper it should go to the husband, as the representative of his wife, especially as she lived to 20. The word *thereof* must be construed *reddendo singulis*, as it is applied to the personal or real estate; and with regard to the latter devised by the mother's will, the husband's term of tenancy, by the curtesy therein, is not to be supported, in regard *Bridget* died before she was in a capacity of disposing of the real estate, and the contingency therefore happened on which the 6000*l.* was given to the charity, that must be its place.

As a person at the age of 14 may dispose of personal estate, as the law now stands, the daughter was intitled at that age to all the personal estate devised to her by her mother; and as she made no disposition, it will go to the husband. The word *thereof* must be construed *reddendo singula singulis*, as applied to personal or real estate.

But then it has been said a question might be made as to the residue of the real estate; after the charity provided for; *the residue thereof, in case her daughters should die unmarried, to go to the testatrix's sisters, &c.* And I think that might go to *Bridget*, and so to the plaintiff her husband, as tenant by curtesy; because the words may be taken, that if *Bridget* died unmarried, then the residue to go to the sisters: but as the contingency never happened, and as in doubtful cases the heir is always to be preferred, *Bridget* is intitled as heir at law to her father.

The residue of the mother's real estate, after the charity, shall go to the daughter, and so to the husband, as tenant by the curtesy, as the contingency on which it is given never has happened, and in doubtful cases the heir is always to be preferred.

doubtful cases the heir is always to be preferred.

The Lordship declared that the plaintiff, as administrator of his late wife, was intitled to the residue of the personal estate of her mother, and to an account of the personal estate of *Robert Billingsley* her father; and if the personal estate be not sufficient to pay the 10,000*l.* it shall be considered as a charge on his real estate. He directed the long annuities to be assigned to the plaintiff, as administrator of his wife; and as to the real

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real estate devised by *Rupert Billingsley* to *Mary* his wife, and afterwards devised by the will of *Mary*, declared the same liable to answer the 6000 *l.* given to charitable uses, and subject thereto, the plaintiff is intitled to it for his life as tenant by the curtesy, and his daughter, after his death, intitled to the real estate in fee (1).

Vide title *Dower* and *Jointure*.

(1) *Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 323.*

(F) *What Words pass an Estate Tail.*

May the 2d, 1738. Easter Term.

Jonathan Ivie, an Infant, by *George Rooke*, his } Plaintiffs:
next Friend, ———

John Ivie, *Belfield*, *Strange*, *Buck* and *George* } Defendants:
Ivie, ———

Case 195.

A. by his will
devises to his
eldest son *Jonathan* a real estate
for life, remainder
to his sons in
tail male, remainder
to testator's second
son *John* for life,
remainder to
his sons in tail
male, remainder
to plaintiff's
father *George*
Ivie for life,
remainder to his
sons in tail male,
remainder over.
And also gave
to three trustees
two long annuities
of 100 *l.*

JONATHAN *Ivie*, the plaintiff's grandfather, by will, dated the 7th of *March*, 1717, devised to his eldest son *Jonathan Ivie* his manor of *Bearford*, with the advowson thereto belonging for life, remainder to his sons in tail male, remainder to the testator's son *John Ivie* for life, without impeachment of waste, remainder to his sons in tail male, remainder to the plaintiff's father *George Ivie* for life, remainder to his sons in tail male, remainder over; and also gave to defendants *Strange*, *Buck*, and *Belfield*, two long annuities of one hundred pounds each, in trust as to one for the plaintiff's father for life, and then to the plaintiff for life, remainder to the issue male of his body, with divers remainders over. And as to the other, in trust for his son *Robert* for life; and in default of issue male, remainder to the said *John Ivie* for life, remainder to his issue male in tail male, remainder to the said *George Ivie* for life, remainder to the plaintiff for life, remainder to the plaintiff's issue male, with divers remainders over; and appointed *John Ivie* his executor, who possessed the personal estate, together each, in trust as to one for the plaintiff's father for life, and then to the plaintiff for life, remainder to the issue male of his body, remainder over; and to the other, in trust for testator's son *Robert* for life, and in default of issue male, remainder to *John Ivie* for life, remainder to his issue male in tail male, remainder to *George* for life, remainder to the plaintiff for life, with divers remainders over, and appointed *John* his executor, who possessed himself of the title deeds of the real estate, and tallies belonging to the annuities.

Jonathan Ivie is dead without issue, *Robert* likewise without issue male, and the son *John Ivie*, born after testator's death, is since dead, and his father has administered.

In 1720, *John* joined with *George* in sale of the annuity devised to *George* for 3250 *l.* and the purchase money was paid to *George*.

The plaintiff, the son of *George*, brings his bill to have the deeds and writings relating to the real estate deposited in court; and as to the annuity devised to *John* and to the plaintiff in remainder to have security given for the payment of it, when his interest therein should take effect in possession.

And as to the other annuity, to have a satisfaction against *John*, for the breach of trust, in conveying in the sale thereof to the plaintiff's prejudice, and for an equivalent upon the death of his father *George Ivie*.

with the title deeds to the real, and the tallies and orders belonging to the annuities; and in 1720, without the consent of the trustees, subscribed them all into the stock of the *South-sea* company.

Ivix v. Ivix.

Robert Ivie, after the death of the testator, died without issue male; *Jonathan Ivie*, the testator's eldest son, died several years since without issue, and *John Ivie* had a son, who died before the testator, and the father has administered to him, and now without any children. In the year 1720, the trustees lining to accept the trust, *John* joins with his brother *George*, in the absolute sale of the annuity devised to *George*, 325*l.* and all the purchase-money is accordingly paid to *George*.

The plaintiff insists, that by the death of *Robert*, without issue male, he is intitled to have the lands settled according to will, and the produce of the long annuities; and therefore the bill is brought for an execution of the trusts in the will of *Jonathan Ivie* his grandfather, and that the deeds and writings relating to the real estate may be deposited in court, for the mutual benefit of all parties intitled thereto, and against the father and his uncle *John*. As to the annuity devised to *Robert*, and to plaintiff in remainder, to have security given for payment of this annuity to him, when his interest therein should take effect in possession; and as to the other annuity, to have satisfaction against *John* for the breach of trust in conveying in this sale to the prejudice of the plaintiff, and that an injunction might be provided for him to have the benefit of, from the death of his father, when the annuity would have come in, if no such sale had been made thereof.

The Lord Chancellor was clearly of opinion, that as to the annuity devised to *Robert*, and afterwards to *John* for life, &c. that the being words of limitation annexed, such as would create an estate tail in the case of a real estate, upon the birth of the issue of *John*, the whole interest in remainder, after the death of *Robert*, vested in such son, and that the defendant *John Ivie* is absolutely intitled to that annuity as administrator to his son, and therefore, as to this demand, he ordered the bill should stand dismissed (1).

Lord Chancellor of opinion, as the annuity devised to *Robert*, and afterwards to *John* for life, &c. that there being words of limitation annexed, such as would create an estate tail in the case of a

real estate upon the birth of the son of *John*, the whole interest in remainder vested in such son; and that *John*, as administrator to his son, is absolutely intitled to it; and as to this demand, dismissed the bill.

Where a trustee has been corruptly guilty of a breach of trust, the court will compel such trustee to satisfaction to the utmost; but as to the annuity sold by *John*, as it was at the instance of *George*, and the money received by *George*, he would not charge *John* with the price the annuity was sold for, but decreed that *George* and *John*, or one of them, do, at their own charge, purchase an equivalent annuity of 100*l.* a year for 99 years, and assign the same to trustees, to be approved of by the court, and the trusts thereof declared according to the limitations in the will.

Scale v. Scale, 1 P. W. 290. *Dod v. Stratton*, 2 vol. 376. *Stratton v. Payne*, 3 Bro. P. C. 451. *pl. 25. Butterfield v. Butterfield*, 1 Ves. 133. 154. *Daw v. Par. Ca. 450. See Hodgson v. Saltern*, 347. *Saltern v. Saltern*, post. 2 vol. 89.

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As

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Ivie.*

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As to the other demand, he said, when a trustee had corrupt or unfair manner, been guilty of a breach of the court will sometimes compel such trustee to make faction to the utmost; yet, as *John* was induced in the to come into a sale of this annuity, at the pressing in and request of his brother, in order to raise money, a money was in fact received by *George*, he would not the defendant *John* with the price of the annuity, as sold, but decreed that *George Ivie* and *John Ivie*, or one of do, at their or one of their own charges, purchase an annuity of 100*l.* a year for 99 years, of the like and value of the exchequer annuity which was sold assign the same to trustees to be approved of by the court and that the trusts thereof be declared according to the provisions in the will; and further declared, that it appeared by proofs in the cause, the said annuity was sold at the request of the defendant *George Ivie*, the tenant for life; and that the purchase money came to his own use, the defendant *John Ivie* ought to be indemnified by *George* from the expence he may be put to by being obliged to purchase such annuity, and that in case *John* shall purchase such annuity and assign the same to such trustees, or shall be at expence in the purchase thereof, he shall be at liberty to execute this decree against *George Ivie* in the plaintiff's to compel *George* to purchase such annuity, and assign the same as aforesaid, in order to oblige *George* to reimburse *John* his principal money, which shall have been so laid out by him in and about the purchase of such exchequer annuity, a interest thereof, and all such expences as he shall have put to as aforesaid; and that till *George* shall have so paid such growing payments of the annuity which shall be purchased by *John*, as shall accrue during the life of *George*, he be paid to *John* towards such indemnity, and directed the defendants *George* and *John* to pay the plaintiff his costs in this part of the cause.

His Lordship refused to direct the deeds and writings to be deposited in court, because the plaintiff's interest in the real estate was too remote to warrant it, and is never done but in the case of a remainderman, whose interest is expectant on a mere tenancy for life (1).

As to that part of the plaintiff's bill which prayed the delivery of the real estate, which were in the hands of *John* the tenant for life, might, for the better security of the plaintiff, in whom the inheritance was lodged, be taken out of his hands and deposited in court, his Lordship agreed to be the common practice in the case of a remainderman whose interest was expectant on a mere tenancy for life as there was a contingent limitation here to all the sons of *John*, and after that an estate for life in *George* the plaintiff's father, he thought the plaintiff's interest too remote to warrant such a proceeding, and that, as such limitations are extremely frequent, if such a practice should be suffered to prevail, the title-deeds of half the estates in the kingdom might be brought into court; besides, in the present case, the first

(1) Vide *Lord Lempster v. Lord Pem-* 2 *Ves.* 612. *Ford v. Peering*, *Ves.* 154. *Soubby v. Stonehouse*, 72. 77. *Smith v. Cooke*, *post.* 3 *v.*

for life is not the heir at law, but takes by the will as well as the remainder-man, so that there is no danger of destroying the deeds, as there might be in case he was heir, in order to better his estate, and as there is no precedent for any thing of this kind, he declared he would not make one; and therefore, as to so much of the plaintiff's bill as seeks to have the title deeds deposited in this court, his Lordship ordered the bill to stand dismissed (1).

IVIR v.
IVIR.

(1) Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 794.

Easter Term, 1738.

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Wyld v. Lewis.

*Handwritten: Mand. v. Mand.
2. M. v. Keen. L. L.*

RICHARD Wyld, by his will, "devised to his wife Elizabeth, now the wife of the defendant, all his lands, *S. C. post. 3 vol. 785. cited.* " &c. not settled in jointure generally," and then follow these words, "If it shall happen that my said wife Elizabeth shall have *R. W. by his will devised to his wife Elizabeth, all his lands, &c. not settled in jointure, and then says, if it shall happen that she shall have no son nor daughter by* no son nor daughter by me begotten on the body of the said Elizabeth and for want of such issue, then the said premises to return to my brother John Wyld, if he shall be then living, and his heirs for ever, only paying to his two brothers (A. and B.) the sum of 150*l.* within one year after the decease of the said Elizabeth."

me, for want of such issue, the said premises to return to my brother (the plaintiff) if he shall be then living, and his heirs for ever, paying to A. and B. 150*l.* within a year after Elizabeth's death.

Decreed to be an estate tail in Elizabeth, because where preceding words are proper to create an estate tail, the legal operation of them cannot be controuled by subsequent provisions (1).

Elizabeth had a daughter born after the death of the testator, and since dead. The bill was now brought by John Wyld, the brother of the testator, and who is likewise his heir at law, to restrain the defendants from committing waste; and the question was, What estate Elizabeth took by the will, whether in tail, or for life only?

Mr. Brown for the plaintiff insisted she took for life only, that the words in the will (*if she has no son or daughter*) would certainly not raise an estate tail by implication, and the subsequent words (*for want of such issue*) will not enlarge the estate, the word (*such*) restraining the word (*issue*) to mean only such son or daughter; that the word *issue* received such a restrained construction for the same reason, in the case of Popham v. Banfield, 236*l.* for there the devise was to A. for life, remainder to the first son of A. in tail male, and so on to the tenth son, and if A. die with-

(1) See Sunday's case, 9 Co. 127. b. Astley, 3 Burr. 1570. See also Robinson v. Popham, 1 P. W. 56. Black- v. Robinson, post. 3 vol. 736. v. v. Edgley, 1 P. W. 605. Evans v.

Handwritten: Marshall v. Pro. 24th Ch. 4. Montgomery. Montgomery. 3. Jones v. La. 4. b. Har. 1.

WYLD &
LEWIS.

Ad in
Houston v
Hughes 5
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out issue male, remainder over; it was insisted A. had an estate tail, but the court held otherwise, and construed the words, dying without issue male, a dying without such issue male.

That it was the intent of the testator, that Elizabeth should take for life only, appears farther from the limitation in the will to John, if he should be then living; so likewise from the direction for paying the money within a year, and to the two brothers, particularly naming them, which provisions seem to imply plainly an intention in the testator, that the estate of John should commence, if at all, on the death of Elizabeth, and was not intended to wait till an estate tail should be spent. That the limitation here to John was merely contingent, and such contingency never happening, because Elizabeth had a daughter, the plaintiff John does not claim under this devise, but as heir at law to the testator, is intitled to the reversion in fee expectant on the estate for life, limited to the wife under the will.

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Mr. Fazakerley *e contra*. To prove this an estate tail, cited *Newton v. Barnardine*, Moore 127. and *Byfield's case*, Hil. 42 & 43 Eliz. cited by Hale Chief Justice, in *King v. Mellin*, 1 Vent. 231. there the devise was to A. and if he dies, not having a son, then to remain to the heirs of the testator. Son was there taken to be used as nomen collectivum, and held an entail. He likewise cited 2 Vern. 766. *Pinbury v. Elkin*, it is said there, if he die, not having a son, that these words create an estate tail. To enforce this construction, Mr. Fazakerley insisted on the absurdity which would otherwise follow, that supposing Elizabeth not tenant in tail, but for life only, with a contingent limitation to any son or daughter of her's, if such son or daughter should die in the life of the mother, though leaving issue, such issue could never take within the words of the will, which can never be presumed to be the intent of the testator.

Mr. Wilbraham on the same side, said in the case of *Popham v. Bumfield*, the foundation the court went on in construing that an estate for life only was the express devise for life to the first devisee, for the words are, "there is a mighty difference between a devise to A. and if he die without issue, to B. and a devise to A. for life, and if he die without issue then to B."

Mr. Brown in reply said, if the testator by his will had made a certain and absolute disposition of the whole fee, the objection that the grandchildren would by this construction be excluded, would be strong against us, but here a contingent disposition only, is made of the inheritance to John, which contingency has not taken effect, and the estate descends as was intended by the testator, if such contingency should not happen, so that no exclusion of the grandchildren could possibly be.

Lord Chancellor: It seems clear from the words of the will (as to all my worldly estate) which introduce the disposing part of the will, that the testator intended to make an absolute disposition of his whole estate by his will, and not suffer any part to descend as undisposed of, in case of any contingency;

he intended a disposition of the whole by his will, the objection that the grandchildren by this construction are liable to be excluded, is a very strong argument for construing this an estate tail, and the inclination to avoid this absurdity has been the principal reason for construing words of the singular number, which are properly descriptive of particular persons only, in collective sense, as including the descendants of the first taker, and was the governing reason, in the cases of *Dubber v. Trollop* (1), in *B. R.* and *Shaw and Weigh* (2), 28th of April 1729, *Dom. Proc. Eq. Caf. Abr.* 185. The case cited in *Ventris* is all as strong as the present; here is no difference in the construction of the devise of a real estate, between a provision, that devisee dies, not having a son, as it is there, or if the devisee has not a son as *here*.

WYLD v.
LEWIS.

In *Popham v. Bamfield*, an express estate for life is limited to the devisee, which has always had a great influence in the construction of a will, when the question has been, Whether tenant for life, or in tail?

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Great stress has been laid by the plaintiff's counsel upon the word *such*, as if it restrained the word *issue* to mean only *such* son or daughter, and that the precedent words, if *Elizabeth* has no son nor daughter, will not raise an estate tail by implication; but in *Wild's* case, 6 Co. 16. b. it was resolved, that if *A.* deviseth his lands to *B.* and his children or issue, and he hath not any issue at the time of the devise, that the same is an estate tail, for the intent of the devisor is manifest and certain, that his children or issues should take, and as immediate devisees they cannot take, because they are not *in rerum natura* and by way of remainder they cannot take, for that was not his intent, for the gift is immediate; therefore, there such words shall be taken as words of limitation, viz. as much as children or issues of his body, for every child or issue ought to be of the body." And I am of opinion, therefore, the words *son or daughter* must be taken in the same sense, having no issue, and then the word *such* will have no weight, but will amount to the same thing, as if he had said, for want of issue, and the words, having no issue, or dying without issue, have been always considered in the same light, both in law and equity.

If *Elizabeth* has no son nor daughter, must be understood having no issue, and the words for want of such issue, amount to the same, as if he had said for want of such issue generally.

The direction for the payment of the 150*l.* within a year, in every proper circumstance in general to be made use of, to produce the construction contended for by the plaintiffs, and that may seem to imply an intent in the testator, that the interest of *John Wyld* under the will should, if at all, commence on the death of *Elizabeth*, but if the preceding words are proper to create an estate tail, the legal operation of them cannot be concluded by those subsequent provisions. The bill must therefore be dismissed.

(1) *Ante* 412. S. C. cited.

(2) 2 *Str.* 798. S. C. *Fert. f. Rep.*

(F) Of Things personal, as Goods and Chattels, &c. by what Description and to whom good.

February the
27th, 1738.

The Attorney General v. Pyle.

Case 197.

A. devises a freehold messuage at Rumsford, to the charity school there, and directs the rents and profits to be applied for the benefit of the school, so long as it shall be endowed with charity.

And by the same will reciting a debt of 1000*l.* to be owing to him, gives the said sum to the Coopers Company to build alms-houses.

The debt devised by the will, instead of 1000*l.* amounted to 365*l.* 16*s.* 7*d.* only.

The freehold estate being devised to a charity, so long as it continues to be endowed with charity, is only given *quousque*, and when it ceases as a gift of real estate, it shall revert for the benefit of the heir of testator.

Though the debt devised by the will amounts only to 365*l.* 16*s.* 7*d.* yet the wrong description, and falling short, will not defeat the legacy.

Wm. Hoag
Granger
Sim. 85.

The testator also appointed the interest of the 1000*l.* to be paid yearly, in several proportions, and for several purposes. At the time of the testator's death, the balance of the account from *Stephenson* and company amounted only to 365*l.* 16*s.* 7*d.* The information was brought at the relation of the Coopers company, to have the directions of the court with regard to these devises, and for the establishment of the charity.

Lord Chancellor : Where a sum of money is given to a charity, so long as it shall continue to be endowed with charity, it is only given *quousque*, and when it ceases, if it is a gift of real estate, it shall fall into the inheritance for the benefit of the heir, if personal, into the *residuum*.

Where a person gives a debt by his will to a corporation, they may recover it in the ecclesiastical court.

Where a person gives a debt of 1000*l.* which was due to him, to a corporation, it vests in them in law, and they might have recovered it in the ecclesiastical court. The only question that remains then, is, as to the trust of this legacy; the general intention of the testator was, to give a charity to the town of *Rumsford*, and the Coopers' company; but if the trust cannot be satisfied in the very terms intended by the testator, yet a wrong description and falling short will not defeat the legacy (1); for there are many cases where a trust for charity cannot take place according to the strict intent of the testator, and still the charity shall not intirely fail, but the court will direct the application of it as far as they can, to carry the intent of the testator into execution, or at least nearest to the intent; and I will in this case endeavour to apply the legacies in such a manner as

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(1) See *Ashru v. Ashru*, 3 P. W. 384, and *Deer v. Geary*, 1 Ves. 255.

be most agreeable to the testator's design, and do therefore
re, that the rents and profits of the freehold messuage at Rum-
ought to be applied to the benefit of the charity school at Rumford,
as the said charity school shall continue to be endowed with cha-
and decree the defendant Lewis, the heir at law of the testator,
vey the said messuage to the other defendants, the trustees of the
ty.
id let the sum of 365 l. 16s. 7d. be placed out at interest, and
e interest arising therefrom be from time to time distributed among
lms people belonging to the alms-houses of the Coopers' company,
re increase of their allowance, over and above what is now al-
l them by the donor of the said alms-houses.

THE ATTOR-
 NEY GENER-
 AL V. PYLE.

(G) What Words pass a Fee in a Will.

<i>Chiefman, Widow,</i>	—	—	Exceptant.	
<i>cis Partridge, Clerk,</i>	—	—	Respondent.	December the 6th, 1739.

THOMAS Chiefman by will dated the 20th of *March* 1730. Case 198.

devised in the words following, I give to the charity school
Yevill, to be paid 12 months after my decease, the full and
sum of 50 l. "Item, I give unto the Latin school, if any
an is possessed of it, that teacheth boys, and is richly
ounded in the Latin tongue, the sum of five pounds, to
paid him yearly for teaching and instructing three boys.
m, I give to the poor of Yevill fifty shillings a year, to
paid every Easter after my decease, out of my estate of
mer, to be paid by my executrix. Item, I give my wife
Sarah Chiefman, that estate in Homer in the parish of Trent,
l also that at Wandall in the parish of Mudford, to her
her heirs for ever, and made Sarah executrix."
. Partridge was schoolmaster, but 5 l. a year hath not been
o him.

T. C. by will
gives to the Latin
school of Yevill,
five pounds,
to be paid
yearly for
teaching and
instructing 3
boys.
As it is not a
gift to a parti-
cular school-
master, but to
the school it-
self, it is a per-
tuitly, and the
general words
for instructing
3 boys, means
3 in succession
one after
another.

the commissioners named under a commission of chari-
 uses ordered, that *Sarah* should within one month after
 pay to the defendant *Partridge* the sum of 10 l. &c. and
 he proprietor of the lands called *Homer*, for the time
 should for ever pay unto such person as should be
 master, the yearly sum of five pounds, by equal half
 payments at *Michaelmas* and *Lady Day*, and decreed that
 lands called *Homer* were charged with the payment of
 r ever.

which decree *Mrs. Chiefman* took exceptions, insisting
 ie is not, nor ought to be bound thereby.

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?, For that the messuage, tenement and premisses, called
 , devised to her, are not by the will charged with the
 nt of 5 l. a year, to such person, and for such purposes,
 nd by the decree hath been adjudged.

ndly, For that if the said tenement and premisses were
 d with the five pounds a year, the same was not by the
 ds a perpetual charge thereon, nor payable at such times.

CHEESEMAN and in such proportions, as by the said decree is likewise
 & PARTRIDGE. adjudged.

Lord Chancellor: The will is so inaccurately penned, that I believe this man made it himself; but though it cannot take place according to the words, I must make such construction as is most agreeable to the intention.

There seems to be two intentions of this testator.

First, To give his money legacies independant of his annuities, and in gross sums; for the first legacy is the full and whole sum of fifty pounds, *to be paid a twelvemonth after his death.*

Secondly, An annuity of five pounds, and another of fifty shillings, to be paid yearly every year after his decease.

The question is, Whether the annuity of five pounds is a charge upon the estate at *Homer*.

In the first place, What is to be the continuance of this five pounds *per ann.* and that will determine in some measure the other question, Whether the estate at *Homer* will be liable to answer it.

A gift to the parish church of *A.* has been construed a gift to the parson and parishioners of *A.* and their successors for ever.

Now I am of opinion, that this was intended by the testator as a perpetuity, for he did not give it to a particular school-master, but to the school itself, which is like the old case of a gift to the parish church of *St. Andrew, Holborn*, which was construed to be a gift to the parson and parishioners of *St. Andrew*, and their successors for ever.

Another circumstance, that it is in general words, for the instruction of *three boys*, which must be understood to mean three boys in succession.

There can be no question as to the charging his estate at *Homer*, for he has made it liable in express terms, and the calling his wife executrix in this clause, is only another description of her, for the words immediately following give the inheritance to the wife in this estate (1).

I am of opinion it cannot be charged upon testator's personal estate, because the real estate is expressly set apart to answer the annuities; for what the testator means by his respective legacies, are the pecuniary sums, or sums in gross, that are before given in other parts of his will.

The next question is, As the fund intended for the school is not sufficient, Whether the estate at *Homer* be liable to make up the deficiency.

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Item in a will a conjunctive in the sense of *and* or *also* and is only made use of to distinguish clauses.

Item ought to be construed as a conjunctive in the sense of *and*, or *also*, to connect the two sentences together, and make the estate at *Homer* as much liable to one annuity as the other. For *Item* has never been construed a disjunctive, but is only made use of to distinguish the clauses in the will; the cases of *Cole v. Rawlinson*, 1 Salk. 234. and *Hopewell and Ackland*, 1 Salk. 239. are in point for this purpose.

(1) *Vide Edgell v. Haywood*, post. 3 vol. 352. 357.

The time of payment is at *Easter*, and as it is directed to be paid yearly, which naturally intends taxes, this court cannot alter it to half yearly payments, and clear of taxes.

**CHRISTMAN
v. PARTRIDGE.**
Where a will directs payments out of land yearly, at a particular time, it cannot be altered to half yearly payments.

I do therefore order that the exceptions be over ruled, save as to the time for payment of the five pounds a year, and as to that, the said exceptions must be allowed, and that so much of the said commissioners' decree, as directs the five pounds *per ann.* to be paid half yearly at *Michaelmas* and *Lady Day*, be reversed, and I do order that the arrears be forthwith paid to the respondent, and that the five pound for the future be paid yearly at *Easter*, subject to the land tax, and I affirm the rest of the decree (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1739. fol. 208.

For more of Devises, *Vide* title *Bill*, under the Division, *Bills of Discovery*.

Vide title *Exposition of Words*.

Vide title *Dower and Jointure*.

Vide title *Legacy*.

Vide title *Legacy*, under the Division, *Ademption of a Legacy*.

Vide title *Conditions and Limitations*.

C A P. XLI.

Distribution.

Vide title *Executors and Administrators*, under the Division, *Who are intitled to a Distribution*.

Vide title *Exposition of Words*.

C A P. XLII.

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Dower and Jointure.

- (A) *What shall be a good Satisfaction, or good Bar of Dower, and how far a Dowress shall be favoured in Equity.*
- (B) *Of making good a Deficiency out of a Husband's Assets.*
- (C) *Of what Estate of the Husband, with respect to the Nature and Quality thereof, shall a Woman be endowed.*

(A) *What shall be a good Satisfaction, or good Bar of Dower, — how far a Dowress will be favoured in Equity.*

Yone the 2d,
1739.

Glover v. Bates.

Cafe 199.

A provision for a wife, in articles before marriage, declared to be in full satisfaction of dower, or any claim or right by common law, custom of the city, or any other usage, law or custom notwithstanding. The wife survived the husband, and accepted of the terms mentioned in the articles. This demand of the wife may be extinguished by agreement, but as she was an infant when the articles were signed, had her election at her husband's death, which she has made by accepting what was designed as a satisfaction for dower.

IN articles made before marriage, it was expressly provided, that the terms therein mentioned should be to the wife, in full satisfaction and recompence of all right and claim of dower, or any claim or right by common law, custom of the city, or any other usage, law or custom notwithstanding.

The wife survived the husband, and accepted of the terms mentioned in the articles. This demand of the wife may be extinguished by agreement, but as she was an infant when the articles were signed, had her election at her husband's death, which she has made by accepting what was designed as a satisfaction for dower.

See
Collection
of the 6
Linnons 19

The wife lived some time after the death of her husband, who died intestate, and she accepted of the terms mentioned in the articles. Upon her death her representative brought a bill to have her distributory share of the husband's estate, notwithstanding these articles.

Lord Chancellor: The first question is, If the wife is bound by these articles.

This demand of the wife (if she had in her life demanded it), tho' not properly the subject matter of a release, yet may certainly be extinguished by agreement; she was an infant at the time of entering into this agreement, therefore, at the death of the husband, she had her election (1), and she has made it by accepting what was designed by the articles as a satisfaction, which plainly shews her sense of the articles.

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The words in the articles, any law, usage, or custom notwithstanding, extend to the husband's personal estate, and bar the wife of her share under the statute of distributions.

The next question is, If upon the construction of this agreement it can extend to bar her distributory share? And it is objected that this proviso was only to leave the estate in the power of the husband to dispose of, in case he had made a will, and so this claim not inconsistent; and indeed, with respect to the custom of London, it generally is thus understood; but where such express words are used as here, any law, usage, or custom notwithstanding, it is plain he intended his estate should go to his relations, exclusive of any claim of the wife, and as she must claim under the statute of distributions, which is a law, it is expressly provided against.

His Lordship therefore ordered the plaintiff's bill to stand dismissed, with costs according to the course of the court.

(1) See *Harvey v. Ashley*, post. 3 vol. 697.

B. The cases of *Badcock v. Lovell* (1), in *M. T.* 1726. and *Glover v. Davila v. Davila*, before Lord Chancellor *Cowper*, 2 *Vern.* 724, and *Lockier v. Savage* (2), in the court of Exchequer, were cited by Mr. Attorney General for the defendants where the words *or otherwise* were held to extend to bar the distributory share (3)

GLOVER v. BATES.

- 1) 7 *Vin.* 211. pl. 24. S. C.
- 2) 2 *Stra.* 917. S. C. 2 *Eq. Ab.* 260.
- 3) See also *Read v. Snell*, *post*. pl. 642. where under a similar clause, the wife was barred of her paraphernalia bequeathed to her by her husband's will.

) Of making good a Deficiency out of a Husband's Assets.

May the 11th, 1739. Easter Term.

Robert v. Morgan and Clifford.

THIS was a bill brought by the plaintiff to have the deficiency of her jointure supplied out of the assets of her husband and his father, and also for 1000 *l.* left her by her husband, payable with interest from three months after his death, likewise to have her *paraphernalia* made good.

Cause 200.

S. C. Amb. 6.
S. C. 2. Cox's
P. W. 544. in
note fully.

A bill by the plaintiff to have deficiency of her jointure made good out of the assets of her husband and his father, also for 1000 *l.* left her by her husband, payable with interest from three months after his death, and for her *paraphernalia*. Where the father and son are parties to the marriage contract, as a lien both upon the estate of her father and son. An account of assets was decreed, and the deficiency should be made good out of the son's estate, it appearing that he received most of the assets.

In the marriage of *Robert* the son with the plaintiff, the father and son both covenanted that the lands settled upon her jointure were worth 300 *l.* per ann. part of which was woodlands, but the whole original income was not worth 300 *l.*

James Payer
3 *Nov.* 1761

Lord Chancellor: In marriage contracts, when the fortune of wife is paid to the father, or to clear incumbrances, or to son and the father and the son are parties to the marriage contract, the wife has a lien both upon the estate of the father and son.

As to the woodland part of the estate, it appearing that notwithstanding a valuation was made of what arose from the sale of timber and cutting wood every year, a deficiency still remained to satisfy the jointure. An account of assets was decreed, and that the deficiency in the jointure should be made good out of the personal estates of the father and son pursuant to the covenant, and in case that should prove deficient, then of their real estates liable to their debts by specialty.

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Lord

PROBERT v.
MORGAN.

The 1000*l.* given by the will to the wife, cannot be considered as a satisfaction for the deficiency of her jointure, for as the jointure lands are covenanted to be worth so much clear of all reprises, the testator intended the 1000*l.* as a bounty.

Lord Chancellor held, that the legacy of 1000*l.* given by will to the wife, ought not to be considered in this case as a satisfaction for the deficiency of her jointure, because that did not arise till after his death, and therefore could not, at that time, be in his consideration; and as the jointure lands are covenanted by the marriage settlement to be worth so much clear of all reprises, the testator plainly intended the 1000*l.* as a bounty to her.

The words of the husband's will were, *First, I charge all my real estate, &c.*

There was another question, Out of what fund this legacy was to be paid? For by the marriage settlement (1), the husband had a power to charge the estate with 2000*l.* after the death of his wife, and a term of years was raised for that purpose.

The words of the husband's will were, *First, I charge all my real estate, &c.*

If a person in the execution of a power sufficiently describes the estate he had a power to charge, the estate is bound, tho' there is no reference to the deed out of which the power arises.

Lord Chancellor: If a man has a power to charge an estate, it is not necessary, in the execution of it, he should refer to the deed out of which the power arises; for in a court of equity it is enough that his intent appears, and if in the execution he sufficiently describes the estates he had a power to charge, the estate is certainly bound, especially where the person charging is a purchaser of the power (2.)

He has indeed mistaken a circumstance with respect to the time of raising it, but that will not make it void (3).

It is insisted for the plaintiff, that as the husband by his will left her the 1000*l.* payable with interest, the interest should be made good till it amounted to the sum of 2000*l.* which he had a power to raise.

But his Lordship said, as to that the 1000*l.* being the only charge upon the estate, he was of opinion that the interest should not be made good out of the power, for that is to charge the estate with the principal sum of 2000*l.* (4).

With regard to the *paraphernalia*, it was strongly insisted upon by the counsel for the defendant, that the wife cannot stand in the place of bond creditors; and the case of *Tipping v. Tipping*, 1 *Wms.* 729. was cited for that purpose.

(1) By another settlement subsequent to the marriage.

(2) *Ex parte Caswall*, *post.* 559, 560. But in such cases, it must appear, that the person who has the power, intended to execute it. *Moulton v. Hutchinson*, *post.* 558. *Andrews v. Emmot*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 297.

(3) The sum of 2000*l.* was to be

raised two years after the term should come into possession.

(4) His Lordship reserved the consideration, whether interest was to be allowed upon the sum of 1000*l.* from 3 months after the testator's death to be made good out of the real estates descended or the real estates devised, *Reg. Lib. B.* 1738. *fol.* 310.

Chancellor: Where there are real estates descended, the ay be intituled to her *paraphernalia* (1); but otherwise in se, where the real estates came by the husband, and said e in 2 *Vern.* 246. had been carried full far enough, for it is there laid down that where *A.* dies intestate, or by th not dispose of the jewels, his wife may claim, in case be no debts, the jewels suitable to her quality to be worn ornaments of her person; yet by the old law they were ely in the power of the husband (2): And if he by will away the jewels, such devise should stand good against the claim of *paraphernalia* (3). *Cro. Car.* 343. and 1 *Roll.* [*442] 11. *sec.* 9.

PROBERT v. MORGAN.
Where there are real estates descended, the wife may be intituled to her *paraphernalia*, but otherwise in this case, where the real estates came by the husband.

Decreed, that if the personal estate lent to pay debts, then the plaintiff intitled to have her *paraphernalia*: ot sufficient, then she is to have ion out of the real estates *descend- g. Lib. B.* 1738. fol. 310. *Sed cledon v. Northcote*, *post.* 3 vol. (2) So *Graham v. Londonderry*, *post.* 3 vol. 394. (3) *Contra Northey v. Northey*, *post.* 2 vol. 77. *Seymore v. Tresilian*, *post.* 3 vol. 358. *See Snelfan v. Corbet*, *post.* 3 vol. 369.

What Estate of the Husband, with respect to the Nature and Quality thereof, shall a Woman be endowed.

June the 22d, 1738. At the Rolls.

Sneyd v. Sneyd.

Tinsleton v. Horne
1. 4. c. Collyer. 172

I E plaintiff's father, *Ralph Sneyd*, being, by virtue of two settlements, seised in tail male of several manors ds, and in possession of great part thereof, and having sed several others, intermarried with the defendant the P's mother, but no settlement was made in consideration marriage; and on the 18th of *October* 1733, he died in- leaving the plaintiff *Dryden Sneyd*, his eldest son, where- lands in the settlement, and the estates purchased by the became vested in the plaintiff, as the eldest son and heir

Case 201.
The plaintiff's father, being seised in tail male of several manors and lands, and in possession of great part thereof, and having purchased several others, intermarried with the defendant

iff's mother, and in *October* 1733 died intestate. The plaintiff, as eldest son and heir in gs a bill to set aside the assignment of dower for partiality, upon a suggestion that part of the copyhold and not liable thereto.

husband became intituled to the copyhold estates by copy of court roll, and granted them out copy of court roll, his wife is not intituled to dower; but if he became intituled otherwise than f court roll, and did not grant them out again by copy of court roll, she is intituled to dower se estates.

defendant claiming dower out of the plaintiff's estate, d judgment in a writ of dower against him, and dower erwards assigned by the sheriff; and the present bill is : for an account of the rents of the real estate, and to set e sheriff's assignment of dower for partiality, part of the estate

SNEYD v.
SNEYD.

estate being copyhold, and not liable to dower, and yet entitled upon the writ of inquiry for ascertaining of dower.

The defendant insisted the copyhold was properly entitled because *Ralph Sneyd* her husband, had the freehold of the chafed copyhold estates in him as lord of the manor, which tained as well copyhold as freehold, and by him not granted and that she is therefore dowable of the said copyhold, and if he did grant them out, the instantaneous seisin in the husband at the time of the purchase, was sufficient to intitle her to dower, and that no after-act of his could give away that which was once attached in her.

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• Sir Joseph Jekyll.

A wife is not intitled to dower out of an instantaneous seisin. The converse of a fine is not so seised as to give his wife a title to dower; nor in the case of a wife has the widow of a trustee any claim of dower from such a momentary seisin in her husband.

The Master of the Rolls : Though no cases have been of either side, and seems to be a new point, yet I should that this instantaneous seisin of the freehold of the pure copyhold estates in the husband, will not intitle the defendant wife to her dower; for notwithstanding there may be none of the same nature with this, yet it may be governed by the same and general rules of law: as for instance, *the converse of a fine is not so seised as to give his wife a title to dower*; and in the case of a trustee, the widow of a trustee has been determined to have no claim of dower from such a momentary seisin.

I do therefore in the first place decree, *that the assignment of dower by the sheriff be set aside*, and that it be referred to a Master to inquire, whether the intestate became intitled to the copyhold in question, by virtue of surrenders from the tenant by copy of court roll, or not? And whether he granted the copyhold estates out again by copy of court roll, and not by lease for years or lives? *And if the intestate became intitled by copy of court roll, and granted them out again by copy of court roll, then I am of opinion that the defendant Anne Sneyd is not intitled to dower on those estates.*

And as to the lands whereon the leases for lives or years were renewed by the intestate, I do order the Master to inquire, whether of those leases were actually expired at the time of the renewal, and which not; *and am of opinion, that the defendant Anne is not intitled to dower out of an instantaneous seisin, but she is intitled to dower out of those lands where the Master shall find that the leases were actually expired (1).*

(1) *Reg. Lib. B. 1737. fol. 448.*

November the
12th, 1739.
and July the
21st, 1740.

Hervey v. Hervey.

Vide title Power, under the Division, Of the right Execution Power, and where a Defect therein will be supplied.

C A P. XLIII.

Ejectment.

Vide title Jointenants and Tenants in Common.

C A P. XLIV.

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Estate Tail.

Ivie v. Ivie.

*May the 24,
1738.*

Vide title Devise, under the Division, What Words pass an Estate Tail.

C A P. XLV.

Evidence, Witnesses, and Proof.

- (A) *What will be admitted as Evidence, and will amount to sufficient Proof.*
- (B) *Where parol, or collateral Evidence, will or will not be admitted to explain, confirm, or contradict what appears on the Face of a Deed or a Will.*
- (C) *Of examining Witnesses de bene esse, and establishing their Testimony in perpetuum rei memoriam.*
- (D) *Of the Sufficiency or Disability of a Witness.*
- (E) *Rules the same in Equity as at Law.*

- (A) *What will be admitted as Evidence, and will amount to sufficient Proof.*

Graves v. Eustace Budget, Esq;

*May the 5th,
1737.*

IT was moved on the defendant's behalf, that certain witnesses of the plaintiff's, who were to prove exhibits, might be examined *viva voce* at the hearing of the cause; and that an order

Cafe 202.
This court will allow the proving of exhibits *viva voce* at the hearing, but not to let in other examinations, and this only at the application of the party who is to make use of the exhibits, but no instance where it is allowed at the application of the contrary party.

order

GRAVES v.
BUDGELL.

order of the late Chancellor, for a commission to examine them in the country, might be discharged.

The motion was founded on two things.

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First, The great importance of these exhibits to the merits of the cause, being receipts of the defendant, which he insisted were forged. and had denied in his answer.

Secondly, The ill state of health of the defendant disabling him to go down into the country to attend the commission, in support of which an affidavit of his physician was read.

On these matters it was prayed that the witnesses might be examined *vivâ voce* at the hearing, that the defendant might have an opportunity of cross-examining them, and sifting their evidence; and a case of the Dutchess of Newcastle was mentioned by Mr. Fazakerley, where it was so allowed. This was also prayed in honour of the defendant, he having denied the receipts.

Lord Chancellor: I cannot allow the motion; the constant and established proceedings of this court are upon written evidence, like the proceedings upon the civil or canon law. This is the course of the court, and the course of the court is the law of the court; and though there are cases of witnesses being so examined, yet they have been allowed but sparingly, and only after publication, where doubts have appeared in their depositions, and the examination has been to clear such doubts, and inform the conscience of the court.

There never was a case, where witnesses have been allowed to be examined at large at the hearing; and though it might be desirable to allow this, yet the fixed and settled proceedings of the court cannot be broke through for it.

The utmost latitude the court have taken in this, is to allow the proving of exhibits *vivâ voce* at the hearing, but not to let in other examinations; and this is allowed only where the application is by the party who is to make use of the exhibits: but there never was a case where it was allowed on the application of the contrary party; if he is suspicious of fraud, he has notice, and may cross examine the witnesses.

Easter Term, 1737.

Fry v. Wood.

Case 203.
Where a person
has been exam-
ined here, his
deposition may
be read at law
between the
same parties.

A Greed in this case, where a person has been examined in Chancery, that in a cause at law between the same parties, his deposition may be used in evidence, if it can be proved that the witness is dead, or by reason of sickness, &c. is not able to attend, or that he is out of the kingdom, or otherwise not amenable to the process of the court (1).

(1) See *Bull. Nisi Pri.* 236. 238, 239.

In Michaelmas Vacation, 1737.

Goodier v. Lake.

THERE an original note of hand is lost, and a copy of it is offered in evidence to serve any particular purpose in a cause, you must shew sufficient probability to satisfy the jury that the original note was genuine, before you will be allowed to read the copy.

Cafe 204.
Where an original note is lost, and a copy of it is offered in evidence, you must shew the

original note was genuine, before you will be allowed to read the copy.

Metcalf v. Ives.

June the 18th,
1737.

le Award and Arbitrament, under the Divison, For what Causes set aside.

Michaelmas Term, 1744.

Omichund v. Barker.

Vide title Alien.

Ramkissenfat v. Barker.

December the
4th, 1749.

Vide title Alien.

Eade v. Thomas Lingood, and Others.

May the 23d,
1747.

e Bankrupt, under the Divison, Rule as to Examinations taken before Commissioners.

Evidence. Vide title Power.

Hilary Term, 1737.

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nd Others, Assignees of Dellow, a Bankrupt, v. Dellow and Others.

title Bill, under the Divison, Bills of Discovery, &c.

here Parol, or Collateral Evidence will or will not be admitted, to explain, confirm, or contradict, what appears on the face of a Deed or a Will.

D. L. I.

C. g.

Vacation after Trinity Term, 1737.

*Taylor v. Taylor.**Vide title Copyhold, under the Division, In what Cases a Defect Surrender, or the Want of it, will be supplied in Equity.*Merch the 4th,
1737.*Hutchins v. Lee.*

Case 205.

Bill brought to set aside an assignment of a leasehold estate, &c. upon suggestion that it was not intended as an absolute assignment, but only as a trust for the plaintiff's benefit.

BILL brought to set aside an assignment of a leasehold estate, and all other the estate and effects of the plaintiff upon a suggestion that the same was never intended as an absolute assignment for the benefit of the defendant, but made to ease the plaintiff of the trouble and care of managing his concerns at that time, (being then under great infirmity of body and mind), and subject to a trust for the benefit of plaintiff, if he should afterwards be in a capacity of taking of his own affairs.

Though no express trust in the deed, yet as it might be collected from circumstances arising out of the assignment itself inconsistent with an absolute disposition: *Lord Chancellor* admitted parol evidence to explain this transaction.

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Tho' there can be no parol declaration of a trust since the 29 Car. 2. yet parol evidence proper in avoidance of fraud.

No trust of any kind appeared on the face of the assignment but upon the whole circumstances of the case, (*viz.*) the assignment reserved to the plaintiff, being by no means equivalent to estate so disposed of, the recital in the deed of assignment, the plaintiff was under a disability at that time, of taking care of his own affairs, all the effects in general being assigned as the leasehold estate, and after a general covenant in the deed from the defendant, to indemnify the plaintiff against any breach of covenant in the original lease, and a special reservation to the plaintiff of all the timber, &c. and he to set out, and allow for the repair of the estate (1), (a circumstance principally relied on by *Lord Chancellor*, as not at all reconcilable with an absolute disposition of the whole interest to the defendant) and other circumstances raising a strong presumption of a trust intended.

Lord Chancellor admitted parol evidence to explain this transaction, *viz.* declarations by the defendant at the time the deed of assignment was executed, and afterwards amounting to a knowledge of such a trust as the plaintiff now insisted on, and his Lordship said, such evidence was consistent with the deed, as there was all the appearance of an intended trust on the face of it; but however though there can be no parol declaration of a trust, since the statute of the 29 Car. 2. yet this evidence is proper in avoidance of fraud, which was here intended to be put on the plaintiff, for the defendant's design was entirely to deprive the plaintiff of all the benefit of his estate.

(1) These covenants do not appear in the Register's book.

(2) Decreed, that the defendant should reconvey the estate to the plain-

tiff. *Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 406. Thynn v. Thynn, 1 Vern. 296. O v. Litchford, 2 Vern. 506. W v. Willis, post. 2 vol. 71.*

*Whitton v. Russell.*July the 28th,
1739.

THE testator left *A.* 20*l.* *per ann.* by a codicil to his will, and after talking of making another codicil, and giving him 15*l.* *per ann.* more, the attorney told him, that if *B.* and *D.* whom he had made devisees of his estate, would give *A.* a bond to pay him 15*l.* *per ann.* it would be sufficient, accordingly *B.* one of the devisees present promised that he and the devisees would, and a draft was prepared but not executed. The testator lived five weeks after this transaction, and *A.* remained nine years without demanding the performance of the promise, or insisting to have the draft perfected, and then brought his bill. The defendant denied the promise, and the plaintiff's bill was dismissed at the Rolls, who thereupon appealed. The cases cited for the plaintiff were *Oldham v. Litchfield*, 2 *Ves.* 506. *Thynn v. Thynn*, 1 *Vern.* 296. *Devenish v. Baines*, 1 *in Chan.* 3. and *Blackett v. Blackett*, July 20, 1720.

ing present, promised that he and the devisees would, and a draft was prepared, but not executed; testator lived 5 weeks after, and *A.* remained 9 years without demanding the performance of promise or draft to be perfected, and then brings his bill, dismissed at the Rolls, and upon appeal, is of dismissal affirmed (1).

defendant by his answer insisted on the statute of the 29 *Car.* for prevention of frauds and perjuries.

Lord Chancellor: These cases upon the statute of frauds are so proceeded on with the greatest caution. The present plaintiff does not appear to be any relation of the testator, and there is no ground on the parol evidence to decree for the plaintiff in the present case, though the cases cited go a great way.

The present attempt is, in effect, to add a legacy to a will and codicil in writing, by parol proof, which, if relating to personal estate only, ought not to be allowed; but this goes further, and seeks to charge lands with an annuity of 15*l.* *per ann.* without writing, expressly against the statute of frauds; and in the next place to have a specific performance of an agreement not in writing, which this court will not do.

Neither is there, in the present case, any ground for relief on head of accident or fraud: at the time of making the will, the testator talks only with one of the devisees of giving 15*l.* *per ann.* more to the plaintiff.

The testator lived five weeks afterwards, when it was always in his power, but does nothing towards it; therefore there was no accident to prevent it, nor is it in the power of this court to relieve against accidents, which prevent voluntary dispositions of estates; nor is there any clear fraud: every breach of promise ought to be called a fraud, nor does it appear, that the testator was drawn in by this promise, not to add the legacy to this codicil.

(1) But see *Reech v. Kennegal*, 1 *Ves.* 123, and *Drakeford v. Wilks*, *post.* 3 vol.

WHITTON v.
RUSSELL.

As to the precedents cited, *Thynn v. Thynn*, *Oldham v. Litchfield*, they do neither of them come up to the present case. *Blacket v. Blacket* depended on the reason of younger children unprovided for, yet that went a great way. I cannot come into the reason of this case, unless for the younger children.

But here the great opportunity the testator had of doing this in a much shorter way than by bond, if he thought fit; the draft was imperfect, it not being inserted what the undertaking of the obligor should be, and the length of time before the bill brought, are material facts.

Demands of this kind should be pursued very recently, for the danger of perjury intended to be prevented by the statute, increases much more after length of time, and therefore are strong objections.

The undertaking and promise is not by all the persons interested, but by one only; the cases cited are, where the promise is made by the person solely interested, and therefore a decree to make the estate liable, would be to affect persons no way concerned in the first transaction, and to charge him who made the promise, would not be consistent with the intent of the testator, who meant only to charge the lands.

Therefore I am of opinion, the decree at the Rolls was cautiously made, and ought to be affirmed.

[450] (C) *Of examining Witnesses de bene esse, and establishing their Testimony in perpetuum rei memoriam.*

August the 9th,
1739.

The Earl of Suffolk v. Green et al.

[Case 207.]

S. C. 2 Eq. Caf.
Abr. 79. pl. 14.
Bill brought to
perpetuate the
testimony of
witnesses to a
bond charged to
be usurious, and
alleging that the
defendant *Green*,
whom the plaintiff
wanted to examine,
was very aged and
infirm.

Green, who was a *nominee* only in the bond, demurred, as the bill sought to subject him to a penalty, and also as plaintiff does not offer to pay what is really due.

If demurrer had stood at the first part, it would have been good, but as it goes to the perpetuating the testimony, it is bad, and over-ruled, but without prejudice to the defendant's insisting on the same thing by way of answer.

Morris
Morgan
10 January
341.

out of Litchfield
Bond
Decr. 88.

THE plaintiff brought his bill to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses to a bond, entered into by the plaintiff's ancestor, charging that the defendant *Green*, whom the plaintiff wanted to examine, was very aged and infirm, and insisted in his bill, that the bond was entered into on an usurious contract, the defendant being to have 10 *l. per cent.*

Green, who was a *nominee* only in the bond, demurred, as the bill sought to subject him to a penalty, and also as plaintiff does not offer to pay what is really due.

If demurrer had stood at the first part, it would have been good, but as it goes to the perpetuating the testimony, it is bad, and over-ruled, but without prejudice to the defendant's insisting on the same thing by way of answer.

The defendant demurred, for that the bill sought to subject him to a penalty, and that, on the plaintiff's own shewings there was a great sum really lent, but the plaintiff does not offer to pay what is really due to the defendant.

For the plaintiff was cited the case of *Shirley v. Earl Ferris*, 3 *Wms.* 77. where a bill was brought to perpetuate the testimony of a witness, for fear he should die during a long vacation, and he was ordered to be examined *de bene esse*, where the thing examined into lay only in the knowledge of the witness, and

as a matter of great importance, *tho' the witness was not proved to be old and infirm.*

The defendant Green was only a nominee in the bond, and the beneficial interest in one Peers.

Lord Chancellor : So far as the present bill prays the defendant put in an answer, so far it is a bill of discovery, for the answer will necessarily go to the usury charged in the bill.

The defendants have demurred to so much of the bill as seeks discovery, and to perpetuate the testimony.

As to the first part, that it would subject the defendants to a penalty, the demurrer is proper, and if it had gone no further, it would have been allowed as an usual case. For as to the objection, that the defendant Green will lose nothing by the discovery, he has no interest ; a trustee has as much the benefit of the pleading of this court, as he that has the equitable interest, nay, a *cestui que trust* is intitled to have the privilege maintained by a trustee.

Earl of
Suffolk &c.
GREEN.

Plenings. H. for
2. Simons H.
Simon v. H.
490 C. 169.

A trustee has as much the benefit of the pleading of this court, as he that has the equitable interest, and *cestui que trust* is intitled to have the privilege maintained by the trustee.

*But as to the other part of perpetuating the testimony, the demurrer is bad, for the plaintiff is intitled to perpetuate testimony, notwithstanding his not offering to pay ; and there is no certain distinction laid down, where a man is forbid to perpetuate testimony, as to personal demands against himself. So far as this, if proved, relates to the loss of the debt, so far it may be called a penalty ; but a man may bring a bill to perpetuate testimony in many cases, where he cannot bring a bill for relief, without waiving the penalty ; as *in waste*, or *in the case of a forged deed*, or in the case of insurances after commissions to examine witnesses beyond sea, as to fraudulent losses, and yet in many cases fraudulent losses are subject to a penalty, even sometimes felonious. This bill is to perpetuate testimony of a plain fact, what the consequence of that fact is, is of another consideration.

A plaintiff is intitled to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses to an usurious contract, notwithstanding his not offering by the bill to pay.

A man may bring a bill to perpetuate testimony in many cases, where he cannot bring a bill for relief, without waiving the penalty as in waste, &c.

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This demurrer, being bad in part, must be over-ruled, for it is not like a plea, which may be allowed in part : but a demurrer bad in part is void *in toto* (1), and cannot be separated.

A demurrer bad in part, is void *in toto*, otherwise as to a plea.

His Lordship therefore held the demurrer to be insufficient, and ordered the same to be over-ruled, but without prejudice to the defendants insisting by way of answer, against making any discovery touching the usurious contract (2), charged and suggested by the bill.

(1) *Huggins v. The York Buildings Company*, post. 2 vol. 44. *Baker v. Ritchard*, post. 2 vol. 389. *Dormer v. Mestree*, post. 2 vol. 284. *Earl of Derby v. Duke of Arkel*, 1 Ves. 205. *Metcalf v. Harvey*, ibid. 248. *Bishop of Exeter and Man v. Earl of Derby*, 2 Ves. 17. Note, There cannot be two de-

murrers to the same bill. *Bancroft v. Wardour*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 66. Nor can there be a saving of any thing on a demurrer. *Gregor v. Moleworth*, 2 Ves. 110.

(2) *Anon.* 2 Eq. Abr. 70. pl. 7. *Chauncy v. Tabernden*, post. 2 vol. 393. *Harrison v. Southcote*, post. 539.

November the
15th, 1738.

Brandlyn v. Ord.

Vide title Purchase, under the Division, Of Purchasers without Notice.

(D) *Of the Sufficiency or Disability of a Witness.*

Trinity Term, 1738.

Cotton v. Luttrell.

Case 208. Tho' a wife is a defendant, and charged with fraud and mal-practices yet the evidence of the husband shall be admitted where the interest of a third person shall be concerned (1).

THE plaintiff's counsel objected to the evidence of Sir *John Chesbire*, as his wife is charged with fraud and mal-practices, as his testimony might be supposed to go in favour of his lady, by palliating and excusing her conduct, in relation to the procuring her husband to be made a trustee of the whole legal estate under the late Mr. *Cotton's* settlement; and besides, if the court should be of opinion she has been guilty of a fraud, she will be liable to costs, and his evidence will be favourable to her with respect to costs, and will be in some measure against the rule, that a husband shall not be examined for, or against his wife.

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Mr. *Fazakerley* for the plaintiff insisted, that there is no case extant, where the rule laid down here ought more strongly to prevail, especially where there is such clear evidence of fraud against Lady *Chesbire*. It cannot be disputed, if she is liable, but that the husband, where the wife is concerned, must be likewise liable; and that as every remainder to trustees to prefer contingent remainders, is a vested one, or else would be bad, Sir *John Chesbire* is concerned, for if the court should determine in favour of the plaintiff, he, as having the legal estate, must be decreed to convey.

The objection will hold still stronger against Lady *Chesbire's* evidence, because she is concerned in interest in the event of the suit, as she may, or may not, be liable to costs, according as the court shall determine upon the merits of the case.

The counsel for the defendant said, the principal question is, Supposing that Sir *John Chesbire* ought not to be examined where the wife is concerned, yet, whether the evidence, both of him and Lady *Chesbire*, should not be read, as here is a third person who is greatly interested under the settlement of Mr. *Cotton*, and can produce no evidence so material as Sir *John Chesbire's*, who had the framing and perusing of the whole conveyance.

The chief case relied upon for the defendants was *Tyrrd v. Holt*, where *Ward* and *Wilbrabam*, trustees through the whole estate, (Sir *John Chesbire* being only a trustee to preserve

(1) See *Har. Co. Litt.* 6. b. note 6.

tingent remainders), were charged with fraud, and yet court of King's Bench, upon an issue of fraud, directed of Chancery, admitted them upon solemn debate to be mined.

COTTON v
LUTTREL.

Lord Chancellor: The reason, why persons who at law are into the *simulcum*, are yet admitted as witnesses, is, that they may not be made parties to a cause only to take off evidence: but notwithstanding this, if there is a strong evidence against the *simulcum* man, that he is *particeps criminis*, the it will exclude him from being a witness.

A person who at law is put into the *simulcum* may be admitted as a witness, that he may not be made a defendant, only to take off his evidence; but if strong proof that he is *particeps criminis*, he will be excluded from being a witness.

When this objection was first started, I must confess I was doubtful, whether the depositions of Sir John Chesbire and y Chesbire ought to be read: but, upon the matters being y discussed, I am of opinion that the objection goes only to r credit, and not their competency.

As to Lady Chesbire, the objection depends upon these con- rations, Whether she has been properly made a defendant: v I will not say she has improperly been made a defendant, use it was necessary in order to a discovery; but it was im- r her she should be brought to a hearing, for she is no ways rned in interest in the event of this suit, as she was barely gent for Mrs. Luttrell, and consequently no decree can be e against her.

I will not say but there might be a case, where it was neces- to bring such a person to hearing; as suppose A. should, by d, obtain a conveyance for his own benefit, where it ought ave been in trust only, there might be a decree against such rson.

ut this is a bill brought merely to have a reconveyance from person, to whom it is alledged the estate is fraudulently and ally conveyed.

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ut if there is no decree against Lady Chesbire, how is it pos- that costs should be given against her, for if she is no wa rned in interest, there can be no decree.

he consequence of this is, that the objection goes only to r credit, and not to her competency.

he next consideration is as to Sir John Chesbire; and as I am pinion that my Lady Chesbire's deposition should be read, reading his deposition is a consequence of it; for it would very strange to reject his testimony, when there is not the colour to say, that he is concerned in the fraud.

do not know any case in this court, where a feme covert been guilty of a fraud solely, without the husband, and re he has no benefit at all from it, that he should suffer, ould be extremely hard to say, that he should pay costs; ow of no precedent, nor do I believe the court would it.

Where a feme covert has been guilty of a fraud solely without the husband, no precedent or the court's making him pay costs.

he depositions of Sir John and Lady Chesbire read accordingly.

(E) *Rules the same in Equity as at Law.*

Michaelmas Term, 1737.

Manning v. Lechmere.

Cafe 209.
The rules as to
evidence are the
same in equity
as at law (1).

LORD Chancellor: The rules as to evidence are the same in equity as at law, and if *A.* was not admitted as a witness at the trial there, because materially concerned in interest, the same objection will hold against reading his position here.

Where two
leases are set up,
you cannot read
one of them, till
you have proved
possession under
that lease.

There are many cases where leases are granted to persons which possession upon that lease, and payment of rent, shall presumption of right in the lessor, till a better is shewn; when two leases are set up, you cannot read one of them, you have proved possession under that lease.

To shew a title
in the lessor he
must prove ac-
tual payment of
rent, receipts
alone will not do.

Receipts for rent are not a sufficient evidence of a title in lessor, unless he proves actual payment, especially where person who has signed the receipt is living, for he ought to be examined in the cause.

Bailiffs' rentals
are evidence of
payments.

Where there are old rentals, and bailiffs have admitted or received by them, these rentals are evidence of the payments because no other can be had.

(1) *Glynn v. Bank of England*, 2 Ves. 41.

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After Hilary Term, 1736.

The Dutcheffs of Marlborough v. Sir Thomas Wheat.

Cafe 210.
Masters in
Chancery in
reports are only
to state bare
matters of fact.

LORD Chancellor laid it down in this case, that Masters in Chancery in reports which are special, are not to set the evidence with their opinions upon it, but only to state bare matter of fact, for the judgment of the court, in the manner as in courts of law, they only state the facts allowed both sides in a special verdict, but never meddle with any of the evidence on either side.

C A P. XLVI.

Executors and Administrators.

- (A) *Who are intitled to a Distribution.*
 (B) *Of Administration, to whom to be granted.*
 (C) *Of Remedies by one Executor or Administrator against another, and how far the one shall be answerable for the other.*
 (D) *What shall be Assets.*
 (E) *Rule where a Bill is brought against an Executor of an Executor.*

(A) *Who are intitled to a Distribution.*

Durant and Frances his Wife, Administratrix of } Plaintiffs. June the 30th;
Anne Prestwood, deceased ————— *1738.*

Thomas Prestwood and Charlotte Ann Prestwood } Defendants.
Infants, by their Mother and Guardian, and
Ambrose Rhodes and Elizabeth his Wife,

A NNE Prestwood died intestate, and letters of administration were granted to the plaintiff Frances as her aunt, and one of her next of kin, who would have distributed the personal estate to the intestate's next of kin, according to their interests. *without suit; but defendants insisting they are severally intitled to the whole, the bill is brought in order that an account may be taken of the intestate's personal estate, and that the shares of all persons may be ascertained, and the plaintiffs in right of Frances claim one third of the personal estate for their own use.

CASE 211.
 S. C. cited.
 2 Ves. 215.
 Aunts and nephews in the same degree of relation to an intestate and equally intitled under the statute of distributions (1).

No right of representation here, but must take *per capita* and not *per stirpes* (2).

The defendants Ambrose Rhodes and Elizabeth his wife insisted that in case the plaintiffs, in right of Frances, are intitled to a third, they in right of the defendant Elizabeth are intitled to a like share, she being the plaintiff Frances's only heir. [*455]

- (1) *Loyd v. Tench*, 2 Ves. 213. Page Drwes, 3 P.W. 50. *Stanley v. Stanley*, Cook, 2 Ves. 214 cited. post. 456. *Loyd v. Tench*, 2 Ves. 213.
 (2) *Walsh v. Walsh*, 1 Eq. Ab. 249. Page v. Cook, 2 Ves. 214. cited.
 7. Pre. Cha. 54. S. C. *Davers v.*

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DURANT v. PRESTWOOD. The defendants *Thomas*, and *Charlotte Anne Prestwood*, who are the only children of *Thomas Prestwood* deceased, who was the only brother to the intestate, insist that they, as representatives of their father, and nearest of kin to the intestate, are intitled to the whole personal estate.

Lord Chancellor : As by our computation the aunts and nephews are in equal degree of relation to the intestate, they are equally intitled under the statute of distributions, and no right of representation can be here allowed, and, according to the authority of many cases, they are to take *per capita*, and not *per stirpes*, and therefore his Lordship directed, after the satisfaction of debts, the clear surplus of the intestate's personal estate to be divided into four equal parts, one fourth to the plaintiffs, one fourth to the defendant *Thomas Prestwood*, one fourth to the defendant *Charlotte Anne Prestwood*, and the remaining fourth to the defendant *Rhodes*, and *Elizabeth* his wife (1).

Harrel v. White, in the Court of Exchequer, and *Grainger v. Grainger* before Lord Talbot, were cited.

(1) Reg. Lib. A. 1757. fol. 761.

May the 14th, 1739. *Hans Stanley Esq; and Elizabeth, Anne, and Sarah Stanley* (his Sisters) Infants, by *Edward Hooper*, Esq; their next Friend, } Plaintiffs.

George v. Walton *Phillippa Stanley, Widow, and Anne Stanley, Widow, Defendants.*

Cause 212.

S. C. 2 Vef. 213. cited.

William Stanley, and Ann his wife, had two sons, *George* and *Hoby*, who severally married

in their father's life-time; *William* the father dies, *Ann* his wife survives him. *George* afterwards dies, and leaves several children, who are still living, then *Hoby* dies intestate, leaving *Phillippa* his wife) possessed of a very large personal estate.

The children of *George* bring a bill against *Phillippa*, who has administered to her husband, and also against *Ann* their grandmother, insisting, that, as the representatives of their father, they were intitled with their grandmother to one half of the moiety of the intestate's estate, the wife being intitled to the other moiety, by the 22 & 23 Car. 2. c. 10.

The residue of the intestate's estate, after satisfaction of debts, directed to be divided into four equal parts, two fourths thereof to be received by *Phillippa* the intestate's widow, one other fourth part to be paid to *Anne Stanley* the intestate's mother, and the remaining fourth part to be laid out in *State-securities* in the name of the accountant general, subject to the order of the court, for the benefit of the children of *George*, equally to be divided.

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The children of *George* bring this bill against *Phillippa*, who had administered to her husband, and also against *Anne* their grandmother, insisting that, as the representatives of their father, they were intitled with their grandmother to one half of the moiety of the intestate's estate, the wife being intitled to the other moiety by 22 & 23 Car. 2. cap. 10.

was insisted for the plaintiffs, that by the statute of 12. cap. 17. sec. 7. it is enacted, that if after the death of father any of his children should die intestate, without wife or children in the life of the mother, every brother and sister, the representatives of them, shall have an equal share with mother.

STANLEY v. STANLEY.

E. Williams & Trow
4 C. & F. 276

In this case there is a wife left, but the intent of the act was that the intestate's brothers and sisters, and their representatives, in the same light and condition with the mother; so whenever the mother was intitled, the brothers and sisters, their representatives (*per stirpes*), were to have an equal share with her, and cited the case of *Keilway v. Keilway*, 2 C. 344. (1), *Pasch.* 12 *Geo.* which was as follows: The plaintiff was the widow and administratrix of one that died intestate leaving no children, but left a mother, a brother and sister, brother's children, and it was decreed the wife should have moiety, and the other moiety equally to the mother, brother and sister, and brother's children, (as representatives of the father *per stirpes*), which case is exactly the same with the present in every circumstance, except that in the present case the intestate had no brother and sister living at his death, which is immaterial, in regard that the children of the brother take by right of representation.

It was insisted for the defendant, the intestate's mother, that the statutes are to receive a favourable construction to exclude representations in a remote degree, in respect of collaterals, comparable to the case of *Carter v. Crawley*, *Raym.* 496. and that the words in the statute of *James* are in the conjunctive, and require a brother or sister to be *in esse*, as well as representatives of brothers and sisters to make a case within that statute.

It has been determined that when the intestate leaves brother's children, and no brother or sister, such children take *per capita*, as next of kin, and not by representation, *Eq. Caf.* 249. *Walsh and Walsh*; and that the construction of the statute was the same if a man died leaving aunts and nieces, and no brother or sister, such aunts and nieces would all take *per capita*, and the nieces could not take *per stirpes*; and yet if the father of the nieces had been living, he would have taken the whole, and this was determined in the case of *Durant and Prest*, June 30, 1738 (2).

Where an intestate leaves brothers or sisters children, and no brother or sister, they take *per capita* as next of kin, and not by representation: So if he died, leaving aunts and nieces, and no brother or sister, they

all take *per capita*; but if the father of the nieces had been living, he would have taken the whole.

and from hence it was argued, that as there was no brother or sister of the intestate living, if the plaintiffs in this case took the whole, it must be necessarily *per capita*, and not by representation; that when brother's children take *per capita*, they must necessarily take as next of kin, because, as they are not in equal

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(1) 1 *Str.* 710. S. C. *Gillb. Rep.* 189.
(2) *Eq. Ab.* 441. S. C. *pl.* 47.

(2) *Ante* 454. S. C. See the cases in the notes.

degree

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degree with the intestate's mother, they could not otherwise take at all.

And it was further urged, that if they were intitled by representation, it might be carried to the fourth or fifth generation, for there was nothing to restrain it in this act, as there was in the statute of distributions, which would create great confusion and fractions in the estates of *intestates*.

Lord Chancellor. There are two questions in this case.

First, Whether the plaintiffs, who are the nephews and nieces of the intestate, shall share with the intestate's mother, there being a widow of the intestate?

Secondly, Supposing they may share, notwithstanding that objection, whether they can come in, in respect that there is no brother or sister of the intestate living?

The statute of distributions, and the statute of *Jac. 2.* very incorrectly penned, and therefore the latter is to be construed according to the intent of the legislature.

As to the first, it is directly within the case of *Keilway* and *Keilway*, and I am satisfied with the reason of that case. It depends upon the construction of the proviso in the statute of *James*, which is very incorrectly penned, and so is the statute of distributions; and therefore a construction is to be made upon the second statute, according to the intent and meaning of the legislature.

Upon the statute of distributions, the descending line excluded all collaterals, and afterwards went to the next of kin; so that the father or mother would take all. As suppose a rich citizen died *intestate*, his share would all go to the mother; therefore the subsequent statute intended she should have a provision only equal with a brother and sister of the intestate.

As to the second question, it is a new one; for the intestate has left no brother or sister for the mother to collate, or share equally with.

The case of *Walsh v. Walsh*, is grounded upon the statute of *Car. 2. sec. 5.* The words of the act do suppose that there must be some persons to take in their own right, and others in right of representation; but the statute of *James 2.* is of a different kind, and lets in another person.

The word *and* in the 7th section of *Jac. 2. c. 17.* immediately preceding the words *the representatives*, must be construed in the disjunctive.

Here is a mother takes an original share in her own right, and the brothers and sisters children take as if the brother and sister were living; for the word *and*, immediately preceding the words *the representatives*, must be construed in the disjunctive.

The proviso in the statute of *James* is to be incorporated into the statute of *Charles* where it says, that representation shall not be carried beyond brother's and sisters children. The rule is, that statutes made *pari materia* shall be construed into one another.

As to the objection, that such representation might be carried to several generations, I think that consequence does not follow, for the proviso in the statute of *James* is to be incorporated into the statute of *Charles*, which expressly says, that representation shall not be carried beyond brother's and sister's children; and this is agreeable to the rule my Lord *Hale* lays down in *Ventr.* that statutes made *pari materia* shall be construed into one another.

I think

I think the statute of *James* intended to let in the rule of the civil law, which contained three lines, ascending, descending, and collateral; the descending line absolutely excluded all others, the ascending excluded all collaterals except brothers and sisters, and they took alike.

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STANLEY.

His Lordship therefore ordered the residue of the intestate's estate, after satisfaction of debts, to be divided into four equal parts, and two fourth parts thereof to be retained by the defendant *Phillippa* the intestate's widow, and one other fourth part to be paid to the defendant *Anne Stanley*, the intestate's mother, and the remaining fourth part to be laid out in *South-sea* annuities, in the name of the Accomptant general, subject to the order of this court, for the benefit of the plaintiffs the infants, equally to be divided (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. B. 1738. fol. 283.*

(B) Of Administration, to whom to be granted.

Charles Humphrey, Administrator of the Goods
un-administered of his Sister *Mary Scarlet*,
Widow of *William Scarlet*, and formerly the
Wife of *John Osborne*, deceased, — } Plaintiff.

May the 18th,
1737.

Thomas Bullen, and *Anne* his Wife, Administra-
trix of the said *William Scarlet*, who was Ad-
ministrator of the said *Mary Scarlet*. — } Defendants.

A. Survives her first husband, who left her a legacy, and in-
termarries with *B.* She dies, the legacy being unreceiv-
ed by *B.* during her life, but after her death he took out admi-
nistration to her, but died himself before the legacy came to his
hands, and his administrator gets it in, and the administrator
de bonis non of the wife brings his bill to have this legacy, re-
ceived by the administrator of the husband, paid over to him
as the legal representative of the wife.

Case 213.
S. C. 2 Eq. Ca.
Ab. 4. 5. pl. 21.
S. C. 11 Vin.
Abr. 88. pl. 6.
A. survives her
first husband,
who left her a
legacy; she dies,
the legacy being
unreceived by

the second husband during her life, but after her death he administers, and dies before the legacy came to his hands; his administrator gets it in, and the administrator *de bonis non* of the wife brings this bill for the legacy.

Equity considers the administrator *de bonis non* as a trustee for the administrator of the husband, who having an absolute right by surviving his wife, his administrator ought to have the benefit of it (1).

During the coverture, husband and wife are but one person; but when she dies, he has a right to administer exclusive of all other persons.

(1) See *Cart v. Rees*, 2 Eq. Ab. 423. *Elliot v. Collier*, 10ft. 3 vol. 526. 1 Vesf. 47. 1 P. W. 381. S. C. cited. *Lady 15. S. C. 1 Wilf. 168. S. C. 1 P. W. 382. cited.*

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Mr. Attorney General for the plaintiff contended, that a husband and wife in law are but one person, and consequently no relation, nor intitled to administer.

Lord Chancellor : During the coverture, they are but one person ; but when that coverture is dissolved by the death of the wife, the husband is certainly the next friend and nearest relation, and has a right to administer exclusive of all other persons. At common law no person at all had a right to administer, but it was in the breast of the ordinary to grant it to whom he pleased, till the statute of the 21st of Hen. 8. which gave it to the next of kin ; and if there were persons of equal kin, which ever took out administration was intitled to the surplus ; and for this reason the statute of distribution was made, in order to prevent this injustice, and to oblige the administrator to distribute.

The question here is, Whether the administrator *de bonis non* of the wife, or the administrator of the husband, is intitled to this legacy?

I think clearly it was a vested interest in the husband, and therefore his administrator, as his representative, is intitled to it, without being obliged to make distribution ; for the husband is not within the equity of the statute, and it is explained besides by the last clause in the statute of frauds and perjuries (1), *sec.* 25. "And for the explaining an act of this present parliament, intituled, An act for the better settling of intestates estates, be it declared, that neither the said act, nor any thing therein contained, shall be construed to extend to the estates of feme coverts that shall die intestate, but that their husbands may demand, and have administration of their rights, credits, and other personal estates, and recover and enjoy the same, as they might have done before the making of the said act."

Notwithstanding by the rules of the common law the administrator of the wife is intitled to it, being a *chose in action*, not received or got in by the husband in his life-time, yet equity will consider such administrator as a trustee for the administrator of the husband, for the husband having an absolute right to it by surviving his wife, his administrator ought to have the benefit of it ; and therefore the plaintiff's bringing this bill is a breach of trust, and I dismiss it with costs, and decreed accordingly. For the plaintiff was cited *Burnet v. Kynaston* *, and for the defendant *Huntley v. Griffith* †.

(1) 29 Car. 2. c. 3. *sec.* 25.

* *Proc. in Chan.* 118, and in 2 *Vern.* 401.

† *Ms.* 452.

Of Remedies by one Executor or Administrator against another, and how far one shall be answerable for the other.

Hudson v. Hudson.

November the 7th, 1737.

Case 214.

JOHN Hudson dying intestate, and unmarried, letters of administration to him were granted to the plaintiff and one William Hudson, who prevailed on the plaintiff to join and procure several letters of attorney to the defendant Benjamin Hudson, then in Flanders, and also to another defendant Joseph Hudson, then in London, empowering them to get in the effects of the intestate. After the defendants had received some of the estates and effects, William Hudson, joint administrator with the plaintiff, settles an account with the defendants, who were his sons, receives the balance, and gives them a general release, and then dies; afterwards the surviving administrator filed his bill to set aside the defendant's stated account of the releases, and to have satisfaction, suggesting that they ought not to bind him, being settled without his privity. The defendants, in their answer, insisted on their stated accounts and release; and the question was, If the release would bar the surviving administrator?

S. C. cited 2 Vef. 267. The plaintiff and W. H. administrators to J. H. empower the defendants by letters of attorney to get in the intestate's effects in Flanders. W. H. afterwards settles the account with them, receives the balance, gives a general release, and then dies. The plaintiff, as surviving administrator, prays the stated account, and re-

lease may be set aside, as being settled without his privity. One administrator cannot release a debt so as to bind his fellow, otherwise as to an executor, for each intirely represents the testator; the release of one administrator may bar both, if release is accountable to them in their own right, and not as administrators. The releases here being jointly obtained, though effectual in equity.

Lord Chancellor: There are two questions in this case which are merely matters of law.

First, Whether a release of a debt, or conveyance of a term by one administrator, will bind his companion where there is a joint administration granted?

Secondly, Whether the defendants acting, and collecting part of the estate under a letter of attorney from both the administrators, will vary the case?

As to the first point, I am of opinion that one administrator cannot release a debt, or convey an interest, so as to bind the other, and that the case of an administrator differs from that of an executor.

It is certain that executors have such a power, and the reason is, that each executor is considered as intirely representing the testator (1). If an action is brought against joint executors, who plead different pleas, some books say, that plea may be received which is most for the benefit of the testator's estate, and this shews each executor may plead in right of the testator.

(1) See 2 Bac. Ab. 395.

But

Hudson v. Hudson.
The interest of an executor arises not from the probate, but from the testator, therefore he may release a debt, or assign a term before probate.

If a debtor be made executor, the debt is totally extinguished, otherwise if he be appointed administrator, for it is no extinguishment of the debt, but a suspension of the action, and his representative chargeable at the suit of the administrator *de bonis non*, &c. of the first intestate.

The right of executors and administrators depends on different foundations, the latter arising from the ordinary; the former from the testator.

An administration properly defined, a private office of trust, being more than a bare authority, and yet less than the interest of an executor.

But the case of executors differs essentially from that of administrators; executors receive all their power and interest from the testator, and though before they can maintain an action they must prove the will (1), yet the probate is only a declaration of the proper court that they are executors, which by the law of *Scotland* is called confirming the executors to the testator, and is the same in effect as is done here, and still the interest arises not from the probate, but from the testator; therefore an executor may release a debt, or assign a term before probate (2), and if after probate he sues for the same, the precedent act done by him may be pleaded in bar: if an executor appoints another to be his executor, and dies, he is immediate representative to the first testator, but on the death of an administrator, his whole interest determines, and administration *de bonis non*, &c. must be granted.

So if a creditor makes his debtor his executor, the debt is totally extinguished, and cannot be revived (3), though the executor should afterwards die intestate, and administration *de bonis non*, &c. of the first testator should be granted: but if a debtor be appointed administrator, that is no extinguishment of the debt, but a suspension of the action, and his representative on his death would be chargeable at the suit of the administrator *de bonis non*, &c. of the first intestate. *Salk.* 299. 8 *Co.* 135. These cases evince the different foundations on which the rights of executors and administrators depend, the power of the latter arising wholly from the ordinary, of the former from the testator.

The right of an administrator is expressed so differently in the books, as if they were at a loss how to describe it. In 8 *Co.* 135. *b.* it is called an authority, because the administrator has nothing to his own use; in *Vaughan* 182. it is with greater propriety called a private office of trust, for it is more than a bare authority, and less than the interest of an executor, which seems to have been the foundation of Lord *Cowper's* opinion in 2 *Vern.* 514.

If therefore an administration be in the nature of an office, what will the consequence be in the present case? for if an office is granted to two, they must join in the executing the acts of the office, and one cannot act unless in the name of

(1) *Will v. Will*, *post.* 2 vol. 280. note 1.

(2) *Dyer* 357. *a.* pl. 39. *Mead v. Lord Overton*, *post.* 3 vol. 239.

(3) So *Wentford v. Wentford*, 1 *Salk.* 299. But it seems that the appointment of a debtor executor, is only parting with the action; but the executor is con-

sidered as a trustee for the money so owing to the testator, and such money in equity is considered as part of the testator's personal estate. *Holliday v. Bear*, 1 *Roll. Ab.* 920. *Ashwith v. Chamberlain*, 1 *Chb. Rep.* 138. *Field v. Clark*, *ibid.* 242. *Fox v. Fox*, *post.* 463. *Cary v. Goodings*, 3 *Bro. Chb. Rep.* 110.

both

, and on this kind of reasoning the present case will
nd. HUDSON v.
HUDSON.

here has been no case cited except *Dyer* 339, and *Co.* 143. which turns on the repeal of letters of administration, but I the opinion of a very great man, Lord *Bacon* in his *Eli-*, 4th vol. new edit. p. 83. which seems to correspond mine as to the nature of the different rights of executors administrators, therefore I think the release of one administrator will not bar the other (1).

he next question is of another consideration, whether the defendants having acted under the letters of attorney of both administrators, and being therefore accountable to themselves their own right, and not as administrators, the release of one not bar both, and I think it may.

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ie cases consider them as representing the intestate, and in that right, where they must name themselves administrators, and so says Lord *Bacon*; but here both administrators take a letter of attorney, to empower the defendants to collect the effects, and receive the intestate's debts, and so far as have acted under that authority, they are answerable to the administrators in their own right, and might be charged as their receivers, and they need not name themselves administrators, and if nonsuited, they must pay costs as suing in *proprio*.

A person acting under a letter of attorney from administrators may be sued by them in their own right as a bailiff or receiver, and need not name themselves administrators.

here is a joint debt owing to two, and one releases, the is gone, whether it arises on bond, or simple contract.

as been said, that some part of the intestate's estate has received by the defendants in specie, upon which the right administration should subsist; but I apprehend in such case release of one administrator would be a bar, for those things necessary delivered to them by the administrators themselves, which they must sue in their own right, and therefore the release of one bars the other; for tho' in trover they may name themselves administrators, yet they need not do it.

Tho' administrators in trover may name themselves so, yet they need not do it, for they may sue in their own right.

on the question is, What a court of equity will do with a that is effectual at law? If it was unfair and collusive, of equity ought to set it aside, and upon the evidence the releases appearing to be unfairly obtained, were set

as to the defendants *Benjamin* and *Joseph Hudson*, his ip declared that the plaintiff is not bound by the acknowledged, and the releases executed by their father, from giving an account against them in a court of equity, and ore an account was directed accordingly (2).

But the Author of the Touchstone of *Willard v. Fern*, in B. R. that one a quære as to this point. See administrator stood on the same ground *Jacob*. 484, 485. And the Master and foundation with one executor. *Roils* in *Jacob v. Harwood*, 2 (2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1737. fol. 138. said, that it was held in a case

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HUDSON.
Where one ad-
ministrator dies,
the right sur-
vives without
new letters of
administration

N. B. When this case of *Hudson v. Hudson* came before *Talbot*, on a plea of a stated account, and the release held, that if one administrator dies, the right of administration would survive without new letters of administration. *Vide 2 Vern. 514 (1)*.

(1) But the Master of the Rolls in *Jacomb v. Harwood*, 2 *Ves.* 268. said, that the ecclesiastical court now holds it necessary in the case of two administrators to come back to them on the same for a probate.

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(D) *What shall be Assets.*

Michaelmas Term, 1737.

Fox v. Fox.

CASE 215. *A.* Mortgaged his estate to the defendant, who paid money in consideration of the mortgage, but gave *A.* for 130*l.* *A.* afterwards makes the defendant his executor. The heir of *A.* brings his bill to have the real estate exonerated considering this bond as assets in the hands of the defendant. *Lord Chancellor*: Notwithstanding at common law the name of an obligor executor extinguishes his debt, yet in this case the bond shall be considered as assets in the hand of the defendant the executor, and applied, after the payment of funeral expenses and legacies, to the exoneration of the real estate in favour of the heir. (1).

S. C. 2 *Eq. Caf.*
Abr. 502. pl. 39.
A. mortgaged
his estate to *B.*
who paid no money,
but gave a
bond for 130*l.*
A. afterwards
makes *B.* his
executor.
The debt not
extinguished in
equity.

(1) *Reg. Lib. A. 1737* fol. 789. See *Hudson v. Hudson*, ante

Nov. November 13th,
1738.

Nugent v. Gifford and Others.

CASE 216.

S. C. 2 *Ves.*
267. cited.
An executor assigns over a mortgaged term of his testator to *A.* as a satisfaction of a debt due to *A.* from the executor, this is a good alienation, and *A.* shall have the benefit of it against the daughters of the testator who were creditors under a marriage settlement (1).

THE bill was brought against some of the defendants trustees of a mortgage term for an assignment, and against others to discover what interest they had in the premises.

It appeared that the mortgage in question, was a mortgage term to trustees in trust for Sir *Richard Billings* the testator. *Mr. Arundel* executor of Sir *Richard* had assigned this mortgage term to the plaintiff, as a satisfaction for a debt due to *Mr. Arundel* to the plaintiff.

(1) The authority of *Nugent v. Gifford*, 265. *Bonny v. Ridgard*, 2 *Br. Rep.* 438. 4 *Br. Cha. Rep.* 625. cited. *Whale v. Booth*, 4 *Durn. & Merriman*, post. 2 vol. 41. *Mead v. Lord Orrery*, post. 3 vol. 235. *Itel v. Beane*, 1 *Ves.* 215. *Jacomb v. Harwood*, 2 *Ves.* 268. *ford, Amb.* 17.

The question was, If such assignment was good against the daughters of Sir Richard Billings, who were creditors under the marriage settlement, and also to whom the trustees should assign the legal estate.

Lord Chancellor : The question is, If the two daughters, who are allowed to be creditors, are intitled to follow this mortgage term (in the hands of the plaintiff as assignee of it) as specifick affects.

I am of opinion they are not, but that the plaintiff is intitled to the benefit of such assignment by the executor.

At law the executor has a power to dispose of, and alien the assets of the testator (1), and when they are aliened, no creditor by law can follow them, for the demand of a creditor is only a personal demand against the executor, in respect of the assets come to his hands, but no lien on the assets: This court will indeed * follow assets upon voluntary alienations by collusion of the executor (2); but if the alienation is for a *valuable consideration*, unless fraud is proved, this court suffers it as well as at law, and will not controul it; for a purchaser from an executor, has no power of knowing the debts of the testator; and if this court, upon the appearance of debts afterwards, would controul such purchasers, no body would venture to deal with executors.

It is objected first, That these were the equitable assets of Sir *Richard Billings*, and that the plaintiff purchased nothing but an equitable interest, burthened with all the equity in the hands of the person from whom he purchased (3).

But that is a rule only where there is a lien on the thing itself, and I know no difference in this court, between the power of an executor to dispose of equitable and legal assets.

The *second objection* is, That the assignee took this assignment with notice, that it was the testamentary assets of Sir *Richard Billings*.

But if this was sufficient to affect it, it would affect every purchase from an executor, because every such purchaser must have such notice.

The *third objection* is, That this is a *devastavit*, because the consideration was a debt of the executor's own.

But I know no rule in this court to warrant *that*, neither is there any difference between this and money paid down, provided it be done *bonâ fide*, a sum of money *bonâ fide* due (4), is as good and valuable a consideration as any.

**NUGENT v.
GIFFORD.**

At law an executor may alien the assets of a testator, and when aliened, no creditor can follow them, and where the alienation is for a valuable consideration, this court suffers it as well as at law.

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No difference in this court between the power of an executor to dispose of equitable and legal assets.

An assignment by an executor of a testator's assets to a person who has a sum of money bona

due, is as valuable a consideration as for money paid down.

(v) But it seems, that a testator's goods cannot be taken under an *execu-
tion* for a debt of the executor. See *Farr
v. Newman*, 4 Durn. & East. 621.

(2) *Crane v. Drake*, 2 *Vern.* 616.
Taney v. Ivis, 2 *Ves.* 469, and see the
cases cited *supra* in note.

(1) See *Scot v. Tyler*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep.

431. where the question, whether an equitable assignment of a specific legacy by an executor for his own private debt, was binding, was much agitated. But that point ended in a compromise.

(4) *Vide* *Hodgson v. Dand*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 475.

NUGENT v.
GIFFORD.

The only authorities relied on are *Crane v. Drake*, 2 Vern. 616. and *Paget v. Hopkins*, *Proc. in Eq.* 431. (1) the first greatly differs from the present case, there being express notice of a debt from the testator, still unsatisfied, and a contrivance between the purchaser and the executor, to defeat a just debt, and as Lord Chancellor said, the defendant was a party to, and contriving a *devastavit* (2).

Here was no notice of any debts due from the testator, for it is sworn in the answer, that Sir Richard Billings died worth 40,000 l. and this was a debt under a settlement, which is a private transaction in the family.

As to the case of *Paget v. Hopkins*, that was a gross sum computed by the wife as her share of her former husband's estate, according to the custom of London, and taken by the husband, subject to that account (3).

These are the only authorities, and both different from the present case; this I think therefore is a good alienation, and the plaintiff ought to have the benefit of it. (4).

(1) *Gilb. Rep.* 111. S. C.

(2) His Lordship according to a MSS. report of *Nugent v. Gifford*, observed, that the purchaser in *Crane v. Drake*, admitted notice of the plaintiff's debt by his answer; it was so stated in the decree, and the determination was right.

(3) In the above noticed MSS. report

his Lordship said, that *Paget v. Hopkins* was a clear case, and he wondered my Lord Harcourt should vary his first decree.

(4) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1738. fol. 117. See the Master of the Rolls's observations on this case in *Andrew v. Wrigley*, 4 Bro. Cha. Rep. 136.

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November the 30th, 1739. At the Rolls.

John Hinton and Others Creditors of Edward Toye, } Plaintiffs.

Henry Toye, William Broughton the elder, William Broughton the younger, Sarah Broughton, and Anne Broughton, } Defendants.

Case 217. BY articles of agreement dated the 26th of April 1723, before the marriage of Edward Toye with Mary Broughton, it was declared and agreed that 300 l. part of 450 l. charged upon

Before the marriage of Edward Toye with Mary

Broughton, it was agreed that 300 l. till it could be laid out in the purchase of lands, should be settled in trust for Edward Toye for life, for Mary Broughton for life, and in default of issue, to the use of such person, and for such estate as she should by any deed direct or appoint, and for want of such appointment, to her right heirs forever.

Mary by power appointed the 300 l. to be paid to her husband, to be employed by him to such charitable uses, or other intents and purposes as he should think fit.

Edward Toye by will devised to the defendants William, Sarah, and Anne Broughton, 100 l. a-piece, being the money charged on the estate of his wife's father, and declared in his will that such disposition was in pursuance of the directions.

The creditors of Edward Toye bring their bill to have the 300 l. applied to the payment of his debts, as a part of his assets.

This is not a naked power only to convey to charitable uses, but ought to be considered as a part of the assets of Edward Toye, and applied in payment of his debts (1).

(1) So *Thompson v. Towne*, *Proc. Cha.* 52. 2 Vern. 319. S. C. *Laffin v. Lamb*.

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TOYE.

an estate of Doctor Broughton, and devised by him to the said Mary his daughter, should remain a charge upon the land, till it could be laid out in the purchase of lands of inheritance, which should be settled in trust for Edward Toye for life, and after his decease, in trust for Mary Broughton for life, in augmentation of her jointure, with other limitations for the benefit of the younger children of Edward and Mary, and for want of such issue, to the use of such person and persons, and for such estates as the said Mary Broughton, the younger, should by any deed in writing direct or appoint, and for want of such direction, to the right heirs of Mary Broughton for ever.

After marriage, Mary the wife of Edward Toye, by deed poll dated the 4th of May 1736, did appoint the 300*l.* to be paid to her husband the said Edward Toye, to be employed by him to such charitable uses, or other purposes and intents as he should think fit.

Edward Toye, there being no issue of the marriage, by his will, after other bequests, devises to the defendants, William Broughton the younger, Sarah Broughton, and Anne Broughton, one hundred pounds a-piece, being the money charged on the estate of William Broughton his brother-in-law, and settled on the testator by his late wife, and declared in his will, that such disposition was in pursuance of the direction of his dear wife.

On the 10th of Nov. 1736, Edward Toye died, leaving Henry Toye his only son and heir; the devisees of the 300*l.* are the three children of a poor clergyman unprovided for, and brother to Mary the wife of the testator.

The creditors of Edward Toye brought this bill to have the three hundred pounds applied to the payment of his debts, as a part of his assets.

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The defendants insisted that Edward Toye had only a naked power to convey this sum to some charitable uses, pursuant to the appointment of the wife, and that the will shall be taken as an execution of such power, and is a disposition to a charity according to that appointment, and not liable to pay the testator's debts.

Master of the Rolls (a): The question is, Whether Mary the wife of Edward Toye, considered him as a trustee of the 300*l.* and a bare instrument to convey to other persons, or whether he had the ownership? If it be his own property, certainly no act of his could dispose of a creditor's right: if a man has the use of a thing, (and he plainly was intitled to it for his life in all events), and the power of giving it to whom he pleases, he is undoubtedly the owner of it, which power Edward Toye very plainly had, for there are but three ways of property, enjoying in one's own right, transferring that right to another, and the right of representation; here it is given to be employed in such purposes as the husband shall think fit; can there be any purpose in the world but he may employ it in?

(a) Mr. Ferney. There are only three ways of property, enjoying in one's own right, transferring that right to another, and the right of representation.

Lord Cornwallis, *Proc. Cha.* 232. 2 Vern. 287. *Townsend v. Windham*, 2 Vesf. 1: 465. S. C. *Ashfield v. Ashfield*, 2 Vern. *Bainton v. Ward*, post. 2 vol. 172.

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The only doubt is upon the words, *charitable uses*, and indeed they do intimate that the wife had some wish, that her husband would so employ the 300 l. or at least *recommended* it to him to dispose of it to charity (1) but has not tied him down to it, for the latter words leave it absolutely to his discretion, to dispose of it to any purposes or intents, as he shall think fit.

In the case of *Laffels v. Lord Cornwallis*, *Proc. in Chan.* 232. A. on his marriage creates a term in trust to raise 6000 l. of which 3000 l. was for his younger children, and the other 3000 l. as he should appoint, after he appoints the 3000 l. as a collateral security to J. S. and by will devises it and the other 3000 l. to his daughter, and yet hold, that it should be assets to satisfy a bond creditor.

A man cannot by an expression in his will alter the nature of his estate, and disappoint his creditors.

In the case now before me, there is the same uncontrolled power as in the other, nor does there want any precedent act to make this exist in the husband, for the money is actually directed to be paid into his hands; could he not therefore have laid it out on a mortgage, or lent it upon a bond, or even thrown it into the sea? So that no stronger instance can be given, than the present, to prove ownership and property; and though he says indeed in his will, it was in pursuance of the direction of his dear wife, yet a man cannot by any expression in his will alter the nature of his estate, and disappoint his creditors who have no occasion to resort to his will, but claim by an interest precedent viz. the deed of appointment by his wife, whereby they shew that their right commences from the wife's execution of the power given her by the marriage articles.

No instance of a construction in favour of legatees to the prejudice of creditors, unless the creditors found their right under the will itself.

There is no instance in this court of a construction in favour of legatees to the prejudice of creditors, unless the creditors found their right under the will itself, which they do not in the present case.

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His Honour therefore declared, that the 300 l. is to be considered as part of the testator's assets, and ought to be applied in payment of his debts, and decreed the real and personal estate to go in payment of his debts, and if sufficient, then to pay the legacies, if not sufficient, the legatees to abate, except as to the three legacies of 100 l. each to William, Sarah, and Anne Broughton, which are to be paid them preferably to the other legacies (2).

(1) *Cunliffe v. Cunliffe*, *Amb.* 686. (2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1739. fol. 145.
See *Harding v. Glyn*, *post.* 470. note 1.

February the
26th, 1736.

Case 218.

S. C. post, 2 vol.
54. 383.
Rule where a
husband is left
sole executor.

Partridge v. Pawlet (1).

IN this case Lord Chancellor laid down the following rules.
Where a husband is left sole executor, he is intitled to the surplus, and it shall not be construed as a resulting trust.

(1) It seems necessary to state this case briefly from the Register's book. *John Ward* devised lands (after certain limitations which were determined) to his

If two tenants in common put out money as joint executors, PATRICK v. PAWLET. hall not survive, but shall go respectively to those persons Rule as to survivorship. who are the proper representatives of each.

A devise of the rents and profits of an estate to the husband Rule upon a devise for life, without impeachment of waste. life, without impeachment of waste, shall not considered

daughters *Elizabeth* and *Sarah* in as tenants in common; and gave 12000 *l.* equally between them to be used by the sale of timber. He appointed *Sarah* and *Elizabeth* executrixes residuary legatees, and died. *Ward* by her will bequeaths the use of her personal estate to her two daughters the said *Sarah* and *Elizabeth*, and to the issue of them executrixes, and dies. *Ward*, being thus intitled to a considerable personal estate, (tho' the same was not actually in her possession) and to a moiety of a real estate, upon her marriage with the plaintiff *Patrick* directed to pay him 5300 *l.* in consideration whereof he, by indenture dated the 2d of June 1736, settled certain lands and tenements to her and her issue. Previous to her marriage, *Sarah* by indenture bearing date with the last mentioned indenture directed to herself the power of disposing of her real and personal estate (except the said 5300 *l.*) *Sarah* and *Elizabeth* had at different times placed out of the monies, which they were directed to as aforesaid upon mortgages, by virtue of her power devised the real estate to trustees in trust for her use and in default of such issue the rents and profits to be to the use of the plaintiff her husband for life sans waste. She appointed him sole executor and died without issue. The plaintiff now brought bill; when his lordship directed the defendant to take an account of the personal estate of *John Ward* deceased, a moiety thereof, after payment of debts, &c. to be considered as the personal estate of the plaintiff's late wife; and also to take an account of the personal estate of *Mary Ward* deceased, and as to so much thereof as was received in the life-time of said *Sarah*, the master was to see whether any act was done to sever the jointenancy of such part, and if so, in what part as was received by *Sarah* in her life-time was to be a debt upon her, and the plaintiff was to be satisfied for what he had received.

The master was also to take an account of the personal estate of *Sarah*, and to see, whether said 5300 *l.* had been paid to the plaintiff, and so much as appeared due for said 5300 *l.* and the surplus of her personal estate (after payment of debts, &c.) was to be paid to the plaintiff. The defendants were to account for the rents and profits of the real estate devised to the plaintiff for life, and those rents and profits were to be applied in the first place to keep down the interest of the surplus of *Sarah*'s debts, and the residue to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was to hold the premises devised to him, according to his wife's will, subject to the order of the court, but not to sell timber without leave of the court, unless for necessary repairs and boots. *Reg. Lib. B. 1736. fol. 223.* The master now made his report, whereby he reported, that part of the personal estate of *Mary Ward* (after certain payments) had been received by and divided between *Sarah* and *Elizabeth* in the life-time of the former: that the plaintiff received 847 *l.* on *Cutfield*'s mortgage, who, with his wife gave the defendants a note promising to be accountable to them for one moiety thereof with interest from the receipt until they had made over their shares in *Newland*'s and *Crowther*'s securities: that it did not appear such shares were ever made over: that no act (except as aforesaid) was done to sever the joint-tenancy of such parts of said personal estate as were received by *Sarah* in her life-time: but plaintiff insists that such jointenancy was severed by the deed of the 2d of June 1730. (note it does not appear by the Register's book what the contents of this deed were, except as before stated). His Lordship declared, that the joint-tenancy as to *Mary Ward*'s personal estate was not severed, except as to *Cutfield*'s, *Newland*'s, and *Crowther*'s mortgages, which he decreed to be equally divided between the plaintiff and the defendant and his wife. *Reg. Lib. B. 1739. fol. 461.*

PARTRIDGE v. PAWLET. as annual profits only, but will empower him to cut timber (1).

Rule also payment of interest. Tenant for life pays one third of interest upon debts and legacies, and reversioner two thirds (2).

(1) See the case and *Co. Lit.* 4 b.

Dove, post. 3 vol. 201. *River v. Watkins,*

(2) This conclusion is neither warranted by the above case, nor by the general rule in cases of this kind. See *Saville v. Saville, post.* 2 vol. 402. *Bridgman v.*

1 *Ves.* 93. *Amesbury v. Brown,* 1 *Ves.* 480. *Tracy v. Hereford,* 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 128. See *post.* 2 vol. 416. note 1.

Vide title Affets. .

(E) *Rule where a Bill is brought against an Executor of an Executor.*

Michaelmas term, 1739.

Case 219.

Huet v. Fletcher.

The plaintiff's father died intestate, the mother administered 3, 40 years after the father's death, the son who had accepted of a legacy under the mother's will, equal to two thirds of what his father left, brings this bill against the mother's executor, to account for the father's personal estate come to her hands.

THE father of the plaintiff dies intestate, the mother possesses herself of all his personal estate, the son acquiesced for 40 years after the death of his father, and upon the mother's dying, accepts of a legacy under her will, in value at least equal to two thirds of what his father left, and was contented for some time, but brings his bill now against the executor of the mother to account for all the personal estate of the father which came to her hands.

To deter others from such frivolous suits, his Lordship dismissed the bill with costs.

To deter others from such frivolous suits, his Lordship dismissed the bill with costs.

Lord Chancellor: These are a sort of bills that deserve the utmost discouragement from this court, to oblige an executor to account for a personal estate, which, through the great length of time, he is utterly incapable of doing, besides too, a personal estate of a third person, and that did not belong to his testatrix, and where the plaintiff himself has also accepted of a legacy under the will of his mother, and acquiesced for a considerable time, and therefore to deter others from such frivolous and vexatious suits, I will dismiss the bill with costs.

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After Hilary term, 1736.

Case 220.

Jeffries v. Harrison, Executor of Sir Thomas Travel.

The rule in relation to costs to be paid by an executor or defendant is, the same in the court of Chancery as at law.

LORD Chancellor said in this cause, that when an executor is defendant at law, and fails in his defence, the rule is, that he must pay costs *de bonis testatoris, si non de bonis pro-*

Pris; and as in this case the executor has misbehaved himself, by paying simple contract debts, preferable to a bond creditor, with notice, the court of chancery have no occasion to vary it from the common course.

Vide title Jointenants.

Vide title Bonds and Obligations.

Vide title Creditor and Debtor.

Vide title Bankrupt.

C A P XLVII.

Key v. Young.
W. C. Keen. 780.

Exposition of Words.

Verdict v. Henage.

1. *Simons. 542.*

Harding v. Glyn. 144.

Lechman v. Lave
2. W. Keen. 197

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Grant v. Lynn
See v. Chas. H. Russell. 2.

June the 7th 1739.

NICHOLAS Harding in 1701 made his will, and thereby gave "To Elizabeth his wife all his estate, leases, and interest in his house in Hatton Garden, and all the goods, furniture, and chattels therein at the time of his death, and also all his plate, linen, jewels, and other wearing apparel, but did desire her at or before her death, to give such leases, house, furniture, goods and chattels, plate and jewels, unto and amongst such of his own relations, as she should think most deserving and approve of," and made his wife executrix, and died the 23d of January 1736, without issue.

Case 221. *Per N. H. by will gives to Elizabeth his wife all his estate, leases and interest in his house in Hatton Garden, and all the goods and furniture therein at the time of his death, and also all his plate jewels, &c. but desired her, at*

or before her death, to give such leases, &c. unto such of his own relations as she should think most deserving. Elizabeth, by her will, gave all her estate and interest to H. S. in the said house in Hatton Garden, and after several legacies, the residue of her personal estate to the defendant and two other persons, and made them executors; but neither gave, at or before her death, the goods in the said house, or her husband's jewels to his relations.

The Master of the Rolls was of opinion that Elizabeth, under the will of N. H. took only beneficially during her life; and that so much of the household goods in Hatton Garden, not disposed of by her according to the power given her by the will of N. H. in case the same remains in specie, or the value thereof, ought to be divided equally among such of the relations as were his next of kin at the time of her death (1).

(1) So in the following cases, the word relations or kindred in a will (without any specification of what relations or kindred) was confined to such as were within the statute of distributions. *Car v. Bedford, 2 Cha. Rep. 146.* *Griffith v. Jones, 2 Cha. Rep. 394.* *Roach v. Hammond, Prec. Cha. 401.* *Thomas v. Hale, Cn. Temp. Talb. 251.* *Anon. 1 P. W. 327.* *Whitborne v. Harris, 2 Ves. 527.* *Edge v. Salisbury, Amb. 70.* *Brunfild v. Woolledge, Amb. 507.* *Isaac v. Daffrix, Amb. 595.* *Wiamie v. Woodreffe, Amb. 636.* *Green v. Howard, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 31.* *Cresley v. Clure, Amb. 397.*

Phillips v. Garth, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 64. *Rayner v. Morcbray, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 234.* *contra Jones v. Benie, 2 Vern. 381.* *Benier v. Honeywood Amb. 708.* But notwithstanding the above construction, yet the shares and proportions of such relations and kindred must be regulated according to the intent and construction of the will under which they claim, and not according to the statute of distributions; as particularly appears by the above cited cases of *Car v. Bedford*, *Thomas v. Hale*, *Brunfild v. Woolledge*, and *Phillips v. Garth*. *Butler v. Stratton, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 367.*

Elizabeth

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 GLYN.

Elizabeth his widow made her will on the 12th of *June* 1737, "and thereby gave all her estate, right, title, and interest to *Henry Swindell* in the house in *Hatton Garden*, which "her husband had bequeathed to her in manner aforesaid; and "after giving several legacies, bequeathed the residue of her "personal estate to the defendant *Glyn* and two other persons, "and made them executors," and soon after died, without having given at or before her death the goods in the said house, or without having disposed of any of her husband's jewels to his relations.

The plaintiffs insisting that *Elizabeth Harding* had no property in the said furniture and jewels but for life, with a limited power of disposing of the same to her husband's relations, which she has not done, brought their bill in order that they might be distributed amongst his relations, according to the rule of distribution of intestates effects.

Master of the Rolls: The first question is, If this is vested absolutely in the wife? And the second, If it is to be considered as undisposed of, after her death, who are intitled to it?

As to the first, it is clear the wife was intended to take only beneficially during her life; there are no technical words in a will, but the manifest intent of the testator is to take place, and the words *willing* or *desiring* have been frequently construed to amount to a trust, *Eales & ux. v. England & ux.* 2 *Vern* 465. and the only doubt arises upon the persons who are to take after her.

Where the uncertainty is such, that it is impossible for the court to determine what persons are meant, it is very strong for

See [470]
 The words
willing or *desiring*
 in a will have
 been frequently
 construed to
 amount to a
 trust (1).

Where the uncertainty is such that the court cannot possibly

determine who are meant in a will, it may be construed only as a recommendation to the testator, and make it an absolute gift to him. Where there is a devise to relations in a will, the distribution is a good rule to go by, in construing who are meant by that word.

(1) It seems, that any words of a testator intimating a request, wish, desire, recommendation, &c. are sufficient to create a trust; provided there be certainty of the gift, and of the object to be benefited thereby. *Brett v. Copley*, 1 *Ch. Rep.* 245. *Parry v. Jackson*, 3 *Ch. Rep.* 38. *Eales v. England*, *Pres. Ch. Rep.* 200. 2 *Vern.* 460. S. C. 1 *Eq. Ab.* 257. pl. 3. S. C. *Chewless v. Pelham*, 1 *Vern.* 411. *Jones v. Natus*, 1 *Eq. Ab.* 404. pl. 3. *Richardson v. Chapman*, 1 *Burn. Ecl. Law*, 225. *Winn v. Vernon*, *Amb.* 3. 2 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 227. S. C. cited. *Clifton v. Lombe*, *Amb.* 519. *Messey v. Sherman*, *Amb.* 520. *Nawian v. Nelligan*, 1 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 489. *Forger v. Garret*, 2 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 38. 26. *Finch*, 1 *Ch. Rep.* 200. in note S. C. *Lewis v. King*, 2 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 600. objects where the gift or the object ap-

pears to be uncertain. *Palmer v. Scribb*, 2 *Eq. Ab.* 291. pl. 9. *Buggins v. Leach* 9 *Med.* 122. *Harding v. Glyn*, *supra* per Lord Hardwicke. *Le Main v. Banister*, 2 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 40. cited, *Finch Prec. Ch. Rep.* 201. S. C. *Bland v. Bland*, 2 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 43. cited *Finch Prec. Ch. Rep.* 201. S. C. *Harland v. Trigg*, 1 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 142. *Wynne v. Hawkins*, 1 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 180. *Sprang v. Bernard*, 2 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 585. The case of *Cunliffe v. Cunliffe*, *Amb.* 685. *Finch Prec. Ch. Rep.* 201. S. C. 2 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 42. S. C. which was determined contrary to the first of the above positions, was over-ruled by the master of the Rolls in the case of *Garret v. Piersen*, cited *supra*. See 2 *Bro. Ch. Rep.* 46. *Hill v. the Bishop of London*, *post.* 620.

to construe it only as a recommendation to the first and make it absolute as to him; but here the word is a legal description, and this is a devise to such relation operates as a trust in the wife, by way of power of and apportioning, and her non-performance of the shall not make the devise void, but the power shall devolve on the court; and though this is not to pass by virtue of the mode of distributions, yet that is a good rule for the court. And therefore I think it ought to be divided among the relations of the testator *Nicholas Harding*, who is next of kin at her death; and do order, that so much of the said household goods in *Hatton Garden*, and other part of the said testator *Nicholas Harding*, devised by his wife the said *Elizabeth Harding* his wife, which she did not exercise according to the power given her thereby, in case she remains in specie, or the value thereof, be delivered to the next of kin of the said testator *Nicholas Harding*, to be divided equally amongst them, to take place from the time of the death of the said *Elizabeth Harding*.

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How
Lawless.
5 Clerk & T.
129.
Knight & Knight
J. B. & Co. 149
Barnes & Satchell
W. Simon 129
Lacey & Phelps
5 May 14.
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Leeke v. Bennett.

John Leeke, by his will, devises in these words: "I give to my nieces *Elizabeth Martin* and *Hannah Martin*, which shall be living at the time of my death, all my old goods (particularly mentioned) in my house at *Maze-Hill, Greenwich*."

February the
20th, 1737.

Case 222.

Sir J. L. gives, by a codicil to his will, to *E. M.* during her natural life, his house in *Green-*

with, with all the household goods that shall be found therein at the time of his death, and *with* so conjoins the devise of the house and household goods, that the devisee can have no rest in the latter, than was expressly limited as to the former. And *with* would have had the same effect in the case of a grant.

codicil afterwards he says, "I give to my niece *Elizabeth Martin*, during the time of her natural life, my house on *Maze-Hill* in *Greenwich*, with all the household goods that shall be found therein at the time of my death."

There were only ten years to come in the house; both the nieces were living at the time of the testator's death, but the one survived the other. Part of the goods given in the will were excepted in the will, as gilt hangings, and some other things, and an additional 100*l.* a year given to his niece *Elizabeth Martin*, now *Bennet*, by the codicil, and then he mentions the goods before mentioned.

Chancellor: The question is, Whether this be an absolute devise to *Elizabeth*, or for life only?

The first consideration is, what she would have taken under the will.

It is plain the nieces would have taken as jointenants, and the particular goods so bequeathed, for the goods excepted.

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BENNET.

cepted they could not, though in the house at *Greenwich*; and the survivor would have taken the whole.

The codicil has made a total alteration in two respects; instead of a joint interest, it is made a sole interest, instead of an absolute property, an interest for life; and *Elizabeth* likewise takes the goods excepted, and consequently it is a revocation of the will, and an entire new bequest. If the codicil had stood alone, it would have been plainly a gift of the goods for life only; and the word *with* being made use of, it so conjoins the devise of the house and household goods, that the devisee can have no larger interest in the household goods, than was expressly limited as to the house (1). If the words *during her natural life* had been subjoined to the devise of the house, it had not been so clear a case, though I think that would not have varied the law of the case neither; but those words being put before the devise, must operate equally on both parts of the subsequent devise, and the same interest pass in both. The word *with* would have had the same effect, and been construed in the same manner in the case of a grant.

His Lordship took notice of a case in 1 *Roll's Abr.* 844. letter *M. No. 2.* If a man devises *Blackacre* to one in tail, and *also Whiteacre*, the devisee shall have an estate tail in *Whiteacre* likewise, for this is all one sentence, and consequently the words that make the limitation of the estate go to both. *Trin. 40 Eliz. B. R.* He cited too the case of *Cole v. Rawlinson**, where the word *also* had the like effect, and the same construction put upon it.

Mr. Fazakerley, who was of counsel for the plaintiff, insisted upon the defendant's giving security for the goods, as the court had determined she had only an interest for life.

A tenant for life of goods is not obliged to give security for the goods, but to sign an inventory only to the person in remainder (2).

Lord Chancellor said he never knew it done, and therefore would not oblige the defendant to do it in this case, but directed an inventory to be made by the defendant *Bennet*, and signed by him and his wife, and to be delivered to the plaintiff.

(1) Vide *Richards v. Baker*, *post.* 2 vol. 321. (2) *Bill v. Kynaston*, *post.* 2 vol. 82. 321.

[472]
May the 18th,
1737.

Champion v. Pickax.

Case 223. *HENRY Pierce*, by his will, devised several leasehold estates to two trustees, in trust to assign them to his granddaughter *Mary Pigott*, at her age of 21 years, or marriage, if she married with the consent of them, or the survivor of them; if his granddaughter married without their consent, to convey the premises to two other trustees, in trust for her separate use during her life, and after her death for the use and benefit of her issue. Though she has no children by the first husband, she has only a right for her life, for the issue by any husband are provided for by this settlement.

them;

; but if she married without such consent, then they were conveyed the premises to two other trustees and their heirs, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the said Mary Piggott, exclusive of any power and controul of her husband, for and during the term of her natural life, and after her decease, for the use and benefit of her issue. She married without the consent of the trustees, and they, in pursuance of the power in the will, conveyed the premises to two other trustees, in trust for her during her natural life, and after her decease, for the use and benefit of all and every her child and children. Her first husband died, and had no issue by her; she married the present plaintiff, and they brought their bill against the defendant, who was the surviving executor of the surviving husband, to have him join in a sale of the trust estate, suggesting that the intent of the will was, for providing for the issue by her first husband only, and he dying without issue, she had now an absolute right and title to the premises. The court decreed she had only a right for her life, for she might have issue by any husband, who are provided for by the settlement, and would take by purchase. The bill dismissed.

CHAMPION v. PICKER. Smith & Fowler v. Russell.

Vide title Devises.

Vide title Remainder.

Vide title Jointenancy.

title, Devise, under the Division, What Words will pass a Fee in a Will.

title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

Primrose v. Bromley.

Vide title Dower and Jointure. Glover v. Bates.

C A P. XLVIII.

Extent of the Crown.

[473]

Ex parte Marshall and others.

Mar. b the 28th. 1752

title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to an Extent of the Crown.

C A P. XLIX.

Fines and Recoveries.

(A) *What Estate or Interest may be barred or transferred by a Fine or Recovery.*

(B) *What Estate or Interest is not barred by a Fine or Recovery.*

(A) *What Estate or Interest may be barred or transferred by a Fine or Recovery.*

May the 12th,
1739.

Robinson v. Cuming.

Case 224.

S. C. Ca. Temp.
Talb. 163.

TH E limitation in a will was to C. and his heirs, to the use of him and his heirs, in trust to pay debts, and after the death of C. and his heirs, in trust for D. and the heirs of his body, and in default of heirs of the body of D. remainder to C. and his heirs, on condition he married M.

to pay debts, and after in trust for D. and the heirs of his body, and in default of the heirs of the body of D. remainder to C. and his heirs.

The recovery of D. barred the remainder to C. as being a remainder of *the trust*, for a remainder of a legal estate cannot be barred by the recovery of a *cestui que trust*.

D. suffers a recovery, and the question was, Whether this recovery barred the remainder to C.?

Lord Chancellor: The question depends upon this point, Whether the remainder to C. be a remainder of a legal estate, or of a trust? For a remainder of a legal estate cannot be barred by a recovery of *cestui que trust* (1), but all the remainders of the trust are (2).

It has been said, that it is impossible for a man to be a trustee for himself; but that is not the point here, for as the legal estate and use is wholly in C. by virtue of the first part of the devise, the remainder cannot be in him, for that is part of the estate he had before, and unless the testator had given C. the remainder of the trust, it would have resulted to his heirs at law: he has therefore given him an interest distinct from either the legal estate or the use, which is the remainder of the trust, and he has given him that on a condition which would be intirely defeated, if he had taken the remainder of the legal estate by the former part of the devise; and there-

(1) So *Salvin v. Thornton*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 73. in note *Amb.* 545. 699. S. C. *Beverley v. Beverley*, 2 Vern. 131. *Shipland v. Smith*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 74. *Boteler v. Allington*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 74.
(2) *North v. Champness*, 2 Cha. Ca. 63, 78. 1 Vern. 13. S. C. 1 P. W. 91. S. C. *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 1 Vern. 40.

ordship decreed, that the recovery of *D.* barred the
to *C.* ROBINSON v.
CUMING.

Oliver v. Taylor.

July the 13th,
1738.

Cafe 225.

are copyhold, a common recovery suffered in the
of common pleas will not pass such lands, but if
customary freeholds, and pass by surrender in a bo-
rt, yet a recovery in the common pleas of such
be good (1). The case of *Baker v. Wise*, in Lord
P's time, cited. A common reco-
very suffered in
the common
pleas will not
pass copyhold
lands; otherwise
as to customary
freeholds.

issue was directed to try court of the borough, or by common
he lands in question were recovery in the court of common
or customary freehold; and pleas at *Westminster*. *Reg. Lib. B.*
e capable of being intailed, 1737. fol. 483. The editor has not
ch intail could be barred by been able to learn the result of the trial
or common recovery in the at law.

it Estate or Interest is not barred by a Fine or Recovery.

Willis v. Shorral.

February the
24th, 1738.

Cafe 226.

T. S. Brickley, by a proviso in his marriage-settlement,
he dies without issue, gives his wife *Anne Brickley* a
dispose of one hundred pounds by will to such per-
e shall appoint, such hundred pounds to be paid to
within one year after his death, and in default of
nent, *John Moreton* is empowered to make a lease of
d *Sayres's Farm*, to raise this sum, and when raised
o be void. The wife, after the year expired from
of her husband, makes an appointment of the hun-
ds, but never received it while she was living; the
he husband mortgaged the estate to *B.* who at that
no notice of this power in the marriage-settlement;
s, upon *B.*'s purchasing the estate absolutely, the
the husband levied a fine to him, and in the next
way of collateral security, conveyed the equity of
n to *B.* who then had notice of the power; five
rred after levying of the fine, and no claim on the
e appointees of the hundred pounds, who have now
heir bill to be paid this sum. T. B. by proviso
in a marriage set-
tlement, gives
his wife a power
to dispose of
100 l. by will to
such person as
she shall appoint,
to be paid to the
wife within one
year after his
death, and in
default of such
payment, J. M.
is empowered
to make a lease
of particular
lands to raise
this sum. The
wife makes an
appointment of
the 100 l. but
never received
it while living,
the heirs of the
husband mort-

tate to *B.* who when had no notice of this power. Afterwards, on *B.*'s purchasing the
irs of the husband levy a fine to him, and convey the equity of redemption as a collateral
then had notice of the power. Five years incurred after levying of the fine, and no
part of the appointees of 100 l. but they now bring their bill to be paid this sum.
iffs are intitled to 100 l. and interest, from the end of one year after the death of *Anne*
wife of *T. B.*

Mr.

WILLIS v.
SMORRALL.

Mr. Fazakerley for the plaintiff insisted, that nothing can be barred by a fine or non-claim, but what is first devised, that according to the resolution in *Zouch and Stoley's case* in *Plowden's Commentaries* (1) a bare naked power as the present case is, and a mere future interest only, cannot be barred by a fine: the same doctrine is laid down in *Cro. Eliz.* 226. that considering it as a trust, it cannot be barred, for it is expressly admitted, that the buyer had notice of it, and though he was a purchaser for a valuable consideration, yet notice makes him a trustee only, and for this purpose mentioned 2 *Vern.* 194. "A seized in fee in trust for B. for full consideration conveys to C. the purchaser having notice of the trust, and afterwards C. to strengthen his own estate, levies a fine. B. the cestuique trust is not bound to enter within five years, for C. having purchased with notice, notwithstanding any consideration paid by him, is but a trustee for B. (2) and so the estate not being displaced, the fine cannot bar."

Mr. Wilbraham for the defendant said, that courts of equity govern themselves with regard to fines, as they do at law, for this reason, because they are the common security to estates, and therefore if he should admit this to be an equitable interest in the estate, it is equally barred as if it had been a legal interest, and that it is laid down in *Sir Nicholas Stourton's case*, by Lord Chief Justice Hale, that a fine, and non-claim, is a good bar to an equity of redemption. Cited in *Lingard v. Griffin*, 2 *Vern.* 189.

Lord Chancellor: The first question is, Whether this, which is a mere collateral power in the land, can be barred, and will depend on the force and effect of the fine.

Here is, in point of law, a power vested in *John Moreton*, to create a term for years for raising the 100*l.* in default of payment by the heirs or assigns of the testator within one year after his death, the plaintiff therefore had an equitable interest till the same was paid: consider then what effect the fine has either upon the power or the interest.

The mortgagee took, as a collateral security, the conveyance of the equity of redemption after the fine levied; generally speaking, *some right* that a person has in an estate, must be displaced to give a fine any force (3).

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A bare naked power is not barred by any of the statutes of fines (4) otherwise as to an interest termini.

A greater force too has been given to fines by statutes than they had at law, as by the statute of non-claim, &c. but I do not find in any of these statutes, that a power is barred by them, but only such *right, claim, and interest*, which strangers had at the time of the fine levied, unless they pursue their

(1) *Plowd.* 355. *Jenk. Cent.* 266. S. C.

(2) See *Saunders v. Deberw.* 2 *Vern.* 271.

(3) *Margaret Poulger's case*, 9 *Co.* 106. a. 1 *Cruise*, 243.

(4) A collateral or naked power cannot be barred nor extinguished by fine, seoffment, or any other conveyance. *Co. Litt.* 237. a. *Albany's case*, 1 *Co.* 111. a. *Digge's case*, 1 *Co.* 174. a. *Edwards v. Slater*, *Hards.* 415.

claim and interest, by action or lawful entry, within
 years after the proclamation made and certified.

WILLIS v.
 SHORPAL.

can a stranger, as *John Moreton* was, that has no in-
 make an entry, he who had barely a naked power, and
 nently could not be affected by a fine; for the con-
 n of the statute of 4 H. 7. in *Bro. Abr. title Fine*,
 3. as to what a fine will bar, does not at all relate to

then it may be said, the lessee of *Moreton* might have
 for he had a right, by virtue of the leasehold estate,
 be sure *Saffyn's case*, 5 Co. 123. b. comes very near this
 or nothing can be more like a power than an *interest*

“ A man made a lease for years of certain land, to begin
 the end of a term for years then in being, the first years
 mined, the second lessee did not enter, but he in the reversion
 ed and made a *seoffment*, and levied a fine of the land with
 amations, according to the 4 H. 7. c. 4. and five years
 d without entry or claim made by the second lessee, and the
 ion was, Whether the lessee for years was barred by the fine,
 the act of 4 H. 7. ? Adjudged that this term and interest
 barred, and both within the letter of the act, and the mis-
 intended to be provided against thereby.”

next consideration is, What effect the fine will have
 on equitable interest?

no doubt the rules of this court, with relation to fines,
 been taken by analogy from the rules at law, and the
 is the same with regard to an equitable interest, if of
 nature, that, turned into a legal interest, it would have
 irred.

I need not labour this point, for supposing the equi-
 interest is barred, yet I am of opinion the power is still
 ng in *John Moreton*, and he may make a lease till the
 d pound is raised.

therefore declare the plaintiffs are intitled to a satis-
 for the sum of one hundred pounds, and interest from
 d of one year after the death of *Anne Brickley*, and do
 re decree the defendants the heirs at law of *Thomas*
 y, to pay the same to the plaintiffs accordingly, with
 t at the rate of 4 l. per cent.

the Agreements, &c. under the Division, When to be per-
 formed in Specie.

Vide title Forfeiture.

Fixtures.

August the 15th,
1750.

(A). What shall be deemed such.

Ex parte Belcher.

4 Deacon & Chitty 703. Ex parte Quincy.

Case 227.

A mortgage of a
brewhouse with
the appurte-
nances, will not
carry the uten-
sils, but the
things only be-
longing to out-
houses.

Ex parte Lloyd.
D. & Chitty 76.

11th. Hynd.

Ma. D. & Ch. 442.

442.

An executor
cannot enter to
take away fix-
tures, without
being a trespasser.

A tenant during
the term may
take chimney
pieces, and even
wainscot, if af-
ter he is a tres-
passer.

IN 1745 *Robinson* sells the utensils of a brewhouse, and lets a lease of the brewhouse to *Brewwood*, and in 1746 mortgages his brewhouse with the appurtenances, &c. to *J. S. Brewwood* after this sells his lease and utensils to *Warner*, who for a sum of money in 1748 mortgages the whole to *Robinson*, afterwards *Robinson* becomes a bankrupt, and his effects are vested in the petitioner as assignee under the commission, who, as standing in the place of the bankrupt, is intitled to the mortgage from *Warner*, and by virtue thereof claims the utensils.

J. S. the mortgagee of the brewhouse in 1746 insists the fixtures passed by his mortgage; this petition preferred therefore for a delivery of all the utensils.

Mr. Attorney General, for the mortgagee, cited *Owen* 71. under title *Heir and Ancestor*.

Lord Chancellor: This is a case for a mere action at law, and might be determined by action of trover or detinue.

I am inclined to think it was not the intent of *Robinson* to mortgage the utensils; for there is some description generally of things in a brewhouse.

The manner of describing the parcels shews he did not at all mean to mortgage utensils, for the word *appurtenances* seems to intend only things belonging to out-houses.

The rule as to fixtures, as between an heir and executor, is another thing. The freehold descending on the heir, the executor cannot enter to take away fixtures without being a trespasser (1).

But there is another rule between landlord and tenant: During the term a tenant may take away chimney pieces, and even wainscot (2), which is a very strong case, but not after the term, if he did, he would be a trespasser.

A mortgage, says *Mr. Attorney General* is a purchase, but then it is a redeemable one.

How does it stand between a purchaser and a vendor?

(1) See *Lawton v. Lawton*, in *B. R.* the end of the case of *Lawton v. Lawton*, *Essex* 22 Geo. 3. cited in the note at *post* 3. vol. 13.

(2) *i. e.* if put up by himself.

man sells a house where there is a copper, or a brew-
here there are utensils, unless there was some con-
n given for them, and a valuation set upon them, they
ot pass.

Ex parte
Quincy.

By the sale of a
brewhouse, the
utensils will not
pass.

hen another question will arise after possession is de-
what action you can bring? For where things are fixed
ehold, an action of trover will not lie for them.

l sorts of things are often fixed to the freehold, and yet
aken away, as beds fastened to the ceiling with ropes,
quently nailed, and yet no doubt but they may be re-

Beds fastened to
the ceiling with
ropes, or even
nailed, are not
fixtures, but
may be re-
moved.

ifficulty with me is the possession of the mortgagor,
is cleared up, because it was the express agreement
the parties, that the mortgagor should not be prevented
ing on the brewhouse.

shend the sale of the utensils was a defeasible sale, to
the bankrupt at the end of the term, and if so, there
ty in the grantor, and therefore, as to the mortgagee,
on in the bankrupt.

stand over to the next day of petitions, and let the
e produce all deeds and writings, and assignee at his
to take copies if he pleases.

C A P. II.

Forfeiture.

Brandlyn v. Ord.

November the
15th, 1738.

Purchase, under the Division, of Purchasers without
Notice.

Vide title Custom of London.

C A P. LII.

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Freeman of London.

Ex parte Carrington.

January the
22d, 1739.

Bankrupt, under the Division, Who are liable to Bank-
ruptcy.

I i 2

C A P. LIII.

Fraud.

Michaelmas Vacation, 1737.

Nicholls v. Nicholls.

Vide title Deeds and other Writings, under the Division, Deeds and Instruments entered into by Fraud, in what Cases to be believed against.

Vide title Bill.

[480]

C A P. LIV.

Guardian.

(A) *What Acts of his with regard to the Infant's Estate shall be good.*

Pierfon v. Shore.

Some July the 28th,
1739.

Feb.

1733.

Case 228.

A. who had a bishop's lease to her and her heirs during three lives, devises the same to her daughter an infant, and directs the guardian and trustees to make purchases for the infant's benefit.

The guardian, upon the decease of one of the three lives, took a new lease for three new lives. The infant dies. The lease shall go to the heirs of the infant ex parte paterna; for the new lease is to be considered as a new acquisition, and to vest in the infant as a purchase.

A. Who had a bishop's lease to her and her heirs during three lives, devises the same to her daughter who was an infant, and directs the guardian and trustees appointed by her will, to make purchases for the benefit of the infant. After the death of the mother, the guardian, upon the death of one of the three lives, took a new lease for three new lives, and the infant being now dead, the question before the court was, Whether this new lease should go to the old uses? To the heirs *ex parte maternâ*, as the first lease would have done, or whether to the heirs of the infant *ex parte paternâ*.

Lord Chancellor: This is a descendible freehold, and if nothing had been altered, would have gone to the heir *ex parte maternâ*; but the new lease is to be considered as a new acquisition, and to vest in the infant as a purchaser; how then will this go, considered as a new purchase?

infant had lived till full age, and then had surrendered
 se and taken a new one, this certainly would have
 the heirs *ex parte paternā*; so if all the lives had died,
 the guardian had renewed the lease, it would likewise
 go to the heirs on the part of the father; and this is
 the case of an infant's personal estate turned into real,
 son of that's being still considered as personal estate,
 of the different ages at which the infant might dis-
 personal, and his real estate, and not out of favour
 representative more than another. *Indeed in the case*
trust, whatever new alterations are made, it is still subject
ust (2).

PERSON v.
 SHORE.

The reason why
 an infant's per-
 sonal estate
 turned into real,
 is still consid-
 ered as personal, is
 on account of
 the different
 ages at which
 the infant may
 dispose of his
 personal, and
 his real, and not
 in favour to one

representative more than another (1)

n objected, that this was an act done by a guardian only
 minority, and ought not to prejudice any who take by
 it, it being an act merely voluntary, and not out of

indeed had been wantonly done by the guardian, with-
 out benefit to the infant, it would have been proper to
 a court of equity to be relieved against it; but here
 and reasonable occasion for what the guardian has
 done was directed by the mother to make purchases for
 the infant. Here one life being dead, surren-
 dered, and taking a new lease, was the most beneficial
 to the infant that could be, and therefore ought to
 have the same consequence as if done by the infant herself at
 full age, to go to the heirs *ex parte maternā*. The case of *Ma-*
son, is exactly in point with the present, *Prec. in*

The act of a
 guardian where
 a reasonable one
 will have the
 same conse-
 quence as if done
 by the infant at
 full age, other-
 wise if wanton-
 ly done by the
 guardian, with-
 out any real be-
 nefit to the in-
 fant.

"A feme purchases a church lease to her and her
 three lives, and dies, leaving an infant daughter,
 when she lives die, the infant's guardian renews the lease,
 as a new acquisition, and shall go to the heirs on the part of the
 mother (3)."

The ship therefore dismissed the bill brought by the heir
materna.

Per v. Whitter, 3 P. W. 100. *Liams, Amb. 734.* 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 199.
Perk v. Warth, 1 Vef. 461. S. C. in note. *Taster v. Marriot, Amb.*
St v. Holt, 1 Cha. Ca. 191. 608. *Sed vide Darrel v. Wbitchot*, 2
lar, post. 2 vol. 597. *Ed. Cha. Rep. 59.*
twiss, post. 3 vol. 538. *Pick-* (3) 2 Eq. Ab. 494. pl. 7. S. C. *Gillb.*
cles, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 197. Eq. Rep. 77. S. C. See *Amb. 719.*
ester, Amb. 715. 1 Bro. Cha. where this case of *Peirson v. Shore* is cited
 C. note. *Owen v. Wil.* under the name of *Mason v. Shore*.

C A P. LV.

Habeas Corpus.

May the 12th,
1742.

Ex parte Lingood.

Vide title *Bankrupt*, under the *Division*, Rule as to a Certificate from Commissioners to a Judge.

C A P. LVI.

Heir and Ancestor.

- [482] (A) *Where Charges and Incumbrances on the Lands shall be raised, or shall sink in the Inheritance for the Benefit of the Heir.*
- (B) *Where the Heir shall have the Aid and Benefit of the Personal Estate.*

- (A) *Where Charges and Incumbrances on the Lands shall be raised, or shall sink in the Inheritance for the Benefit of the Heir.*

Vide title *Conditions and Limitations*, under the *Division*, In what Cases a Gift or Devise, upon Condition not to marry without Consent, shall be good and binding, or void, being only in *terrorem*. *Hervey v. Aston*.

Easter Term, 1738.

Prowse v. Abingdon.

Cafe 229. **THOMAS** Compton, by will dated the 13th of August 1718 devises all his lands in general words to *John Clement*, and *John Prowse*, and their heirs in trust, and to the uses, intents and purposes following, viz. that they should sell all his lands lying

S. C. cited
Com. Rep. 718.
2 Eq. Ca. Abr.
464. n. S. C.

T. C. devised all his lands to *T. C.* and *J. P.* and their heirs in trust, that they should sell his lands in *M.* and *P.* and out of the purchase money pay his debts, and as to the rest in trust, to receive the rents and to make leases for 99 years, determinable, &c. and therewith to pay his debts and legacies, then to the use of *J. A.* wife of *C. A.* for life, remainder to the issue male and female of her body, and makes the trustees executors; he likewise gives a legacy of 500*l.* to his nephew *Thomas Prowse*, to be paid at 21, or marriage, who died before 21.

Personal estate of the value of 700*l.* the lands in *M.* and *P.* not sufficient to pay the debts. Bill brought by the administrator of *Thomas Prowse* to have the 500*l.* raised. The Lord Chancellor's opinion, as the legacy was charged upon the real as well as personal estate, it could not be raised, as the legatee died before the time of payments and dismissed the bill (1).

(1) See *Bond v. Brown*, 2 Cba. Ca. 321. *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Vern. 92. 165. *Paulett v. Paulett*, 1 Fern. 204. *v. Pettiplate*, 2 Vern. 416 Cl.

ing in *Mindford* and *Pinard*, and out of the purchase money
ing from such sale should pay and satisfy the testator's debts,
ar as the same will go, and as to the rest of the lands, &c.
will declares that the trustees should stand seised of them,
trust to receive the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and
make leases of the same, for the term of 99 years determin-
on three lives, and therewith to pay all the testator's debts
legacies, that then they should stand seised to the use of
ella Abingdon, wife of *Charles Abingdon*, and sister of the
ator for life, remainder to the issue male and female of her
y, remainder over, &c. and makes the trustees executors of
will. He bequeaths likewise a legacy of 500*l.* to his ne-
w *Thomas Prowse*, to be paid at his age of twenty-one, or
riage.

he nephew died before he attained the age of twenty-one,
unmarried.

he personal estate of the testator was about the value of
l. the estates in *Mindford* and *Pinnard*, were not sufficient
ay the testator's debts.

he bill is now brought by the administrator of *Thomas*
wife to have the sum of 500*l.* raised against the defendant,
claims the lands under *Isabella*, subject to the payment of
itor's debts and legacies, upon a supposition that *Thomas*
wife had an interest vested in this legacy, transmissible to his
esentative, though the legatee died before the time of pay-
it came.

Ir. *Chute* for the plaintiff insisted, that this case was very
erent from that of a devise of lands to a third person, charg-
with the payment of legacies out of it, that the lands here
sed to the trustees for the payment of debts and legacies,
t be considered as the personal estate of the testator accord-
to the general doctrine of a court of equity, which often
siders land as money, and *vice versa*, according to the na-
of the case, and the intention of the party who directs the
osition of the one or the other; that the trustees might in
have entred here, and continued in possession till they had
ived money enough by the rents and profits, and fines taken
n granting long leases, according to the power given by the
l, to pay off all the debts and legacies; and in such case, as
fund out of which this legacy would be payable, would be
sonal estate, the contingency of the legatee's dying before the
of 21, or marriage, not being annexed to the devise of the

PROWSE v.
ABINGDON.

Lawrence
Blake -
S. J. & Fin.
530

Hastons v. Hay
S. J. & Cr. 125.
Earl of Miltoun
French
400 & 276.

[483]

- S. C. Carter v. Bletsoe*, *Proc. Cha.* post. 512. *Boycot v. Cotton*, post. 555.
2 Vern. 617. *S. C. War v. War*, *Richardson v. Greefe*, post. 3 vol. 69. *At-*
c. Cha. 213. *Tournay v. Tournay*, *torney General v. Milner*, post. 3 vol. 112.
c. Cha. 290. *Stapleton v. Cheeles*, *Basset v. Basset*, post. 3 vol. 207. *Sher-*
Proc 318. *Jennings v. Looks*, 2 P. *man v. Collins*, post. 3 vol. 320. The
276. *Bateman v. Roach*, 9 *Mod.* reader is referred to Mr. Cox's note to
Gordon v. Raynes, 3 P. *Wms.* 134. 2 P. *W.* 612, and to *Eul. Co. Litt.* 237.
dey v. Powell, *Ca. temp. Talb.* 193. a. note 1.
lv. Tary, post. 502. *Van v. Clarke*,

**PROVISE v.
ABINGDON.**

legacy itself, but to the time of payment, the plaintiff would be intitled.

Secondly, It must however be admitted that this legacy was chargeable upon the personal as well as the real estate, and as the personal estate is the primary and natural fund to be charged, and the real estate comes in only in aid of the personal estate, and as a security only for payment of the money, the real estate here ought to be subject to the same rules with the personal, and subservient to the same purposes, and more especially so, since in order to avoid that confusion which must otherwise follow, if, in determining whether this legacy was due or not, regard should be had to the different resolutions which prevail in cases of this kind, where the personal estate only, or the real estate only, is charged with the payment of legacies.

Thirdly, That admitting this legacy was chargeable only on the real estate, yet the rule which has prevailed, for portions to sink into the estate for the benefit of the heir at law, will not extend to the present case, nor is this within the reason of those cases of portions, which have always been determined on this foot, that children dying before they could want their portions, there could be no occasion for raising them, nor is it to be supposed the testator could intend to have such sum raised merely in prejudice of any other child, who should have the estate, when no provision of that kind was now wanted. He cited the case of *Jackson v. Farrand*, 2 Vern. 424.

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Mr. *Fazakerley* on the same side insisted, that the trustees to whom this devise is made being likewise executors, the estates devised must be considered as personal legal assets in their hands, and governable by the same rules as if the testator had actually left personal assets in specie to that value. He cited for this purpose 1 *Lev.* 224. and relied on what is there said by Mr. Justice *Twifden*, and also *Dyer* 264. b. No. 41. He likewise insisted, that it appeared there were sufficient personal assets left in specie to satisfy this legacy, as the other creditors and legatees had an undoubted right to take their remedy against the land for a satisfaction of their debts and legacies, and if the plaintiff cannot be intitled to this legacy, supposing it to be chargeable on the land, this court will so marshal the assets as will make every part of the will effectual, and charge the personal estate only with the payment of this legacy. He relied likewise much on the case of *Jackson v. Farrand*.

Money arising from the sale of a real estate is legal assets only where it is sold under a bare power given to sell, not where the interest in the estate passes by the will to the devisees;

and making the trustees executors does not alter the case.

Lord Chancellor: before they began for the defendant, interposed, and said he was clearly of opinion the estates devised could not be considered as personal assets at law, in the hands of the trustees; that by the devise in general of all his lands to them and their heirs, here was plainly a disposition of the estate to them, and a trust created in them for the payment of debts; and that money arising from the sale of a real estate was legal assets only, where the estate was sold under a bare power given to

and not where the interest in the estate passed by the will to devisees as it did here, and that making the trustees executors wife, could not alter the case (1).

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ABINGDON.

That the other part of the devise, whereby the devisees are directed to receive the rents, &c. could with much less colour out of the construction contended for, but was in the nature of the thing plainly intended as a trust; and taking notice likewise of what had been said by Mr. *Fazakerley*, that as to this part of the case it might be considered as a devise to them of the real estate, *quousque* they should have received sufficient out of the real, &c. to answer the purpose, and that then the estate should vest in *Isabella* by way of executory devise; *his Lordship*

A devise to *A.* and *B.* and their heirs till such a sum be raised, for payment of debts, does not create a fund of legal assets, but is proper only to give the devisee an interest in the lands specifically, not to turn them into personal estate.

supposing such a construction should be suffered to prevail, yet there is no colour for saying the rents, &c. so received should be legal assets, and put the case of a devise to *A.* and *B.* their heirs, till such a sum should be raised for the payment of debts and legacies, would that create a fund of legal assets? What rate a legatee might sue *A.* and *B.* under those circumstances in the ecclesiastical court; but such a jurisdiction in a case of that kind was certainly never thought on, nor can it be maintained: but a provision of that sort is proper only to give the devisee an interest in the estate specifically, not to turn the lands into personal estate, and make them legal assets in the hands of the devisee.

Mr. *Attorney General* for the defendant, insisted on the distinction between legacies charged on the real, and legacies charged on the personal estate. Where a legacy is charged on the personal, and made payable at a future day, and the legatee dies before the day of payment, the court, in compliance with the rule of the civil law, and in order to conform to the proceedings in this and the ecclesiastical court (as

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they have a concurrent jurisdiction) uniform and consistent, determined such legacy shall not be considered as a lapsed legacy, but shall go to the representative. But that rule has never been extended to legacies charged on a real estate; that there is no ground whatever for the distinction taken between a legacy charged on real estate, and money given to a child by a parent as a portion, nor is it supposed by any authority; but the only question in such case is, upon what fund the charge is laid, whether on the real or personal estate? That the case of *Jackson v. Farrand*, as appears by the report of it in *Pres. in Ch.* 109. turned entirely upon this; that the legatee there died after marriage, and that therefore having happened, when it was the cause of the portion, it should be raised after death.

That it was not at all material here; that the legacy was charged on a mixed fund, or real and personal estate too; that was in the case of *Jackson v. Farrand*; but this objection

(1) But see *Silk v. Prime*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 138, in note, and *Blatch v. Wilder*, 420, note.

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was not so much as made; so it was in the case of the *Duke of Chandos v. Talbot*, in Lord Chancellor King's time, *Mich. 5 Geo. 2.* where a sum of money was by will charged on the real and personal estate of the testator, payable at the age of 21; it was held in that case, that the legatee dying before the age of 21, his representative was not intitled, but the bill was dismissed, and the Lord Chancellor in that case cited the case of *Jennings v. Lukes* in the time of the Lords Commissioners, exactly to the same purpose, *2 P. Wms. 276.* Mr. Attorney General cited the case of *Yates v. Pettyplace*, *2 Vern. 416.* *Carter v. Blad-jo*, *2 Vern. 617.* and Mr. Floyer, of the same side, cited *Smith v. Smith*, *2 Vern. 92.*

Lord Chancellor said, the only inducement he had to suffer so long a debate in this court by the bar, was, in order to receive satisfaction as to the point, which had been insisted on in relation to this legacy being chargeable on a mixed fund, consisting of real and personal estate too.

Such strong resolutions that there is no difference between a charge on the real estate only, and a charge on the real and personal estate too, they are not to be shaken now.

He said, that was a difficulty which always stuck with him, and it was something very extraordinary that the real estate, which was only an auxiliary fund to the personal, should, in cases of this kind, be chargeable in a different manner, and not be made liable to the same rules and determinations with the primary security the personal estate; but he said he found the resolutions so strong, that there was no difference between a charge on the real estate only, and a charge on the real and personal estate too; that he could not at this time of day, think of determining in a different manner (1).

Whether a charge on land be created by deed or will, whether given by way of portion for a child, or merely as a legacy by collateral relations, or others, if the party dies before the day of payment, cannot be raised.

* He said it was very clear that charges on land, payable at a future day, could not be raised, if the party died before the payment; that there was no difference at all, whether that charge was created by deed or will, nor whether it was provided by way of portion for a child, or given merely as a legacy by collateral relations, or others; and this was the case in the *Duke of Chandos v. Talbot*, and *Jennings v. Lukes*, in which he was counsel, for in neither of them was the provision made by a parent (2).

As to what is said, that the assets may be so marshalled as for the present plaintiff to receive a complete satisfaction out of the personal estate, though the executors were not before the court, and so impossible to make any decree on that foot, yet if they thought it would be material, he would retain the bill, with liberty to make the executors parties; but he said, he conceived that point could by no means be maintained, for that rule of marshalling assets in the manner before mentioned, would hold only where it was proper to be done at the time the legacy first took place, and not where it was owing to a fact, which happened subsequent to the death of the testator,

(1) See *Reynish v. Martin*, *post.* 3 vol. 335.

(2) See cases cited in note 1. *supra* 482, and *Hail v. Terry*, *post.* 504.

to a mere accident, as here, the death of the legatee before (1).

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ABINGDON.

He said the resolution in the case of *Jackson v. Farrand* was founded on a single circumstance, the marriage of the legatee, which being the foundation of that judgment, implies plainly if the case had stood only on the devise to the legatee at the age of 21, and she dying before that time, that the court would, in that case, have determined against the plaintiff, if they could not be laid hold on the circumstance of marriage; besides, the authority of that case seems to be much weakened by the subsequent resolution in *Carter v. Bletsoe*.

The authority of *Jackson v. Farrand*, 2 Vern. 424. much weakened by the subsequent resolution in *Carter v. Bletsoe*, 2 Vern. 617.

have often heard it said, that the reason why legacies, charged on land, payable at a future day, shall not be paid, if the legatee dies before the day of payment, though otherwise in the case of a charge on the personal estate, is, that the heir is a favourite of a court of equity, and ought to have the preference of the representative of a legatee, and likewise that the court will go as far as they can in giving the real estate intire, and as free from incumbrances as possible.

But I think the court has never gone upon such reason, the true reason I take to be this, that the court will go on themselves as far as is consistent with equity by the rules of the common law. In the case of personal estate, the rule is the same here as in the civil law, that there may be an uniformity of judgments in the different courts; but in the case of lands, the rule of the common law has always been adhered to: as suppose a person should covenant to pay money to another at a future day, if the covenantee dies before the day of payment, the money is not due to his representative. The same rule holds in the case of a promise to pay money, &c.

The true reason why legacies, &c. charged on land, payable at a future day, shall not be paid if legatee dies before the day of payment, is, that this court governs itself by the rules of the common law; for there if A. covenants to pay money to B. at a future day, and B. dies before the day, the money is not due to his representative.

The bill dismissed.

B. dies before the day, the money is not due to his representative.

(1) See *post*. 3 vol. 335.

Where the Heir shall have the Aid and Benefit of the Personal Estate. [487]

Bartholomew v. May.

February the 7th, 1737.

THE testator *May*, devises his lands at *Hadlow* to *Richard May* in tail, remainder over, &c. then in mortgage for 1300 l. and devised other lands to *Thomas May*, subject however to the payment of his debts, in case his personal estate, and other estates devised for that purpose, should prove sufficient to satisfy all the debts.

Case 230.

A. devises lands to R. M. in tail then in mortgage for 1300 l. and devised other lands to T. M. subject to the payment of his debts, in case his personal estate should not prove sufficient.

payment of his debts, in case his personal estate should not

Lord

MORGAN v. MORGAN. ther, the court is not so strict, as imagining the parental authority might hinder the bringing any bill or ejectment to recover the possession.

May the 31st, 1738. *Lincoln's Inn Hall.*

Anon'.

Case 232.
S. C. post. 578.
The court will not appoint a receiver of an infant's estate where there is no bill filed.

THERE is no instance of appointing a receiver of the rents and profits of an infant's estate, where there is no bill depending in this court, if it were only filed there might be an application for this purpose on behalf of the infants (1).

(1) *Ex. part Whitfield, post. 2 vol. 315.*

(B) *What Actions of Infants are good, void, or voidable.*

Case 233.
June the 26th,
1739.

Smith v. Low.

Case 233.
R. L. devised some land and houses built thereon to his six children; the mother as guardian to the children, who were all infants, demised the premises on a building lease for 41 years. The eldest son joined in making

RICHARD Lloyd devised some land and houses built thereon to his six children; the mother acting as guardian to the children, who were all infants, demised the premises on a building lease for forty-one years; her eldest son who was about 19 years of age, joined with her in making the lease, and covenanted that the lessee should have quiet enjoyment, and that the rest of the children, when of age, should confirm the lease; the children all arrived at age, and accepted the rent for above ten years after the youngest came of age, under this lease; after such acceptance brought their ejectment against the lessee; and the bill is brought to have the lease established.

the lease, and covenanted that the rest of the children when of age should confirm it.

They all attained 21, and accepted the rent for above ten years, after the youngest came of age, and then brought their ejectment against the lessee, who by his bill prays to have his lease established.

Under the circumstances of this case, and particularly the acceptance of the rent for so long a continuance, the court decreed the lease to be established during the residue of the term.

Where a person is of age when he makes a lease, and has nothing in the premises, but they after descend to him, the lease shall enure by way of estoppel, otherwise if he had been an infant.

[*490] *Lord Chancellor:* The chief question is, if this lease is good, and ought to be established in a court of equity, under the circumstances of this case; and it is not material in the present question, whether the lease be or be not good in law, as against the infant who signed it, for as the plaintiff comes into equity, it must be supposed bad, though as to one sixth part it is certainly good, as against him, by acceptance of the rent (1), and yet as to the other two parts which descended on him, I think

(1) So 3 *P. W.* 209. *Vide also 4 v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794. May v. Leon 4. pl. 15. Har. Co. Litt. 45. b. n. Hooks. Har. Co. Litt. 246. a. in note 1. 1. 51. b. n. 3. Litt. J. 258. 547. Zouch*

be good by way of estoppel; for notwithstanding person of age makes a lease, and has nothing in the but they after descend to him, this lease shall enure of estoppel (1). yet that arises from the deed, and act as an estoppel against an infant, whose deed is

SMITH v.
LOW.

: the lease is to be made good upon equitable circumstances it appears to be for a valuable consideration, rent and covenants for the lessee to leave it in good repair, mentioned by the mother, who acts as guardian, to be benefit of the infants; there is no fraud or collusion on the lessee, and the husband of the lessor, and father of the infants, died in bad circumstances, unable to repair the which were houses, and a mill, therefore the contract of the lessee's repairing them, is a beneficial one for them, and that is sworn to be done; and there are several where this court binds infants to contracts made in itself, as marriage contracts (2), especially if the wife receives pin-money, or after the husband's death accepts the jointure under that contract, and here the great point is, the amount of the rent for so long a continuance, the youngest child of age ten years, and notice of this lease is to be given in all this time. They found a person in possession of the land, and that was sufficient to put them to inquire, and sufficient to put the party upon an inquiry, is good notice.

An infant bound in this court by a marriage contract, especially if she accepts pin-money, or after the husband's death, a jointure under the contract.

Whatever is sufficient to put a party on an inquiry, is good notice in equity to that party.

the court therefore declared that the plaintiff, under the circumstances of the case, is entitled to have the lease established to the residue of the term, and decreed accordingly; and against conscience to bring ejectments after these transactions ordered that the plaintiff should have costs at law, and (3).

Co. Litt. 47. b.

(3) Reg. Lib. B. 1738. fol. 475.

Harvey v. Aspley, post. 3 vol.

Vide title Guardian.

Devisees, under the Division, Of Devisees of Lands for Payment of Debts.

Vide title Will.

Vide title Plantations.

Marriage, under the Division, Where it is Clandestine.

Vide title Injunction.

Injunction.

- (A) *In what Cases, and when to be granted.*
 (B) *Rule as to Injunctions where Plaintiff is a Bankrupt.*

(A) *In what Cases, and when to be granted.*

February the
12th, 1738.

Case 234.

Where there is a trust, or any thing in nature of a trust, notwithstanding the ecclesiastical court have an original jurisdiction in legacies, yet this court will grant an injunction.

Marsh
Ripoll
1. May 86.
44.

Anon'.

A Bill brought for an injunction to stay a suit in the ecclesiastical court for a legacy, because that court cannot make a legatee refund in case of a deficiency of assets, and this being the day for shewing cause why the injunction should not be dissolved, the counsel for the plaintiff relied on the case of *Knight v. Clark*, cited in the case of *Noel v. Robinson*, 1 Vern. 93. where Lord Chancellor said, there was a difference between a suit for a legacy in the Spiritual court, and in this court; if in the Spiritual court they would compel an executor to pay a legacy, without security to refund, there shall go a prohibition.

Lord Chancellor continued the injunction till the hearing, because the plaintiff is an executor in trust only, for where there is a trust, or any thing in the nature of a trust, notwithstanding the Ecclesiastical court have an original jurisdiction in legacies, yet this court will grant an injunction, trusts being only proper for the cognizance of this court.

The rule in this court now is varied since the case in *Vernon's Reports*, for legatees are not obliged to give security to refund upon a deficiency of assets.

Where the husband of an infant institutes a suit in the ecclesiastical court for her legacy, upon the executor's bringing a bill, and suggesting this matter to the court, an injunction will be continued to the hearings.

His Lordship mentioned a case where a woman an infant was intitled to a legacy upon her marrying, the husband instituted a suit in the Ecclesiastical court for it, which he might do; but upon the executor's bringing a bill, and suggesting this matter to the court, an injunction was continued till the hearing of the cause (1); and the same order was made in the present case.

(1) See *Hill v. Turner*, post. 516. post. 2 vol. 420. *Proc. Cla.* 548.

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November the
29th, 1748.

(B) *Rule as to Injunctions where Plaintiff is a Bankrupt,*

Anon'.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Bankruptcy no Abatement.

Vide title Marriage, under the Division, Where it is clandestine.

Vide title Will, under the Division, The Power of this Court over the Prerogative Court.

C A P. LX.

Insolvent Debtor.

Ex parte Green.

August the 7th,
1743.

ide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors' Act under Commissions of Bankruptcy.

C A P. LXI.

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Jointenants and Tenants in Common.

Hilary Term, 1737.

Prince v. Heylin.

Stensdale v. Hanksin
1. Simons. 393.

THE testatrix in this case being a lessee for a term of years, of two houses in London, devised the same to her nephew John Prince, pewterer, and John Heylin, clerk, generally, and then the will goes on thus, "and my will and meaning is, that the rents of my said two houses shall be equally shared and divided between them, the said John Prince and John Heylin, clerk, as aforesaid." The testatrix soon after dies.

Case 235. *Testatrix*
A testatrix de-
vices two houses
to J. P. and
J. H. general-
ly, and then
says my mean-
ing is, that
the rents of
my two houses
J. P. and J. H.

should be equally shared between
The devisees shall take as tenants in common, and not as jointenants.

John Prince survived the testatrix, and died in 1721, ever since the premises have been enjoyed by the defendant as the survivor.

This bill is now brought by the administrator of Prince, to have an account of the rents and profits.

The question was, Whether, by the words in the will, a jointenancy, or a tenancy in common, was created.

It was agreed clearly, that if the words *equally shared* had been annexed to the thing itself, they would have created a tenancy in common, but insisted upon at the same time, that the former are plainly words of jointenancy, and the subsequent amount only to a direction in what manner the profits should be received during the lives of the devisees, viz. to each of them an equal share, which is saying no more than what otherwise the law would direct.

Over v. De Brea
16 Mass. 410. 3
Rock v. Allen
6 Mass. 53.

PRINCE v.
HEYLIN.

Lord Chancellor : I am clearly of opinion, the devisee tenants in common, that had the testatrix expressly directed the rents to be shared during the joint lives of the devisees might admit of some doubt, but with regard to the latter part of the devise was as general as the former, and the word *rents* will as properly pass the interest in the houses, as any other word whatever. This is therefore a plain tenancy in common (1).

J. H. having on the death of J. P. taken possession of the two houses as survivor, and enjoyed them ever since, must account for the rents as far back as the death of J. P. and not from the filing of the bill.

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Ejectment not maintainable by one tenant in common against another without an actual ouster. If the statute of limitations be neither pleaded, nor insisted on by the answer, you cannot have the benefit of such bar.

With regard to the time the defendant is to account for rents and profits, there having been no entry made or demand of the rents, &c. it has been insisted on for the defendant that he ought to account only from the time of the bill filed : in the case of jointenants or parceners, there is a mutual trust between them, and they are accountable to each other, as to the length of time ; it is otherwise in the case of tenants in common, and this is an adversary possession maintained by the defendant against the plaintiff ever since the death of the intestate : however the statute of limitations is a bar to demand further back than six years, and by the 4 *Ann.* c. 27. An action of account lies for one tenant in common against another, and such action is expressly mentioned in the statute of limitations, and as there is no remedy at law, there can be no reason for any in equity.

I am of opinion the defendant must account for rents and profits from the death of the intestate, the nature of the possession being devised not admitting of an adversary possession, in regard to the privity that is between tenants in common : an ejectment is maintainable by one tenant in common against another, without an actual ouster (2) : no advantage can be now taken of the statute of limitations, it not being pleaded by the defendant, nor insisted on by his answer, which in all cases is necessary, in order to have the benefit of such bar to the plaintiff's demand, indeed the court sometimes, when there is a very stale demand notwithstanding the statute is not pleaded, will in its discretion reduce that demand to a reasonable time, and makes use of the statute of limitations as a proper rule to go by in the exercise of that discretion.

(1) So *Fisher v. Wigg*, 1 *Cox's P. W.* 14. note 1. *Owen v. Owen*, *post.* 494. *Heathe v. Heathe*, *post.* 2 vol. 122. *Hawes v. Hawes*, *post.* 3 vol. 525. *Stones v. Hewitkey*, 1 *Ves.* 165. *Har. Co. Litt.* 190. b. n. 4. *Gaskin v. Gaskin*, *Cowp.* 657. See *Rigden v. Vallier*, *post.* 3 vol. 731. *Jolliffe v. East*, 3 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 25. In *Campbell v. Campbell*, 4 *Bro. Cha. Rep.*

15. the words *unto and amongst* the children, &c. were held to create a tenancy in common.

(2) *Reading v. Roydon*, 2 *Sa.* 204. *Storey v. Windjor*, *post.* 2 vol. 104. *Fairclaim on adm. of Eyson v. Proffer*, *Cowp.* 217.

Owen v. Owen.

March the 2d,
1738.

Cafe 236.

HE testatrix, after several legacies, bequeaths in these words, "All the rest and residue, &c. I give and beath to my two nieces *Mary* and *Elizabeth*, daughters to nephew *William Owen*, and *Anne* his wife, whom I de- to be trustees for their children, to take care of their icies for them, they being of tender age, and my will that my estate be equally divided between my two nieces, *ry* and *Elizabeth*, whom I nominate and appoint my cutrixes accordingly."

A. devises all the residue of her estate to her two nieces Mary and Elizabeth, daughters to her nephew William Owen, and Anne his wife, whom she desires to be trustees for their

, to take care of their legacies, and then says, *My will is, that my estate be equally divided be- ary and Elizabeth, whom I appoint my executrixes accordingly* : One of the nieces died in the life :statrix, and all the next of kin had small legacies, except one. ewife to the two nieces is not a jointenancy, for the words *equally divided*, though not annexed ause which giveth the residue, can relate to that only, and if they had been both living at the the testatrix, they would have taken as tenants in common.

*Knight - 400
2 M. & S. 21*

: of the nieces died in the life of the testatrix.

: question was, Whether *William Owen*, and *Anne* his stand in the light of trustees of a moiety of the residue e next of kin, and whether the testatrix was to be con- l as dead intestate in respect to that moiety, or whether ewife to the two nieces was a jointenancy, and *Wil- hoven* and *Anne* his wife are trustees for the surviving niece

*Cole v. Cole
1 Han. 517*

B. *All those who were next of kin, and intitled under the sta- ute of distributions, had small legacies left them, except one.*

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the plaintiffs the next of kin were cited, the cases of *v. Page* before Lord Chancellor King, 2 Wms. 489. and *Wells v. Rayner*, before Lord Hardwicke.

Brown, for the defendant the surviving niece, urged the f civil law, that where heirs were instituted (which words the same import as legatées in our law), and one dies, gacy goes to the rest by way of accretion, because the perfon cannot die testate and intestate as to the same : he relied much on the authority of *Hunt v. Berkeley*, at oills the 24th of June 1731, before Sir *Joseph Jekyll*.*

Lord

ry Berkeley possessed of a personal estate on the 8th of December 1720, made her hereby she gave both specific and pecuniary legacies to her brother *Francis*, and to her two sons in law the defendants, and likewise gave legacies to a each of them, and also legacies to other persons, and then gives all the rest and of her personal estate to her before-mentioned brother and sons in law, to be divided among them, and makes them executors: In January 1722, *Francis* died, afterwards in March 1725 the testatrix died. The question was, Whe- third part of the residuum devised to *Francis Woolmer*, should go to the next or to the surviving executors; and the Master of the Rolls decreed for the is (1).

It seems that if there be a join- pens, by whatever cause, that one of the y, created by a will, and it hap- joint-tenants is prevented from taking.

K k 2

The

OWEN v.
OWEN.

Lord Chancellor: The first question that hath been made this cause is, Whether these two nieces, if they had survived the testatrix, would have been tenants in common.

Though the words *equally to be divided* in a strict settlement at common law have never been determined, barely of themselves to make a tenancy in common, yet it is settled they do so in a will, both with regard to real and personal estate.

It is clear to me, that, if both of the nieces had been living the words *to be equally divided* would certainly have made a tenancy in common; for though, as hath been truly said, the words in a strict settlement at common law have never been determined barely of themselves to make a tenancy in common, yet in a will it is settled that these words will make a tenancy in common, both with regard to real and personal estate (1).

mon, yet it is settled they do so in a will, both with regard to real and personal estate.

The only distinction attempted by the defendant's counsel in this case is, that the words *equally divided* are not annexed to a clause that gives the residue, and therefore must be relative to the subsequent clause which nominates the two nieces executrixes.

The interest and authority of executors is joint, and cannot be divided into distinct powers, but they may be so appointed as that their authority may commence or determine at different times.

But the construction would be absurd, because as executors there can be no division of their interest, or authority though a man may appoint executors in such a manner, their authority may commence or determine at different times, yet he cannot nominate persons executors, and confine one of them to one branch of his estate, and another to another, for they have a joint authority, which extends to the whole estate, and cannot be divided into distinct and separate powers, and therefore these words must be applied to the whole of the beneficial interest: If therefore they are tenants in common, what is the consequence of the death of one in the lifetime of the testatrix? Why, clearly where it is either a pecuniary legacy or of a real estate, that is given to two persons, to be equally divided between them, and one of them dies in the lifetime of the testatrix, it is a lapsed legacy, and the share of the person dying in the present case ought to be considered as such.

The next question is, Whether this shall go to the full share of the executrix, or be distributed amongst the next of kin, as a moiety.

The legal interest in a lapsed legacy is in the executor, but the beneficial interest is in the next of kin of the testator.

There are two things to be considered in regard to a lapsed legacy, moiety, the legal interest, and the equitable interest. By the maxims of law, a legal interest of a lapsed legacy certainly goes to the executor; but in the judgment of this court the beneficial interest is given likewise, and according to the determination here since *Foster and Munt*, in 2 Vern. 473. n. it goes to the next of kin, tho' in all those cases, the legal interest unquestionably allowed to be in the executor.

Page v. Page in 2 Wms. 489. is a strong case, Where the testator devised the residue of his personal estate to six persons, to

The whole will vest in the survivor after the testator's death. *Pring v. Clay*, 2 Cba. Rep. 187. *Humphrey v. Taylor*, Amb. 136. *Dowset v. Sweet*, *ibid.* 175. *Freeman v. Relfe*, 2 Bro. Cba. Rep. 220.

Baldwin v. Johnson, 3 Bro. Cba. Rep. 455. *Buffar v. Bradford*, *post.* 220.

(1) See *Prince v. Hylin*, and the cases cited in the note.

urt, and made them executors, and one of them dying in
time of the testator, Lord Chancellor *King* was of
the legacy did not survive, and decreed his share to the
kin: this case, on the 29th of *August* 1734, was cited
Lord *Talbot*, and followed by him, and by me afterwards
case of *Holdernefs v. Reyner*.

OWEN v.
OWEN.

Joseph Jekyll late Master of the Rolls, in *Hunt v. Barkley*,
intirely from *Page v. Page*, but this is only one case
many, and the reason he went on there is not sufficient
ort the doctrine of that case; for the next of kin in this
are similar to an heir at law, and as he does not take by
ention of his ancestor, but in his own right by act of
with regard to the personal estate, the next of kin
in like manner in succession *ab intestato*, and not by the
m of the testator, but as cast upon them by the law:
re I am of opinion the plaintiffs are intitled to a dis-
n (1).

As an heir does
not take real
estate by the in-
tention of his
ancestor, but by
act of law, so
with regard to
personal, the
next of kin take
in succession *ab
intestato*, and not
by the intention
of the testator.

William Owen and *Anne* his wife, the father and mother of
nieces, are no more than natural guardians to take care
legacy, for they cannot be in law trustees, unless some
in the thing given were actually vested in them.

No person can
be a trustee in
law, unless he
has a vested in-
terest in the
thing given.

to *Bagwell v. Dry*, 1 P. W. 700. See *Man v. Man*, 2 Stra. 905. *Cbeslyn*
Page, 2 P. W. 489. 2 Stra. 820. v. *Creswell*, 6 Bro. P. C. 1.
Peat v. Chapman, 1 Ves. 542.

Partridge v. Pawlet.

February the
26th, 1736.

c *Executors and Administrators, under the Division, What
shall be Affets.*

Vide title Partition.

C A P. LXII.

[497]

Jointure.

Vide title Dower and Jointure.

C A P. LXIII.

Judge.

Ex parte *Lingood*.

May the 12th,
1742.

e *Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to a Certificate
from Commissioners to a Judge.*

K k 3

Landlord and Tenant.

March 11th 2d,
1738. Benjamin Charlewood, ——— Plaintiff.
The Duke of Bedford, Smith and Bever. ——— Defendants.

Case 237.

The bare entry of a steward in his lord's contract book with his tenants, is not an evidence of itself, that there is an agreement for a lease between the lord and a tenant.

*Y. Harp v Bryan
2. Bing: N.C. 735.*

[498]

THE plaintiff as assignee of a lease, being intitled, during the remainder of a term therein, to a house in *Covent-Garden*, with offices, and also to a stable and coach-house, with a room over the same, and to the use of the yard adjoining to the coach-house, the defendant *Smith*, the late Duke of *Bedford's* steward, and the plaintiff, who was desirous to continue in the house beyond the term in the said lease, on the 26th of *May* 1731 came to an agreement, that in consideration of the plaintiff's surrendering the stable and coach-house, with the room over the same, and his right to the yard, in order to accommodate Mr. *Rich*, who was then building a new play-house, he should have 30*l.* allowed him for the then remainder of the term therein, and have the same term in the residue of the premises made up to him 21 years from that day at 60*l.* per ann. and that a lease should be executed to the plaintiff accordingly, and for which he should pay the Duke 80*l.* which agreement he delivered *Smith* to be entered in his Grace's contract book with his tenants; that some short time after, Mr. *Rich* entered into and possessed the stables, coach-house, &c. and took down and demolished part thereof to build his playhouse.

Smith, on the death of the late Duke, being continued steward, declared to the plaintiff that he must stand to the agreement, and should have a further lease according to the terms of that agreement, on which the plaintiff began to repair and fit up the house, and laid out several hundred pounds in needful repairs, and alterations, beyond what he was obliged to by any covenants in the old lease.

At *Lady Day* 1736 the lease expired, and no new one hath been made to the plaintiff according to the agreement, though he has offered to pay the fine; but the defendant the Duke of *Bedford* doth not only refuse to make a new lease to the plaintiff, but hath actually made a lease of the said premises to the defendant *Bever*, and given the plaintiff notice to deliver the possession, or to pay double rent.

The bill therefore is brought to have such further lease decreed him, and the sum of thirty pounds paid him, and that if the defendant *Smith* made the agreement without sufficient authority, that he may make satisfaction to the plaintiff for the damages he may sustain thereby.

The Duke of *Bedford* by his plea, which on arguing was ordered to stand for an answer, insisted that by the statute of frauds and perjuries, " All leases, &c. or term of years, or any

ain interest in any messuage, lands, &c. made by parol *not put in writing, and signed by the parties* so making the lease, or their agents, lawfully authorized by writing, shall be the force and effect of leases at will only, and shall not be in law or equity, be deemed or taken to have any other greater force or effect, *any contract for making any such lease, or any former law to the contrary notwithstanding;*” and avers that the pretended agreement for a lease to be made by the plaintiff of the premises, *was not put into writing and signed by the defendant;* and doth also aver that the same was not made by his late brother in his life time, *or by any agent of his brother, or himself, thereunto lawfully authorized by writing,* and that the agreement was made by *Smith*, the same was never approved of by his brother (1), nor himself, nor did the plaintiff apply for the lease, till the defendant had directed the lease to be made to *Brer*, and which he admitted he made in *June 1733*, to commence from the expiration of the former lease at *Lady-day* last.

CHARLEWOOD
v. The Duke of
BEDFORD.

And the defendant, the present Duke, by his answer, insisted that the agreement, though *reduced into writing*, yet was made without the late Duke's approbation, and had been never approved by him, or signed by him, or any agent of his lawfully authorized, nor by the plaintiff or the defendants.

And Chief Baron Comyns sitting for Lord Chancellor; I conceive that *this* agreement should be carried into execution, and, to be sure, there are cases where agreements have been carried into execution, which have not literally pursued the letter of frauds and perjuries. [499]

In this case there does not appear to be any certain agreement between the parties, for the bare entry of a steward in his contract book with his tenants, is not an evidence of that there is an agreement for a lease between the lord and his tenants, unless it is supported by other proof.

Here the plaintiff has brought a bill for a specific performance of an agreement, and declines, as the present does, reading the answer of the defendant, it is a strong suspicion that the answer does not come up to the case he would make by his

It does not appear whether this is a true copy of the writing as entered in the contract book, but may be only heads for agreement; and in a case a lessor, by writing an agreement for lease in a book, should be said to substantiate the lease, and would be giving too large a power to him, and would intire-

The duke admitted that his brother by writing authorized him to do such transactions for his approbation. *Reg. Lib. A. 1738. fol. 162.* and another to manage and let the estates, they acquainting and lay-

CHARLEWOOD
v. The Duke of
Bedford.

A performance
only of one side
is not a dispensa-
tion of the statu-
te of frauds and
perjury, but
casus omisus,
against which
there is no pro-
vision.

ly frustrate the design of the statute of frauds, &c. for it would be too great a temptation to perjury (1).

It was urged by the plaintiff's counsel, that if an agreement be made in part, and executed on one side (2), that this is a foundation for equity to establish the agreement, especially where there has been an expence to one of the parties (3).

But in all cases where there is a performance only of one side, that is not a dispensation of the statute, but *casus omisus*, against which there is no provision made.

The court declared that the plaintiff ought to be relieved against the payment of the double rent, and ordered the injunction granted for stay of the defendant's proceeding at law for double rent to be continued; and that the plaintiff's bill, as to all other matters, be dismissed without costs, except as to the defendant *Bever*, and as to him with forty shillings costs (4).

(1) But in *Allen v. Bower*, 3 Bro. Cba. Rep. 149. a lessor made a verbal promise to his lessee to secure him in the possession of the premises during the lessee's life. In consequence of the promise, the lessee made considerable alterations and improvements. After the lessor's death a memorandum of this promise was found among his papers, wherein he hoped the same would be observed. Lord Thurlow held,

that the memorandum took the case out of the statute of frauds, and directed a lease to be made to the lessee for 99 years determinable on his life.

(2) See *Attorney General v. Day*, 1 Kef. 221. *Potter v. Potter*, 1 Ves. 441. *Whitchurch v. Bevis*, 2 Bro. Cba. Rep. 559. *Vide post*. 3 vol. 4. note 1.

(3) So *Allen v. Bower*, 3 Bro. Cba. Rep. 149.

(4) *Reg. Lib. A. 1738. fol. 362.*

C A P. LXV.

Lapsed Legacy.

Vide title Conditions and Limitations.

Vide title Jointenants and Tenants in Common.

C A P. LXVI.

[500]

Lease.

Vide title Statute of Frauds and Perjuries.

C A P. LXVII.

Legacies.

- A) Of *vested or lapsed Legacies* being to be paid at a future Time or certain Age, to which the Legatees never arrived.
- B) Where Legatees shall, or shall not, have Interest.
- C) Of *Specifick and Pecuniary Legacies*, and here of abating and refunding.
- D) *Ademption of a Legacy*.
- E) Of a *Lapsed Legacy*, by Legatees dying in the Life-time of the Testator, and here in what Cases it shall be good, and vest in another person to whom it is limited over.

- (A) Of *vested or Lapsed Legacies* being to be paid at a future Time, or certain Age, to which the Legatees never arrived.

Trinity Vacation, 1737.

Atkins v. Hiccocks.

A Testator devises in these words, "I devise to my daughter Elizabeth Hiccocks, the sum of 200 l. to be paid her at the time of her marriage, or within three months after, provided she marry with the approbation of my two sons William and Samuel Hiccocks, or the survivor of them; and my will is, that my said daughter Elizabeth shall yearly receive, and be paid, until such time as she shall marry, the sum of twelve pounds, free and clear of all taxes and impositions whatsoever." And willed, that his leasehold estate called _____, should stand charged with the payment of the said 200 l. *per ann.* and likewise with the payment of the 200 l. when the same should become due, and devised the said leasehold premises, and his whole personal estate, to his two sons, and made them his executors.

Daffield v. Oliver.
2 S. C. cited - 544.
S. C. cited

1 Vef. 5, 44.
2 Vef. 201. *Hudson*
Case 238. *Foster*
A testator de-
vise to his
daughter E. H.
200 l. to be paid
her at the time
of marriage, or
within 3 months
after, provided
she marry with
the approbation
of his two sons.
E. H. died after
twenty-one, but
without being
married. Bill
brought by her
representative for the legacy.

Elizabeth died after 21, but without being married; and the present plaintiff, as her administrator, brought a bill against the executors of Hiccocks for the 200 l.

The general question, Whether the legacy vested in Elizabeth, and whether it so vested as to be transmissible to her administrator?

[*501]

Lord

ATKINS v.
HICCOCKS.

Lord Chancellor : I am of opinion this was not a vested legacy ; in the common cases of legacies to be paid at the age of 21, there is a certain time fixed, not to the thing itself, but to the execution of it, and the time being so fixed, must necessarily come : but when the time annexed to the payment is merely eventual, and may or may not come, and the person dies before the contingency happens, I can find no instance in this court, where it has been held that the legacy at all events should be paid. The rule as to the vesting is founded upon another rule, *certum est quod certum reddi potest*, and it is plain that the testator did not regard the point of time, but the fact that was to happen, *the marriage*, which makes it a legacy on a condition, and cannot be demanded till the condition be satisfied.

It has been argued by Mr. Attorney General, that this bequest differs not from a legacy given *to be paid at 21*, which vests immediately, and the time of payment only is postponed.

But it has been always held, with regard to such a limitation of payment at 21, that it is *debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro*, and the payment postponed merely on account of the legatee's legal incapacity of managing his own affairs till that age ; and this has been the established rule of this court ever since *Cloberie's case*, 2 *Ventris* 342.

In the *Digest*, lib. 35. tit. 1. lex 75. de *Conditionibus*, &c. it is held that *dies incertus conditionem in testamento facit*, and these are the words of the text, and not of the commentator ; so that a time absolutely uncertain is put on the same footing as a condition ; but as the civil law is no further of authority than as it has been received in *England*, let us see what our own authors say. *Swinbourn*, part 4. sec. 17. page 267. *old edition*, makes a difference between a certain and an uncertain time, and lays it down, that if a legacy is given to be paid at the day of marriage, and the legatee die before, the legacy is lost. *God. Orp. Leg.* 452. is to the same effect.

It has been insisted, that the testator's giving 12 *l. per ann.* to *Elizabeth* till the contingency of her marriage, is in the nature of interest for the 200 *l.* and that from thence it appears to be his intention, that the legacy should vest in the mean time⁽¹⁾ ; but whenever this doctrine has been allowed, the payment of the principal hath been certain, and so not similar to the present case, because here this is not meant as interest, for it is an annuity of 12 *l. per ann.* charged upon, and issuing out of an estate.

[502]

The case in 1 *Salk.* 170. *Thomas v. Howell*, was plainly a condition subsequent, and being made impossible by the act of God, it was adjudged that the condition was not broken, and consequently should not divest the estate out of the devisee.

(1) See *Fonnercau v. Fonnercau*, post. 3 vol. 645. *Dodson v. Hay*, 3 *Bro. Chanc. Rep.* 404.

The second point is very strong against the transmissibility, and is her marrying with the consent of her two brothers, shews plainly the testator intended a condition precedent, *if she married she was to have 200 l. for her portion*; but if died before, there was no occasion to have it raised for the fit of a stranger.

It is true indeed, as there is no devise over, the clause of condition might be only *in terrorem*, but in all cases, where the condition of marrying is annexed, it is necessary that the condition, as to the marrying at least, should be performed, though it is not obliged to marry with consent.

ATRINGS v.
HICCOCKS.

In all cases, where the condition of marrying is annexed, it is necessary there should be marriage to vest the legacy (1).

I am the more satisfied, because it appears to be the intention of the testator, that this 200 l. should be in the nature of a marriage portion, for he has taken it out of a leasehold estate; if she did not marry, it was manifestly his design that it should sink in that estate for the benefit of his sons: therefore I think this bequest is to be considered as a condition precedent, which not being performed, the legacy did never vest, consequently the administrator can make no title to it. bill dismissed.

) *Garbut v. Hilton*, ante, 281. *Elton* S. C. 1 *Ves.* 4. S. C. *Hemmings v. ton*, post. 3 vol. 504. 1 *Wils.* 159. *Munkley*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 303.

Pool v. Terry.
by Linnous. 29th

MICHAEL Terry, being intitled to the reversion of an estate after the death of his wife, "devised it to C. D. and his heirs, so as he should pay to his sister Elizabeth Oades the sum of one hundred pounds, within six months after the reversion came into his possession (2), and devised the rest and residue of his personal estate, all his debts and legacies before decreed being first deducted, to C. D. and another, whom he made his executors."

November the 8th, 1738.
Case 239.
S. C. cited
1 *Ves.* 44.
2 *Ves.* 202.
Com. 718. S. C.
8 *Vin. Abr.*
383 pl. 36.
M. T. being intitled to the reversion of an estate after the death of his wife

did to C. D. and his heirs, so as he should pay to his sister Elizabeth Oades 100 l. within six months after the reversion came into his possession.

Elizabeth Oades died in the life-time of the wife, and Elizabeth's representative brings the bill against the 100 l.

The legatee dying before the time for raising the 100 l. was come, her representative is not intitled (1).

) It appears from a MSS. report in this case that the testator charged the manors, &c. with the payment of 100 l. and after giving several pecuniary legacies, gives the rest and residue of his real and personal estate, his debts and legacies being thereout first allowed, &c.

) Lord Tzurlow in *Godwin v. Mun-*
1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 191. disapproves
the case: and observes that it can-

not be reconciled with *Leather v. Con-*
don, post. 2 vol. 127. The same re-
mark seems to apply to other cases,
as particularly to *Emes v. Hancock*, post.
2 vol. 507. *Hutchings v. Fay*, Com. 716.
Sherman v. Collins, post. 3 vol. 319.
Tunstall v. Bracken, Amb. 167. 1 *Bro.*
Cha. Rep. 124. S. C. *Jeale v. Titchner*,
Amb. 703. *Hodson v. Rawson*, 1 *Ves.*
44.

Elizabeth

HALL v.
TERRY.

Elizabeth Oades died in the life-time of the wife, and she likewise being now dead, the representative of *Elizabeth Oades* brings this bill against *C. D.* to have the 100*l.* paid to him.

[503]

Mr. Fazakerley for the plaintiff insisted, that this is a vested legacy, and that the legatee might have assigned it, or released it; and if it was transmissible in her life-time, it is, after the death of legatee, equally transmissible to her representative, and was not intended as a contingent payment, but the time of payment only was postponed. He relied chiefly on the case of *King v. Withers*, T. 1735. *Caf. in Eq.* in the time of Lord Chancellor Talbot, 117. but if the court should be of opinion against the plaintiff in this point, he submitted it, that the 100*l.* might be raised out of another fund, the personal estate, as the defendant allows he has assets in his hands, and that by virtue of the last words in the will, all his debts and legacies before bequeathed being first deducted, it was an original charge on the personal estate, and therefore ought to follow the ordinary rule of pecuniary legacies.

The *Attorney General* for the defendant insisted, that, on the face of the will, it is plainly no legacy, but only a charge upon the estate, and is nothing more than a gift of the real estate, so as the devisee pay such a sum of money; that a charge upon a real estate was never subject to the jurisdiction of the Spiritual court, and by their rules it is a vested legacy only that is transmissible to the representative; that the law does not look upon a charge on a real estate, as a vested legacy till the day of payment comes, and this court have always governed themselves, in these cases, by the authority of *Pawlet v. Pawlet*, 2 *Ventr.* 366, 367.*

Mr. Brown of the same side said, to make the personal estate liable, this legacy ought to be a general charge, which is not the present case, because it is particularly charged upon a real estate, which has never been construed a legacy, but merely a testamentary gift, by imposing terms and conditions on the person who takes the estate.

Where there is an absolute legacy, and the future time *must* come for the payment, by the civil law, it is transmissible, but here are no words that can make a gift of the money, nor can he claim it as absolutely given, for it is only annexed as a condition to a devise of lands to another person, and he relied on the case of *Carter v. Bletsoe*, 2 *Vern.* 617†.

* A term limited by a settlement to raise portions for younger children payable 21, or marriage; one of them dies under 21, and unmarried, her portion shall not be raised for the benefit of the administratrix.

† *A.* devises lands to *B.* his son and his heirs, and declares, that out of the lands he shall pay 200*l.* to his daughter at her age of 21: she marries and dies under age. *Cur.* There is no vesting clause in the will, the direction, that the son pays to the daughter at her age of 21, vests nothing until she attains 21, and she dying before it never arises.

ord Chancellor : These are cases upon which there have been a variety of determinations, and they are not very easily to be distinguished.

The question is, Whether the plaintiff is intitled to have the 100*l.* paid to him which is given under the will of *Michael Terry Elizabeth Oades*.

The general rule is, where money is given to be paid out of real estate at a future time, that if the person dies before the time, it shall sink into the estate, and this has been established since the case of *Parulet v. Parulet*, in 2 *Ventr.* and so likewise as to personal estate, where the time of payment is annexed to the legacy, if the person dies before the time, it cannot be raised.

There are other legacies under the will of the testator, to which the words, *his legacies before bequeathed being first deducted*, properly applicable, and therefore no argument can be drawn thence, that the 100*l.* was intended as an original charge on the personal estate.

It is insisted by the plaintiff's counsel, that the legacy is vested, only the time of payment postponed for the convenience of the estate, as it was a dry reversion.

But I am of opinion, that the gift of the sum of money is by the direction for the payment, and that it cannot be this is an original gift, so as to vest the legacy, and the payment only postponed to a future time.

Another distinction has been attempted, that the time of payment was not taken from the nature of the legacy, or the circumstances of the legatee, but from the nature of the estate, that therefore *this* is different from all the cases (1).

But I doubt, if I should give into this reasoning, I should turn the cases of portions, or of other sums bequeathed : of late years it has been held, that where a sum of money is given by way of portion, or as a general legacy, charged on land, if the party dies before the time, it cannot be raised.

In the present case here is no contingency, the time is to be paid within 6 months after the death of tenant for life, when the reversion came into possession, so that it never could be raised, because the person died before the time for payment.

As to the case of *King v. Withers*, Lord Talbot said, that though the contingency, on which the sums there given were payable, had not happened, yet that the time on which these sums were directed to be paid, had happened, and therefore *that* they were to be vested.

HALL v.
TERRY.

Where money is given to be paid out of real estate at a future time, if the person dies before the time, it shall sink into the estate ; the same as to personal estate, where the time of payment is annexed to the legacy.

[504]

Whether a sum of money be given as a portion, or as a legacy, if charged upon land, and the party dies before the time, it cannot be raised (2).

1) See *Lowther v. Condon*, *post*.
vol. 129.

(2) See *Prouse v. Abingdon*, *ante*
482. and *Sherman v. Collins* *post*, 3 vol.
319.

HALL v. TERRY. The case of *Bright v. Norton*, determined by Lord Talbot, is a very strong authority in the present case; *that was a trust upon lands, for raising and paying a sum of money, within six years after the death of the testator, to the second son, who died within the time, held to be intended for his maintenance only, and not transmissible to his executor, unless he had lived to the end of the six years (1).*

Upon the whole, I must direct the bill to be dismissed, but without costs.

A trust upon lands for raising and paying a sum of money, within six years after the death of the father, to the second son, who dying within the time, construed to be for maintenance only and not transmissible.

(1) In a MSS. report Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said, "*Bright v. Norton* is a strong case; but what I ground myself upon is, that the direction of payment is the gift, and she dying before, there is no gift." *Vide etiam. 1 Ves. 48. 1 Bro. Cba. Rep. 124. note.*

[505]

(B) *Where Legacies shall, or shall not have Interest.*

Michaelmas Term, 1737.

*Palmer v. Mason.**Verale.**Val.**Lord v.**Ed.**252.***Case 240.**

A. gave 500*l.* to his granddaughter to be paid at 21, or marriage, and if she died before either contingency, then it is devised over to B.

JOSEPH Palmer by will gave 500*l.* to his granddaughter, to be paid at 21, or day of marriage, and if she died before either of the contingencies happened, then the testator devised the legacy over to another.

Bill brought for interest upon the legacy, and to secure the principal.

As it is given over, nothing vests in the granddaughter, and therefore neither intitled to interest, nor to have the principal secured.

A specifick devise of land shall not contribute upon an average with the

A bill brought for interest upon the legacy, and that the principal may be secured to the plaintiff, who is an infant, till the contingencies happened, the case of *Acherley v. Vernon*, in 1 *Wms.* 783. was cited for this purpose.

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion, as the legacy is given over, that nothing vested in the granddaughter the legatee, and that she is not intitled to interest, or to have the principal secured (1).

There was another point in the cause between a specifick devisee of land under the will, and the heir at law of the testator, whether the former shall contribute equally with the latter, in the payment of debts, where the personal estate is not sufficient.

Lord Chancellor: Where there is a specifick devise of land = the specifick legatee shall never contribute upon an average with the heir at law, towards satisfaction of creditors.

(1) See *Heath v. Perry*, *post.* 3 vol. 101, and the cases cited in the dissenting notes there.

heir at law towards satisfaction of creditors, while the real
s of the heir are sufficient (1).

PALMER v.
MASON.

(1) See *Galton v. Hancock*, post. 2 vol. 424.

Green v. Belchier.



January the
28th, 1737.

IN the intended marriage of *Henry Faine*, the *Castle Inn* at
Kingston was vested in trustees, and the trust thereof de-
ed to one *Elizabeth Stidd* for life, remainder to *Anne Payne*,
er of *Henry Payne* for life, remainder to *Henry Payne* for
remainder to his intended wife for life, remainder to his
and other sons in tail: And in the deed of settlement there
proviso to this effect, that if *Henry Payne* and his wife should
leaving any issue unprovided for, that then it should be
ul for the trustees to enter and receive the rents and profits
his estate, until they had received the sum of 200 l. and the
misses are afterwards declared to be chargeable, and to stand
ged with the raising this sum, for the benefit of such chil-
so unprovided for, in such manner, and in such propor-
s, as the survivor of the husband or wife should appoint:
wife survived the husband, and, according to the power
r the proviso, appointed the 200 l. to be paid to her daugh-
he wife of the plaintiff, the only child *not provided for* in the
of the father and mother.

Case 241.

On settlement
before marriage,
a proviso, that
if a husband and
wife die, leav-
ing issue unpro-
vided for, that
then the trust-
tees might enter
upon an estate,
and take the
rents thereof,
till they had re-
ceived 200 l. for
the benefit of
such unprovided
children, in such
manner and pro-
portion, as the
survivor of the
husband and
wife should ap-
point: The
wife survived,
bill brought to

pointed the 200 l. for a daughter, the plaintiff's wife being an unprovided child: bill brought to
the 200 l. raised.

Joseph Jekyll decreed the 200 l. and interest by way of maintenance, from the death of the mo-
defendant appealed from that part which allows interest, and decree affirmed.

he bill was brought against the defendant, who purchased
remisses of the eldest son of the marriage, in order to have
00 l. raised.

[*506]

he *Master of the Rolls* (a) decreed the principal sum of 200 l. (a) Sir *Joseph*
e raised for the plaintiff, and likewise interest by way of *Jekyll*.
tenance for the plaintiff's wife from the time of the death
e mother, which happened about a year before the filing of
ill.

Haw. Bone

1. Nov. 55.

om that part of the decree relating to the allowance of in-
the defendant appealed to *Lord Chancellor*.

Andrua B.

14 Jan. 55.

Lord Chancellor: The defendant in this case being a purchaser
notice of the charge upon the estate, is to be considered in
ume light, as if the bill had been brought against the per-
nder whom he claims.

ie question in this case will be, Whether the 200 l. is to be
lered as a sum to be raised by receipt of the annual rents
rofits, or as a sum in gross by a determinate time.

is plain by the settlement, that this 200 l. was intended
ie children's portions, and what is material too, for such
re otherwise unprovided for, and therefore if no maintenance

GREEN v.
BELCHER.

was allowable in the mean time, the estate not being above *50l. per ann.* the 200*l.* must necessarily be exhausted greatly in bare subsistence of such children, before the whole sum could be raised.

Wherever the words *to be raised by rents and profits* are used in a deed, unless there are other words to make it annual, the court have always made a liberal construction, in order to obtain the end which the party intended by raising the money, have allowed and a sale.

Such a construction therefore ought not to be made, unless the words are extremely plain, which is not the present case: That part of the proviso, empowering the trustees to enter and receive the rents, &c. seems to mean the annual rents and profits, though in general, where money is directed to be raised by rents and profits, unless there are other words to restrain the meaning, and to confine them to the receipts of the rents and profits as they accrue, the court, in order to obtain the end which the party intended by raising the money, has, by the liberal construction of these words, taken them to amount to a direction to sell, and as a devise of the rents and profits will at law pass the lands, the raising by rents and profits, is the same as raising by sale (1).

The subsequent words, by which the premises are declared to be charged with this 200*l.* if they stood alone, would certainly warrant a sale or mortgage (2), and they ought certainly to have their proper force, and ought not to be controlled by the preceding words, supposing them to mean annual rents only.

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The appointment of the 200*l.* being in such manner, and proportions, as the survivor of the father and mother shall think fit, the father or mother might have made it payable at any time.

Where a legacy is given by a father to a child as a provision, though payable at a future day, yet the child has an immediate right to the interest of the money, otherwise, if legatee be a stranger to testator.

(a) Prec. in Chan. 583. and 2 Wms. 13.

The words of the appointment of the 200*l.* being in such manner, and in such proportions, as the survivor of the father and mother shall direct, are very material, for these words not only include a power of raising it by mortgage or sale, but a certain *determinate time for raising it*, and as there is no time limited by the settlement for payment of the money, the father or mother might no doubt have made the 200*l.* payable at any time, as at the age of 21, or marriage, and in such case interest by way of maintenance would certainly be allowable in the mean time; it being a constant rule in equity, that wherever a legacy is given by a father to a child, as a provision for such child, though the legacy be payable at a future day, yet the child has an immediate right to the interest of the money (3); if the legatee was a *stranger* to the testator, it would be otherwise. In the case of *Ivy v. Gilbert* (a), there were no words declaring the premises to be charged with, &c. as in the present, and yet it was held even there, that the words, rents and profits would in general warrant a sale, though it did not in that particular case, by reason of the subsequent words restraining the manner of raising the money, by leases for one, two or three lives, or for any number of years determinable thereon, or for 21 years absolutely at the old rent.

The decree affirmed (4).

(1) See *Traford v. Ashton*, 1 Cox's P. W. 418, note 1. *Ivy v. Gilbert*, 2 Cox's P. W. 19. n. 1. *Okefen v. Okefen*, post. 550.

(2) See post. 2 vol. 42.

(3) See *Heath v. Perry*, post. 3 vol. 102. note.

(4) *Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 289.*

Of Specifick and Pecuniary Legacies, and here of abating and refunding.

Palmer v. Mason.

Vide this Case in the Division immediately preceding.

Lawson v. Stitch (1).

May the 5th,
1738.

Case 242.

JOHN Lawson by will dated the 20th of *July 1733*, amongst other legacies, devised to the defendant 500*l.* to remain and continue at interest on such securities, as he should see at the time of his death, or to be put out on government securities at the election of his executors.

It appeared in fact, that the testator had a mortgage for the principal sum of 500 *l.* on the estate of one *Mr. Pope*, and that he had no other sum out at interest, and it was insisted by the defendant, that he had several times declared that he would leave the said 500*l.*

There being a deficiency of assets to answer all the other legacies given by the will, the question is, If this is a specifick legacy, for if it is, it would not be liable to any proportionable abatement, with the other pecuniary legatees.

It was insisted by the *Attorney General*, that this is a specifick legacy, that it appearing the testator had in this mortgage sufficient to answer the charge, and that too appearing to be the security the testator had, it must be presumed he intended the legacy should be satisfied out of this mortgage; that where any security itself is devised, or any part of the money due on such security, such legacy is always to be taken as a specific one, and in support of his argument, he cited the case of *Wright v. Carey*, at the Rolls, the 14th of *May 1728*. "There the testator devised a legacy of 1000*l.* payable at the age of 21, or marriage, to be retained in the hands of *Atwell* (who had money of the testator's in his hands, as his banker); the Master of the Rolls held this legacy should not carry interest, only from the time limited for payment, which is the case always of general pecuniary legacies, but that by this manner of devising this 1000 *l.* it was severed from the rest of testator's estate, and specifically appropriated for the benefit of this legatee, and that it should carry interest immediately." (2.

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1) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1737. fol. 299. that this case had often been denied to
2) *Lord Thurlow* in *Asbburner v.* be law. *Vide Heath v. Perry*, *post.* 3 vol.
Moira, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 113. said, 102. and notes.

LAWSON v.
STITCH.

A devise of a
sum of money in
a bag, &c. is a
specifick legacy
and shall not
abate with pe-
cuniary legates.

Lord Chancellor: It is pretty difficult to make pecuniary legacies specifick ones; but some such there are, as in the case of a sum of money in such a bag, the devise of a bond, or other security, or a devise of money out of such security, and in such case there can be no abatement (1).

But this seems to me by no means a specifick legacy, here is no particular charge of the legacy on this mortgage, and the election given to the executor plainly shews the testator did not intend to make the mortgage the particular fund, out of which the legacy should issue, but only gave the legatee a power of taking part of the mortgage money, if it should happen to be a subsisting mortgage at the time of his death, or if otherwise, that part of the testator's money, to the amount of 500 l. should be laid out in the purchase of some government security or other, to that value.

That the case at the Rolls was very different, for that was plainly a devise only of part of a debt due from *Atwell* to the testator, nor did this point come in judgment, or was it at all necessary to be determined there, the question only was, from what time the legacy should carry interest, and tho' it was held to carry interest immediately, yet it will not follow from thence it was a specifick one, but liable to an abatement with the other legacies, if any deficiency had made that necessary.

Where a particular debt is devised, and afterwards recovered by testator in an adversary way, it is an ademption of the legacy.

N. B. It was said by the *Attorney General* in this case, that where a particular debt was devised, or part thereof, and the same was recovered by the testator in his life-time, in an adversary way, that will amount to an ademption of the legacy, otherwise, if voluntarily paid off by the debtor to the testator: it was admitted by the *Chancellor* in this case, that distinction had prevailed, and that it was the practice of the court (2).

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His Lordship declared, that the 500 l. given to the defendant, is to be considered as a pecuniary legacy, and liable to abate in proportion with the other legates.

(1) See *Purse v. Snaplin*, ante 414, 1 P. W. 464. *Ford v. Fleming*, 2 P. W. 469. *Astton v. Astton*, 3 P. W. 386.

(2) So *Orme v. Smith*, 1 Eq. Ab. 302. *Drinkwater v. Falconer*, 2 Ves. 623. *Attorney General v. Parkyns*, Amb. 566. *Abburner v. McGwire*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 108. *Rider v. Wager*, 2 P. W. 328. *Partridge v. Partridge*, Ca. temp. Talb. 228. *Hambling v. Lister*, Amb. 401. *Baant v. Stevens*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 431. *Sed contra Earl of Thownd v. Earl of Suffolk*,

(D) Ademption of a Legacy.

Order the 28th,
1738.

Purse v. Snaplin, et c contra.

Wide title Devises, under the Division, Of Void Devises, by Uncertainty in the Description of the Person to take.

Graves v. Boyle.

July the 27th,
1739.

IR *Samuel Garth* having, upon his daughter's marriage, entered into a bond to leave at his death 5000*l.* amongst her younger children, by will creates a term in trustees for 21 years, in trust to apply the rents and profits for a maintenance the children of his daughter, till they came of age; by the will he gives his personal estate in trust, to pay the produce of it to his wife during her life, and after her death to pay 500*l.* to *A.* one of the daughters of his daughter, and to pay 500*l.* to and among the other younger children of his daughter in such manner as his daughter should appoint, and if she made no appointment, then equally between them at their ages of 21 or marriage, and declares his will to be, that the legacies for 1 to his daughter's children, shall be in full satisfaction of the bond.

Cafe 243.

Sir *S. G.* having upon his daughter's marriage given a bond to leave 5000*l.* at his death among her younger children, by will creates a term for years, in trust to apply the rents and profits for maintenance of his daughter's children till 21, and also gives his personal estate

to, to pay the produce of it to his wife for life, and after her death to pay 1500*l.* to *A.* for one of the daughters of his daughter, and 3500*l.* among the other younger children of his daughter, as she should appoint, and if no appointment, equally between them at 21 or marriage, and declares the legacies shall be in full satisfaction of the bond.

must elect to claim under the will, or under the bond; if she claims under the latter, can take benefit under the former.

where a particular thing is by a will given in discharge of a demand, and the party insists on it, he cannot only waive that particular thing, but all benefit claimed under the whole will (1).

The plaintiff brings her bill to have her share out of the term, and likewise her share of the 5000*l.* under the bond.

The Lord Chancellor at the hearing of the cause had declared, that the plaintiff might choose to claim either under the will, or under the bond, but if she claimed under the bond, she must take no benefit at all under the will; but next day conceiving doubt, on account of the devise being of a real estate, and not being a personal debt, gave orders to be attended with precedents, and this day delivered his opinion in support of his former decree, and mentioned the case of *Jenkins v. Jenkins*, November 5, 1736, before Lord Talbot, as a case in point, where a particular thing was given in discharge of a demand, the party insisting on his demand, it was decreed he should waive not only that particular thing, but all benefit which he claimed under the will. The case of *Shepherd v. Philips* at the Rolls, Dec. 1738, was determined on a similar point.

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At the same time the Chancellor took notice, that in the present case the devise was expressed to be in satisfaction of the term, and when he gave orders to be attended with precedents, he would not extend the construction of devises in satisfaction further than they had already gone. He decreed the

Lord Hardwicke declared he would not extend the construction of devises in satisfaction, further than they had

gone. Decreed the children born after the death of the testator should have their share of the bond.

(1) See *Bellasis v. Uibruatt*, ante 26. note.

L 1 2

children

GRAVES v. BOYLE. children born after the death of the testator should have their share under the bond * (1).

* Vide the case of *Lingen v. Scuray*, *Prec. in Chan.* 400.

(1) See *Heathe v. Heathe*, *post.* 2 vol. 121.

(E) *Of a Lapsed Legacy, by Legatee's dying in the Life-time of the Testator, and here, in what Cases it shall be good, and vest in another Person to whom it is limited over.*

July the 1st,
1739.

Van v. Clark.

Case 244.

S. C. cited
1 Ves. 46.
Com. Rep. 718.
M. C. by her
will devised to
G. C. his heirs,
executors, &c.
all that her
messuage in
Great Lincoln's-
Inn Fields, with
all her furniture,
household stuff,
&c. and all her
real and personal
estate, not o-
therwise dis-
posed of, to the
intent that out
of the said real
and personal
estates, her se-
veral legacies
might be paid.

And then gives
to *Thomas Lewis*
2000*l.* in trust
for the use of his
daughter *Mary*;
and he, till she
attain the age of
18, or be mar-
ried, to give
out the same at
interest, and
pay it with the
produce thereof
to his daughter for her own use, on her attaining the age of 18, or marriage, which should first happen.

The 2000*l.* directed to be paid to *Thomas Lewis* within one year and a half after her decease, the infant dying before the time of payment to the trustee, the legacy not raisable for her representative.

Thomas Lewis died in the life-time of the testatrix, and *Mary Lewis* half a year after, unmarried. Bill brought by the representative of *Mary* to have the 2000*l.* paid to him.

Thomas Lewis died in the life-time of the testatrix, Mary Lewis about half a year after the testatrix, unmarried.

The bill was brought by the plaintiff, as representative of Mary Lewis, to have the 2000*l.* paid to him.

The defendant Godfrey Clark, the executor and residuary legatee of Lady Craven, admitted personal assets sufficient to pay 2000*l.* but submitted to the court if the plaintiff was in the right, and his counsel insisted that the house in Lincoln's-Inn was in the first place charged with this, and that it was a charge merely on the personal estate, but on the residuary fund of real and personal; and therefore, the legatee being before the day of payment, it ought to sink, according to the case of *Pawlet v. Pawlet*, 2 Ventr. 366, and 1 Vern. 204, 324, and *Smith v. Smith*, 2 Vern. 92. *Yates v. Phettiplace*, 1 Vern. 416. *Carter v. Bletsoe*, 2 Vern. 616. and *Prowse v. Prowse*, 1 Vern. 1738 *, that there was no vesting clause, only a direction to the executor to pay at a certain day; so that the legacy is annexed to the substance of the legacy, not merely to the day of payment. *Dyer* 59. marginal note. *Swinbourne* 32.

For the representative of Mary Lewis was cited the case of *Spencer v. Spencer*, January 1732, 3 Wms. 172, where the testator directed all his just debts, funeral expences, and legacies, should be charged out of his personal estate, as far as that would go, and in default of that, ordered his executors to raise 2000*l.* out of his real estate within twelve months after his decease, which 1000*l.* he gave to his son A. and charged all his real estate therewith. A. died within the twelve months, and yet decreed to be raised.

That if the trustee had received it in the present case, it must wholly have gone to the representative of Mary Lewis, and it must be considered as entirely separated from the estate, and never to come back to the executor; and cited the case of *Jury v. Elkin*, 2 Vern. 766, and *Jones v. Westcomb*, Prec. in Ch. 716. where a devise was held to be good, though the day of payment was uncertain, and the contingency never happened, (in opposition to the rule of civil law which had been cited *contra*, that *dies incerta conditionem facit*) and also the case of *Corbet v. Palmer* (1), February 1734, where the residue was to be divided among six at the death of the wife of the testator, who died before the wife, and held by Lord Talbot that the interest of the two who died was a vested interest, and transmissible to their representatives, and did not depend on the legatee's surviving the wife, *Whalley and Cox* (2), March 1736, where J. S. made his will as follows: "I give and bequeath to R. Plumer 300*l.* to be paid within three years after my decease, to put the same out to interest, and to pay the interest and profits thereof to my niece

and to her son T. and the other 100*l.* to her son C. W. and T. both die within the three years. The court decreed the whole money should be paid, though charged on both funds.

VAN W. CLARK.

Wm. v. Stn
1 Ann. v. Wms. a
357.

* *Vide ante* 482. pl. 229.

Residue directed by a will to be divided among six persons, at the death of the testator's wife, two died before her; held by Lord Talbot that the interest of the two was a vested one, and transmissible, and depended not on surviving the wife. J. S. gives to R. P. 300*l.* in trust to be paid within three years after his decease to his niece W. for her separate use, and after her decease 200*l.* the three years.

(1) 2 Eq. Ab. 548. pl. 27. S. C.

(2) 2 Eq. Ab. 549. pl. 29. S. C.

VAN W.
CLARK.

Whalley for her separate use; and after her decease in trust to pay the interest thereof, &c. I give 200 *l.* thereof to her son *T. Whalley*, and the other 100 *l.* to her son *C. Whalley*. The mother *Mrs. Whalley* and the son *Thomas* both died *within the three years*, and yet the Master of the Rolls decreed that the whole money should be paid. It was charged on both funds, real estate as well as personal, but it was admitted *that the personal estate was sufficient*.

Lord Chancellor: The infant dying before the time of payment to the trustee, I am of opinion makes this legacy not raisable for the benefit of the plaintiff her representative.

Legacy out of personal estate payable, or given at a certain time, and interest in the mean time, is a vested one; otherwise as to legacies out of real estate, for if legatee dies before the time is come, it sinks into the inheritance. The same construction where a legacy is given out of a mixed fund of real and personal estate as a certain time, or to be paid at a certain time.

If a legacy is given out of a personal estate payable (1) at a certain time, or if given at a certain time, and interest (2) in the mean time, it is a vested legacy; but the rule of this court as to legacies out of real estates is otherwise, for if given at a certain time, or payable at a certain time, yet if the legatee dies before the time is come, it sinks into the inheritance; so when a legacy is given out of a mixed fund of real and personal estate at a certain time, or to be paid at a certain time (3), the construction is the same as if given out of a real estate only. There is but a slight difference between the cases of legacies given at a day, or payable at a day, but the distinction is adhered to only to give a contemporaneous jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical courts; nor is there any case, that I know of, to warrant a distinction between legacies given out of a mixed fund of real and personal estate, and out of real estate only (4).

If the infant had survived the year and half, though the trustee dead before, she would have been intitled to the legacy; so likewise if she had died after the time aforesaid and before 18, or marriage, her representative would have been intitled.

If the infant had survived the year and half (for the death of the trustee makes no distinction), it would have been extremely clear she would have been intitled to the legacy; or if she had died after the time aforesaid, and before eighteen or marriage, her representatives would have been intitled: but if this had been merely personal, as she died within the year and half, her representative could not have been intitled, for the whole gift is in the direction of the payment, which makes that the substance.

Where a legacy charged on real estate is clearly intended as a portion, the court goes as far as it can to hinder the raising it out of land for the benefit of representatives.

In the present case it is not a legacy merely out of a personal estate, but out of both funds, and the real charged in the first place by the testator's express directions, viz. *her estate in Great Lincoln's-Inn Fields*. And this construction is more agreeable to

(1) See *Steadman v. Palling*, post. 3 vol. 427.

(2) See *Atkins v. Hicocks*, ante 501. *Founercau v. Founercau*, post. 3 vol. 645.

(3) See *Proyse v. Abington*, ante 482. *Baycot v. Cotton*, post. 555. *Richardson v.*

Greese, post. 3 vol. 69. *Attorney General v. Milner*, post. 3 vol. 112. Mr. Cal's note to the *Duke of Chandos v. Talbot*, 2 P. W. 612, and *Burl. Co. Litt.* 237. (4) See *Reynish v. Martin*, post. 3 vol. 330.

: intention of the testatrix, as the sum was intended clearly as a provision for *Mary Lewis*: and the court always goes as far as possibly can to hinder the raising portions out of land for the benefit of representatives, and the end of this bill is plainly for this purpose.

VAN D.
CLARE.

His Lordship dismissed the bill, but without costs.

Vide title Conditions and Limitations.

de title Devises, under the Division, Where a Devise shall or shall not be in Satisfaction of a Thing done.

Legacy vested. Vide title Heir and Ancestor.

Vide title Injunctions.

C A P. LXVIII.

Maintenance for Children.

Easter Term, 1737.

Edward Jackson, an Infant, ——— Plaintiff.

Anne Jackson and Others, ——— Defendants.

[THE sum of 3500*l.* had been conveyed to trustees for the benefit of *Mary* the plaintiff's mother, during her verture, and for a provision for children; and if no issue on the husband of *Mary*, if his necessities required it, with the approbation of the trustees, might sell the 3500*l.* (1).]

CASE 245.
Where there is a falling of stock, without the neglect of the trustee, he is not liable to

make good the deficiency, but is answerable only as far as the value, especially where it was stock.

Anne

(1) The plaintiff's mother *Mary* before her marriage was possessed of 500*l.* *South-sea* stock, which according to the price of that stock was valued at 400*l.* It was agreed that 3500*l.* part of this 3700*l.* should be settled on *Mary* and her children by the marriage. The settlement recited that *Mary* was possessed of 3500*l.* principal money, for which the trustees under the settlement were to give a receipt. But in fact no part of the 500*l.* *South-sea* stock was sold to

raise this 3500*l.* except 100*l.* which was sold for 745*l.* out of which *Anne Jackson* one of the trustees received 300*l.* in order to make up with the remaining 400*l.* *South-sea* stock the said sum of 3500*l.* Afterwards the 500*l.* *South-sea* stock greatly fell in value. Plaintiff brought his bill to have the deficiency of the 3500*l.* principal money made good. Decreed, that so far as the bill seeks to make up the 3500*l.* principal money to the value of the 500*l.* *South-sea* stock,

JACKSON v.
JACKSON.

Anne Jackson, the mother of *Mary*, and her uncle, were the trustees under the marriage-settlement, and the 3500*l.* was paid into their hands. *Mary Jackson* is, by the trust, allowed to make a will during the coverture, and to dispose of this money as if she was a *feme sole*.

Mary Jackson lived but four years; before her death she made a will, and devised the 3500*l.* in trust for the benefit of her husband as to the interest thereof, during his life; and for the infant as to the principal; and if the infant dies, the whole for the husband.

Anne Jackson, the mother of *Mary*, paid the interest for the 3500*l.* for a considerable time.

Insisted by her counsel, that, as the stocks are fallen, she is only answerable as far as the value of the stock, especially as it was specifick stock, and the fortune of her daughter lay in this specifick stock, and therefore ought not to be considered as money, especially as stocks are of such a fluctuating nature, and liable to such frequent change, and that the money paid to the daughter, was only the dividends of the stock.

[514]

But it appeared in the cause, that the receipts from the daughter to the mother were for interest generally, and nothing was mentioned in them of stock. The settlement too recites the daughter to be possessed of 3500*l.* principal money in her own right.

Lord Chancellor: This is a mere falling of stock without the trustees' neglect, and therefore comes under the last clause of the statute of *Geo. 1.* made for the indemnity of guardians and trustees, which provides, "That if there be a diminution of the principal, without the default of the trustees, they shall not be liable."

It has been said, that after the stocks fell, the trustees paid interest for 3500*l.* amounting to much more than the produce from the dividends, and therefore to a demonstration it appears to be a trust for money.

But it is well known, that during *the golden dream*, people were so infatuated as to look upon imaginary wealth as equally valuable with so much money.

It has been said, that long after the falling of the stock, the defendant *Anne Jackson* continued paying the same interest.

But still it does not answer either way, for it does not amount to the common rate of interest, and yet is more than the dividends of the fallen stock; and to compel trustees to make up a deficiency, not owing to their wilful default, is the harshest demand that can be made in a court of equity.

Notwithstanding, antecedent to the marriage, it was agreed by the defendant to take the stock at seven hundred and fifty,

be dismissed: and an account was directed of what was due for the 400*l.* *Scarb sea* stock, and the 500*l.* (part of the produce of the sale of the said 100*l.*

Scarb sea stock as aforesaid) with interest at 4*l.* per cent. from *Mary's* death. *Reg. Lib. A. 1736. fol. 411. Vide Traffard v. Boehm post. 3 vol. 444.*

a transfer made accordingly; yet this court will never ge a trustee to acquiesce under so hard and unreasonable contract.

JACKSON v.
JACKSON.

Mary Jackson in her will recites the deed of settlement, and power of devising.

The counsel for the plaintiff insist the devise to the husband is ally made, and not pursuant to the power, and have en- voured to shew, from the whole tenor of the marriage-arti- , she had no power of disposing of any part of the money for benefit of her husband, to the prejudice of the infant the ntiff, and rely principally upon the following proviso:

'Provided nevertheless that no part of the principal money hall be applied to the use of the said *Edward Jackson*, without the consent of the trustees under hand and seal, to he end that this sum may be kept intire for the advantage of he infant."

am of opinion that Mrs. *Mary Jackson* had no power to dis- : of the principal, to the prejudice of the infant, but in one icular circumstance; therefore the disposition she has made is pursuant to the power.

His Lordship directed, that the defendant *Anne Jackson* should out for the whole interest of the 3500*l.* stock from the th of *Mary Jackson*.

The father of the plaintiff appearing to be sufficiently com- ent, his Lordship would give no direction with regard to maintenance, for he said, that whether an infant should e an allowance of maintenance during the life of the fa- r, depends always upon the particular circumstances of the : (1).

[515]
Where a father is sufficiently competent, the court will give no direction with regard to an infant's maintenance.

(1) See *Butler v. Butler*, *post.* 3 vol. 60.

le title *Portions, under the Division, At what Time they shall be raised, &c.*

Vide title *Custom of London.*

C A P. LXIX.

Marriage.

(A) *Where it is clandestine.*

December the
20th, 1737.

Hill v. Turner (1).

* Case 246.

*John Hill
vs. W. Turner
V. S. 530*

A Bill had been brought against an executor for an account of a testator's estate, and also prayed that there might be a guardian assigned, and maintenance for an infant; the mother was appointed guardian, and 10*l.* *per annum* allowed for his maintenance.

The infant being made drunk at an alehouse near the Fleet prison, was drawn in to marry a woman in mean circumstances and of bad character; and upon an application to this court, the wife was committed to the Fleet. The infant's mother, as he had no estate sufficient to maintain a wife till of age, has put him out an apprentice to a merchant in *Holland*, upon which the wife immediately instituted a suit in the ecclesiastical court, for alimony and for restitution of conjugal rights: a sentence there that the husband should cohabit, and if not, that he should pay alimony; and an order made likewise by that court, upon the guardian, to pay the sum of 10*l.* to the wife towards alimony, and afterwards a monition to the guardian to pay a further sum as an increase of alimony, and a sentence of excommunication pronounced against her for not obeying the monition, and also against the infant, the husband, for not receiving his wife.

Mary Stewart, the mother of the plaintiff, petitioned the court that a prohibition might be granted to stay the proceedings upon the decree, and excommunication against her in the spiritual court.

Lord Chancellor: I have no doubt at all as to the propriety of applying to this court, but the misfortune is, the want of a sufficient law to restrain such clandestine marriages, which are not only introductive of great mischiefs, but put courts of judicature under great difficulties (2); but notwithstanding this defect in the law, it is incumbent on this court to prevent as far as they can, persons from profiting themselves by such infamous methods.

Notwithstanding the wife may have been discharged from the order of commitment, yet, till she has paid the costs of the court for the contempt, she is still under the authority and jurisdiction of this court, though she goes at large.

The sentence of the ecclesiastical court cannot be reversed in a summary way, but by appeal only to proper judges; nor can a prohibition to that court be

I cannot reverse the sentence which has been pronounced in the ecclesiastical court, *that* can be only done by appeal to the proper judges, for it cannot be reversed in a summary way, nor can I, upon a petition, grant a prohibition to the ecclesiastical court, for that can only be upon shewing they have no jurisdiction, which must be done by motion, and a proper suggestion: Besides, there is no colour to say the ecclesiastical court want jurisdiction.

granted upon a petition; by motion and a proper suggestion it may.

(1) *Reg. Lib. A. 1737. fol. 269.*

(2) See *Stat. 26 Geo. 2. c. 33.*

tion, for the authority they exercise in matrimonial cases is a general law of the land, and extends to persons not only of all ages, but under, provided they are old enough to contract matrimony.

HILL v.
TURNER.

But the question will be, Whether this is not a particular case, and so circumstanced as to give me an authority to restrain the person, without meddling with the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court? For an injunction, when awarded, does not deny, it admits the jurisdiction of the court of common law; and the ground upon which it issues is, that they are making use of their jurisdiction contrary to equity and conscience. The same with regard to the ecclesiastical court in case of a legacy left in trust, where the trustee is suing for payment into his own hands, the court will restrain him, out of regard to the interest of *cestui que trust*; and will do it likewise in the case of a portion devised to a daughter upon marriage, where the husband is suing for it before he has made an adequate settlement (1).

An injunction does not deny, but admits the jurisdiction of the court of common law; and the ground on which it issues is, that they are making use of their jurisdiction contrary to equity. So where a trustee is suing in the ecclesiastical court for payment of *cestuique trust's*

pay into his own hands; or in the case of a portion, where the husband is suing for it there, or a settlement made; this court will, upon the same grounds, restrain them from proceeding.

It is upon this footing I shall proceed, for if I was not to restrain the wife, all the care the court has exercised with regard to the estate and person of the infant, would be vain and useless: has been rightly said, that this court will not only take care of the infant's maintenance and education, but that he does not marry likewise to his disparagement, and though there is no particular order to restrain, yet the marriage is a contempt of the court.

This court hath the care and ordering of infants, and though by act of parliament the court of wards had a particular power over them and lunatics, yet, in every other respect, the law is to infants continued as before: and as the statute of the 12 Car. 2. c. 24. has dissolved the court of wards and liveries, the power of this court over infants is resulted back to them again: The law of England is favourable to infants, no decree shall be had against them here, but what they may shew cause for, when they come of age; this court will make strangers accountable to infants, in case they take upon them to receive the profits of their estates; this court can also ascertain the *quantum* of an infant's maintenance, and to whom it shall be paid; and this is conclusive to all parties.

The power of this court over infants resulted back to them again, upon the dissolution of the court of wards and liveries, by the 12 Car. 2.

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The allegation of *fraud* is, a term in the ecclesiastical court, with regard to the ability of an infant to allow alimony, and is according to the quality of the person, and the quantity of the maintenance; it is this makes them judges of the application for the maintenance, and incroaches upon the jurisdiction of the court; and for whom have they now interposed? for the

Tho' this court cannot on petition prohibit the ecclesiastical court, yet they will restrain a person who has married a ward of this court

clandestinely, from proceeding on an excommunication, either against the infant or his guardians

(1) See *Anon*, ante 491.

benefit

HILL v.
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benefit of a wife, who has in a scandalous manner inveigled an infant, and stolen him away from this court; but though I cannot upon a petition prohibit the ecclesiastical court, yet I will restrain the wife from proceeding either upon the excommunication pronounced against the infant, or upon the excommunication against the mother the guardian of the infant; for as there is a certain sum allotted for his maintenance, the guardian is to be considered as very little more than the hand of this court; for if the guardian applies it to other purposes, it is a misapplication, and she would be liable to the censure of the court.

The ward of the court is married with the consent of his friends, yet there must be an application *here* for an increase of maintenance.

Suppose this woman had even married the infant in a fair way, and with the consent and approbation of friends, still there ought to have been an application to *this court* for an increase of maintenance, and I have known such instances, and it is highly improper to institute a suit in the ecclesiastical court for that purpose.

His Lordship ordered, that *Mary Hill* who seduced the plaintiff the infant by ill practices to marry her, while he was under the care of this court, in contempt thereof, be restrained from proceeding in the Spiritual court against the petitioner the guardian of the infant, for payment of alimony, and that she be also restrained from proceeding there against the infant himself, for restitution of conjugal rights and alimony.

And on motion or other application to be made to the Spiritual court on the behalf of the infant, or his guardian, or either of them, to absolve them or either of them, from the sentences of excommunication awarded against them or either of them; *His Lordship* ordered, that *Mary Hill* do consent thereto in the Spiritual court, to the end that such sentence or sentences may be effectually removed out of the way.

Vide title Conditions and Limitations, under the Division, In what Cases the Breach of a Condition will be relieved against.

Vide title Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

Master and Servant.

(A) *What Remedy they have against each other.*

Argles v. Heafeman.

November 26th,
1739.

Y indenture of apprenticeship of the 28th of *August* 1732, the plaintiff's son put himself apprentice to the defendant mercer for seven years, and he, in consideration of twenty pounds, covenanted to instruct the plaintiff's son in his trade, and the plaintiff agreed to pay the defendant 20*l.* more, if his son lived to the 24th of *June* 1734, and gave the defendant a bond for it (1), on such contingency. After the 24th of *June* 1734, the plaintiff's son quitted the defendant upon being abused and evil treated, in being compelled by the defendant to the care of his horses, and to do other servile offices; and upon the defendant's proceeding at law against the plaintiff upon the bond he brings a bill for an injunction, and for the delivery of the bond.

Case 247.

The plaintiff's son was put apprentice to the defendant for 7 years, but quitted him on being misused, and on defendant's proceeding at law, on a bond given by the plaintiff, he brings a bill for an injunction, and for the delivery of the bond.

A court of equity has no jurisdiction in matters of this nature, but belongs to justices of peace, and before the plaintiff ordered to pay costs at law, and in this court.

Lord Chancellor : A very unnecessary suit in this court, and it should take upon me to determine it here, it would be a vast expense to the masters and apprentices, and would be assuming a jurisdiction which does not at all belong to me, but by the statute of *Eliz.** is left intirely to justices of the peace as a matter proper for their determination.

* 5 *Eliz.* c. 4.
sec. 35.

The only pretence for bringing it into equity, is the *misuser*, and why cannot this be as well determined at law, for if an action is brought by a master against the father of an apprentice, for a breach of covenant in the son's quitting his service, it should appear there has been a *misuser* of the apprentice, and it would certainly direct a jury, that this is no breach, for an apprentice may leave his master upon *misuser*.

A *misuser* of an apprentice is not a foundation for coming into equity, for if an action is brought by a master against the father of an apprentice, for a breach of covenant in quitting his service, if *misuser* appears, this is no breach.

The only question is, Whether the *misuser* is a discharge of apprenticeship, which is a mere matter of law, nor is there the pretence for coming into this court.

But, *with the consent of the defendant, his Lordship* decreed, that the injunction already granted be made perpetual, and that the bond be delivered up to the plaintiff to be cancelled, and at the same time he ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant his costs at law, on the action upon the bond, and also his costs in this court (2).

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(1) The bond, it seems, was given for the payment of this further 20*l.* and for performance of the covenants contained in the indenture of apprenticeship. It appears from the bill and answers, that the plaintiff duly paid the further 20*l.* and the defendant brought his action upon the bond for the breach of covenant. It also appears, that the justices had discharged the apprentice, and had ordered

one 20*l.* to be refunded. Since the coming in of the answer, it was admitted, that the defendant had repaid the said 20*l.* and that the order of sessions had been quashed by the court of *K. B.* but that another order had been made at the sessions to discharge the apprentice. *Vide Hale v. Webb*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 78.

(2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1739. fol. 179.

C A P. LXXI.

Wine Profits.*Vide title Occupant.*

C A P. LXXII.

Money.

Anon.

*February the
22th, 1738.*

Case 248.

WHERE money by an order of this court is paid the *Accountant General's* hands, to be placed bank, till it can be laid out according to the direction decree, if you move for an application of this money, you not only have a certificate that the money was paid in bank, but that it is actually in the bank at the time of the made.

C A P. LXXIII.

Mortgage.(A) *Of Cancelled ones.*(B) *What will, or will not pass by it.*(C) *Where a Person who wants to redeem, must do Equity Mortgagee before he will be admitted.*

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(A) *Of Cancelled ones.**November the
25th, 1738.*

Case 249.

If a mortgage is found cancelled in the possession of mortgagee, it is as much a release as cancelling a bond.

Harrison v. Owen.

THIS cause went off to an issue, to try whether mortgages were fairly cancelled by the mortgagee, whether they were fraudulently and by stealth carried off by the mortgagor, and the seals cut off by him.

Lord Chancellor said in this cause, that if a mortgagee cancels mortgage, and it is found so in his possession, it is as much a sale as cancelling a bond, but it does not convey or take the estate in the mortgagor, for that must be done by some

HARRISON &
OWEN.

(B) *What will, or will not, pass by it.*

Ex parte Quincy.

August the 15th,
1750.

title Fixtures, under the Division, What shall be deemed such.

Where a Person who wants to redeem, must do Equity to the Mortgagee before he will be admitted.

Sir Hugh Smithson v. Thompson.

November the
9th, 1739.
Case 250.
Where a first incumbrancer by judgment, has likewise a mortgage, though there is another

THE defendant has a prior judgment, and a mortgage likewise upon the estate of *B.* A subsequent judgment creditor, but prior in time to the mortgage, brings his bill in court, and prays a sale of the mortgagor's estate, who is likewise willing and desirous to sell.

meant prior to the mortgage, yet if the mortgagee had no notice of it, the court will not direct a sale of the estate in favour of the creditor upon the second judgment, unless he will pay off principal and interest both of the first judgment and mortgage (1).

Lord Chancellor : In *Churchill and Grove*, 1 *Ch. Ca.* 35, 36. which has been cited by the plaintiff's counsel, the defendant's purchase was subsequent to plaintiff's security; but here the defendant is not a subsequent incumbrancer buying in a prior, but is the first of the incumbrancers who has advanced money upon a second incumbrance.

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Where the first incumbrancer, by judgment, has likewise a mortgage upon the estate, notwithstanding there is another judgment, prior in time to the mortgage, yet if the mortgagee had no notice of such judgment, the creditor upon the second judgment shall not come into a court of equity, and by a sale of the estate so mortgaged, without paying off the principal and interest, both of the first judgment and the mortgage; for it would be very hard, if the defendant should be in a worse condition, with a prior incumbrance in his favour, than a mortgagee without notice of a prior judgment would be in this court.

Therefore I will not decree a sale of the mortgagor's estate unless the plaintiff will submit to these terms; and if he does

See the resolutions in *Brace v.* and *Morrett v. Parker*, *post.* 2 vol. 53.
Case of Marlborough, 2 *P. W.* 491.

not

SMITHSON v. THOMPSON. not like them, he may take his remedy at law, by extending the estate.

Vide title Tenant, by the Curtesy.

Vide title Heir and Ancestor.

C A .P. LXXIV.

Ne exeat Regno.

January the 12th, 1748. First Seal before Hilary Term.

Anon'.

Cafe 251.

A writ of *ne exeat regno* originally confined to state affairs, but now very properly used in civil cases.

UPON a motion for a *ne exeat regno*, Lord Chancellor said, this was originally confined to state affairs, and the intent of it was to prevent any person from going beyond sea, to transact any thing to the prejudice of the King or his government, but now it is very properly used in civil cases; but then, said *his Lordship*, to induce the court to continue it to the hearing of a cause, it is necessary for the plaintiff to shew that the debt she demands against the defendant, is certain (1).

But in this case here is nothing more than a demand of a wife against her husband, by virtue of a marriage-agreement, in which the defendant obliged himself to secure 1700 l. out of his estate real and personal to the wife, as a provision in case she survived him; but this is a contingency that may never happen, for the husband may survive her; and besides, if it was not so, this court would have business enough, if they interposed wherever a marriage-settlement is suggested to be a hard bargain, and a surprize on the wife; persons should take the proper care before they marry; and therefore *his Lordship* denied the motion.

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(1) So *Rice v. Gualtier*, *post*. 3 vol. *Done's case*, 1 Cox's P. W. 263. note 10.
501. *Shearman v. Shearman*, 3 Bro. Cha. fifth edit.
Rep. 570. See also *Donn*, *post*. 2 vol. 210.

C A P. LXXV.

Next of Kin:

Vide title Jointenants and Tenants in Common.

C A P. LXXVI.

Notice.

(A) *Plea of a Purchaser without Notice over-ruled.*

Kellall v. Bennet.

March the 19th;

HE bill set forth, that *A.* made his will, in which he devised the estate in question to *B.* in tail, remainder to fee, and is brought by the heir of the body of *B.* against defendants, for deeds and writings, and to have possession of estate.

1736-7. Case 252.

A. devises the estate in question to B. in tail, remainder to C. in fee, the bill brought by the

heir of the body of *B.* for deeds and writings, and possession. defendant pleads he is a purchaser for a valuable consideration from *C.* and had no notice of plain-
le.

the defendant claims under a conveyance, in which there is an estate tail prior to the estate under which he purchased, it is incumbent on him to see if that estate is spent; and therefore over-ruled the

the defendant pleads, that he is a purchaser for a valuable consideration from *C.* that the plaintiff's father lived in *ia* at the time of the purchase; that *C.* was in possession of this estate, and that he had no notice of the plaintiff; for that *C.* at the time of the purchase, made affidavit *B.* was dead abroad without issue, and therefore insists a purchaser without notice, who may protect himself by

Attorney General for the plaintiff. Both parties claim one will, and it appears by the plea, that the defendant the plaintiff's father was alive, or that the plaintiff himself there was such a person, must of course be intitled. Besides, it is a denial only of the knowledge of the plaintiff being *in esse*, not of his title, which they were bound to notice of at their peril.

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Chancellor: If the defendant claims under a conveyance where there was an estate tail prior to the estate, under which he purchased, it is incumbent on him to see if that estate is spent. I. M m estate

KELBALL v.
BENNET.

estate is spent. The question here is, therefore, Whether purchaser can protect himself by plea, without denial of title of the plaintiff's title. Denial of notice is what gives power of protecting himself by plea.

Plea over-ruled.

Vide title Conditions and Limitations, under the Division, are to take advantage of a Condition, or will be prejudice it.

Vide title Fines and Recoveries. Willis v. Shorral.

C A P. LXXVII.

Oath.

Vide title Evidence, Witnesses, and Proof, under the Division, examining Witnesses de bene esse, and establishing their competency in perpetuam rei memoriam.

Vide title Alien.

C A P. LXXVIII.

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Occupant.

Hilary Term, 1737.

Norton v. Frecker.

*Reynolds v. Jones
H. C. Stat. 206.*

Case 253.

A. being seised of a church lease to him and his heirs during 3 lives, by settlement before marriage, limited to the use of himself for life, and to the first and every other son in tail male; a person may take such estate so granted in fee, determinable on lives by remainder, as a special occupant.

RICHARD Norton was seised of the manor of *Ixworth* in the county of *Suffolk*, in fee simple, and of a church lease in the manor of *Alford* in *Hampshire*, and a farm called *Latham* farm, lying in the said manor, to him and his heirs during three lives, granted by the bishop of *Winchester*.

Richard, being so seised, and having issue one son *David* intermarried with a daughter of Lord *Say* and *Seale* in 1660 and by indenture dated the first of *March* in that year, *David*

1 the premises to the use of himself for life, then as to the manor of *Ixworth* and *Lanham* farm, to the use of his first and every other son in tail male, remainder to his own right heirs: and as to the manor of *Alford*, to the use of such child or children of the said marriage, and for such estates as he should by deed or will appoint, and for want of such appointment, to the first and every other son in tail male, remainder to his own right heirs.

NORTON v.
FRACKER.

There were several children of this marriage, and *Richard* was the eldest, and upon his marriage with *Elizabeth Butler* an indenture was made by *Richard* the father, dated the 3d and 4th of Oct. 1673, which recited, that by the marriage-articles, previous to the marriage, the son had agreed to settle this estate, and thereupon *Richard* the father settled the premises in trust for himself for life, remainder to *Richard* the son for life, and if he should die without issue male of his body, then in trust for raising portions for daughters, remainder in trust for such uses as *Richard* the younger should by his will or deed direct, and in default thereof, in trust for such uses as *Richard* the elder should appoint, and for want of such appointment, in trust for the heirs, executors and administrators of *Richard Norton* the elder; this deed was executed likewise by *Richard Norton* the son.

Some time after *Richard* the father died; in 1708, *Richard* the son likewise died without issue, and neither of them made any appointment.

Upon the death of *Richard* the son, the heir at law of *Richard* the father by the first venter, whose name was *Richard* likewise, entred into those lands.

The plaintiff was grandson of old *Richard* by his second marriage, and under the deed of 1657, had nothing further been done, would have been intitled to the premises: In 1721 he applied to the heir at law of old *Richard*, that the church lease might be renewed for the benefit of him and his son, upon his paying the fine, which was accordingly granted, and in 1722 *Richard* the heir at law delivered a deed to the plaintiff, declaring the trust of this lease to be for himself for life, remainder to the plaintiff for life, remainder to his eldest son.

In 1732 *Richard* the heir at law died, and on his death the plaintiff entred on the premises, and now brings his bill against the administrator, with the will annexed of *Richard* the heir at law, in order to have an account of the rents and profits; the defendants by their answer insisted on the statute of limitations, but that bar being now removed by a particular act of parliament of the last session, the question upon the whole was, Whether the plaintiff was intitled to any relief?

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion the plaintiff was, by virtue of the remainder, limited to the first and other sons in the deed of 1657, intitled to the manor of *Alford*, and *Lanham* farm, if nothing had been done subsequent to that, to bar his right.

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NORTON &
FRICKER.

In the case of *Wasteneys and Chapple* (1) in the house of Lords in 1712, it was determined, that in respect to estates then granted in fee determinable on lives, a person may take by way of remainder, as a special occupant, but that as such an estate tail is not within the statute *de donis*, nor barrable properly as a recovery as an estate tail, any limitations depending thereupon are intirely in the power of the first taker in tail, and may be destroyed by any conveyance, or even articles in equity and was so determined in the case of the Duke of *Grafton* Lord *Euston*, in 1723, in which I was counsel myself (2).

The deed in 1673 amounted to a good disposition, by *Richard* the younger, of all the interest claimable by him, or any one in remainder after him, and clearly so with regard to *Lea* farm, the tenant for life, and the remainder man in tail of the interest vested, having joined in the conveyance, and limited the estate to other uses. And as to the manor of *Alford*, no remainder was vested in *Richard*, yet the father and son both joining, amounted to a good disposition of it, I am of opinion, that the deed of 1673 would in a court of equity, operate as an execution of the power which old *Richard* had, of limiting the uses to his children by the deed of 1657 and so the uses of the deed of 1657 were destroyed thereby likewise; and with regard to the transaction in 1721, there is no evidence of any concealment, or suppression of the plaintiff's title.

The rule in equity is the same as at law, as trespasses will not lie for *mesne* profits till possession is recovered, so neither can a bill be brought for an account thereof till then.

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The plaintiff's bill for an account of rents and profits is improper and premature, the possession never having been recovered against *Richard* the defendant's ancestor, and in this respect the proceedings in equity are the same as at law, where trespasses will not lie for *mesne* profits, till the possession is recovered by ejectment: that even supposing the court should now have been of opinion that *Richard*, the heir at law of old *Richard*, had no right, and ought to be considered only as a trustee for the plaintiff; yet as he was in possession, claiming the estate as his own right, and insisting on his own title, the court cannot decree an account of rents and profits, without having any regard to the recovery of the possession (3). The bill dismissed.

N. B. Lord Chancellor said in this case, no executor was compellable, either in law or equity, to take advantage of the statute of limitations against a demand otherwise well founded.

(1) 1 Bro. Par. Ca. 457. S. C.

Blake, 3 P. W. 10. in note 1. Har. O. Litt. 20. a. n. 5.

(2) 3 P. W. 266. note (B). S. C. So *Forster v. Forster*, post. 2 vol. 259. *Saltern v. Saltern*, post. 2 vol. 376. *Williams v. Jekyl*, 2 Ves. 681. *Blake v.*

(3) See *Curtis v. Curtis*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 620. *Dormer v. Fortescue*, post. 2 vol. 129, 130.

C A P. LXXIX.

Office.

Ex parte Butler and Purnell.

December the
22d, 1749.
title *Bankrupt*, under the Division, Rule as to the Sale of
Offices under a Commission of Bankruptcy.

C A P. LXXX.

Papist.

*Smith v. Read.*March the 18th,
1736-7.

HE bill was brought for the rents and profits of the estate, and to discover whether *A.* under whose will the defendant claims, was a papist, at the time of a purchase made of the estate from the plaintiff's ancestor.

Case 254.

8. C. 3 Ea. Ab.

799.

8. C. 8 Vin. Abr.

540. pl. 21.

brought to discover whether *A.* under whose will the defendant claims, was a papist at the time of a purchase made by *A.* of the estate from the plaintiff's ancestor. Defendant's to the discovery, the statute of the 11th and 12th of *Will. 3.* by which, if *A.* was a papist, she led to take.

the rule, a man is not obliged to accuse himself, is implied, that he is not to discover a disability; and as *A.* would not have been obliged to discover, the defendant, who claims under title, is intitled to the same privileges, and takes the estate under the same circumstances allowed.

defendant pleads a title under *A.* and as to the discovery the (1) statute of the 11th and 12th of *Will. 3.* against by which stat. if *A.* was a papist, she was disabled to

In re Heath
*2 D. & Chitty 21.**Stoneman v. Hilly*
44 H. 169.

therefore, as the defendant's counsel insisted, this bill seeks over what, if true, would be a forfeiture and a penalty, no one is bound in equity to discover; and as *A.* was a papist, the defendant, as standing in his place, is equally by law obliged no man to accuse himself, and for this they cited 2 *Cha. Ca. 8. Molings* and *Molings*, and the *Company* and *Dolliff*, where a disability was held equivalent to a penalty, or a forfeiture.

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Will. Gould v. Lucas
2 How. 566.

Attorney General for the plaintiff said, Here the estate, if a papist, never was vested, or could descend; and therefore not to be compared to forfeitures.

(1) See Stat. 18 Geo. 3. chap. 60.

SMITH v.
READ.

The case of *Molings* and *Molings* is not a determination according to equity, for they claim under one, whom it does not appear but that they had notice could not take.

Mr. *Fazakerley* on the same side.

This prevents the estate coming to them, but does not devote it as a forfeiture, and the bill is no more than to discover a title.

The estate never moved from the grantee.

Lord Chancellor : I think the defendant is not bound to discover, for there is no rule more established in equity, than that a person shall not be obliged to discover what will subject him to a penalty, or any thing in the nature of a penalty.

Under the rule, a man is not obliged to accuse himself, is implied, that he is not to discover a disability in himself; and there is no difference between a forfeiture of a thing vested, and a disability to take, inflicted as a penalty; and the 11th and 12th of *Will. 3.* is a penal statute.

If this bill had been brought against the person himself, and there was no other penalty than this, I think he would not have been obliged to discover.

Therefore they who claim under the same title are intitled to the same privileges, and take the estate under the same circumstances.

As to its being a defective title only, it is true; but then it is a defect arising from a penalty.

The laws of bankrupts are not all penal laws, and in the cases of aliens bastards, &c. there is a difference where the disability arises from the rules of law, and where it is imposed as a penalty.

If this plea was not allowed, it would affect numberless inheritances, and protestants more than papists. And where the legislature have intended discoveries of what is penal, they have put in clauses for that purpose, as in the statute of the 12th of *Anne*, ch. 14. of the livings belonging to papists.

The plea allowed (1).

(1) See *Harrison v. Southcote*, next case 539.

[528] *Thomas Harrison, and Elizabeth his Wife,* — Plaintiffs.
July the 31st, 1751. *Edmund Southcote, and William Moreland, Esqrs.* Defendants.

Case 255. **T**HE case the plaintiff makes by his bill is, that *Elizabeth* his wife is the only daughter of *George Stiles*, who was the younger brother of *Thomas Stiles*, late of *Watten* in *Northamptonshire*, and first cousin and heir to *Winifred Southcote* deceased, defendant *Moreland*, whether *Southcote* was not a person professing the popish religion before he conveyed the freehold and copyhold estates to the defendant, in the bill mentioned, as a purchaser thereof.

A plea of the statute of the 11th and 12th of *Will. 3.* for preventing the growth of popery, in that it goes to the discovery whether *Southcote* was a papist, allowed.

Winifred Stiles, the only daughter and heir of *Thomas* HARRISON v. SOUTHCOTE.

Winifred being seised of a freehold estate at *Watton*, of value of 130*l.* and of a copyhold estate in *Lincoln*-
the yearly value of 100*l.* which descended to her upon
of her father *Thomas Stiles*, did, in 1747, intermarry
defendant *Southcote*.

the marriage settlement, dated the 28th of *January*
said estates were limited to the use of the defendant
and his wife for life, remainder to the issue of their
remainder to the survivor in fee.

the 6th of *April* 1749, *Winifred* died without issue,
decease *Southcote* insisted that he became seised in
se estates under the settlement; but the plaintiffs
t *Winifred* was educated in the popish religion, and
ed to her death; and that the defendant *Southcote*
and always hath professed the popish religion, so
eral acts of parliament made for preventing the
popery, and to disable papists from taking any new
, *Winifred* had not power to make such conveyance
utes, and settle the same in such manner; nor was
capable to take any land or estate by purchase, but
s of *Winifred* descended, at her death, to her next
eir at law; and that the plaintiff *Elizabeth*, being
aw to *Winifred*, and a protestant, the real estate of
pon her death, descended on her; and the plaintiff
Trifon, in right of his wife, is become intitled to the
the same, and ought to have been let into possess-
e defendant *Southcote*, being conscious of his own
taking these estates, went to the other defendant
e next morning after his wife was buried, and told
ssity he was under of conveying these estates before
Elizabeth, as next protestant heir, could recover
r give notice of her claim thereto; and then desired
it *Moreland* to permit these estates to be conveyed in
1, and to prevent the plaintiff's coming at the same
any valuable consideration for such conveyance.

1 agreement being entred into by the defendants,
1 accordingly convey the freehold and copyhold
Moreland, in fee by some deed, but were never duly
he act of parliament requires.

Southcote was in so great a hurry to convey these estates,
ere even conveyed before *Moreland* ever saw the
ad any estimate made of the same, and the convey-
mpleted before the plaintiffs had any account of
eath, and therefore they could not have made any
ne estates, or have given any notice of their claim.

the death of *Winifred* to the execution of the con-
Moreland was only nine days, during which time the
Southcote never entred upon, or was in the actual pos-
se estates, or appeared amongst the tenants after the

Lord
Stea
of
King of
Whitton
John

HARRISON v.
SOUTHCOTE.

death of *Winifred* to the time of the sale, or ever received any money on account of the rents thereof, after her death till such sale.

That the defendant *Southcote* could not be looked on as the reputed owner of these estates, never having been in possession thereof; and as the same was conveyed to *Moreland*, under such circumstances, and in a fraudulent manner, and without a consideration *bonâ fide* paid; and the plaintiff being intitled as aforesaid, they filed their bill the 28th of November 1749, and prayed that *Moreland* may be decreed to reconvey these estates to the plaintiffs, and that he and the defendant *Southcote* may account for the rents and profits.

As to so much of the plaintiff's bill as seeks to compel the defendant *Moreland* to set forth, or discover whether *Winifred Southcote* did, at any time during her life, profess the popish religion; or which seeks to compel this defendant to set forth or discover, whether the other defendant *Edmund Southcote* did, at or at any time before his conveyance and surrender to this defendant, of the freehold and copyhold estates in the complainant's bill, and herein after particularly mentioned, profess the popish religion, or which seeks to compel this defendant to reconvey all or any part of such freehold or copyhold estates to the complainants, or which seeks to compel this defendant to discover any of his title deeds, or writings relating to the said estates, or any part thereof. This defendant doth plead in bar, and for plea saith, that by an act of parliament made in the 11th and 12th years of the reign of his late Majesty King *William* the Third, intituled, An act for the further preventing the growth of popery, it was enacted, "That if any person
" educated in the popish religion, or professing the same, should
" not, within six months after he should attain the age of 18 years,
" take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and also subscribe the declaration expressed in an act of parliament made
" in the 13th year of King *Charles* the Second, every such person
" should, in respect of him or herself, and to or in respect of
" any of his or her heirs or posterity, be disabled, and made
[530] " incapable to inherit or take by descent, devise, or limitation
" in possession, reversion, or remainder, any lands, tenements
" or hereditaments, within the kingdom of *England*, &c. and
" that during the life of such person, or until he or she should take the
" oaths, and make and repeat the said declaration, the next of his or
" her kindred, which should be a protestant, should have and enjoy the
" said lands, &c. without being accountable for the profits by him,
" or her, received during such enjoyment."

And this defendant for further plea saith, *Edmund Southcote* being, or claiming to be seised in fee, of and in the several freehold messuages, lands, and hereditaments herein after mentioned, and to be also seised and well intitled to him and his heirs, according to the custom of the manor of *Watton* in the county of *Northampton*, in divers copyhold messuages, and also being or claiming to be possessed of, and well intitled to, several leasehold messuages for the remainder then to come and unexpired, of a term of years granted by the dean and chapter of *Peterborough*.

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and being in actual possession of the said freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, he did, in the month of *April* 1749, apply to this defendant, and propose to sell all the said freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, and all his right, title, and interest therein to this defendant, for the sum of 4500*l.* which he then declared was, in his judgment, the real value of the said estates; but at the same time agreed, that if upon a further view and valuation 4500*l.* should appear to exceed the real and just value thereof, he would return such over-valuation money, or make an allowance to this defendant for the same; and after taking some short time to consider, the defendant did agree to the proposal, and that he would, upon executing the conveyances, pay to *Southcote* 100*l.* in part, and give him a bond for the payment of 4400*l.* residue thereof, with interest, after the rate of 3*l.* 10*s.* *per cent. per ann.* and *Southcote* in two or three days afterwards, being fully satisfied of this defendant's ability to pay 4400*l.* did agree to accept such bond, and by indentures of lease and release, dated the 14th and 15th days of *April* 1749, and duly inrolled in the court of Common Pleas, between *Edmund Southcote* of the one part, and this defendant of the other part, in consideration of 4500*l.* mentioned to be paid, or secured to be paid to him the said *Edmund Southcote* by this defendant, he the said *Edmund Southcote* did give, grant, bargain, sell, release, and convey unto this defendant, his heirs and assigns, all that capital or chief mansion-house with the appurtenances, situate, &c. at *Watton* aforesaid, then in the tenure and occupation of the said *Edmund Southcote*, and all other the lands, &c. therein mentioned, *To hold* the same unto and to the use of this defendant, his heirs and assigns for ever; and for the consideration aforesaid, he the said *Edmund Southcote* did assign to this defendant all and singular the lands and tenements of him the said *Edmund Southcote*, in the county of *Northampton*, by lease of the dean and chapter of *Peterborough*, to hold the same to this defendant, his executors, administrators, and assigns, for the remainder of a term of years, which was then to come and unexpired; and for the consideration aforesaid, he the said *Edmund Southcote* did, by indenture of release, covenant with this defendant, that he and his heirs, would, with convenient speed, well and sufficiently surrender all his copyhold lands to this defendant and his heirs.

And this defendant for further plea saith, that the said *Edmund Southcote* did, on or about the first of *May* 1749, duly surrender out of court into the hands of the lord of the manor of *Watton*, by the hands of the steward, all the copyhold estates; and this defendant was afterwards duly admitted tenant *to hold* he same, to this defendant, his heirs and assigns for ever.

And this defendant for further plea saith, that, at or before he time of the execution of the lease and release, he the said *Edmund Southcote* delivered to this defendant the title deeds, and writings, relating to the said estates; and this defendant at the time of the execution of the said indentures, did really and

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and actually pay and deliver to the said *Southcote*, a bank note for 100 *l.* in part of the consideration money, and this defendant at the same time entered into such bond as was before agreed upon.

And this defendant for further plea saith, that, in the beginning of the month of *May* 1749, he entered upon and took possession of all the said estates; and the said *Edmund Southcote* and the tenants attorned to this defendant, and he hath ever since been in the possession of the said estate, and intitled to receive so much of the rents and profits as became due since *Lady-day* 1749.

And the defendant afterwards took a view, and made inquiry into the value of the said estates, and upon such view and inquiry found that they had been greatly over-valued, and informed the said *Edmund Southcote* thereof, and insisted that a very considerable abatement should be made him in respect of such over-valuation out of the said 4500 *l.* and *Southcote*, being satisfied they were not worth more than 3500 *l.* did agree to abate or allow to the defendant 1000 *l.* out of the principal money secured by the said bond, and accordingly by deed poll, indorsed on the said indenture of release, dated the 25th of *November* 1749, it was declared and agreed between the said *Edmund Southcote* and this defendant, that 1000 *l.* should be abated in respect of the deficiency in value of the said estates, and that the said *Edmund Southcote* should, by an indorsement on the bond give a discharge to this defendant for 1000 *l.* part of the money thereby secured, and did agree that the said bond should remain a security for the 3400 *l.* and interest, and no more.

And this defendant, for further plea, saith, that the said 3500 *l.* paid and secured to be paid by this defendant to the said *Southcote*, for the purchase of the said several freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, was a full and valuable consideration for the purchase of all the said estates; all which matters and things this defendant doth plead to so much and such part of the complainant's bill as aforesaid, and demands judgment, whether he ought to be compelled to make any further or other answer.

[532] By way of answer, the defendant *Moreland* insisted, that he had not any intimacy with, or any particular friendship for, *Edmund Southcote*, before the time of making the contract, but that the purchase was fair and open, and made *bonâ fide*, and not colourable or merely to serve the designs of *Edmund Southcote*, nor did *Edmund Southcote* ever apply to him, to take or permit any conveyance whatsoever, of all or any part of the estates in trust for the said *Edmund Southcote*, or upon any trust or confidence whatsoever, without paying a full and valuable consideration for the same; nor was the conveyance made in trust for *Edmund Southcote*, or in or upon any other trust or confidence; nor was any kind of agreement at any time made or entered into, by or between this defendant and the said *Edmund Southcote*, concern-

the said estates, upon any such trust or confidence, or with **SOUTHCOTE.** and of secret or fraudulent design whatsoever.

And that *Edmund Southcote*, at the time of the sale of these, and for a considerable time before, was in the occupation of all the estates at *Watton* in the county of *Northampton*, desiring the defendant to permit him to continue in the occupation thereof as tenant to this defendant, it was there agreed between the said *Edmund Southcote* and this defendant that the said *Edmund Southcote* should hold and enjoy the same from *Lady-day* then last, for four years (it being customary to let lands from four years to four years), at the clear rent of 90 *l.* and the said *Edmund Southcote* hath ever since been in the occupation of all the estate at *Watton* under the tenant, but hath not paid the yearly rent of 90 *l.* to this defendant, to whom this defendant being indebted as aforesaid, the defendant hath not required payment thereof.

And that the rest of the estates purchased by this defendant do hold and lie in *Lincolnshire*, and at the time of his purchase were of the yearly value of 86 *l.* 15 *s.* and is now rented at that

And that *Edmund Southcote* was at the time of the conveyance and had from the death of *Winifred* been, the reputed possessor of the said estates, which this defendant purchased as a tenant; and that this defendant doth now, and at the time of the purchase, and at all times hath professed the protestant religion, and that he purchased the said estates merely for his own benefit.

And that the complainants had not, before the time when the defendant purchased the said estates, recovered, nor hath since recovered the said estate, nor had the complainants given any relief whatsoever to this defendant, before the filing of the bill of any claim or title thereto, for or by reason of any kind of disability or incapacity, or otherwise howsoever; neither had the complainants then, or at any time since, entered any claim to the said estates in open court, at the general sessions of the peace for the county, riding, or division wherein any of the said estates lie, in which the complainants might have had immediate notice of the death of *Winifred Southcote*, she having been long ill.

And this defendant admits he did not see the said estates before his purchase thereof, but relied on the declaration and agreement of the other defendant.

Solicitor General for the defendant *Moreland*.*

**Mr. Murray.*

The question is, Whether *Winifred* the wife was, or the defendant *Southcote* himself, a papist or person professing the popish religion, and if this be a bar to the plaintiff's having a discovery, the plaintiff may have relief prayed.

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The bill is not brought by a protestant next of kin, but by the plaintiff simply as heir at law of *Winifred*, and thereby intends to take the lands by descent, and states there is a bar in equity, for in consideration of a marriage of *Winifred* with the defendant

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defendant *Southcote*, both the freehold and copyhold lands were settled on *Southcote* for life, and the wife for life, and to the heirs of their two bodies, and to the survivor in fee; but, in order to remove this bar and to set aside the conveyance, charges at the time of the settlement she was a papist, and he also one, and is so now, and being intitled to the fee on survivorship, the settlement is void.

That *Southcote*, conscious of this, looked out for a protestant purchaser, the defendant *Moreland*, but did not give any consideration, or at least a valuable consideration, and that it was a fraudulent transaction to defeat the plaintiffs, and therefore pray a reconveyance of the freehold and copyhold lands so pretended to be sold.

The principal question is, Whether *Southcote*, selling so soon after the death of *Winifred*, can be said to be such a *visible owner* as within the meaning of the act of parliament of the 3 Geo. cap. 18. could convey to a protestant upon a purchase.

The defendant *Moreland* insists that *Southcote* was in possession of these estates a twelvemonth before *Winifred's* death, and in possession also from her death till he sold.

That the plaintiffs never put in any claim at the court of sessions in the county where the lands lie, within a twelvemonth after *Winifred's* death.

The question then is, Whether he has put in a good plea to the discovery.

The bill is brought by the plaintiff *Elizabeth* as an heir at law in general, to have a discovery of a disability or incapacity in some person under whom *Moreland* derives, on this ground only, that there is a flaw in his title, arising from this incapacity.

Whether the conveyance from *Southcote* to *Moreland* is a good conveyance, is a mere legal question.

It is clearly settled now, that no person is obliged to make a discovery, which will subject himself to a disability under these acts, as, *for instance*, would make him liable to be prosecuted as a papist.

I shall cite a case to shew the same rule will hold in favour of a purchaser under papists. *Smith v. Read* (1), before Lord Chancellor *Hardwicke* in 1736, (reported in *Viner and Bacon's Abridgments*). It is laid down there, this act must be considered as a penal law, and there is no one instance, said the court, where a person has been obliged to discover, whether he purchased under a papist.

[534] He cited also a case of *Jones v. Meredith* in Lord Chief Baron *Comyns's Reports*, 661.

This is a fact to be made out in evidence at law, and as the rule of law is *Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum*, so upon the equity of that rule, no person here shall be obliged to discover what will subject him to a penalty, or any thing in the nature of a penalty.

incellor : You have not pleaded in bar to the discovery
er only, but to the discovery also of title deeds. HARRISON v.
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itor General : The bill does not go at all upon the
for it does not charge title deeds under former settle-
ere there are intails.

owed to suppose every word in the plea to be true,
plaintiffs may reply to a plea, as it is in nature of an
falsify ; then whether it is not a good bar to discovery
depends on the construction of the statute of the
18.

of the statute of the 11 & 12 Will. 3. cap. 4. to pre-
s having landed property, does not restrain them
g, but invites them to change their property, and
money ; and, to make this act more effectual, the
cts, " That no sale for a full and valuable con-
n of any manors, &c. or of any interest therein by
on being reputed owner, or in the possession or re-
the rents or profits thereof, heretofore made, or here-
be made, to or for any protestant purchaser, and
nd only for the benefit of protestants, shall be avoided
ched, for or by reason or upon pretence of any of
ilities or incapacities in the said acts incurred, or sup-
be incurred, by any of the persons making or joining
sale, or by any other person from or through whom
to such manors, &c. is or shall be derived, *unless,*
wh sale, the person intitled to take advantage of such dis-
incapacity, shall have recovered such manors by reason of
ility or incapacity, and have entred such claim in open
t the general sessions of the peace for the county, &c.
such manors lie or arise, and bonâ fide and with due
pursued his remedy in a proper court of justice for the re-
hereof."

by the plea, that the plaintiffs had not before the time
lefendant purchased the said estates recovered, nor hath
ered the same.

ve they given notice of any claim before the filing of

re they entered any claim at the quarter sessions.

the saving clause is out of the case, and must rest in-
a *this* being or not being a trust, that is, Whether a
nerely for the benefit of a protestant purchaser, or a
southcote.

illature meant to encourage the papist to sell as fast as
that, before the protestant could put in his claim, he
rid of his estate out of hand ; therefore those parts of
uggesting a precipitate sale, and that there was no re-
ey, are immaterial. [535]

t liberty under this act, for argument sake, to admit
knew him to be a papist, for it is no flaw in the title :
s of the act indeed are *for a full and valuable considera-*
f Moreland should have bought for one year's purchase
states in the neighbourhood fell for, it would not upon
account

HARRISON v. account of these words make it void ; in a case of *Wildgoose v. Moore*, before your Lordship, this point was settled.

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The annual value is 263 *l.* as charged by the plaintiff's bill, and that the estate is part freehold, part copyhold, and part leasehold.

But it is insisted by the defendant *Moreland*, the annual value is but 176 *l.* and that 3500 *l.* was paid for it, and has sworn it was absolutely a purchase for his own benefit, and no trust.

I allow *Southcote* sold on purpose to prevent a protestant claim, for the act itself encourages papists to sell ; but if selling a popish estate a year and a half under value, supposing it was so, was to defeat this purchase, it would be attended with this bad consequence, that it would effectually discourage protestants from purchasing.

Mr. *Hopkins* of the same side argued, that *Smith v. Read* was a weaker case than the present, for the defendant there was a devisee under the will of one Mrs. *Paine*, who was charged to be a papist, and therefore could not devise, and Mrs. *Read* was only a volunteer as claiming under a will.

The plea covers the title deeds in general, but it is not a plea to the discovery of conveyances to the defendant *Moreland* himself ; he has sworn too, in the very words of the act, that he paid, or secured to be paid, a sum of money as for a full and valuable consideration, and the only reason why no sum of money hath been paid since, is the bringing of this bill.

Let a papist come to an estate by purchase, or by devise, he never could dispose of it to any other person, because he could not make a title, and therefore this act of parliament of the 3 *Geo. cap. 18.* came in aid of the statute of the 11 & 12 *Will. 3.* and is a very useful one for the publick, and if *Southcote* was a visible owner of the estates, then *Moreland* is clearly within the act, for he bought of a papist in such a situation as is described there ; and considering the whole nature of the estate, twenty years purchase, at which rate *Moreland* paid, is a full and valuable consideration.

Lord Chancellor, before the counsel went on for the plaintiffs, asked if they could distinguish this case from *Smith v. Read* ; for if they could not, he would not differ from himself, and said, that whether the point of collusion between the two defendants comes out to be fact or not, he ought not to compel *Moreland* to discover what would defeat his title.

The distinction between this and the case of *Smith v. Read*, as taken by plaintiff's counsel is, that in that case there was a bill barely to discover whether the devisor was a papist, and capable of devising, therefore the defendant *Read*, by discovering that Mrs. *Paine* the testatrix was a papist, would have subjected herself to a forfeiture, because of a disability in the devisor ; but here the defendant *Moreland* may safely discover that the vendor *Southcote* was a papist, and yet not forfeit, for the act of parliament protects him, as being a protestant purchaser from a papist.

Lord Chancellor said, he thought there was a distinction between the two cases, and bid the counsel for the plaintiffs HARRISON v.
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Mr. Noel for the plaintiffs.

The defendant *Moreland* has not paid one farthing of the purchase money, except 100 *l.* at first, *Southcote* appears to be still in possession, for it is not pretended that any rent has ever been paid to *Moreland*.

He insists that he is a purchaser under the act of parliament made in the third year of the late king.

That act was never made to protect such a purchaser, for it is impossible *Southcote* could be the reputed owner in so short a time as eight or nine days after the death of his wife, and therefore no person, who might have a claim upon this estate, could in that time give the notice required by the statute, and such a purchaser must not only be the visible and reputed owner of the estate, but must also be in the actual receipt of the rents and profits of such estate.

Mr. Clarke of the same side.

The ground such a plea goes upon is, the defendant's subjecting himself to a penalty, and the case of *Smith v. Read* turned altogether upon this; the discovery here could not directly, or indirectly, subject the defendant *Moreland* to a penalty, and therefore is not within that case.

The 3 *Geo. 1. cap. 18. sect. 4.* plainly supposes the person selling to be under such an incapacity, as is within the 11 & 12 *Will.* or any other of the recited acts.

Southcote and *Moreland* lived a hundred miles distant, the one in *Kent*, the other in *Northamptonshire*; it is stated by the bill, that *Southcote* was an intire stranger to *Moreland*, and the purchaser does not pretend there was any survey before he bought, nor that he or any agent for him ever saw it.

Suppose it was a plea of a purchase for a valuable consideration without notice, he could not possibly protect himself under such a plea, but for money actually paid, security to be paid is not sufficient, and the plea would have been over-ruled; independent therefore of the vendor's being a papist, the defendant here could not support his plea, being money only secured to be paid; and on the circumstances of the present case, as *Moreland* has never had any possession, or ever received any rents, and as *Southcote* is still the owner, he could not, on such a plea of a purchase without notice, to a bill brought by any person standing in the place of *Southcote*, support such a plea.

Mr. Evans of the same side.

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The fifth clause of the 3 *Geo. 1.* (which recites a part of the 11 & 12 *Will. 3.* and enacts, that the recited part of the said act

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act of parliament shall not be hereby altered or repealed, but the same shall be and remain in full force, as if this act had never been made) shews clearly it was not intended to give any advantages to papists, or to alter the disabling statutes, because here is an express saving to those statutes, and therefore is merely an interposition in favour of the protestant purchasers.

In the case of *Jones v. Meredith*, there was a plea and demurrer by a mortgagee, and both over-ruled; and for this very reason, because such a discovery could not prejudice him, the same reasoning will hold in the present case, the discovery will not subject the defendant *Moreland* to a forfeiture.

If there is a private trust for the benefit of a papist, it is clearly not within the meaning of the act of parliament, and strip this case of the defendant's oath, and nothing can be stronger to shew this is a trust; here is no transmutation of possession, the purchase money not to be paid till 1752, by which time they would be able to judge whether the protestant heir would put in his claim, a security only to be given for the purchase money, a security too, the interest of which is equal, as near as can be calculated, to the rents of the estate, *Moreland* put in possession, that he may set off the rents against the interest due on his bond; and if such a case so circumstanced should prevail, it would greatly encourage schemes to evade this act of parliament.

Mr. Solicitor General's reply.

It is very odd to say that a volunteer from a papist should protect himself with such a plea, and yet a person under a more favourable light, a purchaser for a valuable consideration, shall not.

The allowing the plea does not preclude them from replying, and impeaching the truth of it, and then the court can determine, on the evidence of both sides, whether *Southcote* was a papist or not? nor does this preclude them from going into evidence at law, upon an ejectment to shew he is a papist, and suppose it should come out there he was not a papist, then why should the plaintiff compel a discovery which he may obtain at law?

This case differs from the common case of purchasers, because, the moment the estate is sold, the papist has no lien upon it for the purchase money, and therefore is not within the rule they compared it to, of a plea of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice.

Penal laws are
not to be con-
strued according
to rules of
equity.

Lord Chancellor: The rule is, that penal laws are not to be construed according to rules of equity, and if I should allow this plea generally, it would intirely overturn the intention and effect of the act of parliament made in the 3 Geo. 1. for the consequence would be, a contract might be so made and contrived, that if there should be no litigation within the time, that then it should be a trust only for the papist; but if a controversy between the reputed owner, and protestant next of kin, then it should be deemed an absolute purchase.

, of a man's not subjecting himself by such a disability, is laid down out of great tenderness, and will not break in upon it, unless there is a good

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rdly can come a case before the court liable to more in the present, as to the fairness of the purchase.

person, who has no title to the inheritance of the estate at the death of the wife, because the limitation is to

and their heirs: On the 6th of April 1749, Mrs.

s; in nine days after, in which it is very difficult to ascertain the *reputed ownership*, a sale is made to the defendant

without any knowledge of the estate in the purchase. In the previous treaty, the contract for 4500*l.* and only

then, by delivering of a bank note, and a mere security of a bond to pay the residue in a year's time;

taken of the estate, not so much as a surety joined

and in the bond; can any thing appear more colourable

by wife or prudent man ever sell his real estate for less than only a bond in payment?

Is a subsequent transaction passed, and the purchase

reduced from 4500*l.* to 3500*l.* which shews that the

price paid is less than it was before; it is said this is a circumstance which

gives credit to the purchase; I think not at all, but the

fact was, they found the consideration was greatly above

and concluded that might be an imputation on the

transaction, and therefore an abatement is made

merely to take off the force of that objection. Another

circumstance is *Moreland's* granting a lease im-

mediately on his purchase of these estates to *Southcote* for the

years.

Not a plea of a purchase for a valuable consideration,

and if it had, would not have done, because

it was a purchase for a valuable consideration,

upon money actually paid, or else you are

where consists of two parts.

One of the statute of 11 & 12 Will. 3. cap. 4. sect. 4.

The statute of the 3 Geo. 1. cap. 18. sect. 4.

pretended the defendant *Moreland* is a papist himself,

penalty could fall upon him on that account, but yet

he should discover the person under whom he bought

it would defeat his title.

More in general, by the determination in the case of

d (1), (which was heard the 18th of March 1736,

in the term 1737, the books which take notice of it,

as to the time), it is settled where there is a plea

of a voluntary sale, or by a devise from a papist, and not

be a colourable trust, that by reason of the penal

to discover, whether the devise was a papist.

(1) 3 Bac. Ab. 799. ante 526.

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law which would attach upon him, from the incapacity in the devisor to devise, the defendant shall not be compelled to discover, whether the person under whom he claims is a papist.

The distinction taken by the plaintiff's counsel in the present case, and which they insist makes the difference from other cases, is, that *Moreland* has not pleaded himself a devisee, or volunteer from a papist, but a purchaser for a valuable consideration from the defendant *Southcote*, and that there are not all the averments here, which bring him within the protection of the statute of the 3 G. 2. 1.

The rule of law is, that a man shall not be obliged to discover; what may subject him to a penalty, not what *must* only.

There is, no doubt, a plain distinction between the cases; but I am of opinion still he is not obliged to discover whether *Southcote* was a papist, for a purchaser is not to be hurt by any discovery, as here, for instance, where he might suffer a loss by a penal law, and though the averments of the plea are, that the plaintiff had not given notice of his claim, and observed other ceremonies required by the statute, yet it may be disproved, and come out contrary to the averments of the plea, and if it should appear in evidence, that the plaintiff has made his claim with due diligence, and as soon as he had any notice thereof; then if the defendant *Moreland* was to make a discovery, that the person under whom he purchased was a papist, he would overturn his conveyance, and though he has actually paid part of the purchase money, he never could get it back again, for the law makes such conveyance void, a papist not being capable of conveying, and the heir might recover in an ejectment.

The rule of law is, that a man shall not be obliged to discover what *may* subject him to a penalty, not what *must* only (1), and though upon the particular circumstances of the case, it might not possibly create a forfeiture, as it does not appear at present with certainty, whether such a discovery would create a forfeiture, yet eventually it may do so; and therefore with regard to so much of the plea as relies upon the statute of the 11 & 12 Will. 3. it ought to be allowed.

The defendant *Moreland's* plea to the discovery of the title decds. disallowed.

As a plea may be separated (2), I am at liberty to apply it to the different parts of the defence: The next question therefore will be as to the other part which obliges the defendant to discover his title decds.

I am of opinion there is no ground to allow the plea here, either as to the discovery or relief.

(1) So *Honeywood v. Selwin*, post. 3 vol. 276. On this head, see *Bird v. Haverwicke*, 1 Vern. 109. *Sharp v. Carter*, 3 P. W. 375. *Adon*, 2 Eq. Ab. 70. pl. 7. *Earl of Suffolk v. Green*, ibid. 79. pl. 14. ante 450. *S. C. Duncalfe v. Blake*, ante 52. *Boteler v. Allington*, post. 3 vol. 357. *East India Company v. Campbell*, 1 Ves. 247. *Brownlow v. Edwards*, 2 Ves. 243. *Chetwynd v. London*, ibid. 451. *Smith v. Read*, 3 B. Ab. 799. ante 526. *Chauncy v. Tabornden*, post. 2 vol. 393. *Bishop of London v. Fytche* 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 97. (2) See *Duncalfe v. Blake*, ante 52. note.

Moreland has not pleaded himself a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, and therefore there is no pretence for a part of the plea, especially as it goes to the discovery of that settlement by which it is averred the heir at law is barred, every heir at law has a right to inquire by what means, and under what deed he is disinherited,

HARRISON v. SOUTHCOTE. Every heir at law has a right to inquire by what means, and under what deed he is disinherited.

The next consideration as to the relief, Though an heir at law is not intitled to come into this court upon an ejectment bill of possession, yet he is intitled to come here, to remove terms of the way, which would otherwise prevent his recovering possession at law; and has also a right to another relief before he has established his title, namely, that the deeds and writings may be produced and lodged in proper hands for his inspection, and therefore the plea should not be allowed as to the relief prayed in this respect.

[540] An heir, before he has established his title at law, may come here to remove terms out of the way, which would prevent his recovering there, and may also come here for production and inspection of deeds and writings.

Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the plea ought to be allowed, as to the discovery sought by the bill, Whether *Winiard* or *Edmund Southcote* were not papists, or persons professing popish religion; but as to all other parts of the plea, it must be over-ruled (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. A. 1750. fol. 646.* are enabled to take lands, tenements, or hereditaments by descent, devise, limitation or purchase.

C A P. LXXXI.

Paraphernalia.

Vide title Dower and Jointure.

C A P. LXXXII.

Parol Agreement.

Vide title Partition.

C A P. LXXXIII.

Parol Evidence.

Vide title Custom of London.

C A P. LXXXIV.

Parson.

December the
24th, 1747.

Ex parte Meymot.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Who are liable to
Bankruptcy.

C A P. LXXXV.

Parties.

Vide title Bill.

C A P. LXXXVI.

Partition.

November the
19th, 1739.

Mary Ireland, sole Executrix and Residuary Le- } Plaintiff.
gatee of *Mary Ingram*, her Aunt,

Susan Rittle and Others,

Defendants.

Case 256.

Mary and Susan Jackson, the daughters and co-heirs of *James Jackson*, being seized in fee of certain lands, the former married *Thomas Ingram*, and the latter *William Rittle*, and by a mutual agreement between their husbands in 1686, a partition was made of the said premisses between themselves, and the heirs of *Mary* and *Susan*.

JAMES Jackson, the plaintiff *Mary's* grandfather, being intitled to the reversion in fee of certain copyhold lands, surrendered the same to himself for life, to his wife for life, and, after the death of the survivor, to his own right heirs; the tenant for life died soon after, and *James* the reversioner left a widow and two daughters, *Mary* and *Susan*, who, upon the death of their mother, were admitted as co-heirs of *James*, and the lord of the manor did, in consideration of 40*l.* enfeoff and convey the same to *Mary* and *Susan Jackson*, their heirs and assigns for ever; *Mary* intermarried with *Thomas Ingram*, and *Susan*, the plaintiff's mother, with *William Rittle*, and having made no partition of the said premisses before their intermarriage, *Thomas Ingram* and *William Rittle*, the husbands of *Mary* and *Susan*, by a mutual agreement in 1686, made a partition of the said premisses between themselves and the heirs

and *Susan*, by which each of them agreed to take one
 of, which they did, and entered into possession, and
 holds a share of the premises so divided by virtue of
 ition, and *Mary* enjoyed her part till her death (1),
 y's share being, at the time of the partition, somewhat
 an *Susan's*, in consideration thereof, *Mary* paid the
 d the levies charged upon both.

IRELAND v.
 RITTLE.

Ingram died many years since without issue, leaving
 s widow, and, in 1733, *William Rittle*, the plaintiff
 ther, died intestate, leaving the defendant *Susan Rittle*
 v and four children: the bill is brought, among other
 o confirm the division of the said estate, and that the
 t *Susan Rittle* may be restrained from proceeding at law
 ie plaintiff to compel a new partition thereof.

The husbands
 are both dead,
 and the bill is
 brought against
Susan Rittle, to
 confirm the di-
 vision of the said
 estate.

The agreement
 of the husbands
 cannot bind the inheritance of the wives.

Chancellor: Where there has been a long possession
 agreement for *ouelty* of partition, this court is strongly
 o quiet the enjoyment of such estates, and I was at
 opinion to establish this agreement; but it appears now,
 s only an agreement between the two husbands, which
 no means bind the inheritance of the wives (2), for the
 of long enjoyment is of no force here, unless it had
 finally the agreement of the wives, though I do admit
 agreement of long standing, acknowledged by all the
 have been the actual agreement, and accordingly put
 on, will be established by this court, where it appears
 persons who made such agreements had a right to con-
 I will not, at fifty-three years distance, suffer either
 controvert the equality of the partition, at the time it

A parol agree-
 ment for an
 equality of par-
 tition of a long
 standing, by per-
 sons who had a
 right to con-
 tract, and ac-
 cordingly put in
 execution, will
 be established
 by this court.

ext consideration is, Whether *Mary's* share being larger
 v's at the time the partition was made, will induce the
 et it aside.

supposing that the agreement was between proper par-
 not think the objection of a contingent advantage
 one of the parties upon the partition, is sufficient to set
 agreement, for a jointenant upon *ouelty* of partition
 ie thinks proper, accept of a contingent uncertain ad-
 where one moiety of the lands is of superior value to
 as in the present case; *Susan*, who had the less valua-

If a jointenant,
 upon equality of
 partition, thinks
 proper to accept
 of a contingent
 uncertain ad-
 vantage, where
 one moiety of
 the land is of
 superior value

to the other, it will not vacate the agreement.

ry in her life-time, and after
 of her husband, *by lease and re-*
 he plaintiff states by her bill)
 er part to the use of herself
 ith remainder to the plaintiff
 irs.

Oldham v. Hughes, *post*. 2 vol.
 this doctrine, so far as it re-
 titions (where such partitions

are equal) is directly contrary to the text
 of *Littleton* (*Litt. f.* 257.) and the autho-
 rity of his commentator. *Co. Litt.* 171.
a. See *Oakeley v. Smith*, *Amb.* 368. In
 the case of *May v. Hook* (*Har. Co. Litt.*
 246. *a.* note 1.) it was held, that an
 agreement by an *infant* jointenant could
 not sever the jointenancy. So, *post*. 2
 vol. 480.

IRELAND v. RITTLE. ble moiety, by way of compensation or recompence, was no taxes whatsoever; and though she may be disappointed expectations from this contingency, yet that will not vary the agreement.

[543] But upon the particular circumstances of the present case I do declare, that though the defendant *Susan Rittle* co-tenant in the life-time of her husband, to hold the premises in partition, according to *the partition* made between him and *Ingram*, yet that she is not bound by such agreement; she now submits to hold the several parts of the said premises as they have been already held in *severalty*, I decree that the plaintiff, and the defendant *Susan Rittle*, do respectively hold and enjoy the said several parts of the said premises, *in severalty*, that each of them do execute conveyances of the respective shares thereof to the other, according to their respective interests therein, and that the plaintiff do pay the taxes of the estate (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. A. 1739. fol. 151.*

C A P. LXXXVII.

Personal Estate.

Vide title Rents.

Vide title Real Estate.

C A P. LXXXVIII.

Pin Money.

Vide title Baron and Feme.

C A P. LXXXIX.

Plantations.

u, an Infant, by his next Friend, Plaintiff.

December the
16th, 1738.

his Wife, ——— Defendants.

was brought for the delivery of the possession of
of lands in *St. Christophers*, and likewise for an
rents and profits. Case 257.

nt demurred to the first part, for that this court
ion over lands at *St. Christophers*, and likewise to
yed of rents and profits, for that the plaintiff
th a clear title to them.

[544]

B²
L
P B.

lor: As to the first part of the demurrer, I ap-
ry right, because this court has no jurisdiction fo
ons into possession, in a place, where they have
ods on such occasions, to which the party may
the present bill, therefore, is carrying the jurif-
court further than it ever was before. (*Vide*
Angus v. Angus, 1736, before the present Lord

This court has
no jurisdiction
over lands at
St. Christopher's,
and a demurrer
will lie to a bill
brought here,
for d livery of
possession of
lands there.

plantations are no more under the jurisdiction
than lands in *Scotland*, for it only *agit in per-*

Lands in the
plantations are
no more under
the jurisdiction
of this court,
than lands in
Scotland.

question is, Whether an account of rents and
o be demanded before the plaintiff has established
?

rent is shewn to prevent the plaintiff from
jectment, for he claims a moiety as tenant in

neral equity, an infant here in *England* may bring
ccount of rents and profits against a person who
after the death of the infant's ancestor; and as
s only to the bill, I must take it for granted, he is
England.

An infant may
bring a bill for
an account of
rents and pro-
fits, against a
person who
keeps posses-

sion, after the death of the infant's ancestor.

nt should not have demurred for want of jurisdic-
urrer is always in bar, and goes to the merits of
therefore it is informal and improper in that re-
ould have pleaded to the jurisdiction.

Demurring for
want of jurif-
diction is in-
formal and im-
proper; a de-
fendant should
plead to the
jurisdiction.

of possession may be enforced in person, which
ay; but the writ of assistance to put persons in
y way of injunction, is of more modern date (1).

) See *Stribley v. Hawkie*, *post*. 3 vol. 275.

N n 4

Plan-

Plantations.

ROBERDEAU
v. ROUS.

Plantations originally members of England, and subject to the laws thereof, unless in some customs, which they have a power of making.

Plantations were originally members of *England*, and governed by the laws of *England*; and persons went out originally subject to the laws of *England*, unless in some regulations and customs, which they have a power of making.

There have been instances of plantation estates being sold in this court, and consequently this court must have a power of enforcing a decree for a sale upon the person ordered to convey.

His Lordship mentioned the case of the widow in *Pennsylvania* and *Hamilton*, where there was an order upon *Hamilton* to deliver possession.

His Lordship held the demurrer to be insufficient, and then fore ordered the same to be over-ruled.

[545]

C A P. XC.

Plea.

Vide title *Alien*.

Vide title *Answers, Pleas, and Demurrers*.

Vide title *Papist*.

Vide title *Purchaser without Notice*.

C A P. XCI.

Policy of Insurance.

December the 6th,
1739.

Motteux and Others v. the Governor and Company of *La Assurance* and others.

Case 258. **T**HE ship *Eyles*, as appears by the bill, late in the *India* Company's service, was in 1732 at *Bengal* which time the owner employed Mr. *James Halhead* to insure this ship in the *London* insurance office for 500*l*. the adventure to commence from her arrival at *Fort St. George*, thence to continue till the said ship, with her ordnance, pavel, &c. should arrive at *London*, and that it should be in accordance of the agreement, it shall be made agreeable to the label.

S. C. 4 Vin. 281.
pl. 10.
S. C. cited 1 Vef. 317.
If a policy or insurance differs from the label, which is the memorandum or minutes of the agreement, it shall be made agreeable to the label.

d ship, in the said voyage, to stay at any port or out prejudice, and that the ship was, and should be tereft or no interest, without further account; in on whereof *Halhead* paid 15 *l.* premium, being at the per cent. which was the current premium then, up at and from Fort *St. George*, and a label of such was, the 7th of *August* 1733, entred in a book, and by *Halhead* and two of the directors, and the policy e been made pursuant thereto; but, upon looking licy, it appeared, that by a mistake the policy was different from the label, and instead of the ship's be- from the time she should arrive at Fort *St. George* to have been, according to the label, the insurance the policy to commence only from the departure of m Fort *St. George* to *London*; and therefore the Com- ng, that in regard the ship was lost in the river of d not in her voyage from Fort *St. George* to *London*, ffs are not intitled to recover on the policy, and sion the plaintiffs have brought their bill against the the Company, to be paid 500*l.* with interest, usual abatements in case of loss.

es came to Fort *St. George* in *February* 1733, in her gland; but being leaky, and in a very bad condition, unanimous advice of the governor, council, com- ships, &c. she failed for *Bengal* to be refitted; and sheathed, in her return upon her homeward bound ie struck upon the *Engilce* sands, and was lost. was read on the part of the plaintiffs, to prove that the most proper place for ships to refit, and that she ier for that reason, and that this was a voyage of nd not a trading voyage, for she took nothing on water, provision, and ballast. It was insfited by the counsel, that though the policy in that part of it called the risque, is beginning the adventure from ntely following her departure from Fort *St. George*, yet nes within the rule in equity, that a conveyance, from articles, shall notwithstanding be made con- o articles, and no instance that articles have been make them similar to a subsequest conveyance; and upon this reasoning, the policy must be made agree- original agreement, or minutes, called the label, for rely so much upon the label, that the policy is e out in many instances, unless in a case of loss.

defendants, the Company, it was said, that the ot go directly to *Bengal*, but to a place called *Maf-* hich was not in the proper road, but for the benefit ain, who staid there six days merely for the sake of ding; that the loss likewise was not at Fort *St.* on a voyage from thence to *England*; that from orge to *Bengal* is a hazardous voyage; a ship might the whole voyage from Fort *St. George* to *England*, and

MOTTEAU
the LONDON
Assurance.

Key
Will
9. 4. 8
41

Alexander
1 Lloyd

Stutcher
2 Nov.

Blith
9 Nov.

Small
16. 2.

[546]

MOTTEAUX v.
the LONDON
Assurance.

and therefore nothing but the strongest necessity could warrant such a voyage, and that it is impossible but there must be timber enough at Fort St. George, which is undoubtedly the largest settlement belonging to the East-India Company, to mend a leak, without going such a dangerous voyage merely to refit.

Lord Chancellor: This is properly a question at law, Whether it is such a loss as is within the terms of the policy.

The first consideration is, What was the real agreement?

2dly. Whether there is any breach of this agreement, by a loss within the terms of the policy?

Now the *label* is a memorandum of the agreement, in which the material parts of the policy are inserted, the master's, the ship's name, the premium, and the voyage.

In the *label* the words are, *at and from*; this certainly includes the continuance at Fort St. George, and in the first part of the policy the voyage is described in the same manner; but in the latter, according to the constant form, it points out what shall be called the *risque*, and the adventure there is confined to the departure only from Fort St. George.

[547] It has been contended on the part of the plaintiffs, that it ought to be construed equally the same, as if the words *at and from* were actually inserted in this part of the policy.

It is pretty difficult to reconcile the first part of the policy, and the latter; but the *label* makes it very clear, for that considers the voyage and the *risque* as the same, and therefore it was only the mistake of the clerk, which ought to be rectified agreeable to the *label*.

As to the second question, Whether there has been a breach, or, in other terms, a loss, this is not so properly determinable in equity.

It is not sufficient ground for coming into equity, that an insurance is in the name of a trustee, unless he refuses the *cestui que trust* his name, in an action at law.

Two reasons have been assigned by the plaintiff's counsel for coming into this court: *First*, That the insurance is in the name of a trustee: if the trustee had refused the *cestui que trust* his name in an action at law, there might have been some pretence; but upon this general ground only of a trust, I should at this rate determine all policies, without giving the company the advantage of a trial.

Secondly, That the loss is plainly and clearly according to the agreement, and if it was to, to be sure I might determine it here; but this is far from being the case.

If a ship is decayed, and goes to the nearest place, it is the same as if it were at the place from whence the voyage was to commence, and no deviation.

The general principles laid down by the plaintiff's counsel are right, as respects of weather, and the danger of proceeding on a voyage when a ship is in a decayed condition; and in such a case, if she went to the nearest place, I should consider it equally the same as if she had been repaired at the very place from whence the voyage was to commence, according to the terms of the policy, and no deviation (1).

(1) *Gibbert v. Readshaw*, *Park on Insurance*, 314.

It is a very material circumstance that the governor ordered ^{MOTTREUX} ^{the LONDON} ^{Assurance.} the ship to be taken out, to shew the necessity of the ship's being repaired; but there is not a syllable of proof why she might not have been equally repaired at Fort St. George.

But there is one part of this case, which differs from all others whatever, and that is, as to the certain time the voyage was to commence. Now the fact is, that the ship was lost in July 1733, three weeks before the time of making this policy; so that clearly the ship was not at Fort St. George at the time the agreement was made, and therefore it is a material consideration whether this comes within the agreement.

For the plaintiff indeed it is insisted she was at Fort St. George in February before in her voyage to England, and that as she came out of necessity to Bengal for the sake of repairing, that circumstance must be laid entirely out of the case, and the commencement of the adventure must be dated from this February when she came with full intention to proceed for England. This observation perhaps may be a very material one, but it is proper that merchants should determine what is usual in these cases.

A question arose upon settling the issues, Whether the words of the risk, beginning the adventure from and immediately following her departure from Fort St. George, could not, according to the natural construction, be referred to her first arrival at Fort St. George in her way to England? [548]

Lord Chancellor: There was a case before me, upon a trial at Guildhall, where the owners of this very ship *Eyles* were plaintiffs, and the Royal Assurance Company defendants; and it was then debated, Whether the words *at and from Bengal to* implied England, meant the first arrival of the ship at Bengal? And it was agreed the words *first arrival* were implied, and always understood in policies; for *these reasons* his Lordship directed the issues in the manner hereafter mentioned (1).

It was insisted by the counsel for the Company, that *Halhead*, at the time he came for the policy, should have compared it with the label, that, in case of a variation, it might have been rectified upon the spot, before he took away the policy; and therefore the difference, though a material one, must now pre-^{An agent for the owner of the ship, when he fetches the policy, not obliged to compare it with the label}vail.

There is no colour for this objection, because *Halhead* was a mere agent or servant to the owner of the ship, and not at all necessary that he should be so exact as to compare the label and policy at the time he fetched it.

His Lordship ordered the parties to proceed to a trial at law in the court of Common Pleas in London, the next term, upon the following issues.

First, Whether by the label, whereon the policy was made out, it was agreed or intended, that the adventure on the ship *Eyles* should begin from and immediately on her first arrival at Fort St. George, in her homeward-bound voyage, or at any other, and what time?

(1) See *Chitty v. Solwin*, post. 2 vol. 359.

Secondly,

MOTTEAUX &
the LONDON
Assurance.

Secondly, Whether the loss in July 1733 was a loss during the voyage, and according to the adventure which was agreed upon, or intended to be insured by the said label or memorandum? (1)

N. B. On a trial at Guildhall the jury found against the Company on both issues.

(1) Reg. Lib. B. 1739. fol. 65.

[549]

C A P. XCII.

Portions.

(A) At what time Portions shall be raised, or Reversionary Estates or Terms sold for that Purpose.

(B) Rule as to the Consideration.

(A) At what time Portions shall be raised, or Reversionary Estates or Terms sold for that Purpose.

Michaelmas Term, 1737.

Stanley v. Stanley.

Stanley v. Stanley
7. 48 60. 116

Case 259.

Where there is a term for years for raising daughters' portions, payable at a certain time and a vested interest, they shall not stay till the death of father and mother; but the court will lay hold of the slightest circumstance in a settlement, that shews an intention to postpone the raising them in the life of the father and mother.

IT was in this case laid down by Lord Chancellor, as a general rule, that if there be a term for years, or other estate limited to trustees for raising portions for daughters, payable at a certain time, which is become a vested interest, they shall not stay till the death of the father and mother (1), unless some intention appears to postpone it; and if there does, the court will always take notice of such intention, and postpone it accordingly; and the latter cases, as *Broome v. Berkeley*, 2 Wms. 484. and others, shew, the court will lay hold of very small grounds, that speak the intent of the parties, to hinder the raising the portions in the life of the father and mother.

* Corbet v. Maidwell, 2 Vern. 640 (2).

(1) So *Gervard v. Gervard*, 2 Vern. 458. 1 P. W. 452. *Graves v. Maddison*, 4. Jones, 201. *Staniforth v. Staniforth*, 2 Vern. 460. *Saville v. Saville*, 1 P. W. 456. *Sandys v. Sandys*, 1 P. W. 707. *Hebblewhite v. Cartwright*, Ca. temp. Talb. 31. *Hall v. Carter*, post. 2 vol. 354. *Smith v. Evans*, Amb. 633. *Lyon v. The Duke of Chandos*, post. 3 vol. 416.

(2) *Butler v. Duncomb*, 1 P. W. 448. *Pierpoint v. Lord Cheney*, 1 P. W. 408. *Rensley v. Newland*, 2 P. W. 93. *Kaenbill v. Dansey*, 2 P. W. 179. *Broome v. Barkley*, 2 P. W. 484. *Evelyn v. Evel*, 2 P. W. 659. *Stevens v. Detrick*, post. 3 vol. 39. *Churchman v. Hawley*, Amb. 335. *Conway v. Conway*, 3 Bro. Cts. Rep. 267.

was declared by his Lordship, that the three daughters, **STANLEY v. STANLEY.** plaintiffs in the cross cause, are not intitled to have either of portions of 8000*l.* or interest, or maintenance in respect of, raised out of the reversionary term of 500 years during the life of their mother (1).

) The above noticed rule is so well the Register's book; which however the
 justified by authorities, that it seems reader will find in *Reg. Lib. B. 1737.*
 necessary to state this long case from fol. 120.

und Okeden, Esq.

Plaintiff.

[550]
 November the
 17th, 1738.

William Okeden, an Infant, and Heir Apparent of
the Plaintiff, by his Guardian, and several } Defendants.
Others.

Case 260.

WILLIAM Okeden, deceased, being seised in fee of a considerable real estate, subject to a term of 600 years, created by his marriage-settlement, and which was vested in trustees for raising 5000*l.* after his death, for his daughter *Mary*, wife of *William Gliffon*, did, by his will, dated the 30th January, 1717, direct, "that his debts, legacies, and funeral expences, and also the 5000*l.* should be raised and paid out of his personal estate, but if that was not sufficient, he devised to *Walter Bond, &c.* and their heirs, his lands at *Corse Pool, Penlick, &c.* in trust to sell the same, or a part thereof, to pay his debts, legacies, and funeral expences, and so the 5000*l.* and such part as should not be sold, he devised to the same uses as his mansion-house, and which, by his will, together with all other his lands, he devised to the same trustees for 500 years, in trust to receive the rents, issues and profits, and to apply such part thereof as they should think fit yearly in the education, placing out, and maintenance of his two natural sons, *the plaintiff and defendant William Okeden, until they attained 25 years*, and for raising 5000*l.* the plaintiff's portion, if he should live to that age, and to apply yearly such sums as are necessary for the support of the mansion-house, &c. and to pay *Mary Morgan* 50*l.* a year for life; and after the expiration of the term, he devised the said premises to the defendant the plaintiff's brother in strict settlement, remainder to the plaintiff in the same manner, remainder in fee to his own right heirs, and made the trustees executors."

Directing a gross sum to be raised does not imply that it shall be raised at once for it may be raised out of the rents and profits, and so laid up till it amounts to that sum.

the testator died in September, 1718, leaving *Mary Gliffon* only legitimate issue, who, with her husband, died soon intestate; and, upon their so dying, their two daughters became intitled, as their representatives, to the said 5000*l.*

and

OKEDEN v.
OKEDEN.

and interest from the testator's death, and also the reversion in fee of the real estate.

The bill charges that the plaintiff hath applied for payment of his 5000*l.* and that the defendant *Okeden*, being let into possession of the trust estate by the trustees of the 500 years term before his age of 25, had ever since applied the rents and profits thereof to his own use, and refuses to consent to a sale to satisfy the plaintiff's demand, and therefore prays that such part of the said estate may be sold as will satisfy his demand, and that the defendants, the daughters of *Mary Gliffen*, may be paid, and the estate discharged of their demands.

The principal question was, Whether upon the construction of this will the court can decree a sale of the trust estate?

[551]

Lord Chancellor: The intention of the testator is clear to me, that the sum of 5000*l.* was to be raised out of the rents and profits, and not from an absolute sale, unless from mere necessity; and what the court would do in such case, is another consideration (1).

The directing the trustees to pay yearly, money for the repairs of the mansion-house, farm-houses, plantations, &c. is a strong indication that the trustees should keep possession, till the defendant *William Okeden* arrived at his age of 25.

I do not think that the directing a gross sum to be raised will necessarily imply, that it shall be raised at once, and this was settled in the case of *Evelyn v. Evelyn*, 2 *Wms.* 666. for it may be raised out of the rents and profits, and so laid up till it amounts to that sum.

The age of 25 in this will, is the time fixed for the payment, but I do not think it the time fixed for the raising, for the testator has directed, if there should be any surplus, that it should be paid to the reversioner, and the natural consequence would have been, if *William Okeden* had died before 25, that what had been received out of the rents, would have been the money of the reversioner, and must have been paid over to him.

Whether the testator computed right as to the value of this estate, is not material, for the view and intention is to be regarded only.

The consideration is, how far this court will controul the original and natural import of the testator's words, so as to decree a sale.

(1) By a liberal construction of the words *rents and profits*, they generally in a will include a direction to *sell or mortgage*, especially when in favour of debts and portions; because a devise of rents and profits will at law pass the lands. See *Ligon v. Foley*, 2 *Cha. Ca.* 205. *Trafford v. Ashton*, 1 *P. W.* 418. *Mills v. Banks*, 3 *P. W.* 7. 8. *Green v. Belcher*, ante 506. *Hall v. Carter*, post. 2 vol. 358.

Gibson v. Rogers, *Amb.* 93. *Baines v. Dixon*, 1 *Vesf.* 41. *Secus* where any subsequent words restrain the meaning of those words to annual profits, or to the receipt of the rents and profits, as they accrue. *Ivy v. Gilbert*, 2 *P. W.* 13. *Evelyn v. Evelyn*, 2 *P. W.* 666. *Mills v. Banks*, 3 *P. W.* 9. *Green v. Belcher*, ante 506. *Small v. Wing*, 3 *Bro. P. C.* 503.

There have been a great many strong cases cited to this purpose, but they do not come up to the present case; the first, the case of *Brooks v. Banks*, the second *Ivy v. Gilbert* and others, *Proc. in Chan.* 583. and *2 Wms.* 13. *Jones v. Warren*, before Lord Chancellor King, *Trafford v. Aston* (1), *Barry v. Askham*, *2 Vern.* 26. The case of *Sheldon v. Dormer* (2) goes upon the point of necessity, that the annual rents and profits would not, in a vast tract of time, pay the money; besides, in that case, the very sale of the estate itself would not answer the 4000*l.* charged upon it.

OKEDEN v.
OKEDEN.

Ivy v. Gilbert is not a case in point for the defendant the reversioner, and indeed it is impossible that these cases arising upon wills should tally in every respect, yet it certainly is a very strong case in favour of the reversioner.

It has been truly said, that this court have laid great stress upon a particular time being appointed for the payment, and have enlarged the power of trustees, in order to raise the money within the time.

This court lays great stress upon a particular time being appointed for the payment of a portion, and have enlarged the power of trustees to raise it within the time.

Therefore here the surplus profits over and above the 50 *l.* per annum annuity, and the maintenance to *Edmund*, shall be applied towards the discharge of the 5000*l.* but if the surplus profits will not be sufficient to answer the purpose, then I shall be strongly inclined that the estate shall be sold to make up the deficiency.

It is absurd to suppose that the defendant *William Okeden* was intitled to be let into possession before he attained his age of 25, as both he and his brother were to have a maintenance till that age, and therefore the trustees, by letting him into possession of the rents and profits before that age, have abused their trust; for as they have managed, how was it possible that the 5000*l.* could be raised by the time the plaintiff came to the age of 25.

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I will not immediately decree a sale, till the trustees have accounted for the surplus rents and profits (3); for it is hard the reversioner should suffer by the sale of the estate, when it might have been quite cleared, if the trustees had faithfully executed their trust.

His Lordship ordered it should be referred to a Master, to take an account of the rents and profits of the trust estate devised to the trustees for the term of 500 years, accrued from the death of the testator *William Okeden*, until the defendant *William Okeden* attained twenty five years, that have been received by the trustees, or by the defendant *William Okeden*, and *his Lordship* declared, that the defendants the trustees are answerable for so much thereof as have been received by the defendant *William Okeden*.

(1) 1 *P. W.* 418. S. C.

(2) 2 *Vern.* 310. S. C.

(3) And if what shall appear due upon the balance of the rents and profits shall not be sufficient to raise the said

5000 *l.* and interest, then *his Lordship* reserved the consideration, how the surplus should be raised. *Reg. Lib. B.* 1738. fol. 111.

November the
24th, 1738.

Philadelphia Boycot, Sophia Cotton, Hester Maria Cotton, and Sidney Arabella Cotton, the four surviving Daughters of Sir Thomas Cotton, Bart. deceased, and Dame Philadelphia his Wife, } Plaintiffs.

Sir Robert Salisbury Cotton, Linch Salisbury Cotton, Cotton King, and John Crew, } Defendants.

Case 261.

Where there is a power to charge an estate with a gross sum, it implies a power to charge an estate with interest like-wife (1).

*Hampson
Sullivan
Wm. & Warren
446*

*Railly
W
Hedges & Co.
Drury. 122*

*Alfau & Coopers
L.R. 323
Lewis & Clarke
Res. 507*

[553]

BY indenture of the 27th of July 1687, Sir Robert Cotton and dame Hester his wife did covenant to levy a fine to trustees and their heirs of the capital messuage of *Levenez*, and lands thereunto belonging, and of several estates in *Denbighshire* therein mentioned, to the use of Sir Robert and dame Hester for their lives, and the life of the survivor, without impeachment of waste, remainder to *Thomas Cotton* their second son, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders; to the first and other sons of *Thomas*, in tail male, and after divers remainders, to the use of dame Hester (and her heirs, with a proviso, that it should be lawful for *Thomas Cotton*, or any other tenant in tail in possession, after the death of Sir Robert and Hester, by any deed or will executed by them respectively, in the presence of three or more witnesses, to limit any part of the same lands, not exceeding 500 l. a year, to a wife for life for her jointure, and a power also for *Thomas Cotton*, and the other tenants in tail in possession, to charge any part of the lands, not exceeding 500 l. a year, for portions for his younger children, subject to a power of revocation in Sir Robert and dame Hester, and the survivor of them by deed or will.

About 1690 *Thomas Cotton*, then become the eldest son of Sir Robert, intermarried with *Philadelphia Linch*, and by indentures of lease and release in 1701, Sir Robert covenanted that Hester should levy a fine of the premises therein mentioned to the use of *Thomas Cotton* (afterwards Sir *Thomas*) for life, with power to commit waste, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to *Philadelphia* for her jointure, remainder to trustees for 500 years, without impeachment of waste, remainder to Sir Robert Cotton in fee.

The term of 500 years was in trust, that if *Thomas* should die, leaving any daughter or daughters, or younger child or children by *Philadelphia*, living at his death, it should be lawful for the trustees, or the survivor, or the executors of the survivor, by rents and profits, or by demise, mortgage or sale of the term, or by felling timber, or by any means they should think fit, or most for the advantage of such younger children to raise such sums of money for the portions, or yearly maintenance of such children, *videlicet*, if there should be a son, and but one younger child, 3000 l. and if two or more younger children, then 5000 l. to be equally divided, to be paid to the daughters at 18, or marriage, which shall first happen, and to

(1) *Hall v. Carter*, *post*. 2 vol. 358.

sons at 21; and, till such portions should be payable, should to such younger child, if but one, 60*l.* a year, and if more, *l.* 2-a-piece, at *Lady-day* and *Michaelmas*, provided, if any daughter or daughters should have attained 18, or be married in the life of *Thomas Cotton*, and their portions unpaid, or if any son should attain 21, in *Thomas Cotton's* life-time, and their portions unpaid, then the portion of such child or children should be paid to them in twelve months after the death of *Thomas Cotton*, or as soon afterwards as might be, and in the mean time, said 60*l.* and 50*l.* yearly, or the interest of their portions for a maintenance.

BOYCOT v.
COTTON.

Dame *Hester* died in 1709, and Sir *Robert Cotton* in December 12, without revoking or altering the uses of the deed of the 12th of *July* 1687, leaving several children, particularly *Thomas Cotton*, his then eldest son, who entered upon the estates limited to him by the deed of *July*, 1687, and had 12 children by *Philadelphia*, and, being minded to increase her jointure, executed a deed-poll, dated the 31st of *July* 1714, whereby he did give the capital messuage, with the lands and appurtenances in *Wenez*, and several other lands in *Denbighshire*, whereunto the deed did extend, and which were then under the yearly value 500*l.* to the use of *Philadelphia* and her assigns, after his death, for life, as a further increase of her jointure; and as to her provision for his younger children, did execute another deed-poll, dated the 1st of *August* 1714, reciting the deed of the 27th of *July* 1687, and that of the 31st of *July* 1714, and that he, in pursuance of the power given him for raising portions for his younger children, did charge the residue of the messuages, lands and premises comprized in the indenture of the 27th of *July* 1687, and not limited by the said deed-poll to his wife; and after her decease did charge the several premises and appurtenances therein mentioned, with the sum of 675*l.* for the portion of his son *Stephen*; 675*l.* for *John Salisbury Cotton*; 675*l.* for *Lynch*; 675*l.* for the plaintiff *Philadelphia Boycot*; 675*l.* for the plaintiff *Maria*; 675*l.* for the plaintiff *Hester Maria*; 675*l.* for *Sidney Bella*; and 675*l.* for *Vere*; such portions to be paid to such children as should have attained 21 before his death, within one year after his death, and to such child as should be under 21 at his death, to be paid to his sons at 21, and to his daughters at 21, in marriage, which should first happen, the respective portions to be paid with interest at five per cent. per ann. from his death, to the payment thereof.

The principal of a portion to be paid to sons at 21, to daughters at 21 or in marriage, with interest at 5 per cent. per ann. from the death of the father, to the payment thereof.

The interest ought not to accumulate till the portions are payable, but to be paid annually, for it is given as a recompence in the mean time, till the principal becomes due.

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Sir *Thomas Cotton* died the 12th of *June* 1715, and appointed *Philadelphia* sole executrix of his will, and left nine children, *Robert*, then Sir *Robert*, *Stephen*, *John*, *Lynch*, the plaintiff, and also *Vere*.

In 1716, Dame *Philadelphia* intermarried with *Thomas King*, since deceased, and by the death of Sir *Thomas Cotton*, the plaintiff, and also *John Salisbury Cotton*, became intitled to their shares of the 5000*l.* with interest from 18, and to the sum of *l.* 2-a-piece, limited to them by the deed of the 1st of *August* 1714, with interest from the death of Sir *Thomas*.

10*l.* 1.

O o

Phila-

BOYCOT v.
COTTON.

Philadelphia had two children by Mr. King, *Thomas* and *Cotton King*.

In 1727, *Stephen Cotton* died, having made his will, and appointed Sir *Robert Salisbury Cotton*, his brother, sole executor and residuary legatee.

On the 21st of *March* 1728, *John Salisbury Cotton* being above 26, died intestate and unmarried, having received very little, if any, of the said sums, and administration was granted to dame *Philadelphia* his mother.

About *September* 1730, *Vere Cotton* died intestate and unmarried at the age of 16, having received very little, if any, of the shares due to her of the said several sums, and administration was granted to *Philadelphia* her mother.

Dame *Philadelphia*, *Thomas King* the elder, *Lynch Cotton*, and the plaintiffs came to an agreement, dated the 2d of *October* 1734, whereby *Thomas King* and dame *Philadelphia*, in consideration that the plaintiffs had agreed to release all their claim on account of the personal estate of Sir *Thomas Cotton*, and the rents of the *Denbighshire* estate, received by dame *Philadelphia* after her marriage, did agree to convey to the plaintiffs all their right and interest in the personal estate of *John Salisbury Cotton* and *Vere Cotton*.

Thomas King, the elder, died about *January* 1734-5, having bequeathed his personal estate to dame *Philadelphia*, and appointed her sole executrix.

In pursuance of the agreement abovementioned, by a deed, dated the 28th of *March* 1735, *Philadelphia* assigned to the plaintiffs all her parts and proportions of the personal estates of *John Salisbury Cotton* and *Vere Cotton*, which were vested in her. To hold to the plaintiffs, as their estates in equal shares, and appointed them her attorneys to receive the same.

[555] The plaintiffs having attained the age of 18, have brought their bill against Sir *Robert Salisbury Cotton* and the trustees, praying that their portions may be raised and paid in pursuance of the deed in 1701, and also the 675 *l.* a-piece, charged on the estate in *Denbighshire*, with interest from the death of Sir *Thomas Cotton*, and also for the plaintiffs' shares of the estate of *John Salisbury Cotton*, with interest from his age of 21, and also for their shares of the estate of *Vere Cotton*.

Lord Chancellor: It is admitted in the cause, that the whole of the lands charged did not amount to above 500 *l.* per ann. that *Vere Cotton*, one of the daughters of Sir *Thomas Cotton*, died at the age of 16, and that *John Salisbury Cotton*, one of the sons, died at or about the age of 27.

The first question is, Whether Sir *Thomas Cotton* could charge interest?

The second question, Whether he has so charged it, that it may be annually received, or whether it must be accumulated and paid by way of principal sum at the age of 21?

The third question, Whether the sum of 675 *l.* was transferable at the death of Mrs. *Vere Cotton* at 16, or sinks into the real estate for the benefit of the reversioner?

the first question, I am of opinion, that Sir Thomas BOYCOT v. COTTON. could charge the estate with interest, for where there is a charge an estate with a gross sum, it likewise implies a charge it with interest, because it may be necessary that should be given by way of maintenance, for there may be

court has been so liberal in their construction, that re charged land with interest, even before the portion ad.

s objected by the counsel for the defendant Sir Robert Cotton, that this is a power to charge an estate in re- only, and it has been truly said, that this court has been eful, that real estate in the hands of the heir shall not be thened.

he rule does not prevail in the present case, because it by the settlement in 1687, that regard was paid to the tion of the estate for the reversioner, the intention being o make a large provision for younger children, and Sir Cotton has subsequently charged the whole value of the r portions.

r Thomas could therefore exhaust the whole estate, by g of principal sums, then where is the difference, if he it by charging partly interest, and partly principal, or by l only.

the second question, I am of opinion that the interest ot to accumulate, but to be paid annually, for when it at the rate of 5 per cent. the natural construction is, that l be paid annually, and becomes due every day, for it is s a recompence in the mean time, till the principal

the third question, I am of opinion that Mrs. Vere Cot- re of 675 *l.* ought not to be raised, but ought to sink for efit of the heir.

ettled now, whether the portion charged upon land be Whether a por- tion charged on land, be given with or without interest, by deed, or by will, if the person ore the age at which it becomes payable, it shall sink into t. interest, by deed, or by will, if

the person dies before it becomes payable, it shall sink in the estate (1).

case of *Cave v. Cave*, 2 Vern. 508. has been much relied The case of he counsel for the plaintiffs, in support of their opinion, *Cave v. Cave*, 2 Vern. 508. is intirely mis- . Vere Cotton at her age of 16; in that case Mr. Vernon taken by the reporter, for as it is stated in 5, and interest in the mean time, and he to have a the Register, which was by Lord Chancellor's order, it is impossible there could be that question in the cause, e book states.

See *Procuse v. Abingdon*, ante 482. ante 512. *Fonncreau v. Fonncreau*, post. *v. Parsons*, 2 Ves. 262. Secus as 3 vol. 645. al property. See *Van v. Clarke*,

BOYCOT v. COTTON. "maintenance, and directs the 4000*l.* to be raised out of a trust estate: the son dies under 25, held by Lord Keeper *Wright* to be a vested legacy, and that it went to his executors."

This case, as it is reported in the books, is an authority in point, but I have ordered the Register to be searched, and, as it is there stated, it is impossible it could be made a question in the cause: I am very sorry to find that the reports of so able a man should be so imperfect, and come out in this manner.

A portion given to one, payable at a certain age, and if he dies, to another, without mentioning any age, if the first dies before the time of payment it vests in the second immediately. Where a portion is given, payable at a certain age, to one person, and if that person dies, limited over to another, without mentioning any age, when it should be paid, if the first dies before the time of payment, it vests in the second immediately, for it is as to him a new legacy (1).

The case of *Bruen v. Bruen*, in 2 *Vern.* 439. goes a great way to overturn his own authority of *Cave v. Cave*, and as it is reported in *Prec. in Chanc.* 195. is exactly right. "The case was, a term created by a marriage-settlement to raise 3000*l.* for daughters' portions, within two months after the death of the survivor of husband and wife: the daughter of the marriage dying at the age of five years, and the portion being to be raised out of land, it shall not be raised for her administrator, but the interest or maintenance the child was intitled to, shall be raised."

Jackfen v. Farrand, 2 *Vern.* 424. is an anomalous case, and Lord Hardwicke declared he should lay no stress upon it.

This comes extremely near the present case: there is an authority too in Lord Cowper exactly in point: The case of *Tourney v. Tourney*, *Prec. in Chan.* 290. "There, by marriage-settlement, a term is created for raising 400*l.* 2-piece for younger children, to be paid them within a year after the father's death, and with interest from his death; one of the children dies after the father, but within a year after his death, the portion not being raised; held by Lord Cowper, that it should sink in the inheritance, and not be raised for the benefit of its representative." *Jackfen v. Farrand*, 2 *Vern.* 424. is quite an anomalous case, and I lay no sort of stress upon it.

There will still a question remain as to the interest of Mrs. *Farr Cotton*.

Where there is a power of charging interest, it shall be considered as maintenance.

I am of opinion, as there was a power of charging interest, that it should be considered as maintenance, for giving of interest is the same thing as giving an express maintenance, and whoever has maintained the daughter, will be intitled.

If a younger brother has a provision under a settlement, and lives with the elder, whose estate is charged with the portion, he shall have an allowance for this maintenance out of the interest due. As to the six years Mr. *John Salisbury Cotton* lived with his brother, if Sir *Robert Cotton* insists upon it, I cannot help allow-

(1) See *Laundy v. Williams*, 2 *Cox's P. W.* 480, and the cases there cited.

BOYCOT v.
COTTON.

g him something for maintaining him so long, for if a younger other has a provision under a settlement, and lives with the ler, who is intitled to the estate so charged, *he* shall have an owance for his maintenance. In this case *his Lordship* did Sir Robert's allowance for the maintenance to be paid out the interest due to Mr. *John Salisbury Cotton*, upon his share 675 *l*.

His Lordship declared, that Mrs. *Vere Cotton* dying before such e as her portion becomes payable, the principal sum of 675 *l*. ht not now to be raised, but must sink into the estate charged ewith, for the benefit of the defendant Sir Robert Salisbury on the heir at law, and did therefore order the plaintiffs , as far it seeks to have the 675 *l*. raised for the portion of s. *Vere Cotton*, to be dismissed.

And as to the rest of the cause, decreed that it be referred to Master to take an account of what is due to the plaintiffs for r original portions of 675 *l*. a-piece under the deed of the h of July 1687, with interest for the same at 5 *l*. per cent. n the death of Sir Thomas Cotton (1).

An account was directed to be taken likewise of what is due the share of Mr. *John Salisbury Cotton*, of the sum of 5000 *l*. rided for the portions of the younger children, under the riage settlement of 1701, with interest to be computed af- the rate of 4 per cent. from the time of *John Salisbury Cotton*'s ining the age of twenty-one, except when he was maintain- by his brother, and then the maintenance to be set against interest.

And it appearing there was no maintenance for Mrs. *Vere on* during her life, except the interest directed by the deed of 7; *his Lordship* declared, that a reasonable allowance should made for her maintenance during her life, equal to the interest er portion of 675 *l*. at 5 per cent, from the death of Sir Tho- her father, and did therefore decree the several sums before tioned (the sum of 675 *l*. appointed to Mrs. *Vere Cotton* ex- ed) to be raised by sale of the lands and premisses, comprized ie deed of the 1st of August 1714, subject to the jointure of y *Philadelphia*; and out of the money arising by the sale, he eed that the plaintiffs should be paid their original portions of *l*. together with interest for the same as aforesaid, and as to ortion of 675 *l*. given to *John Salisbury Cotton*, he ordered the same be divided into ten equal parts.

And as to what shall be found due for the share of *John Salis- Cotton* in the 5000 *l*. provided by the settlement of the 17th uly 1701; it is decreed that the same be raised by mortgage, le of part of the estate charged with these portions, subject dy *Philadelphia*'s jointure (2).

) The like direction with respect to his brother to be set against the interest.
75 *l*. of *John Salisbury Cotton*; and (2) Reg. Lib. A. 1738. fol. 306.
aintenance which he received from

(C) *Rule as to the Consideration.*August the 1st,
1744.*Ex parte Marth.*

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, The Construction of the Statute of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. with respect to Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Assignment.

Vide title Conditions and Limitations.

C A P. XXIII.

Power.

(A) *Whether well executed or not.*(B) *Of the right Execution of a Power, and where the Defect of it will be supplied.*(A) *Whether well executed, or not.*

At the Rolls, 1739.

Molton v. Hutchinson.

Case 262.

S. C. 2 Eq. Ca.
Ab. 659. n.

J. C. by will devised the produce of 1000*l.* S. S. stock to F. C. for life, and gave him a power to dispose of 400*l.* thereof, by any writing signed in the presence of three witnesses.

and if F. C. made no appointment, the 400*l.* was devised over to a charity.

F. C. made his will, gave several legacies, and then devised the residue of his personal estate amongst his nearest relations; held to be no execution of the power, and that the 400*l.* did not pass by the devise of the residue.

Parol evidence not allowed to prove F. C.'s intent to dispose of the 400*l.*

J O H N Cutler, by his will devised the income and produce of 1000*l.* South-sea stock to Freeman Cutler for life, and gave him a power to dispose of 400*l.* thereof, by any writing signed in the presence of three credible witnesses, and in case Freeman Cutler made no such appointment, he devised the 400*l.* over to a charity: Freeman Cutler made his will, and thereby gave several legacies, and then devised the rest and residue of his personal estate among his nearest relations: The question was, Whether this 400*l.* passed by that devise of the residue, and was a good execution of the power.

arol evidence was offered to prove it was the intent of *Free- Molton v. Cutler*, that the 400*l.* should be disposed of by his will, but *Hutchinson*. not allowed.

he Master of the Rolls, though he acknowledged a man ht execute a power or appointment, without particularly re- g it, yet here he held this was not an execution of the power, the 400 *l.* must go over according to the will of the first tef- r (1).

Andrews v. Emmot, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 297. See also *Probert v. Clifford*, *ante* 441.

parte George Caswall; In the matter of *John Caswall*, *August the 1st,* 1744.
a Bankrupt.

IR *George Caswall*, the father of the petitioner, and the Cafe 263.
bankrupt, surrendered a copyhold estate, lying at *Wood-* A person may
in *Essex*, to *William Billers*, and another person, to the use execute a power
e wife of Sir *George Caswall* for life, and after his death, to it, but necessary
the rents and profits to all his children equally, and then he should men-
ust to such use or uses as Sir *George* shall by deed or will ap- tion the estate
t, and for want of such appointment, then to his son *John* poses of (1).
wall and his heirs.

ady *Caswall* is dead, and Sir *George*, upon the 26th of Aug. *Jones v. Payer*
t, makes his will in the presence of three witnesses, in & *Mac v. 60c*
h there is the following clause, "As to all the rest, resi-
ie, and remainder of my effects, real and personal, of what
ature, kind, or quality soever, I give to my son *George*
swall, in full bar and satisfaction of what he may claim by
rtue of the custom of *London* or otherwise."
ie testator died soon after, and *John Caswall* at the time of
ng the will was dead.

orge Caswall by his petition prays. that *Thomas Clifford* the
ice of the estate and effects of *John Caswall*, under the se-
e commission of bankruptcy issued against him, may take
per conveyance of the copyhold lands at *Woodford*, in the
on mentioned from the commissioners, and that he
t thereupon duly surrender and pass the same to the
oner and his heirs, or as the petitioner should direct and
nt.

r. *Brown*, who was counsel for the petitioner, insisted, that
George Caswall had by will made a proper appointment to
petitioner, and that the assignees under the commission
st *John Caswall* the eldest brother of the petitioner, ought
liver the possession accordingly: he cited Lord *Ferrer's*
and *Bainton v. Ward*, *April*, the 24th, 1741 (2), to
the present is like those cases, because Sir *George* had a
r to dispose of it absolutely. That it ought to be considered
interest or estate in Sir *George Caswall*, and not as any

re *Probert v. Morgan*, *ante* 441.

(2) *S. C. post.* 2 vol. 172.

Ex parte
CASWALL.

part of the estate of *John Caswall*, and compared it to the case of *Carr v. Ellison*, April the 6th, 1744, where Mr. Carr by his will devised his estate in general words, without particularizing the copyhold, and yet held by Lord Chancellor that it passed (1).

[560]

Mr. Attorney General for the creditors of *John Caswall*, who became a bankrupt in 1741, said, the cases cited by Mr. Brown were not applicable, because there the power was actually executed.

Lord Chancellor: The case of Lord Ferrers is a very extraordinary determination, because the known rule of law is, that if a power is executed, the persons take by virtue of that power only, and not under the appointer, for when he has once appointed, he has nothing more to do with the estate, and therefore they need not derive through him (2).

The inference from the circumstance of the son's being a bankrupt is not to be regarded, for I must make such construction as if *John Caswall* was living, and no bankrupt.

The question is, Whether this be a good execution of the power? What a court in a judicial way may do, is another matter; but in this summary way, as I am at present advised, I am of opinion it is not a good execution of the power.

The material thing is the limitation over of the copyhold in the surrender; what is the effect of that? Why, there is an estate actually vested in *John Caswall*, and nothing but an appointment executed could divest it out of him; and this would have been the construction if it had been a legal estate, and though it is a trust estate, yet in this court ought to be considered and construed in the same manner, and therefore is no more than an estate for life to Sir George Caswall, remainder in fee to *John Caswall*, subject to be defeated and opened, on a proper appointment, by Sir George Caswall.

Though a man may execute a power without reciting, or taking the least notice of the power, yet it is necessary he should mention the estate which he disposes of, and must do such an act as shews he takes notice of the thing which he had a power to dispose of.

Sir George Caswall had other lands on which the devise to George Caswall might be satisfied.

Freehold lands
only will pass by
a devise of all his
lands, and not
copyhold, unless
a testator has
nothing but co-
pyhold.

If a man devises all his lands and tenements, only freehold land will pass, and not copyhold; yet if he has nothing but copyhold lands, they shall pass (3). So where freehold lands and leasehold lands are devised, if there are no other than leasehold lands, they shall pass by the words *lands and tenements* (4).

Leasehold, if there are no other, will pass by the words *lands and tenements*.

(1) S. C. post. 3 vol. 73.

(3) See *Smith v. Baker*, ante, 386.

(2) *Cook v. Duchesfield*, post. 2 vol. 562, 563. *Hall v. Carter*, ibid. 356.

(4) So *Day v. Trig*, 1 P. W. 286.

Southby v. Stonehouse, 2 Ves. 612. See *Hare v. Fletcher*, Doug. 43.

Knotsford v. Gardiner, post. 2 vol. 451. and references.

But here is nothing that is at all descriptive of the thing which Sir George Caswall had a power to dispose of, but what is applicable to other estates of which Sir George was seised and which he could equally dispose.

Ex parte
CASWALL.

I do therefore order the petition to be dismissed.

) Of the right Execution of a Power, and were the Defect of it will [561]
be supplied.

Hervey v. Hervey.

November the
12th, 1739.

Cafe 264.

EDWARD Hervey the father, by settlement made on his own marriage with his first wife, the mother of the defendant Michael Hervey the son, was tenant for life of the family estate which was very large, with a power to make a settlement on a second wife of 600 *l.* *per ann.* remainder in tail to first and other sons.

S. C. Barn.
C. B. 103.
S. C. 2 Eq. Caf.
Abr. 669. pl.
20, 21, 22.
It was agreed in
consideration of
5000 *l.* of the

portion paid to the father of the defendant, on his marriage, that he should be put into immediate possession of part of the estate; and as to the remainder, it was to be settled on the father for life, with a power for him to make a jointure of such of the lands as he thought proper, not exceeding 600 *l.* *per ann.* remainder to the son in tail, remainder over, and settlement was made accordingly.

Thornton

On the marriage of the defendant the son, it was agreed that recovery should be suffered to bar the uses of the former settlement; that in consideration of 3000 *l.* part of the portioned to the father, the defendant should be put into immediate possession of part of the estate, and as to the rest it was to be settled on the father for life, with power for him to make a jointure, of such of the lands as he thought proper, not exceeding 600 *l.* *per ann.* remainder to the son in tail, remainder over, and the settlement was made accordingly (1).

Bright - 2
M. Craig - 2
Jackson v. Sa
1. Bracy. 9.
Green v. Goss
2. Somers 529.

Hervey the father, before his marriage with the plaintiff his second wife, whose maiden name was Mary Carteret, by his deed, dated the 5th of May 1725, conveyed all the premises in the settlement contained, limited to him for life, of the yearly value of 900 *l.* to trustees *in trust*, in the first place, to pay 50 *l.* clear, as pin-money, to the intended wife during the coverture; and upon this further trust, if she survive her husband, to pay the plaintiff 300 *l.* *per ann.* rent-charge to his wife for her jointure, and to permit the defendant to take the profits of the estate, provided he did not interrupt her in the receipt of the 300 *l.* *per ann.* which was declared to be in bar of dower of the wife, or of any jointure on any other land.

By a deed of the
5th of May 1725.
Henry the father, before his
marriage with
the plaintiff his
second wife, con-
veys an estate of
900 *l.* *per ann.*
to trustees in
trust to pay 200 *l.*
clear as pin-
money to the in-
tended wife; if
she survive him,
to pay her 300 *l.*
per annum rent-
charge for her jointure.

(1) This settlement was made accordingly by indentures bearing date the 23 days of July 1715. and in release there was the usual covenant in Edward and Michael to make further advances.

† And their heirs during the lives of the said Edward and his intended wife.

The

HERVEY v. HERVEY.
After marriage, he by a second deed, gives her another 300*l.* per ann. clear.

[The marriage took effect.

By a second deed *Hervey* the father gives his wife another 200*l.* per ann. clear, as a further provision by way of jointure.

By a deed of the 15th of Jan. 1731, as a further provision for the wife, and in execution of the power, he conveys all the said premises to the same trustees to raise the further sum of 100*l.* for pin-money,

* And by a deed of the 15th of January 1731 (1), as a further provision for the wife, and in execution of the power, *Hervey* the father conveyed all the said premises to the same trustees in the former deed, to raise, during the joint lives of the husband and wife, the said sum of 100*l.* per ann. for pin-money, and the net sum of 600*l.* per ann. as a provision for her in case she survive her husband, in bar of all other provisions before made; and in this settlement is the following declaratory clause.

and the net sum of 600*l.* per ann. as a provision for her in case she survive her husband, in bar of all other provisions before made; and in the settlement is the following declaratory clause: "It is hereby declared and agreed, by and between, &c. that it is the intention of this deed, and of the preceding ones, to secure a jointure to his then wife, not exceeding 600*l.* per ann."

The plaintiff having survived her husband, brings her bill against his son, and the trustees under the several deeds, to have the benefit of these provisions, all or some of them.

The defendant and the trustees decreed to convey to the plaintiff a jointure, not exceeding 600*l.* per ann. but to be made liable to taxes, repairs, &c. and to hold and enjoy the same against the defendant, &c. during her life.

[*562] "It is hereby declared and agreed, by and between all the parties to these presents, that it is the intention of this deed, and of the preceding ones, to secure a jointure to his then wife, not exceeding 600*l.* per ann."

No recovery was ever suffered in pursuance of the agreement made on the son's marriage.

Mrs. *Mary Carteret*, now *Hervey*, survived her husband, and has brought her bill against his son *Michael Hervey*, and the trustees under the several deeds, to have the benefit of those provisions, all or some of them.

Lord Chancellor: The first thing to be considered is the construction of the power under the deed, between *Edward* and *Michael Hervey*.

It is very plain that this was a power in *Edward Hervey* to settle a jointure upon any after-wife, and so *toties quoties* upon any subsequent marriage; it is a power likewise to settle and assure, that is, to convey a legal estate; but then it is limited in point of value, for he could not settle all the manor, but only so much as would amount to 600*l.* a year, and that only during the natural life of such wife.

It is very certain, nor is it denied by the plaintiff's counsel, that Mr. *Edward Hervey*, in point of law, could not, by virtue of this power, settle an annuity clear of taxes upon any after-marriage, by way of provision for the wife (2).

(1) This deed recites the two former executions of the power and for the more effectual securing the payment of the said sums of 100*l.* 300*l.* and 300*l.* at the times therein mentioned &c.

(2) See *Tyrconnel v. Ancaster*, 2 Fd. 500. *Blandford v. Marlborough*, 2 vol. 542.

then consider in what manner Mr. *Edward Hervey* has his power. HERVEY v. HERVEY.

first place, he conveys all the lands which were subject over to trustees, not to the intended wife, for raising a *l. per ann.*

second deed, to raise 300 *l.* more, clear of taxes &c.

the third deed, he recites that he intended only to her 600 *l. per ann.* and no more, by all thole

pon this state it appears to me, that the execution of is absolutely void in law and equity.

power is to settle lands for a jointure, or provision, [563]
ling 600 *l. per ann.* and he has settled 900 *l. per ann.*

ords *jointure*, or *provision*, are synonymous terms; but A conveyance to
nveyance to trustees, which is in point of law no join- make a jointure
to make it so, the conveyance ought to be to the wife ought to be to
the wife herself,
and not to
trustees.

ward *Hervey* too has conveyed a clear estate of 600 *l.*
which is likewise contrary to the power.

is undeniably void in law, consider how it will
quity, and I say it is void there too; but when I say
, I do not mean that this court will not go as far as
o supply a defect in the execution of such a power

present case, neither of the parties can possibly have A court of equity
originally intended them by the power; for in respect will supply a de-
fective execution
Michael *Hervey*, the defendant, it is contrary to what of powers, as
stated between him and his father; for here is a clear well in the case
of younger chil-
dren and a provi-
sion for a wife,
as in favour of
purchasers or
creditors.
e issuing out of his estate, instead of being subject
&c. and in respect to the plaintiff, there is not what
stated for her, because the power will not extend to
ar rent-charge.

been rightly observed by the bar, that a court of
l supply a defective execution of powers, as well in
of younger children and a provision for a wife, as in
purchasers or creditors (4).

c counsel for the defendant insist, that this relief is
only to a wife unprovided for, and that here the
rovided for by the settlement previous to the marriage.

this is expressly contrary to
and declaration in the deed of
r. 1731.

Lit. 35. b. 4 Co. 1. b. 2 a.

rchman v. *Harvey*, Amb. 335.

Pollard v. *Grenwill*, 1 Cha.

1 Cha. Ca. 10. S. C. Smith v.

Cha. Ca. 263. 1 Freem. 308.

bergill v. *Felbergill*, 2 Freem.

v. *Blansfey*, Gibb. Rep. 166.

v. *Coventry*, 2 P. W. 222.

. S. C. *Tollet* v. *Tollet*, 2 P. W.

489. *Cotter* v. *Lager*, 2 P. W. 622. *Holt*

v. *Holt*, 2 P. W. 648. *Sergeant* v. *Sealey*,

pp. 2 vol. 414. *Tryconnet* v. *Ancker*,

2 Vesf. 500. *Wade* v. *Paget*, 1 Bro. Cha.

Rep. 363. *Sneed* v. *Sneed*, Amb. 54. focus

as to the non-execution of a power. *Arun-*

del v. *Philpot*, 2 Fern. 69. 3 Cha. Ca. 70

S. C. *Piggot* v. *Pemice*, Com. 250. Co-

ventry v. *Coventry*, 2 P. W. 227. *Tollet*

v. *Tollet*, 2 P. W. 490. *M'Adam* v.

Logan, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 310.

But

HERVEY v.
HERVEY.

But as the whole which has been done in this case is directly contrary to the power, she must be looked upon as a wife unprovided for.

The case of *Smith and Affiston*, *Cha. Ca.* 263. (1) and *Tollet* and *Tollet*, 1 *Wms.* 489. before the late Sir *Joseph Jekyll*, sufficiently prove, that where powers are defectively executed, this court will supply them notwithstanding.

Upon these authorities, and many more which might be mentioned, there can be no doubt but if a tenant for life, who has such a power, does after marriage execute the power, tho' defectively, yet it shall be supplied.

I am of opinion here, that the wife cannot have what was stipulated for her, previous to her marriage, carried into execution; for if I should so decree, it would be breaking in upon the agreement under the deed between *Edward* and *Michael Hervey*.

Then taking it upon this footing, she must be considered as a wife unprovided for; and if so, she is clearly intitled to the relief of this court, according to the authorities before mentioned. This case, in some respects, differs from any other that has been cited, viz. *Bath* and *Mountague*, *Select Ca. in Chanc.* 55. 2 *Ch. Rep.* 417, &c. because in them there was a provision, but a defective one.

[564] Then it falls pretty much within the rules of a wife, or child unprovided for, by defective provisions, under a will; and to this purpose the case of *Weeks* and *Urn*, decreed by Lord *Coventry* 1717, is applicable.

One reason that weighs greatly with me in the decree I am going to make, is this, That if the wife had claimed the 600*l.* per ann. without setting forth any consideration, but merely as a voluntary gift from her husband, there is no doubt but the court would have given it her, and it would be very absurd to say, that because she sets forth in her bill, a valuable consideration for a part, therefore she shall lose the whole.

If there had been any proof in this cause of her using unwarrantable means to insinuate herself into the favour of an old man, and, by imposing upon his weakness, had gained any thing clandestinely. it might have had some weight; but, in the present case, there is not so much as a suggestion of this kind, and besides too, she brought a considerable fortune in marriage.

The main argument in Lord *Coventry*'s case (2) was, that there was a non-execution of the power, but there has always been a distinction between a non-execution, and a defective execution of a power.

Here the declaratory clause in the last deed has supplied any defects that might be in the former, and the natural consequence of this is, that the parties waive all benefit which might accrue

(1) 1 *Freem.* 308. S. C. 3 *Kebl.* 551. (2) 2 *P. W.* 222. S. C. *Str.* 596.
S. C. 3 *Salk.* 277. S. C. *Rep. temp.* S. C. 9 *Mod.* 12. S. C. *Maxims in Equity*.
Finch 273. last case.

them from the other settlements, and are contented with the provision that is made pursuant to the power. HERVEY v.
HERVEY.

That clause which impowers the son to hold the estate, provided he pays 600*l. per ann.* neat, to the trustees for the wife, is within the power, and consequently void, and no conveyance can be pursuant to the power, but what is *to the wife herself*.

must therefore decree (1) that *Michael Hervey*, and the otherendants the trustees, do convey and assure to the plaintiff, a jointure not exceeding 600*l. per ann.* and that the Master shall of the manor subject to the power, take such lands as shall be sufficient for that purpose, but to be made liable to taxes, tithes, &c. in the same manner with other landed estates, and the plaintiff to hold and enjoy the said lands against the defendant, and all other persons during her life.

This cause was reheard on the 21st of July 1740.

Mr. Noel counsel for the defendant *Michael Hervey* argued, *Lord Chancellor* still continuing of his former opinion, confirmed his decree *in toto*.
that as the portion which the plaintiff brought in marriage, is only 2000*l.* that the settlement of 300*l. per annum* is much more than adequate to that fortune.

He insisted that the first settlement is such an appointment, which in law and equity, as is a full and absolute performance of the power reserved under the settlement, made upon the marriage of the defendant *Michael Hervey*, and therefore that the second deed, executed after the marriage of *Edward Hervey* with the plaintiff, ought to be considered as merely contrary.

The conveyance to the intended wife under the first deed was to trustees; it has been objected that it ought to have been a direct conveyance of a legal estate to the wife herself, and therefore the conveyance to trustees is improper.

[565]

To which I answer, that by the power the father was to give a liberty of making such a jointure or provision, as did not exceed the rents and profits of an estate of 600*l. per ann.* tho', as an express estate has not been limited to the wife herself for life, it is not properly a jointure, yet in this court, by way of provision, it may be construed a due performance of the power.

For, *First*, It is a good execution of the power at law.

Secondly, If not good at law, it is certainly in equity.

Under the deed of 1725, it was agreed between *Edward Hervey* the father, and his intended wife the plaintiff, that after the rent-charge of 300*l.* a year out of an estate of 600*l.* a year, the residue of the rents and profits should go to his son defendant *Michael Hervey*.

Therefore, as these are parties able to contract in a court of equity, this must be considered as good, by way of agreement,

1) That the plaintiff is intitled to power in the settlement of the 23d, July 1715. *Reg. Lib. A. 1739. fol. 273.*
the said 600*l.* made good out of lands in question according to the

and

HERVEY v. HERVEY. and any further addition which the wife had after the marriage, must be considered merely as a bounty, and for so much she is only a volunteer.

He cited *Scrpe* and *Offley* (1) in the House of Lords the 24th of March 1735-6, in order to shew, by that case, that the court, where a wife is provided for before, will not aid and assist the defective execution of a power under any second settlement.

I do likewise insist, that the trustees were equally trustees for Mr. *Michael Hervey* the son, as for the wife of *Edward Hervey* the father, and that, as the estate was then out of the father and in the trustees, if they had conveyed according to the trust, it would have been no breach of their duty.

The second settlement gives a rent-charge of 600*l.* a year, which is bad in substance, because it is impossible an estate of 600*l. per ann.* in land, can produce a neat sum of 600*l.* and where a person has exceeded all bounds of his power, I do not know that this court hath, in any instance, reduced that excess within the true limits of the power, but has been always held a void execution of the power.

It has been objected, that the wife claimed part as a volunteer, and part as a purchaser, and therefore it would be hard to say, in a court of equity, that when a person is allowedly a purchaser for part, this court will not supply the defective execution of a power.

To this I answer, that under the first settlement, the plaintiff was certainly a purchaser for a valuable consideration, by virtue of her fortune of 2000*l.* but that the settlement of 1731 is separate and independent from the former, and she was there only a volunteer.

The case principally relied on by the other side is *Tollat* and *Tollat*, 2 *Wms.* but there is a very material one for the defendant, and which was not mentioned at the former hearing, the case of *Loper* and *Cotter*, 1 *Wms.* 623. and heard before Lord Chancellor *King* in 1731, where, it is laid down, that equity will aid a defective execution of a power, *provided it is for a valuable consideration.*

Upon the whole, he insisted that the present is a new case, and no authority whatever cited that comes up to it.

Mr. *Wilbraham* of the same side.

The question is, Whether the first settlement is good in law and equity.

Secondly, If it be good in law and equity, whether this court will supply a defective execution of a power, under a second or third settlement, where they are undeniably bad in law; he cited the case of *Newport* and *Savage*, before Lord Chancellor *Tallot*, and *Thwytes* against *Dye*, 2 *Vern.* 80. to shew,

(1) S. C. 4 *Bro. P. C.* 237.

at where a person has a power of charging lands to such his children, and in such shares and proportions, as he by writing shall appoint; he may not only limit the land any of his children, but may charge the lands with any rent-charge, or sum of money, for any of his children.

80*l. per ann.* rent-charge, is looked upon by conveyancers a reasonable provision for a portion of 1000*l.* and if the settlement in the present case had been 320*l. per ann.* clear, it could have been double the provision that is usual for it: being four times 80*l. per annum.*

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HERVEY.

Mr. *Attorney General* for the plaintiff said,

That under the settlement, in which Mr. *Hervey* the father exercised this power, he may be called a purchaser of it from the son, the defendant *Michael Hervey*, because he absolutely gave up an estate, in which he had his life, to the son immediately in possession.

It is admitted by the counsel on all sides, that the power is not well executed in law, under the settlement of 1725, therefore the execution of the power is void, but equity will supply a defect in the execution, and cited the case of *Kettle v. Townshend*, 1 *Salk.* 187. where it was held, that equity will supply a defect, in favour of a son or daughter, and that it is not material that such a son was provided for before, nor how far.

Mr. *Murray* of the same side.

This is a power that may be executed piece-meal, part at one time, and part at another (1).

If a wife had any former provision, that is defective under the execution of a power, the counsel for the defendant takes it for granted, without producing any instance, or even a *distum* of the court, that equity will not supply any defect in a latter provision for the benefit of a wife.

He cited the case of *Watts v. Bullas*, 1 *Wms.* 60. to shew that a voluntary conveyance made to a brother of the half blood, tho' void and defective at law, will be made good by a court of equity; and that as the consideration of blood would at common law raise a use, and as before the statute of the 17 *H.* 8. such *cestui que use* might have compelled an execution of the use in a court of equity, so would this imperfect conveyance raise a trust, and consequently ought to be made good in equity. [567]

Lord Chancellor: As this case is attended with some particular circumstances, I am not sorry it has been re-heard; for

(1) See *Zouch v. Woolston*, 2 *Burr.* 1136. *Doe v. Milborne*, 2 *Durn.* and *Eas.* 721.

HERVEY v.
HERVEY.

if I had seen any reason to have changed my opinion, I should not have been ashamed of doing it, but after hearing it fully argued on the part of the defendants, I still continue of the same opinion.

I will not repeat what I said before, but rather apply myself to give an answer to what seems to be the principal reason urged for a re-hearing.

The general argument is, the validity of the first settlement, at least in a court of equity; but I take it to be clear, that the deed of 1731, which is the ultimate attempt towards the execution of the power, is a waiver of the former settlements, and supplies any defects that might be in the other two.

In aiding the defective execution of a power, either for a wife or child, it's being intended for a provision, whether voluntary or not, will intitle this court to carry into execution.

In cases of aiding the defective execution of a power, either for a wife or a child, whether the provision has been for a valuable consideration, has never entred into the view of the court; but being intended for a provision, whether voluntary or not, has been always held to intitle this court to give aid to a wife or child, to carry it into execution, tho' defectively made.

I am of opinion, if this power had been executed in favour of a stranger, it would have been good; but being merely an equitable thing, the person claiming must have come into a court of equity.

With regard to the deed of *May*, 1725, it has been said, the power being completely executed, that it cannot be executed *toties quoties*, but I am of opinion, that the power is not executed either in law or equity.

Supposing it had been defectively executed, and the parties afterwards execute it properly, there is no doubt but the law would look upon the first execution as null and void, and that it might therefore be executed over again.

If there had been words in the first settlement, which shewed that Mr. *Edward Hervey* had fully executed the power, or would have amounted to a release of it, it would indeed have prevented any subsequent execution; but there are no words, except what are usually put in by scriveners, namely, in bar of dower and thirds.

Nothing is to be inferred from the words, *the surplus I give to the remainder-man*, for they are only of course, and if not expressed, he would have had the surplus by implication.

The case of *Scroop* and *Offley* differs *toto caelo*, for there a covenant was entered into by the husband for a valuable consideration upon the first marriage, that the issue of that marriage should enjoy, free from any incumbrance done, or to be done, so that he was tied down by that clause.

It has been further urged by the defendant's counsel, that supposing the 300 *l. per ann.* be not a good and complete execution of the power, yet it is such an execution of the power, as will induce the court to think a wife, in some measure, provided for under it.

Th

is is relied upon as the strong point. I am of opinion the rule, as laid down by the defendant's counsel, that a wife or child, who come for the aid of this court, to supply defective execution of a power, must be intirely unprovided for is not the right rule of the court.

I think the general rule, that the husband or a father are the proper judges, what is the reasonable provision for a wife or child is a good and invariable rule.

And when a father has done any thing extravagant, in either of these cases, the court does not break thro' this general rule, they set it aside, but they go upon a collateral reason, this extravagant provision, either for a wife or one child is a prejudice and injury to the rest of the family, and that such ought not to be improperly preferred to the ruin of the rest.

In *lady Oxford's* case, mentioned in *Smith and Ashton*, 1 Ch. 63. her jointure was decreed good, where the power was refused, tho' only a part of her jointure depended on the power.

Still, in the next place, consider it as if the rule laid down by the defendant's counsel was a right one, and then it will come to this question, Whether she is a wife provided for under the power.

I am of opinion, that as the court cannot carry it into execution, according to the intent and meaning of the parties, it cannot be said to be a wife provided for.

This is a power to make a jointure of lands only, not exceeding 600*l.* *per ann.* it was not the intent that the whole estate should be incumbered, for the remainder-man was to have the 300*l.* which he will not have, if the 300*l.* *per ann.* rent-charge should take place, for then the whole will be liable to another rent-charge, and by that means the remainder-man will have a surplus.

Then it has been said, the court might have taken 600*l.* *per ann.* out of the 900*l.* *per ann.* to answer this rent-charge.

I suppose this estate had lain in the level or marsh grounds, and then the part so sold might not even have produced a rent-charge of 600*l.*

It would have been a prejudice too, in respect of subsequent remainder-men; for supposing the 600*l.* a year had, by accident, proved an insufficient fund, then the arrears of rent-charge would have run on, and the remainder-man, who stands behind *Michael Hervey*, would have been prejudiced.

And, if there had been no settlement besides the deed of the court would have found out some other way to make the provision for the wife effectual, and might, perhaps, have done what *Mr. Noel* has pointed out, allotted so much of the estate which was subject to the power, as would have been sufficient for her.

. I.

P p

sufficient

HERVEY v. HERVEY.
That a wife or child, who come for the aid of this court to supply a defective execution of a power, must be totally unprovided for is not the right rule.

HERVEY v. HEAVEY. sufficient to have answered a clear neat sum of 300*l.* annually, making an allowance for landed estates being liable to taxes.

[569] But I am of opinion, whatever the court might have done under the deed of 1725, to aid and assist the wife, if it had stood singly, and clear of subsequent settlements, yet as the case is now circumstanced, if the court cannot give her what is agreed and stipulated for, under this deed, they will certainly secure to her what is given under the settlement of 1731.

As the plaintiff has not the provision stipulated for her, she must be considered as totally unprovided for.

And as this is a rent-charge, and not such a provision as is stipulated for the wife, she must be considered as absolutely unprovided for, and then she will clearly be intitled, according to the rules of equity, to be aided and assisted in carrying a defective provision into execution.

Where there has been an excess in the execution of a power, this is void but for the surplus, and good within the limits of the power.

It has been said, where there has been an excess in the execution of a power, that there are no instances where the court have assisted to carry such a case into execution, but though there is an excess or redundancy in the thing itself, yet it must be considered only as a defect in the legality; and there are many cases to this purpose, and I will put one; suppose a power to lease for 21 years, and the person leases for 40, this is void only for the surplus, and good within the limits of the power (1).

It is surprizing to me, how the person who drew this settlement could mistake, when he had so plain a power for his guide; but he does not seem to have committed blunders so much as wilful mistakes, with a view to try experiments, like Serjeant *Magnard's* conclusions, in some of the clauses of his will, *valeat quantum valere potest*.

Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the settlement in 1725, being drawn in such a manner as that the wife could not have what was intended for her, did not annul or defeat the last settlement, and therefore do direct that my former decree shall stand without any variation (2).

(1) See *Parry v. Bowen*, *Nelf. Rep.* 87. (2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1739. fol. 507. 2 *Vef.* 644.

Vide title Charity.

Vide title Dower and Jointure.

C A P XCIV.

Process.*Vide title Arrest.*

C A P. XCV.

[570]

Prochein Amy.*February the 13th, 1737. At the Rolls.*

Anon.

A *Prochein Amy* need not be a relation, but then he must be a person of substance, because liable to costs. Case 265.

C A P. XCVI.

Prohibition.*Vide title Marriage.*

C A P. XCVII.

Purchase.) *Of Purchases without Notice.*| *Whether Lands purchased after a Will, pass by it.*

Belurus & Paoli
1. Nov. 456.

(A) *Of Purchasers without Notice.*

November the
15th, 1738.

Brandlyn v. Ord.

Cafe 266.

Cafe 266. **I**T was said by *Lord Chancellor* in this cause, that a man who purchases for a valuable consideration, with notice of a voluntary settlement from a person *who bought without notice*, shall shelter himself under the first purchaser, yet it must be the very same interest in every respect.

ment, from a person who bought without notice, shall shelter himself under the first purchaser (1).

James Nixon & Youngs 359

He likewise said, he never knew a man defend himself in this court, as a purchaser for a valuable consideration under articles only; if he is injured, he must sue at law upon the covenants in the articles.

Where defendants plead a former suit, they must shew it was *res judicata*.

**A tenant in tail,
out of possession,
cannot bring a
bill to perpetuate
testimony.**

And that a bill dropped
for want of pro-
secution, is
never to be pleaded as a decree of dismissal.

His Lordship also laid it down as a rule, that where the defendants plead a former suit, that the court implied there was no title when they dismissed the bill, is not sufficient, they must shew it was *res judicata*, an absolute determination in the court that the plaintiff had no title.

He also held, that a tenant in tail, out of possession, cannot bring a bill to perpetuate testimony of witnesses, till he has recovered possession by ejectment; if he does, on the defendant's demurring for this reason, the court will allow it (3).

And that a bill dropped for want of prosecution is never to be pleaded as a decree of dismissal in bar to another bill.

And that a fine levied by termor for years, is a forfeiture; but the reverfioner has five years after the expiration of the term to enter (4).

(1) See *Sweet v. Southcote*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 66. *Lowther v. Carlton*, post. 2 vol. 242.

(2) See *Fitzgerald v. Fauconberge*, *Fitzgib.* 207. *Hart v. Middlehurst*, *post.* 3 vol. 377.

(3) *Parry v. Rogers*, 1 *Vern.* 441.
Phillips v. Carew, 1 *P. W.* 117.

(4) The reader is referred to the *Essay on Uses and Trusts*, 320, to 325. See also *Smith v. Clifford*, 1 *Durn. & East*, 7:8, with respect to a recovery suffered by a termor for years and a tenant for life.

November the
30th, 1739.

At the Rolls. Anon.'s

Cafe 267.

S. C. ante 88.

New assignees

under a com-
mission of bank

million of bank
ruptcy on filing

ruptcy, on which
by the old affi

THE question before the court was, Whether new assignees, under a commission of bankruptcy upon the death or removal of the former, shall, on filing a supplemental bill, be in-

ruptcy, on filing a supplemental bill, shall have the benefit of the proceedings in the suit commenced by the old assignees.

titled to the benefit of the proceedings in a suit begun in the time of the first assignees, or must begin again by original bill?

ANON.

Master of the Rolls: In the case of an abatement, if you can, you must revive; but in the case of assignees of bankrupts, where some die, or some are discharged, and others are by order of court put in their room, there is no privity between the bankrupt and the assignees, or at least but an artificial one, and therefore they cannot revive; and it would be extremely hard if there have been pleadings, examinations, &c. in a former suit, that the new trustees should not have the benefit of them by a supplemental bill.

Suppose the court, upon the death or discharge of assignees, of bankrupts, should say that all must go for nothing, and you must begin again by original suit, why then all the charges and expences in the former suit are absolutely thrown away.

In the present method, though you cannot come against the representative of the former assignee, yet by a supplemental bill you will have the bankrupt's estate liable, at all events, to answer the costs.

I will put a case that comes very near this, and will shew the reasonableness of my present determination, Suppose an estate has been in controversy for twenty years in this court, and during the suit it is purchased, the purchaser, on filing his supplemental bill, comes into this court *pro bono et malo*, and shall be liable to all the costs in the proceedings, from the beginning to the end of the suit. For these reasons I am of opinion, that the new assignees ought to have the benefit of the former proceedings in the suit commenced by the old assignees (1).

A purchaser of an estate, after it has been in controversy in this court, on filing his supplemental bill, comes here *pro bono et malo*, and is liable to all costs from the beginning to the end of the suit.

(1) See *Anon. ante* 263.

(B) *Whether Lands purchased after a Will pass by it.*

Green v. Smith. On Exceptions.

December the 15th, 1738.

A. Articles for the purchase of lands, and dies; it happened afterwards that the seller could not make a good title to the lands, and the question was between the heir at law, and the executor of *A.* Whether the purchase money was to be considered as land or personal estate?

Case 268.

If a man covenants to lay out a sum in the purchase of lands, and devises his real

estate before he has made such purchase, the money to be laid out will pass to the devisee.

Lord Chancellor, in this cause, laid down the following rules:

Hallett

That agreements to be performed, are often considered as performed: for if a man covenants to lay out a sum of money in the purchase of lands, generally, and devises his real estate be-

Middleton

J. Russell. 2.

P p 3

fore

Jeff. & Stephens

J. Hume. 1

Pocock, & Meade

GREEN v. SMITH. fore he has made such purchase, the money *agreed* to be laid out will pass to the devisee (1).

Where a person contracts for a purchase of lands after a will made, they will not pass thereby, but descend to the heir at law. That where a man having made his will, afterwards enters into a contract for the purchase of land, the lands contracted for will not pass by the will, but descend to the heir at law (2).

Where after making a will a person agrees for the purchase of particular lands, if a good title cannot be made, as the heir at law cannot have the land, he shall not have the money intended to be laid out. That where an ancestor, after the making of a will, agrees for the purchase of particular lands, the heir at law would have a right to them, provided a good title can be made, otherwise if it cannot; but it is going too far to say that though the heir at law cannot have the land, yet he shall have the money so intended to be laid out (3).

That if a man gives a portion to his daughter by a will, and afterwards advances her with the like sum, it shall go in ademption of the legacy (4).

That *the vendor* of the estate is, from the time of his contract, considered as a trustee for the purchaser, and *the vendee*, as to the money, a trustee for the vendor (5).

That in bills for specific performance, this court never gives relief where the act is impossible to be done, but leaves the party to his remedy at law.

That where an ancestor has agreed for the purchase of particular lands, but dies before it is quite completed, if the heir at law brings his bill against the devisees, who claim the real estate of the ancestor by a will made before the purchase of those particular lands, the vendor of these lands, where he has a doubtful title, must be made a defendant to the suit, otherwise if his title be clear.

(1) *Milner v. Mills*, *Mof.* 123. *Greenhill v. Greenhill*, *Pre. Cha.* 320. *Lingen v. Scowry*, 1 *P. W.* 172. 3 *P. W.* 221. *S. C.* cited. *Potter v. Potter*, 1 *Vesf.* 437. *Beaucherk v. Mead*, *post.* 2 vol. 169. *Oldham v. Hughes*, *post.* 2 vol. 453. *Pullyn v. Ready*, *post.* 2 vol. 590. *Whittaker v. Whittaker*, 4 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 31. See also *Guidot v. Guidot*, *post.* 3 vol. 254. (2) *Langford v. Pitt*, 2 *P. W.* 629. *Allyn v. Allyn*, *Mof.* 262. See *vide*

Cotton v. Cotton, 2 *Cha. Rep.* 138.

(3) Therefore his Lordship saw no ground for giving directions to perform the agreement or to pay over the purchase money. *Reg. Lib. A.* 1738. fol. 265.

(4) See *Bellasis v. Utbawatt*, *ante* 426. note 2.

(5) *Vide Pollexfen v. Moore*, *post.* 3 vol. 273.

Vide title Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Assignees

Anon' at the Rolls. M. T. 1739.

C A P. XCVIII.

Real Estate.

(A) *Where the Personal shall not be applied in Exoneration.*

November the 4th, 1738. At the Rolls.

Miles v. Leigh.

HENRY Leigh, the plaintiff's father, being seised of a messuage called *Hills*, and of another messuage called *Boreys* (1), with lands in *Somersetshire* of 50l. a year, and also possessed of personal estate, made his will the 23d of *March* 1701, and in the outset thereof says, "All my worldly goods I give to Joan my wife, and the premises aforesaid he devises to her for life, and then to his son Robert, brother of the plaintiff, and his heirs for ever; and to the plaintiff, by the name of his daughter Mary, a legacy of 150l. to be paid her in a twelvemonth's time after his son Robert should come to enjoy the premises, and if Robert should die before Joan, then that Henry, another son, and the brother of the plaintiff, coming to the possession of the premises, and surviving his mother, should pay to the plaintiff 200l. and made Joan executrix."

Case 269. S. C. 4 Vin. Abr. 463. pl. 221. 8 Vin. Abr. 295. pl. 14. 347. pl. 3. n. H. L. the plaintiff's father, being seised in fee of several lands, he devises them to his wife for life, and then to his son Robert and his heirs, and gives to the plaintiff a legacy of 150l. to be paid to her in a twelvemonth's time after his son Robert should come to enjoy the premises; and if Robert died before his mother, then that Henry, another son, coming to the possession thereof, and surviving his mother, should pay the plaintiff 200l.

Robert and Henry died before Joan, but Robert left a son, the defendant Henry Leigh, and nephew to the plaintiff, to whom she applied for the legacy, and, upon his refusing payment, brought her bill against him to pay what is her due for the legacy, or, in default thereof, that the defendant may deliver possession of the premises.

The Master of the Rolls decreed, that it be referred to a Master to see what is due to the plaintiff, for her legacy of 150l. and to compute interest at 4l. per cent. from a year after the death of Joan Leigh, and the defendant to pay what should be found due, or in default thereof the defendant is to account for the rents of *Hills tenement*, and that *Hills tenement* be sold (2).

A decree for the legacy at the Rolls, with interest at 4 per cent. from a year after the death of the mother, and, upon appeal to Lord Chancellor, decree affirmed.

(1) The testator was seised of this messuage in tail.

(2) As to the messuage called *Boreys*, the bill was dismissed. Reg. Lib. B. 1738. fol. 83.

MILES v.
LEIGH.

On the 25th of July 1739, this cause came on before his Lordship, upon an appeal from the decree of the Master of the Rolls.

Lord Chancellor: I think the will obscurely penned, but the construction must be agreeable to the intent of the whole will taken together; and upon that consideration I am of opinion the decree at the Rolls is right.

The words the testator uses in the disposition of his personal estate, *wordly goods*, are an extensive description thereof; and then the first question will be, Whether, by the words and intent of the testator, the legacy is a charge on the real estate?

Conditions in wills are often construed so, from the nature of the thing itself, where the words merely of themselves are not conditional.

I am of opinion it is, and that no other part of the estate, but the real, is charged with it; the testator breaks the descent, and his son Robert takes only a remainder under the will, and the clause of the legacy to his daughter Mary is to be construed just as if it had followed the clause of the devise to Robert and his heirs, and therefore is a condition annexed to the estate, and conditions in wills are often construed so from the nature of the thing itself, where the words merely of themselves are not conditional, as in the case of adverbs of time, and here are adverbs of time directing the particular time of payment, and the word *then* has often been construed a condition.

It is objected, that it is not said to be paid out of the estate at Hills, nor is it said by whom it is to be paid.

[575]

Tho' a legacy is not expressly said to be paid out of an estate, nor by whom, yet it has been considered as a charge thereon, where the general intent of the testator has appeared.

But there are many cases where it is neither said to be paid out of the estate, nor by whom, yet has been considered as a charge upon the estate, where the general intent of the testator has appeared; but here the whole will being taken together, the subsequent clause directing Henry to pay, he coming into possession, &c. is a plain declaration of the testator's intent, that the person who possessed the estate should pay the legacy.

The testator intended it should come out of both estates, and he has charged his son, in respect of the whole estate he was to have; and that is generally the rule of proportion in charging the son for younger children's fortunes, in respect of the value of the whole estate that is to come to him. The words are, I think, sufficient to charge the real estate; and as to the personal, it is given absolutely and intirely to the mother; she might spend it, or do what she pleased with it; nor is the legacy given to be paid at the particular time of the death of the mother, so that it is impossible to imagine that could be the fund intended by the testator (1).

A condition will bind the heir, if the devise to him takes effect, so that he must claim under the ancestor, as much as if the ancestor had taken in possession.

The second question is, Whether the plaintiff's legacy is a contingent charge? For it has been insisted on by the defend-

(1) See *Walker v. Jackson*, post. 2 vol. 624.

ant's counsel, that it depended on the contingency of *Robert's* personally enjoying the premises; but the construction must be, when the devise to *Robert* takes effect, and the present defendant claims under *Robert*, and the condition will bind the heir, if the devise so takes effect as that he must claim under the ancestor, as much as if the ancestor himself had taken in possession (1).

MILLS v. LEIGH.

As to the satisfaction said to be received by the plaintiff from the mother, that depends on the question, Whether this was a legacy payable out of the personal estate? But this never was so, nor was the personal estate liable, for if it had been intended, there would have been no occasion to postpone the payment of the legacy, till the estates called *Boreys* and *Hills* came into possession.

Decree affirmed (2).

(1) See *Marks v. Marks*, 1 *Stra.* 129. (2) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1738. fol. 351.
1 *Ves.* 46.

Burgoigne v. Fox and Others.

May the 13th,
1738.

ON the marriage of Lord *Bingley* with a daughter of Lord *Guernsey*, a settlement was made of his estate in *Yorkshire*, to the common uses of a marriage settlement, and in case of failure of issue male, a term of 1000 years was created for raising the sum of 10,000*l.* for daughter's portions.

Case 270.
The 10,000*l.* charged by Lord *Bingley*, on the term of 1000 years, shall not be paid out of his personal estate, but the land on which it was originally charged must bear the burthen of it.

Lord *Bingley* afterwards, by lease and release, dated the 25th and 26th of *August* 1714, conveys an estate he had in *Hertfordshire*, called *The Nunnery of Cheshunt*, to the use of himself for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, remainder to *Samuel Benson* (a near relation) for life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, remainder to the right heirs of Lord *Bingley*, subject to a power of revocation by any deed or writing under the hand and seal of Lord *Bingley*, and attested by two or more witnesses, so as, at the time of such revocation, he settles other land in *Yorkshire*, free from all incumbrances, and of as good or better yearly value than the estate at *Cheshunt*, to the same uses as are mentioned in the deed of 1714.

Hampden's case
2 *Simon.* 4
[576]
Lord Bingley
Little
2. *James v. Fox*
613

Lord *Bingley* afterwards, by his will dated the 17th of *June* 1729, "devises to the present plaintiff an estate for life, in the "lands, &c. at *Cheshunt*; and all his lands in *Yorkshire*, and "elsewhere, he devises to trustees, for the benefit of his daughter and only child, (since married to Mr. *Fox* the defendant) "for life, remainder to the first and other sons in tail, remainder "over, &c."

After-

BURGOINEV.
FOX.

Afterwards Lord *Bingley*, by lease and release, of the 29th and 30th of *June* 1730, intended by him as an execution of the power of revocation in the deeds of 1714, conveys an estate at *Hatton* in *Yorkshire*, to the same uses with the deeds in 1714.

But this estate was deficient in value, and was likewise charged with the term of 1000 years, under a deed in 1703, for raising 10,000 *l.* for daughters' portions.

After the death of Lord *Bingley*, a bill was brought, and decree obtained by consent, for charging Lord *Bingley's* personal estate with this 10,000*l.* portion, which was done to avoid circuit, the testator having by his will, directed his personal estate, which was very considerable, to be laid out in the purchase of lands, to be settled to the uses mentioned in his will as to the other lands.

Samuel Benson died, and *Robert* his son refusing to accept of the estate at *Hatton*, under the deed of 1730, and having recovered the *Cheshunt* estate by ejectment, the bill was now brought by the plaintiff, praying, in the alternative, either that *Robert Benson* may be compelled to relinquish his claim to the *Cheshunt* estate, and accept that of *Hatton*, upon a supposition that the power of revocation was equitably, though not legally pursued; or, that if that should be thought otherwise, that the plaintiff may have the *Hatton* estate, which appeared to be conveyed to *Robert Benson*, in lieu of the *Cheshunt* estate, or at least to have a satisfaction and equivalent for this devise out of the personal estate of the testator, in respect of a covenant entered into by him in the deed of 1730, that the *Hatton* estate then was, and should continue during the interest of *Samuel Benson* therein, of the clear value of 120*l.* *per ann.* which was the value of the *Cheshunt* estate at the time of the settlement thereof in 1714.

[577] Lord Chancellor : I am clearly of opinion the power of revocation was not well executed in respect of the difference of the value of the two estates, and the term of 1000 years which covered *Hatton* as part of the *Yorkshire* estate settled in 1703.

I am likewise clearly of opinion, that the deed of 1730 was a revocation of the will, *quoad* the devise of the *Hatton* estate, as part of all the testator's lands, &c. in *Yorkshire*, mentioned to be devised by the will, and therefore *Hatton* could not be subject to the particular uses created by the will. *Vide Shower's Parl. Ca.* 150.

But as it was admitted, that tho' *Robert Benson* had the legal estate both in *Cheshunt* and *Hatton* estates, the former under the settlement in 1714, and the other in 1730, yet as one only was plainly intended him, and he chuses to adhere to the *Cheshunt*, &c. he must be a trustee as to the other estates, for some person or other who in equity has a right to it, and I think the heir at law of the testator will plainly be intitled to this trust; and the principal question therefore is, as between the plaintiff and the heir at law.

And

And as the plaintiff claims only under the will, and is there- ^{BURGOINE & FOX.}
 re a mere volunteer, he is not intitled to any equity of this
 nd.

That in the case of *Noys v. Mordaunt*, 2 *Vern.* 581. it is
 ain Lord *Cowper* went upon this, a provision which was
 hereby to be made by a father for his child; and it is likewise
 in this respect distinguishable, that the dispute there was be-
 tween persons who claimed under the same will, here between
 devisee and the heir at law, who is always favoured.

In *Reeve v. Reeve*, 1 *Vern.* 219. particular notice was taken by
 the testator, in his will, of his apprehension that the 3000*l.*
 charge would be good against the jointure. No express inten-
 on of any thing of that kind appears in the present case.
 Here it was likewise to make provision for an only daughter,
 and no inference can be drawn from those resolutions, in favour
 of a mere volunteer, as the plaintiff is.

N. B. Held clearly by Lord Chancellor, there was no pretence
 of paying off the 10,000*l.* charged on the term of 1000 years,
 out of the personal estate of Lord *Bingley*, but the land on which
 was originally charged must bear the burthen of it; and what
 as done by the decree in this case could be only matter of
 agreement between the parties (1.)

His Lordship declared he saw no cause to give the plaintiff any
 relief in equity, and therefore ordered that the matter of the
 plaintiff's bill stand dismissed without costs.

- (1) See *Coventry v. Coventry*, 2 *P. W. Rep.* 57. *Ward v. Dudley*, 2 *Bro. Cha.*
 12. *Evelyn v. Evelyn*, *Cox's 2 P. W. Rep.* 316. *Howel v. Price*, 1 *Cox's P.*
 14. note 1. *Lanoy v. Atbol*, *post.* 2 vol. *W.* 294. note 1. *Galton v. Hancock*, *post.*
 4. *Tankerville v. Fawcett*, 2 *Bro. Cha.* 2 vol. 435, 439. and notes.

C A P. XCIX.

[578]

Receiver.

(A) Rule as to Appointing him.

Anon'.

May the 31st,
 1738.

ORD Chancellor: There is no instance of appointing a Case 271.
 receiver of the rents and profits of an infant's estate, where S. C. ante 489.
 ere is no bill depending in this court; if it had been only The court will
 ed, there might have been an application for this purpose on not appoint a
 half of the infant (1). receiver of an
 infant's estate,
 where there is no
 bill filed.

(1) *Ex parte Whitfield*, *post.* 2 vol. 315.

Vide title Infant. May the 31st, 1738.

C A P. C.

Recoveries.

Vide title Agreements, Articles, and Covenants, under the Division, when to be performed in Specie.

Vide title Fines and Recoveries.

C A P. CI.

Relations.

Vide title Exposition of Words.

C A P. CII.

[579]

Remainder.

July the 17th, 1738. *Eleanor Davenport* Widow, one of the Daughters of *Margaretta Farmer*, Widow, deceased, and *John Davenport* her Son, and *Mitchel Lodge*, and *Chaplin*, Executors of *Margaretta Farmer*, } Plaintiffs.

John Oldis, *John Blake*, *Richard Owen*, and *Margaret Lee*, } Defendants.
Woburn & Lyne
Russell h. 54.

Case 272. *JOHN Owen* Esq; being seised in fee of a messuage and lands in *Shropshire*, mortgaged the premises to *Griffith Thomas* for 120l. and being also seised in fee of a messuage in the possession of *Margaret Humphrys*, did by will devise the two messuages, with the lands belonging, to his wife *Margaret Owen* for her life, and after her decease, to his son and daughter *John and Margaret Owen*, to be equally divided between them, and the several and respective heirs of their bodies, and for want of such issue, to his wife *Margaret Owen* his wife in fee, and made her sole executrix: she proved the will, entred on the said messuages, and received the rents till her death in *December 1726*, having survived her son *John Owen*, who died an infant unmarried.

A. devises lands to his wife for life, and after her decease to his son and daughter, *John and Margaret*, to be equally divided between them, and the several and respective issues of their bodies, and for want of such issue, to his wife in fee. This will not create a cross remainder, which can only be raised by an implication absolutely necessary, which is not the case here, for the words *several* and *respective*, effectually disjoin the title.

The

The widow of the testator, after his death, married with DAVENPORT & OLDIS. *John Farmer* the plaintiff *Eleanor's* father, and having survived him, made her will, reciting her first husband's will, and devised one moiety of the said two messuages to *Mitchell Lodge, and Chaplin*, in trust for the separate use of the plaintiff *Eleanor* her daughter, during her life, and after her decease, to *John Davenport* the son of *Eleanor* for life, and after his decease, to the defendant *Richard Owen* in fee.

The defendant *Margaret*, the daughter of the testator *John Owen*, married one *Lee*, (who is since dead), and the defendant *Oldis* having paid off *Thomas's* mortgage, took an assignment thereof; and being willing to purchase the *Shropshire* estate of *Lee*, and the defendant *Margaret* his wife, they by indentures of lease and release in 1732, between them and *Oldis*, in consideration of the sum therein mentioned, granted to him the said premises, and suffered a recovery, and he insists that he has a right to enjoy the same, as standing in the place of *Margaret Lee*, on whom, upon the death of *John Owen* her brother, the estate descended by survivorship, and that she became intitled thereto by a cross remainder under the testator's will. [580]

The plaintiffs claim the benefit of their several devises under the will of *Margaretta Farmer*, and have brought their bill, in order that the plaintiff *Eleanor* may, on paying her share of the mortgage, have a conveyance of a moiety of the premises, and that she may be let into the receipt of one moiety of the rent, and that a partition may be made of the said premises, and that she may be quieted in the possession of a moiety thereof, in severalty, for the plaintiff's benefit.

Lord Chancellor: I am of opinion, that the will in this case is not so penned, as to create a cross remainder, which, as it is never favoured by the law, can only be raised by an implication absolutely necessary, and that is not the present case, for here the words *several and respective*, effectually disjoin the title; his *Lordship* for this purpose cited the case of *Comber and Hill*, in the King's Bench. *H. T. 7 Geo. 2 1733* * (1).

The

* *John Holden*, being seised of several lands in fee, devised to his son *Richard* for his life with remainder to his issue in tail male, and after his death without issue, he demised the premises among his three grandchildren in this manner, To his grandson *Richard* and *Elizabeth* his granddaughter as tenants in common, and to the heirs of their respective bodies, and for default of such issue, the remainder to his granddaughter *Anne Holden* in fee: *Anne* married, and afterwards *Elizabeth* died without issue of her body: The question was, Whether *Richard Holden* and *Elizabeth* took an estate in common, with cross remainders to the heirs of their bodies, for then the estate could not vest in *Anne*, but upon failure of issue of both their bodies, or whether this was an estate in common, with remainders to the heirs of their bodies generally, for in that case, one moiety of the estate would vest in *Anne*, who had the remainder in fee, immediately upon the death of either of them without issue: the court were of opinion, that no cross remainders were created by this devise, but that by the death of *Elizabeth* her moiety went over to *Anne*.

(1) 2 *Stra.* 969. *S. C. Williams v. mainders could only arise in a will by im-*
Browne, 2 *Stra.* 996. It is observable *plication between two.* See *Gilbert v.*
that according to the old cases, cross re- *Witty*, *Crö. Jac.* 655. *Cole v. Lexington*,
1 *Vent.*

DAVENPORT v.
OLDIS.

The only instance wherein this case differs is, that in the case of *Comber and Hill*, all the devisees were grand children, in equal degree to the testator, and in this case the devise over was to the wife, who could not claim as heir at law, but yet the presumption of kindness was as strong in favour of a wife, and then this does not differ from the reason of that case.

Cross remainders
have never been
adjudged to arise
merely upon
these words, *In*
default of such
issue (2).

In the case of *Holmes and Meynell, T. Raym.* 425. a great stress was laid upon the word *they*, in case *they* happened to die, then he devised all the premises, nor can there be any case cited, where cross remainders have been adjudged to arise merely upon these words, *in default of such issue*, and therefore *his Lordship* declared, that the plaintiffs *Eleanor Davenport, John Davenport*, and the defendant *Richard Owen*, are intitled to the equity of redemption of a moiety of the premises, on payment of a moiety of the principal and interest on the said mortgage, and that in case either of the plaintiffs, or the defendant *Richard Owen*, should redeem the said premises, then he decreed that a commission should issue, to divide the premises into moieties, one moiety to go to the plaintiffs *Eleanor and John Davenport*, and the defendant *Owen*, according to their interest therein, and the other moiety to the defendant *Oldis*, and, after such partition made, he directed proper conveyances to be executed by the several parties (3).

[581]

1 *Vent.* 224. *Holmes v. Meynell, T. Ray.* 452. But more modern determinations extend such implication to a greater number. *Pery v. White, Cowp.* 777. *Phipard v. Mansfield, Cowp.* 797. *Atberton v. Pye, 4 Durn. & East,* 710. *Har. Co. Litt.* 195. b. n. 1. Tho' cross remainders can never be created by implication in a deed (See *Cole v. Levingston, 1 Vent.*

224.) yet they may arise upon the construction of marriage articles. *Marryat v. Townley, 1 Ves.* 105. *Twissden v. Lath, Amb.* 663.

(2) *Sed contra Wright v. Holdford, Cowp.* 31. *Amb.* 468. *S. C. Phipard v. Mansfield, Cowp.* 797, 800.

(3) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1737. fol. 783.

March the 12th,
1738.

Hopkins alias Dare v. Hopkins.

inght-
v
44
513

Cause 273.

HEARD upon the 3d of March, and stood for judgment this day.

S. C. Ca. temp.
Talb. 44.
S. C. 1 Vern.
268.

J. H. devised his real estate to trustees and their heirs, to the use of them and their heirs, upon several trusts therein after mentioned. These words are declaratory of his intention,

that the legal estate so given, should be used to support all these trusts and limitations after declared; part of which were to the after-born sons of J. H. and the court made such a construction as supported the intention, being of opinion it was not inconsistent with the rules of law and equity.

John Hopkins the testator, having a large real and personal estate, makes a disposition of both by his will, and as to the bulk of his real estate, devises the same to trustees and their heirs, to the use of them and their heirs, upon several trusts, viz. for *Samuel*, the only son of his cousin *John Hopkins* for life, and after his decease in trust for the first and every other son of the body of the said *Samuel*, to be begotten successively, and the heirs males of the body of every such son respectively, and for want of such issue, in case his cousin *John Hopkins* should have any other son or sons, then for all and every such other son or sons respectively for their respective lives, with like remainders to

their

r several sons successively and their issue male, and for default of such issue, to the first and every other son of the body of Sarah, first daughter of his said cousin John Hopkins for life successively, with like remainders to their issue male, and for want of such issue, the like remainders to the first and every other son of the body of Mary, second daughter of his said cousin John Hopkins, and their issue male, and so carries on the limitation in like manner, in default of the other daughters of his said cousin, then in being, for want of such issue, in case his cousin John Hopkins should leave any other daughter or daughters, then in trust for their first and every other son in like manner, and for default of such issue, in trust for the first and other sons of his cousin Hannah Hopkins, with like remainders to her first and every other son and his issue male, with remainders over to other relations, remainders to his own right heirs.

Then comes a proviso, that none of the persons to whom the estate was thereby limited, should be in actual possession of the whole, or any part thereof, till he or they respectively attained to their age or ages of 21, and in the mean time, the trustees to make a handsome allowance for the education of such persons, and the overplus to go to such as should be intitled thereto (1).

These are the several limitations and provisos, materially relating to the real estate.

Then he devises all the rest and residue of his personal estate, in case there should be any, after payment of debts, &c. to his executors in trust, to be, with all convenient speed, laid out in the purchase of lands, and to be settled to and upon the same trusts and purposes in his will declared of the real estate he was then seised of, and made the trustees his executors.

Samuel Hopkins the first devisee died before the testator, which, after the testator's death, occasioned the bringing two bills, one

John Hopkins and his daughter, to have an account, and execution of the trust, and John Hopkins prayed, that, as heir at law, he might have the profits till some persons come in esse, capable to take under the will, as part of the trust undisposed of; the other was brought by the trustees, that till a person was in esse, capable of taking, the profits might be accumulated to increase the estate.

These causes were heard before the Master of the Rolls in 1733, and it was admitted on all hands, that if Samuel had survived the testator, he would have taken (at least) an estate for life, in the trust in possession, and all the subsequent limitations between him and the present plaintiff, would in such case have been contingent remainders.

But it was insisted for the plaintiffs in the original cause, that, the death of Samuel in the testator's life, that devise was void, and was to be considered as if it had never been inserted, and that if the subsequent limitations could not take effect as contin-

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4th Nov. 1733. Lani.
11. Simon.

Underblank v. H.
3 Dec. 1.

Gordons v. William
21. Heli. Ch. 40

Monday v. Colls.
4. King's Bench.

Wills v. Wills.
12. Jan. 4. 1733.

Langford v. Mass.
11. Heli. & Term: 6.

File v. Sweller.
2. H. of Lords. Ca.

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(1) This proviso is more fully stated in Ca. temp. Talb. 44.

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gent remainders, they might by way of executory devise, and that they should operate as they could, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*.

For the present plaintiff it was insisted, that by the death of *Samuel*, the estate of freehold devised to him, became void, and so consequently the contingent remainders, and that the law cannot admit a limitation in its original creation, a contingent remainder, to be by an accident changed into an executory devise.

The Master of the Rolls was of opinion, "That the limitation to *Samuel Hopkins* was to be considered as if it had never been in the will, and therefore that the devise to after-born sons being by future words, in case his cousin *John Hopkins* should have any other son, it was now to be considered as the first devise, and might take effect as an executory devise."

Lord Chancellor *Talbot* was of the same opinion on the appeal, (*Vide Cas. in Eq. in his time, 44.*) "and decreed, the trustees to deliver possession to the plaintiff *John Hopkins*, (of particular estates) and of the estate purchased by the testator, after the making the will, and to deliver the deeds and writings to him, and declared he was intitled to the rents and profits devised to the trustees, accrued since the testator's death (1), till some person should be in being intitled to an estate for life in possession (which makes no difference in the decree) according to the limitation in the will, and was intitled to the surplus produce of the testator's estate, after payment of the annual sum charged thereon, and directed an account of both the real and personal estate, and a like direction as to the personal estate for investing it in lands: there was no direction given concerning, a conveyance of the estate, but a general reservation, and liberty to apply to the court, as there should be occasion."

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This was the decree then made, and upon great consideration, and as to the point on which it was established, it is not disputed in this case, because the plaintiff here founds himself by the present bill, expressly on the foot of that decree.

Since that decree, two new events have happened, which have given rise to this suit.

John Hopkins, on the 18th of June 1736, had another son born, named *William*, who died the 24th of Dec. 1737, and on his death, the plaintiff, the eldest son of *Hannah Dare*, having attained twenty one, brought this bill to have a settlement made by the trustees, and first prays an estate may be limited to him in possession, and also an account of the profits during *William's* life, and that the surplus profits may be paid to him.

Mr. *Chute* for the plaintiff.

This is a contingent remainder, and not an executory devise, for the estate for life in the first taker, is a vested interest, and

(1) *Ante* 424, n. 1.

consequently

frequently the contingent remainder vests at the same time. *HOPKINS v. HOPKINS.* *is's case, Cro. Eliz. 848.*

The testator has laboured to give to an un-born person, what apprehends was never given to any un-born person before, for has restrained the vesting of the freehold, and suspended it further than any court whatever has attempted to do.

What we contend for is, that admitting this was an executory devise in the second son of *John Hopkins*, yet after he was dead, whatever was executory, was then executed, and the freehold estate for life vested in him, with remainders to his first and every other son, and as he has died without issue male, the contingent remainder takes place in the plaintiff. *Lisle v. Lisle* (1).

No difference between the limitation which did come in *esse* by birth of *William*, and the limitation which would have come in *esse* immediately, if *Samuel*, the first son of the nephew *John Hopkins*, had survived the testator but an hour.

The proviso in the will, is an abridgment of the power which is given to the first taker, of holding an estate for life, and is for that reason void, as much as if a person should appoint one executor, and then restrain him from administering. *Taylor v. Brydges*, 2 *Mod.* 289.

The question will be, Whether, notwithstanding *William* the first was born, the whole rents and profits of the testator's estate shall still accumulate, till the infant would have attained his age 21, or whether by the birth of *William* the freehold absolutely vested in him.

If a man in a will attempts to give such an estate as the law does not admit, and endeavours to raise such a contingency as it does not allow, they must take their fate according to the rules of law. *Reeves v. Long*, 3 *Lev.* 408. *Salk.* 227. the case which introduced the statute of King *William*, as to unborn children.

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Executory devises had their original here, but the reason of it is so strong, that the courts of law soon conformed to those decisions.

No body is intitled to take the profits under Lord Chancellor *Bolton's* addition to Sir *Joseph Jekyll's* decree, but *John Hopkins*, the court is silent as to every other person.

What is the *terminus a quo* under the last decree? Why, until the person is born, who is intitled to take an estate for life in possession, for otherwise my Lord *Talbot* would have added, until the person arrive at the age of 21 years.

It would be repugnant to say, that *John Hopkins* took an estate for life at 21 years, at the very time that his estate as *heir at law* ceased on the birth of his son.

William was not in *esse* at the time of the executory devise, and therefore to say it is still executory, is carrying this doctrine further than was ever yet attempted, for it will wait longer than

(1) *T. Raym.* 278. S. C.

HOPKINS v. HOPKINS. the compass of one life, for here is the life of *William* who is dead, and the life of a person who is unborn.

Mr. Noel of the same side.

The only question, Whether the contingent remainder takes effect in possession in the plaintiff, upon the death of the second son of *John Hopkins*? Or whether it is still to wait, till the birth of another son of *John Hopkins*.

As an executory devise was introduced to support and assist the rules of law, this court will not construe an executory devise in such a manner as to overturn the rules of law.

Lord Chancellor: *Pays's* case is likewise reported in *Noy* 43. and differently stated from what it is in *Cro. Eliz.* 848.

Mr. Noel: It was only necessity that obliged the court to construe it an executory devise, at the time of the decree of Lord Chancellor *Talbot*.

But as here is a son of *John Hopkins* born since the decree this necessity ceases, and *eo instante* the estate for life vested in possession in the son, the contingent remainder vested in the plaintiff.

The testator allowed the trustees to expend such a sum upon the birth of the first person, who should take an estate for life in possession, by way of education, as is suitable to the largeness of the estate he is intitled to at twenty-one, shews the intention of the testator, that it should vest in the first taker. *Bate's* case, *Salk.* 254.

Lord Chancellor: The word *immediate* was put in at first by Lord *Talbot*, in his decree, in his own hand, but struck out afterwards, and stands now as has been before mentioned, *viz.* instead of *immediate* estate for life in possession: *only*, estate for life in possession.

[585] Mr. Green of the same side, cited *Dyer* 3 & 4 *Pollex.* 430. where it is said by a very high authority, that the intention of a testator is to direct the construction of a will; but if that intention, though ever so plain, is contrary to law, it is absolutely void.

The question, if the plaintiff should have a decree, whether he is intitled only to an estate for life, or to an estate tail by virtue of the limitation to him for life, remainder to the heirs male of his body; he insisted for the plaintiff, that these are words of limitation, and not of purchase.

Mr. Murray of the same side.

This is carried further than the law will suffer executory devises to wait, for here it must wait till the death of the father *John Hopkins*, and the death of the son *John Hopkins*, and the rule is, that it must wait only 21 years, or arise within the compass of one life.

Lord Chancellor *Talbot*, in his reasons for support of his decree, says, if *Samuel Hopkins* had survived the testator, he would

certainly have had an estate for life, and there can be no distinction made between the limitation in the will to *Samuel*, and the limitation to any other son to be born of the testator's nephew *John Hopkins*. HOPKINS v. HOPKINS.

That the contingency was to wait till the first person who should take an estate for life arrives at the age of twenty-one, was never considered at all in the hearing before Lord *Talbot*, and never could, because the profits are disposed of by the testator himself.

In all cases of property, this court inviolably and invariably adheres to the rules of law, because they are positive, and all the good end of uses before the statute, are still preserved in the construction of trusts since the statute, for *equitas sequitur legem*.

It is contrary to the policy of the law to support an executory devise any longer than till an estate for life comes in being, upon which the contingency may vest: an executory devise cannot be extended further, or an estate made unalienable any longer than for a life in being, or 21 years after such life. *Stephens v. Stephens*, *Cas. in Eq.* in Lord *Talbot's* time (1).

In the Duke of *Norfolk's* case, *Select Cases in Chancery* 1. it was said by Lord Keeper *North*, that the measures of limitation, in respect to the trust of a term, and of the legal estate of a term, are all one, and this court makes no distinction, any more than the courts of law. *Vide Humberston v. Humberston*, 2 *Vern.* 737.

Mr. Attorney General *e contra*.

Money directed by a devise to be laid out in land, and settled in a particular manner, is a mere executory trust, and must be carried into execution by this court, and therefore the personal estate here is distinguished from the real, and liable to the trust.

Mr. *Brown* of the same side.

It has been insisted for the plaintiff, that the limitation to him has taken effect to the exclusion of all others, and it is pretended, that trusts, in the cases of property, must be governed exactly by the same rule as legal estates.

There are several instances, where this court have deviated [586] from this rule; as a dowress is intitled to dower in a legal estate, but cannot be endowed of a trust (2); at law a man cannot convey an estate to his wife, but in this court he may do it by way of use (3).

(1) *Ca. temp. Talb.* 228. S. C.

(3) *Har. Co. Litt.* 3. a. n. 1. 112.

(2) See *Godwyn v. Winsmore*, *post.* 2 a. vol. 526.

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As it was impossible, at common law, for a person to convey an estate, but he must part with the whole estate at the time; to obviate this inconvenience, the invention of uses arose; as for instance, If a man conveyed to A. and his heirs, to commence within four years, during the intervening time, the freehold is in abeyance, and is a void remainder; but taking it as a springing use, the estate continues in the feoffor, and is executory till the expiration of the four years (1).

The invention of trusts to preserve contingent estates, was to remedy many inconveniences, and, among the rest, to guard against the accident of a son's being born after the death of the father.

A general legal estate here is conveyed to the trustees, in trust to preserve and answer the particular purposes of his will, and therefore, in this case, it is a general legal estate, and a general trust.

The testator declares, if Mr. Hopkins has another son, they shall be trustees for that son, which must mean that they should be trustees of the estate likewise; for when a thing is given, the means by which it may be obtained, are certainly intended to be given at the same time, and it would be harsh to say, in a court of equity, whose chief jurisdiction arises out of trusts, that Chancery will limit and restrain the power of trustees, where it is naturally and necessarily implied, though not expressed in terms. *Vide* the case of *Reeves v. Long*, 3 *Lev.* 408.

The rule of executory devises has been extended in *Stephens v. Stephens* so far, as till a child shall come to the age of 21, and for this reason, because no person, until that age, is intitled to convey.

In the case upon Serjeant *Maynard's* will, the court directed trustees to preserve and support contingent remainders, though omitted in the will itself.

Chapman v. Blesfet, before Lord *Talbot*, after *Hopkins and Hopkins*, Cases in Equity in his time, 145.

It is justice, his Lordship said, in a court of equity, to apply the legal estate, so as to support the trust estate, and your Lordship will, I do not doubt, preserve these trusts in the same manner.

Mr. *Fazakerley* of the same side.

The arguments which the counsel of the other side draw to trusts, from the rules of law, I allow is very right, where they are exactly the same in all circumstances; but where they are not similar, it is otherwise; for if the reason ceases, it would be absurd to construe them by the same rules. *Vide* the Rector of *Cheddington's* case, 1 *Co.* 148. b.

An estate at law may be in abeyance, but a trust is not so one moment in equity; for if there was a chasm of ever so small a duration, it would revert to the heir at law: In *Salter's*

(1) See the *Essay on Uses and Trusts*, 175. et seq. 283. et seq.

ise, *Yelverton*, fol. 9 & 10. a case put there by Lord Chief Justice Popham, and agreed to by all the Judges, and a much stronger one than the present.

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It is not necessary that there should be a trust at all to preserve a contingent remainder.

Many instances where this court have spelt out the intent of a testator, though it is not expressed in words, for by implication this court have done what the testator intended.

Are they, in this case, appointed trustees for any particular purpose, exclusive of another? If they are not, then are they trustees in general for all the uses of the will, and, among the rest, are to be considered as trustees to preserve contingent remainders.

The construction we contend for, will support the whole intention, but what the plaintiff aims at, will defeat it in the weakest part of the will, therefore we hope your Lordship will instruct them trustees for the purpose we insist upon, the preserving the contingent remainders; the case of *Massenburgh v. Webb* is not exactly stated in 2 Vent. but in the octavo edition of *bankery Cases* it is (1).

As to the personal estate, wherever there is an executory trust, this court will mould it in such a manner, as may best answer the intention of the testator, and therefore I shall not trouble your Lordship with cases to this point, when they are trustees for the several purposes in the will, it is absurd to say, that they are not trustees to preserve the contingent remainders, which is one of the principal purposes of the will, and the testator has given the estate to trustees during the life of *John*, and during the life of *Inne* the mother.

Mr. Chute by way of reply.

It has been insisted by the gentlemen of the other side, that the case of *Samuel* and *William* are the same; and that the contingent remainders ought still to be preserved.

I never heard, nor ever met with it, that when a tenant for life is born, with remainder to his first and every other son in tail, that trustees ever interposed any further, than between such tenant for life, and his issue in tail, and contingent remainders beyond this, would be too remote to be at all considered in the eye of the law; such a distant remainder is not so much as affects this court.

Lord Chancellor: This could not be an executory devise, because there was an estate of freehold before it, and therefore it is a contingent remainder.

Mr. Chute: There is no difference between the present case and *Humberston v. Humberston*, but only there several estates for life were limited to persons not in esse, and here estates tail are limited to future persons unborn.

In this case, whilst *John Hopkins* is without a son, he enters at the door of his testator, and has quiet possession, as soon as a

(1) 2 Cha. Rep. 275. S. C. 1 Vern. 234. 257. 304. S. C.

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It has been insisted upon, that this is an absolute estate of freehold in the trustees; I am at a loss then to conceive how they can subdivide this absolute estate into so many particular freeholds, as they must do, if they would preserve the contingent remainders, for I submit to *your Lordship*, that upon the birth of *William*, an estate for life actually vested in him, and was not to wait till he arrived at the age of 21, and that at the same time the subsequent limitations of course ceased to be executory, and are become vested remainders, to take place upon the death of *William* without issue, and in this respect equity too will follow the law; for as uses, before the statute of uses, were the same as trusts, so, since the statute of uses, trusts are considered in the nature of uses before the statute. *Vide Chudleigh's case*, 1 Co. 113. a.

Lord Chancellor: For the plaintiff it is argued, that the estate vested in *William* on his birth, and was no longer executory, and consequently all the subsequent limitations became remainders, either contingent, or vested, according to their respective natures, and that those that were contingent, not vesting, either during, or *eo instante*, that the particular estate of *William* determined, are now void, and consequently the plaintiff, as having the first remainder vested in him, is intitled to the estate in possession.

For the defendant this was endeavoured to be answered three ways;

First, That there is no necessity to consider the limitations subsequent to that, to the second son of *John Hopkins*, as contingent remainders, but that they may subsist as so many distinct executory devises, and if one did not take effect, another might.

Secondly, (And which is most relied on) that admitting, that by the estates vesting in *William*, the subsequent limitations were to be looked upon as remainders, yet such as were contingent, were not destroyed by their not vesting during his life, but that the legal estate in the trustees is sufficient to support them.

Thirdly, That a determinable freehold in the equitable estate descended on the heir at law, and that is sufficient to support the contingent remainders of the trust estate.

These points have been well argued at the bar, and there are, I think, some things clear.

First, That if those had been contingent remainders of a legal estate, or a use executed, and no trustees inserted to preserve contingent remainders, they would have been void.

Secondly, It is clear, that these subsequent limitations cannot be supported as so many distinct executory devises.

In the case of *Higgins v. Derby* in *Salk.* (1), before Lord *Cowper*, *Mich. 6 Ann.* the utmost that was said was, that on the

limitation of the trust of a term to the first son, and the heirs males of his body, which never took effect, there never having been a son, that the limitation over to daughters might possibly be good.

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But in this case the trust estate vested in *William*, and at least for life, (for it must be admitted, that the proviso did not suspend the vesting), which being a freehold, was capable of supporting remainders, and consequently according to the doctrine in the case of *Purefoy v. Rogers*, 2 *Saund.* 380. (1), and all the authorities, ought to be considered as remainders (2), and in truth, the subsequent remainders are to be considered as so many parts of the same executory devise, and when that became vested in the first taker, they remain no longer executory.

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The case is therefore reduced to this question, Whether the legal estate in the trustees, will support these remainders.

Before I proceed to the discussion of it, I will observe that it is not necessary, in order to bar the plaintiff from having a conveyance (3), that all the intermediate contingent limitations should be good subsisting contingent remainders, but it is sufficient, if some of them are good by way of contingent remainder, and still subsisting, for then, so long as they continue, the plaintiff comes too early.

And I am of opinion, that the legal estate in the trustees will support (at least) some of these contingent remainders (4), for it is not to be contended that all of them are good, and this on two grounds,

First, Upon the plain intention of the testator.

Secondly, That this intention is consistent with the rules of law, and the common principles of equity.

First, As to the intention, the present plaintiff certainly comes before the court in a very unfavourable light, for he claims under the will, and the testator's bounty, and at the same time endeavours to defeat the greatest part of it; indeed this was retorted on the defendant *the heir at law*, but that is very differ-

(1) The following part of this paragraph should run thus, — "and other authorities, the subsequent limitations ought to be considered as remainders; and in truth, although the first estate in *William*, who was not born at the testator's decease, be construed an executory devise, yet are not the subsequent limitations to be taken as separate and distinct executory devises, but as parts of the same devise." *Per Lord Loughborough*, in *Habergbam v. Vincent*, 4 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 390, from a corrected copy of this case.

(2) *Reeve v. Long*, *Carth.* 310. 4 *Mod.* 282. *S. C.* *Nealby v. Beville*, *Rep. temp. Hard.* 258. *Walter v. Drew*, *Com.* 372, and 2 *Ves.* 616. *Doe v. Morgan*, 3 *Durn. & East.* 763, 765.

(3) The following part of this paragraph should stand thus, — "that all the intermediate limitations between the estate vested in *William*, and that limited to him, should be good subsisting contingent remainders, but it is sufficient if some of them are good." *Per Lord Loughborough*, *ubi supra*.

(4) *Chapman v. Blisset*, *Ca. temp. Talb.* 145, and *post.* 594. *Robinson v. Robinson*, 2 *Ves.* 230. In *Barnfield v. Peckham*, 1 *P. W.* 56. 1 *Ves.* 26. *Lord Trevor* said, that it was resolved, that a *cestuique trust* for life could not destroy the contingent remainders to his first and other sons.

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The testator could not frame a will, that no one should take his estate; if he could, it is likely he would have done it.

To consider therefore, and apply this intention to this point, *First*, he devises his real estate, to trustees, and their heirs, to the use of them and their heirs (so that it is a clear use executed by the statute), *upon several trusts herein after mentioned*: These words were properly and strongly relied on for the defendant, as declaring his intention, that the legal estate so given should be used to serve and support all the trusts and limitations after declared: Then he proceeds to limit the trust, and when he comes to the after-born sons of *John Hopkins*, he says, *In case John Hopkins should have any other son*, then in trust for all and every such other son for life, with like remainders to their issue male, &c. so that he expressly declares, that they should be trustees for those after-born sons, and consequently the court is to make a construction to support it in such manner as they can: But though this was the plain intention, yet, if it is inconsistent with the rules of law and equity, it is to be rejected.

Tho' contingent remainders by law, must vest during, or at the instant the particular estate determines, yet it does not hold in the case of trusts. The ground the law goes upon is, that a freehold cannot be in abeyance, be-

cause there must be a tenant of the freehold to perform services, and answer all writs concerning the realty, but this objection is obviated in the case of an equitable estate, because the trustee is the tenant of the freehold to perform services, &c.

* Therefore, as to the second question, the great objection is, that, by law, contingent remainders must vest during, or at the instant the particular estate determines; and the only method found out to avoid this since *Chudley's case*, 1 Co. has been to create a particular estate of freehold, and vest it in trustees to preserve the contingent remainder; and there is no such limitation in this case, and it is said to be a maxim in this court, that trust estates (creatures of equity) are governable by the same rules of property as legal estates, in order to preserve one uniform rule and measure of property.

[*590] And further, that the owner of a trust has the same power over it as he would have had it a legal estate in the same interest or extent: this is undoubtedly true in general, but affords no just conclusion in the present case.

First, Because the ground and foundation the common law goes upon, in making contingent remainders void in such cases, does not hold in the case of trusts.

(1) *Secondly*, Because to allow them to be good, will not affect any rightful power of alienation in the *cestuique trust*, which the law allows to owners of legal estates, and consequently do not tend to a perpetuity.

(1) This paragraph should be as follows, — "*Secondly*, Because to allow such of the limitations as are not too remote to be good will not affect any rightful power of alienation in the

" *cestuique trust*, which the law allows to owners of legal estates, and consequently, do not tend to a perpetuity." Per Lord Loughborough, *supra*.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Because to require a new distinct limitation of legal estate, to support the contingent remainders in such a case of a trust, would be quite nugatory. HOPKINS v. HOPKINS.

As to the *first*, the ground on which the common law requires the vesting of the contingent remainders either during, or *eo instante*, the particular estate determines, is, that a freehold cannot be in abeyance; that there must be a tenant of the freehold to perform services, to answer to a *præcipe*, and all writs to be brought concerning the realty, or otherwise there would be a failure of publick service and publick justice.

But this holds not in the case of an equitable estate, *the trustee* is tenant of the freehold to perform services, &c. but it has been objected there is equal mischief, if he is not liable to answer demands, and to be bound by decrees in this court.

That will not follow, for if there are ever so many contingent limitations of a trust, it is an established rule, that it is sufficient to bring the trustees before the court, together with him in whom the first remainder of the inheritance is vested, and all that may come after will be bound by the decree, though not *in esse*, unless there be fraud and collusion between the trustees and the first person in whom a remainder of inheritance is vested; but that is of no weight, for fraud and collusion will unravel a thing as well at law as equity. Where there are ever so many contingent limitations of a trust, it is sufficient to bring the trustees before the court, together with him, in whom the first remainder of the inheritance is vested.

There is a great opinion, that this maxim of the common law that there must be a freehold, could not be drawn over to uses before the stat. of *Hen. 8.* *Chudleigh's case*, 1 *Rep.* 135. *per Gawdy*, "That if a man, before the statute, had made a feoffment to the use of one for years, and after to the use of the right heirs of J. S. this limitation had been good, for the feoffees remain tenants of the freehold; but such limitation after the statute is void, for then the freehold would be in abeyance, for nothing can remain in the feoffees."

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As to the second reason, if it tended to a perpetuity, it would be a great objection. Before the statute of *Hen. 8.* the judges of the common law gave uses very hard names, and called them the product of fraud, &c. to remedy those mischiefs the statute was made, to execute and bring the estate to the use, that after the statute the *cestuique use* was seized of the estate at law, as before he was of the use in equity; and this the judges professed to adhere to, but notwithstanding that, the necessities of mankind, and reasonable occasions in families, obliged them in a little while to give way to uses. The statute of uses was made to execute, and bring the estate to the use; and after the statute, the cestuique use was seized of the use at law, as before he was of the use in equity; but the necessities of mankind have

obliged judges to give way to uses notwithstanding.

Contingent uses, springing uses, executory devises, powers over uses, were also foreign to the notions of the common law, and could not be limited on common law fees, but were let in by construction, by the judges themselves, upon uses, after they became legal estates; yet the judges still adhered to the doctrine, Contingent uses, springing uses, executory devises, &c. were foreign to the notions of the common law but were let in

by construction (by judges themselves) upon uses, after they became legal estates. that

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that there could be no such thing as *an use upon an use*, but where the first use was declared, there it was executed, and must rest for that estate: therefore, on a limitation to *A.* and his heirs, to the use of *B.* and his heirs, in trust for *D.* *B.*'s estate was held there to be executed by the statute, and *D.* took nothing (1).

Of this construction equity took hold, and said that the intention was to be supported. It is plain *B.* was not intended to take, his conscience was affected. To this the reason of mankind assented, and it has stood on this foot ever since, and by this means a statute made upon great consideration, introduced in a solemn and pompous manner, by this strict construction, has had no other effect than to add at most, three words to a conveyance (2).

Courts of equity have given the same power to *cestuique trusts* as to alienation, as if it was an use executed.

It is very true this would not have been endured, if courts of equity had not in general allowed these trust estates to have the same consideration in point of policy with legal estates, and given the same power to *cestuique trusts*, with respect to alienations, as if it was an use executed. Therefore a tenant in tail of a trust may bar his issue by a fine; a tenant in tail of a trust, remainder over, may dock the remainder by a common recovery (3); nay, some go so far as to say (4), he may do it by feoffment only (5).

Upon a trust in equity, no estate can be gained by wrong, as there might of a legal estate; therefore on a trust in equity no estate can be gained by disseisin, abatement, or intrusion.

But all these are common assurances, and rightful methods of conveying estates, for it was never allowed that in trust estates, a like estate may be gained by wrong as there might be of a legal estate; therefore, on a trust in equity, no estate can be gained by disseisin, abatement, or intrusion. It is true, it may happen so upon a trustee, and in consequence the *cestuique trust* may be affected, but that is on account of binding the legal estate; but on a bare trust, no estate can be gained by disseisin, abatement, or intrusion, whilst the trust continues.

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(6) The destruction of contingent remainders, by tenant for life, is considered as a wrong without remedy, and so strongly a tort, that it is a forfeiture of his own estate, and therefore works a destruction of the remainder. Now if equity never suffers any other wrongful act, or any thing similar, to gain or defeat the trust estate, whilst the trustee is in possession, why should this

(1) *Dyer* 155. a. *B. N. C.* 284. 1 *Co.* 136. b. 137. 4. 2 *P. W.* 146, 147. *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, *post.* 2 vol. 578.

(2) See the *Essay on Uses and Trusts*, 231, 232, 233.

(3) *North v. Champenoon*, 2 *Cha. Ca.* 78. *Carpenter v. Carpenter*, 1 *Vern.* 440.

(4) What follows should be thus, — “a bargain and sale alone, by a tenant in tail in equity, shall have the same effect as a fine.” *Vide per Lord Loughborough*, *ubi supra*. So 1 *Vern.* 440. *Beverly v. Beverly*, 2 *Vern.* 133. *Contra Leyatt v. Sewell*, 2 *Vern.* 552.

(5) *Bowater v. Bily*, 2 *Vern.* 344.

(6) From the corrected copy of Lord *Loughborough* noticed *supra*, it appears, that the two following paragraphs should be read thus, — “Nor have courts of equity ever supported the destruction of contingent remainders by tenant for life, but have endeavoured to support them, where there hath been no remedy at law, and so in cases of mergers, they have revived terms for raising younger childrens’ portions, where the terms were merged at law for the sake of creditors, and other equitable purposes, as in *Powel v. Morgan*, 2 *Vern.* 90.”

ke place, or the court strive to preserve a power to *cestuique trust* or life, the execution whereof the law calls a wrong?

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It is in this respect to be compared to the cases of *merger*, for though it is the doctrine of this court, that the rules of propriety and convenience hold in the same manner with respect to trusts as to legal estates, to prevent perpetuities; yet in the cases of *merger* there are many instances where there would be *mergers* of legal estates, and yet courts of equity have never suffered *mergers* of trusts, where the legal estate continued in the trustees, but have been against the *merger* if the justice of the case required it.

There are many instances where there would be *mergers* of legal estates, and yet courts of equity have never suffered *mergers* of trusts.

Thirdly, Where the whole fee is in the trustees, to require a new distinct limitation to support contingent remainders, would be wholly vain and nugatory.

Suppose, after the limitation to *Samuel* and his issue, the testator had limited over a remainder to *J. N.* to preserve contingent remainders, could *J. N.* have taken at law? No, for it would have been *a use on a use*; nor would he have taken in equity, for the first trustees having the whole estate, are *trustees* or all the *cestui que trusts*.

Suppose such limitation had been to the first trustees, they could have taken nothing more; so that such a new limitation would have no operation.

The principal objection is, "That the legal estate in the trustees, and the equitable in the *cestui que trusts*, are of different uses, and cannot draw over the one to support the contingent remainders of the other, and that a man might as well make use of an estate executed by the statute of uses, to support a contingent remainder of a particular estate in a use." (1).

I admit they are of different natures, but still the legal estate remains in the trustees to serve and support all the trusts; but it is quite otherwise on the statute of uses*. The words of the statute are, "That every person that shall have any such use, &c. shall from henceforth stand, and be seised, &c. of such lands, &c. to all intents, constructions, and purposes in the law, of and in such like estates, as they had or shall have in use, trust or confidence of or in the same." By which the legal estate is executed to the uses, and the *cestui que trust* has the legal estate, just in the same manner as the use before; the consequence whereof is (2), that as to persons *in esse*, the legal estate became vested immediately as they came *in esse*, provided they come so in due time, according to the rules of common law;

Uses executed, and mere trusts, stand on different foundations, and will not be governed by the same reasoning. • 27 Hen. 8. c. 10.

(1) The above paragraph should be read thus, "The principal objection is, that the legal estate in the trustees, and the equitable in the *cestui que trusts* are of different natures, and the one cannot support the other." *Corrected copy noticed supra.*

became vested immediately, or if not, then the estate went over immediately to the next remainder-man, as it would in the case of a common law fee. So it is construed in *Chudleigh's case*, and if it once goes over, it can never come back again. *Corrected copy supra.*

(2) Read the following part of this paragraph thus, "That the legal estate either

if

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if not, then the estate went over immediately to the next remainder-man, as it would in the case of a common law fee; So it is construed in *Chudleigh's* case, and if it went over by deed or will, so as the party took as a purchaser, it is never drawn back again.

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This shews that, as to this question, there can be no reasoning at all from the cases of uses executed to mere trusts, but they stand on different foundations. These are the reasons which govern my judgment on this point, and I own I can see no inconvenience from it.

It must be admitted that the testator might have done this, as to part of the remainders (those that are capable of being supported), if he had used proper words; and if he has clearly expressed his intention, this court (which is to direct a settlement according to his intention, as far as it may stand with the rules of law) will take the proper method to effectuate this intention.

Where a trust is in its nature executory, it is incumbent on the court to follow the intention of the parties, as far as the rules of law will admit.

Next as to the cases, the Earl of *Stamford v. Sir John Hobart*, in 1709, (notwithstanding the distinction taken upon it) is a strong authority for this purpose. Serjeant *Maynard* "devised his estate to trustees and their heirs, and declared after his wife's death, they should convey the estate to the use of, and in trust for, Sir *H. H.* for life, remainder to the first son for 99 years, if he so long live, remainder to the heirs male of such first son, remainder to the Countess of *Stamford* for life, remainder, &c. a conveyance was directed according to the will, exceptions were taken to the draught of the conveyance; Lord *Crauper* declared, that where articles or a will were improper or informal, the court was not to direct a conveyance according to such improper directions, but in a proper and legal manner, which might best answer the intention of the parties, and conceived the intention to be, that the estate should be secured so far as the rules of law would admit (1), before cross remainders should take place, and therefore ordered accordingly."

Upon an appeal to the House of Lords, alledging, that this was making a different settlement, the order was affirmed upon this principle, *that a trust estate being in its nature executory, it is incumbent on the court to follow the intention of the parties, as far as the rules of law will admit.*

Where the court makes use of the words *strict settlement* in an order, it implies a direction to the Master to have trustees to preserve contingent remainders inserted.

The next is the case of *Humberston v. Humberston* (2), 2 *Vern.* 737, and *Cas. in Eq. Abr.* 207. "There the testator had made a

(1) Instead of the words which follow as above read thus. "And therefore interposed between the estate for life and the remainders, an estate to trustees to support contingent remainders, tho' there was no such direction in

"the will." *Corrected copy cited supra. Vide etiam Baskerville v. Baskerville, post. 2 vol. 279.*

(2) *S. C. 1 Cox's P. W. 332 n. 1.*

"whimsical

Remainder

“ whimsical will, devising his estate to the drapers company
 “ and their successors, in trust to convey to the plaintiff for
 “ life, remainder to his first and every other son for their lives,
 “ and to their heirs males for life, remainder to about *fifty* other
 “ persons for their lives, and their sons for their lives. Lord
 “ *Cowper* declared it a vain attempt to make a perpetuity, but
 “ however that there ought to be a *strict settlement*, which im-
 “ plied a direction to the Master to have trustees to preserve
 “ contingent remainders inserted,” for that is always under-
 stood by the words *strict settlement*.

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It appears by these cases, that however improperly a will is
 penned, the court will take notice whether the testator intend-
 ed a strict settlement, and direct accordingly, as far as the rules
 of law will permit.

However i
 perly a wi
 penned, if
 testator in
 a strict se
 ment, the
 will direc
 cordingly.

But a distinction was taken between those cases and the pre-
 sent, that they were cases of executory trusts, where the will
 *itself directed a conveyance; but here is no conveyance direct-
 ed, but the trust only declared by the will.

I admit the court has thrown out such sort of expressions, but
 I think there is no difference. All trusts are executory (1), and
 whether a conveyance be directed by the will or not, this court
 must decree one, when asked at a proper time; but I do not give
 any conclusive opinion to oust that distinction.

All trusts :
 executory;
 whether a
 conveyance be
 directed or n
 court must
 decree one, a
 asked at a
 time.

In this will there is a plain declaration of the testator's inten-
 tion that this should be an executory trust, and that there
 should be in due time a strict legal conveyance made by the
 trustees.

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The first clause from which such an intention may be col-
 lected, is the *proviso* relating to the profits before the persons
 come into actual possession, &c. till he or they attain 21, and in
 the meantime the executors to make such handsome allowance
 for the education of such persons, and the overplus to go to
 such person as shall be intitled thereto.

Here is an intention plainly declared, that the trustees should
 continue in possession of the estate and receipt of the rents, till
 one to whom an estate for life is limited should be 21, and the
 trustees in the mean time are to make a handsome allowance
 for the education of such persons out of the rents, (whether the
 direction for laying up the surplus was to be supported or not,
 is immaterial to this question), and after attaining the age of
twenty-one, such person to have the possession, (that is) *the*
estate to be conveyed.

The next clause is directing 300 *l. per ann.* to *James Hopkins*,
 one of the trustees, for past services, to encourage him in the
 care of the trust, &c. to be paid him half-yearly, till some per-
 son should come into possession, &c.

This is still fixing the age of 21 to be the time that such per-
 son should have the possession, and consequently, by construc-
 tion, intitled to have a conveyance of the legal estate.

(1) See *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, *post*. 2 vol. 583.

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The next clause is *that* where he directs "the residue of his personal estate to be laid out, &c. and conveyed to his trustees upon the same trusts, &c." (*Vide* the clause.)

By which is plainly meant to make as strict a settlement as possible of the lands to be newly purchased, and yet he connects them both together upon the same trusts.

But be this point as it will, the case of *Chapman v. Blisset* (1), decreed by *Ld. Talbot* in 1735, is a clear authority, "that the legal estate in trustees will support contingent remainders, even of a trust declared by will *where no conveyance is directed*."

The legal estate in trustees will support contingent remainders of a trust declared by a will, where no conveyance is directed.

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The case was, "*J. Blisset*, after several directions and charges upon his real estate, devises all other his real estates to trustees and their heirs, in trust to pay his son *J. B.* quarterly, 37 *l.* 10 *s.* during his life, and if there were any child or children, he gave the rest and residue of his real estate for the education and benefit of such child or children, and if his son married with such consent as the will mentions, 100 *l.* *per ann.* to his wife; if without, 10 *l.* *per ann.* and after his said son's decease, gave one moiety of the said trust estate to such child or children, their respective heirs, executors, and assigns, the survivor of them, &c. and the other moiety to the child or children of *Joseph*, &c. and if *J. B.* died without issue, to such child, &c. of my daughter, &c. with a remainder over; the testator dies. *J. B.* marries and has a son then died; *Joseph* (who was the testator's grandson) had no son born at the time of the death of *J. B.* but had a son four years after, and upon this a bill was brought by the heir at law, insisting that these limitations were void, particularly to the son of *Joseph*, not being born till four years after the death of *J. B.*"

The first question was, Whether it was to be considered as a legal estate subsisting in the trustees, or whether it was not a use executed by the statute? Lord *Talbot* (and myself on a rehearing) were of opinion, "that the legal estate in fee was in the trustees, and all the limitations, in the subsequent interest, were trusts."

The next question was, Whether the limitation to the son of *Joseph* was good? and if so, Whether as an executory devise or a contingent remainder? Lord *Talbot* "was of opinion, that it might be good even as an executory devise, in a legal limitation, and the only objection was, that the limitation was *in verba de presenti*: but he said the words were to be considered as the testator meant them, that he knew *Joseph* was an infant and young, and devising a moiety to his child (knowing he had none) must necessarily intend it future, and therefore it was impossible to shew an intention more clearly of children thereafter to be born.—But he went on, that when *J. B.* had a child born, that had a freehold in the trust during the life of *J. B.* whether, after that, it was to

(1) *Ca. temp. Talb.* 145. S. C.

" be considered as an executory devise, or a contingent remainder the child of *J. B.* having a kind of freehold in the trust itself? He held, that if taken as a remainder (in case of a limitation of legal estate) it was clearly void, for the freehold would be in abeyance for 4 years, between the death of the son of *J. B.* and the birth of the son of *Joseph*; but he said, the reason of that rule failed in the case of trusts, and was of opinion, that the first estate in the trustees preserved the whole trust and therefore, whether it was to be considered as an executory devise, or contingent remainder of a trust, that it was good, and that the plaintiff was intitled to a moiety."

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This resolution comes up to the present in all its points.

As to the third point, I shall not lay much stress upon it, and I own I took it to be clearly otherwise, when mentioned at the bar, but on consideration, I think there is more to be said in support thereof than I was at first aware of.

The objection is, that the particular estate, and remainder must be created at one and the same time, as making parts of the same estate; and this is undoubtedly the general rule; but it is equally a rule at law, that in cases where an estate is limited to the ancestor for life, and afterward to the heirs males of his body, that the estates are connected, and make an estate tail in the ancestor, where it is by the same conveyance; so is *Shelly's* case, and it has also been held to connect and make one estate tail, where it did not arise by the same conveyance, but by way of resulting use, and so resolved by three judges in the case of *Pybus* and *Mitford*, 1 Vent. 373. *A.* covenanted to stand seised of lands, to the use of the heirs males begotten or to be begotten on the body of his second wife, and died at the time of the deed; he had issue by her, a son *R. Hale*, *Wild*, and *Rainsford* held, that, in this case, " The use of the freehold returned or resulted, by operation of law, to the covenantor for life, which being conjoined to the estate limited to the heirs males of his body, made an estate tail, and that this estate for life, arising by operation of law, was as strong as if it had been express."

Where an estate is limited to the ancestor for life, and afterwards to the heirs males of his body, the estates are connected, and make an estate tail in the ancestor, where it is by the same conveyance. The same has been held where it did not arise by the same conveyance, but by way of resulting use; Lord Chancellor inclined to think, that the resulting trust of a freehold, to support contingent remainders of a trust, might together with it.

connect in the same manner with the limitation in tail, though not created

Now, if an estate for life, resulting to the covenantor, which was part of the old use, and remaining in him, might unite and connect with the limitation in tail in the conveyance, why may not the resulting trust of the freehold, to support contingent remainders of a trust, do the same, though not created together with it? There doth not seem to me to be any greater objection to the one than the other.

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My Lord Chief Justice *Hale's* expression in that case, is directly applicable, that this is plainly according to the intention of the parties, and if we can by any means support it, we ought to do it as good expositors.

But however, as I said before, I would not be understood to give any positive opinion; but it deserves to be better considered,

HOPKINS v. HOPKINS. dered, by reason of it's analogy to the case of *Pybus and Mitford*.

In a limitation to support contingent remainders, it is not material to restrain it to the life of tenant for life of the land, provided it be restrained to the life of a person in being.

Another objection taken for the plaintiff was, that it is impossible to frame such an express limitation, as would support these contingent remainders: If this was true, it would be very material: It is so, as to some, but not to all; for as to the sons of *John Hopkins*, to be born hereafter, the limitations, when the conveyance is to be made, may be supported, so as to the sons of the bodies of such daughters as were living at the testator's death, for I make a great distinction between that limitation, and the limitation to the sons of *after-born daughters*: as to *John Hopkins's* after-born sons, it may be limited to trustees and their heirs, till he has a son born, and so after his death, till *Sarah* has a son born, and to any other of the daughters that were in *esse* at the testator's death.

But it has been objected further, that this is a new invented limitation to support contingent remainders, and that it was never yet carried further than during the life of tenant for life of the land, or birth of a posthumous son, and that to be sure is the common case of settlements; but there have been other limitations, and it is not (in my opinion) material to restrain it to the life of tenant for life of the land, provided it be restrained to the life of a person in being.

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It has been also objected, that all such trustees on such limitations have hitherto been restrained to receive the profits for the benefit of the tenant for life, but this would be to create a new trust for the benefit of the heir at law; but this is no more than the common case of a resulting trust, and it is immaterial, whether it be express or implied; for if it be implied by the will, it must be expressed in the conveyance.

There may be a resulting trust, under a trust to appoint contingent remainders for the heir at law, in the same manner as under an executory devise.

And so it was allowed in the case of *Carrick v. Errington*, 2 *Wms. Rep.* 361. "*Edward Errington* had made two settlements of his estate, one by fine in the life-time of his ancestor, which (if at all) could only operate by estoppel; he afterwards made another settlement to trustees, to the use of himself for life, &c. remainder, &c. and by a conveyance executed another day, they (to whom the fee was limited) executed a declaration of trust for *Thomas Errington* for life, without impeachment of waste, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, during the life of *Thomas Errington*: In the conveyance were unnecessarily made trustees to preserve contingent remainders, it being a trust estate; *Edward Errington* died without issue, and the whole legal estate was admitted to be in the trustees: In the second deed they were only trustees of the beneficial interest, and *Thomas*, who was to take the first estate in the trust, was a papist and disabled by the statute to take any beneficial interest; and it was insisted that, by the statute, both the trust and legal estate were void, and therefore the estate to go over by that conveyance to the next remainder-man, who should be a protestant, and capable of taking.

" *Fid.*

" First question, Whether the deed was obtained by fraud?

" Second question, Whether the legal estate in the trustees (who were only trustees under the first deed) was void, because this remainder-man was a papist, and incapable of taking?

" Lord King, and afterwards the House of Lords, held, that the trust being not only to receive rents, &c. but also to preserve contingent remainders, and possibly a person capable of taking might come in *esse*, that *that* was a further trust, which the statute did not make void; it had indeed avoided that for life, but as there was another trust upon the legal estate, which might, by possibility, be capable of being enjoyed, the estate should remain in the trustees, to support the contingent remainders; and as to the profits in the mean time (for the remainder-man could not take them, nor the trustees, they being only mere instruments) the heir at law should have them, till some person came in *esse*, capable of taking under the contingent remainders."

This, therefore, is a very clear authority, that there may be *resulting trust* (under a trust to support contingent remainders) for the heir at law, in the same manner as under an executory devise: Indeed it was insisted in that case, that the estate could, in the mean time, go over; but the court held otherwise, for then it would have vested by purchase, and could never have come back again.

As to the devise of the personal estate, if I am right in what I have said with regard to the real estate, it will hold stronger to the personal, that it is a clear executory trust, and falls within the reason of the case of *Papillon v. Voice*, which is a strong authority on that head (1).

The consequence of the whole is, that the present plaintiff cannot have such a conveyance as he prays by his bill, nor the profits of the profits during the life of *William*.

But it remains to be considered, whether he can have any other relief.

I think no conveyance ought yet to be made of this estate, that it must remain in the hands of the trustees to see whether *Ben Hopkins*, or any of his daughters, will have a son that shall attain the age of 21, for so long there are trusts to be served, and no *cestui que trust* till then is to come into possession.

If a conveyance was to be now directed, it would be proper to consider what estate ought to be limited to the plaintiff; but as I think this is not necessary, the bill must be dismissed, but without prejudice as to the plaintiffs applying to court under the former decree, for a settlement to be made of the trust estate, according to the reservation in that decree (2).

(1) 2 P. W. 471. S. C. (2) Reg. Lib. A. 1738. fol. 367.

C A P. CIII.

Rent.

debtors of (Duties) (A) In what Cases there may be a Remedy for Rent, in Equity, when none at Law.

Lord Thimbleton
(Duties & Liabilities) 535
 May the 19th,
 1739.

Benson v. Baldwin (1).

Case 274. **L**ORD Chancellor: Where a man is intitled to a rent out of lands, and thro' process of time the remedy at law is lost, or become very difficult, this court has interfered and given relief, upon the foundation only of payment of the rent for a long time, which bills are called bills founded upon the *folet*: Nay, the court has gone so far as to give relief, where the nature of the rent (as there are many kinds at law) has not been known, so as to be set forth, but then all the terre-tenants of the lands, out of which the rent issues, must be brought before the court, in order for the court to make a compleat decree (2).

(1) The original bill was brought to ascertain what lands were charged with certain rents; when it was referred to the Master to enquire what lands were so charged. *Reg. Lib. A. 1728. fol. 487.* An order was made upon the Master's report, and his Lordship now reversed that order, and directed the Master to review his report. *Reg. Lib. A. 1738. fol. 417.*

(2) See *Tborndike v. Allington*, 1 *Cha. Ca.* 79. *Collet v. Jaques*, 1 *Cha. Ca.* 120. *Davy v. Davy*, 1 *Cha. Ca.* 144. *Cox v. Foley*, 1 *Vern.* 359. *North v. Strafford*, 3 *P. W.* 148. *Holder v. Chabury*, 3 *P. W.* 256. *Duke of Leeds v. Powel*, 1 *Ves.* 171. *Duke of Bridgewater v. Edwards*, 4 *Bro. P. C.* 139. *Bouverie v. Prentice*, 1 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 200. *Duke of Leeds v. New Radam*, 2 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 340, 518.

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C A P. CIV.

Resulting Trusts:

Vide title Affets.

Vide title Creditor and Debtor.

Vide title Trust and Trustees, &c.

C A P. CV.

Rule of the Court.*Vide title Money.*

C A P. CVI.

Scribener.*Ex parte Burchall.**Vide title Bankrupt, under the Divison, The Construction of the
repealing Clause in the 10th, of Queen Anne.**April the 2d,
1752.*

C A P. CVII.

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Separate Maintenance.

Easter Term, 1737.

*Moore v. Moore.**Vide title Baron and Feme, under the Divison, Concerning Alimony
and separate Maintenance*

C A P. CVIII.

Specifick Legacy.*Dun and Others v. Coates and Another.**November the
24th, 1732.**Vide title Bill, under the Divison, Bills of Discovery; and herein
of what Things there shall be a Discovery.**Vide title Legacy, under the Divison, Ademption of it.**Vide title Injunction.**Vide title Commission of Delegates.*

C A P. CIX.

Spiritual Court.

Michaelmas Term, 1737.

Hill v. Turner.

Vide title Marriage, under the Division, Where it is clandestine.

C A P. CX.

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Statute relating to Creditors.

(A) Rule as to the 13 Eliz. cap. 5.

November the
6th, 1745.

Walker and Others v. Burrows.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.

C A P. CXI.

Statute of Frauds and Perjuries.

March the 2d,
1738.

Charlewood v. The Duke of Bedford.

Vide title Landlord and Tenant.

Vide title Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

C A P. CXII.

Statute of Limitations.

Vide title Answers, Pleas, and Demurrers.

C A P. CXIII.

Statute relating to Purchasers.*(A) Rule as to the 27th of Eliz. cap. 4.**Walker and others v. Burrows.**Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Assignees.**November the
6th, 1745.*

C A P. CXIV.

Steward.*Vide title Landlord and Tenant.*

C A P. CXV.

Surrender.*Vide title Copphold.*

C A P. CXVI.

Tenants in Common.*Vide title Jointenants in Common.*

Tenant by the Curtesy.

Hilary Vacation, 1737.

Wm. & Mary Elizabeth and Mary Casborne, ——— Plaintiffs.

How 394 Elizabeth Scarfe, and Alexander Inglis, ——— Defendants.

Case 275.

S. C. 2 Eq. Caf.
Abr. 728. pl. 6.
S. C. 7 Vin.
Abr. 156. pl.
23.

A. seised in fee of a freehold estate, mortgages it, and afterwards intermarries with *B.* *A.* dies and the mortgage is not redeemed during the coverture; this is notwithstanding such a seisin in the wife as intitles the husband to be tenant by the curtesy of the mortgaged premises, for in this court the land is considered only as a pledge or security for the money, and does not alter the possession of the mortgagor.

* Sir Joseph Jekyll.

Vagb. v. Bayley
Edm. & Hanson
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John v. Carter
4. How. 400.

THE father of the plaintiffs devised to *Anne* his daughter, the plaintiff's eldest sister, all his estate, freehold and copyhold, in fee, charged with 200*l.* a-piece to the plaintiffs. *Anne*, after her father's death, possessed the several estates, and afterwards intermarried with the defendant *Inglis*, and soon after died, leaving issue a son, who died an infant and without issue, upon whose death the plaintiffs, as heirs at law both to the infant and their sister, became intitled to the real estate. *Anne Inglis*, before her marriage, mortgaged part of the freehold premises to the defendant *Scarfe* in fee for 900*l.* The bill is brought against the mortgagee and the husband for an account, and for the direction of the court.

The defendant *Alexander Inglis* insisted, that, having had issue by his wife, he was intitled to an estate for life, as tenant by the curtesy, in his late wife's freehold premises, subject to the mortgage of the defendant *Scarfe*.

On the 5th of May 1735, the Master of the Rolls*, on hearing the cause, was of opinion, the defendant *Inglis* was not intitled to a tenancy by the curtesy, in the estate comprised in the mortgage (1).

The defendant appealed from this decree to Lord Chancellor, and the cause came on before his Lordship on the 28th of January, and 4th of March, 1737.

For the plaintiffs it was insisted, the equity of redemption was no actual estate or interest in the wife, but only a power in her to reduce the estate into her possession again, by paying off the mortgage; it was compared to the case of a proviso for a re-entry in a conveyance and no re-entry ever made, and to a condition broken and no advantage ever taken thereof; that the wife was never seised in fee in law, because the legal estate was out of her by virtue of the mortgage, but had only a bare possession, and was in receipt of the rents and profits; so that the mortgagor had merely a right of action, or a suit in a court of equity, in order that the estate might be re-conveyed to her upon complying with the terms in the mortgage; that it was the laches of the husband, he did not pay off the mortgage money, which would have re-vested the estate in the wife, but not having done that, there is no more reason that he should

be a tenant by the curtesy here, than that he should have the benefit of a seisin in law in the wife, which he cannot have, for there must be an actual seisin; for the words of Lord Coke in his comment upon the 35 *sect. of Littleton* are, *A man shall not be tenant by the curtesy of a bare right, title, use, or of a reversion, or a remainder, expectant upon any estate of freehold, unless the particular estate be determined or ended during the coverture.* It was likewise said, if it be considered as an interest, it is merely a contingent one, as it is uncertain whether the mortgagor will ever take back the estate again, for it was intirely at her election, and supposing it to be mortgaged to the value, though she had a right to redeem, yet she was under no obligation to do it; and it does not appear in this case the wife ever intended it, and if the law should cast the estate on the husband, he, by never paying the interest during his life, might load the inheritance in such a manner, that it would never be of any benefit to the heir.

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The Attorney General cited the case of *Penville v. Luscombe* (1), at the Rolls, the 4th of February 1728, where the Master of the Rolls* was strongly inclined to think there could be no *possessio* * Sir Joseph Jekyll. of an equity of redemption. He likewise cited the case of *Reynolds v. Messing*, at the Rolls, the 20th of February 1732†, where it was held a wife was not dowable of an equity † Sir Joseph Jekyll. of redemption in the case of a mortgage in fee (2); and in the case of *Robinson v. Tongue*, Michaelmas term 1730, Lord Chancellor King was of the same opinion (3).

Mr. Fazakerley *e contra*, insisted, that the husband's paying off the mortgage would have been buying what the law gives him as a tenant by the curtesy; that though at law a mortgage in fee is a revocation of a will, yet in a court of equity it is otherwise; and here a mortgagor is considered as having still the ownership of the estate, which is only a pledge or security for the money of the mortgagee, without making any alteration in the property, for the estate retains all its former qualities as any other not in mortgage.

That the argument *ab inconvenienti* falls to the ground, for as a tenant for life he will be obliged to keep down the interest during life, so that there is no danger of his injuring the inheritance: that there is a difference between a tenant by the curtesy, and a tenant in dower with regard to a trust, for there may be a tenancy by the curtesy of a trust, though a woman is not endowable of it; but what were the grounds of this distinction he would not take upon him to say, for as both by the decrees of this court, and in the house of Lords, it has been determined without giving any reasons, he would not presume to offer any. 2 *Vern.* 585, and 680.

(1) S. C. cited 7 *Vin.* 160. *Cha. Rep.* 327. See *Gutwin v. Winstmore*, *post.* 2 vol. 525.
(2) This case is said to be misrepresented, and does not warrant the point here said to be determined by it. 1 *Bro.*
(3) 3 *Vin.* 145. pl. 28. S. C.

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* Show. Parl.
Cal. 67.

That in the case of *Penville v. Luscombe*, nothing was therein determined by the *Master of the Rolls*, who was very doubtful in the principal point; but Mr. *Fazakerley* said he had a note of a case, with the same names, determined by Lord *Cowper* in 1716, who held directly the contrary, that there might be a *possessio fratris* of an equity of redemption, and if so, the rule of *equitas sequitur legem*, in cases of property, is certainly the best guide; and if this court upon niceties should relax this rule, it would be a precedent to dispense with it in other cases. He said, it was agreed the principal point had never been determined, tho' it is at the same time admitted there are many cases, where, after a recovery at law, either of dower or tenancy by the curtesy, a trust term has been laid out of the way for the benefit of dowers, &c.

Mr. *Murray* of the same side said, the statute of uses interposes only between a *cestui que trust* and his own feoffee, strictly speaking; that in this court, the *cestui que trust* is considered as the owner of the land, and the trustee, like the donee of a fine, only the mere instrument, and no more. That the case of *Lady Radnor v. Vandebendy**, was affirmed in the house of Lords for this reason, because all conveyancers have insisted, that where there is a trust term, it may be safely purchased without any danger of dower, and is one reason for the distinction between a dowers and a tenancy by the curtesy.

That a mortgage in fee is no more than a charge upon the land; and that in the case of *Tabor v. Grover*, 2 *Vern.* 367. it was held, a mortgage in fee (tho' two descents cast. and tho' more was due upon it than the value, and tho' the mortgagor, by his answer, said he would not redeem) should go to the executor, and not to the heir of the mortgagee, the equity of redemption not being foreclosed or released. The several cases following were likewise cited by the defendant's counsel, 1 *Vern.* 329. *Hall v. Dunch*, 2 *Vern.* *Amburst v. Dowling*, and *Strode v. Lady Russell*, 2 *Vern.* 625. and *Lady Williams v. Wray*, 8 *Co.* 96. and *Parulet* and the *Attorney General*, *Hurd.* 467, 469.

After the point had been argued on both sides, Lord *Chancellor* declared his surprize that this matter, as it seemed a case which must frequently happen, should never have been brought before the court till now, and as it was a question of great consequence and general concern, should take time to give his opinion.

On the 25th of *March*, 1738, the cause stood for judgment. Lord *Chancellor*: This question depends on two considerations. First, What sort of interest an equity of redemption is considered to be in this court?

Secondly, What is requisite to intitle the husband to be tenant by the curtesy?

An equity of redemption may be devised, granted, or entailed, and such entail may be barred by fine and by recovery, and the person intitled to it is the owner of the land, and a mortgage in fee is considered as personal assets.

First, An equity of redemption has always been considered as an estate in the land, for it may be devised, granted, or entailed with remainders, and such entail and remainders may

red by a fine and recovery, and therefore cannot be considered as a mere right only, but such an estate whereof there is a seisin; the person therefore intitled to the equity of redemption is considered as the owner of the land, and a mortgagee is considered as personal assets.

a devise of all lands, tenements and hereditaments, a devise in fee shall not pass (1), unless the equity of redemption is considered as a new purchase of the land.

s, forecloses an equity of redemption on a mortgage in fee, such estate will not pass by these words of lands, &c. because a foreclosure is considered as a new purchase of the land.

This rule as laid down here by *Hardwicke*, and by the reports of 10 cases of *Wynn v. Littleton*, 3, and *Litton v. Russell*, 2 *Vern.* deserves some consideration. It is int, which frequently occurs in practice of a conveyancer. The question is, Whether we must understand trusteeship's meaning to be, that the devise of all lands, tenements and hereditaments will neither pass the legal estate of mortgagees in fee or forfeiture, or whether those words are incompetent to pass the beneficial interest? If the latter, the rule, generally speaking, is certainly right: because the beneficial interest being in fact gone but the money due on the mortgage and the lands mortgaged being considered in equity merely as a security for a personal debt, it is very evident that such personal or beneficial interest is not passed by words peculiarly adapted to pass real property; unless in some particular instances, as where the testator had no other lands than those mortgaged to him, in which case the manifestation would hold against the legal construction. See *Clarke v. Abbot*, 4 *Ch. Rep.* 457, 461. But I take it there is a very obvious distinction between the legal estate of a mortgagee in fee after forfeiture, and the beneficial interest, as to the operation of a devise. The latter would certainly pass by a residuary bequest of all his real estate; yet it is clear, that the mortgagee would not; which, if not vested in any particular person by the will, in such case descend to the heir of the testator as a trustee for the benefit of the personal estate. Vide *Ex parte General v. Myrick*, 2 *Pesf.* 46. See the decree in *Wynn v. Littleton*,

cited *infra*. But as the mortgagee is considered as to the legal estate and inheritance merely as a trustee (*vide post*. 606. 2 *Vern.* 401.) if he should devise all and every his real estate to A. and his heirs, this would according to the determination in *Marlow v. Smith*, 2 *P. W.* 198. pass the legal estate, and if he should likewise bequeath all his personal estate to B., this would pass the mortgage debt, and A. would thereby become a trustee for B. The reasoning in *Marlow v. Smith* was, that the legal estate being in the trustee, it was in the eye of the law his estate and his property, and therefore passed by a devise of his estate. If then there be a settled distinction between the legal and beneficial interest of a mortgagee, and if the words real estate will pass such legal estate, why will not the general devise of lands, tenements and hereditaments have that effect, when unconnected with circumstances indicative of the testator's intention to exclude such a construction? The word hereditament must, I think, be as operative as the words real estate. The former is expressive of the latter. It is said in Sir Thomas Littleton's case, 2 *Vent.* 351. that, "if a man had lands in fee, and other lands mortgaged to him in fee, by a devise of all his lands the mortgage would pass." The case *Ex parte Bowes*, 26th July, 1744. seems to confirm the above observations in their utmost extent. There, one *Thurland* mortgaged the reversion of the manors of *Bigging and Fairworth* and divers lands and hereditaments in the county of *Surry* to *Henry May* in fee, who by his will devised all his manors, farms, lands, tenements, hereditaments, and real estate in *Sussex, Kent, and Middlesex*, and elsewhere in *England* in possession,

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tion be foreclosed; and if, after such devise made, a foreclosure is had, yet such estate shall not pass by those general words of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, because a foreclosure is considered as a new purchase of the land.

A mortgage in fee, after a devise of the estate is in law a total revocation; in

equity *pro tanto* only.

The interest of the land must be somewhere, and cannot be in abeyance; but it is not in the mortgagee, and therefore must remain in the mortgagor. A. devises his estate and after

possession, reversion, or otherwise to certain uses, which now vest an estate tail in *Thomas Knight* an infant, with remainders over. The mortgage money was paid to the executor of *May*; but the legal estate has not been reconveyed. The question now is, Whether the legal estate of the mortgaged lands was vested by virtue of the above devise in *Thomas Knight*, the infant? And if so, whether he could convey by recovery pursuant to the *Stat. 7 Ann?* Lord *Hardwicke* decreed, the infant to convey the legal estate: "And it appearing under the devise in the will of the said *Henry May*, that the said *Thomas Knight*, the infant, is tenant in tail, with remainders over, it is ordered, that all proper parties are to concur in all necessary acts for the infant's suffering a common recovery, in order to make the conveyance effectual." *Reg. Lib. A. 1743. fol. 537.* It is very clear that the testator in the above case could not intend to create an estate tail in the legal estate of the mortgaged lands; and yet Lord *Hardwicke* thought that the legal operation of the devise ought to hold against the intent. As to the case of *Wynne v. Littleton*, which is reported in *Venon*, is usually cited as an authority to the contrary; it appears from the Register's book, *B. 1680. fol. 452.* that it was decreed, that *Lady Littleton* (the administratrix) was entitled to the mortgages in question, as part of the testator's personal estate: and the decree directs, that upon payment of principal and interest by the mortgagor (who had brought a cross bill to redeem), "the said dame *Anne Littleton* and the plaintiff *Sir John Wynne* do convey and assure to the said *Mr. Prior* and his heirs all their title estate and interest in and to

"the said mortgaged premises." As the decree directs *Sir John Wynne* to be a party in the re-conveyance, it is clear that he was supposed to have the legal estate in him, because the decree previously declared he had no beneficial interest by the devise. Now the Register's book does not mention whether he was heir at law to the testator, but merely that he was the testator's near kinsman, whilst administration was granted to *Lady Littleton* as next of kin. The doubt therefore still remains, whether the legal estate vested in *Sir John Wynne* as heir at law, or as devisee. If as devisee (and which I apprehend to be the case), then the above observations are established in their fullest extent. If as heir at law, it shews, that the legal estate does not even in equity necessarily follow the beneficial interest, and pass as personal property to the executor or administrator, but requires certain technical words, peculiarly adapted to the transfer of real property, in order to pass it. It is observable too in the above case of *Wynne v. Littleton*, that the testator had made a charge upon the lands devised, which rather seemed to shew, that those mortgaged were not intended to be the subject of the devise. With respect to the case of *Litton v. Russell* it can afford no argument on either side of the question: for the decree in that case, as it is stated in the Register's book, takes no notice of any mortgages, except those whereof the testator had after the making his will purchased the equity of redemption. Indeed it appears from the bill and answers, that there was only one other mortgage, which was of a copyhold estate, not surrendered to the use of the testator's will, *Reg. Lib. B. 1707. fol. 510.*

makes a mortgage in fee, tho' that is a total revocation in law, yet in this court it is a revocation *pro tanto* only (1). CARBORNE & SCARFE.

It is certain the mortgagee is not barely a trustee to the mortgagor, but to some purposes, *videlicet*, with regard to the inheritance he certainly is, till a foreclosure (2).

Secondly, At common law, four things are necessary to intitle the husband to the tenancy by the curtesy, *marriage, issue, death of the wife, seisin in fact*. In this case the three first concur, but it is objected, that here is no seisin whatever of the legal estate in the wife in the consideration of the law. But that is not the present question; the true question is, if there was such seisin or possession of the equitable estate in the wife, as in this court is considered as equivalent to an actual seisin of a freehold estate at common law, and I am of opinion there was.

Actual possession, cloathed with the receipt of the rents and profits, is the highest instance of an equitable seisin, both of which there was in this case, and that a husband shall be tenant by the curtesy of the equitable estate of the wife, has been often determined, as in *Sweetapple v. Bindon*, 2 Vern. 536. which was a much stronger case than this, for in that case there was neither seisin nor land, and in 2 Vern. 680. it was held that lands articted for only will pass by a will. A husband shall be tenant by the curtesy of the equitable estate of the wife (3).

The principal objections are two.

First, Laches and neglect in the husband, by not paying off the mortgage.

Secondly, That the rule ought to be equal between dower and curtesy, and that dower cannot be of a trust estate.

As to the first, it is not similar to the cases of laches in the husband, *viz.* as in a case where entry is requisite, because it is nothing near so easy to pay off a mortgage as to make an entry; and it holds equally strong in the case of a trust estate, for a husband may more easily get a decree for his trustees to convey, than a decree to redeem a mortgage, which is necessarily attended with many delays.

The second objection proves too much, if any thing, and intirely fails by the precedents of this court: if any innovations were to be made, I am of opinion the nearest way to right would be, to let in the wife to dower of a trust estate, and not to exclude the husband from being tenant by the curtesy of it, and there can be no inconvenience to the heir at law, for he would have the same remedy in this court, to make a tenant by the curtesy keep down the interest as against any other tenant for life: for these reasons I am of opinion the defendant is intitled to be An heir at law can oblige a tenant by the curtesy to keep down interest, as much as any other tenant for life.

(1) *York v. Stone*, 1 Sa'll. 158. *Perkins v. Walker*, 1 Vern. 97. *Hall v. Dunch*, 1 Vern. 329, 342. *Duke of Bridgewater v. Bolton*, 2 Lord Ray. 968. *Riser v. Wager*, 2 P. W. 334. *Parsons v. Freeman*, post. 2 vol. 748.

(2) See *Hard. 467*. 2 Vern. 401.

(3) So *Watts v. Ball*, 1 P. W. 108. *Chaplin v. Chaplin*, 3 P. W. 234.

CASBONE v. SCARFE. tenant by the curtesy, and the decree at the Rolls, as to this part, must be reversed (1).

(1) *Reg. Lib. A: 1737. fol. 408.*

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December the
2th, 1738.

Roberts v. Dixwell, et c contra.

Case 276.

Sir T. S. by will directs his trustees to convey a full fourth part of all his freehold lands, &c. to the use of his daughter Priscilla for life, and so as she alone, or such

person as she shall appoint, take and receive the rents and profits thereof, and so as her husband is not to intermeddle therewith, and from and after her decease, in trust for the heirs of the body of the said Priscilla for ever (2). This being an executory trust, the wife took an estate for life only, and the husband therefore not entitled to be tenant by the curtesy.

The principal question was, Whether this was a trust executed, or executory? For if executed, Priscilla was then tenant in tail, and her husband intitled to be a tenant by the curtesy; the contrary, if executory only.

Part of the lands devised being of the nature of gavelkind, and Priscilla having left two sons, another question was made, Whether these particular lands must descend in gavelkind, or go according to the rule of the Common law?

Mr. Fazakerley for the sons of Priscilla.

The question is, Whether the words heirs of the body, will be construed to give them an estate derived from their ancestor, or whether they take by purchase?

He insisted, that it appears to be the intention of the testator, that the husband should have no benefit, and therefore cannot be tenant by the curtesy.

The wife married improvidently, and against her father's consent.

She might have disposed of the rents and profits by will, there was not one moment of time, where the husband had the least right, or ever was in possession of any part of the estate.

He said he did not recollect any one case, where a husband can be tenant by the curtesy, unless he can shew seisin in him-

(1) After raising certain sums for payment of portions pursuant to a marriage settlement, and of his debts and funeral expences.

(2) The testator then gives the other three fourths to his three other daughters and the heirs of their bodies, and in

case of the death of certain of his daughters therein named without issue, he gives the share of her or them so dying to the surviving daughters, "but the share of his daughter Priscilla to be conveyed in trust as aforesaid."

self in right of his wife ; upon the death of *Priscilla*, the husband here can have no right at all, for there is no longer a continuation of the wife's estate.

He cited *Co. Lit. fol. 30. a.* to shew, that a husband must have some right even in the life-time of the wife, and that it commences in her life-time, and not at her death.

Where the wife has a separate interest, the court considers her always as a *feme sole*; if he had nothing during the coverture, how could he intitle himself to any thing at the time of her death, when all her interest was gone, and it is expressly laid down by Lord *Coke*, that a tenancy by the curtesy is initiate in the life-time of the wife.

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DIAWELL.

Talbot v. J.
14 *Session*

Boswell

Pitt

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Mr. Attorney General for the defendant.

He insisted, where a trust estate is attended with all the similar circumstances that there could be in a legal estate, to give a husband a tenancy by the curtesy, this court will make no difference in the construction.

Lord Chancellor : The question is, how this trust ought to be carried into execution, and in what manner the trustees ought to convey.

Priscilla herself is dead, and yet it must be considered, what kind of estate the trustees ought to have conveyed to her, if she had been living.

First, Whether to *Priscilla* in tail, or to her for life only?

If the conveying an estate tail would have answered the purpose of the testator in his will, then this case need not have been varied from former cases.

But I am of opinion, the conveying an estate tail here would have defeated the intention of the testator.

To be sure, where an estate has been granted or given by will to *A.* for life, and to the heirs of the body of *A.* such a devise has been, by the Common law, united so in the first person, as to convey to him an estate tail; the same construction too has prevailed with respect to trust estates.

But, in the present case, here are all sorts of trusts, as to mortgage, sell, &c. (1) but the latter part of the trust is merely executory, to be carried into execution after the performance of the antecedent trusts ; the whole direction therefore falls upon this court, and they are to direct how the parties are to convey.

This court have taken much greater liberties in the construction of executory trusts, than where the trusts are actually executed ; as in the case of the Earl of *Stamford* v. Sir *John Hebart* (2), concerning Serjeant *Maynard's* will, which came on upon exceptions to the Master's report, Nov. the 19th, 1709, and the resolution affirmed in the house of Lords. The case of *Papillon*

(1) *Bagshaw* v. *Spencer*, post. 2 vol. 578. (2) 1 Bro. Par. Ca. 288. S. C.

ROBERTS v. VOYCE, 2 Wms. 471. and Lord Glenorchy v. Bosville, Cas. in Eq. in Lord Talbot's time, 3. (1).
DIXWELL.

These cases shew that the court have taken a greater latitude; and the point which has governed them, has been the intention of the testator.

The words here in trust for *Priscilla*, for and during the term of her natural life, and so as she alone, &c. have no doubt some meaning; and there is a particularity in the expression, because he has given plainly and expressly an estate tail to his other daughters in different parts of his estates, but I do not think that this alone would have been sufficient.

[609] Things must not only be consistent in executory trusts, according to the intention of the testator, but must be done according to the form and method of conveyancing: now I do not know any instance, where an estate for life conveyed by deed or will to the wife, for her separate use, has been construed an estate tail in the wife; if the testator had intended an estate tail, he would have done it by way of remainder.

Some stress has been laid upon the word *therewith*, as if it related to the last antecedent, the rents and profits, but it may be taken in a large sense, and refer to the whole fourth part.

If the wife had been intitled to an estate tail, I do not see but the husband must have been tenant by the curtesy.

It is said this is an executory trust, and nothing to be conveyed till all the other precedent trusts were executed, and consequently the estate continued in the trustees, and there was no seisin in the husband and wife.

In case of a trust-estate for payment of debts, or in the case of an equity of redemption, a husband may be a tenant by the curtesy of an estate devised to the wife, for her separate use. But it has been held in a case of a trust-estate for payment of debts, and in the case of an equity of redemption, that a husband may be tenant by the curtesy (2); for in the case of a trust for payment of debts, it is only a chattel interest in the trustees (3), and the first taker has a freehold over.

Where a trust is executory, and to be carried into execution by this court, they will direct a conveyance of lands, notwithstanding they are *quodlibet*, to be made according to the rule of Common law. If, therefore, a trust-estate is not such a one as is sufficient to bar the husband of his tenancy by the curtesy. The next question will be, Whether the devise to the wife for her separate use, will bar him? I am of opinion it will not, because here is a sort of a seisin in the wife (4).

My Lord Coke says, that to make a tenancy by the curtesy, there ought to be a right in the husband inchoate in the life of the wife; but he does not say, that he should be seised of the rents and profits.

(1) See also *Leonard v. Earl of Suffolk*, 2 Vern. 526. *Bagshaw v. Spencer*, post. 2 vol. 246, 570, 577. *Baskerville v. Baskerville*, post. 2 vol. 279. *Read v. Snell*, post. 2 vol. 648. (2) See *Casborne v. Inglis*, ante. 603. (3) *Vide Todd v. Downes*, post. 2 vol. 304. (4) See *Hearle v. Greenbank*, post. 3 vol. 716.

Therefore I think, if this had been an estate tail, he would have been intitled to be tenant by the curtesy, notwithstanding this court, by their authority, might have prevented the husband from intermeddling with the rents and profits during the life of the wife.

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But, upon the whole, I am of opinion the wife could not take an estate in tail, but took an estate for life only; and the grounds of those cases which have been mentioned, do not arise from the court's making a different construction upon a trust, than upon a legal estate, but that some circumstance in the will has induced the court to make a narrower construction.

Therefore, as it is plainly the intention of the testator, that the husband should have no manner of benefit from the estate, either in the life-time of the wife, or after her decease, (for immediately upon the death of the wife, it is conveyed in trust to the heirs of her body for ever), the husband of consequence is absolutely excluded, for a tenancy by the curtesy depends absolutely upon an estate tail.

As this is my determination on the construction of Sir Thomas Sandys's will, the estate must be conveyed to Mr. Richard Sandys, the eldest son of Priscilla, and the heirs of his body, with remainder to the second son and the heirs of his body (1), and not according to the custom of gavelkind, because, agreeable to the opinion I have now given, it must go according to the rule of Common law, being not a trust executed, but executory, and to be carried into execution by this court.

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(1) Reg. Lib. B. 1738. fol. 119.

C A P. CXVIII.

Cithest.

(A) Of a Modus.

Case of Rochester v. Lee
2 De Gex. M. 44. 427

Clifton v. Orchard, clerk.

January the
28th, 1737.

THERE having been two verdicts in this case in favour of the plaintiff in equity, the *modus* was now established with the costs at law, but none were given with regard to the proceedings in equity, for Lord Chancellor said, the suit in this court was merely for the security of the plaintiff, and to prevent any farther impeachment of his right to an exemption from the plaintiff intitled to his costs at law only and not in equity.

Cafe 277.
Issues directed by this court, to try a *modus*, though established by two verdicts, the plaintiff intitled to his costs at law only and not in equity.

payment

CLIFTON v. ORCHARD. payment of tithes in specie, and that this was like the case of a bill brought to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses, wherein costs are never given against the defendant: That the plaintiff might have applied for a prohibition, and if he had succeeded therein at law, he would have had his costs, and he ought to have the same advantage with regard to the proceedings at law directed by this court, but that there was no pretence for any other costs (1).

His Lordship decreed the *modus* to be established, and ordered the defendant to pay costs to the plaintiff, in respect to the proceedings at law, to be taxed; but as to costs in equity, relating to the *modus*, his Lordship did not think fit to award any to be paid by either of the said parties (2).

(1) See *Anon. post*, 2 vol. 14. (2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1737. fol. 207.

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C A P CXIX.

Trade and Merchandize.

May the 18th, 1737. Powell, senior and junior, ——— Plaintiffs.
Elizabeth Monnier, Widow, and Executrix of John }
Monnier, ——— Defendant.

CASE 278. y^e Russell
deposited **T**HE plaintiffs, who were partners, the 3d of April, 1731, received a bill of exchange from Charles Newburgh, then dated and drawn on John Monnier for 50 l. to the plaintiffs or order, thirty days after date, indorsed by the plaintiffs, and negotiated by several persons; on the 15th of April it came into the custody of Lavington and Paul of Exeter, merchants, who sent up to Monnier the bill of exchange; he received it, and kept it ten days before the same became due, without making any objection, and, whilst he had it in his hands, wrote on the left side of the top thereof, N^o. 84. and at the bottom the 6th of May, which the plaintiffs charged were the private mark or number of bills by him accepted, and intended to be paid, and upon the 6th of May, the time when payable, Monnier, on that day, sent it back to Lavington and Paul, and refused to accept it, or allow it as so much received by him on their account; whereupon Lavington and Paul demanded and received the 50 l. of the plaintiffs, who can have no satisfaction against Newburgh, he having become a bankrupt and insolvent, before the return of the bill.

The bill is therefore brought for 50 l. with interest due thereon: Monnier died after putting in his answer, and the cause has been revived against his executrix.

It was admitted, that Newburgh acquainted Monnier by letter of his having drawn the 50 l. bill, and desiring him to

account

Trade and Merchandize,

accept and pay the same; to which *Monnier*, on the 13th of April, wrote a letter in answer, that the 50 l. bill should be duly honoured, and placed to his debt. POWELL
MONNIE

It was insisted for the plaintiffs, that if *Monnier* had not intended to accept and pay the bill, he should, according to the custom of merchants, have returned the same immediately to *Lavington* and *Paul*, whereby the plaintiffs might have got the 50 l. from *Newburgh*, who was then, and several days after, in good credit, and particularly in such credit with the defendant, that, after the plaintiff's bill came to his hands, *Newburgh* drew another bill of exchange on him for 18 l. three days after date, which was duly paid.

Mr. Fazakerly, who was counsel for the defendant, insisted, that the suit here ought not to be proceeded upon any farther, but should go off to a trial at law, as it is a mere legal question.

Lord Chancellor: If *Monnier* had been living, I should have been of opinion, that the bill ought to have been dismissed; but now he is dead, and the suit is revived against his executrix, notwithstanding it is a legal question, the plaintiffs may bring their bill, and by praying satisfaction out of assets, and a discovery of assets, it is made a case, of which this court takes cognizance, any if they retain bills, where it is a legal demand, they must judge upon the facts relating to the legal demand, and, unless those facts are doubtful, will not dismiss the bill, and turn it over to a trial at law. If this court retain bills where it is a legal demand, they must judge upon the facts relating to such demand.

Mr. Fazakerly then, upon the merits alledged, that *John Monnier* kept the 50 l. bill till the 6th of May, merely in expectation of receiving money or effects from *Newburgh* to answer it, and that, in receiving it from indorsee, he entered it in his bill book, as he constantly did all bills he received, whether good or bad, and that it was then entered at or against No. 84, and therefore wrote that figure on the top of it, and that it did not denote the number of bills accepted or entered, but was paid by him, and that writing the 6th of May denoted the day the defendant returned the bill, that *Newburgh* not remitting any effects to answer it, he returned it to *Lavington* and *Paul*; that, at the time of drawing the bill, *Monnier* had not, nor hath since had, any effects of *Newburgh's* in his hands; that when *Monnier* returned the bill to *Lavington* and *Paul*, he wrote to them as follows; *You remitted me Newburgh's bill, which I do not pay for reasons, therefore please to credit me, and note 50 l. the same being due to-day, and let the indorsee reimburse you.* And therefore, upon all other circumstances, this not such an acceptance as will make *Monnier* liable to pay

Lord Chancellor: The principal question is, Whether this is a sufficient acceptance to charge the defendant, and if there is any doubt of it as to the fact, or whether in law, what has been done amounts to an acceptance, it might still be necessary.

POWELL v. MONNIER. necessary to send the parties to a trial at law, but I think there is no doubt of either.

If a person on whom a bill of exchange is drawn, says in a letter to a drawer, *it shall be duly honoured and placed to your debit*, this is an acceptance, and will make him liable, for a parol acceptance has been held to be good, and so determined in a case made for the opinion of the court of King's Bench in the time of Lord Hardwicke, Ch. Just.

Monnier, when the bill was sent to him, received it, entered it in his book, as his course of trade is proved to have been, under a particular number, and wrote that number under the bill; now it has been said to be the custom of merchants, that if a man underwrites any thing, let it be what it will, that it amounts to an acceptance; but if there was no more than this in the case, I should think it of little avail to charge the defendant, because that matter has been fully explained; but what determines me are Monnier's letters, by which it appears very clearly that he has accepted of it, in one he particularly mentions the 50*l.* bill, and says it shall be duly honoured, and placed to the drawer's debt; nor is there in his letters to Newburgh, or the indorsee, one expression that shews the least suspicion of Newburgh's credit.

[612] I think there can be no doubt, but an acceptance may be by letter, and has been so determined (1); there have been questions too, whether a parol acceptance could be good? Lord Chief Justice Eyre held it might, Lord Raymond held the contrary; and there was a like point before me at *Nisi prius*, in the cause of Lumley and Palmer (2), and I had a case made of it for the opinion of the court of King's Bench, where it was several times argued, and at last solemnly determined, that such acceptance is good, much more then must an acceptance by letter be good.

The payee of a note intitled to interest against the acceptor, tho' no protest, for all the damage that can be had in such a case is the interest.

As to the plaintiff's being intitled to interest, I was at first doubtful whether he could demand any; but on reading the statute of the 3d and 4th of Queen Anne, chap. 9. sec. 4. I think it a clear case that he is, tho' no protest for that is made necessary by the act, it being requisite only to intitle a payee to damages against a drawer, but does not mention the acceptor of a bill of exchange; and all the damage, therefore, that can be had in such a case is the interest.

Lord Chancellor decreed the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of 50*l.* together with interest for the same from the time of filing the original bill, at the rate of 4*l.* per cent, and further ordered, that she should also pay to the plaintiffs their costs of this suit, from the time of filing of the bill of revivor, to be taxed (3).

(1) See *Wilkinson v. Lutwidge*, 1 *Str.* 648. also *Mason v. Hunt*, *Doug.* 297.

(2) 2 *Str.* 100. S. C.

(3) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1736. fol. 332.

C A P. CXX.

Trust and Trustees.

- (A) *What Acts of the Trustees shall defeat the Trust, or be a Breach of Trust in them.*
 (B) *Of Resulting Trusts and Trust by Implication.*
 (C) *Of Trusts to attend the Inheritance.*
 (D) *Trustees how to account, and what Allowance to have.*

- (A) *What Acts of the Trustees shall defeat the Trust, or be a Breach of Trust in them.*

Trinity Term, 1737.

Symance v. Tattam.

A Bill was brought to compel trustees to join in a sale, Case 279.
 which would destroy the contingent remainders, and likewise the uses in a settlement made before marriage; the limitations were to the husband for 99 years, if he so long live, to the wife for her life, remainder to trustees to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to the heirs begotten on the body of the wife, remainder to the heirs of the husband; and the first declaration under it was that it was the intention of the settlement to make a provision for the children of the marriage, and a covenant on the part of the husband that he will not bar the estate tail to the wife, but will preserve the uses before limited and appointed. [614]

Lord Chancellor : There are many cases in which the court will compel the trustees to join in such conveyance as will destroy contingent remainders, but then it must be in some measure to answer the uses originally intended by the settlement: and has been usually done in the case of old settlements only, as in *Winnington v. Foley**, but I believe no instance where This court will not compel trustees to join in a sale, which will not only destroy contingent remainders, but all the uses in a marriage settlement, for they are guilty of a breach of trust, in joining to destroy contingent remainders, whether the settlement be voluntary, for a valuable consideration, or by will (1).

* 1 Wms. 536. There, in a marriage-settlement, the husband was made tenant for 99 years, if he so long lived, remainder to trustees during the life of the husband to preserve

(1) See *Woodhouse v. Hoskins*, post. 3 vol. 22.

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MUNIER.

If a person on whom a bill of exchange is drawn, says in a letter to a drawer, *it shall be duly honoured and placed to your debit*, this is an acceptance, and will make him liable, for a parol acceptance has been held to be good, and so determined in a case made for the opinion of the court of King's Bench in the time of Lord Har-

cessary to send the parties to a trial at law, but no doubt of either.

Monnier, when the bill was sent to be
it in his book, as his course of trade
under a particular number, and wrote
bill; now it has been said to be that
if a man underwrites any thing
amounts to an acceptance; but
this in the case, I should think
defendant, because that is the
what determines me are the
very clearly that he has
mentions the 50% but I do, after trust
and placed to the credit of the case is different
Newburgh, or the law to compel the trustee
suspicion of Newburgh remainders.

in the fa-

only honorary;
of *Pigg v. Pigg*,
and in *Manfell v.*
ing, *affs'd by Lord*
Ernest Reynolds, was ef-
tained remainders, joining to
and that there was no
or for a valuable con-
of those cases turned
trustees had actually de-
different, for the appli-
tees to do an act which

[612]

Another difficulty besides, which is, the husband's interest in the settlement, that he will not bar the wife, but preserve the uses before limited, though the husband were dead, the wife could not do otherwise by which she could bar the estate tail, notwithstanding the trustees should consent to join with her; for this is ab-
solutely restrained from barring it by the 11th of Hen. 7.

If it had been an application only to destroy the contingent remainders, I should have taken more time to consider; but here it would overturn all the uses of a marriage settlement, which would be assuming too much power, and would be making a decree to compel a breach of the husband's own covenant.

The bill was dismissed.

preserve contingent remainders, &c. remainder to the first, &c. sons of that marriage in tail male successively; a son was born, and of age, the wife dead, the son being in treaty for a marriage, which appeared to be a beneficial one for the family; Lord Chancellor Parker decreed the trustee should join with the father and son in barring this, and making a new settlement.

“† If any woman which shall hereafter have any estate in dower, or for term of
“life or in tail, jointly with her husband, or only to herself, or to her use, in any
“manors, lands, &c. of the inheritance, &c. of her husband, and shall hereafter
“being sole, or with any other after-taken husband, discontinue, alien, &c. or
“suffer a recovery of the same, such recovery, discontinuance, alienation, &c.
“shall be utterly void and of none effect.”

Easter Term, 1738.

Ivie v. Ivie.

Vide title Devise, under the Divison, What Words pass an Estate Tail.

Anne Thayer, Widow and Executrix of *John Thayer*, Esq; deceased, ——— } Plaintiffs.

February the 9th, 1739.

Jane Gould, Widow and Executrix of *Nathaniel Gould*, Esq; deceased, who was Executor of *Humphrey Thayer*, Esq; deceased, and *Stephen Collins*, ——— } Defendants.

THE case arose upon the settlement made after the marriage of *Anne Collins*, now the plaintiff *Anne Thayer*, with *John Thayer*, the chief intent of which was to secure two several sums of 1000*l.* one to be advanced by the intended husband, and the other by Mr. *Collins*, the father of the plaintiff. Case 280. S.C. cited post. 2 vol. 245. 1 Ves. 519. By settlement before marriage it was agreed, that 2000*l.* in the hands of a

trustee, should be laid out in land, to the use of the husband for life, then to the wife for life for her jointure, and to the children equally; and in case the husband died without issue, to the wife in fee; and if he survived, to him in fee. The husband and wife being necessitous, the trustee paid them 600*l.* on a release, and their joint bond of indemnity, and afterwards 400*l.* more on the like bond, and a new agreement that the remaining 1000*l.* should be laid out in the purchase of an annuity, for the separate use of the wife during the coverture, and in fee in case of survivorship. The trustee afterwards paid the husband this 1000*l.* likewise; he is dead without issue, and left the wife destitute. Bill brought against the representative of the trustee for this breach of trust in him, and to be paid what should be due to the wife for the 2000*l.* out of his personal estate.

In March 1738, the Master of the Rolls decreed, that the wife should be paid what should be remaining due to her for the 2000*l.* and interest out of the trustee's personal estate in a course of administration.

Upon appeal to Lord Chanceller, he recommended it to the parties, from hardship on one side, and dangerous consequence on the other, to find out a third way of moderating the affair.

The agreement afterwards of the executrix of the trustee to pay the wife of the *cessuque trust* an annuity of 100*l.* quarterly, during her life, free of taxes from Lady-day 1737, and the costs of the suit was made an order of the court.

Mr. *Thayer's* 1000*l.* was a sum he was intitled to under the trusts of a term; Mr. *Collins's* 1000*l.* was paid in. By the settlement it was agreed that the 2000*l.* which was placed in the hands of *Humphrey Thayer*, one of the trustees, and brother of the husband, should be laid out by him, and the defendant *Stephen Collins*, the other trustee, and uncle of the plaintiff, in the purchase of lands, to the use of the husband for life, then to the wife for life for her jointure, in bar of dower, and to the children of the marriage, share and share alike; and in case of the husband's dying without issue, to the wife in fee; and if he survived the wife, to him in fee, with the common appointment of paying the interest of the 2000*l.* to the husband, till it was invested in lands.

Mara v. Mowbray
2 Jones & Lat.
511.

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GOULD.

Some time after the marriage, the husband and wife joined in an application to the trustee, *Humphrey Thayer*, to raise the money to assist them in their necessities, and upon his paying them 600*l.* they both gave him a release for so much, and likewise a joint bond to indemnify him; and upon receiving 400*l.* more from him afterwards, another bond of the like nature. The husband and wife came to a new agreement, that the remaining 1000*l.* should be laid out in the purchase of an annuity, which should be for the sole and separate use of the wife during the coverture, and in fee in case of survivorship; the husband afterwards found means to prevail upon *Humphrey Thayer* to pay him this 1000*l.* likewise (1). The husband died without issue, and left the plaintiff destitute, there being no assets.

The bill was brought against the representative of *Humphrey Thayer*, for this breach of trust in him, and to be paid what should be due to the plaintiff for the said 2000*l.* out of his personal estate.

The cause was first heard in *March* 1738, before Sir *Joseph Jekyll*, "who referred it to a Master to see what was due to the plaintiff for the 2000*l.* placed in the hands of *Humphrey Thayer*, "by virtue of the plaintiff's marriage settlement, and to take "an account of the assets of *John Thayer*, come to the hands of "his widow, and what should appear to have come to her hands, "after payment of debts of a superior nature, was to go in diminution of what should be found due to the plaintiff for the "2000*l.* and interest, and to take an account also of the personal estate of *Humphrey Thayer* come to the hands of the defendant *Jane Gould*, or of *Nathaniel Gould*, her late husband, "and the plaintiff was to be paid what should be remaining due to her for the said 2000*l.* and interest, out of the said *Humphrey Thayer's* personal estate in a course of administration." (2).

The defendant *Gould* appealed from this decree, and on the 24th of *November*, 1739, it came on before *Lord Chancellor*.

For the plaintiff was cited *Mary Portington's* case, 10 *Co. Rep.* 42. *b.* where it is laid down, "That no feme covert shall "be barred by her confession of her inheritance or freehold, but "when she is examined by due course of law; and that is the "cause, that if the husband and wife acknowledge a statute or "recognizance, it is void as to the wife, although she survives "her husband; so if the husband and wife acknowledge a deed to "be enrolled, and it is enrolled, it is void as to the wife; and the "reason is, because no such writ is depending against the husband and wife, upon which the wife may by law be examined." From hence they argued, that no act, in which the plaintiff joined with her husband, could make any alteration in the uses of the settlement, and that as money to be laid out in land is considered as land, she is intitled, notwithstanding her release, to have it conveyed to her in fee. The 7th of *Edward 4.* fol. 14. *b.* *Mansell v. Mansell*, 2 *Wms.* 610. *Palmer v. Trew,*

(1) *Stephen Collins* the other trustee was not privy to any of these transactions.

(2) *Reg. Lib. B.* 1738. fol. 231.

1 Vern. 261. *Rutland v. Molineaux*, 2 Vern. 64. were also cited, and it was insisted by the plaintiff's counsel, that the case of *Baker v. Child*, 2 Vern. 61. is no authority for the defendant, because falsely reported; for though it is said there the court was of opinion, "Where a feme covert agrees to join with her husband in making a surrender, or levying a fine, and he dies before it is done, equity will compel her to perform the agreement;" yet it was in fact no more than a recommendation by the court (the parties being present and consenting) to Serjeant Rawlinson, to make an end of the affair between the parties by his private award, which was to be final (1). And what makes it still a stronger case against *Humphrey Thayer* is, that the trustee *Stephen Collins*, though the plaintiff's own uncle, was entirely unacquainted with any of these transactions, and not trusted for fear he should refuse his consent to this iniquitous scheme.

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GOULD.

The Attorney General for the defendants insisted, this was not an interest in land, because no fine could be levied upon it while it continued in money, and that being personal, her contract with her husband would bind her, though a feme covert, and cited the case of *Thesbalds v. Duffoy*, Mod. Cas. in Law and Equity, 2d part, 101. where it was laid down that the contract of a feme covert, where it was with the consent of her friends, was good. He also cited the case of the Countess of *Portland v. Progers*, 2 Vern. 104.

Lord Chancellor: I foresee great hardship on the one side, and dangerous consequences on the other, and have very great doubts with myself what decree I shall make; and therefore recommend it to the parties, as it is a case of considerable difficulty, to find out a third way of moderating this affair (2).

As an annuity was originally intended to be purchased for the wife in the life-time of the husband, by way of compensation for the trustees paying in of the money, some method may be contrived to make that effectual; and therefore let the cause be adjourned till the first day of rehearings, to give the parties an opportunity of settling it among themselves.

The cause standing in the paper to-day, and the plaintiff's counsel alledging that the parties had come to an agreement in writing, signed by the plaintiff and defendant, and praying that the same might be made an order of court, and a counsel for defendant consenting;

His Lordship ordered the agreement to be made an order of the court, and, pursuant thereto, decreed the defendant *Jane Gould*, out of the estate of *Humphrey Thayer*, to pay to the plaintiff *Anne Thayer* an annuity of 100*l.* payable quarterly, free of taxes, during her life, and that she should also forthwith pay to her the arrears of the said annuity, from Lady-day 1737,

(1) See *Hody v. Lun*, 1 Roll. Ab. 375.
Daniel v. Adams, Amb. 495. 497, 498.

(2) See *Smith v. French*, test. ol.
243. 246.

THAYER v. GOULD. and that she should likewise pay the plaintiff the costs of this suit (1).

(1) Reg. Lib. B. 1739. fol. 152.

(B) Of Resulting Trusts, and Trusts by Implication.

Trinity Vacation, 1737.

Taylor v. Taylor.

Vide title Evidence, Witnesses, and Proof, under the Division, Where Parol or Collateral Evidence will, or will not, be admitted to explain, confirm, or contradict what appears on the Face of a Deed or Will.

Vide title Copyhold.

February the 9th, 1738.

Hill v. The Bishop of London, Smith, and Others (1).

Case 281.

R. S. incumbent of the rectory of *Bushy*, in the county of *Hertford*, by his will dated the 1st of October 1713, devised in these words: "As for my worldly goods with which it hath pleased God to bless me, after my debts paid and funeral expences discharged, I dispose thereof as follows: First, I give, devise and bequeath my perpetual advowson, donation, and patronage of the parish church of *B.* and all glebe lands, profits, and appurtenances to the same belonging, to *G. S.* willing and desiring her to sell and dispose of the same to *Eton* college, and on their refusal, to *Trinity* college, *Oxford*, and on the refusal of both these societies, to any of the colleges in *Oxford* or *Cambridge*, who will be the best purchaser. There is in this

RICHARD Smith, incumbent of the rectory of *Bushy*, in the county of *Hertford*, by his will dated the 1st of October 1713, devised in these words: "As for my worldly goods with which it hath pleased God to bless me, after my debts paid and funeral expences discharged, I dispose thereof as follows: First, I give, devise and bequeath my perpetual advowson, donation, and patronage of the parish church of *Bushy*, in the county of *Hertford*, and all glebe lands, profits and appurtenances to the same belonging unto my honoured mother-in-law, *Mrs. Grace Smith*, willing and desiring her to sell and dispose of the said perpetual advowson and patronage, with the appurtenances, as soon as she conveniently and lawfully may sell and dispose thereof, to the fellows of *Eton* college in the county of *Buckingham*, and their successors, or to the fellows of *Trinity* college in *Oxford*, where I had my education; the fellows of *Eton* college to have the first offer, if they will agree to purchase it; and upon their refusal or disagreement, to be sold to the fellows of *Trinity* college in *Oxford* and their successors, if they will agree to purchase it; and upon the refusal or disagreement of both these societies, for the purchasing of the said perpetual advowson, with the appurtenances thereof, to be sold to the fellows and society of any one of the colleges in *Oxford* or

beneficial interest therein to *G. Smith*, with an injunction only to sell to particular societies.

(1) Reg. Lib. A. 1738. fol. 609.

"Cambridge"

' Cambridge, who will be the best purchaser. Item, I give and bequeath all my freehold lands and tenements in the parish of Oldenham, in the county of Hertford, with the appurtenances, unto my said mother-in-law, Mrs. Grace Smith, and to her heirs and assigns for ever: Item, I give to Thomas Wood 20 s. and 20 s. to my cousin Mary Wicks, and all the rest of my goods and chattels" (except a silver tankard, which I give to my cousin John Smith) "I give and bequeath unto my honoured mother-in-law, Mrs. Grace Smith, whom I make my sole executrix."

Hill v. The Bishop of London.

Wood v. Cox
1. Keen 317
see on appeal
2 M. & Craig 61
[619]

The plaintiffs, the cousins and co-heiresses at law of Richard Smith the testator, presented Cleave Greenhill, and Grace Smith presented the defendant James Smith to the living of Bushey: the present bill therefore is brought in order that the bishop of London may be enjoined from accepting James Smith, and that his Lordship may grant institution to Cleave Greenhill; the plaintiffs insisting that the testator did not intend the present avoidance should go to Grace Smith, but that she ought to be considered altogether as a trustee for the heirs at law of Richard Smith, and more especially as to the present avoidance: the defendant Grace Smith insisted on the other hand, that it is not a trust, but an absolute devise to her.

Coch. v. Hutchinson
1 Term 49
Woods v. Wood
11 M. & Craig 401
Mayor of Gloucester v. Wood
3 Bosc. 131
Martin v. Martin
12 Sim. 679

On the arguing this question the first time, Lord Chancellor was of opinion with the plaintiffs, that it was a trust in the defendant to sell the advowson under the restrictions in the will, and also for the payment of the debts of the testator, and after those were paid, a resulting trust as to the surplus for the benefit of the heirs at law, and that the presentation was in them as *vestitive trusts*.

Andrew v. Andrew
1 Collyer 686
Hughes v. Swan
13 Bosc. 44
Corp. of Gloucester
Robinson
1 Ch. & Fin. N. 272

But his Lordship a day or two after, doubting, he ordered the case to be spoke to again, by one counsel of a side, and then took time to give his opinion, and on the 19th of August, 1739, gave judgment.

Steyd v. Stey
2 Bosc. 222

The general question on this devise is, Whether there be a resulting trust, or not? On the first hearing I inclined to think, that there was, but I have changed my opinion intirely: the general rule, that where lands are devised for a particular purpose, what remains after that particular purpose is satisfied, results (1), admits of several exceptions (2). If J. S. devise

The general rule, that where lands are devised for a particular purpose, that what remains after that purpose is satisfied, results, admits of several exceptions.

(1) As instances of this general rule, see *Randall v. Bookey*, 2 Vern. 425. *Prec. Ch.* 162. *S. C.* *City of London v. Garway*, 2 Vern. 571. *Hobart v. Suffolk*, 2 Vern. 644. *Bristol v. Hungerford*, 2 Vern. 645. *Starkey v. Brooks*, 1 P. W. 190. *Cruise v. Barley*, 3 P. W. 20. *Stonchouse v. Evelyn*, 3 P. W. 252. *Digby v. Legard*, 3 Cox's P. W. 22. *Graveyard v. Hallum*, Amb. 643. *Arnold v. Chapman*, 1 Ves. 108. *Akroyd v. Smithson*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 503. *Leslie v. Devonshire*, 2 Bro. Cha. Rep. 188. *Robinson v. Taylor*, *ibid.* 589. *Hutchinson v. Hammond*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 128. *Spinks v. Lewis*, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 355. *Sherrard v. Lord Harborough*, Amb. 165. *Robinson v. Taylor*, Ves. jun. 44.

(2) So *Coningham v. Mellish*, *Prec. Cha.* 31. *Rogers v. Rogers*, 3 P. W. 193. *Mallabar v. Mallabar*, Ca. temp. Talb. 78. *Durour v. Mitteux*, 1 Ves. 320. *Cook v. Duckensfield*, post. 2 vol. 562. *Wright v. Row*, 1 Bro. Cha. Rep. 61. *Popham v. Lady Aylesbury*, Amb. 68.

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lands to *A.* to sell them to *B.* for the particular advantage of *B.* that advantage is the only purpose to be served, according to the intent of the testator, and to be satisfied by the mere act of selling, let the money go where it will, yet there is no precedent of a resulting trust in such a case: nor is there any warrant from the words or intent of the testator to say, this devise severs the beneficial interest, but is only an injunction on the the devisee to enjoy the thing devised in a particular manner. If *A.* devises lands to *J. S.* to sell for the best price to *B.* or to lease for three years, at such a fine, there is no resulting trust, so that the devise here amounts to no more than this; the testator gives the advowson to *Grace Smith*, but if such or such a college will buy it, then he lays an injunction upon her to sell, and therefore there are two objects of the testator's benevolence, *Grace Smith*, and the colleges.

There can be no constructive trust, but where the intent of the testator is apparent; *willing and desiring* *G. S.* to sell, &c. are more properly words of injunction, than trust.

[*620]

Where there is a resulting trust, the heir at law, after the particular purposes are satisfied, may by bill compel the trustee to convey to him, here he cannot; in all events the heir at law is disinherited: or where the heir at law is intitled to a resulting trust, he may by bill compel the estate to be sold out and out; here he could not, if the colleges should refuse to buy. This circumstance differs the case from all the cases put, the word *trust* is not made use of, and if *Grace Smith* is a trustee, it must be by construction, and then the intent of the testator must be chiefly considered as a guide to that construction; and though many other words will create a trust, yet that must be where the intent of the testator is apparent, but here, *willing and desiring* are more properly words of injunction than trust (1).

The case of *Randal v. Booke*, 2 Vern. 425. cited for the plaintiffs, is the common case of a surplus undisposed of; so likewise in the case the City of London v. *Garway*, 2 Vern. 571. no express trust was declared, and yet the devisees were in all events to be considered as mere trustees, and in the case of *Hobart* and the countess of *Suffolk*, 2 Vern. 644. the devise was, upon the trusts after mentioned.

The case of *Cunningham v. Meliish*, Prec. in Chan. 31. cited for the defendants, is a stronger case against the heir at law, than the present, for there the words *in trust* were used, *it being a devise of lands to his cousin A. and his heirs in trust to be sold for payment of his debts and legacies, and the surplus held to be no resulting trust for the heir.* In *Rogers v. Rogers* (2), June 1733, the words, *I leave my wife sole heiress and executrix*, amount to no more than devising the real and personal estate, then come the words, *To sell and pay his debts*, and if this had been sufficient, to make her a trustee, it would have been so upon that inaccurate expression, yet it was there held, she had the beneficial interest in the estate, and the court must in all those cases collect, if they can, the intent of the testator, from the particular circumstances of the case before them; in the case of *Malabar v.*

(1) See *Harding v. Glyn*, ante 469.
470. n. 2.

(2) 3 P. W. 193. S. C. *Ca. temp. Talb.* 286. S. C.

Mallabar, 5th of *May*, 1725, there was a clear intent, that the whole estate should be turned into money, and a trust expressly mentioned, and yet held by *Lord Talbot* to be no resulting trust (1).

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LONDON.

No general rule is to be laid down, unless where a real estate is devised to be sold for payment of debts, and no more is said, there it is clearly a resulting trust; but if a particular reason occurs, why the testator should intend a *beneficial interest* to the devisee, there are no precedents to warrant the court to say, it shall not be a *beneficial interest*.

Where a real estate is devised to be sold for payment of debts, and no more said, there clearly it is a resulting trust.

As to the presentation that happened by the death of the testator, the heir at law cannot present, for the advowson being devised, it follows the devise, and cannot descend. *Vide Holt* and the bishop of *Winchester* in *Lev.* and as the heir cannot take by law, so neither can he in equity, for the devise here takes effect instantly, so does the avoidance, and it is a devise of the beneficial interest, accompanied with an injunction to sell to particular societies, and no other trust; if so, every thing else that is beneficial takes effect immediately in the devisee.

The devisee in this case, and not the heir at law, intitled to present on the avoidance that happened by the death of the testator.

His Lordship therefore declared, that there is no resulting trust of the advowson of *Busbey* for the heirs at law, and ordered that the plaintiffs' bill, so far as it seeks to have the benefit of any resulting trust for the plaintiffs, the heirs at law of the testator *Richard Smith*, in respect of this advowson, and of the presentation in the avoidance that happened by the testator's death, do stand dismissed, and that the injunction to restrain the bishop of *London* from accepting *James Smith*, and granting institution to him of the rectory of *Busbey*, do also stand dissolved.

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But his Lordship declared, that the plaintiffs the heirs at law are intitled to the copyhold lands descended to them, disincumbered from a mortgage, which must be paid out of the personal estate, and if not sufficient, then out of the real estate, charged by the will of the testator with his debts.

(1) *Ca. temp. Tulb.* 78. S. C.

Hawkins v. Chappel and Others.

November the
7th, 1739.

WILLIAM *Hawkins* being patron and incumbent of *Simmonsbury*, by will dated the 5th of *February* 1734, devises all his lands in *S.* and the perpetual advowson of *S.* to Sir *William Chappel*, &c. upon trust in the first place to present his son *William* to this living, if he should be alive at the time of his decease, if not to such person as his wife should nominate, and

Cafe 282.

living, and that after the church shall next after his death be full of an incumbent, then to sell the perpetuity, and to apply the profit arising from the sale, first for the payment of his debts, and the overplus he distributes in thirds to his daughters; the trustees presented *W.* the son, who died before the advowson was sold, leaving a daughter an infant, who by her next friend brings her bill, insisting after debts and legacies paid, there is a resulting trust to the heir at law of the testator in the advowson.

His Lordship of opinion, the whole legal estate is devised away, and no resulting trust for the heir at law.

W. H. by will devises the perpetual advowson of *S.* to *W. C.* &c. upon trust to present his son *W.* to this
Martin
Martin
Leira
579
Schout
Robt.
P. B. 23

HAWKINS V.
CHAPPEL.

then he goes on and says, *That after the church shall next after my death be full of an incumbent, then to sell the perpetuity of it, and after such sale, to apply the profit arising from it, in the first place for the payment of his debts, and the overplus he distributes in thirds to his daughters, and to the daughter that was of age, he gives an immediate share, and the proportion of those under age he directs to be placed out in government securities; then comes this condition, that if any, or either of the daughters die before the age of 21, or marriage, their thirds to go to the son, provided he executed a deed for the confirmation of the will, and in case he should refuse, the third or thirds so lapsing, should go to the surviving daughter or daughters.*

The trustees presented *William* who died before the advowson was sold, leaving a daughter an infant, that by her next friend brings this bill, as heir at law to the testator, for an injunction to restrain the defendants the trustees from presenting any other clerk to the living of *Simmondsbury*, than a person nominated by the plaintiff, upon a suggestion, that after the testator's debts and legacies are paid, here is a trust resulting to the heir at law in this advowson, and that she has the right to nominate.

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Lord Chancellor : Of all the cases that have borne any argument for a resulting trust, this seems to me to be the strongest against the heir at law.

First question, Whether any resulting trust arises out of the devise of this advowson to the heir at law, or whether the ownership of it, or any spark of right, is descended to the heir at law?

Secondly, Whether the ownership is not in the daughters, by virtue of the devise under the will of the father?

At common law, where an estate is devised to trustees and their heirs, the whole is gone from the heir, but in equity there may be a beneficial interest remaining to the heir upon the trust.

It must be admitted, that at common law where an estate is devised to trustees and their heirs, the whole is gone from the heir; then the question will be, Whether in equity there is any beneficial interest remaining to the heir upon the trust of this advowson? and that must depend on the declaration of the trust by the will, whether the trust of the whole be declared, or whether any part be omitted; and in my opinion the trust of the whole is plainly declared, *if either of my daughters die before 22, or marriage, the share of her dying to be divided among the survivors*: an express trust also, to sell the perpetuity and divide the surplus among his daughters.

A certain rule in equity, that where an estate is charged with an incumbrance, or payment of creditors, and after such charge or payment, the surplus is given over, the whole property vests in the residuary legatee.

This is a devise of the inheritance clearly to the daughters, subject to the charge of the debts, for nothing is more certain in equity than that (where an estate is charged with an incumbrance, or with the payment of creditors, and after such incumbrance or creditors are discharged, the surplus is given over) the whole property or ownership of the estate vests in the devisee, or residuary legatee.

In the present case too, the heir at law is absolutely disinherited, according to the intent of the testator, which appears by his direction, that the heir shall confirm his will under the penalty of losing the small contingent benefit in the surplus, and the true question is, Who is the real owner of the advowson? Now, whoever has the trust, is in this court considered as having the

beneficial interest, and therefore the ownership of the estate, and that is the foundation of the case of *Roper* and *Ratcliff*; nor did Lord *Harcourt* differ with Lord *Macclesfield* in this general ground of equity, but in the consequences of that principle, and how it would operate upon the disabling statute against papists, the 11 & 12 *Will.* 3. c. 4. (a).

HAWKINS v.
CHAPPEL.

(a) Vide *Mod.*
Cal. in Law and

Eq. 2d part, 167 & 181, and the *New Abr.* of Law, 3 vol. 795.

In the arguments for the plaintiff it is said, that though the debts or legacies should exhaust the whole estate, yet an heir at law may come into a court of equity, and compel trustees to give him the option of taking the estate upon payment of the debts, &c. but the reason of that is, because the court does not take into consideration, whether the estate is exhausted, but the right of the heir to the equity of redemption of the estate; nor do they give an election arbitrarily, that a person shall redeem or submit to the sale of an estate, for the privilege is not founded upon the election, but upon the property in and ownership he has of the estate.

The right of the heir to the equity of redemption of an estate, tho' debts and legacies will exhaust the whole, is not founded upon his election to redeem, or to submit to a sale, but upon the ownership he has of the estate.

If a man seised of an advowson be likewise incumbent of the living, and devises the advowson upon his death, the devisee will be intitled to nominate.

If A. seised of an advowson be also incumbent, and devises it,

the devisee on his death is intitled to nominate.

But then it is objected, that Sir *William Chappel*, &c. are mere trustees, and that they can do nothing of themselves, and that somebody must nominate; why then should not the heir at law? for this plain reason, that if the ownership and property of the advowson is in the daughters, all the rest is a consequence of it; for wherever there is a right given, to say the heir is intitled, is to say, that he hath a right to the fruit fallen, without having any right to the tree, or the soil in which it grows.

If the ownership and property of the advowson be in devisees, that they, and not the heir at law, should nominate, is a consequence of such ownership.

It has been said likewise, that as it is money, and a mere personal interest, which is given to the daughters, that therefore there is a resulting trust for the heir at law; but whether a man has an advowson in him as a personalty, or a realty, it will make no difference, for the right of presentation will equally belong to him.

Nor will it make any difference, whether the devisee has the advowson in him as a personalty, or a realty.

Because the daughters have the money arising by the sale, it does not follow that they have nothing else given them; for if giving them so much money, gives them the beneficial interest in the advowson, every thing else, that is a consequence of such interest, will follow upon it; and therefore as the advowson is the daughter's property, the presentation is a beneficial interest, and will likewise belong to them.

It is objected too, that this interest of the daughters is a contingency, and to arise *in futuro*; but I am clear of opinion, it is a vested interest, for the produce of the money arising by the sale, is intended for a maintenance for the daughters who are under age, though not payable, till they arrived at twenty-one, and this is nothing but a regulation and direction for the managing

HAWKINS v.
CHAFFEL.

managing of the estate, till they come of age; and it has never been held in a court of equity, to alter the construction of a will.

Trustees postponing, or accelerating the sale of estates devised to them, will make no alteration in favour of the heir to the prejudice of *cestuique trusts*.

But it is said, the daughters take nothing till the sale, and here the avoidance is before the sale, and that the delay of the trustees, in the sale of the advowson, has made an alteration in the heir's favour.

It never was allowed in this court, that trustees postponing or accelerating a sale, should make any alteration in the interest of the *cestuique trust*, because such an admission would be putting it in the power of trustees, by fraud or collusion to destroy the whole intention of a testator.

It has been said, that if the heir at law should nominate, it would not injure the daughters, because the advowson may sell after the *plenary*, forasmuch as before, and so it may, but still it might be sold for less, and if the daughters dispose of the presentation, they may for prudential reasons insert an old life, and then it would certainly sell for more than if there was a young one; and therefore I shall not assume to myself a power of giving away the right of the daughters, upon a bare possibility that the heir at law's presenting will not turn to their disadvantage.

I am therefore of opinion, that the legal and equitable estate are devised away by the will, and the ownership in equity vested in the *cestuique trusts* of the surplus, and that the nomination to the present avoidance follows such equitable ownership of the advowson.

His Lordship therefore ordered the bill to stand dismissed, and the injunction upon the trustees to be dissolved.

March the 12th,
1738.

Hopkins alias Dare v. Hopkins.

Vide title Remainder.

(C) *Of Trusts to attend the Inheritance.*

Vide title Creditor and Debtor.

(D) *Trustees how to account, and what Allowances to have.*

Easter Term, 1737.

Jackson v. Jackson.

Vide title Maintenance for Children.

Vide title Fines and Recoveries.

Vide title Evidence, Witnesses, and Proof.

C A P. CXXI.

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Voluntary Deed.

(A) *The Effect thereof.*

After Hilary Term, 1736.

Oxley v. Lee (1).

ORD Chancellor said in this cause, he did not remember that this court ever decreed a voluntary conveyance to be delivered up to a purchaser, upon a valuable consideration, unless it appears there are some circumstances of fraud, attendant on such conveyance (2): a case was mentioned to be determined by the late Master of the Rolls, where a voluntary conveyance was decreed to be delivered up, though no circumstance of fraud appeared.

Case 283.

The court will not decree a voluntary conveyance to be delivered up to purchaser, on valuable consideration, unless obtained by fraud.

(1) *Lee* the elder leased the premises in question to one *Stevens*, who in consideration of the natural affection he bore to his daughter the wife of *Lee* the younger, for life in consideration of 5 s. paid by *Lee* the younger, assigned over the lease to a trustee in trust for *Lee* the younger for life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder to the issue of the younger. The premises were also subject to a mortgage. *Oxley* contracted for

and absolutely purchased these premises for a valuable consideration and without notice of the settlement or mortgage. Decreed, that the trustee should convey the legal estate to the purchaser, that the settlement should be delivered up, and that *Lee* the younger should pay off the mortgage money. *Reg. Lib.* 1736. fol. 188.

(2) See *Doe v. Routledge*, *Cowp.* 705. *Walker v. Burrows*, *ante*, 94.

December the
5th, 1739.

Cafe 284.

A voluntary
deed kept by a
person, and ne-
ver cancelled,
will not be set aside by a subsequent will (2).

Boughton v. Boughton (1).

LORD Chancellor: The first question in this cause is, Whether a will can have any effect to revoke a voluntary deed which was previous to it in time, and which is formal as to the execution, but very informal as to the several parts of it.

Excham v. Holt
6 Linn. 37.

Ellow v. Popham
Mur. Cr. 644.

Butcher v. Fletcher
4 Mass. 47.

ind v. Randall
2 Brav. 261.

Byron v. Willeman
2. S. 100. 544.

The case which has been cited before Lord *Macclesfield*, of *Naldred and Gilham*, 1 *Wms.* 577. is not applicable to every case, but was dependant upon particular circumstances: "There an old woman had executed a voluntary deed, which she kept by her, her nephew surreptitiously got a copy of this deed, the old woman afterwards destroyed the original: it was heard first at the Rolls, when the late Master decreed, that as the original was lost, the copy should supply the place of it, and be effectual for the purpose intended by it; an appeal to Lord *Macclesfield*, and he reversed the decree, for he said he would not establish a copy surreptitiously obtained, but left the party to his remedy at law, and that the keeping the deed by her, implied an intention of revoking."

(1) A considerable real estate was settled on *E. Boughton* for life, remainder to his issue male, remainder to himself in fee, charged with a rent charge to his wife for life, and with terms for raising portions for younger children. *E. Boughton* having issue five daughters and no sons, and being possessed of a considerable personal estate, made an instrument dated 15th of February 1733, in these words, "Whereas I have heretofore by several letters promised a certain gentleman 3000*l.* down with my daughter *Anna*, and my estate at my death if he should change his name to *Boughton*; but he has affronted me; and lest I should die, and they should be taken advantage of, I do charge all my estate with 4000*l.* a-piece to all my children, and 100*l.* to my sister *Coke*, and 500*l.* a-piece to her two sons; and I do hereby bind myself, my heirs and assigns in 25,000*l.* to all of my daughters to be paid to them at my death, if all my real and personal estate, (but what is charged to my sister and her sons) shall not be divided equally among them. Witness my hand and seal. *E. Boughton.*" Afterwards *E. Boughton* made a will to a very different effect, and died leaving

his said daughters and no sons. The plaintiffs the daughters now brought their bill, when his Lordship declared, that the deed of the 15th of February 1733, is well proved and ought to be established, and that the same is not revoked by the subsequent will: and decreed, that the residue of the personal estate (after payment of debts, &c.) should be applied in payment of the said 100*l.* to *Coke*, and 500*l.* a-piece to her two sons, and then be divided between the plaintiffs; and that the real estate (subject to the rent-charge to the wife) should also be divided among them. *Reg. Lib. A. 1739. fol. 41.* But see *Birch v. Blagrove*, *Amb.* 264.

(2) *Villers v. Beaumont*, 1 *Vern.* 100. So a subsequent voluntary conveyance shall not set aside a voluntary settlement. *Allen v. Arme*, 1 *Vern.* 365. *Clavering v. Clavering*, 2 *Vern.* 473. *Young v. Cottle*, 1 *P. W.* 102. But equity will not carry an agreement into execution without a valuable or meritorious consideration. *Colman v. Sorrel*, 3 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 12. See *Williamson v. Cadington*, 1 *Ves.* 512. So a fraudulent deed is no revocation of a prior will. *Hawes v. Wyatt*, 3 *Bro. Cha. Rep.* 156.

But in the present case, here is a voluntary deed, without a power of revocation, not at all unfair, but only kept by him, and never cancelled.

The will is no more than voluntary, and as there is no case where a voluntary settlement has been set aside by a subsequent will, this no longer remains a question.

The next question is, upon the construction of the deed of settlement. [626]

I take it that the grantor of this deed imagined that 4000 *l.* a-piece to his five daughters, would exhaust his whole estate, but to provide against the event of the residue's being of a greater value, he binds himself in 25,000 *l.* to secure the surplus to his daughters, over and above the 20,000 *l.* This is a deed solemnly executed, signed and sealed, and must therefore be looked upon in nature of a bond to the daughters, and will certainly take place against all voluntary claimants (1); but creditors for a valuable consideration, would be preferred to it.

BOUGHTON v. BOUGHTON.
A father by settlement grants to his five daughters 4000 *l.* a-piece, but to provide against the event of the residue's being of greater value, binds himself in 25,000 *l.* to secure the surplus over and above the 20,000 *l.*

This must be considered in the nature of a bond to the daughters, and will take place against all voluntary claimants; otherwise as to creditors for a valuable consideration.

(1) See *Ward v. Lant. Pre. Cha.* 182.

C A P. CXXII.

Usury.

Vide title Catching Bargain.

Ex parte Thompson.

Vide title Bankrupt, under the Division, Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills of Exchange. June the 4th, 1746.

C A P. CXXIII.

Will.

1) *The Power of this Court over the Prerogative Office.*

2) *The Validity of a Probate, where examinable.*

(A) *The Power of this Court over the Prerogative Office.*

November the
23d, 1738.

Frederick v. Aynscombe.

Case 285.

S. C. cited
Amb. 345.

S. C. ante 392.
note S. P.

Where a person
is sole devisee of
the real estate,
and one of the
witnesses to the
will resides al-
together abroad,
upon a commis-
sion granted to
examine such
witness, the
court will at the
same time make
an order, that
the original will
be delivered out
by the proper

officer of the prerogative court, to a person, to be named by the party praying the commission, in order to be carried out of the kingdom; he first giving security to be approved of by the judge of the prerogative court, to return the same (1).

PHILLIP *Aynscombe* devised all his real estate to the defendant in fee, by a will executed at *Bullogne*; the defendant after the testator's death proved the will in common form, and the original will was deposited in the prerogative court of *Canterbury*: *John Hill* one of the witnesses resides altogether at *Bullogne*, and the defendant cannot get him to come from thence, and therefore necessary he should have a commission to be executed there, to examine the said witness, to prove the will, having brought a bill here to perpetuate the testimony thereto; at the execution of which commission it will be likewise necessary to have the said will; and application having been made for the prerogative office to deliver out the original will to be proved at *Bullogne*, the Register of that court refused to deliver it upon any security whatever, for the return of it, but insisted to send a messenger of their own, which will put the defendant to a considerable expence.

It was therefore moved by *Mr. Murray*, that a commission might go to examine witnesses at *Bullogne* in *France*, and that the Register of the prerogative court, or the record keeper, may forthwith deliver out to the defendant the original will of *Phillip Aynscombe*, upon the defendant's giving a reasonable security to return the same, after executing the commission upon the suggestion, that *Hill* resided wholly there, and is in such circumstances as will not allow him to come to *England*.

Lord Chancellor directed that the defendant be at liberty to take out a commission to examine his witness in *Bullogne*, in order to prove the will, and it appearing that the defendant is the only devisee who can claim any real estate under the will, ordered the original will to be delivered out by the proper officer of the prerogative court to a fit person to be named by the defendant, in order to be produced at the execution of the said commission; such person first giving security to be approved of by the judge of the prerogative court, to return the same in three months from the delivery of the same to him (2).

His Lordship also directed (as there have been precedents of wills being delivered out of the prerogative court upon trials at assizes where they were necessary to be read at such trials, to save the expence of the Register of the prerogative office attending) that these precedents be searched, and this order to be

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(1) See *Williams v. Fleyer*, Amb. 343.
Lake v. Cayjich, 3 Bro. Cha. Rep. 263.

(2) *Reg. Lib. A.* 1738. fol. 52.

awn conformable to them, and if there should be any dispute to the security for the safe custody and return of the will, that shall be referred to a Master in Chancery to settle and adjust the same.

FREDERICK V.
AYNSCOBBE.

If the defendant had not been the sole devisee of the real estate, but there had been other persons under the will interested in it, and they had refused their consent, he should not have made this order, because the taking a will out of the kingdom is different from any former cases in this court; they have gone no further than ordering them to different parts of England.

Lord Macclesfield, in a motion of this kind, made an order upon the prerogative court to deliver a will to the register in *Symond's Inn*, to lie there till the court of Chancery could have done with it, and said at the same time, with some warmth, that he thought his officers of equal credit, and as fit to be intrusted with the custody of the will as theirs, or any other office whatever.

The court of Chancery, where necessary, will make an order upon the prerogative office, to deliver a will to the Register's office, in *Symond's Inn*, and to lie there till the court of Chancery has no farther occasion for it.

and to lie there till the court of Chancery has no farther occasion for it.

N. B. I was informed, by a gentleman of the bar, that there was another motion of this kind, in the time of Lord Chancellor Talbot, in the cause of *Morse v. Roach* (1), who ordered the prerogative court to deliver a will, to be proved in Gloucestershire, under a commission from the court of chancery; and though it was strongly insisted upon, on the behalf of the prerogative office, that one of their officers should attend the execution of the commission, yet he absolutely denied

The court of Chancery, upon motion, ordered the prerogative office to deliver a will to be proved in Gloucestershire, under a commission from the court of Chancery, and would not suffer an officer of the prerogative office to attend the execution of the commission.

officer of the prerogative office to attend the execution of the commission.

(1) 2 Sra. 961. S. C.

(B) *The Validity of a Probate, where examinable.*

Sheffield v. The Dutchess of Buckinghamshire.

October the
9th, 1739.

THE bill was brought by Mr. *Sheffield* against the defendant the Dutchess of *Buckinghamshire*, for a perpetual injunction to all further proceedings in the suit in the prerogative court, for controverting or calling in question the will and codicils of *John* late Duke of *Buckinghamshire*, after determinations already had, and opinions given by the court.

Case 286.

A bill for a perpetual injunction to stay proceedings in the prerogative court for controverting the will and codicils of *John*, of *Buckinghamshire*, after the determinations already had; the injunction before granted made perpetual.

of *Buckinghamshire*, after the determinations already had; the injunction before granted made perpetual.

Lord Chancellor: After hearing the case elaborately argued, I am of the same opinion as when I granted the injunction, and the case not being altered, the same reasons continue for making it perpetual.

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T t a

Three

SHEFFIELD v.
Dutcheſs of
BUCKINGHAM-
SHIRE.

Three questions ariſe in this caſe.

First, If this queſtion has been already determined, or which is the ſame thing, whether the Dutcheſs of *Buckinghamſhire* is concluded as to this point?

Secondly, If this queſtion has been determined on proceedings in a proper court?

Thirdly, What will be the conſequences of granting or not granting it?

The firſt depends on ſeveral facts and proceedings in this court, and admissions in her Grace's answers. Two bills have been brought by the late Duke of *Buckinghamſhire*, *Edmund*, and Mr. *Sheffield*; both of them ſuggeſt the will and codicil to be duly executed, and both to be duly proved. The Dutcheſs was defendant to both the bills, and ſays in her answer ſhe believes them both of the Duke's own hand writing, and inſiſts on and claims legacies under them.

The will and codicil have been both proved in this court by witneſſes examined on the part of the Dutcheſs, the cauſe heard, and the court have declared the will and codicil to be well proved, and decreed the truſts of them to be performed, and thoſe truſts relate as well to perſonal as real eſtate.

The perſonal eſtate has been laid out under the decree of this court, and two great purchaſes alſo made under the direction of the court, and with the acquieſcence of all proper parties, and a conveyance executed to truſtees, and likewiſe an order pronounced for approving of the purchaſe, and a quiet enjoyment by the Dutcheſs of what was given her by the will, to this very time.

After Duke *Edmund's* death, there was an appeal to the houſe of Lords by the Dutcheſs, not only in her own right, but expreſſly named as executrix of her ſon, inſiſting that the court had miſtaken the conſtruction, but not in the leaſt complaining of the invalidity, or undue execution of the will or codicil. The decree of the court below was affirmed by the Lords in 1737.

I am of opinion therefore that by this ſeries of facts and proceedings the Dutcheſs is concluded, unleſs new material evidence appears.

It is objected that this court has preſumed the will and codicil to be well proved on the probate only, which has never yet been conteſted in the proper court.

But it is not ſo, for here the probate has been ſtrengthened by the admission of the parties concerned; and as to the matters of fact, an *admission* by a party concerned (1), and who is moſt likely to know, is ſtronger than if it had been determined by a jury, and facts are as properly concluded by admission as by a trial; as in writs of error, the party may admit error in fact, though he cannot admit error in law; and if this court was not to conclude on ſuch admissions, there would be no end of cauſes here, where there is no jury at the bar.

Admission by a party concerned in matters of fact is ſtronger than if it had been determined by a jury, and facts are as properly concluded by admission, as by trial.

It is objected the admission carries it no further than the probate would go of itself.

If the probate merely is produced, and nothing said about it, this court must presume it good, and proceed on it; but if parties are dissatisfied with the probate, this court will give time to dispute the validity of it, and suspend their determination, till it has had a trial in a proper court; as in the case of *Pain v. Stratton*, the court voluntarily gave time to try the validity, upon some apprehension of a difference between the probate and original will.

But here the case is very different; the party in this case, so far from being dissatisfied, that at the time of admitting the probate, the original was produced, and these rasures appeared on the face of it; and then, when if at any time this objection to the bill should have been made, they allowed the will well proved.

Second question. If it has been determined in a proper court? It is insisted that the validity of the probate is only proper to be determined in the ecclesiastical court, and that nothing done in a temporal court can conclude.

It is true, in an adversary way, this court, or a court of law, cannot determine the validity of a probate of a will or co-lilic (1); but if it comes here on an incident in a cause, and that incident is admitted by the parties, this court, or a court of law, may determine it, and hold the parties bound by their admission; and if either of the parties would afterwards bring a new suit to contest that determination, this court would certainly grant a perpetual injunction.

SHEFFIELD v. Dutcheff of BUCKINGHAM-SHIRE.

Where parties are dissatisfied with a probate, this court will suspend their determination, till a trial has been had of the validity in a proper court.

This court cannot determine the validity of a probate adversely; but if it comes here incidentally, and that incident admitted, they may determine it, and hold the parties bound by their admission.

As to the distinction which has been offered between parties admitting things proper to be determined by the court, in which the admission is made, and admission of things cognisable in another court, I can see no difference if facts are admitted, and the parties establish their own admissions. Disputes about probates may be determined by a decree in a proper court, or under the direction of this court, like the case where this court does not direct an issue, but gives liberty to bring a new action.

But what properly and effectually gives this court a jurisdiction here in the present case is, the *trust* declared in the will, the trusts this court have determined on, and every thing that comes in by incident binds the parties.

This question does not touch or impeach the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court, as in the case of a prohibition, where if the court proceeds, the judge is guilty of a contempt; but the injunction stays the party from proceeding, and at the same time this court supposes the ecclesiastical court to have jurisdiction, but does not think proper, from some collateral cir-

No difference between parties admitting things proper to be determined by the court, in which the admission is made, and admission of things cognisable in another court, but are equally bound.

(1) See *Bennet v. Wade* post 2 vol. 324.

SHEFFIELD v. DUTCHESS OF BUCKINGHAM-SHIRE. circumstances, to suffer the party to apply, and take the benefit of that jurisdiction.

Thirdly, as to the consequences of granting the injunction or not.

It is objected, that this case is not a proper one for a perpetual injunction; that here is no vexation or multiplicity of trials, but that is not the only ground the court proceeds on in granting injunctions, tho' in mere legal titles it is so: It was not the ground in the case of *Acherly v. Vernon*, or of *Calvert v. Calby*, where in each there was only one trial.

New matter is the only solid ground of contesting this will, and if there had appeared any new material facts and evidence since the last hearing, I should not have granted the perpetual injunction; but the *rafures*, &c. objected to now, did appear on the face of the will, nor is there any proof that the Dutchess had no knowledge of them till after the hearing, nor is it disputed but that the *rafures* and interlineations are of the Duke's own hand writing.

An infant, unless here is new matter, or fraud or collusion, is bound by a decree made for his benefit; and with respect to personal estate, except for the causes before mentioned, the parol never demurs.

Where there is a decree for the benefit of an infant, and he dies, his executor, tho' it may be for his own advantage to do so, shall never dispute that decree.

As to a new right accrued to her Grace as executrix of her son, that makes no alteration with regard to the consequences of the present question; he was bound by the decree; unless there is new matter, or fraud and collusion, an infant is bound by a decree made for his benefit (1), which this decree plainly was; and as to personal estate, unless for the causes before mentioned, the parol never demurs, and her Grace cannot be in a better condition than her son, for if a decree is for the benefit of an infant, and he dies, his executor shall never dispute that decree, tho' it may be for the advantage of the executor so to do.

But here have been acts done by her Grace in this capacity since the death of her son, which bind her. An appeal to the house of Lords as executrix of her son, and insisting on and claiming under the will and codicil.

As to the authorities, *Acherly v. Vernon* is full for the plaintiff, unless new matter had been shewn; and *Calvert v. Calby* was a case not so strong as the present.

The case of *Montague v. Maxwell*, in the house of Lords 1715, cited for the defendant, does not come up to the present; there was nothing in that case but the probate simply, no admission, no proof in this court, nor any acts or judicial proceedings here. In the case of *Crompton v. Crompton*, there were only extrajudicial declarations.

If I was not to grant this injunction, many inconveniences must necessarily arise to the parties; the will made was in 1716, and proved, with the privy of the Dutchess, in 1721; the decree was in the same year, vast sums laid out, and an acquiescence of all parties; the decree affirmed in the house of Lords in 1737; then a new suit in the ecclesiastical court, to dispute the will on the same facts on which the precedent determinations were had, two witnesses are dead, who possibly, if living, might establish the will; if this was suffered, property would never be safe.

(1) See *Gregory v. Molefworth*, post. 3 vol. 626.

As to the trustees, actions at law, if the will was overturned, might be brought against them for acting under the decree of this court, nor would it be in the power of this court to help them.

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His Lordſhip therefore decreed, that a perpetual injunction be awarded to ſtay the defendant, the Dutcheſs of *Buckinghamſhire*, from proceeding in the prerogative court of *Canterbury*, or in any other eccleſiaſtical court, in the ſuit already brought by her Grace, or in any other ſuit, to call in queſtion or revoke the ſaid probate of the will and codicils of *John* late Duke of *Buckinghamſhire* her late huſband, or to have the ſame declared null and void, or that it may be pronounced that the ſaid Duke died inteſtate; and as to the coſts of this ſuit, his Lordſhip gave none.

Vide title *Legacies, under the Diviſion, Ademption of it.*

Vide title *Evidence, Witneſſes, and Proof, under the Diviſion, Where parol or collateral Evidence will, or will not, be admitted to explain, confirm, or contradict what appears on the Face of a Deed or Will.*

Vide title *Power, under the Diviſion, Of the right Execution of a Power, and where a Defect therein will be ſupplied.*

C A P. CXXIV.

Willneſs.

Vide title *Evidence, Witneſſes, and Proof.*

C A P. CXXV.

Words of Limitation.

Vide title *Deviſes.*

C A P. CXXVI.

Words.

Vide title *Expoſition of Words.*

C A P. CXXVII.

Writ.

(A) *Of the De Homine Replegiando, and its Effects.*

March, the 22d, 1736-7.

Treblecock's case.

Case 287.

Foot v. Collins
1 M. d. Craig. 250

The writ *de homine replegiando* is an original writ, and the party may sue it of right.

A Motion to discharge an order for superseding a writ *de homine replegiando*

Lord Chancellor, The writ *de homine replegiando* is an original writ, and the party may sue it of right, and granted here on a motion or petition, without shewing cause.

It is properly returnable in the courts of law, and may be there declared upon; and, as it is remedial, the defendant, against whom it is sued, is obliged to assign some cause why he does not comply with the writ.

Therefore after it is sued, I do not know that I can supersede it, and if the party who sues out the writ is not intitled to it, it must be pleaded to below; in this case it is the writ of the infant, and there is no suit about the infant here, and therefore the order made to supersede the writ must be discharged.

It might be otherwise, if the infant was in court, by being a party to the suit here.

If this writ is brought by an infant against his testamentary guardian, or by a villain against his lord, I think they may plead the special matter to the writ, and defend themselves at law.

His Lordship granted the motion.

Vide title *Ne exeat Regno*.

A T A B L E

OF

The Principal Matters.

Abatement and Rehearsal.

WHETHER bankruptcy is an abatement, see note 1. Page 263
See Bill, under Supplemental Bill 291

Account.

What shall be a good Bar to a Demand of a general one.

Where a bill for a general account, and defendant insists on a stated account, it is *prima facie* a bar to a general one till particular errors are assigned to the stated account 1

It will not support a stated account to allege there has been a dividend made between the parties, for a dividend may be made subject to an account to be afterwards taken *ibid.*

Ademption. See Legacies.

Administration. See tit. Executors and Administrators.

Admission. See Bill, under Bills of Discovery, &c. 288

Adoption. See Trust and Trustees, under: Resulting Trusts, and Trusts by Implication.

Agreements, Articles, and Covenants.

Agreements and Covenants which ought to be performed in specie.

See tit. Conveyances, Fraudulent.

See tit. Purchase.

A court of equity is very desirous of laying hold of any just ground to carry agreements into execution, made to establish the peace of a family and where it appears that such agreements are entered into with a view of saving the honour of a family, and are reasonable ones, the court will, if possible, decree a performance

From page 2 to 6

An infant may have a decree upon any matter arising on the state of his case, though not particularly prayed by his bill 6

Where there is an agreement to suffer a recovery, and uses are declared, though it is suffered at a different time from the recovery, covenanted to be suffered; yet if no subsequent declaration of uses, it will enure to the uses so declared 7

Where there is a deed to lead the uses of a recovery. it is not in the power of tenant in tail male to declare new uses; but such subsequent declaration must be by all the parties concerned in interest *ibid.*

Two

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The expression in the countess of Rutland's case, 5 Co. that, *notwith it is directory only*, new uses may be declared, means that as the uses must arise out of the agreement of the parties, they by mutual consent may change the uses Page 7

Where a court of law or equity find that the general and substantial intent of the parties was, that the estate should pass, they will construe deeds in support of that intention different from the formal nature of those deeds themselves 8

Where there is a recovery for strengthening the title of a purchaser, with a declaration of the uses to him and his heirs, notwithstanding a precedent one to different uses, it will not enure to make good such former declaration, but the uses of the purchase only *ibid.*

If tenant in tail makes a lease not warranted by the statute, and suffers a recovery, it lets in the lease and makes it good; the same as to a judgment, statute, or bond *ibid.*

The issue of tenant in tail by virtue of the statute *de donis* may avoid a prior lease, charge or estate made by him, but not he himself; but when by the recovery he has gained a fee, the issue being barred, all the reasoning for their avoiding estates, &c. made by him ceases 9

Where a tenant in tail suffers a recovery, he by construction of law is in of the old use, and the estate is discharged of the statute *de donis* *ibid.*

Where there is a valuable consideration for an agreement on all sides, there is sufficient ground to come into a court of equity, but a mere volunteer not intitled to come here for an execution of an agreement 10

An agreement upon a supposition of a right, though it may afterwards come out on the other side, is binding, and shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties *ibid.*

As to agreements made under parental influence 10

By a settlement before marriage securities for money belonging to the wife were assigned to a trustee, to be laid out in the purchase of freehold lands, to be settled among other uses to the

first son in tail male, with like remainders to the second and other sons, remainder to the heirs female; the father and mother both dead, leaving two sons more besides the plaintiff and four daughters; the eldest son now prays by his bill that the sureties may be assigned to him, being tenant in tail, and not laid out in land, on the brothers and sisters appearing in court, and *consenting*, the trustee was directed to transfer the securities to the plaintiff Page 11 note 1

Though the vendor of an estate does not produce his deeds, or tender a conveyance within the time limited by the articles, the court does not regard this neglect, but will decree a sale *ibid.*

And see the cases in notes

Parol Agreements, or such as are within the statute of Frauds and Perjuries.

A. agrees for the purchase of an estate, but the agreement not reduced into writing, though A. in confidence thereof give orders for conveyances to be drawn, and went several times to view the estate, this court will not carry such agreement into execution, and the statute of frauds may be pleaded to a bill brought for that purpose 12

A letter is not sufficient evidence of the agreement unless the terms of the agreement are mentioned therein; but where a man takes possession, or does any act of the like nature in pursuance of an agreement, this court will decree an execution of it *ibid.*
See notes 1, 2, 3.

A performance of an agreement only of one side is not a dispensation of the statute of frauds and perjuries 499

Voluntary Agreements, in what Cases to be performed.

A settlement after marriage, in consideration of a portion paid by the wife's father, good against creditors 13

A settlement being voluntary is not for that reason fraudulent, but an evidence of fraud only, though hardly a case where the person conveying was

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was indebted at the time that it has not been deemed fraudulent *Page 15*

A voluntary settlement is not fraudulent where the person making is not indebted at the time, nor will subsequent debts shake such settlement *ibid.*

Where the father tenant for life, and son tenant in fee, join in a settlement, it is good against creditors, for the son might have disposed of the residuary interest without the father's joining *16*

Where a father takes back an annuity to the value of the estate comprized in the settlement, it is tantamount to a continuance in possession, and creditors will be relieved against such settlement *ibid.*

Concerning the Manner of performing Agreements.

Where children under a marriage settlement have obtained a contingent advantage, the court will not vary it to the prejudice of the issue after the marriage" *17*

The court will not change a mere trustee for a wife under a marriage settlement, without sending it first to a master to see if the person proposed is a proper person *18*

Administrators See Executors.

Alien.

The persons of foreigners subject to the authority of this court only while in *England*, but though their persons are out of the reach of process, the property they have here is under its controul *19*

The court directed a commission to the *East Indies* to take the answer of the defendant, who was of the *Gentoo* religion, and empowered two or three of the commissioners, to administer such oath in the most solemn manner as in their discretions shall seem meet, and if they administered any other oath than the christian, to certify to the court what was done by them, that if there should be any doubt, as to

the validity, the opinion of the judges might be taken *ibid.*

The court will not stay proceedings in an original cause until the answer comes in to the cross bill, but will only stay publication. *Page 21*

The depositions of witnesses of the *Gentoo* religion, sworn according to their ceremonies, ought upon the special circumstances of the case to be read as evidence in the cause *ibid.*

Heathens admitted as witnesses by the civil law, by the law of nations, and by the common consent of mankind *21*

A *Jew* a competent witness to prove a murder *42*

By the policy of all countries oaths ought to be administered to persons according to their own opinion, and laying the hand on the book, &c. originally borrowed from the pagans *ibid.*

That Turks and Infidels are *perpetui inimici*, and therefore not to be admitted witnesses here, is a common error founded on a groundless opinion of justice *Brooke ibid.*

The necessity of trade has mollified the too rigorous rules of the old law in their restraint of aliens *43*

The law of *England* not confined to particular cases, but governed more by reason than any one case whatever *ibid.*

If these witnesses were here they would be liable to a prosecution for perjury, and might be indicted upon a special indictment *ibid.*

Talis sacris evangelis not necessary words in an indictment of perjury, for several old precedents are that the party was *Juratus generally ibid.*

Some infidels may under some circumstances be admitted as witnesses *ibid.*

The *Jews* before their expulsion from *England*, and since their return to it, have been constantly admitted as witnesses *44*

Oaths are not of the christian institution, but as old as the creation *45*

If infidels do not believe a God, or rewards and punishments hereafter, they ought not to be admitted *ibid.*

The rule of evidence is that such ought to be admitted as the necessity of the case will allow of, but though admitted, must be left to the persons who

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who try the cause to give what credit to it they please Page 45
 As the witnesses here do not believe the christian oath, they must out of necessity be allowed to swear according to their own notion of an oath 46
 Rules of evidence are to be considered as artificial rules, framed by men, for convenience in courts of justice, and founded upon good reason *ibid.*
 Hearsay cannot be admitted, nor husband and wife as witnesses against each other, and yet from necessity have been allowed 46
 The rule as to admitting evidence in foreign and commercial matters differs from other instances in courts of justice 47
 Lord Chief Justice *Lee* of opinion, that if the validity of a foreign contract made in the presence of a public notary was in question here, his testimony would be allowed to authenticate the contract *ibid.*
 Cases determined at law upon evidence taken from histories of countries 48
 The efficacy of an oath is an appeal to the Supreme Being as thinking him the rewarder of truth, and avenger of falsehood, and Lord *Coke* the only writer who has grafted the word christian into an oath *ibid.*
 The outward act not essential to the oath, for this was always matter of liberty *ibid.*
 An absolute necessity the first ground for departing from strict rules of evidence, a presumed necessity the second 49
 Courts of law here will give credit to the sentence of a foreign court of admiralty, and take it to be right without examining their proceedings *ibid.*
 If a heathen not an alien enemy brings an action, and defendant a bill for an injunction, he shall be admitted to answer according to his own form of an oath 50
 Framers of indictments multiply words to no purpose, therefore the old precedents are the best, and by them it appears *supra sanctum dei evangelium* are not necessary words in indictments for perjury *ibid.*
 The case of the *East-India Company* and Admiral *Matthews* in the Court of Exchequer mis-stated, for there is no such thing as sending one judge

out of a court to the judges of another upon a point of evidence Page 50
 A bill brought for an account against the representatives of an *East-India* Governor, who pleaded that the plaintiff was an alien born, and an alien infidel, and could have no suit here: plea over-ruled, for, being a mere personal demand, the plaintiff may bring a bill in this court 51

Amendment.

In what Case allowed or not.

After publication is past, a plaintiff can not amend without withdrawing his replication 51

Answers, Pleas, and Demurrers.

Vide tit. **Bill for Discovery** 285, 289.

What shall be a good Plea and well pleaded.

Lands devised to be sold for payment of debts: Bill brought by a creditor of testator against his widow to discover her title to lands in her possession: She pleads a settlement and jointure, and offers to discover if plaintiff will confirm it, but neither sets out the date nor lands contained in the settlement: The plea over-ruled, for she ought to have set forth both these matters 52

An insurer by his bill suggests the ship was lost fraudulently, and in the charging part mentions, that instead of proper goods there was only wool on board, and in the interrogatory part prays defendant may set out what kind of goods be had on board; defendant pleads several statutes that make it penal to export wool, in bar to a discovery of all kinds of goods on board; The plea allowed, because no goods, but wool mentioned in the charging part; if there had, defendant must have given some answer to it *ibid.*

A plea may be bad in part, and yet not for the whole 53

Where a defendant pleads a decree of dismissal of a former cause for the same 54

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same matter, in bar of the new bill, if the plaintiff does not apply that it may be referred to a master to state whether there is such a decree, but sets down the cause for hearing, he has waived his right of application for such reference, and the court will determine it Page 53

The defence proper for a plea must be such as reduces the cause to a particular point, and from thence creates a bar to the suit, and every good defence in equity is not likewise good as a plea 54

Appointment, See Power.

Apprentice, See Master and Servant.

Arrest, Vide tit. Durels.

Where good though on a Sunday.

2. If a bankrupt is liable to be arrested while under summons of commissioners 54

An arrest on a Sunday by Lord Chancellor's tipstaff under a warrant of the court, for a contempt in disobeying an order, though insisted upon to be illegal, as being contrary to the statute of 29 Car. 2. cap. 7. sec. 6. intitled, *An act for the better observance of the Lord's Day*, determined by Lord Chancellor, upon consideration, to be a lawful arrest 54

A man may surrender himself voluntarily to a warrant upon a Sunday 57

The order of commitment for a contempt differs from a process to sheriffs, for it is that *the Party should stand committed*, and if petitioner had been present when the order was pronounced, he was instantly a prisoner ibid.

The warrant here directed to the gaoler to take him, and to carry him to prison, but in other courts are directed to sheriffs, and other ministerial officers, ibid.

This is drawn up like escape warrants, which may be executed on a Sunday ibid.

Lord Chief Justice Holt of opinion, a man might be taken up on a Sunday, upon a process of contempt, because in the nature of a breach of the peace, and

an exception out of the act of parliament Page 58

The court of Common Pleas held that a man might be taken on a Sunday upon an attachment for non-performance of an award; a contempt for non-performance of an order of this court, equally a breach of the peace 58

Assets, See Heir and Ancestor, Executors and Administrators.

A. gives several legacies, and makes B. his executor and residuary legatee; B. receives all the assets, and buys lands with the money, and also the equity of redemption of another estate, on which A. had a mortgage, and dies: Bill brought by legatees to be paid their legacies out of B.'s real and personal estate. The court directed that the assets laid out in the purchases should be restored to testator's personal estate. The equity of redemption held to be assets 59

Where money arising from the sale of lands, &c. shall or shall not be legal assets 420 note 1

Bward and Arbitrament.

A. by articles previous to his marriage agrees to vest 1000 l. in trustees, the interest thereof to be received by A. and his wife, during their lives, and afterwards to be divided between their issue, and gives the trustees a warrant of attorney to confess a judgment for that sum which was entered up; A. enters into partnership with B. afterwards, and being indebted to the partnership estate in more than his interest in that estate, they submit the difference between them to arbitration, and part of the stock in trade is awarded to be lodged in the hands of a third person, any part to be delivered to either of the parties, on making it appear any bond or other debt due from the partnership had been paid by either, the quantity to be delivered in proportion to the money paid: the trustees in the marriage articles bring a *scire facias* on the judgment confessed to them, and take a moiety

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a moiety of the deposited stock in execution as the property of *A*. 60

Bill by the partnership creditors to set aside the execution, and to have the moiety of the stock so seized appropriated to payment of their debts, insisting it was specifically bound by the award and the execution of it, *the plaintiffs* being no parties to the submission, nor privy at all to the transaction, nor under an obligation of abiding by the award, ought not to have the benefit of it, and therefore bill dismissed. *Page 61*

A bill will not lie to carry an award into execution where the parties to the submission do not acquiesce in it, nor agree afterwards to have it executed, but must be enforced at law. 62

A. and his wife covenant in articles before marriage, in consideration of 2000*l.* his wife's portion, to release all the right that might accrue to them out of her father's personal estate by the custom of *London*. 63

The husband is bound by his covenant, and though the wife was under age, yet it is a matter that accrues to him in the right of his wife, and he may release it, and his release will bind her. 64

An old law in the city, called *Jud's* law, whereby a husband is authorized to agree with the father for the wife, though she is under age. *ibid.*

The husband's covenanting to release is an extinguishment of the wife's right to the orphanage part, and if so, leaves the estate of the father as if it had never been charged, and therefore must be considered as a part of his general personal estate, and not go wholly to the father's executor as a part of the dead man's share. *ibid.*

Where arbitrators are deceived, or where they make their award clandestinely, without hearing each party, a court of justice will interpose and avoid such award. *ibid.*

Though a bill in Chancery cannot be received in evidence at law, yet in this court it may be read, and has been often allowed as evidence. 65

An arbitration bond is a debt at law. 241

Bankrupt.

Concerning the Commission and Commissioners.

A Commission of bankruptcy is an action and execution in the first place. *Page 67*

Separate creditors may come under a joint commission and prove their debts. *ibid.*

If a bankrupt has his certificate under a joint commission it discharges him from all debts separate as well as joint. *ibid.*

Commissioners have no power to admit separate creditors to prove debts without the sanction of the court. 68

Commissioners upon the day for chusing assignees are not to examine critically into the debt, but to admit creditors for what they swear is due to them, as they are liable to an account afterwards. 68

A creditor by bond, and an open account likewise, shall be admitted to prove the bond, because the commissioners may still take the account, and upon a dividend he shall be intitled to no more than is due to him on balance. 70

A creditor in all cases of open accounts ought not to be excluded till the account is taken, because then the choice of assignees might arise from a minor part in value of the creditors, but still if commissioners have just grounds to doubt the debt, they do right to admit it only as a claim. *ibid.*

The granting caveats against commissioners of bankrupts very inconvenient, as it may give persons against whom commissions are to be taken out an opportunity of making away with their effects. 72

A note given before an act of bankruptcy, though indorsed after, is a debt, upon which the indorsee may take out a commission of bankruptcy against the drawer. 73

Rule as to the Certificate of a Bankrupt.

See *Tawis v. Mossy* under *Concerning the Commission and Commissioners.*

The certificate of a bankrupt being stayed upon the petition of a claimant under

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- under the commission, who suggested fraud and collusion between the bankrupt and his son : at a meeting of the commissioners to examine into this matter, several new creditors came in and proved their debts, but as they did not join in a petition to set aside the certificate as fraudently obtained the court would not delay the allowance thereof, but left the claimant to bring a bill if he thought proper
Page 73
- Where a bankrupt's estate is sufficient to pay all, with a large surplus, creditors, whose debts carried interest, shall be allowed interest for their respective debts, from the time the computation of it was stopped by the commissioners; but such as are creditors by bond not beyond their penalties 75
- Where bills are brought to settle the demands of creditors in bankrupt cases, the rule of determination is the same as if heard upon petition 76
- The proof of a debt before commissioners, unless an objection made in a reasonable time, is conclusive, and the bankrupt's representatives are bound by it 77
- A certificate in the life-time of the bankrupt, though not confirmed by *Lord Chancellor* until after his death, is good; for the operative force of it arises from the consent of the creditors, and when confirmed has its effect from the beginning *ibid.*
- The statute of the 13 *Eliz.* gives commissioners an equitable as well as legal jurisdiction, and so construed ever since, and on petitions before the Chancellor, he proceeds as in causes by bill upon the rules of equity *ibid.*
- A certificate discharges the person of the bankrupt, and his estate subsequently accrued, but not the estate in the hands of the assignees 79
- Where there is mutual credit between a bankrupt and a creditor, the commissioners ought to stop interest on both sides at the time of the bankruptcy, or compute interest on both sides till the settling the account 80
- Where 4 parts in 5 in number and value of the creditors have signed the certificate, the court will not stay it on the petition of persons whose demands on the bankrupt's estate depend upon an account to be taken, and where they do not swear to a balance in their favour *Page 81*
- The bankrupt acts are not adopted in *Ireland* 82
- Where a person carries on a trade in dominions belonging to the crown of *Great Britain*, and comes over to *England*, a commission may be taken out by a creditor, in the place where he then happens to be, as he has traded to this kingdom, and contracted debts here *ibid.*
- Certificates are matters of judgment, and a *mandamus* would not lie to compel an allowance, for it is discretionary in commissioners first, and in the *Lord Chancellor* afterwards 82
- Where a bankrupt is a trader in *Ireland* signing his certificate in three months after the commission issues is too precipitate, and *Lord Chancellor* stopped it on account *ibid.*
- Unless a person proves a debt, or shews a reasonable ground for a claim, he is not within the rule for assenting or dissenting to a certificate 83
- The allowance of a bankrupt's certificate will not discharge his sureties, but they may be proceeded against notwithstanding such allowance 84
- An application by a creditor to stay the bankrupt's certificate: the commission was taken out the 10th of *September*, and the certificate signed the 30th of *November* following: such hasty proceeding is contrary to the intention of the statutes of bankruptcy, which were made in favour of creditors, but are too often abused for the service of insolvent persons; the certificate therefore ordered to be staid *ibid.*
- A person who has a debt in his own right, and another as executor cannot sign a certificate in two distinct capacities 85
- The clause in the 5 *Geo. 2.* in which a bankrupt is excepted from the benefit of this act, who hath upon marriage of any of his children given above the value of 100*l.* unless he hath sufficient to satisfy all his creditors, must be construed strictly, and not extended further than children of a bankrupt 86
- The certificate being signed upon the same day with the bankrupt's last examination,

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examination, and two thirds of the creditors living in *Guernsey*, the allowance of the certificate stayed for these reasons Page 86
 Formerly the judges had the cognizance of certificates, but being found inconvenient the Great Seal has taken it to itself 87

Rule as to Assignees.

The rule that trustees shall not be accountable for losses, which happen from necessary acts, does not extend to their agents *ibid.*
 If an assignee under a commission of bankruptcy employs an agent to receive money, and he imbezils it, the assignee will be liable to make it good to the creditors, unless he consulted the body of the creditors in the appointment of the agent 88
 All the court can do in a summary way under a commission of bankruptcy, is in transactions between the creditors and assignees, but the court will not on petition determine on private agreements between assignees independent of the creditors *ibid.*
 Where assignees of bankrupts die, or are discharged, and others are put in their room, they cannot revive, but must bring a supplemental bill to intitle themselves to the benefit of proceedings in a former suit *ibid.*
A purchaser pendente lite, on filing a supplemental bill, is liable to all the costs from the beginning to the end of the suit 89
 Where an assignee dies before he has accounted for what he has received, and leaves no personal assets, the creditors have a lien upon his real estate *ibid.*
 Assignees are mere trustees, and each separately answerable only for what they receive *ibid.*
 Where a joint obligor dies, his representative shall be charged *pari passu* with the surviving obligor in the payment of the bond 90
 Proper to insert the words *jointly and severally* in assignments under commissions of bankrupts *ibid.*
 Where assignees do not divide a bankrupt's effects in a proper time, but are making a private advantage to

themselves, the court will charge them with interest Page 90
 An assignee cannot stop a person's share in a dividend, on account of his own private debt owing to him from that person *ibid.*
 Creditors cannot give a general power to assignees to prosecute suits, or submit matters to arbitration at their own discretion, but there must be a distinct meeting of creditors, upon a notice given in the *London Gazette*, to consider of each particular suit or case for arbitration 91
 Commissioners may order a dividend to be advertized, if they think it proper for assignees to make one 91
 The court will not set aside the choice of assignees because some of the creditors live beyond sea, and had no opportunity of voting *ibid.*
 Assignees ought not to be removed, unless it is shewn that they are not persons of substance or integrity 92
 No precedent to be found of an order for creditors to proceed to a second choice upon a bare suggestion that some live remote from *London*, or are out of *England*. *ibid.*
B. in 1718, after marriage, conveys his real estate to trustees, in consideration of 5*s.* and other valuable considerations, in trust for himself for life, to his wife for life, then to his eldest son if he survived his father and mother, and so to the next son, &c. *B.* afterwards became bankrupt: this is a conveyance which fails directly within the clause of 1 *Jac.* 1. *cap.* 15. and therefore trustees decreed to convey to the plaintiffs the assignees under the commission against *B.* 93
 Necessary to prove on the statute of 13 *Eliz.* that, at the making of the settlement, the person conveying was incumbered at the time of the execution of the deed *ibid.*
 Upon the statute of 27 *Eliz.* subsequent purchasers shall prevail to set aside a settlement that is voluntary, and not for a valuable consideration 94
 Assignees stand in the place of a bankrupt, and are bound by all acts fairly done by him *ibid.*
 The consideration in a deed of 5*s.* and other valuable considerations does not oblige

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the court to hold it to be for a
 sole consideration *Page 94*
 see under a commission of bank-
 rupt must surrender a copyhold to
 the purchaser notwithstanding the lord
 exact two fines, for no person can
 a common-law conveyance of
 hold 95
 see under a commission of bank-
 rupt of a copyhold estate is a vendee
 the statute of 13 Eliz. cap. 7.
 of the purchaser from the as-
 signor of such estate 96
 assignors ought to accept copyholds
 of a deed of assignment of the
 bankrupt's estate because it will save
 the expense of two fines to the lord,
 and may convey to the purchaser
 in the first instance by bargain
 and sale 96
 no adice will accrue to creditors by
 giving out copyhold estates in a tem-
 porary assignment, for an extent of
 their own will not affect it *ibid.*
 things in the bankrupt laws
 want reformation *ibid.*
 when an assignee becomes a bankrupt,
 he is removed, his assignees as well
 as himself must join with the commis-
 sioners in executing an assignment to
 the assignees 97

Joint and separate Commission.

where there is a joint commission against
 debtors each must be found bank-
 rupt and though one die, the com-
 mission may go on, but if one be
 at the time of issuing the com-
 mission, it abates *ibid.*
 where there is both a joint and separate
 commission, a creditor under the joint,
 and one under the separate, and af-
 ter dissent to the certificate *ibid.*

Commission and Commissioners.

creditors may come in under a
 commission and prove their debts,
 where there are two persons who
 were partners, and yet the com-
 mission is taken out against them as
 separate traders. *Where* creditors upon
 joint estate cannot prove their debts
 each commission 98
 commission of bankruptcy taken
 against two persons, and a separate
 commission 98

commission against one, a creditor upon
 their joint and several bond is not in-
 titled to have a full satisfaction out of
 both estates at the same time, but must
 make his election upon which of the
 estates he will come in the first place,
 and such creditor shall have time to
 look into the accounts of the bank-
 rupt's joint and separate estate, before
 he makes his election *Page 98*
 Doubtful whether a creditor under a
 separate commission against A. and
 debtor to a joint commission against A.
 and B. can set off the debt he owes
 the latter by his demand against the
 former 100

Rule as to his Executor, or where he is one himself.

Executor, of a bankrupt unless the com-
 mission against his testator be superse-
 ded, cannot take out one for a debt due
 to the testator *ibid.*

Petitioning creditor shall pay costs of
supersedeas only, where a commission
 is superseded merely for a defect in
 form 101

Where assignees have possessed themselves
 of effects which belonged to the bank-
 rupt as an executor only, the court
 upon an application of the testator's
 creditors will for the securing his
 effects, appoint a receiver, to whom
 the assignees shall account for so much
 as they have got in of the testator's
 estate *ibid.*

An executor selling off the stock of his
 testator; though it consists of wines,
 and he buys some others to mix with
 and sell them, will not make him a
 bankrupt; otherwise if he buy wines
 intire, and sells them to his customers
 intire 102

Where a person against whom a commis-
 sion is taken out has surrendered him-
 self, and acquiesced a year and half
 since the taking out thereof, the court
 will not direct an issue to try the bank-
 ruptcy, but leave him to an action at
 law *ibid.*

Rule as to Landlords.

Where a bankrupt's goods are sold by an
 assignee; a landlord can only come in
 for

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- for his rent *pro rata*, with the other creditors *Page 102*
- A mortgagee who has paid the arrear of rent on a bankrupt's estate, unless he has an order to stand in the landlord's place, shall not be preferred to the creditors under the commission 103
- If the landlord of a bankrupt suffers his assignees to sell off his goods, he is not intitled to his whole rent, but must come in *pro rata* with other creditors under the commission *ibid.*
- A landlord may distrain for his whole rent, even after assignment or sale by the assignees, if the goods are not removed 103
- An assignment has a retrospect so as to avoid any mesne acts done by the bankrupt *ibid.*
- Commission against *A.* who owed *B.* twelve years rent; *B.* proves his debt under the commission; the assignees sell the whole goods of *A.* to the petitioner, who lives in *A.*'s house; *B.* three years after proving his debt, distrains upon these goods as being still upon the premises. The vendee of the goods is intitled to them; and the proceedings of *B.* upon his replevin restrained and confined to his remedy under the commission 104
- Notwithstanding a commission, and a messenger is in possession of the goods, the landlord may distrain for rent, even after an assignment, if the goods are on the premises *ibid.*
- A creditor after he has received a dividend under a commission, will be allowed to bring an action at law for his debt upon refunding that dividend 105

Rule as to Compositions.

- A.* being upon an agreement for a composition, gives one of his creditors who would not consent to it otherwise, a bond for the residue over and above his composition, such a contract, though not void by the express words of 5 Geo. 2. seems to be within the reason and design of this act *ibid.*

Rule as to Creditors.

- A bond creditor, to whom the partners were jointly and severally bound, may make his election to come against the

joint or separate estate, but not against both, except for the deficiency, and after the other creditors are paid *P. 106*

Where a meeting of creditors is properly advertised, and some do not think proper to come, the majority in value who are present have a right to bind those who are absent *ibid.*

Where drawer and indorser of notes are both become bankrupts, and the creditors have received a dividend of 6*s.* under the commission against the indorser, they can only prove the remaining 14*s.* under the commission against the drawer 107

See Rule as to Assignees 91.

See Commission and Commissioners 67.

- B.* a creditor under a commission, being indebted to *K.* in 79*l.* draws on the assignee for that sum, payable to *K.* or order, out of *B.*'s share of the dividend to be made; the assignee accepts it by parol, but, before any dividend, becomes a bankrupt himself. *K.* is intitled to the whole 79*l.* and is not obliged to come in *pro rata* only under the commission against the assignee 108
- Where a bankrupt is in execution for one debt, and the judgment creditor has another against him of a distinct nature he may prove *ibid.* under the commission notwithstanding he refuses to waive his execution upon the other 109
- The petitioner creditor of a bankrupt who gave him besides bills of exchange on merchants in *Holland*, that made themselves liable by acceptance *ibid.*
- An obligee may have several actions against each obligor, but shall not levy more than one satisfaction for his debt 110
- A creditor is intitled to come under a commission of bankrupt against all the obligors, drawers of notes, &c. till he is completely satisfied *ibid.*
- The petitioner was admitted under the commission for his whole debt, and before a dividend receives 2*s.* and 6*d.* in the pound under a composition of the acceptors of the bills *ibid.*
- The assignees insist, he shall be paid a dividend on the sum left only, after deducting the 2*s.* 6*d.* But as the composition was not paid till af

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debt proved, he shall receive a dividend on the whole sum Page 110

Cuff had been for several years a collector of the land-tax for the parish of *St. Dunstan's* in the *West*, and at the issuing of the commission owed upon the balance 928 *l.* 11 *s.* to the chamberlain of *London* 111

An inhabitant of the parish admitted a creditor by *Lord Chancellor*, and allowed to prove for himself and the rest of the parishioners *ibid.*

Where a person stays till a bankrupt and the assignees are dead, and fifteen years after the date of the commission applies to be admitted a creditor, the court on these circumstances, and in consideration of the length of time will, dismiss the petition *ibid.*

Contingent Debts.

A husband by articles previous to marriage covenants to leave his wife 600*l.* in case she survives him; he becomes a bankrupt, and dies before any dividend made; the wife, as the law now stands, cannot be admitted a creditor under a commission against the husband 115

A bond payable at installments, the obligee, upon a breach of payment at the first installment, gets judgment on the whole penalty; on payment of the money due and costs, even a court of law will act equitably, and relieve the obligor 118

The case *ex parte Criswell, &c.* was an *obiter* opinion of lord *King's* only, and not the case in judgment *ibid.*

A, a debtor to a bankrupt, before his bankruptcy, and creditor to him upon a contingency that takes place after the bankruptcy, shall not be at liberty to set off under the clause relating to mutual credit 119

B. M. in pursuance of articles before marriage with the petitioner, executed a bond to T. M. and W. R. trustees under the articles, in the penalty of 1000*l.* conditioned to be void if the heirs, &c. of B. M. should pay to T. M. and W. R. 500*l.* within three months next after the death of B. M. for the use of the petitioner, or in case she should not survive, to the use of her child or children, if any: A commission of bankruptcy issued against B. M. who dies on

the 1st of *April* 1749: on the 28th of the same month a dividend is made of 9*s.* in the pound: the petitioner prayed to be paid a proportionable dividend: assignees being served with notice, and no counsel attending for them, directed she should be admitted a creditor, and receive a dividend of 9*s.* in the pound, not being opposed Page 120

A judgment would have made it an immediate debt, and she would have been intitled to have come in as a claimant before her husband's death, and the assignees must then have retained sufficient on a dividend day to answer a proportionable dividend to the petitioner when the event happened 121

Lord Chancellor *King's* being an *obiter* opinion as to a wife's being admitted to a dividend, and Lord *Talbot* doubting of it, and the present Chancellor in a case *ex parte Groome*, December 1741, refusing to admit such a person creditor, his Lordship would not suffer the secretary to draw up the order pronounced at a former day of petitions, though not defended, but recommended it to the assignees to compromise it with the petitioner *ibid.*

The petitioner's husband before marriage gave her father a bond in the penalty of 600*l.* conditioned for the payment of 300*l.* to her in case she survived him: he has a commission of bankruptcy taken out against him, and dies in ten days after 113

The court thinking it a doubtful case, whether she should or should not be admitted a creditor, did not give an absolute opinion, but on assignees consenting, she should come under the commission for 150*l.* ordered her a dividend accordingly *ibid.*

The statute of 7 *Geo.* 1. cap. 31. extends only to creditors at a future day certain and not to debts on mere contingencies which have not happened at the time of the act of bankruptcy committed *ibid.*

All the cases since *Fully v Sparks*, 2 *Ld. Raym.* 546. have been determined against a contingent interest 114

Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills of Exchange, &c.

W. draws bills of exchange on H who had no effects of W. in his hands; they are

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transmitted to R. and Company, and indorsed over by them to several persons; the assignees of R. and Company admitted as creditors under W.'s commission, for so much as they have paid to the indorsees of W.'s bills of exchange under R. and company's commission.

Page 122

A. draws a bill on *B.* who has effects of *A.*'s in his hands, afterwards it is negotiated and indorsed over, this will not make the indorsers only in nature of sureties to *A.* but every indorser will be considered as a new original drawer 124

D. being indebted to *M. K.* in 71 *l.* gave him the following note; *I promise to pay to M. K. the sum of 71 l. Witness my hand, Aug. 28th, 1734. E. D. M. K.* being indebted to *B.* in 92 *l.* 19 *s.* delivers *D.*'s note to him, that he might receive the money in part of his debt who gave the following receipt, *Received 20th Dec 1734, a bill for 71 l. which when paid will be on account per Thomas Byas M. K.* becomes a bankrupt, but not having indorsed or assigned the note to *B.* the assignees apply to *D.*'s solicitor, and receive of him the 71 *l.* The assignees of *K.*'s estate, considered as trustees for the petitioner with respect to the sum of 71 *l.* *ibid.*

A. gives a note payable to *B.* two months from the date for 100 *l.* *B.* indorses it over to *C.* but allows a discount of 9 *l.* per cent. he proves it under a commission against *A.* for the whole sum, but commissioners, finding out this fact afterwards, stop his dividend; Lord Chancellor rejected his petition, and ordered an issue to try whether a bond from the drawer and indorser to *C.* for 100 *l.* paying only 91 *l.* 8 *s.* 6 *d.* was usurious 125

A note given before an act of bankruptcy, though indorsed after, is a debt upon which the indorsee may take out a commission of bankruptcy against the drawer 126

Mr. Bilton and one *Mitchell* had various transactions together, principally negotiating bills of exchange from 1742 to the 5th of June 1743, and on the 18th of April 1743 *Mitchell* committed a private act of bankruptcy, the sums paid by *Mitchell* for these transactions to the plaintiff amounted to 3000 *l.* The assignees bring an action against

Bilton, for so much money had and received to their use, and recovered a verdict against him for 3000 *l.* *Bilton* insisted on the trial to have 712 *l.* allowed him, as paid to and for the bankrupt, but being refused, brought a bill for the 712 *l.* *Bilton* insisted to have this allowance, and the verdict not conclusive upon him, because it is matter of contract, and of account, and in that respect, a proper subject for the jurisdiction of the court of Chancery

Page 126 & 127

Drawing and redrawing bills of exchange for large sums, and a continuation of it, is a trafficking in exchange, and a trading which will make a man liable to a commission of bankruptcy, tho' a loss ensues to the bankrupt by so doing 128

G. drew a great number of bills payable to *V.* and *A.* upon *H.* who had no effects of *G.*'s in his hands, but, to do honour to the bills, accepted them notwithstanding. *G.* becomes a bankrupt and *H.* by means of the great sums he paid on account of such acceptance, becomes a bankrupt likewise: The billholders prove under both commissions, and receive dividends, but not sufficient to pay 20 *s.* in the pound: The assignees of *H.* petition to stand in the place of the billholders, *pro tanto*, as they had received under *H.*'s commission, against the estate of *G.* Ordered that they should *pro tanto*, as *H.*'s estate had paid on account of his acceptance of the said bills, but not to receive any dividend from *G.*'s estate, till the billholders had received a full satisfaction for their debts 129 & 130

Watkin of Bristol had large dealings with *G.* of Worcester, who had *Hatton* for his correspondent in London. It was agreed between *G.* and *Hatton*, that the latter should answer all draughts that *Watkin* should draw upon him on account of *G.* *Watkin* draws accordingly on *Hatton* for 4000 *l.* who accepts it, though he had no effects of *G.*'s in his hands. The payee, on the acceptor's non-payment, applies to the drawer who pays it: *Watkin* applies to be admitted a creditor under a commission of bankruptcy against *Hatton*: The agreement between *G.* and *Hatton*, puts the latter to all intents in the same situation.

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tion as G. himself, and therefore *tho'* he had no effect of G.'s in his hands at the time, he has, by his agreement, made himself, liable, and *Watkin* has a right to come in as a creditor under the commission against *Hatton* Page 131

Where Assignees will be charged with Interest.

See Rule as to Assignees. 87.

Rule as to Partnership.

See Joint and separate Commission. 97.

See Rule as to Creditors. 106.

A separate commission taken out against persons formerly partners, *the joint creditors*, upon an application to the court, were left at liberty to bring their bill for any demand on account of the partnership against the assignees of the separate estate, who were directed to sell the whole effects, and deposit the money in the bank, but not to make a dividend, until the suit should be determined 132

The joint creditors allowed to prove their debts under the commission in the mean time, without prejudice *ib.*

A commission may issue against one partner for a joint debt, tho' an action cannot be maintained against one without joining the other two partners 133

Though a majority of creditors agree to certify that a commission ought to be superseded at a meeting for that purpose, yet if one creditor says, I shall be able to prove in a few days, do not certify yet, the court will not supersede till such creditor has an opportunity of proving his debt 135

Where there is a principal and surety, and surety pays off the debt, he is intitled to have an assignment of the security to enable him to obtain satisfaction for what he has paid above his own share *ibid.*

H. a silkman, and *F.* a dealer in coals, are partners in both trades, they afterwards dissolve the partnership, and *F.* gives *H.* a release of all demands,

and took upon him the payment of the debts due from the coal trade, and *H.* the debts from the silk trade and the respective debts assigned accordingly Page 136

H. dies, and a commission of bankruptcy is taken out against *F.* and the messenger attempting to seize the effects of *H.* in the hands of his representative, is opposed and turned out of possession. The assignee petitions, complaining of the force upon the messenger *ibid.*

By the release of *F.* to *H.* the whole property of the silk trade vested in *H.* and the assignees of *F.* standing in no better light than the bankrupt, the goods of *H.* ought not to have been seized under the commission against *F.* and petition dismissed with costs 136 & 137

Formerly, where there were several partners, the custom was to take out separate commissions against each partner, as well as a joint commission; but this being thought a very unreasonable practice, and occasioning great confusion with regard to bankrupts' effects, has been discountenanced, and the court now keep one commission only on foot, and direct distinct accounts to be kept of the several estates 138

Where there is a joint commission, separate creditors ought not to take out a separate one, but apply to be admitted to prove their debts under the joint, as being a means of saving expence to the creditors *ibid.*

Upon an application of joint creditors to be admitted to prove their debts under a separate commission; ordered provisionally, that they shall be admitted creditors, and admit or dissent to the bankrupt's certificate, because it would otherwise clear him of the debts of joint creditors, as well as separate *ib.*

Rule as to Costs.

See Rule as to Assignees. 87.

See Rule as to his Executor, or where he is one himself. 100.

If a whole petition is recited in an affidavit of service, the court will make the attorney

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attorney who drew it pay the costs out of his own pocket Page 139

See Rule as to Assignees. 87.

An issue had been before directed to try the bankruptcy of G. and found no bankrupt agreeable to the judges directions. A commission of bankruptcy is a proceeding at law in the first instance, and if costs are given there, it will follow of course in the proceedings before this court *ibid.*

Costs accrued by protesting bills before a commission issues may be proved, but no parts of the costs arisen afterwards 140

The Construction of the repealing Clause in the 10th of Queen Anne.

The statute of the 10th of Queen Anne. cap. 15 repeals only that part of the statute of 21 Jac. cap. 19. which constitutes a bankrupt, but not the description of the trade or occupation of the person against whom the commission issues 141

A scrivener is comprehended in the words bankers, brokers and factors in the statute of 5 Geo. 2. cap. 30. sect. 39. 142

Rule as to Dividends,

See Rule as to Assignees being charged with Interest. 132.

See Drawers and Indorsers of Bills, &c. 122.

See Rule as to allowance to Bankrupts. 207

Commission superseded.

See Rule as to his Executors, or where he is one himself. 100.

See Rule as to Costs. 138.

See Rule as to Partnership. 132.

On superseding a commission, the court may either direct an inquiry before a master of the damages sustained by the bankrupt, or a quantum damnificatus upon an issue at law, and after damages are settled, may, for the bet-

ter recovery thereof, order the bond given by the petitioning creditor to Lord Chancellor, to be assigned to the bankrupt Page 144

After two dividends, the creditors release the bankrupt of all further demands; he petitions to supersede the commission, and for liberty to collect in the debts still due to the estate: The bankrupt admitted to stand in the place of the assignees to get in the remainder of the debts, but Lord Chancellor would not supersede the commission for the sake of the bankrupt, as it would entirely defeat his certificate 145

After a commission of bankruptcy has been proceeded upon in the usual manner, and all the creditors have acquiesced in it, and the whole completely finished, the court will not supersede it, tho' the act of bankruptcy committed before the petitioning creditor's debt arose was of a doubtful nature *ibid.*

A commission superseded, because it issued against an infant 146

A. treated with H. against whom a commission of bankruptcy was awarded, for the purchase of the equity of redemption of his estate in mortgage to F. 400 l. settled for the purchase: Articles signed, and A. pays 251 l. 1 s. to clear off the mortgage, and was to pay 150 l. more on the execution of conveyances: On H.'s refusing to complete the purchase, or pay off the mortgagee, A. brought an action against H. who was carried to gaol, where he lay two months, and upon this was declared a bankrupt: H. applies now to supersede the commission, on a suggestion that A's debt is not of such a nature as intitles him to sue out a commission 147

The court doubted whether A. could take out a commission on such a contract, saying, the remedy ought to have been a bill for performance of the contract, and no action could be maintained; and it appearing that A. since the issuing of the commission, had taken an assignment of the mortgage, he was restrained from proceeding on the commission, for, as standing in the place of the mortgagee, he could hold till redeemed, and likewise com-

pel a performance of the contract, or oblige A. to refund the 25 l. 1 s.

Page 147

Rule as to Bankrupt's Attendance on Assignees.

The attendance of the bankrupt on the assignees to assist them in making out the accounts of his estate, is confined by the 5th of the present King to the 42 days, or the enlarged time at most; but if the assignees will undertake, for the creditors under the commission, that they shall not arrest him, the court will order him to attend, notwithstanding any risque he may run from his creditors at large

148

Rule as to an Apprentice under a Commission of Bankruptcy.

An apprentice, where his master becomes bankrupt, shall be admitted as a creditor only upon the remaining sum, after deducting for the time he lived with the bankrupt

149

Rule as to discounting of Notes.

See *Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills of Exchange.*

A person who takes no more for the discount of notes than at the rate of 5 l. per cent. per Ann. shall prove the whole amount of those notes under a commission of bankruptcy against the drawer, without being obliged to deduct what he received of the indorser for the discount

150

The rule established by commissioners of bankrupts, that note creditors cannot prove interest upon them, unless expressed in the body thereof, is a reasonable one, and the court will not break through it

151

Rule as to a petitioning Creditor.

See *Rule as to his Executor, or where he is one himself.*

The clerk of the commission caused the bankrupt to be arrested at the suit of I. petitioning creditor and assignee,

in the Sheriff's court of London, for 80 l. and afterwards causes another action to be brought in B. R. for the same sum, and kept him in custody till F. had an opportunity of arresting him on the King's Bench action, and afterwards charges him with another action at the suit of one Wals; bankrupt applies to be discharged from both actions: I. and H. directed by the court respectively to discharge him out of the custody of the marshal, as the same attorney was concerned in both actions

Page 152

A petitioning creditor cannot arrest a bankrupt, because a commission is both an action, and an execution in the first instance

ibid.

A petitioning creditor determines his election by taking out the commission and cannot sue the bankrupt at law, though for a debt distinct from what he proved

153

Where persons refuse to prove debts under a commission, the barely being assignees will not determine their election, but they may still sue the bankrupt at law

ibid.

A petitioning creditor has not the same election as a common creditor; for if he was to elect to proceed at law, it would supersede the commission

See *Commission superseded.*

Rule as to Notes where Interest is not expressed.

See *Rule as to discounting of Notes* 150

The Construction of the Statute of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. with respect to Bankrupts' possession of Goods after Assignment.

Assignment of a ship at sea for a valuable consideration may be good against assignees of a bankrupt, though no possession is taken thereof, but if of goods at land otherwise

154

Person has only a special property in goods, if not redeemed within the time

156

An owner of hoys mortgages them, and after so doing, is suffered by the mortgagee to use them for three years together, and has money lent him upon the credit of being the owner, they

U u 4 are

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- are liable to be sold under a commission of bankruptcy *Page 157*
- Where a creditor of a bankrupt has received money of him, and an action is brought by the assignees to recover back such money, they must prove such creditor had notice of the bankruptcy when he received the same *ib.*
- Where goods are delivered to a creditor after notice of an act of bankruptcy, the proper action for the assignees is trover, because there is a tort in detaining, though he came rightfully to the possession of the goods *ibid.*
- Marriage, without a portion, is itself a consideration for an agreement *158*
- A woman's fortune falling short of the husband's expectations, is no reason for setting aside a marriage agreement *159*
- The clause in 21 *Jac.* 1. which says, *that all goods in the possession of a bankrupt, which by him have been gained, shall be liable to his creditors*, relates to goods the bankrupt has in his own right only. *ibid.*
- R. W. and his partner gave a bond to H. for 1200 *l.* and the same day by deed assigned to H. or order, the goods in two ships then at sea, and also 13 bills of lading, and policies of insurance containing the said goods, as a collateral security, the latter indorsed to H. the former not: A bill brought by the assignee of R. W. become a bankrupt for these goods, insisting that R. W. acted as the visible owner of the ship and cargo, being not put into the possession of H. and therefore the plaintiff intitled thereto for the benefit of the creditors at large *160*
- The court of opinion that every thing which could shew a right to the ship and cargo being delivered over to H. R. W. could no longer be said to have the order and disposition of them, and therefore not within the meaning of 21 *Jac.* cap. 17 and consequently H. has a right to retain the ship and cargo till the principal sum of 1200 *l.* and interest is satisfied *160*
- A. being indebted to B. assigns over barges to B. who suffers A. to keep the possession, this is a fraud on the creditors at large, and the barges may be seized under a commission of bankruptcy taken out afterwards against A. *161*
- Where there is an assignment of an outward bound cargo, it is a complete contract, though the cargo is not delivered to the assignee *Page 162*
- Indorsing bills of sale does not amount to an assignment, unless the goods are directed to be delivered to the assignee *ibid.*
- Assignees under commissions of bankruptcy take, subject to all equitable liens against the bankrupt himself *ib.*
- Assignment of choses in action for a valuable consideration, are good against creditors under a commission of bankruptcy *ibid.*
- If a person advances money upon a conditional sale of goods, and does not insist upon a delivery thereof, he confides in the credit of the vendor, and not on any real or particular security, and ought to come in under a commission of bankruptcy against the vendor, as much as any other person, that places a confidence in the bankrupt, and not on any other security *165*
- The general view of the provision now in question, is to prevent traders from gaining a delusive credit from a false appearance of their circumstances *163*
- The statute of 21 *Jac.* 1. cap. 19 extends to conditional as well as absolute sales *ibid.*
- A share of the partnership trade, or mortgaged to a partner, must be delivered, or it is a delusive credit, and falls within the statute of 21 *Jac.* 1. cap. 19. *ibid.*
- The provisions in 21 *Jac.* 1. cap. 19. sec. 11. with respect to legal interests, must be followed as to equitable ones; choses in action therefore held to be within the meaning of the act, and are included in the words goods and chattels *184*
- How far partnership stock is liable to the debts of partners in the first place *ibid.*
- Where one partner lends money to another partner generally, and it is not entered in the partnership books, he does not gain a specific lien upon the share of the borrower *ibid.*
- A person may set off a debt under the bankrupt acts, though not relative to the mutual credit between him and the bankrupt *184*

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One *Matthews* sold to one *Flyn* and *Field* two-thirds of 500 barrels of tar, at the rate of 9s. per barrel, and the other third he agreed should go, and be assigned to them for sale, at his risque, and on his own account, and that he should be at the charge of cartage and portorage, and shipping of the whole.

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Matthews accordingly caused the tar to be put into a warehouse or cellar of his own, for the purposes of the agreement; *Flyn* and *Field* at the same time paid *Matthews* in London bills 150 l. the amount of two-thirds, and *Matthews* made them out a bill of parcels; *Matthews* afterwards becomes a bankrupt, and the assignees take possession of the tar, as they found it remaining in his warehouse *ibid.*

This was held not to be within the intent of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19 which meant to guard against leaving goods in the possession, order and disposition of bankrupts, but a mere temporary custody, till *Flyn* and *Field* had an opportunity of shipping it off to Ireland, and that they are intitled to two-thirds of the tar *ibid.*

Rule as to Copybolds under a Commission of Bankruptcy.

See *Drury v. Man*, under Rule as to Assignees 95

Where Assignees are liable to the same Equity with the Bankrupts.

Though the court will favour creditors, yet it must be where they have a superior right to other persons 188

A settlement after marriage good, if it be upon payment of money as a portion, or a new additional sum, or even upon an agreement to pay money, if afterwards paid 190

Where creditors can have no remedy at law, but must come into equity, this court will make them do equity 191

Though in a conveyance by lease and release the lease is missing, yet if a consideration be proved, the release will amount to a covenant to stand seised 191

In the case of voluntary settlements and wills, if there is no declaration of the

trust of a term, it results to the donor; otherwise, where it is a settlement for a valuable consideration, and in the nature of a contract for the benefit of a wife, and of the issue P. 191

A limitation in a settlement to a husband for life, to trustees to preserve, &c. to the wife for life for her jointure, and after the decease of both, to trustees for 99 years, on such trusts as hereafter expressed; and after the determination of that estate, to the first, and every other son in tail: No declaration of the uses of the term. The court always takes agreements of this kind according to the nature of the agreement, and therefore consider it only as a trust term to attend the inheritance, according to the limitations in this settlement *ibid.*

See *Walter v. Burrows*, under Rule as to Assignees 93

See title *Baron and Feme*, under Rule as to the possibility of the Wife 280

A bond given to A in trust to secure the payment of an annuity of 40 l. during the joint lives of Sir *Edward Smith* and petitioner, the bankrupt's wife; he delivers up the bond upon his last examination; she applies to the court, and prays the assignee may deliver the bond to her trustee; and that the arrears of the annuity, and all future payments may be made to her: Lord Chancellor ordered it accordingly 192

Where a bond is given to a trustee for the benefit of a wife, and the husband becomes a bankrupt, the assignees cannot bring an action, for by 1 Jac. 1. assignees can only have the like remedy to recover a debt, as the bankrupt himself might have had, the word party in the act being meant of the bankrupt 193

The obiter opinion in *Miles v. Williams* and his wife, 1 Wms. 255. denied by Lord Chancellor to be law 193

What is or is not an Act of Bankruptcy.

Where there is a doubt of the bankruptcy, and the bankrupt is out of the kingdom

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kingdom, the court will not supersede the commission upon petition, but send it to trial: But where the bankrupt is at home, the court will send it back to the commissioners, to consider if, on the evidence, they can declare him a bankrupt or not *Page* 193

Absconding to avoid an attachment, upon an award for non-delivery of goods pursuant to an award, is not an act of bankruptcy within the statute of *Jac. 1. cap. 15.* but it must be a departing from the dwelling-house to avoid the payment of a just debt, and not the delivery of goods, for that is a duty only 196

A commission of bankruptcy taken out against the petitioner, who insists, that, as he is a clergyman, he is not liable to become a bankrupt within the intent of any of the bankrupt statutes: *Lord Chancellor* would not supersede the commission, or direct an issue, but left the petitioner to his action at law *ibid.*

The statute of 21 *H. 8.* will not exempt a clergyman from being a bankrupt, for he cannot take advantage of the breach of one law, to excuse him from the breach of another 199

Smuggling, though contrary to an act of parliament, is still a trading within the meaning of the bankrupt acts, and such persons liable to a commission *ibid.*

A bargain or contract made by a parson, contrary to the statute of 21 *H. 8. sec. 5.* is void, as to himself only, and he alone is liable to the penalty of the act *ibid.*

If a bankrupt has an objection to a question, he must demur to the interrogatories, and the court will judge of it, upon a petition; or if he refuses to answer any question, and the commissioners commit him, and the delinquent brings an *habeas corpus*, the question must be set forth particularly in the return to the *habeas corpus*, that the judges may judge whether it was lawful or not 200

Ecclesiastical estates may be taken in execution, and upon a sequestration likewise, and the method which is taken in executions and sequestrations may be followed upon a commission of bankruptcy 200

A peer or a member of the house of commons, if they will trade, are liable to a commission of bankruptcy, otherwise as to infants *Page* 201

A person's denying himself to a creditor who calls at eleven o'clock at night, is no act of bankruptcy, for it cannot be said to be done *with an intent to defraud* his creditors, which is the ingredient the acts of parliament require to make a man a bankrupt *ibid.*

Rule as to Sales before Commissioners.

Advertisements in cases of sales before commissioners of bankrupts should not be general only, for a meeting, in order to sell a bankrupt's estate, but ought to name the hour as *masters* do, and after the time expired, if commissioners are not gone, should admit a better bidder, in order to give creditors as great satisfaction for their loss as possible 202

Rule as to Examinations taken before Commissioners.

An order had been obtained to read *inter alia* the examinations of *Margaret Lingood*, taken before the commissioners under *Thomas Lingood's* bankruptcy. They cannot be read, unless proved in the cause that there were such examinations taken before the commissioners; for the proceedings in a commission of bankruptcy against *Thomas* are, as to *Margaret*, *res inter alios acta* 203

A will cannot be proved by an examination of witnesses *viva voce*, for the defendant has a right to a cross examination of plaintiff's witnesses *ibid.*

An order to read the proceedings in one cause, in another, must be between the same parties 204

Where one defendant is charged with a fraud, his deposition cannot be read for another, as it may tend to excuse him with regard to his own costs *ibid.*

Lord Chancellor, on a former application, limited the examination of a bankrupt's mother before the commissioners to her son's trading only, but upon a second application refused to restrain the commissioners from asking her any questions, or inquiring into any circumstances

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circumstances which may make him a trader Page 204
His lordship would not make an order that the mother should have counsel upon her examination, because it might be made a precedent in other commissions, and he thought an inconvenience would arise, if allowed in every case 205
A person, instead of attending commissioners, petitioned that he might be examined upon interrogatories, and have a copy thereof, and a month's time to prepare himself, and that the commissioners may be restrained from asking him particular questions in his business of a banker *ibid.*
Lord Chancellor will not restrain commissioners in their examinations, as it would be attended with expence, and an inconvenience arise from applications of this kind *ibid.*
The bare exchanging of notes with a bankrupt, or giving money for bank notes, cannot affect him as a trader with that bankrupt 206

Who are liable to Bankruptcy.

Pawnbrokers within the statutes of bankrupts, and seem particularly included in the general word *brokers*, in the 39th section of the 5th of Geo. 2. and so is a public officer, as an exciseman, if he will trade *ibid.*
The daughter of a freeman of London, if she trades separately from her husband, may be a bankrupt *ibid.*

See *Cripp*, under *Rule as to Partnership*.

See *Meymot*, under *What is or is not an Act of Bankruptcy*.

See *Richardson v. Bradshaw*, under *What is a Trading to make a Man a Bankrupt*.

See *Williamson*, under *Rule as to the Certificate of a Bankrupt*.

Rule as to a Bankrupt's Allowance,

A bankrupt is not intitled to his allowance till he has had his certificate 207

A bankrupt's allowance under the act of parliament is a vested interest, and, if he dies, will go to his representative Page 208

Bankrupts are not intitled to their allowance under the 5th of the present king, till a final dividend is made, for it cannot be seen before, whether they will be intitled to any allowance at all 208

Upon an affidavit of a creditor, that he has not read the *Gazette*, he will be admitted to prove his debt, so as not to disturb a former dividend; nor can commissioners proceed to make a second till he is brought up equal to the creditors under the first 209

The representative of a bankrupt who had, in his life-time, divided 10*s.* in the pound, is, as standing in his place, intitled to the allowance *ibid.*

Rule as to Solicitors in Bankrupt Cases.

The court cannot, upon petition, make the clerk of the commission pay costs of suit, for not attending to give evidence at a trial, by reason of which the bankrupt was acquitted, for the remedy lies at law *ibid.*

Where a solicitor carries on suits for an assignee, without the authority of the majority in value of the creditors, the estate of the bankrupt is not liable to his bill for such suits 210

Rule as to the Sale of Offices under a Commission of Bankruptcy.

One Richardson, in 1745, purchased the office of the under marshal of the city of London for 900*l.* a salary annexed to it of 60*l.* half yearly, and a freedom of the said city, worth annually 25*l.* his effects, under commission of bankruptcy, not amounting to 5*s.* in the pound; the assignees applied to the Lord Mayor and court of aldermen for liberty to sell the bankrupt's office, but he being present in court, and refusing to consent, they declared that they could not alienate it without his consent 210

An application to the court here, that the office may be forthwith sold; and that the

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- the lord mayor, &c. may be indemnified in accepting such alienation on the assignees paying the usual alienation fine: *Lord Chancellor* of opinion, that assignees might, by anticipation, sell this office of under-marshal, and that it is not within the statute of *Edward 6.* as it doth not concern the administration of justice Page 210
- The office of serjeant at mace is not saleable, as it concerns the execution of justice: The same as to a sworn clerk in the six clerks office 212
- The office of under marshal is clearly within the description of the 34 & 35 *Hen. 8. cap. 4.* and 13 *Eliz. cap. 7. ibid.*
- An office *quam diu se bene gesserit*, is an office for life 213
- Where a bankrupt is an executor and residuary legatee, and has paid the debts, and particular legacies out of part of the assets, if he refuses to collect in the rest, notwithstanding the assignees have not the legal interest vested in them, the court would assist them to get in the remainder, in the name of the executor ibid.
- If an officer of the army should become a bankrupt, the court would lay their hands upon his salary, for the benefit of his creditors 214
- A bankrupt, being under marshal of the city of *London*, and refusing to surrender his office, the assignees obtained an order for disposing of the office. *B.* agrees with the assignees for the purchase of the office at 850*l.* and on the 17th of *October*, 1749, *B.* was presented to the court of lord mayor, &c. who approved of him, and were ready to take the bankrupt's surrender, but he refusing, was ordered by *Lord Chancellor* to be committed for his contempt, and thereupon absconded 215
- An application to the court to order the court of lord mayor, &c. to admit *B.* in the room of the bankrupt. *Lord Chancellor* would not make an order upon the lord mayor, &c. to admit *B.* as it was intirely discretionary in them but recommended it to the lord mayor, &c. upon the bankrupt's non-attendance, by which his office was forfeited, to dismiss him, and admit *B.* 215
- Where the legal interest of a copyhold is in one, and the equitable interest in another, the court can order the trustee to surrender, though *cestui que trust* refuses Page 215
- What shall or shall not be said to be a Bankrupt's Estate,*
- See *Brown v. Heathcote*, under *The Construction of the Statute of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. with respect to Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Assignment.*
- See *Flyn and Field*, under the same Division.
- Where there is a Trust for a Bankrupt's Wife,*
- See *Greenaway*. See *Grooms*. See *Michell*, under *Contingent Debts*.
- See *Walker v. Burroughs*, under *Rule as to Assignees*,
- See *Grey v. Kentish*, title *Barron and Feme* under *Rule as to a Possibility of the Wife*.
- What is a Trading to make a Man a Bankrupt,*
- See *Higmore v. Molloy*, and *Carrington*, under *Who are liable to Bankruptcy*,
- See *Meymat*, under *What is, or is not, an Act of Bankruptcy*,
- See *Richardson v. Bradshaw & al*, under *Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills, &c.*
- Bankers having taken upon them to act as scriveners, made it necessary for the legislature in the 5th of *Geo. 2.* to add bankers, as being liable to commissions of bankruptcy 218
- A person acting as a banker will be considered as one though he does not keep an open shop 218
- A commission of bankruptcy is as much *ex debito justitiæ* as a writ, and no instance where the court supercedes it, without

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without directing an issue, unless it appears to be taken out fraudulently or vexatiously Page 218

Rule as to Acts of Parliament relating to Bankrupts.

See *Burchell*, under *The Construction of the repealing Clause of the 10th of Queen Anne.*

See *Lingwood*, under *Division*, *Rule as to a Certificate from Commissioners to a Judge.*

See *Walker v. Burrows*, under *Rule as to Assignees.*

What is, or is not, an Election to abide under a Commission.

An assignee, upon refunding what he had received under two dividends, allowed to make his election to proceed at law against the bankrupt 219

The old laws considered bankrupts as fraudulent insolvents, but the more modern as unfortunate ones, and upon these late statutes have the applications been made to compel creditors who proceeded in a double way to make their election *ibid.*

The reason why such creditor who elects to proceed at law, shall still be allowed to assent or dissent to the bankrupt's certificate, is to make the remedy against the person effectual 220

See *Ward*, See *Leaves*, under *Rule as to a petitioning Creditor.*

Notwithstanding a creditor under a commission of bankruptcy elects to proceed at law, he may still assent or dissent to the certificate *ibid.*

Where a person chuses himself an assignee, it is doubtful whether this is not making an election to proceed under the commission; but on his electing in court to proceed at law, his lordship made an order that he should be discharged as a creditor under the commission 221

Rule as to Prosecutions against a Bankrupt for Felony in not surrendering himself.

One *Wood* applies for an order upon commissioners, to admit him a creditor for

211. upon a note, and that the clerk of the commission may be directed to attend at the *Old Bailey*, with the proceedings upon a prosecution against the bankrupt for felony, in not surrendering himself according to the directions of the act of parliament Page 221

As *Wood* has not yet proved his debt, if not made out to the satisfaction of the commissioners, it may be rejected; and *Lord Chancellor* said, that notwithstanding such a prosecution may be carried on by a person who is not a creditor, yet, by the words of the act of parliament, it looked as if the legislature intended there should be a concurrence of the creditors under the commission; and that as this is a penal law, a court of equity will not lend its aid to such a prosecution, by ordering the clerk to attend with the proceedings at the *Old Bailey*, and therefore he would not grant the petition *ibid.*

Where a bankrupt did not surrender himself in due time, if there did not appear to be any intention of defrauding his creditors, *Lord Macclesfield*, in several instances, superseded the commission in order to prevent such a prosecution 222

Rule as to contingent Creditors in respect to Dividends.

See *Groome*, See *Michell*, under *Contingent Debts.*

Rule as to mutual Debts and Credits.

See *Bromley v. Goodere*, under *Rule as to the Certificate of a Bankrupt.*

See *Groome*, under *Contingent Debts.*

A packer may retain goods till he is paid the price of packing, and if he has another debt due to him from the same person, the goods shall not be taken from him till he is paid the whole, notwithstanding the debtor is become a bankrupt 228

There have been many cases to which the clause relating to mutual credit has been extended, where neither an action of account would lie, nor could the court of chancery decree one 229

Mutual

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Mutual credit is not confined to pecuniary demands only, but if a man has goods in his hands belonging to a debtor, it shall be considered as such Page 229

See *Billon v. Hida*, under *Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills, &c.*

A creditor against the bankrupt for 100*l.* and 10*l.* and a debtor to him upon bond for 340*l.* payable on the fourth of *March* 1756. with lawful interest, applies that he may set off his demand of 110*l.* against the principal and interest due on the bond as far as it will go, and not be obliged to prove his debt under the commission, and take a dividend upon it only 230

This is not in strictness a mutual debt, and yet it is a mutual credit, for the bankrupt gives a credit to the petitioner in consideration of the bond, though payable at a future day, and he gives the bankrupt credit for the debt he owes him upon simple contract, and therefore within the equity of 5 *Geo. 2.* An account directed by the court to be taken between the petitioner and the bankrupt, and the balance only to be paid to the assignees *ibid.*

A. lends a sum of money to one partner on his own security, he lends the same to the partnership trade; a joint commission is taken out; *A.* shall not come in as a creditor upon the joint estate of the bankrupts immediately and directly with the rest of the partnership creditors, but by way of circuitry he is intitled, as standing in the place of that partner who has paid the money to the use of the partnership trade 223

Where one partner takes out more money from the partnership stock than his share amounted to, the other has a right to come upon the separate estate of that partner *pro tanto* 225

Two partners agree to borrow a sum of money, but one only gives a bond, and the other only a witness to it, the money afterwards entered in the cash book of the partnership; a joint commission taken out, obligee is intitled to be admitted a creditor *ibid.*

Joint creditors, where there are no separate, may exhaust both the joint and separate estate; but where there are both joint and separate creditors, the

joint estate shall be applied to the satisfaction of the joint, and the separate estate to the satisfaction of the separate creditors Page 27

If there be a surplus of the separate estate, the joint creditors are intitled to it for a bankrupt has no right to any thing till they are fully satisfied 218
Dumas and others, the petitioners, drew bills of exchange on *Julian* and son for 1115*l.* and undertook to make remittances to pay the same, and at the same time acquainted them that these bills were for the proper account of the petitioners, house at *Cadiz*, and desire the *Julians* would keep a distinct account, and distinguish such a new account by the letter *G.* being the initial letter of the first partner's name at *Cadiz*: Bills drawn on *Vanneck* and company in *London* to the amount of 1146*l.* 11*s.* 11*d.* remitted accordingly. The *Julians* by letter acknowledge the receipt thereof, and promise petitioners to give credit in their own account; *G. Julian* the father died the 25th of *February* last. The day before the son stopped payment, he got two of these remittances discounted for 566*l.* 11*s.* 11*d.* 232

On the 20th of *March* a commission of bankruptcy issued against *Julian* the son; *Dumas*, &c. prefer their petition, and pray that the assignees may be directed to deliver to them the several bills of 1146*l.* 11*s.* 11*d.* or pay the full value. *Lord Chancellor* of opinion the specific bills amounting to 580*l.* ought to be delivered by the assignees of *Julian* to the petitioners: As to those which were discounted, the petitioners waived their claim 232

The rule of equality under commissions of bankruptcy extends only to his own estate; otherwise where the matters in question are not relative to his estate in law or equity 233

Where goods consigned to a factor continue in specie, and are found in his hands at the time of his bankruptcy, the principal is intitled to them, and not the creditors at large *ibid.*

Where goods so consigned are sold, and the factors took notes instead of money, the principal is intitled to the notes *ibid.*

A person who repairs a ship, has no specific lien if delivered to the bankrupt;

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ired in a foreign port, whilst out a voyage, it would have been life. Directed to prove the debt pairs under the commission P.

233

last a commission of bankruptcy against *Mathews*; at the time he a bankrupt he was indebted to *Ockenden* in 286*l.* 7*s.* 10*d.* for grinding corn, who had in his custody 36 and 3 bushels of wheat, belonging bankrupt, part ground and part ng, besides a great number of 16*l.* 5*s.* due to him for grinding rn, which was in his hands at the *Mathews* became a bankrupt. The

fold by the assignees by agree- between them and *Ockenden*, with- ejudice to his claim, who applied ition to be paid his whole debt the money arising by the sale *Chancellor* of opinion *Ockenden* had no ck lien upon the corn and sacks, particular one only *pro tanto* as is r grinding the corn in his hands, at the loads of wheat, &c. be- l to the assignees

235

A. borrows a sum of money on the of jewels, and further sums after- upon his note, the executor of *A.* not redeem the jewels, without g the money due on the notes

236

e between clothiers and dyers, othiers and packers, are different the present, it being always cus- y for them to make up their ac- by giving mutual credit; the for instance, on one hand for done, and the clothier for his

ibid.

of equity go no farther than courts v, in the cases of a *set-off* upon ct relating to mutual credit

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a Bankrupt during his Time, of ilige may be taken by his Bail.

heriff's officer, and bail for the oner, a bankrupt, takes him away g the time of his last examination, rrenders him in discharge of his he prays to be discharged out of ly, and that *Fessie* may be censur- a contempt of the court. *Lord*

Chancellor inclined to think, that the bail's taking the principal coming to a court of justice to be examined, has never been determined to be a contempt of the court, provided they bring him to be examined by that court, and there- fore dismissed the petition, but with- out prejudice to the bankrupt's appli- cation to the court of King's Bench

Page 238

The taking of a bankrupt by his bail is not a contravention of the 5th of the present King, for the force of the clause in that act is *arrests by creditors*; and bail are no creditors till damnified, and therefore not within the description

In the language of the court, the bail are the gaolers of the principal, and upon this notion of law may arrest him on a *Sunday*, as he has his liberty only by the indulgence of the bail

239

Rule as to a Certificate from Commissioners to a Judge.

Lingood being declared a bankrupt, and the three sittings at *Guildhall* advertiz- ed, the commissioners upon the exami- nation of witnesses in the intermediate time, finding that he was removing and concealing his effects, summoned him to appear before them the next day from the date of the summons, and on his refusing to come, certified this fact to Mr. Justice *Chapple*, who committed him to *Newgate*, and on the keeper's sending notice thereof to the commissioners, they brought him be- fore them upon their own warrant, and on his refusing to be examined, re-committed him to *Newgate*

Lingood petitioned to be discharged, as be- ing illegally committed; the court of opinion the certificate is pursuant to the powers given to commissioners under the statutes of bankruptcy, and that where they have full evidence of his intention to secrete his effects, they may examine him in the intermediate time, between the declaration of bank- ruptcy and the sittings at *Guildhall*

240

An arbitration bond is a debt at law, and binds the parties till set aside for corruption or partiality, and is also a suf-

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sufficient debt to support a commission of bankruptcy Page 241

The court will not supersede a commission, or direct an issue, upon a general affidavit of the bankrupt that he is not one, for he ought to give a particular answer to the facts charged in the depositions taken before the commissioners, but will leave him to bring a *habeas corpus*, if he thinks proper *ibid.*

Where a person apprehends he is aggrieved by a commitment of commissioners of bankruptcy, the ready way is to sue out a *habeas corpus*, that the legality thereof may be determined by the judges of the common-law 242

The old acts of parliament considered a bankrupt as a criminal, and commissioners might at their discretion imprison him; but though the rigour of the law is taken away as to his person, the power of examining still remains, and a greater punishment is inflicted: If he does not surrender, it is *felony* without benefit of clergy *ibid.*

The judge, upon the bare certificate of commissioners that a bankrupt refused to attend, though the cause of summoning was not mentioned, is obliged to commit him *ibid.*

The Effect of Acquiescence under a Commission.

See *Desautbuns*, under *Commission superseded*.

Rule as to Debts carrying Interest under a Commission of Bankruptcy.

See *Marlar*, under *Rule as to discounting Notes*.

See *Bromley v. Goodere*, under *Rule as to the Certificate*.

On the 10th of April 1744 it was referred to a Master to settle what was due to the creditors under the commission of bankruptcy against *Rooke*, and upon payment by the bankrupt, the commission was to be superseded. The bankrupt offered to pay what was reported due, but the creditors insisting upon interest likewise, from the date of the Master's report, the court said that the creditors here are equally in-

titled (as if they were in the common case of a reference to a Master in a cause, to state what is due for principal and interest) to be paid interest from the time of the Master's report, when the sums due are liquidated; and the bankrupt was ordered to pay accordingly Page 244

Rule as to Principals and their Factors.

Where agents abroad are in disburse for their principal, and, upon being doubtful of his circumstances, make bills of lading to their own order indorsed in blank, notwithstanding these bills of lading come to the principal's hands, yet if the agent's partner in London writes them word that their principal is become bankrupt, and desires them to send the bills of lading, and an order to the captain to deliver the goods to him, he may retain them for himself and company, against the assignees under the commission till paid and reimbursed so much as the partnership is in advance 245

A factor who sells goods for a principal, may bring an action in the name of the principal against the vendee, and make himself a witness; or a vendor of goods to a factor, for the use of his principal, may maintain an action against the principal and the factor be a witness for the vendor 248

If goods are delivered to a carrier, &c. to be delivered to A. and are lost by the carrier, &c. the consignee only can bring the action; but if before delivery consignee hears A. is likely to become a bankrupt, or is actually one, and gets the goods back, no action will lie for A.'s assignees, because while in *transit* they might be countermanded *ibid.*

Notes or bills indorsed in this manner, *pray pay the money to my use*, will prevent there being filled up with such an indorsement as passes the interest. 249

The reason the law goes upon in compelling an original proprietor of goods after delivery, to come in as a creditor under a commission, must be on account of the general credit a bankrupt has gained by having them in his custody *ibid.*

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Rule as to Annuities under Commissions of Bankruptcy.

C. in 1720, gave 300*l.* for an annuity of 30*l. per ann.* for her life, payable out of a person's estate, who becomes a bankrupt in 1738. The commissioners to settle the value of her life, and directed to be admitted a creditor for such valuation, and the arrears of her annuity, and not for the whole 300*l.*

Page 251

Where a bankrupt is under an agreement to pay an annuity, a value must be put upon it, and proved as a debt under the commission *ibid.*

See *Coysegame*, under *Where Assignees are liable to the same Equity with the Bankrupt.*

Rule as to taking out a second Commission.

No second commission can be taken out before a bankrupt has his certificate under the first, for till then nothing can pass to the second, at least of personal estate *252*

All future personal estate is affected by the assignment, and every new acquisition will vest in the assignees; but as to future real estate, there must be a new bargain and sale *ibid.*

Assignees may advertise a meeting upon any extraordinary occasion that concerns the creditors, as well as for the particular purposes directed by the acts of parliament *253*

Rule as an to open Account under a Commission.

Vide ex parte Simson et al^s, under the Division, *Concerning the Commission and Commissioners.*

Rule as to Principal and Surety.

See *Cripp*, under *Rule as to Partnership.*

See *Williamson*, under *Rule as to the Certificate.*

Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors' Act.

Stevens, formerly a trader in *Holland*, fails there, upon which there was a *cessio bonorum*. I.

fo bonorum: He comes to *England*, and is appointed a governor abroad; he applies to one *Burton* to be his security to the company, and to advance him a sum of money, who agreed to it, provided *Stevens* would give him a bond that should comprize the remainder of an old debt due before the *cessio bonorum*, as well as the further sum advanced, which was done accordingly: *Stevens* afterwards becomes a bankrupt; and the commissioners doubting if *Burton* ought to be admitted a creditor for the whole money, he now petitioned for that purpose *Page 255*

Lord Chancellor, on the circumstances of the case, of opinion, he was intitled to be admitted a creditor for the whole money upon his bond *ibid.*

If a debtor cleared under the insolvent acts afterwards gives a bond for the residue of the old debt, this will be binding upon him *256*

If a bankrupt, after his discharge, gets future effects, in point of justice, he ought to make good the deficiency, though no court will compel him *ibid.*

Lord Chancellor seemed to think, if a bankrupt, after his discharge, applies to an old creditor to lend him a new sum of money to carry on his trade, or to be his security for any office, this would be a good consideration for his giving bond for the remainder of the old debt, and the whole may be proved under a second commission *ibid.*

The law of *Holland* with regard to a *cessio bonorum* follows the *Digest*, and is no discharge of the effects, but only of the person *ibid.*

Where a person discharged by the insolvent debtors' act becomes a bankrupt afterwards, his certificate must be special, and will be allowed only as a discharge of his person, but not of his future estate and effects *257*

Rule as to a Bankrupt's future Effects.

See *Proudfoot*, under *Rule as to taking out a second Commission.*

See *Burton*, see *Green*, under *Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors' Act.*

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Rule as to a Cessio Bonorum.

See *Burton*, under *Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors' Act*.

Rule as to Deposits under Commissions of Bankruptcy.

A. intitled to navy bills in 1711, deposits them with *Sir Steven Evans* who gave a note to be accountable for them, and in six months afterwards becomes a bankrupt. The representative of *A.* petitioned to be admitted before the Master to prove both principal and interest to the time of the decree, as navy bills in their nature carry interest. *Lord Chancellor* held this to be a special deposit, and that a calculation should be made of the value of the whole intire thing deposited, both principal and interest, at the time of the deposit, and that interest ought not to run on as in the case of a simple debt Page 259

Rule as to Relation under Commissions of Bankruptcy.

Where the act of bankruptcy is lying in gaol two months, a person shall be deemed a bankrupt from the first day of his surrender to prison by relation, so as to over-reach all intermediate transactions 260

Rule as to an Extent of the Crown.

An extent of the crown is taken out against a surety of a bankrupt, who pays the debt after disputing it some time, and being put to an expence thereby: He shall, notwithstanding he disputed the payment of a just debt, be admitted to prove the expences of such suit under the commission against the principal 262

An extent of the crown is an action and execution in the first instance *ibid.*

A bankrupt though he has conformed in every respect to the acts relating to bankruptcy, cannot be discharged from a commitment under an extent of the crown. *ibid.*

Rule as to Creditors assenting or dissenting to a Certificate.

See *Turner*, under *Joint and Separate Commission*.

See *Lindsey*, under *What is or is not an Election to abide under a Commission*.

See *Williamson*, under *Rule as to a Certificate*.

See *In the Matter of the Simpson's Bankruptcy*, under *Rule as to Partnership*.

Bankruptcy no Abatement.

An order for dissolving an injunction will be made absolute, notwithstanding the plaintiff is a bankrupt, unless he shews cause Page 263
Bankruptcy is no abatement 264

Arrest upon a Sunday for a Contempt regular.

See *Whitchurch tit. Arrest*, under *Where good though on a Sunday*.

Baron and Feme.

How far the Husband shall be bound by the Wife's acts before Marriage.

A Widow had two children by a former husband, and no provision made for them, and these two children had each of them a child, and being in possession in her own right of freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estates, by articles before her second marriage, to which her husband was a party, and by his consent, conveys the whole to trustees, that they may divide the freehold, copyhold, and leasehold, if no issue of the marriage, in moieties, one to the plaintiff her grandson, his heirs and assigns, the other to her granddaughter in fee, provided if there should be any child or children of the marriage, that child or children to have an equal share of the said estates with the grandson and granddaughter. 265

The husband and wife afterwards married, gave the settled estates, to persons who had notice of the settlement.

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The settlement held to be no voluntary agreement, but a binding one, and said by the court, there was no instance where such a limitation has been held fraudulent, and void against subsequent purchasers or creditors, for if it should, no widow on her second marriage would be able to make any certain provision for the issue of a former
Page 265

How far a Feme Covert shall be bound by the ABs in which she has joined with her Husband.

See *Metcalf v. Ives*, tit. *Award and Arbitrament*, under *For what Causes set aside*.

Concerning the Wife's Pin-money and Paraphernalia.

A. had 300 l. *per annum* pin-money, the husband for several years before his death paid her 200 l. only, but promised her she should have the whole at last
269

If a wife accepts less, or lets her husband receive what she has a right to receive to her separate use, it implies a consent in her to submit to such a method. But where the pin-money is paid to her *eo nomine*, her agreement with the husband relating to her separate estate amounts not to a new agreement, and his promise she should have it at last is an undertaking to pay the arrears
269

How far Gifts between Husband and Wife will be supported.

Mary Lucas in her last illness requested of her husband that her wearing apparel, gold watch, pearl necklace, rings, &c. in her possession, and used by her, might be given to her daughter, and put into a friend's hands for her daughter's use, which the husband promised, and after his wife's death gave the said things to his daughter, and made an inventory, and locked them in a strong chest, and gave the key to his wife's friend, and sent the things therein to her for his daughter's use
270

Though the husband afterwards took some of the things into his possession

again, that is not sufficient to invalidate the gift, which was perfect by the former act
Page 270

Gifts between a husband and wife will be supported in this court, though the law does not allow the property to pass
271

Concerning Alimony and Separate Maintenance.

A. before, and in consideration of a marriage and a portion with his intended wife, conveys lands to trustees, upon trust to pay 100 l. *per ann.* to the lady for her separate use: She many years after the marriage, upon disputes between her and her husband, leaves him and goes abroad: The trustees (there being great arrears of the annuity) bring an ejectment for recovery of the terms, and the husband his bill for an injunction to stay the proceedings in ejectment
272

Lord Chancellor of opinion he could not relieve against the payment of the annuity notwithstanding the husband by his bill offered to receive his wife again, and pay her the annuity if she would live with him
ibid.

One *Juxon*, some few years after his marriage, left his wife and two small children, and went abroad, and did not see her or them in fourteen years; the wife's mother, during this time intrusted her with millinery and other goods, and permitted her to maintain herself and children out of the profits: the husband upon his return breaks open the wife's house, and takes away all her goods and produce of the stock so lent as aforesaid
278

A bill (*inter alia*) was brought for the redelivery of the goods: the court held that what the wife has acquired in her husband's absence to subsist herself and family, is her separate property, and not liable to the disposition of the husband; and that what he has forcibly taken he must deliver in specie, and if disposed of, must pay her the value set by the master
278

Rule as to Possibility of the Wife.

Where a particular assignee took with notice of an equity in a wife, and the assignees

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signees under a commission of bankruptcy against the husband, take subject to the same equity, the court, as it is her property, will direct it to be transferred to her Page 280
A husband cannot in law assign a possibility of the wife, nor a possibility of his own, but the court of chancery will support such an assignment for a valuable consideration ibid.

See **Infant**, under *How far favoured in Equity.*

See **Dower and Jointure.**

See **Injunction.**

See **Partition.**

See **Evidence, Witnesses and Proof** 451

Bills of Exchange.

See **Bankrupt**, under *Rule as to Drawers and Indorsers of Bills of Exchange*, and under *Rule as to Principal and Factor.* 122 & 145.

Rule as to an Indorser.

Every indorser is a new drawer 281

Bill.

Bill of Peace to prevent Multiplicity of Suits.

Where there has been a possession of a fishery for a considerable length of time, a person who claims a sole right to it may bring a bill to be quieted in the possession, though he has not established his right at law; and it is no objection, upon a demurrer to such bill, that the defendants have distinct rights, for upon an issue to try the general right they may at law take advantage of their several exemptions and distinct rights 282

A bill of peace, praying an injunction to stay the defendants, who have an interest in the manor of *Tunbridge*, from proceeding at law against the plaintiff for building houses on the manor without leave, and that they may accept of

such a compensation as the court shall think reasonable Page 282

The court dissolved the injunction, as they cannot be applied to as an arbitrator, nor have any legislative authority, but act in a judicial capacity only 28;

A bill of peace may as well be brought by tenants against a lord, as by a lord against tenants ibid.

Bills of Discovery, and herein of what Things there shall be a Discovery.

Whilst a suit is depending in the ecclesiastical court for an administration, a bill may be brought here for an account of the personal estate 286

The reason why a bill is allowed to be brought before probate, is, that the ecclesiastical court have no way of securing the effects in the mean time *ibid.*

A devise of personal estate to *A.* and the heirs of her body. *Lord Chancellor* said, it has never been solemnly determined that where money is so entailed the whole shall go to the first taker ibid.

Where a bill is for a discovery merely, you cannot move to dismiss it for want of prosecution, but pray an order only on the plaintiff to pay the defendant the costs of the suit to be taxed *ibid.*

One *Farr* gave *Mary Atkins* a bond in the penalty of 1000 *l.* on condition that if he did not marry her within a twelve-month after date, he would pay her 500 *l.* soon after, under pretence of reading it, he took it against her consent, and carried it away with him; whereupon she brought a bill for the delivery of the old bond, or, if cancelled, that he might execute a new one 287

Mary Atkins dying intestate, her mother, as her administratrix, and thereby intitled to the 500 *l.* revived against the defendant *Farr* ibid.

The plaintiff's equity, said the court, was the bond's being gone by the default of the defendant, and therefore intitled not only to a discovery here, but relief by payment of the money; and *Farr* was accordingly decreed to pay what was due for the principal sum of 500 *l.* in the condition of the bond, with interest for the same at the same

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of 4*l.* per cent. from the day of filing the original bill Page 287
 The court of chancery will not admit a bill of discovery in aid of the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court, because they are capable of coming at that discovery themselves 288
 Where there is a custom pleaded to a suit in the ecclesiastical court for a church rate, and the plea admitted, they may proceed to try the custom, but if denied it is a ground for a prohibition 289
 Where a bill is brought for discovery of concealments of a bankrupt's estate, the court will not allow the defendants to look into their depositions taken by the commissioners before they put in their answers ibid.

Who are to be Parties to it.

A husband tenant for life, remainder to his wife for life, brings a bill alone for the opinion of the court upon the settlement; objection for want of making the wife a party allowed 290

Bills of Review.

On arguing the demurrer to a bill of review, what evidence appears on the face of the decree can be read only, but after demurrer over-ruled, they may read any evidence as at a rehearing 290

Cross Bills.

Where a defendant in a cross bill, but plaintiff in the original, is in contempt for not putting in an answer; the proper motion is to enlarge publication in the original to a fortnight after the answer is come in to the cross bill 291

Supplemental Bills.

It is a constant rule that matter subsequent to the original bill must come by way of supplemental bill and revivor ibid.
 Though by the 8 *W.* 3. a suit shall not abate upon the death of one defendant, yet it must be taken with this restriction, that the subject matter of the bill is not hurt thereby ibid.

Bill to perpetuate Testimony of Witnesses.

See Evidence, Witnesses and Proof. Page 449

See WARD.

See Answers, Pleas, and Demurrers.

See Amendment.

Bonds and Obligations.

Where a joint obligor dies, his representatives shall be charged *pari passu*, with the surviving obligor in the payment of the bond 90
 Where a bond is payable at installments and the obligee gets judgment on the whole penalty upon a breach of payment at the first installment; on payment of the money then due and costs, even a court of law will relieve the obligor 118
 As to a bond for marrying. See 287

And Bill for Discovery.

A voluntary bond for the payment of a sum of money after the obligor's death is in the nature of a legatory disposition, and is valid 292
 A voluntary bond in equity shall be postponed to debts on simple contract; if claimed for money lent, and the person fails in proving his consideration, it cannot be set up afterwards as a voluntary bond 294
 If an executor pleads *non est factum* to a bond, and not *plene administravit* likewise, he cannot after verdict take advantage of what might have been pleaded to the action ibid.
 The plea of *non est factum* only is an admission of assets, and held the same as in case of a judgment by default against an executor ibid.
 An executor can be relieved only against the penalty of a bond, by paying principal and interest, without regard to his having assets or not ibid.
 A release to one obligor is a release to both, in equity as well as in law 294
 Where there is an assignment of a bond in trust for others, precedent to a release, though without consideration, it is doubtful whether the obligee could
X x 3 release,

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release, or if it could operate to the releasee, as he is a trustee in the assignment Page 294
 Every man is supposed to be consant of a deed, to which he himself is a party ibid.

Bottomree Bonds.

See Catching Bargain. 341.

Canon Law.

THE court of chivalry proceed according to the rules of the civil law, except in cases omitted, and there they go according to the course and custom of chivalry and arms 296
 By the canon law an appeal is admitted from all grievances in general *ibid.*
 As the court of chivalry is governed by the civil law, this court will not grant a commission of delegates, upon an appeal from any interlocutory order of that court, but only where there is a definitive sentence, or such a one as is termed in the civil law *gravamen irreparabile* ibid.
 A person aggrieved by or interested in a sentence in the ecclesiastical court, may have a commission of delegates though he was no party to the original suit 298

Carrier.

See Bankrupt, under *Rules as to Principal and Factor.* 245.

Cases.

Where they are misreported.

See *Portion, Boycot v. Cotton*, where the Case of *Cave v. Cave*, 2 Vern. 508. is mentioned.

An Anomalous Case.

See *Portion, Boycot v. Cotton*, where the Case of *Jackjon v. Farrand*, 2 Vern. 424. is mentioned.

Cases imperfect, or denied to be Law.

See under Bankrupt, *Coysegame.*

The case of *Pope v. Onslow*, 2 Vern. 285. the court said was very imperfect, and ordered it not to be cited for the future till it had been compared with the register Page 300

Catching Bargain.

The 17th of May 1738, Sir *Abraham Janssen* advanced 5000*l.* to Mr. *Spencer*, and the same day took a bond from him in the penalty of 20,000*l.* conditioned for the payment of 10,000*l.* to *Janssen*, at or within some short time after the dutcheffs of *Marlborough's* death, in case Mr. *Spencer* should survive her, but not otherwise 301
 The Dutcheffs died 18 October 1744, and in the month of December following, on *Janssen's* delivering to Mr. *Spencer* the bond to be cancelled, he executed a new one in the penalty of 20,000*l.* conditioned for payment to *Janssen* of 10,000*l.* with lawful interest, on the nineteenth of April next, and at the same time executed a warrant of attorney to empower judgment to be re-entered up against him in *B. R.* for 20,000*l.* which was done accordingly ibid.

In December 1745, Mr. *Spencer* paid *Janssen* 1000*l.* in part, and on the 21st of March 1000*l.* more: On the 19th of June 1746, Mr. *Spencer* died, but before his death made his will, and after payment of debts, &c. gave the residue of his personal estate to his son, and appointed Lord *Chesterfield* and others his guardians, and also executors in trust during his minority, who brought a bill to be relieved against *Janssen's* demand as an unconscionable bargain and usurious contract 302

The court relieved only against the penalty and judgment, by directing Sir *Abraham Janssen* to deliver up the bond to be cancelled, and to acknowledge satisfaction on the judgment, upon being paid by the executors what should be due at law, but would not give him costs, as there was *probabilis causa litigandi*, and *Janssen's* case far from being a favourable one 302

Nothing is legally usurious but what is prohibited by the statutes, and to make a contract so, it must be within the express words, or an evasion or shift to keep out of them 340

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If

a bargain was really for an annuity, though bought at ever so under a price, it is no usury; if on the foot of borrowing and lending money, otherwise.

Page 340

Where there is a borrowing of money, and a communication for interest, a device to have more than the legal rate of interest, is within the statutes of usury *ibid.*

The rule that governs the court in *bottomree bonds*, is the risque of the principal, but may be so contrived as to be construed an evasion of the statute, as well as any other contract 341

The court, not being under a necessity of doing it in *Janssen's* case, would not determine whether a person advancing money to an heir or expectant, should have an extraordinary premium for an extraordinary risque, because it might be made an ill use of out of the court. 342

Though the court might have relieved upon an original contract, yet they will not relieve against the confirmation of it, if fairly obtained 344

The contingency here, *a wager*, whether Mr. *Spencer* or the Dutchess of *Marlborough* died first 345

Where a bond is lost, no action can be maintained, because not pleaded with a *profect hic in curia* *ibid.*

The intent of the agreement, and not the expression, determines whether a contract be a loan or risque 346

Bottomree bonds are not usurious, because the whole money is in hazard *ib.*

There may be cases where the court will interpose to prevent improvident persons from ruining themselves, though no express fraud appears *ibid.*

Agreements of this sort must depend on their particular circumstances 346

Post obitis in general, not to be countenanced in a court of equity 347

The idea of usury in this country fully fixed, by the premium for forbearance of money being settled 348

Bottomree bonds are not usurious, because not within the statutes of usury *ibid.*

Where the profit the lender is to have, is for the hazard, and not for the forbearance, the contract is not usurious *ibid.*

Lord Chief Justice *Lee* recommended it to courts of equity to consider how to prevent bargains, where a lender

runs away with double what he advanced Page 348

By the *Macedonian* decree, all obligations of sons (living under the paternal jurisdiction) contracted by the loan of money, are declared null without any distinction, except the creditor advanced it for a cause that was just and reasonable 349

Lord Chief Justice *Willes* being ill, signified his concurrence in the same opinion, by letter to Lord Chancellor *ibid.*

This contract a plain fair wager, and not within the statutes of usury, because it is no loan 350

If there be a loan of money, and a contingency inserted which gives more than the legal interest, though real and not colourable, and *a hazard*, yet it is usurious *ibid.*

If a casualty goes to the interest only, it is usury, if principal and interest both in hazard, otherwise *ibid.*

The sound and fundamental reason for admitting bottomree bargains is their being out of the statute of usury 351

Loans upon a real and fair contingency are no more usurious than bottomree bonds *ibid.*

Contracts of this kind *vitia temporis* *ibid.*

Fraud must be proved at law, but equity relieves against presumptive fraud 352

Political arguments, as they concern the government of a nation, are of great weight in the consideration of this court *ibid.*

Law-makers in *Rome* thought it necessary to put a prodigal under the care of a curator 353

Brokers for *post obit* bargains and junctim annuities ought to be discouraged in equity 353

New agreements and new terms may confirm what was at first a doubtful bargain 354

Charity.

The Power of this Court with respect thereto.

See *Deblise, Attorney General v. Pile* under *Of things personal, and by what Description, and to whom good.*

The court of chancery will give a proper direction as to a charity, without any regard

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regard to impropriety in the prayer of
an information, and differs from all
other cases, wherein the decree must
be founded on the prayer *Page 355*

W. leaves money to be distributed in charity at the discretion of his executors, three named, one of whom died before the information filed. *This* is not a bare authority, but coupled with an interest, and the nominating who were to partake of the charity, survived to the other two executors 356

The court has a particular extensive jurisdiction in the case of a charity, and not tied down to the ordinary methods of proceedings in other cases *ibid.*

An information dismissed with costs against the relators, and said to be the first instance of it *ibid.*

On a legacy to a charity, interest is payable from the testator's death *ibid.* but see note

Those in Action,

See Bankrupt. *Brown v. Heathcote*,
under *The Construction of the Statute of*
21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. with respect to a
Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Af-
firmment.

Church Lease.

See Occupant.

Commission of Delegates.

See Canon Lib.

Conditions and Limitations.

See tit. **Remainder.**

A condition in a will that a legatee con-
troverting the will shall forfeit his le-
gacy is in *terrorem* 404

*In what Cases the Breach of a Condition
will be relieved against.*

A. having been elected under doctor Ratcliff's donation, received a salary for five years, and then, instead of travelling beyond sea for five years more, as the will requires, upon ill health resigns, and the trustees accept the resignation, and put another in his room: *This* is a dispensation of the con-

dition ; if they had said when *A.* offered to surrender, we will not accept of your resignation, but you must comply with the terms, or refund, it would have been otherwise Page 358

Whether a fellow of a college has a power to let his chambers, is not the object of the court of chancery's jurisdiction, but ought to be determined by the *visitor* 360

*In what Cafes a Gift or De-viſe upon Con-
dition not to marry without Conſent ſhall
be good and binding, or void being only in
terrorem.*

The trust of a term under a settlement was, that if there should be two or more daughters of the marriage: then the trustees were to raise and pay to each the sum of 2000 l. *if for marry with the consent of her mother, if living, and a widow; if not, then with the consent of the trustees, or the survivor of them, his executors, administrators, or assigns:* And in case any of the daughters die before the portion was paid, that it should not go to the executor, but the estate should be exonerated thereof, or if raised should go to him, on whom the reversion of the premises is limited to descend 362

The father afterwards by his will gives the farther sum of 2000 l. to each of his daughters, *as and for an augmentation of their portions*, subject to the same conditions, provisos, and limitations, as their original portions : And if any of the daughters die before the original portions become payable, then he wills that this 2000 l. should not be paid to her executor, but that his lady and executrix should have the *residuum* of this money, and makes her residuary legatee : The plaintiff, Mr. *Harvey*, married one of the daughters without consent, and one *Clutton* another without consent : *They are not intitled to the portions either under the settlement or will.* 362

Where any act is to be done previous to any estate or trust, and that act consists of several particulars, every particular must be performed before the estate or trust can vest or take effect.

It is now settled, that if a pecuniary legacy is given on condition of marriage

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- riage with consent, and there is no devise over, that such condition is void
Page 375
- Where a condition has been performed to a reasonable intent, the court will dispense with the want of circumstances; as where the major part of the trustees consent, or where they give an implied, not an express consent
ibid.
- Pecuniary legacies being sueable for in the spiritual court, is the reason why that law in some respects governs as to them; but this court does not follow it universally in this point, for where there is a devise over, it shall take effect
376
- Where an estate is to arise on a condition precedent, it cannot vest till that condition is performed, even though it is become impossible
ibid.
- Though the civil law has no such term as condition precedent, yet the rule in that law *conditio suspendit legatum* is the thing in effect
ibid.
- It has been held ever since the case of *Amos v. Hwner*, that the devise of the surplus of the personal estate, is a devise over
ibid.
- In the case of a condition subsequent, the thing is vested, and it becomes a penalty, and the intent must be plain, by an express devise over to divest it; in a condition precedent otherwise, for dispensing with the condition would be giving an estate against the intent of the donor; the particular penning of this settlement makes it a condition precedent, and vests nothing in the daughters till a marriage with consent
378
- A condition to marry with consent is a lawful condition, and a condition precedent, and being annexed to these portions, nothing can vest till that condition is performed
379
- It is the established rule since the case of *Powlet v. Powlet*, that portions charged on lands do not vest till the time of payment comes
ibid.
- The rule that a condition to marry with consent is *in terminem* only, where there is no devise over, will not hold in all cases, but must be understood of legacies only, and not of portions
ibid.
- Portions arising out of land are subject to the rules of the common law only
ibid.
- If the daughter of a freeman of London marry against his consent, unless he be reconciled to her before his death, she loses her orphanage share
Page 379
- Where the party dies before a portion becomes payable, if issuing out of land, it shall not be raised; but if a personal legacy and legatee dies before the time of payment, it shall go to the executor; the ground of this distinction is, that in one case the court for uniformity follows the ecclesiastical court, and the common law in the other
ibid.
- The word *augmentation*, in the will of Sir Thomas Aton, shewed the additional were to attend the original portions
380, See the note 1. 381
- P. D. devises to J. G. daughter of T. G. 200 l. provided she marries with the consent of her father and mother, or the survivor of them
381
- J. G. before marriage, and during the lives of her father and mother, brings her bill against the executor, to have this legacy paid, the father and mother by their answers consenting: Marriage here, said the court, is a condition precedent, the plaintiff's application therefore too early, and her bill dismissed
381
- If the words had stopped at *provided she marries*, it would not have vested till then, and the circumstances of consent will not vitiate the whole condition
ibid.
- Who are to take Advantage of a Condition, or will be prejudiced by it
382
- E. W. devises lands to his second son Thomas, upon condition that Thomas, or his heirs, shall pay to my grand children (the children of the said Thomas) 50 l. to be equally divided among them, and on default of payment, a clause of entry and distress: Thomas died in the testator's life-time, the son of the eldest son of the testator entered on the lands as heir at law, and sold them: The legacy to the children of Thomas, the testator's second son, is a continuing charge on the lands in the hands of the purchaser, and they are intitled to be satisfied for the same with interest
382
- A. devises lands to B. on condition to pay C. a sum of money, and on default of entry on default of payment; the legatee

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tee at law has no lien on the lands, but the heir of testator shall enter, and take advantage of the breach of the condition, and yet in this court the heir is considered only as a *trustee* for the legatee Page 383
A man by will may make an equitable as well as a legal charge on his estate, and this court will maintain it against the heir at law *ibid.*
Though a purchaser did not know of an incumbrance before he paid his money, yet, as he knew it before the deed was executed, it affects him, with notice 384

Confirmation.

When new agreements shall confirm what was at first an unfair bargain 354 note 1

Construction.

See tit. *Distribution and Exposition of Words.*

Whether the preamble can restrain the enacting part of an act of parliament 182

Whether by a devise of all lands, tenements and hereditaments, a mortgage in fee shall pass note 1 605

A gift to the parish church of *A.* has been construed a gift to the parson and parishioners of *A.* and their successors for ever 437

Item in a will is a conjunctive in the sense of *and* or *also* *ibid.*

Where a will directs payments out of lands *yearly* at a particular time, it cannot be altered to half yearly payments 438

A man cannot by any expression alter the nature of his estate 466

By a mortgage or sale of a brewhouse with the appurtenances, the utensils will not pass 477

Where a lease is renewed for the benefit of an infant, it is as a new acquisition, and will vest in the infant as a purchase, *see* tit. *Guardian* 480

Where the words *to be raised by rents and profits* will imply a power of selling 551 note 1. 500

Where there is a power to charge an estate with a gross sum, it implies a power to charge with interest 552

Consideration.

See tit. *Conveyances fraudulent.*

Conveyances fraudulent. vide p. 13.

See tit. *Voluntary Deed.*

A settlement after marriage in consideration of a portion paid by the wife's father, good against creditors 13

Vide tit. *Agreement.*

Necessary to prove on the statute 13 *Eliz.* that at the making of a voluntary settlement, the person conveying was indebted at the time of the execution of the deed: *secus* as to the stat. 27 *Eliz.* against purchasers 93, 94

The consideration of 5s. and other *valuable considerations*, does not oblige the court to hold the deed to be for a valuable consideration 94

The consideration of marriage is a valuable consideration with but a portion 153

A settlement *after* marriage, upon payment of a sum of money as a portion, good against creditors and purchasers 190

A settlement by a widow previous to her second marriage, of her estate upon her grand children, held good against subsequent purchasers 265

Contract.

See *Catching Bargain.*

Copyhold.

In what Cases a defective Surrender, or the Want of it will be supplied in Equity 385

A. buys a copyhold estate for his own, and two lives, in the manor of ——— where the custom was, that whoever purchases in it, the estate should go in succession, and by his will devises all his estate real and personal to his wife: **Though** the legal interest be according to the custom of the manor, yet *A.* has an equitable interest from being the sole purchaser, and shall be construed as a trust for him, he having advanced the money 385

Where

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Where a man devises all his estate real and personal to a wife or child, and has no other real estate but the copyhold, it shall pass by those general words *Page* 386. n. 1.

Where a copyhold is devised to the wife, the court will supply the want of a surrender, even though she has a provision under a settlement *ibid.*

The rule that the court will not supply a surrender against an heir, must be applied solely to an heir in blood, and not to a *heres factus* *ibid.*

A father purchases land in his son's name, his son being then 18 years of age, the father continued in possession till his death: This shall be considered as an advancement for the son, and not a trust for the father *ibid.*

Parol evidence, though improper, when offered against the legal operation of a will, or an implied trust, shall be admitted where it is in support of law and equity too *ibid.*

A. gives all his lands unfettled, and all his goods and chattels to his wife for life, and afterwards to his younger children, in such manner as she should think fit to dispose of the same: The testator died seised of freehold lands and customary messuages, which were unfettled, and not surrendered to the use of his will: The land settled being only freehold, naturally the lands unfettled must be the same, and therefore the copyhold lands did not pass 387

Where there is no surrender of copyhold lands to the use of a will, they will not pass by a general devise of lands 388

Though there should be no surrender to the use of a will, yet it is sufficient to pass an equity in copyhold lands *ib.*

This court will not supply the defect of a surrender of copyhold estates in favour of a wife or younger children, to the disinherison of an heir unprovided for *ibid.*

Disinherison is not confined to descent, for if an heir is provided for by settlement, or any other way, he cannot be said to be disinherited *ibid.*

N. S. by will devises to his wife and her heirs, all his freehold and copyhold lands, being well assured she would, at her decease, dispose of the lands amongst, all, or such of his children, as by their conduct should deserve it 389

The wife devises all the freehold and copyhold lands, except the copyhold in *Hampton*, to her daughter, and her heirs, and *that copyhold* to the heir at law of the testator, and his heirs. The testatrix gave directions for surrenders of the respective copyhold estates to the use of the will, but died before they were perfected: The heir not being totally unprovided for, the court supplied the surrender *Page* 389

The word *such* gave the wife the power to devise the whole to one child if she had thought fit *ibid.*

The trust of a copyhold not necessary to be surrendered 390

No person can make a common law conveyance of a copyhold estate 96

The court can order the trustee of a copyhold estate to surrender the legal estate, though the *cestui que trust* refuses 215

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See *Bankrupt*, under *Rule as to Copyholds under the Commissions of Bankrupts.*

Creditor and Debtor.

What Conveyance or Disposition shall be fraudulent as to Creditors.

See *Agreements, Articles and Covenants*, *Russel v. Hammond* under *Voluntary Agreements, in what Cases to be performed.* 13

See *Bankrupt*, *Walker v. Burrows*, under *Rule as to Assignees.*

What Conveyance or Disposition shall be good against Creditors.

See *Bankrupt*, *Brown v. Jones*, under *The Construction of the Statute of 21 Jac. 1. cap. 19. with respect to a Bankrupt's Possession of Goods after Assignment.*

General Cases of Creditors and Debtors.

A father, by articles previous to the marriage of his son, covenants at the end of three years after the solemnization thereof, to pay to trustees, their executors,

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ecutors, &c. 12,000*l.* to be settled to the husband for life, to the wife for life, then to the use of the first and other sons in tail male, remainder to the daughter and daughters in tail general, remainder to the right heirs of the husband

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Provided if there should be *but one daughter, and no other child*, and the heirs, &c. of the husband should, within three calendar months after his death, pay to the trustees 4000*l.* then all the uses limited to *such daughter*, and the heirs of her body in the 12,000*l.* should cease and be void, and from thenceforth should be to the use of the heirs and assigns of the husband *ibid.*

The husband dies, leaving no child *but a daughter*, and by his will had devised the 12,000*l.* and all his property in the same, and in the lands to be purchased therewith, subject to the trusts, to his father, his heirs, &c. and appointed him executor: He lets the three months lapse without paying the 4000*l.* as he had not personal assets sufficient to pay it *ibid.*

Mr. Frederick, a judgment creditor of the husband, brought his bill to be paid principal, interest, and costs out of the personal assets of the testator, and if not sufficient, it was insisted that the husband's reversionary interest in the 12,000*l.* ought to be deemed real assets, and applied in payment of his demand *ibid.*

The reversionary interest in the 12,000*l.* together with the benefit of discharging the same from the estate tail limited to the daughter, was considered by Lord Chancellor as real assets, and the plaintiff, Mr. Frederick, notwithstanding the three months were lapsed without payment of the 4000*l.* the court held, ought not to be prejudiced, but let into the benefit of the redemption *ibid.*

The husband, said Lord Chancellor, by purchase from his father, was made owner of the fee in the estate to be bought with the 12,000*l.* and was therefore in nature of a right of redemption in the son, and not a mere naked power

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Where an heir or executor have omitted to do an act within a limited time, it shall never be to the prejudice of a

creditor, but he shall be admitted to do it himself

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See under Bankrupt, Grower, and under Rule as to Landlords.

See Trade and Merchandise.

See Executors and Administrators under What shall be Assets.

See Devise, under Devise of Lands for Payment of Debts.

See Bankrupt, under Rule as to Partnership.

Costs.

Upon payment of 20*s.* costs, a bill may be amended after an answer put in, but Lord Chancellor said he would consider how to make a more adequate compensation to a defendant for the future, after a long answer, and other necessary proceedings had on the part of the defendant

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See Bankrupt, under Rule as to Costs.

See Evidence, Witnesses, and Proof.

See Charity.

Covenant.

See tit. Agreements, Ward.

The issue in tail are not bound by the covenant of the ancestor. *Secus* as to the assignees of a bankrupt

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A covenant by the husband, respecting his wife's expectancy, binds him, tho' the wife was an infant

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Where a release shall amount to a covenant to stand seised

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How far Chancery will or will not exert a Jurisdiction, in Matters cognizable in inferior Courts.

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See Canon Law.

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See Tenant by the Curtsey.

Custom of London.

Concerning the Custom with respect to the Children of a Freeman, and here, of Advancement, bringing into Hotchpot, Survivorship and Forfeiture.

See **Ward and Arbitrement**, *Metcalf v. Ives*, under *For what Causes set aside*.

What Disposition made by a Freeman of his Estate shall be good, or void being in Fraud of the Custom.

A father having five children, three of age, and two infants, enters into an agreement with them, that he would come to London and take up his freedom, provided they would release any right or demand they may be intitled to in respect of the father's personal estate, by virtue of the custom of the city of London: An agreement drawn up accordingly and executed by the father and the three children who were of age Page 399

A bill brought by the plaintiff, and his wife, one of the daughters who was of age at the time of the agreement, for her customary share of the father's estate, he having in his life-time taken up his freedom ibid.

A court of equity will not interpose in voluntary agreements, where they have been entered into without fraud 401

The agreement, Lord Chancellor held, could not operate as a release, for want of an interest in the children for it to operate upon; for they had neither *jus in re*, nor *ad rem*, the whole being in the father during his life ibid.

Agreements of this kind he said ought not to receive any encouragement, and founded manifestly on a mistake of the father. It is a known rule in equity, to relieve against such agreements as are founded on mistakes 402

The custom of London admits of no such bar, for nothing but an actual advancement of a child will have that effect: But if a daughter, who has a portion given by a father on marriage, agrees to take it in satisfaction of any demand she may afterwards have on his estate, this amounts to a bar Page 402

A father's preferring a child in marriage, or advancing money to set up a son in trade, may amount to a bar of his customary share; but in all those instances there must be a valuable consideration moving from him, and an actual benefit accruing to the child 403

A. on his marriage with one of the daughters of John Burrows, had an estate in land settled on him, and the uses of the settlement purchased with the father's money, but signed a note to the father as a receipt for so much more money advanced for his wife's fortune, this must be considered as money, and brought into hotchpot ibid.

Where a wife is compounded with on marriage, by having a jointure, settled on her in lieu of her customary share, the husband shall not be considered as a purchaser of her third, but the orphanage share shall then be a moiety of his estate ibid.

Where money is expressed to be given in part of a portion, though of small amount, yet it is advancement, and must be brought into hotchpot ibid.

An agreement must depend on the circumstances at the time, and cannot be made better or worse by subsequent facts 404

A provision by will that a legatee converting the disposition of the estate shall forfeit his legacy, is *in terrorem* only, and though he contests, it does not forfeit ibid.

A person cannot take by the custom, and under the will in any instance whatever ibid.

What is, or is not, an Advancement.

If a child or children of a free man of London are advanced in the father's lifetime, they shall be said to be fully advanced, unless the quantum of the advancement appears in writing under his hand 406

This

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This custom will hold equally with regard to an only child, as where there are many children Page 407

Parol evidence of a father's declaration, will not be allowed to debar a child of her orphanage share; but proofs of declarations by the husband, in regard to an advancement in marriage with the daughter of a freeman, will be admitted as evidence, because they are declarations against his own interest *ibid.*

Proofs also of declarations of the wife, made during the coverture of her first husband, may be read against the second, and will bind as much as if made after the death of the first, and before marriage with the second husband *ibid.*

Unless what a freeman has advanced to a child appears by some book, written with the freeman's own hand, the court will not direct an inquiry whether it was a full advancement 408

Where a father or mother are in low circumstances, the child ought to be maintained out of a provision left by a collateral relation

Decree.

AN original independent decree may be had in the court of chancery, where all the facts are stated by the bill, notwithstanding there was a former decree for the same matter in *Wales* *ibid.*

An infant may have a decree upon any matter arising on the state of his case, though not particularly prayed by his bill 6

Deeds and other Writings.

Deeds and Instruments entered into by Fraud, in what Cases to be relieved against.

Though a man is arrested by due process, yet if he is obliged to execute a conveyance whilst under arrest, this court will construe it a duress and relieve against such conveyance 409

Every man is supposed to be consant of a deed to which he is a party 294

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Demurrer.

Vide *Answers, Pleas, and Demurrers.*

Vide *Bill for Discovery.*

Vide *Evidence, Witnesses and Proof.*

A demurrer bad in part, void in *note*; otherwise as to a plea. Page 450

There cannot be two demurrers to the same bill note 1. 451

Nor can there be a saving of any thing on a demurrer *ibid.*

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Where money being entailed under a will shall or shall not go to the first taker 286. 429

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See *Hayward v. Stillingfleet* 422
By a devise of all lands, tenements, and hereditaments, a mortgage in fee shall pass note 1. 605

Of void Devises by Uncertainty in the Description of the Person to take.

In a devise any thing that amounts to a *designatio personæ* is sufficient, and tho' bastards strictly are not sons, yet if they have acquired that name by reputation, in common parlance they are 410
Though a person's name is mistaken in a devise, yet if made out by averment to be the person meant, and can be applied to no other, the devise to him is good *ibid.*

R. L. devises to *R. M.* eldest son of his nephew *R. M.* and the first heirs male of his body, and in default of such issue, to the second son of the said *R. M.* and the heirs male of his body, and their issue; remainder over &c. These words, the second son of the said *R. M.* do not mean the second son of the devisee, but *John* the second son of the testator's nephew *R. M.* 411

A court never construes a devise void, unless it is so absolutely dark that they cannot find out the testator's meaning 412

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Words of limitation super-added to preceding words of limitation, will not make *the first* words of purchase, but the subsequent ought to be rejected as *redundant* Page 413

Subsequent words of limitation affect not the legal operation of the preceding words of limitation, unless the word *heir* is used in the singular number, or an express estate for life limited to the first taker *ibid.*

No stress to be laid upon the word *first*, it means only that they should take in succession according to priority of birth

414

R. R. gives to his niece *A. S.* 5000 *l.* in the old *S. S.* annuity-stock of the *S. S.* company, and to his nephew *R. P.* 5000 *l.* in the old *S. S.* company. At the time of making his will, and at his death, testator had only 5000 *l.* in old *S. S.* annuity-stock *ibid.*

Lord Chancellor said, they are to be considered as two distinct legacies, and *A. S.* and *R. P.* are intitled to have them made good out of the testator's assets, and the executor was directed to purchase out of the personal estate 5000 *l.* old *S. S.* annuity-stock, and transfer one moiety to *A. S.* and the other moiety to his own use, and the 5000 *l.* old *S. S.* annuities, which the testator died possessed of, to be applied proportionably towards payment of the legacies to *A. S.* and *R. P.* 414

Mistakes in making wills are never to be supposed, if any construction that is agreeable to reason can be found out 415

Every clause in a will shall be construed so as to take effect according to the testator's intent, if it is consistent with the rules of law 416

Where a particular chattel is specifically described and distinguished from all other things of the same kind, and is not found among the testator's effects, it fails; or if given first to *A.* and then to *B.* they must divide it; or if disposed of in testator's life-time, it is an ademption of such legacy 417

In our law, said *Lord Chancellor*, particular legatees are always preferred before the residuary legatees, (though otherwise in the *Roman law*), the *residuum* being considered by us as *the gleanings* of the testator's estate 418

Of Devises of Lands for Payment of Debts.

A. by his will, first gives an estate for life to his wife, and in the latter part creates a trust term for payment of debts to take place from the day of his death: The term though subsequent, shall take place of the wife's estate for life, especially as it is a trust term for raising money Page 419

Immaterial how a testator places the several devises in a will, because the whole must be construed together, so as to make it consistent *ibid.*

A testator devises all his real and personal estate to be sold for payment of his debts, and appoints the defendant executor; the personal estate not being sufficient, a bill was brought by bond, and note creditors of the testator, to be paid their demands out of the real estate. The question, whether the executor can sell the same, as the testator had given it generally to be sold, without directing who should sell 420

Lord Chancellor was of opinion the money arising from the sale would be legal assets in the hands of the executor, and therefore thought it a reasonable construction that he should be the person to make the sale, and decreed accordingly *ibid.*

Where lands are devised to trustee to be sold for payment of debts, and the heir is an infant, he has no day to show cause when he comes of age; but if the lands are not devised to any particular person it is otherwise 421

A proviso in the will of *R. B.* that if his personal estate, and house and lands at *W.* should not pay his debts, then *his executors to raise the same* out of his copyhold premises *ibid.*

The rents not being sufficient to discharge testator's debts, these words will give the trustees a power to sell the copyhold lands to satisfy his intention of paying his debts *ibid.*

W. H. by will, gave 100 *l.* to his daughter *Francis*, and 450 *l.* between two other daughters, and then devises his land in trust for a term of ninety-nine years, with a power to raise a less term upon trust, that if his wife should within four years pay off the 550 *l.* then he gives the lands to her for life, and

after

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after her death to *W. H.* his son and his heirs male and female, and for want of such issue, to him and his heirs for ever Page 422

This, said the court, is a conditional limitation in the wife, taking place as an executory devise, and if so, the freehold descended to the son as heir at law to the testator, till the four years were elapsed, or his wife had performed the condition, as a part of the inheritance undisposed of, and by this devise the son had a good estate tail in the inheritance, expectant on the determination of the term of ninety-nine years *ibid.*

Wherever there is a limitation with remainder over made in the words of a condition, which would be construed as a condition, if they could take effect ought to be construed as a limitation if they cannot 424

Where a Devise shall or shall not be in satisfaction of a Thing due.

A. gives an annuity of 20*l.* to his daughter, and the heirs of her body, quarterly, without any abatement. *B.* the surviving executor of *A.* gives to the daughter of *A.* and her daughter, an annuity of 20*l.* by his will, to be paid quarterly without any abatement, out of his freehold houses in *Holborn*, and if they die without issue, then to return to the plaintiff his heir, and by indorsement upon the will, with a pencil, says, I hope this 20*l.* will not be taken for another 20*l.* annuity, but to confirm the 20*l.* *per ann.* her father left her and her daughter 425

The indorsement of no weight, as nothing can either enlarge or diminish what affects real estate, unless it be executed according to the statute of frauds and perjuries *ibid.*

In construing one legacy to be a satisfaction for another, regard must be always had, said *Lord Chancellor*, to the particular circumstances, limitations, and funds out of which the two several legacies are to arise: The daughter of *A.* not entitled to both annuities, for his surviving executor, who was alone chargeable by way of personal demand, might, by way of exoneration of the father's personal estate, direct that if she took the annuity under his will,

she should not have it out of his father's personal estate Page 426

R. B. on his marriage in 1713, settled exchequer annuities for 99 years, amounting to 300*l.* *per ann.* in trust for himself for life, remainder to his wife for life, remainder to his children, in such manner as he should appoint: By the marriage, only one child, a daughter. In 1720, *R. B.* devised all his real and personal estate to his wife, and her heirs, charged with 10,000*l.* as a portion for his daughter, payable at 18. After the death of *R. B.* his wife makes her will, and gives all her real and personal estate to her daughter and her heirs, but if she die before she was of age to dispose, then to trustees to raise 6000*l.* for a charity, the residue thereof if her daughter dies unmarried, to the sisters of the testatrix: The daughter, after the mother's death marries *Mr. Bellasis*, has issue a daughter, and dies about the age of twenty 426

Bellasis, as representative of his wife, and in his own right, brings a bill for an account of the real and personal estate of *R. B.* and his wife; the daughter, said the court, is entitled under the settlement to the exchequer annuities, as an interest vested in her, and the father had only a power of disposing thereof among his children as he thought proper, and there being only one child, she is entitled to the whole *ibid.*

The 10,000*l.* devised by the will of the father to the daughter, shall not be taken to be in satisfaction of the annuities; though this court leans against double portions, yet regard must be had to circumstances; as where there is an eldest son, or more children, and the demand would be to their prejudice, but here it is an only child 427
The thing given in satisfaction must be of the same nature, and attended with the same certainty, as that in lieu of which it is given, and land is no satisfaction for money, nor *vice versa*, money for land; and though they are both of the same nature here, yet the legacy of 10,000*l.* is subject to a contingency of her arriving at 18, and a mere contingency shall not take away a portion

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tion absolutely vested, especially in the case of an only child *P. 428*
 person at the age of 14 may dispose of personal estate, as the law now stands, a daughter entitled at that age to all personal estate devised to her by her mother; and as she made no disposition, will go to the husband *ibid.*
 word *thercof* must be construed *red- singula singulis*, as applied to personal or real estate *ibid.*
 residue of the mother's real estate, the charity, shall go to the daughter and so to the husband, as the conveyance on which it is given over has happened; and besides, in doubt-cases, the heir is always to be preferred *428*

See Dower and Jointure.

What Words pass an Estate tail.

his will devises to his eldest son *than* a real estate for life, remainder to his sons in tail male, remainder to his second son *John* for life, remainder to his sons in tail male, remainder to plaintiff's father *George Ivie* for life, remainder to his sons in tail male, remainder over. And also gave three trustees two long annuities of £1 each in trust, as to one for the plaintiff's father for life, and then to plaintiff for life, remainder to the male of his body, remainder; and as to the other, in trust for the son *Robert* for life, and in default of issue male, remainder to *Ivie* for life, remainder to his male in tail male, remainder to *George* for life, remainder to plaintiffs *se*, with divers remainders over, appointed *John* his executor, who collected himself of the title deeds of real estate, and tallies belonging to annuities. *Jonathan Ivie* is dead without issue, *Robert* likewise without male, and the son of *John Ivie*, after testator's death, is since dead, his father has administered. In *John* joined with *George* in the purchase of the annuity devised to *George* 1250*l.* and the purchase money to *George* *429 & 430*
 plaintiff, the son of *George*, brings bill to have the deeds and writings *ol. l.*

relating to the real estate deposited in court; and as to the annuity devised to *John* and to plaintiff in remainder, to have security given for the payment of it, when his interest therein should take effect in possession. And as to the other annuity, to have a satisfaction against *John* for the breach of trust in concurring in the sale thereof to the plaintiff's prejudice, and for an equivalent upon the death of his father *George Ivie* *Pages 429 & 430*
Lord Chancellor of opinion, as to the annuity devised to *Robert*, and afterwards to *John* for life, &c. that there being words of limitation annexed, such as would create an estate tail in the case of real estate upon the birth of a son of *John*, the whole interest in remainder vested in such son; and that *John*, as administrator to his son, is absolutely entitled to it, and, as to this demand, dismissed the bill *430*

Where a trustee has been corruptly guilty of a breach of trust, the court will compel such trustee to make satisfaction to the utmost; but as to the annuity sold by *John*, as it was at the instance of *George*, and the money received by *George*, he would not charge *John* with the price the annuity was sold at, but decreed that *George* and *John*, or one of them, do, at their own charge, purchase an exchequer annuity of 100*l.* a year, for 99 years, and assign the same to trustees, to be approved of by the master, and the trusts thereof to be declared according to the limitations in the will *ibid.*

His Lordship refused to direct the deeds and writings to be deposited in court, because the plaintiff's interest in the real estate was too remote to warrant it, and is never done, but in the case of a remainder man, whose estate is expectant on a mere tenancy for life *431*

R. W. by his will devised to his wife *Elizabeth* all his lands, &c. not settled in jointure, and then says, if it shall happen that she shall have no son nor daughter by me, for want of such issue, the said premises to return to my brother (the plaintiff) if he shall be then living, and his heirs for ever paying to *A.* and *B.* 150*l.* within a year after *Elizabeth's* death: Decreed to be an estate *Y y*

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estate tail in *Elizabeth*, because where preceding words are proper to create an estate tail the legal operation of them cannot be controlled by subsequent provisions Page 432

The words, if *Elizabeth* has no son nor daughter, must be understood having no issue, and the words for want of such issue amount to the same as if the testator had said for want of issue generally 434

Of Things personal, as Goods and Chattels, &c. by what Description, and to whom good.

A. devises a freehold messuage at *Romford* to a charity school there, and directs the rents and profits to be applied for the benefit of the school, *so long as it shall be continued to be endowed with charity*: And by the same will, reciting a debt of 1000 *l.* to be owing to him, gives the said sum to the coopers' company to build alms-houses: The debt devised by the will, instead of 1000 *l.* amounted to 365 *l.* 16 *s.* 7 *d.* only: the freehold estate being devised to a charity, so long as it continues to be endowed with charity, is only *quousque*, and when it ceases, as it is a gift of real estate, it shall revert for the benefit of the heir of the testator 435

Though the debt devised by the will amounts only to 365 *l.* 16 *s.* 7 *d.* yet the wrong description, and falling short, will not defeat the legacy *ibid.* Where a person gives a debt by his will to a corporation, they may recover it in the ecclesiastical court ibid.

What Words pass a Fee in a Will.

T. C. by will gives to the *Latin* school of *Trevill*, if any man is possessed of it that teacheth boys, and is richly grounded in the *Latin* tongue, five pounds, to be paid him yearly, for teaching and instructing three boys: As it is not to a particular school-master, but to the school itself, it is a perpetuity, and the general words for instructing three boys mean three in succession, one after another 436

A gift to the parish church of *A.* has been construed a gift to the parson and parishioners of *A.* and their successors for ever 437

Item in a will is a conjunctive in the sense of *and* or *also*, and is only made use of to distinguish the clauses Page 438
Where a will directs payments out of land yearly, at a particular time, it cannot be altered to half yearly payments 438

For more of Devises,

See **Will**, under *Bills of Discovery*.

See **Exposition of Words**.

See **Dower and Jointure**.

See **Legacy**, under *Ademption of it*.

See **Conditions and Limitations**.

Distribution, (*Statute of*.)

See **tit. Executors and Administrators**.

Aunts and nephews in the same degree of relation to an intestate, and equally intitled under the statute of **Distributions** 454

Where an intestate leaves brother's or sister's children, and no brother or sister, they take *per capita* as next of kin, and not by representation: So if he died, leaving aunts and nieces, and no brother or sister, they would all take *per capita*; but if the father of the nieces had been living, he would have taken the whole 456

The statute of **Distributions**, and the statute of *Jac. 2*, very incorrectly penned, and therefore the latter is to be construed according to the intent of the legislature 457

The word *and* in the 7th section of *1 Jac. 2. c. 17*. immediately preceding the words *the representatives*, must be construed in the disjunctive 457

The proviso in the statute of *James* is to be incorporated into the statute of *Charles* where it says, that representations shall not be carried beyond brothers and sisters children. The rule is, that statutes made *pari materia* shall be construed into one another 457

The word *relations* or *kindred* in a will (without any specification of what relations or kindred) is confined to such as are within the statute of **Distributions** note 1. 459

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Dower and Jointure.

What shall be a good Satisfaction, or good Bar of Dower, and how far a Dowress will be favoured in Equity.

A provision for a wife, in articles before marriage, thereby declared to be in full satisfaction of dower, or any claim or right by Common-law, custom of the city, or any other usage, law or custom notwithstanding. The wife survived the husband, and accepted of the terms mentioned in the articles: This demand of the wife, said the court, may be extinguished by agreement, and as she was an infant when the articles were signed, and had her election at her husband's death, which she has made by accepting what was designed as a satisfaction for dower, she has barred herself thereof Page 439

The words in the articles, *any law, usage, or custom notwithstanding*, extend to the husband's personal estate, and bar the wife of her share, under the statute of distributions 440

Of making good a Deficiency out of a Husband's Assets.

A widow brings her bill to have the deficiency of her jointure made good out of the assets of her husband, and his father, and also for 1000*l.* left her by her husband, payable with interest from three months after his death, and for her *paraphernalia* ibid.

The father and son having covenanted that the lands settled upon her for her jointure were worth 300*l.* *per ann.* and being both parties to the marriage contract, it was held, she had a lien upon the estate of the father and son; and an account of assets was decreed, and that the deficiency should be made good out of the son's estate, it appearing that he had received most of the fortune 440

The 1000*l.* given by the will to the wife, said Lord Chancellor, cannot be considered as a satisfaction for the deficiency of her jointure, for as the jointure lands are covenanted to be worth so much clear of all reprises, the testator intended the 1000*l.* as a bounty 441

If a person in the execution sufficiently describes the estate, he had a power to charge, the estate is bound though there is no reference to the deed out of which the power arises Page 441

Where there are real estates descended, the wife may be intitled to her *paraphernalia*, but otherwise in this case, where the real estates came by the husband. ibid.

Of what Estate of the Husband's with respect to the Nature and Quality thereof, shall a Woman be endowed.

Ralph Sneyd, being seised in tail male of several manors, and lands, and in possession of great part thereof, and having purchased several others, intermarried with the defendant the plaintiff's mother, and died in October 1733 intestate: The plaintiff, as his eldest son and heir in tail, brings a bill to set aside the assignment of dower for partiality, upon a suggestion that part of the estate was copyhold, and not liable thereto 442

If the husband became entitled to the copyhold estates by copy of court-roll, and granted them out again by copy of court roll, his wife is not entitled to dower; but if he became entitled otherwise than by copy of court roll, and did not grant them out again by copy of court roll, she is entitled to dower out of those estates ibid.

A wife is not entitled to dower out of an instantaneous seisin 443

The donee of a fine is not so seised as to give the wife a title to dower; nor in the case of a use has the widow of a trustee any claim of dower from such a momentary seisin in the husband 443

Durefs.

If a man be legally arrested, and whilst under the arrest, is obliged to execute a conveyance, this is durefs, and the court will relieve 409

See **Dower**, under *Of the right Execution of a Power, and where a Defect therein will be supplied.* *Hervy v. Hervy.*

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Ejectment.

See Jointenants and Tenants in
Common.

Estate for Lives.

See Occupant.

Estate Tail.

See Devise.

Evidence, Witnesses and Proof.

What will, or will not be admitted as Evidence, and will amount to sufficient Proof.

THOUGH a bill in chancery cannot be received in evidence at law, yet in this court may be read, and has been often allowed as evidence

Page 65

The court will allow the proving of exhibits *visâ voce* at the hearing, but not to let in other examinations, and this only at the application of the party who is to make use of the exhibits, but no instance where it is allowed at the application of the contrary party 444
Where a person has been examined here, his deposition may be read at law, *between the same parties* if proved to be dead, or sick, or out of the kingdom

445

Where an original note is lost, and a copy of it is offered in evidence, you must shew the original note was genuine. before you will be allowed to read the copy

446

See Award and Arbitrament. *Metcalf v. Ives*, under *For what Causes set aside*

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See Alien, 21.

See Bankrupt. *Eade v. Lingcod*, under *Rule as to Examinations taken before Commissioners*

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See Power.

See Will, under *Bills of Discovery*, &c.

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Where parol or collateral Evidence will, or will not, be admitted to explain, confirm, or contradict what appears on the Face of a Deed or Will.

See Copyhold, *Taylor v. Taylor*

386

A bill brought to set aside an assignment of a leasehold estate, &c. upon suggestion that it was not intended as an absolute assignment, but subject to a trust for the plaintiff's benefit; though no express trust in the deed, yet, as it might be collected from circumstances arising out of the assignment itself, inconsistent with an absolute disposition; and other circumstances creating a strong presumption of a trust; Lord Chancellor admitted parol evidence to explain this transaction

Page 447

Though there can be no parol declaration of a trust since 29 Car. 2. yet parol evidence is proper here in avoidance of fraud intended to be put upon the plaintiff

448

A person left *A. 20 l. per ann.* by a codicil to his will, and after talking of making another codicil, and leaving him 15 l. more, the attorney told him, that if *B. C.* and *D.* whom he had made devisees of his estate, would give him a bond to pay him 15 l. *per ann.* it would be sufficient; *B.* being present, promised that he and the devisees would, and a draft was prepared, but not executed; testator lived five weeks after, and *A.* remained nine years without demanding the performance of the promise or draft to be perfected, and then brings his bill; dismissed at the Rolls, and upon appeal, decree of dismissal affirmed

ibid.

The court will not add a legacy to a will upon parol proof, though it concerns the personal estate only; a *fortiori* where it tends to charge lands 449
It is not in the power of the court to relieve against accidents, which prevent voluntary dispositions of estates 449

Of examining Witnesses de bene esse, and establishing their Testimony in perpetuum Rei Memoriam

450

Bill brought to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses to a bond charged to be usurious, and alleging that the defendant, one *Green*, whom the plaintiff wanted to examine, was very aged and infirm: *Green*, who was a *nominee* only in the bond, demurred, as the bill sought to subject him to a penalty,

224

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and also as the plaintiff does not offer to pay what is really due *Page 450*
If the demurrer had stopped at the first part, it would have been good, but as it goes to the perpetuating the testimony, it is bad, and over-ruled, but without prejudice to *Green's* insisting on the same thing, by way of answer *ibid.*

A trustee has as much the benefit of the pleading of this court, as he that has the equitable interest, and *cestuique* trust is entitled to have the privilege maintained by the trustee *ibid.*

A plaintiff is entitled to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses to an usurious contract, notwithstanding his not offering, by the bill, to pay *451*

A man may bring a bill to perpetuate the testimony in many cases, where he cannot bring a bill for relief, without waiving the penalty, as in cases in waste, &c. *ibid.*

A demurrer, bad in part, is void *in toto*, otherwise as to a plea *ibid.*

See **Purchase**, under *Of Purchasers without Notice.*

Of the Sufficiency or Disability of a Witness.

Though a wife is a defendant, and charged with fraud and mal-practices, yet the evidence of the husband shall be admitted, where the interest of a third person shall be concerned *ibid.*

A person, who at law is put into a *simulcum*, may be admitted as a witness, that he may not be made a defendant, only to take off his evidence, but if there is strong proof that he is *particeps criminis*, he will be excluded from being a witness *452*

Where a feme covert has been guilty of a fraud solely without the husband, there is no precedent of the court's making him pay costs *453*

Rules the same in Equity as at Law.

The rules, as to evidence, are the same in equity as at law *ibid.*

Where two leases are set up, you cannot read one of them, till you have proved possession under that lease *ibid.*

To shew a title in the lessor, he must prove actual payment of rent, receipts alone will not do *Page 453*

Bailiffs rentals are evidence of payments *ibid.*

Matters in Chancery in reports are only to state bare matters of fact *454*

Executors and Administrators.

See **Fixtures.**

The interest and authority of executors is joint and cannot be divided into distinct powers *495*

Who are intitled to a Distribution.

Aunts and nephews are in the same degree of relation to an intestate, and equally entitled under the statute of distributions: No right of representation here, but must take *per capita*, and not *per stirpes* *454*

William Stanley and Anne his wife had two sons, *George* and *Hoby*, who severally married in their father's life-time; *William*, the father, dies; *Anne*, his wife, survives him: *George* afterwards dies, and leaves several children, who are still living; then *Hoby* dies intestate and without issue, leaving *Philippa* his wife possessed of a very large personal estate: The children of *George* brought a bill against *Philippa*, who had administered to her husband, and also against *Anne* their grandmother, insisting, that, as the representatives of their father, they were entitled, with their grandmother, to one half of the moiety of the intestate's estate, the wife being entitled to the other moiety, by 22 & 23 Car. 2. cap. 10. *455*

The residue of the intestate's estate, after satisfaction of debts, was by *Lord Chancellor*, directed to be divided into four equal parts, two-fourths thereof to be retained by *Philippa* the intestate's widow, one other fourth part to be paid to *Anne Stanley* the intestate's mother, and the remaining fourth part to be laid out in *South sea* annuities, in the name of the accomptant general, subject to the order of the court for the benefit of the children of *George*, equally to be divided *455*

A Table of the Principal Matters.

Where an intestate leaves brother's or sister's children, and no brother or sister, they take *per capita*, as next of kin, and not by representation: So if he died, leaving aunts and nieces, and no brother or sister, they would all take *per capita*; but if the father of the nieces had been living, he would have taken the whole Page 456

The statute of distributions, and the statute of *Jac. 2.* are very incorrectly penned, and therefore the latter is to be construed according to the intent of the legislature 457

The word *and* in the seventh section of 1 *Jac. cap. 16.* immediately preceding the words *the representatives*, must be construed in the disjunctive. *ibid.*

The proviso in the statute of *James*, is to be incorporated into the statute of *Charles*, where it says, that *representations* shall not be carried beyond brother's and sister's children: The rule is, that statutes made *pari materia*, shall be construed into one another ibid.

Of Administration to whom to be granted.

A. survives her first husband, who left her a legacy; she dies, the legacy being unreceived by the second husband during her life, after her death he administers, and dies before the legacy came to his hands; his administrator gets it in, and the administrator *de bonis non* of the wife brings this bill for the legacy 458

A court of equity considers the administrator *de bonis non* as a trustee for the administrator of the husband, who having an absolute right by surviving his wife, his administrator ought to have the benefit of it 458

During the coverture, husband and wife are but one person; but when she dies, he has a right to administer exclusive of all other persons ibid.

Of Remedies by one Executor or Administrator against another, and how far one shall be answerable for the other.

The plaintiff and *W. H.* administrators to *J. H.* empower the defendants by letters of attorney to get in the intestate's effects in *Flanders*. *W. H.* afterwards

settles the account with them, receives the balance, gives a general release, and then dies: The plaintiff, as surviving administrator, prays the stated accounts and releases may be set aside, as being settled without his privity Page 460

One administrator, said the court, cannot release a debt so as to bind his fellow, otherwise as to an executor, for each entirely represents the testator; but the release of one administrator may bar both, if the releasee is accountable to them in their own right, and not as administrators. The releases here being unfairly obtained, though effectual in law, were set aside in equity ibid.

The interest of an executor arises not from the probate, but from the testator, therefore he may release a debt, or assign a term before probate 461

If a debtor be made executor, the debt is totally extinguished (but see note 3.) otherwise if he be appointed administrator, for it is no extinguishment of the debt, but a suspension of the action, and his representative is chargeable at the suit of the administrator *de bonis non*, &c. of the first intestate ibid.

The rights of executors and administrators depend on different foundations, the latter arising from *the ordinary*, the former from the testator ibid.

An administration properly defined, a private office of trust, for it is more than a bare authority, and yet less than the interest of an executor ibid.

A person acting under a letter of attorney from administrators may be sued by them in their own right as a bailiff or receiver, and need not name themselves administrators 462

Though administrators in an action of trover may name themselves so, yet they need not do it, for they may sue in their own right ibid.

Where one administrator dies, the right survives without new letters of administration ibid. but see note 1.

What shall be Assets.

A. mortgaged his estate to *B.* who paid no money, but gave a bond for 130*l.*
A. afterwards

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- A* afterwards makes *B.* his executor: Though at law making the obligor executor extinguishes the debt, yet here the bond is ass'ts in the hands of *B.* and shall be applied in exoneration of the real estate Page 463
- An executor assigns over a mortgage term of his testator to *A.* as a satisfaction of a debt due to *A.* from the executor, this is a good alienation, and *A.* shall have the benefit of it against the daughters of the testator, who were creditors under a marriage settlement *ibid.*
- At law an executor may alien the ass'ts of a testator, and when aliened, no creditor can follow them, and where the alienation is for a valuable consideration, this court suffers it as well as at law *ibid.*
- No difference in this court between the power of an executor to dispose of equitable and legal ass'ts 464
- An assignment by an executor of a testator's ass'ts to a person who has a sum of money *bonâ fide* due, is as valuable a consideration as for money paid down *ibid.*
- Before the marriage of *Edward Toye* with *Mary Broughton*, it was agreed that 300*l.* till it could be laid out in the purchase of lands, should be settled in trust to *Edward Toye* for life, to *Mary Broughton* for life, and in default of issue, to the use of such person, and for such estate as she should by any deed direct or appoint, and for want of such appointment, to her right heirs for ever 465
- Mary* by deed-poll appoints the 300*l.* to be paid to her husband to be employed by him to such charitable uses, or other intents or purposes as he should think fit: *Edward Toye* by will devises to the defendants *William, Sarah, and Anne Broughton*, 100*l.* a-piece, being the money charged on the estate of the wife's father, and declared, in his will, that such disposition was in pursuance of her directions 465
- The creditors of *Edward Toye* bring their bill to have the 300*l.* applied to the payment of his debts, as a part of his ass'ts: This, said the court, is not a naked power only to convey to charitable uses, but ought to be considered as a part of the ass'ts of *Edward Toye*, and applied in payment of his debts *ibid.*
- There are only three ways of property, enjoying in one's own right, transferring that right to another, and the right of representation Page 466
- A man cannot by an expression in his will alter the nature of his estate, and disappoint his creditors *ibid.*
- No instance of a construction in favour of legatees to the prejudice of creditors, unless the creditors found their right under the will itself *ibid.*
- Rule where a husband is left sole executor 467
- Rule as to survivorship *ibid.*
- Rule upon a devise for life, without impeachment of waste *ibid.*
- Rule as to payment of interest *ibid.*
- ### See Ass'ts.
- Rule where a Bill is brought against an Executor of an Executor.
- The plaintiff's father died intestate, the mother administered; forty years after the father's death, the son, who had accepted of a legacy under the will of the mother, equal to two thirds of what his father left, brings his bill against the mother's executor, to account for the father's personal estate come to her hands: To deter others from such frivolous suits, his Lordship dismissed the bill with costs *ibid.*
- The rule in relation to costs to be paid by an executor defendant, is the same in the court of chancery as at law 468
- ### See Jointenants and Tenants in Common.
- ### See Bonds and Obligations.
- ### See Creditor and Debtor.
- ### See Bankrupt.
- ### Exposition of Words.
- ### See tit. Construction.
- N. H.* by will gives to *Elizabeth* his wife all his estate, leases, and interest in his house in *Hatton Garden*, and all the goods and furniture therein at the time of his death, and also all his plate, jewels, &c. but desired her as or before her
- Y y 4

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her death, to give such leases, house, furniture, goods, plate, and jewels, into and amongst such of his own relations, as she should think most deserving and approve of, and made her executrix Page 469

Elizabeth, by her will gave all her estate and interest to *H. S.* in the said house in *Hatton Garden*, and after several legacies, the residue of her personal estate to the defendant, and two other persons, and made them executors; but neither gave, at or before her death, the goods in the said house, or her husband's jewels to his said relations *ibid.*

The Master of the Rolls was of opinion that *Elizabeth*, under the will of *N. H.* took only beneficially during her life, and that so much of the household goods in *Hatton Garden*, as were not disposed of by her according to the power given her by the will of *N. H.* in case the same remain in specie, or the value thereof, ought to be divided equally among such of the relations, as were, &c. at the time of her death *ib.*

The words *willing* or *desiring* in a will have been frequently construed to amount to a trust 470

Where the uncertainty is such that the court cannot possibly determine who are meant in a will, it may be construed only as a recommendation to the first devisee, and make it an absolute gift to him *ibid.*

Where there is a devise to relations in a will, the statute of distributions a good rule to go by, in construing who are meant by that word 470

Sir *J. L.* gives, by a codicil to his will, to *E. M.* during her natural life, his house in *Greenwich*, with all the household goods that shall be found therein at the time of his decease: The word *with* so conjoins the devise of the house and household goods, that the devisee can have no larger interest in the latter than was limited as to the former. *ibid.*

The word *with* would have had the same effect in the case of a grant *ibid.*

A tenant for life of goods, is not obliged to give security for the goods, but to sign an inventory only to the person in remainder 471

A. devises several leasehold estates to two trustees, in trust, if his granddaughter married without their consent, to

convey the premises to two other trustees, in trust for her separate use during the husband's life, and after his death, for the use and benefit of his issue: Tho' she has no children the first husband, she has only a right for her life, for the issue by any husband are provided for by this settlement Page 4.

See **Devises**, under *What Words pass Fee in a Will.*

See **Distribution.**

See **Remainder.**

See **Jointenants.**

See **Bankrupt**, under *Rule as to signs.* 87.

See **Dower and Jointure.**

Extent of the Crown.

See **Bankrupt**, under *Rule as to extent of the Crown.* 262.

Fines and Recoveries.

What Estate or Interest may be barred transferred by a Fine or Recovery.

A limitation in a will to *C.* and his heirs to the use of him and his heirs in trust to pay debts, and after in for *D.* and the heirs of his body, in default of heirs of the body remainder to *C.* and his heirs: recovery of *D.* barred the remainder to *C.* as being a remainder of a fee for a remainder of a legal estate cannot be barred by the recovery of a fee in trust only

A common recovery suffered in the Common Pleas will not pass copyholds; otherwise as to customary holds

What Estate or Interest is not barred by a Fine or Recovery.

T. B. by proviso in a marriage settlement gives his wife a power to dispose of 100*l.* by will to such person

A Table of the Principal Matters.

oint, to be paid to the wife
ie year after his death, and in
f such payment, *J. M.* is en-
to make a lease of particular
raise this sum; the wife makes
ntment of the 100*l.* but never
it while living; the heirs of the
mortgaged the estate of *B.*
1 had no notice of this power:
ds, on *B.*'s purchasing the e-
e heirs of the husband levy a
im, and convey the equity of
ion as a collateral security,
n had notice of the power; five
urred after levying of the fine,
claim made on the part of the
es of 100*l.* but they now
eir bill to be paid this sum

Page 474

ellor held, that the plaintiffs
itled to 100*l.* and interest from
of one year after the death of
ekley the wife of *T. B.* *ibid.*
ced power is not barred by any
atures of fines, otherwise as to
See termini 476

ments, &c. under the Divi-
bich ought to be performed in
2.

See Forfeiture.

Fixtures.

What shall be deemed such.

ge of a brewhouse with the
nances, will not carry the
, but the things only belong-
he out-houses 477
or cannot enter to take away
, without being a trespasser *ib.*
during the term may take away
y-pieces, and even waincot;
, he is a trespasser *ibid.*
e of a brewhouse, the utensils
pafs 478
ned to the cieling with ropes,
1 nailed, are not fixtures, but
removed *ibid.*

Forfeiture.

hase, *Brandling v. Ord.* under,
Purchasers without Notice.

e Custom of London.

Freeman of London.

See under **Bankrupt**, *Carrington*, and
under *Who are liable to Bankruptcy.*

Fraud.

See title **Conveyances**, (*fraudulent.*)

See **Deeds** and other **Writings.**

See **Bill.**

Guardian.

Vide tit. **Infant.**

*What Acts of his with regard to the In-
fant's Estate shall be good.*

A. Who had a bishop's lease to her and
her heirs during three lives, devises
the same to her daughter an infant,
and directs the guardian and trustees
to make purchases for the infant's be-
nefit: The guardian, upon the decease
of one of the three lives: took a new
lease for three new lives; The infant
dies Page 480

The lease shall go to the heirs *ex parte*
paternâ; for the new lease is to be
considered as a new acquisition, and
to vest in the infant as a purchase
ibid.

The reason why an infant's personal estate
turned into real, is still considered as
personal, is, on account of the differ-
ent ages at which the infant may dis-
pose of his personal and his real estate
and not in favour to one representative
more than another *ibid.*

The act of a guardian, where a reason-
able one, will have the same conse-
quence, as if done by the infant at
full age; otherwise, if wantonly done
by the guardian, without any real be-
nefit to the infant 481

Habeas Corpus.

See under **Bankrupt**, *Lingood*, and under
*Rule as to a Certificate from Commis-
sioners to a Judge.* 240.

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Heir and Ancestry.

Where Charges and Incumbrances on the Land shall be raised, or shall sink in the Inheritance for the Benefit of the Heir.

See **Conditions and Limitations.** *Harvey v. Apton*, under *In what Cases a Gift or Devise, upon Condition not to marry without Consent, shall be good and binding, or void, being only in terrorem.* Page 361

T. C. devised all his lands to *J. C.* and *J. P.* and their heirs *in trust*, that they should sell his lands in *M.* and *P.* and out of the purchase money pay his debts, and as to the rest *in trust*, to receive the rents, and to make leases for 99 years, determinable, &c. and therewith to pay his debts and legacies, then to the use of *J. A.* wife of *C. A.* for life, remainder to the issue male and female of her body, and makes the trustees executors: He likewise gives a legacy of 500 *l.* to his nephew *Thomas Prowse*, to be paid at 21, or marriage, who died before 21: The personal estate of the value of 700 *l.* the lands in *M.* and *P.* not sufficient to pay the debts Page 482

A bill brought by the administrator of *Thomas Prowse*, to have the legacy of 500 *l.* raised: *Lord Chancellor* of opinion, as it was charged upon the real, as well as the personal estate, it could not be raised, as the legatee died before the time of payment, and dismissed the bill *ibid.*

Money arising from the sale of a real estate is legal assets only, where it is sold under a bare power given to sell, not where the interest in the estate passes by the will to the devisees; and making the trustees executors, does not alter the case 484

A devise to *A.* and *B.* and their heirs, till such a sum be raised for payment of debts, does not create a fund out of legal assets, but is proper only to give the devisee an interest in the lands specifically, and not to turn them into personal estate *ibid.*

The resolutions are so strong, that there is no difference between a charge on the real estate only, and a charge on the real and personal estate too, they are not to be shaken now 485

Whether a charge on land be created by deed or will, whether given by way of portion for a child, or merely as a legacy by collateral relations, or others, if the party dies before the day of payment, it cannot be raised Page 485

The authority of *Jackson v. Farrand*, 2 *Vern.* 424. much weakened by the subsequent resolution in *Carter v. Bletsoe*, 2 *Vern.* 617 486

The true reason why legacies, &c. charged on land, payable at a future day, shall not be raised, if legatee dies before the day of payment, is, that this court governs itself by the rules of the common-law; for there, if *A.* covenants to pay money to *B.* at a future day, and *B.* dies before the day, the money is not due to his representative *ibid.*

Where the Heir shall have the Aid and Benefit of the personal Estate.

A. devises lands to *R. M.* in tail then in mortgage for 1300 *l.* and devised other lands to *T. M.* subject to the payment of his debts, in case his personal estate should not prove sufficient: The 1300 *l.* must be paid as a debt out of the testator's personal estate, and if deficient, out of the real estate so devised to *T. M.* 487

Where a mortgage is made by a person who is owner of the estate, that mortgage is looked upon as a general debt, and the land only as a security; and therefore personal estate shall be applied in discharge; but if the contest lay between *R. M.* and the creditors of the testator, it would be otherwise *ibid.*

See Real Estate.

See Resulting Trusts.

See **Conditions and Limitations.** 382

See **Legacies** under *Of a lapsed Legacy, by the Legatee dying, &c.*

See Creditor and Debtor,

See Catching Bargain.

See Papist.

See Tenant by the Curtesy.

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Husband and Wife.

See **Baron and Feme.**

Infants.

How far favoured in Equity.

AN infant may have a decree upon any matter arising on the state of his case, though not particularly prayed by his bill Page 6

An infant's personal estate turned into real is still considered as personal 480

Where any person enters upon an infant's estate, and continues the possession, the court of Chancery considers him as a guardian, and will decree an account, and to be carried on after the infancy is determined, unless the infant, after being of age, waived such account 489

The court will not appoint a receiver of an infant's estate, where there is no bill filed ibid.

What Acts of Infants are good, void, or voidable.

R. L. devised some land and houses built thereon to his six children; the mother, as guardian to the children, who were all infants, demised the premises on a building lease for 41 years: The eldest son joined in making the lease, and covenanted that the rest of the children, when of age, should confirm it: They all attained 21, and accepted the rent for above-ten years, after the youngest came of age, and then brought their ejectment against the lessee, who, by his bill prays to have his lease established 489

Under the circumstances of the case, and particularly the acceptance of the rent for so long continuance, the court decreed the lease to be established during the residue of the term ibid.

Where a person is of age when he makes a lease, and has nothing in the premises, but they after descend to him, the lease shall enure by way of estoppel, otherwise, if he had been an infant ibid.

An infant is bound in this court by a marriage-contract, especially if she accepts of pin-money, or after the husband's death, a jointure under the contract Page 490

Whatever is sufficient to put a party on an inquiry, is good notice in equity to that party ibid.

See **Guardian.** 480.

See **Devises**, under *Of Devises of Lands for Payment of Debts.* 419.

See **Will.** 631.

See **Plantations.**

See **Marriage.**

See **Injunction.**

Injunction.

In what Cases, and when to be granted.

Where there is a trust, or any thing in the nature of a trust, notwithstanding the ecclesiastical court have an original jurisdiction in legacies, yet this court will grant an injunction 491

The rule of the court now, with regard to legatees, is, that they are not obliged to give security to refund on a deficiency of assets ibid.

Where the husband of an infant institutes a suit in the ecclesiastical court for her legacy, upon the executors bringing a bill, and suggesting this matter to the court of Chancery, an injunction will be continued to the hearing ibid.

Rule as to Injunctions where Plaintiff is a Bankrupt.

See **Bankrupt.** *Anon.* under **Bankruptcy** no Abatement. 263.

Vide title Marriage.

See **Will**, under *The Power of this Court over the Prerogative Court.*

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Insolvent Debtors.

See **Bankrupt**, under *Rule as to the Insolvent Debtors' Act under Commissions of Bankruptcy* Page 255

Jointenants and Tenants in Common.

Joint-executors and residuary legatees put out money upon security, it shall not survive 467. note 1

If there be a jointenancy created by a will, and it happens, by whatever cause, that one of the jointenants is prevented from taking; the whole will vest in the survivor after the testator's death note 1. 495

A testatrix devises two houses to J. P. and J. H. generally, and then says, my meaning is, that the rents of my two houses should be equally shared between J. P. and J. H. The devisees shall take as tenants in common, and not as jointenants 493

J. H. having, on the death of J. P. taken possession of the two houses as survivor, and enjoyed them ever since, *Lord Chancellor* directed him to account for the rents as far back as the death of J. P. and not from the filing of the bill *ibid.*

An ejectment not maintainable by one tenant in common against another, without actual ouster 494

If the statute of Limitations be neither pleaded, nor insisted on by the answer, you cannot have the benefit of such bar; though, if it is a state demand, the court will make use of that statute as a proper rule to go by, and reduce it to a reasonable time *ibid.*

A. devises all the residue of her estate to her two nieces, Mary and Elizabeth, daughters to her nephew William Owen and Anne his wife, whom she desires to be trustees for their children, to take care of their legacies; and then says, *My will is, that my estate be equally divided between Mary and Elizabeth, whom I appoint my executrices accordingly*: One of the nieces died in the life-time of the testatrix, and all the next of kin had small legacies, except one *ibid.*

The devise to the two nieces is not a jointenancy, for the words equally di-

vided, though not annexed to the clause which gives the residue, can relate to that only, and if they had been both living at the death of the testatrix, they would have taken as tenants in common Page 494

Though the words *equally to be divided* in a strict settlement at common law have never been determined, barely of themselves, to make a tenancy in common, yet it has been settled they do so in a will, both with regard to real and personal estate 495

The interest and authority of executors is joint and cannot be divided into distinct powers, but they may be so appointed, as that their authority may commence or determine at different times *ibid.*

The legal interest in a lapsed legacy is in the executor, but the *beneficial* in the next of kin of the testator 496

As an heir does not take real estate by the intention of his ancestor, but by act of law, so with regard to personal, the next of kin take in succession *ab intestato*, and not by the intention of the testator *ibid.*

No person can be a trustee in law, unless he has a vested interest in the thing given *ibid.*

See **Executors and Administrators**. *Partridge v. Powlet*, under *What shall be Assets*.

See **Partition**. 541.

Jointure.

A conveyance to make a jointure ought to be to the wife herself and not to trustees: but this defect may be supplied in equity 563

See **Dower and Jointure**.

Judge.

See under **Bankrupt**. *Lingood*, and under *Rule as to a Certificate from Commissioners to a Judge* 240

Jurisdiction.

See **Plaintations**. 543.

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Landlord and Tenant.

THIS barment of a steward in his lord's court book, with his tenants, is not in evidence of itself, that there is an agreement for a lease between the lord and a tenant. *P.* 497
A performance only on one side is not a dispensation of the statute of Frauds and perjuries, but *quæ omnia* against which there is no provision. 499

Lapsed Legacy.

See *Devices under the Division, Of a lapsed Legacy by Legatees dying, &c.*

See *Jointenants and Tenants in Common.*

Leases.

See *tit. Guardian.* 480.

See *tit. Statute of Frauds, Perjuries, and tit. Tenant in Tail.*

See *Landlord and Tenant* 497.

Legacies.

A condition in a will, that a legatee controverting the will shall forfeit his legacy, is merely *in terrorem*. 404
Specific legacies, See note 1. Purse v. Snaphin 414
This court cannot add a legacy to a will upon parol proof 448
What shall be a satisfaction of a legacy *note 2.* 427

Of vested or lapsed Legacies being to be paid at a future Time, or certain Age, to which the Legatees never arrived.

A testator devises to his daughter *E. H.* 200*l.* to be paid her at the time of marriage, or within three months after, provided she marry with the approbation of my two sons; *E. H.* died after 21, but without being married: A bill brought by her representative for the legacy 500
This, said Lord Chancellor was not vested, for though the clause of consent, as

there is no devise over, might be only *in terrorem*, yet, in all cases where the condition of marrying is annexed, it is necessary there should be a marriage, but not obliged to be with consent.

Page 500 & 502

M. T. being intitled to the reversion of an estate after the death of his wife, devised it to *C. D. and his heirs, so as he should pay to his sister Elizabeth Odes 100*l.* within six months after the reversion came into possession* 502
Elizabeth Odes died in the life-time of the wife, and *Elizabeth's* representative brings the bill against *C. D.* for the 100*l.* The legatee dying before the time for raising the 100*l.* was come, her representative is not entitled, and the bill was therefore dismissed. *ibid.*

Where money is given to be paid out of *real estate*, at a future time, if the person dies before the time, it shall sink in the estate; the same as to personal estate, where the time of payment is annexed to the legacy. 504

Whether a sum of money be given by way of portion, or as a general legacy, if charged upon land, and the party dies before the time, it cannot be raised. *ibid.*

A trust upon lands for raising and paying a sum of money, within six years after the death of the father, to the second son, who died within the time held to be for maintenance only, and not transmissible. 504

Vide Heir and Incestor. 482

Where Legatees shall or shall not, have Interest.

A legacy to a charity generally, from what time it shall carry interest. 356 *note 1*

A. gave 500*l.* to his granddaughter, to be paid at 21, or marriage, and if she die before either contingency, then he devised it over to *B.* A bill brought for interest upon the legacy, and to secure the principal. 505

As it is given over, nothing vests in the granddaughter, and therefore she is neither entitled to interest, nor to have the principal secured. *ibid.*

A specific

A Table of the Principal Matters.

A specifick devise of land shall not contribute upon an average with the heir at law, towards satisfaction of creditors while real assets are sufficient

Page 505

On a settlement before marriage, *a pro-viso*, that if a husband and wife die, leaving issue unprovided for, that then the trustees might enter upon an estate, and take the rents thereof, till they had received 200*l.* for the benefit of such unprovided children, in such manner and proportion, as the survivor of the husband and wife should appoint *ibid.*

The wife survived, and appointed the 200*l.* for a daughter, the plaintiff's wife, being an unprovided child: A bill brought to have the 200*l.* raised: Sir *Joseph Jekyll* decreed the 200*l.* and interest by way of maintenance, from the death of the mother; the defendant appealed from that part which allows interest, and the decree was affirmed *ibid.*

Wherever the words to be raised *by rents and profits* are used in a deed, unless, there are other words to make it annual, the court have always made a liberal construction, in order to obtain the end which the party intended by raising the money, and have allowed a sale

506

The appointment of the 200*l.* being in such manner and proportions as the survivor of father and mother shall think fit, not only include a power of raising it by mortgage or sale, but a certain determinate time for raising it, and as the settlement limits no time for payment of the 200*l.* the father or mother might have made it payable at any time

507

Where a legacy is given by a father to a child, or as a provision, though payable at a future day, yet the child has an immediate right to the interest of the money; *otherwise*, if the legatee be a stranger to the testator *ibid.*

Of specifick and pecuniary Legacies, and here of abating and refunding.

See *Palmer v. Mason*. 505.

A devise of a sum of money in a bag, or of a bond or other security, or of mo-

ney out of a particular security, is a specifick legacy, and shall not abate with pecuniary legatees

Page 508

Where a particular debt is devised, and afterwards recovered by the testator in an adversary way, it is an ademption of the legacy: If voluntarily paid off by the debtor to the testator it is otherwise *ibid.*

Ademption of a Legacy.

See *Devises, Purse v. Snaplin*, under *Of void Devises by Uncertainty in the Description of the Person to take* 414

Sir *Samuel Garth* having, upon his daughter's marriage, given a bond to leave 5000*l.* at his death among her younger children, by will creates a term for years, in trust to apply the rents and profits for maintenance of his daughter's children till 21, and also gives his personal estate in trust, to pay the produce of it to his wife for life, and after her death to pay 1500*l.* to *A.* one of the daughters of his daughter, and 3500*l.* among the other younger children of his daughter, as she shall appoint, and if no appointment, equally between them at 21 or marriage, and declares the legacies shall be in full satisfaction of the bond

509

She must elect to claim under the will, or under the bond; if she claims under the latter, can take no benefit under the former *ibid.*

Where a particular thing is given in discharge of a demand, and the party insists on his demand, he must not only waive that particular thing, but all benefit claimed under the whole will *ibid.*

Lord *Hardwicke* declared he would not extend the construction of devises in satisfaction, further than they had already gone: He decreed the children born after the death of the testator should have their share under the bond

510

A Table of the Principal Matters.

Of a failed Legacy, by Legatees dying in the Life-time of the Testator, and here, in what Cases it shall be good, and vest in another Person to whom it is limited over.

M. C. by her will devised to **G. C.** his heirs, executors, &c. all that her messuage in *Great Lincoln's Inn Fields*, with all her furniture, household stuff, &c. and all her real and personal estate not otherwise disposed of, to the intent that out of the said real and personal estate, her several legacies might be paid Page 510

She then gives to **Thomas Lewis** 2000 *l.* in trust for the use of his daughter **Mary** and he, till she attain the age of 18, or be married, to place out the same at interest, and pay it with the produce thereof to his daughter for her own use, on her attaining the age of 18, or marriage, which should first happen: The 2000 *l.* was by the will directed to be paid to **Thomas Lewis** within one year and a half after the decease of the testatrix *ibid.*

Thomas Lewis died in the life time of the testatrix; **Mary Lewis** half a year after, unmarried, and the bill was brought by the representative of **Mary** to have the 2000 *l.* paid to him: the infant dying before the time of payment to the trustee was come, the legacy is not raiseable for the plaintiff's benefit *ibid.*

A residue directed by a will to be divided among six persons, at the death of testator's wife; two died before her: held by Lord **Talbot** that the interest of the two was a vested one, and transmissible, and depended not on surviving the wife 511

J. S. gives to **R. P.** 300 *l.* to be paid within 3 years after his decease, in trust to put the same out to interest, and to pay the profits thereof to his niece **H.** for her separate use, and after her decease 200 *l.* thereof to her son **T.** and the other 100 *l.* to her son **C.** 512

W. and **T.** both die within the 3 years, yet Sir **Joseph Jekyll** decreed the whole money should be paid, though charged on both funds *ibid.*

Legacy out of personal estate payable, or given at a certain time, and interest in the mean time, is a vested one; otherwise as to legacies out of real estate,

for if legatee dies before the time it come, it sinks into the inheritance: the same construction where a legacy is given out of a mixed fund of real and personal estate at a certain time, or to be paid at a certain time Page 512

If the infant had survived the year and half, tho' the trustee was dead before, she would have been entitled to the legacy, so likewise if she had died after the time aforesaid, and before eighteen, or marriage, her representative would have been entitled *ibid.*

Where a legacy charged on real estate is clearly intended as a portion, the court goes as far as it can to hinder the raising it out of land for the benefit of representatives *ibid.*

See Conditions and Limitations. 373

See Devises, under Where a Devise shall or shall not be in Satisfaction of a Thing done 425.

Legacy vested. See Heir and Successor.

See Injunction. 491.

Limitation, (Statute of).

Rule as to that statute 282
If the statute of Limitation be not pleaded nor insisted upon by the answer, you cannot have the benefit of it 494

Maintenance for Children.

See Legacies 504.

See Marriage 517.

WHERE there is a falling of stock without the neglect of the trustee, he is not liable to make good the deficiency, but is answerable only as far as the value, especially where it was specifick stock 513

Where a father is sufficiently competent, the court will give no direction with regard to an infant's maintenance 515

See Portions, under At what Time they shall be raised.

See Custom of London.

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Marriage.

Conditions in restraint of marriage, See
note 1. Page 381

Where it is clandestine 515.

The want of a sufficient law to restrain clandestine marriages, not only introductive of great mischiefs, but lays courts of judicature under great difficulties 515

The sentence of the ecclesiastical court cannot be reversed in a summary way, but by appeal only to proper judges; nor can a prohibition to that court be granted upon a petition; by *motion* and proper suggestion it may 516

An injunction does not deny, but admits the jurisdiction of the court of common law; and the ground on which it issues is, that they are making use of their jurisdiction contrary to equity *ibid.*

So where a trustee is suing in the ecclesiastical court for payment of *cestui que trust's* legacy into his own hands, or in the case of a portion, where the husband is suing for it *there*, before a settlement is made; this court will, upon the same grounds, restrain them from proceeding *ibid.*

The power of this court over infants, resulted back to them upon the dissolution of the court of wards and liveries, by the statute of the 12 Car. 2. *ibid.*

Though this court cannot, on petition prohibit the ecclesiastical court, yet they will restrain a person who has married a *ward* of this court clandestinely, from proceeding on an excommunication, either against the infant or his guardian 517

Though a ward of the court is married with the consent of his friends, yet there must be an application *here* for an increase of maintenance, and a suit in the ecclesiastical court for that purpose is improper *ibid.*

See Conditions and Limitations. 376

See Agreements, Articles and Covenants.

Master and Servant.

What Remedy they have against each other
518

The plaintiff's son was apprentice to the defendant for seven years, but quitted him on being misused, and on the defendant's proceeding at law on a bond given by the plaintiff, he brings a bill for an injunction, and for the delivery of the bond Page 518

A court of equity has no jurisdiction in matters of this nature, but belongs to justices of peace, and therefore the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs at law and in this court *ibid.*

Misuser of an apprentice is not a foundation for coming into a court of equity; for if an action is brought by a master against the father of an apprentice, for a breach of covenant in quitting his service, if misuser appear, this is no breach *ibid.*

Mesne Profits. 519.

See Occupant.

Money.

Money has no ear-mark; and therefore courts of equity have been cautious how they follow it. It has been said that if money they have done it 519

If you move for an appraisement of money placed in the bank, by order, you must not only have a certificate that the money was paid into the bank, but that it is actually there at the time of the motion 519

Mortgage.

A mortgage of a brew-house with the appurtenances will not carry the utensils, but the things only belonging to out-houses. 477

Whether by a devise of all lands, tenements and hereditaments, a mortgage in fee shall pass note 1. 605

Of cancelled ones.

If a mortgage is found cancelled in the possession of the mortgagee, it is as much a release as cancelling a bond, but

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here must be some deed to re-
the estate in the mortgagor *P.*
520
that will, or will not, pass by it.

See *Fixtures.* 477.

*a. Person who wants to redeem,
do Equity to the Mortgagee before he
be admitted.* 477.

a first incumbrancer by judgment,
kewise a mortgage, though there
other judgment prior to the mort-
yet, if the mortgagee had no
e of it, the court will not direct
of the estate in favour of the
or upon the second judgment,
he will pay off the principal
nterest, both of the first judgment
mortgage *ibid.*

See *Tenant by the Curtesy.*

See *Heir and Ancestor.*

Re exeat Regno.

I writ of *ne exeat regno*, which
is originally confined to state
, is now very properly used in
cases, but then, to induce the
to continue it till the hearing,
plaintiff must shew the debt he de-
s is certain 521

Next of Kin.

*Intenants and Tenants in
Common.*

Note of Hand.

an original note is lost, and a
of it is offered in evidence, you
shew the original note was ge-
, before you will be allowed to
the copy 446

L. I.

Notice.

*Plea of a Purchaser, without Notice, over-
ruled.* 522.

A. devises the estate in question to *B.*
in tail, remainder to *C.* in fee; the
bill brought by the heir of the body
of *B.* for deeds and writings, and pos-
session: The defendants plead that
they are purchasers for a valuable con-
sideration from *C.* and had no notice
of the plaintiff's title *Page* 446
Where the defendants claim under a
conveyance, in which there is an estate-
tail prior to the estate under which
they purchased, it is incumbent on
them to see if that estate is spent, and
therefore the court over-ruled the plea
ibid.

See *Conditions and Limitations, un-
der, Who are to take Advantage of a
Condition, or will be prejudiced by it*
384

See *Fines and Recoveries.*

Oath.

See *Evidence, Witnesses and Proof,*
under, *Of examining Witnesses de bene
esse, &c.* 450.

See *Alien.* 23.

Occupant. 524.

A. Being seised of a church lease to
him and his heirs, during three
lives, by settlement before marriage
limits it to the use of himself for life,
and to his first and every other son in
tail male: A person may take such
estate so granted in fee, determinable
on lives, by way of remainder, as a
special occupant 524
The rule in equity is the same as at law,
as trespass will not lie for *mesne profits*,
till possession recovered, so neither
can a bill be brought for an account
thereof till then 525
An executor is not compellable here, or
at law, to take advantage of the sta-
tute of Limitations 526

Z z

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Office.

See under *Bankrupt, Butler and Pur-*
nel. 210 & 215.

Papist.

A BILL, to discover whether *A.* un-
der whose will the defendant claim-
ed, was a papist at the time of a pur-
chase made by *A.* of the estate from
the plaintiff's ancestor; the defendant
pleads as to the discovery the statute
of the 11 & 12 *W.* 3. by which, if *A.*
was a papist, she was disabled to take

Page 526

The court said, under the rule, a man is
not obliged to accuse himself, is im-
plied, that he is not to discover a disa-
bility in himself; and as *A.* would not
have been obliged to discover, the de-
fendant, who claims under the same
title, is intitled to the same privileges
and takes the estate under the same
circumstances: *The plea allowed* 526

The bill seeks a discovery whether one
Southcote was not a person professing
the Popish religion before he conveyed
the freehold and copyhold estates to
the defendant, in the bill mentioned,
as a purchaser thereof 528

A plea of the statute of the 11 & 12 *W.*
3. for preventing the growth of popery
so far as it goes to the discovery,
whether *Southcote* was a papist, *allowed*
ibid.

Penal laws are not to be construed accord-
ing to rules of equity 537

A devisee from a papist, by reason of the
penal law which would affect him, from
the incapacity in the deviser to devise
is not compelled to discover whether
the deviser was a papist 538

The rule of law is, that a man shall not
be obliged to discover what *may* subject
him to a penalty, not what *must* only
539

The defendant *Morland's* plea to the
discovery of the title deeds, disallow-
ed *ibid.*

Every heir at law has a right to inquire
by what means, and under what deed
he is disinherited, and a plea therefore
to *such discovery* will not be allowed
ibid.

An heir before he has established his
claim at law, may come here to remove
him out of the way, which would pre-
vent his recovering there, and may also
come here for the production and inspec-
tion of deeds and writings *Page*

Paraphernalia.

See *Dower and Jointure.*

Parental Influence. 100

Parol Agreement.

See *Partition.*

Parol Evidence.

See *Custom of London.* 46

Parson.

See *Bankrupt, ex parte Mymot.* 19

Parties.

See *Will.* 209

Partition.

Mary and Susan Jackson, the daughter
and co-heirs of *James Jackson*, being
seised in fee of certain lands, the for-
mer married *Thomas Ingram*, and the
latter *William Rittle*, and by a mutual
agreement between their husbands
in 1686, a partition was made of the sa-
id premises between them and the hei-
resses of *Mary and Susan*, by which each
of them agreed to take one part there-
of which they did, and entered into pos-
session, and *Susan* now holds such
her said premises by virtue of the pa-
rtition, and *Mary* enjoyed her part
until her death, and being at the time of
partition somewhat larger than *Susan*
Mary, in consideration thereof, paid
the taxes and levies charged upon both

The husbands are both dead, and the bill
is brought against *Susan Rittle* to con-
firm the division of the said estate: The
agreement of the husbands could not
be

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heritance of the wives, nor enjoyment under it of any as it had been originally the of the wives, but *Susan Rittle* to the enjoyment of the ts of the said premises, that held in fealty; it was at the plaintiff and defend- l take in fealty accord-

Page 542

ment for an equality of par- ong standing by persons who t to contract, and acknow- ll the parties to have been agreement, and accordingly cution, will be established urt

542

it upon equality of partition per to accept of a contingent advantage, where one moiety ds is of superior value to it will not vacate the agree-

ibid.

Partners.

3, 184. 225. 227.

Personal Estate.

See **Rents.**

See **Real Estate.**

Pinn-Money.

iron and feme. 269

Plantations.

as no jurisdiction over lands *Topber's*, and a demurrer will l brought here, for the deli- ssession of lands there 544 plantations are no more un- risdiction of this court than *olland*

ibid.

ay bring a bill for an account d profits against a person who ession after the death of the ceftor

ibid.

or want of jurisdiction is ind improper; a defendant ad to the jurisdiction *ibid.* originally members of *Eng-* subject to the laws thereof,

unless in some customs, which they have a power of making *Page 544*

Plea.

See **Alien.**

See **Assumps, Pleas, and Demurrers.**

See **Prisist.**

See **Purchase, under Purchasers without Notice.**

See **Will for Discovery.**

Policy of Insurance.

If a policy of insurance differs from the label, which is the memorandum or minutes of the agreement, it shall be made agreeable to the label 545

It is not a sufficient ground for coming into a court of equity, that an insurance is in the name of a trustee, unless he refuses the *cestui que trust* his name in an action at law 547

If a ship is decayed, and goes to the nearest place, it is the same as if repaired at the place from whence the voyage was to commence, and no deviation *ibid.*

Where there are the words *at and from* a place to *England*, first arrival of the ship is implied, and always understood in policies 548

An agent for the owner of a ship, when he fetches the policy is not obliged to compare it with the label *ibid.*

Portions.

What shall be a satisfaction of a portion note 2 427

At what Time Portions shall be raised or Re- versionary Estates, or Terms sold for that Purpose.

Where there is a term for years for raising daughters' portions, payable at a certain time, and a vested interest, they shall not stay till the death of father

Z z z

and

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and mother; but the court will lay hold of the slightest circumstance in a settlement, that shews an intention to postpone the raising them in the life of the father and mother *Page* 549

Directing a gross sum to be raised, does not imply that it shall be raised at once, for it may be raised out of the rents and profits, and so laid up till it amounts to that sum 550

The court lays great stress upon a particular time being appointed for the payment of a portion, and has enlarged the power of trustees to raise it within the time 551

Where there is a power to charge an estate with a gross sum, it implies a power to charge an estate with interest likewise 552

The principal of a portion to be paid to sons at 21, to daughters at 21 or marriage, with interest at five *per cent per ann.* from the death of the father, to the payment thereof: The interest ought not to accumulate till the portions are payable, but to be paid annually, for it is given as a recompence in the mean time, till the principal becomes due 553

Whether a portion charged on land, be given with or without interest, by deed or by will, if the person dies before it becomes payable, it shall sink in the estate 555

The case of *Cave v. Cave*, 2 *Vern.* 508. is intirely mistaken by the reporter, for as it is stated in the Register, which was searched by *Lord Chancellor's* order it is impossible there could be that question in the cause, which the book states 556

A portion given to one, payable at a certain age, and if he dies, limited over to another, without mentioning any age, if the first dies before the time of payment, it vests in the second immediately *ibid.*

Jackon v. Farrand, 2 *Vern.* 424, is an anomalous case, and in the cause of *Cotton v. Cotton*, *Lord Chancellor* declared he should lay no stress upon it *ibid.*

Where there is a power of charging interest, it shall be considered as maintenance, for giving interest is the same thing as giving express maintenance 3 *ibid.*

If a younger brother has a provision under a settlement, and lives with elder, whose estate is charged with portion, he shall have an allowance for his maintenance out of the income due *Page*

Rule as to the Consideration.

See under *Bankrupt, Marib*, and under *The Construction of the Statute of the Jac. 1. with respect to Bankrupt's Session of Goods after Assignment*

Power.

Under a power of appointment to, of the testator's children as, &c. exclusive appointment to one is good

Where property is settled upon husband and wife for their lives, remainder to the children, in such manner as husband should appoint, and if children, then to his executors, In default of appointment, the wife will vest in the children 426,

A bare naked power is not barred by the statutes of fines

Whether well executed or not.

J. C. by will devises the produce of 10 *S. S.* Stock to *F. C.* for life, and gives him a power to dispose of 400*l.* thereof, by any writing signed in the presence of three witnesses, and if he made no appointment, the 400*l.* was given over to a charity: *F. C.* in his will, gave several legacies, then devises the residue of his personal estate among his nearest relations; to be no execution of the power, that the 400*l.* did not pass by the will of the residue

Parol evidence not allowed to prove *C.'s* intent to dispose of the 400*l.*

A person may execute a power, without reciting it, but necessary he should mention the estate which he disposes of

Freehold lands will only pass by will of all his lands, and not by

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unless testator has nothing but copyhold: *Leasehold*, if there are no other will pass by the words *Lands and Tenements* Page 560

Of the Right Execution of a Power, and where the Defect of it will be supplied.

It was agreed, in consideration of 5000*l.* of the portion paid to the father of the defendant, on his marriage, that he should be put into immediate possession of part of the estate; and as to the remainder, it was to be settled on the father for life, with a power for him to make a jointure of such of the lands as he thought proper, not exceeding 600*l. per ann.* remainder to the son in tail, remainder over, and the settlement was made accordingly 561

By deed of the 5th of May 1725, *Hervey* the father, before his marriage with the plaintiff his second wife, conveys an estate of 900*l. per ann.* to trustees, in trust to pay 200*l.* clear, as pin-money to the intended wife, and if she survives him, to pay her 300*l. per ann.* rent-charge for her jointure *ibid.*

After marriage, he, by a second deed, gives her another 300*l. per annum* clear, as a further provision by way of jointure 561

By a deed of the 15th of January 1731, as a further provision for the wife, and in execution of the power, he conveys all the said premises to the same trustees to raise the further sum of 100*l.* for pin-money, and the neat sum of 600*l. per ann.* as a provision for her in case she survives her husband, in bar of all other provisions before made; and in this deed is the following declaratory clause; It is hereby declared and agreed, by and between, &c. that it is the intention of this deed, and of the preceding ones, to secure a jointure to his then wife, not exceeding 600*l. per ann.* 562

The plaintiff having survived her husband, brings her bill against his son, and the trustees under the several deeds, to have the benefit of these provisions, all or some of them: The defendant and the trustees were decreed to convey to the plaintiff a jointure, not exceeding 600*l. per ann.* but to be made liable

to taxes, repairs, &c. and to hold and enjoy the same against the defendant, &c. during her life Page 562

A conveyance to make a jointure ought to be to the wife herself, and not to trustees 563

A court of equity will supply a defective execution of a power, as well in the case of younger children and a provision for a wife, as in favour of purchasers or creditors *ibid.*

Lord Chancellor, on a rehearing, still continuing of his former opinion, confirmed his decree *in toto* 564

In aiding the defective execution of a power, either for a wife or child, it's being intended for a provision, whether voluntary or not, will intitle this court to carry it into execution, in aid of a wife or child, though defectively made 567

That a wife or child, who come for the aid of this court, to supply a defective execution of a power, must be totally unprovided for, is not the right rule; but that a husband or father are the proper judges what is a reasonable provision, is a good and invariable rule 568

As the plaintiff has not the provision stipulated for her, she must be considered as totally unprovided for, and therefore, according to the rules of equity, intitled to be aided in carrying a defective provision into execution 569

Suppose there has been an excess in the execution of a power, as where a man leases for 40 years who could only do it for 21, this is void only for the surplus, and good within the limits of the power *ibid.*

See *Charity*. 356.

See *Dower and Jointure*. 440

Process.

See *Arrest*. 55.

Prochein Amy.

A *prochein amy* need not be a relation, but must be a person of substance because liable to costs 570

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Prohibition.

See Marriage. Page 515.

Purchase and Purchasers.

Vide tit. Mendoza and Mendee.

Vide tit. Notice.

Purchaser pendente lite. 89

A purchaser decreed to pay the costs and expences of a surrender of, and admission to copyhold premises 96. n. 1.

Of Purchasers without Notice. 571.

A man who purchases for a valuable consideration, with notice of a voluntary settlement, from a person who bought without notice, shall shelter himself under the first purchaser *ibid.*

A man cannot defend himself in this court as a purchaser for a valuable consideration, under *articles only ibid.*

Where defendants plead a former suit, that the court implied there was no title when they dismissed the bill, is not sufficient, they must shew it was *res judicata* *ibid.*

A tenant in tail out of possession, cannot bring a bill to perpetuate testimony till he has recovered possession by ejectment *ibid.*

A bill dropped for want of prosecution, is never to be pleaded as a decree of dismissal in bar to another bill *ibid.*

A fine levied by a termor for years is a forfeiture; but the reversioner has five years after the expiration of the term to enter *ibid.*

New assignees under a commission of bankruptcy, on filing a supplemental bill, shall have the benefit of the proceedings in the suit commenced by the old assignees *ibid.*

A purchaser of an estate, after it has been in controversy in this court, on filing his supplemental bill, comes here *pro bono et malo*, and is liable to all costs from the beginning to the end of the suit. 5-2

572

*Whether Lands purchased after a Will
by it.*

If a man covenants to lay out a sum of money in the purchase of lands, and devises his real estate before he has made such purchase, the money so laid out will pass to the devisee.

Where a person contracts for a purchase of lands after a will made, they do not pass thereby, but descend to the heir at law

Where after making a will a person agrees for the purchase of particular lands, if a good title cannot be made as the heir at law cannot have the land he shall not have the money intended to be laid out ib.

See Agreements, Articles, and Covenants. 11.

See Bankrupt, under Rule as to Assign-
89.

Real Estate.

See ~~Her~~ and Ancestor.

*Where the Personal shall not be applied
Exoneration.*

H. L. the plaintiff's father, being seised in fee of several lands, devises the same to his wife for life, and then to his first-born son, *Robert* and his heirs, and gives to the plaintiff a legacy of 150*l.* to be paid her in a twelve month's time after *Robert* should come to enjoy the premises; and if *Robert* died before his mother, then, that *Henry*, another son, coming to the possession thereof, as surviving his mother, should pay the plaintiff 200*l.*

Robert and Henry died before the mother, but Robert left a son, against whom bill is brought for the legacy: A decree for the legacy at the Rolls, with interest at 4 l. per cent. from a year after the death of the mother, and an appeal to Lord Chancellor the decree was affirmed.

Conditions

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Conditions in wills are often construed so, from the nature of the thing itself, where the words merely of themselves are not conditional *Page 574*

Though a legacy is not expressly said to be paid out of an estate, nor by whom, yet it has been considered as a charge thereon, where the general intent of the testator has appeared *575*

A condition will bind the heir, if the devise so takes effects as that he must claim under the ancestor, as much as if the ancestor had been in possession *ibid.*

The 10,000*l.* charged by Lord Bingley, on the term 1000 years shall not be paid out of his personal estate, but the land on which it was originally charged must bear the burthen of it. *ibid.*

Receiver.

See tit. *Infant.* 48.

Rule as to appointing him.

The court will not appoint a receiver of an infant's estate where there is no bill filed *578*

Recoveries.

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See *Fines and Recoveries.* 473.

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See *Exposition of Words.* 469.

Remainder.

A remainder over shall take effect notwithstanding the condition annexed to the preceding estate, and on which the remainder is limited, should never arise or be performed *424. n. 2.*

A. devises lands to his wife for life, and after her decease to his son and daughter, *John* and *Margaret*, to be equally divided between them, and the several

issues of their bodies, and for want of such issue, to his wife in fee *Page 579*

This will not create a cross remainder, which can only be raised by an implication absolutely necessary, which is not the case here, for the words *several* and *respective*, effectually disjoin the title *ibid.*

Cross remainders have never in any case been adjudged to arise merely upon these words, *In default of such issue* *580. note 1*

J. H. devised his real estate to trustees and their heirs, to the use of them and their heirs, upon several trusts therein after mentioned *581*

These words, said *Lord Chancellor*, are declaratory of his intention, that the legal estate so given, should be used to support all the trusts and limitations after declared; part of which were to the after-born sons of *J. H.* and made such a construction as supported the intention, being of opinion it was not inconsistent with the rules of law and equity *ibid.*

Though contingent remainders by law must vest during or at the instant the particular estate determines, yet it does not hold in the case of trusts: The ground the law goes upon is, that a freehold cannot be in *abeyance*, because there must be a tenant of the freehold to perform services, and answer all writs concerning the realty, but this objection is obviated in the case of an equitable estate, because the trustee is considered as the tenant of the freehold to perform services, &c. *590*

Where there are ever so many contingent limitations of a trust, it is sufficient to bring the trustees only before the court together with him in whom the first remainder in the inheritance is vested *ibid.*

The statute of uses was made to execute and bring the state to the use; and after the statute, the *cessuque use* was seized of the use at law, as before he was of the use in equity, but the necessities of mankind have obliged judges to give way to uses notwithstanding *591*

Contingent uses, springing uses, executory devises, &c. were foreign to the notions of the Common-law, but were let in by construction

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construction by judges themselves, upon *usis*, after they became legal estates

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Courts of equity have given the same power to *cestuique trust*, as to alienations, as if it was an use executed; his *fine* therefore, if tenant in bail, bars his issue, and his *recovery*, remainders over *ibid.*

Upon a trust in equity, no estate can be gained by wrong, as there might of a legal estate; therefore on a trust in equity no estate can be gained by *disseisin*, *abatement*, or *intrusion* *ibid.*

There are many instances where there would be mergers of legal estates, and yet courts of equity have never suffered mergers of trusts 592

Uses executed, and mere trusts stand on different foundations, and will not be governed by the same reasoning *ibid.*

Where a trust is in its nature executory, it is incumbent on the court to follow the intention of the parties, as far as the rules of law will admit 593

Where the court makes use of the words strict settlement in an order, it implies a direction to the master to have trustees to preserve contingent remainders inserted *ibid.*

However improperly a will is penned, if the testator intended a *strict settlement*, the court will direct accordingly *ibid.*

All trusts are executory, and whether a conveyance be directed or not, the court must decree one, when asked at a proper time 594

The legal estate in trustees will support contingent remainders over of a trust declared by will, where no conveyance is directed *ibid.*

Where an estate is limited to the ancestor for life, and afterwards to the heirs males of his body, the estates are connected, and make an estate tail in the ancestor, where it is by the same conveyance: The same has been held where it did not arise by the same conveyance, but by way of resulting use 595

Lord Chancellor inclined to think that the resulting trust of a freehold, to support contingent remainders of a trust, might connect in the same manner with the limitation in tail, though not created together with it *ibid.*

In a limitation to support contingent remainders it is not material to restrain it to the life of tenant for life of the land, provided it be restrained to the life of a person in being Page 596
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A bill may be brought for rent where the remedy at law is lost, or very difficult, and this court will relieve on the foundation of payment for a length of time *ibid.*

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Tenant for life of goods is not obliged
to give security for the goods, but to
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Tenant by the Curtesy.

A. Seised in fee of a freehold estate, mortgages it, and afterwards she intermarries with *B.* *A.* dies, and the mortgage is not redeemed during the coverture Page 603

This is notwithstanding such a seisin in the wife, as intitles the husband to be tenant by the curtesy of the mortgaged premises, for in this court, said *Lord Chancellor*, the land is considered only as a pledge or security for the money, and does not alter the possession of the mortgagor *ibid.*

An equity of redemption may be devised, granted, or entailed, and such entail may be barred by fine and recovery, and the person intitled to it is the owner of the land, and a mortgage in fee is considered as personal assets 605

If a testator, after devising all his lands, tenements, and hereditaments, forecloses an equity of redemption on a mortgage made to him in fee, such estate will not pass by these general words of lands, &c. because a foreclosure is considered as a purchase *ibid.*

A mortgage in fee, made after a devise of the estate, is in law a total revocation; in equity *pro tanto* only 606

A husband shall be tenant by the curtesy of the *equitable* estate of the wife *ibid.*

An heir at law can oblige a tenant by the curtesy to keep down interest, as much as any other tenant for life *ibid.*

Sir *T. N.* by will directs his trustees to convey a full fourth part of all his freehold lands, &c. to the use of his daughter *Priscilla* for life, and so as she alone, or such person as she shall appoint take and receive the rents and profits thereof, and so as her husband is not to intermeddle therewith, and from and after her decease, in trust for the heirs of the body of the said *Priscilla* for ever 607

This being an executory trust, the wife took an estate for life only, and the husband therefore not intitled to be tenant by the curtesy *ibid.*

In the case of a trust estate for payment of debts, or in the case of an equity of redemption, a husband may be tenant

by the curtesy of an estate devised to the wife for her separate use P. 609
Where a trust is executory, and to be carried into execution by this court, they will direct a conveyance of lands, notwithstanding they are gavelkind, to be made according to the rule of common law *ibid.*

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If tenant in tail make a lease not warranted by the statute, and suffer a recovery, it lets in the lease: the same as to a judgment, bond, or statute 9

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Issues directed by this court to try a *modus*, though established by two verdicts, the plaintiff intitled to his costs at law only, and not in equity 610

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If the court of chancery retain bills, where it is a legal demand, they must judge upon the facts relating to such demand, and, unless doubtful, will not turn the parties over to a trial at law 612

If a person on whom a bill of exchange is drawn, says in a letter to a drawer, it shall be duly honoured and placed to your debit, this is an acceptance, and will make him liable, for a parol acceptance has been held to be good, and so determined in a case made for the

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A trustee has as much the benefit of the pleading of this court, as *cestui que trust* 450
The court will not compel trustees to join in a sale, which will not only destroy contingent remainders, but all the uses in a marriage-settlement; for whatever the old action was, said Lord Chancellor, in regard to such trustees, it is now held that they are guilty of a breach of trust in joining to destroy contingent remainders, whether the settlement be voluntary, for a valuable consideration, or by will 614
By settlement before marriage it was agreed, that 2000*l.* in the hands of a trustee should be laid out in land, to the use of the husband for life, then to the wife for life, for her jointure, and to the children equally; and in case the husband died without issue, to the wife in fee; and if he survived, to him in fee 615
The husband and wife being necessitous, the trustee paid them 600*l.* on a release, and their joint bond of indemnity, and afterwards 400*l.* more on the like bond, and a new agreement that the remaining 1000*l.* should be laid out in the purchase of an annuity for the separate use of the wife during the coverture, and in fee in case of survivorship ibid.
The trustee afterwards paid the husband this 1000*l.* likewise; he died without issue, and left the wife destitute: A bill brought against the representative of the trustee for this breach of trust, and to be paid what shall be due to the wife for the 2000*l.* out of his personal estate ibid.

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In *Marb* 1738, the Master of the Rolls directed that the wife should be paid what should be remaining due to her for the 2000*l.* and interest, out of the trustee's personal estate, in a course of administration Page 593

Upon appeal to Lord Chancellor, he recommended it to the parties, from the hardship on one side, and the dangerous consequences on the other, to find out a third way of moderating the affair 615

The agreement afterwards of the executrix of the trustee, to pay the wife of the *cestui que trust* an annuity of 100*l.* quarterly, during her life, tax-free, from *Lady day*, 1737, and the costs of the suit, made an order of the court ibid.

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Of Resulting Trusts, and Trusts by Implication.

Where an estate is purchased in the name of one, and the money paid by another, it is a trust notwithstanding there is no declaration in writing 59

In the case of voluntary settlements and wills, if there is no declaration of the trusts of a term, it results to the donor; otherwise where it is a settlement for a valuable consideration 191

Tho' there be no express trust in a deed yet if it may be collected from circumstances arising out of the deed itself inconsistent with an absolute conveyance; parole evidence may be admitted to prove a trust for the grantor 417

R. S. incumbent of the rectory of B. devises his perpetual advowson, donation and patronage of the parish church of B. and all glebe lands, profits, and appurtenances to the same belonging, to G. S. willing and desiring her to sell and dispose of the same to *Eaton College*, and on their refusal, to *Trinity College, Oxford*, and on the refusal of both these societies, to any of the colleges in *Oxford* or *Cambridge*, who will be the best purchaser ibid.

There is in this case no resulting trust of the advowson of B. to the heirs

at law of the testator, but a devise of the beneficial interest therein to G. S. with an injunction only to sell to particular societies Page 618

The general rule, that where lands are devised for a particular purpose, what remains after that purpose is satisfied, results, admits of several exceptions 619

There can be no constructive trust, but where the intent of the testator is apparent, here *willing and desiring* G. S. to sell, &c. are more properly words of injunction than trust ibid.

Where a real estate is devised to be sold for payment of debts, and no more said, there it is clearly a resulting trust 620

The devisee in this case, and not the heir at law, intitled to present on the avoidance that happens by the death of the testator ibid.

W. H. by will devises the perpetual advowson of S. to W. C. &c. upon trust to present his son W. to this living, and that after the church shall, next after his death, be full of an incumbent, then to sell the perpetuity, and to apply the profit arising from the sale, first, for the payment of debts, and the overplus he distributes in thirds to his daughters 621

The trustees presented W. the son, who died before the advowson was sold, leaving a daughter an infant, who by her next friend brings her bill, insisting, after debts and legacies paid, there is a resulting trust to the heir at law of the testator in the advowson ibid.

Lord Chancellor was of opinion, the whole legal estate was devised away, and that there was no resulting trust for the heir at law ibid.

At common-law, where an estate is devised to trustees and their heirs, the whole is gone from the heir, but in equity there may be a beneficial interest remaining to the heir upon the trust 622

A certain rule in equity, that where an estate is charged with an incumbrance, or payment of creditors, and after such charge or payment, the surplus is given over, the whole property vests in the residuary legatee ibid.

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The right of the heir to the equity of redemption of an estate, though debts and legacies will exhaust the whole, is not founded upon his election to redeem or submit to a sale, but upon the ownership he has of the estate *P.*

622

If *A.* seised of an advowson, be also incumbent, and devises it, the devisee, on his death, is intitled to nominate

623

If the ownership and property of the advowson be in devisees, that they, and not the heir at law, nominate, is a consequence of such ownership: Nor will it make any difference, whether the devisee has the advowson in him as a personalty, or a realty *ibid.*

Trustees postponing, or accelerating the sale of estates devised to them, will make no alteration in favour of the heir, to the prejudice of the *cestui que trust* *ibid.*

Of Trusts to attend the Inheritance.

In the case of a settlement for a valuable consideration, if there be a term created, and no trusts declared thereof, it will attend the uses of the settlement, and will not result to the grantor, *Brown v. Jones* 188

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Voluntary Deed.

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The Effect thereof.

The court will not decree a voluntary conveyance to be delivered up to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless obtained by fraud *Page* 625

A voluntary deed, kept by a person, and never cancelled, will not be set aside by a subsequent will *ibid.* See the note thereto

A father, by settlement, grants to his five daughters 4000*l.* a piece, but to provide against the event of the residue's being of greater value, binds himself in 25,000*l.* to secure the surplus over and above the 20,000*l.* This must be considered in the nature of a bond to the daughters, and will take place against all voluntary claimants; otherwise, as to creditors for a valuable consideration 626

Uses.

With respect to the effect of a subsequent declaration of uses in altering the prior uses, see title **Agreements**, and *Stapleton v. Stapleton* 2

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WHETHER a devise of the rents and profits of an estate to *A.* for life *sans waste*, empowers him to commit waste Page 467 note 1

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A subsequent will cannot set aside a prior voluntary deed 625 and note

The Power of this Court over the Prerogative Court.

Where a person is sole devisee of the real estate, and one of the witnesses to the will resides altogether abroad, upon a commission granted to examine such witness, the court will at the same time, make an order that the original will be delivered out by the proper officer of the prerogative court, to a person to be named by the party praying the commission, that it may be carried out of the kingdom; he first giving security, to be approved by the judge of the prerogative court, to return the same 627

The court of Chancery, where necessary, will make an order upon the prerogative office to deliver a will to the register's office in *Sydney's Inn*, and to lie there till the court of Chancery has no further occasion for it 628

The court of Chancery, upon motion, ordered the prerogative office to deliver a will to be proved in *Chancery*.

shire, under a commission from the court of Chancery, and would not suffer an officer of the prerogative court to attend the execution of the commission. Page 628

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A bill for a perpetual injunction to stay proceedings in the prerogative court for controverting the will and codicils of *John, Duke of Buckinghamshire*, after the determinations already had; the injunction before granted made perpetual ibi. l.

An admission by a party concerned in matters of fact is stronger than if it had been determined by a jury, and facts are as properly concluded by admission as by trial 629

Where parties are dissatisfied with a probate, this court will suspend their determination, till a trial has been had of the validity in a proper court 630

This court cannot determine the validity of a probate adversely; but if it comes here incidentally, and that incident is admitted, they determine it, and hold the parties bound by their admission ibi. d.

There is no difference between parties admitting things proper to be determined by the court in which the admission is made, and admission of things cognizable in another court, but they are equally bound 630

An infant, *unless new matter, or fraud, or collusion appears*, is bound by a decree made for his benefit; and, with respect to personal estate, except for the causes before mentioned, the parol never demurs 631

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